Regaining the Right to Speak

Challenges of the Hungarian Center-Left After Losing Power

Amid a Shrinking Support Base

Viktor Szigetvári  April 2011

The “Demographic Change and Progressive Political Strategy” series of papers is a joint project organized
under the auspices of the Global Progress and Progressive Studies programs and the Center for American
Progress. The research project was launched following the inaugural Global Progress conference held in
October 2009 in Madrid, Spain.

The preparatory paper for that conference, “The European Paradox,” sought to analyze why the fortunes of
European progressive parties had declined following the previous autumn’s sudden financial collapse and
the global economic recession that ensued. The starting premise was that progressives should, in principle,
have had two strengths going for them:

• Modernizing trends were shifting the demographic terrain in their political favor.
• The intellectual and policy bankruptcy of conservatism, which had now proven itself devoid of creative
ideas of how to shape the global economic system for the common good.

Despite these latent advantages, we surmised that progressives in Europe were struggling for three pri-
mary reasons. First, it was increasingly hard to differentiate themselves from conservative opponents who
seemed to be wholeheartedly adopting social democratic policies and language in response to the eco-
nomic crisis. Second, the nominally progressive majority within their electorate was being split between
competing progressive movements. Third, their traditional working-class base was increasingly being
seduced by a politics of identity rather than economic arguments.

In response, we argued that if progressives could define their long-term economic agenda more clearly—
and thus differentiate themselves from conservatives—as well as establish broader and more inclusive
electoral coalitions, and organize more effectively among their core constituencies to convey their mes-
sage, then they should be able to resolve this paradox.

The research papers in this series each evaluate these demographic and ideological trends in greater
national detail and present ideas for how progressives might shape a more effective political strategy.

We are grateful to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for their support of this project.

Matt Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy Teixeira

Contents 1 Introduction and Summary

4 Recent election results and the current situation in Hungary

9 Demography and the shifting coalitions of the center-left

in Hungary

25 The new progressive coalition of voters in Hungary

29 The framework of a new progressive vision in Hungary

32 Endnotes

33 About the author

Introduction and Summary

In this paper, we try to give a detailed picture of the Hungarian political system and
situation, showing the position of center-left parties in different parts of our soci-
ety.1 After providing a detailed but still focused analysis of the structure of support
of the Hungarian left, we then try to create a framework for the future of the move-
ment including electoral coalitions, political narratives, ideology, and policy goals.

One distinctive aspect of the Hungarian situation is that race and immigration
are non-issues. But the social conflicts of cohabitation with the gypsy (roma)
minority “substitute” for the problems of immigration and social integration in
Western countries. There is an important difference, too: Roma people are so
volatile, unpredictable, and non-participatory that they can be hardly considered
as subjects of an electoral strategy of any political movement. Still as citizens to be
integrated into our society and sometimes sufferers of local social conflicts with
the non-roma population, they must be addressed by policy and politics.

Based on our analysis in this paper, we can offer the following observations and
future policy prescriptions:

• The solid institutional framework of the democratic era alongside the pre-
transition “premature welfare state” of the socialist era and the successes of
the governments of the 1990s in Hungary created a relatively successful social
transition and a political integration into supranational organizations such as
the European Union.

• Yet the still existing and disproportionately generous welfare state, the deep
poverty in certain groups of our society, the loss of illusions after 20 years of
democracy and capitalism, the closing channels of social mobility, and the real
wage decreases of recent years result in a society today where the perceived
inequalities are much higher than the real inequalities and the sense of subjec-
tive deprivation is far bigger than real poverty.

1  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

• Although the upper-middle class is getting stronger and the social divisions
among other parts of the society are smaller than before, there is still a signifi-
cant portion of Hungarian society that is getting more and more segregated. In
this group the roma minority is over-represented, and the conflicts of cohabita-
tion with them are affecting everyday life for both the minority and the majority
of our society in many ways.

• The recently ousted socialist government was the first to govern the county for
eight consecutive years since the transition from Communist rule. The failed
reforms of the government due to unpreparedness and obstruction of the opposi-
tion parties, the incompetence and ignorance showed in power toward certain
old and new social problems, the institutionalized corruption of big parties on the
macro level, and the continuing lack of transparency on the micro level of the soci-
ety plus the economic downturn of recent years were the main causes of this defeat.

• While losing power the Hungarian center-left and the Hungarian Socialist Party,
or HSP (MSZP in Hungarian), basically lost 50 percent to 65 percent of its sup-
port among most major social groups. And among less-educated people, inhab-
itants of the rural areas of the country, those younger than 45 years old, and
those inhabitants of areas where poverty is combined with local ethnic conflicts
the Hungarian center-left suffered even bigger losses.

• For different reasons immigration, race, secularism, class, gender, and marital
status don’t seem to be defining factors in support for the Hungarian center-left
parties. Age groups, size of area, and the level of education are more relevant
factors influencing political support in Hungary.

• Without knowing the new system of parliamentary election for a smaller

parliament it would be premature to define an organizational framework for
a new center-left strategy. A more majoritarian system would require a single
party to integrate all the social groups that might support progressive change,
but a more proportional system would require a new coalition of different
movements and parties.

• The new governing party when in opposition capitalized on dissatisfaction in all

groups of society, without providing a real and feasible solution to current prob-
lems. But they were able to build a strong protest campaign against the center-
left parties and politicians. This was supported by a narrative-making machine
from the right wing’s populist media empire that just heated up the debate and
political protest against the government.

2  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

• Now in power, the right wing is still capitalizing on the anti-establishment
sentiments of different groups of Hungarian society—and here the establish-
ment and old status quo is the center-left and mainly the HSP. The government
follows a strange mix of antibusiness but pro-upper-middle-class social policies
combined with actions that are damaging the democratic system of Hungary
and limiting the effects of the system of checks and balances.

• Before anything else, the main task of the Hungarian center-left in order to
become electable again is to recreate credibility and regain the permission to
talk to those voters lost by the party in all social groups. To do that, the HSP
must find a new language and credibly present policies that meet the needs and
concerns of these voters. The Hungarian center-left must understand the prob-
lems of those it wishes to represent.

• The mistakes of the new government will push certain groups of voters back to
the left. But this cannot be enough. A new language and new narrative must first
create the opportunity for the Hungarian center-left to talk to these lost voters
and regain credibility. Then the center-left must address those groups where the
losses were even bigger. This will require implementable, competent, and some-
times groundbreaking policies that address the real problems of our society,
especially those of highest public concern.

