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Demographic Change and Progressive Political Strategy in Spain

Demographic Change and Progressive Political Strategy in Spain

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Report on demographic change and progressive political strategy in Spain by Matt Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy Teixeira.
Report on demographic change and progressive political strategy in Spain by Matt Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy Teixeira.

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Categories:Types, Research, History
Published by: Center for American Progress on Apr 03, 2011
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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11/03/2012

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Demographic Change and ProgressivePolitical Strategy in Spain
1
Ferran Martínez i Coma April 2011
 
Te “Demographic Change and Progressive Poliical Sraegy” series o papers is a join projec organizedunder he auspices o he Global Progress and Progressive Sudies programs and he Cener or AmericanProgress. Te research projec was launched ollowing he inaugural Global Progress conerence held inOcober 2009 in Madrid, Spain.Te preparaory paper or ha conerence, “Te European Paradox ,” sough o analyze why he orunes o European progressive paries had declined ollowing he previous auumn’s sudden nancial collapse andhe global economic recession ha ensued. Te saring premise was ha progressives should, in principle,have had wo srenghs going or hem:
•
Modernizing rends were shiing he demographic errain in heir poliical avor.
•
Te inellecual and policy bankrupcy o conservaism, which had now proven isel devoid o creaiveideas o how o shape he global economic sysem or he common good.Despie hese laen advanages, we surmised ha progressives in Europe were sruggling or hree pri-mary reasons. Firs, i was increasingly hard o diereniae hemselves rom conservaive opponens whoseemed o be wholehearedly adoping social democraic policies and language in response o he eco-nomic crisis. Second, he nominally progressive majoriy wihin heir elecorae was being spli beweencompeing progressive movemens. Tird, heir radiional working-class base was increasingly beingseduced by a poliics o ideniy raher han economic argumens.In response, we argued ha i progressives could dene heir long-erm economic agenda more clearly—and hus diereniae hemselves rom conservaives—as well as esablish broader and more inclusiveelecoral coaliions, and organize more eecively among heir core consiuencies o convey heir mes-sage, hen hey should be able o resolve his paradox.Te research papers in his series each evaluae hese demographic and ideological rends in greaernaional deail and presen ideas or how progressives migh shape a more eecive poliical sraegy.We are graeul o he Friedrich-Eber-Siung or heir suppor o his projec.Mat Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy eixeira

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