• Anti-status quo feelings are expressed by citizens who don’t recognize the need
to change themselves too. These instincts are inflamed by populist movements
on the center-right and on the far right. The task of the center-left is not to
defend the status quo that has lost its legitimacy (even if it had its merits) but
instead to offer something new for the post transition phase, something that is
progressive but still meets the requirements of a demanding electorate.

• The biggest challenge for progressives is when even our voters support unsus-
tainable, irresponsible, and intolerant policies. We have to try to understand the
legitimate concerns behind their support for irresponsible or intolerant policies,
and review our policies based on this without any denial of our principles.

3  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Recent election results and the
current situation in Hungary

Short introduction to the political system of Hungary

From an institutional point of view of the last century, Hungarian democracy is

one of the most solid political systems among the Central Eastern European new
democracies since the transition of the early 1990s. Hungary is a parliamentary
democracy with one house of elected representatives, a German chancellor-like
prime ministerial position, and a constitutionally weak president of the republic.
The prime minister and the president are elected by the parliament, and the prime
minister can only be removed by a no confidence vote that immediately names
a new prime minister. There are many laws that can only be modified by a two-
thirds majority of votes in the parliament (of course including the constitution),
and there are also tough limits on dissolving parliament. All of these factors have
created an institutionally solid political system since the transition.

General elections are held in the spring of every fourth year and municipal elec-
tions are held in the autumns of the same years. The system of parliamentary elec-
tion was unchanged between 1990 and 2010. Now a significant but yet unclear
modification of the system has been started. The Hungarian parliamentary elec-
tion system is a mixed system with majoritarian tendencies that consists of two
rounds with a single electoral district vote and a county list vote of the electorates.
And the lost votes given to nonwinning candidates of single electoral districts are
summed up to a national list of compensation. The system of municipal elections
is a complicated one, with many local municipalities and county-level elected
bodies, but as a system it was a bit more majoritarian than the parliamentary elec-
tion system. In 2010 it was modified to be a system that clearly supports the more
institutionalized national parties.

The party system changed little until 2010, but in that year—with the landslide
victory of FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party—the party system has now seen its
biggest changes since the democratic transition. Prior to this, the biggest change
in the party system was the disappearance of the rural/agrarian Independent
Smallholders Party in 1998. Their voters mainly went to FIDESZ.

4  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Another relevant change was the disappearance of the two defining parties of the
democratic transition—the Alliance of Free Democrats (the liberal party, known
as the SZDSZ based on the party’s Hungarian acronym), and the Hungarian
Democratic Forum (the moderate conservatives, known as the MDF). They both
had bigger support in the general elections in 2002 and 2006 than the 5 percent
threshold, but in 2010 they didn’t get into the parliament.

In 2009 two new parties appeared on the scene. The eco-friendly, anti-status
quo, urban, mildly liberal Politics Can Be Different movement, or LMP, filled the
electoral gap left by the liberal party, and also became very popular among urban
youth. The far-right was reorganized after 2006, rooted in the historical Hungarian
far right but combined with anti-status quo, anticapitalist, antigypsy, and some-
times anti-Semitic convictions. They gained ground after the antigovernment
protests and riots of the autumn of 2006, and coalesced under The Movement
for a Better Hungary, or JOBBIK, which is definitely the third-strongest party
of Hungary. No party on the far-right has been this strong in Hungary since the
1930s, and never under democratic circumstances.

Short political history of the last decade of Hungary

In 1998 FIDESZ knocked the Socialists out of power with a good campaign (see
Figures 1 and 2), but during the second half of their term they lost the center
ground, and especially Budapest, the capital of Hungary. So in 2002 with centrist,
pro-EU rhetoric and social promises, the social-liberal coalition won the general
election. This coalition kept a lot of its promises, but around mid-term they lost
the EU parliamentary elections in 2004 and changed the prime minister to the
young and ambitious leader of the HSP, Ferenc Gyurcsány. With him the coali-
tion became the first re-elected government in Hungary since the transition in the
hotly-contested election campaign of 2006.

But right after the election, the economic unsustainability of the system of taxa-
tion, high budget deficits, and overgrown social redistribution necessitated tough
fiscal reforms that were very much rejected by large parts of the electorate. A
leaked speech of the new prime minister in which he acknowledged the “lies” of
the 2004-2006 government period and the “lies” of the campaign of 2006 broke
the backbone of HSP, of Gyurcsány, and of the social-liberal coalition. When
Gyurcsány didn’t resign and the government continued its reform program, key
parts of its policies were rejected by a landslide majority of voters in the triple
referendum in the spring of 2008.

5  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

The HSP lost ground, the coali-
Figure 1
tion was replaced by a minority
Party preferences of active voters between April 1998 and August 2010
HSP government and FIDESZ
became more and more popular. 60
SZDSZ LMP Other parties MDF KDNP MIÉP MSZP
The campaign in the spring of
2010 was not at all about the 50
Fidesz
race between the incumbent and
the challenger (see Figure 1) but 40
mainly about the scale of victory
Don’t know/
for FIDESZ and about the race didn’t answer
30
between the left and the far-right
for the second position.
20
MSZP
In the spring of 2009, Gyurcsány
FKgP
resigned as prime minister and 10
Jobbik
as the leader of his party, and an
interim, crisis managing govern- 0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ment was sworn in. Gordon
1st Orbán cabinet
Bajnai, the nonparty former 1998 National election 1st Gyurcsány cabinet Bajnal cabinet

cabinet member who was an Medgyessy cabinet 2nd Gyurcsány cabinet 2009 EP election
2002 National election 2006 National election
ally of Gyurcsány between 2006 2nd Orbán cabinet
2010 National election
and 2009, became the prime
minister. Although the crisis-
management government was successful in stabilizing the state of the Hungarian
economy under the ever growing pressures of the world economic crisis, the
voters didn’t come back to the HSP because of the lack of credible party leader-
ship, its plague of corruption scandals and simmering social conflicts, and its
fundamentally broken credibility after eight years in power.

General elections and municipal elections of 2010

In the spring of 2010 the HSP lost after two successful elections and FIDESZ
became the first party to have a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Turnout
is traditionally high in Hungary in general elections (above 64 percent in 2010,
and around 70 percent in 2006). FIDESZ in 2010 received more than 2.7 mil-
lion votes (52.7 percent) while the HSP received only 990,000 (19.3 percent)
on party list votes (see Figure 2). For FIDESZ that meant an increase of almost
430,000 votes, and almost 1.4 million lost votes for the HSP compared to 2006.

6  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

The far-right got 16.7 percent in
Figure 2
2010, and the new movement
Results of general elections, 1998–2010
of Politics Can Be Different
got 7.5 percent of the party list Number of votes

votes. Among the 176 single 6,000,000

Other
electoral districts in the system, parties
5,000,000
only two were won by the HSP, Jobbik
one was won by an indepen- 4,000,000 MIÉP Fidesz/ MDF
KDNP MDF
dent former FIDESZ mayor of joint list
FKgP
a rural city, and all the other 3,000,000
Fidesz
173 constituencies were won by
2,000,000
candidates of FIDESZ.
SZDSZ
1,000,000 LMP
The parliamentary represen- MSZP
tation of elected parties in 0
1998 2002 2006 2010
Hungary changed after 2010
general elections from a domi-
nant two party system to a sys-
tem of one dominant party with two
Figure 3
middle-sized and one small party in Results of general elections, 1998–2010
the parliament. FIDESZ now has 68
Number of parliamentary mandates
percent of seats, HSP has 15.3 per-
Independent–1 MIÉP
cent, the far right has 12.2 percent, MDF
14 FKgP 24
and the LMP has 4.2 percent of the 4% 48 6%
MSZP 13%
seats in the House (see Figure 3). 134 17 MDF
35% 4%
178
1998 MSZP 46% 2002
On October 3, 2010 national munici- 164
43% Fidesz
pal elections were held in Hungary
24 148
with a slightly modified system of 6% 38% 20
5%
SZDSZ Fidesz
local elections. FIDESZ was a clear SZDSZ
winner of this election, too, with
Independent–1 1–Independent
basically unchanged electoral sup- MDF
Jobbik
MSZP
11
port after the landslide victory of the 3% 59 47
16% 12%
spring. The most significant change LMP 16
4%
compared to the spring was a slightly 164
190 Fidesz
MSZP 49% 2006 43% 2010
better result for the HSP in rural areas.
If we look at the party list votes of the
rural areas and Budapest (while we 20 263
5% 68%
exclude county capitals because there SZDSZ Fidesz
is no party-list vote at the municipal

7  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

elections) the HSP received 22.8 percent compared to 16.8 percent in the spring. The
HSP strengthened its position as the second biggest party of the county, and both the
Politics Can Be Different movement and the far-right were far behind. Still, the over-
all lead of FIDESZ both in popular support and elected positions is extremely big.

Current political situation

Since the 2010 general elections the new right-wing parliamentary majority and
the new government is following a strange mix of populist policies, seemingly
tight but nontransparent fiscal initiatives, including a flat tax beneficial only for
the upper-middle classes, nationalizing the mandatory private part of the previ-
ously reformed pension system without real compensation, and unpredictably
taxing “big banks and big profits.” The authoritarian and vengeful politics of the
governing party have met the shallow needs of those dissatisfied voters who
voted for change in the spring, yet only improvisations are visible on the field of
real policies to address the structural problems of redistribution and reform of
Hungary’s political institutions.

The FIDESZ-led government is keen to limit the powers of the constitutional court,
which decides on the constitutionality of laws, and the independent budget council,
which oversees budget planning, because they might be able to either stop or at
least criticize their actions. With these actions against the court and the council, the
ruling party has been damaging the quality of Hungarian democracy and chang-
ing the post-transition political status quo to a more isolationist and nationalist
system. The new prime minister, Viktor Orbán, often talks about “a revolution that
happened in the spring at the voting stations” that provides him and his party the
legitimacy “to fix the problems of the whole political system.” In his speeches he
frequently criticizes “the selfish West that is in a big crisis” and looks to find a “new
model that learns from the more successful contemporary countries of the East.”

The opposition is basically powerless because of the two-thirds majority of the

governing party and because of changes to the constitution that limit the consti-
tutional court’s powers and changed the rules for referendums. And the national
media is dominated by the governing party, with the left only just recently starting
to cope with the challenge of regaining ground in a changed political system.

In the next section of this paper we will try to analyze the structure of support for
the Hungarian center-left and then discuss the policies and politics of any future
return of our side to power.

8  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

 Demography and the shifting
coalitions of the center-left in Hungary

Hungary’s population is a little bit above

Figure 4
10 million and shows significant signs of aging
Age groups in Hungary in 1990
amid a lack of new births. Another relevant
Females Males
problem of the demographic structure is the 80 years and over 177,195 1.7% 0.8% 82,693
lower life expectancy of males compared to
Between 70 and 79 years 360,778 3.5% 2.2% 223,588
that of females. The combined size of age
Between 60 and 69 years 634,553 6.1% 4.6% 481,039
70 and older age groups in 2008 was 7.5 per-
cent for females and 3.8 percent for males Between 50 and 59 years 647,742 6.2% 5.4% 557,502

(see Figure 5). This gap of 3.7 percentage Between 40 and 49 years 708,042 6.8% 6.6% 683,587

points is higher than the average 2.5 percent- Between 30 and 39 years 809,624 7.8% 7.8% 812,132
age point gap in the 27 member nations of the Between 20 and 29 years 638,411 6.2% 6.4% 660,532
European Union.
Between 10 and 19 years 791,356 7.8% 8.0% 832,667

Less than 10 years 622,218 6.0% 6.3% 651,164

If we compare the demographic struc-
1m 750k 500k 250k 0 250k 500k 750k 1m
ture of Hungary in 2008 to the other EU
countries and to the Central European
post-socialist countries (Poland, Romania, Figure 5
Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) Age groups in Hungary in 2008
it becomes clear that the proportion of the Females Males
under-10-years-old population is lowest in 80 years and over 260,839 2.8% 1.1% 111,311
Hungary, and more importantly that there is Between 70 and 79 years 476,467 4.7% 2.7% 275,789
a significant gap between the most popu- Between 60 and 69 years 611,745 6.1% 4.6% 458,157
lous post-war generation and the 40-to-49
Between 50 and 59 years 788,100 7.8% 6.9% 695,162
years old population in Central Europe
Between 40 and 49 years 637,512 6.3% 6.2% 621,082
generally and in Hungary in particular
(EU females 7.4 percent, male 7.5 percent; Between 30 and 39 years 772,975 7.7% 7.9% 797,733

Central Europe 6.6 percent and 6.6 percent; Between 20 and 29 years 690,518 6.9% 7.2% 719,360

Hungary 6.3 percent and 6.2 percent). Since Between 10 and 19 years 567,298 5.6% 5.9% 595,541
the democratic transition, the most signifi- Less than 10 years 470,385 4.7% 4.9% 495,427
cant change in the demographic structure of 1m 750k 500k 250k 0 250k 500k 750k 1m
Hungary (see Figure 4 and 5) is the con-

9  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

tinuing decrease of the proportion of the under-10-years-old age groups from
6.3 percent to 5 percent of females and from 6 to 4.7 percent among males.

Regarding the value structure of Hungary, social trust in institutions and in people
is much weaker than in Western Europe (the European Social Report of TÁRKI
reported this based on a research in 2008). The willingness to help others, the
number of social connections of families, the urge for social cooperation, civil
activism, and participation are all far below the EU average in Hungary. Trust in
the institutions of the political system is also very low, and this correlates with the
high perception of corruption on different levels in our society.

The values survey of TÁRKI in 2009 (as part of the World Value Survey) also
showed that among 50 countries, Hungarians believed the least in the need for
and rationality of cooperation during any economic activity. On a scale of 1 to
10, Hungary led with an average of more than 6.5 points regarding acceptance of
the following statement: “You can get rich and move forward only on the expense
of others.” (In the United States this number was a little bit under 5 points, in
the United Kingdom 5 points, in Russia above 6 points, and in New Zealand a
little bit above 4.5 points.) The value survey quoted above also showed that the
Hungarian value structure was comparatively more secular than in other coun-
tries at a similar level of economic development. On the rational-traditional scale
of values Hungary was on the rational side; but on the values of self-expression
Hungary had closed, introverted thinking and perceptions of reality. Based on this,
Hungary on the value-map was on the “Eastern border” of Western civilization,
closer to Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine than to the Western European countries.

Race and immigration

Immigration as an added source of demographic vitality does not exist yet in Hungary.
More than 90 percent of the society defines its nationality as Hungarian (above this
the main minorities are: Germans, Romanians, Slovakians, Ukrainians, Croatians,
Serbs, and Slovenians—all of these in Hungary for historical or geographical reasons).
A Chinese minority is present but small—the official records show 11,000 Chinese
living in Hungary, but the “real” number of them is probably around 30,000.

Though immigration is not an issue in Hungary the problems of coexistence

with “others” is very real. The target of this kind of conflict is the members of the
gypsy/roma minority. Official statistics register citizens with roma nationality
but only if they define themselves as members of this minority (around 200,000).

10  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Constitutionally it’s the right of every individual to have free choice of identity,
and because of this a lot of gypsies identify themselves as citizens with Hungarian
nationality. So the estimated number of gypsies living in Hungary is higher,
between 500,000 and 700,000 (they live in Budapest but also in the rural areas,
mainly in the northeastern part of the country).

Newer research shows that the roma minority is “among those social groups that
have significantly higher poverty risks than others. […] According to 2007 data
half of those individuals living in the same household with a roma senior can be
considered as ones living in poverty.”2 Family wage analysis also shows that in
2009 the members of the roma minority are concentrated in the two lowest tenths
of the wage structure of Hungary and that their proportion among those in the
two lowest tenths of the wage structure had significantly increased since 2000.3

Still, politically speaking, the importance of the roma minority is not too high—
even if the political relevance of ethnic conflicts is increasing— because roma
people themselves are extremely volatile voters who tend to vote only rarely. No
relevant and trustworthy opinion poll has ever been done among them. They
don’t really participate in public life and their political consciousness is low.

So in the medium run, the roma-minority issue for the center-left exists as a social
conflict that needs to be addressed but not as a source of future votes. It will take
decades for successful social integration programs and desegregation programs
in the education system to create a politically more conscious roma lower-middle
class in Hungary. Only then will they be targets of parties as voters. Until that time
sustainable integration programs are needed because as voters they’re unfortu-
nately not yet considered to be real members our society.

Class structure, education, employment

The solid institutional framework, pre-transition “premature welfare state,” and

successes of the governments of the 1990s in Hungary created a relatively success-
ful social transition and political integration into supranational organizations such
as the European Union. Still, if you want to find an even more relevant crisis than
the demographic one, it’s the crisis of the structure of employment in Hungary.
The problem of the “missing generation” from the active workforce, the post-tran-
sitional crisis of the labor market in certain areas of the country, the high number
of people under different early retirement schemes (pensions for partially disabled

11  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

individuals, early pension
Figure 6
programs), and the added pres-
Structure of employment
sure of the recent effects of the
Working age population (thousands)
world economic crisis create a
8,000
hardly sustainable situation in 5,956.8 6,204.5 6,472.5
6,000
the Hungarian labor market. 4,000
2,000
0
Unemployment was under 1990 1998 2008
Employment rate
control since the mid-1990s,
80.0%
fluctuating between 6 per- 65.2
60.0% 47.4 50.3
cent and 9 percent. Only the 40.0%
recent world economic crisis 20.0%
0.0%
increased the unemployment 1990 1998 2008
rate above 11 percent (see Registered unemployment (thousands)
400.0
Figure 6). The bigger employ- 314.0 329.2
300.0
ment problem in Hungary 200.0
has always been the low level 100.0
24.2
of participation in the active 0.0
1990 1998 2008
labor force. The Hungarian
labor-force participation rate
is among the lowest in the EU and among the industrialized democratic mem-
ber nations of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development,
(50.3 percent in 2008), which increases pressure on the sustainability of the pen-
sion system and the tax system.

Indeed, the proportion of the active workforce among the population is so low
that basically the active one-third of the society finances the other two thirds. In
2008 63.4 percent of all workers were employed in the service sector, 32.1 percent
were industrial workers, and 4.5 percent were agricultural employees.

“Premature welfare state” is the term of Hungarian sociologists for the relatively
generous and socially solid welfare state of the last decades of socialism in
Hungary before the democratic transition. Of course, this system was unsustain-
ably financed by foreign debt. This was the price our country paid for relative
social peace after the revolution in 1956. Without understanding this one cannot
understand the present class structure of Hungary. In the 1970s and the 1980s
Hungary was considered to be the country with the best living standards in the
Eastern bloc of socialist countries. And because of this, huge proportions of our
society consider those years as solid years of relative prosperity, and think about it

12  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

with nostalgia regardless of the repression of those years. Compared to Romania
or Poland of those years, where food shortages were regular and there wasn’t even
relative freedom of movement into neighboring countries, Hungary was much
better off. There were no food shortages at all since the early 1950s, some kinds
of private entrepreneurship were allowed, and there was much greater freedom of
travel into the countries of the former Eastern Bloc.

Methodologically it is unusually hard to provide a class-structure analysis of

Hungarian society that might be a valid framework for both the pre- and post-
transition periods. During the communist era “officially” there were no real
classes in the society, no income tax until the second half of the 1980s, and wage
differences were very small due to the egalitarian wage policy and ideology of
the system. Classes were only identifiable by a deeper analysis of the structure
of the society.

Indeed, “official studies” denied even the existence of a Hungarian underclass

during the 1970s and the 1980s. For the post-transition era, wage-based class
structure analysis would be misleading because of the high level of hidden
income within families (mainly from the gray and black spheres of employment)
and the fast changes in society due to post-transition reforms. Nowadays, no
income-based class structure analysis exists in Hungary that can be considered
trustworthy for all groups of our society. For instance, media buying agencies use
an income-based index known as ESOMAR, but it’s only relevant to the middle
classes and the elite of our society. It isn’t relevant scientifically to those in poverty
whose incomes cannot be conventionally measured.

Because of these problems regarding the class structure of Hungary TÁRKI

created a class-structure analysis that provides a valid framework for pre- and
post-transition comparative studies. “This class structure scheme is based on
employment status, but corrected by social status.”4 Basically this is a class-struc-
ture analysis that is mainly defined by the position of the individual in the employ-
ment structure but has been corrected by social status variables.

By this analysis, since 1990 the size of the Hungarian upper-middle class has
increased significantly (Figure 7) from 4.4 percent to 8.2 percent. The wage per
capita of the richest tenth of the society was 6 times higher than that of the poor-
est tenth in 1992, while in 2003 it was 8.1 times higher. Due to targeted tax system
changes and social programs it decreased to 6.5 times higher in 2007.

13  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

But the number of house-
Figure 7
holds in deep poverty is
Class structure of Hungarian society between 1982 and 2009
not decreasing. In 2009 an
estimated 5 percent to 7 per- Percent of working population

cent of the population lived Elites Upper middle class Middle class Working class Deprived, impoverished
1982 4.4% 42.3% 36.3% 14.7%
in deep poverty and another
2.3%
10 percent lived in depriva-
tion (Figure 7).5 In 2005 38.7 1992 8.8% 40.3% 34.7% 14.4%
percent of the under 15 age 1.8%
group lived in the two poor-
est tenths of the households, 2003 6.8% 32.8% 38.3% 19.6%
while only 8.3 percent lived in 2.6%

the two richest tenths of the

2009 8.2% 29.5% 39.3% 18.4%
households. And although
4.6%
official wage statistics are
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
sometimes partially mislead-
ing because of high levels of
hidden income, child poverty
and the lack of intergenera- Figure 8
tional mobility do cause high Party preference by class, 2004-2008
social tensions in significant 2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
parts of society. This is All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3
sometimes combined with Blue Collar Workers 28 4 4 21 40 3
local social tensions between Professionals 34 7 8 18 31 2
roma and non-roma groups,
2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
especially in rural areas where All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
the estimated proportion and Blue Collar Workers 32 3 4 23 37 1
size of roma households is Professionals 26 8 7 19 35 5
increasing and the non-roma
2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
households are aging. All active voters 16 22 31 45 31
Blue Collar Workers 17 12 30 46 31
Research shows that social Professionals 17 4 3 25 45 33
divisions among other parts
Left Right
of society are smaller than MSZP Fidesz MDF
previously thought. This Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union Hungarian Democratic Forum

is a result of the oversized Urban Liberal Far Right

SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
welfare state that redistrib- Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary
utes significant transfers to Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer
the lower-middle class and

14  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

the middle classes. Still, there is a significant part of
Figure 9
the Hungarian society that is getting more and more
Schooling groups in Hungary 1980 and 2010
segregated. In this group the roma minority is over-
represented. The deprived class of our country increas- 100% ISCED-97 5-6
6 9 12 12 (college, university,
ingly lives without any other income than the social 90% PhD)
subsidies of our welfare state. Their dependence on 80% 29
36
the state has increased over the 1982-2009 period.6 70% ISCED-97 3-4
46 48 (technical school
60% and grammar school)
Meanwhile, the happy memories of the “premature 50%
welfare state” make the post-modern capitalism of 40%
our days in Hungary look disturbing. And although 30%
65
55
our welfare state nowadays is still disproportion- 20% 42 40 ISCED-97 1-2
(elementary school)
ately generous with the middle classes, the sense of 10%
subjective deprivation is far bigger than our actual 0%
1980 1991 2001 2010
poverty. The European Social Report of TÁRKI
Social Research Institute in 2008 underlined that
in Hungary there was a significant discrepancy
between the perception of inequalities and the level Figure 10
of real inequalities. People in Hungary believed that Proportion of the group of ISCED-97 1-2
inequality in our society was much bigger than it (elementary school) among the supporters
was in reality. This view went hand in hand with low of the MSZP
tolerance for inequality. The study also showed that 100

this phenomenon existed in all Central European 90

post socialist countries, and it was far bigger than in 80

Western European countries. 70
60
National average of
Regarding the party preferences of blue-collar 50 45
elementary school voters
44 among all voters: 40%
workers, the loss of support by the HSP and the 40
40 37
32
Hungarian center-left is not bigger than the aver- 30
age drop in support (see Figure 8). FIDESZ is now
20
almost three times more popular among these voters
10
than the HSP, while during the victorious re-election
0
campaign of 2006 the support of the two parties 2004 2006 2008 2010 2010
2nd quarter 1st quarter 1st quarter 1st quarter August
among blue-collar workers was balanced.

The educational structure has changed a lot since

1980 (see Figure 9). The proportion of ISCED-97 1-2
category (elementary and lower secondary) decreased
from 65 percent to 40 percent, and in harmony with

15  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

 Figure 11

the post-modern trends of the Party preference by age groups, 2004-2010

region the size of the highly 2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
educated population (ISCED All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3
5-6, college-educated and Between 18 and 29 years 17 7 5 23 44 4
higher) started to increase fast Between 30 and 45 years 24 6 2 22 43 3
from 6 percent to 12 percent. Between 46 and 60 years 31 4 3 22 35 5

Over 60 years 42 5 5 21 25 2
In terms of educational
groups, the HSP and the 2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Hungarian center-left suf- All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
fered a significant loss of Between 18 and 29 years 22 2 8 22 40 2 4
support among less-educated Between 30 and 45 years 23 6 3 21 43 22
citizens (see Figure 10). In Between 46 and 60 years 35 52 24 31 21
2004, 44 percent of the sup- Over 60 years 41 3 22 31 21
porters of the HSP were in
2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
the ISCED-97 1-2 categories.
All active voters 16 22 31 45 31
In 2010 32 percent to 37
Between 18 and 29 years 8 3 32 51 42
percent of HSP supporters
Between 30 and 45 years 11 21 34 47 41
were in the low-education
Between 46 and 60 years 18 11 28 48 31
group, while among politi-
Over 60 years 28 1 4 29 35 3
cally active citizens the pro-
portion of this group of the 2010, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
society is around 40 percent. All active voters 15 21 23 47 1 11
Among politically active Between 18 and 29 years 42 27 47 20
citizens the biggest group Between 30 and 45 years 10 4 19 52 2 13
(48 percent) is the ISCED- Between 46 and 60 years 16 32 26 43 1 9
97 3-4 category (upper Over 60 years 30 21 44 14
secondary) but the number
of highly educated citizens is 2010, August 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
growing fast in the younger All active voters 9 6 2 30 46 7
generations. HSP lost signifi- Between 18 and 29 years 7 7 1 28 46 11

cant support among highly Between 30 and 45 years 5 6 2 33 46 8

educated professionals since Between 46 and 60 years 13 7 1 27 47 5

2004 (see Figure 8), even Over 60 years 15 2 5 32 44 2

more than the average. As Left Right

important local opinion lead- MSZP Fidesz MDF
Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union Hungarian Democratic Forum
ers these individuals are a key
Urban Liberal Far Right
target for any political revival SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
of the left. Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary
Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer

16  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Age groups Figure 12
Composition of support for center-left parties by age group, 2004-2010
The aging of the Hungarian Active voters in Hungary by age group, average over time
population described in detail
earlier is severe. Traditionally 23 28 25 24
the supporters of the HSP
were always older on aver- MSZP—Hungarian Socialist Party
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
age than the supporters 2004, 2nd quarter 14 23 28 35
of other parties, especially 2006, 1st quarter 19 22 30 29
that of FIDESZ. The now 2008, 1st quarter 17 17 32 34
disappeared liberal party 2010, 1st quarter 11 20 33 36
(Alliance of Free Democrats) 2010, August 21 14 39 26

had a younger support base.

SZDSZ—Alliance of Free Democrats
Although the aging of society 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
and the decreasing size of 2004, 2nd quarter 30 31 18 21
new generations limit the 2006, 1st quarter 21 37 23 19
effects of the unpopularity 2008, 1st quarter 46 25 17 12

of the Hungarian center-left 2010, 1st quarter No data

2010, August No data
among voters younger than
45, this unpopularity is still
LMP—Politics Can Be Different
so damaging that no revival is 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
possible without changing this 2004, 2nd quarter No data
situation. In the age groups 2006, 1st quarter No data

between 18 and 45 the poll- 2008, 1st quarter No data

ing numbers nowadays show 2010, 1st quarter 33 37 30

2010, August 34 27 34 5
such low support for the HSP
(4 percent to 7 percent among
19-29 year olds, or 5 percent 18–29 30–45 46–60 60+

to 10 percent among 30-45

year olds; see Figure 11) that
scientifically speaking this number could be close to zero because the standard
margin of error for these figures is around 4 percent to 5 percent.

If we look at the age composition of center-left support in Hungary, it becomes

clear that since 2004 the proportions of age 46 to 60-year-old voters and 60-and-
over voters among the politically active supporters of the HSP increased from
63 percent to 69 percent (see Figure 12). And the integration of younger voters
into the socialist camp before the re-election of 2006 (where the proportion of

17  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

age 46-and-over voters decreased to
Figure 13
59 percent) has now failed. Those
Size of the Millennial generation, 2010-2030
new voters disappeared from the
party’s support base after 2006 (see 50.0%
Voting millennials Voting millennials
20–42 years old 30–52 years old
Figure 12). 45.0%
39.2% 40.1% Share of
voters 40.0%
Voting millennials
The new urban liberal movement 18–32 years old 35.0%
of Politics Can Be Different has a 27.2% 30.0%
healthier political base. The party is 4,000,000 25.0%
more popular among younger vot- 2,939,427 millennials
3,000,000 2,683,043 2,582,828
ers, but due to personality reasons
2,000,000
they are currently not open to any
kind of cooperation with the HSP. 1,000,000
Meanwhile the far right is more popu- 0 0.0%
lar than either the HSP or the Politics 2010 2020 2030

Can Be Different movement among

those under 45 (see Figure 11).

Figure 14
These unsustainable difficulties
HSP’s support among the Millennial generation, 2004-2010
are even more visible if we focus
100
our attention on the case of the MSZP’s support among Millennials
90
so-called millennial generation MSZP’s support among all voters
80
defined here as those who were
70
born between 1978 and 2000. In
Hungary their size now is close to 60

3 million (see Figure 13), but since 50

they are between the ages of 10 and 40

32 now, not all of them are active 30 28 30
23
citizens of our country’s political 20 18 16 15
life yet. Among voters the share of 10 8 7 9
5
those who are between 18 and 32 0
2004, 2nd quarter 2006, 1st quarter 2008, 1st quarter 2010, 1st quarter 2010, August
in 2010 is 27 percent, and accord-
ing to official statistical projections
their size will grow to 40 percent of voters by 2030. This number reflects the
extremely low numbers of new births projected during this and coming decades.

The support of the HSP in the millennial generation has been below the aver-
age support of the party among active voters since 2004 (see Figure 14). In the

18  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

second quarter of 2004 this support was 18 percent (while the national average
of support was 28 percent), and in the first quarter of 2010 support was 5 percent
(while the national average of support of the HSP at that time was around 15 per-
cent). Yet, scientifically speaking, 5 percent on a subsample like this could also be
zero because of the relatively high margin of error. According to the same research
the support for FIDESZ in early 2010 among these voters was 49 percent, the
support of Politics Can Be Different 2 percent, and the support for the far-right
party, The Movement for a Better Hungary, was 18 percent.

This clearly shows that the Hungarian center-left almost doesn’t exist in the mil-
lennial generation, and the same group of our society is very much open to far
right radicalism and populism.

Marital status

With the post-modernization of our society we see a significant and continuous

decrease in the number of marriages.
The speed of this change in Hungary
Figure 15
even beats the neighboring countries
Crude marriage rate in a comparative perspective, 1990-2007
and the EU average (see Figure 15).
The crude marriage rate is the number 8
EU 27
Post-socialist countries
of marriages occurring among the 7.0 in Central Europe
7
population of a given geographical area 6.3 6.4 Hungary
6
during a given year, per 1,000 residents. 5.1 5.1
5.5
5 4.9
4.4
4.1
The political relevance of marital status 4

hasn’t been analyzed very deeply 3

because this characteristic isn’t con- 2
sidered as one that divides supporters 1
of different parties. The value struc- 0
ture of Hungary is so secular that the 1990 1998 2007

importance of the marriage-rate as an

electoral factor is not something that is
likely to be significant in coming decades.

19  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Gender as a politically relevant factor

The internationally recognized trend of women’s diverging voting behavior from

that of men is a phenomenon that hasn’t appeared yet in Hungary. If we look at
polls of recent years (see Figure 16), there appears to be no real difference in
political support patterns by
gender. In Hungary, gender Figure 16
is not a factor that influences Party preference by gender and education, 2004-2010
votes significantly and this is
2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
true for all the parties. All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3
Men 28 5 6 21 37 3
Among highly educated Women 29 6 3 22 37 3
women support levels for Highly educated women 28 12 3 17 38 2
center-left parties are a little
2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
bit worse than average, but All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
the lower numbers are on the Men 29 4 6 22 36 3
margin of error. Given the fact Women 31 4 3 24 37 1
that the HSP has lost support Highly educated women 23 9 10 18 39 1
significantly since 2004 among
2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
higher-educated profession-
All active voters 16 22 31 45 31
als generally (Figure 9), this Men 15 32 28 46 42
number is probably more Women 18 12 32 44 3
influenced by level of educa- Highly educated women 13 3 33 48 3
tion than by gender.
2010, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 15 21 23 47 1 11
Men 15 22 19 46 1 15
Secular and nonsecular Women 16 21 25 47 1 8
voters in Hungary Highly educated women 14 8 34 32 1 11

2010, August 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
About 75 percent of the
All active voters 9 6 2 30 46 7
population of Hungary has
Men 10 6 3 29 44 8
Christian origins (54 per-
Women 9 5 2 31 47 6
cent Catholic, 20 percent Highly educated women 5 10 2 30 51 2
Protestants, 1 percent others),
but the level of frequent Left Right
MSZP Fidesz MDF
church attendance is far Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union Hungarian Democratic Forum
below 10 percent. Divisive Urban Liberal Far Right
SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
moral issues such as abortion Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary
or divorce are nonissues in Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer
the political arena because of

20  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

the overwhelmingly secular
Figure 17
sentiments of our society. The Party preference by religiosity, 2004-2010
general mood is pro-choice
2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
and it would be a fatal error
All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3
for any party to raise the issue
Religious 20 5 7 19 46 3
of toughening the abortion Seculars 33 5 4 25 30 3
law in Hungary. And even if
the Christian churches have 2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
traditionally better relation-
Religious 25 4 4 24 42 1
ships with the parties of the
Seculars 35 5 5 23 30 2
right, there are still significant
groups of voters who are reli- 2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
gious and support parties of All active voters 16 22 31 45 31

the left. The “moral argument” Religious 14 23 25 54 11

in the political arena focuses Seculars 19 32 34 36 5 1

more on issues of national 2010, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
pride and identity, religious All active voters 15 21 23 47 1 11
heritage, and the education of Religious 15 12 22 54 6
youth than the issues men- Seculars 15 22 23 42 1 15
tioned above.
Left Right
MSZP Fidesz MDF
Among those who consider Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union
Hungarian Democratic Forum

themselves “religious” (in this Urban Liberal Far Right

SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
research they are those who Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary
attend church and participate Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer
in religious activities at least
once a month—around 13
percent in these surveys) overall support for the HSP is lower than the national
average of support among active voters (see Figure 17), but this was more signifi-
cant before 2006 and now is under the margin of error. And among those who
are “seculars” (who don’t believe in any supernatural entity and don’t participate
in any religious activity, 24 percent in these surveys) the average support for the
Hungarian left was higher until 2006. Since then HSP support in this group has
gotten closer to the average support for the party. Between these two groups are
those who are “believers in their own way,” and they represent a huge majority of
the society (60.7 percent). Their political preferences mirror the average prefer-
ences of Hungarian voters.

21  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

Geography of support of the center-left in Hungary

As mentioned earlier, the Hungarian center-left lost 50 percent to 65 percent of

its support among basically all social groups of Hungary since 2006. If we look
at the geography of these
losses, it becomes clear that
Figure 18
except in the most developed
Composition of HSP support by region, 2004-2010
region of Central Hungary
(where around 28 percent of 28 11 10 10 13 16 12
Hungarians live) the HSP lost
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
support according to a gener-
ally similar pattern in all the 2004, 2nd quarter 33 7 8 11 12 13 16

other six regions (see Figures 2006, 1st quarter 32 12 10 8 12 14 12

18 and 20). In Central Hungary 2008, 1st quarter 37 12 13 7 10 9 12

the HSP losses were lower. 2010, 1st quarter 32 10 8 10 14 13 13
Because of this, the propor- 2010, August 36 10 7 12 12 13 10
tion of HSP supporters from
Central Hungary Central Transdanubia Northern Hungary
Central Hungary increased Western Transdanubia Northern Great Plain
from between 32 percent and Southern Transdanubia Southern Great Plain

33 percent to 36 percent (see

Figure 18). Although there are
significant differences in the Figure 19
quality of life and development Composition of HSP support by settlement group, 2004-2010
between certain noncentral
regions (for example the qual- 18 18 33 31

ity of life is better in Western 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Hungary than in the region 2004, 2nd quarter 21 20 33 26
of Northern Great Plain and
2006, 1st quarter 20 20 33 27
Northern Hungary), the sup-
2008, 1st quarter 22 20 36 22
port patterns for the Hungarian
2010, 1st quarter 22 25 26 27
center-left across these regions
are not very different. 2010, August 31 18 25 26

Capital Towns
Comparing types of area rather County capitals and
towns of county ranks (23)
Villages

than geographical regions

gives a better understanding of
changes in the HSP’s support. In the capital, Budapest, in the 19 county capitals,
and four other cities of county ranks, the Hungarian center-left parties, especially
the HSP lost significantly fewer votes and support than in smaller cities, towns,

22  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

 Figure 20
and villages (see Figure 19).
Party preference by region, 2004-2010
While the HSP had a sup-
port level around 32 to 33 2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3
percent in 2004-2006 in the Central Hungary 32 8 8 23 25 4
capital, county capitals, and Central Transdanubia 19 8 6 21 43 3
Western Transdanubia 23 23 20 48 4
cities of county ranks, sup- Southern Transdanubia 31 22 15 45 5
Northern Hungary 29 3 4 31 30 3
port decreased to the range Northern Great Plain 25 6 3 16 49 1
of 19 percent to 20 percent Southern Great Plain 32 4 5 23 35 1

by early 2010. Meanwhile, 2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
the average support for the All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
Central Hungary 34 5 5 23 31 2
party in smaller cities, towns, Central Transdanubia 31 4 8 21 35 1
and villages has stagnated Western Transdanubia 32 3 3 20 39 3
Southern Transdanubia 27 32 21 47
at around 12 percent to 13 Northern Hungary 28 4 3 34 28 3
Northern Great Plain 29 24 26 38 1
percent. Because of these Southern Great Plain 27 7 3 12 48 3
changes, the proportion
2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
of HSP’s supporters from All active voters 16 22 31 45 31
towns and villages has Central Hungary 21 31 31 40 31
Central Transdanubia 17 14 20 50 7 1
decreased to 51 percent to Western Transdanubia 19 2 28 47 31
Southern Transdanubia 14 2 30 47 5 2
53 percent (see Figure 21) Northern Hungary 13 1 3 34 46 21
while they have more than Northern Great Plain 10 12 30 54 21
Southern Great Plain 15 4 2 40 37 2
60 percent of the Hungarian
population. Meanwhile the 2010, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 15 21 23 47 1 11
bigger cities are becoming Central Hungary 17 5 1 23 43 1 10
heavily weighted in the Central Transdanubia 14 1 3 22 48 3 9
Western Transdanubia 12 11 23 50 1 12
socialist camp. Southern Transdanubia 16 11 23 51 8
Northern Hungary 17 2 26 41 1 13
Northern Great Plain 12 1 2 23 50 1 11
These public opinion survey Southern Great Plain 16 12 18 49 1 13

results were “validated” by 2010, August 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
the results of the municipal All active voters 9 6 2 30 46 7
Central Hungary 14 11 1 30 38 6
election this autumn. On Central Transdanubia 9 5 2 27 49 8
Western Transdanubia 6 5 2 23 55 9
October 3, 2010 national Southern Transdanubia 11 3 3 26 52 23
turnout was 46.6 percent and Northern Hungary 8 4 4 34 40 10
Northern Great Plain 6 2 5 32 47 7
the HSP received 29.6 per- Southern Great Plain 6 5 2 34 48 4
cent in Budapest on a party
Left Right
list vote (because of the low MSZP Fidesz MDF
Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union Hungarian Democratic Forum
turnout this relatively high
Urban Liberal Far Right
number reflects only the
SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
views of 12.7 percent of all Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary

Budapest voters). In smaller Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer

23  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

 Figure 21
cities, towns, and villages the
Party preference by settlement group, 2004-2010
HSP’s party list received 21.1
percent among those who 2004, 2nd quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

participated (but this relatively All active voters 28 5 5 22 37 3

Capital 33 8 7 27 21 4
high number, because of the
County Capitals and Towns 32 6 4 19 35 4
low turnout, again only means of county ranks (23)
Towns 30 6 4 20 38 2
10.2 percent of all voters in
Villages 22 3 4 21 47 3
these rural areas).
2006, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 30 4 3 23 36 22
Capital 32 6 2 18 36 2 4
County Capitals and Towns 33 42 20 35 42
of county ranks (23)
Towns 33 42 25 33 12
Villages 25 3 27 41 22

2008, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 16 22 31 45 31
Capital 21 6 32 36 32
County Capitals and Towns 18 2 4 32 39 5
of county ranks (23)
Towns 18 12 34 40 41
Villages 12 1 25 59 21

2010, 1st quarter 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 15 21 23 47 1 11
Capital 19 6 2 17 47 9
County Capitals and Towns 20 3 27 39 1 10
of county ranks (23)
Towns 12 1 22 48 2 15
Villages 13 13 23 50 1 9

2010, August 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
All active voters 9 6 2 30 46 7
Capital 17 11 1 33 32 6
County Capitals and Towns 9 8 2 30 45 6
of county ranks (23)
Towns 7 51 34 45 8
Villages 8 2 4 25 55 6

Left Right
MSZP Fidesz MDF
Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Civic Union Hungarian Democratic Forum
Urban Liberal Far Right
SZDSZ LMP Jobbik
Alliance of Free Democrats Politics Can Be Different The Movement for a Better Hungary
Other parties Don’t know/didn’t answer

24  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

The new progressive coalition
of voters in Hungary

Structured summary of losses of support by the Hungarian

center-left

After eight years, the HSP and the Hungarian center-left in 2010 lost power. The
old liberal party disappeared; new movements appeared on the scene. The HSP
lost 50 percent to 65 percent of support among almost all groups in society. The
traditionally secular, introverted, and pessimistic Hungarians are suffering from a
post-transitional crisis. Some tendencies in the society are close to those in other
Western countries—for example the changing structure of education and class,
and the changing behaviors and career paths of postmodern capitalism—but
there are some more typically Hungarian and Eastern European tendencies too
(high level of subjective deprivation, lack of trust in institutions, low level of active
workforce participation).

For different reasons immigration, race, secularism, class, gender, and marital
status don’t seem to be defining factors in support for Hungarian center-left par-
ties. Age groups, size of area, and the level of education are more relevant factors
influencing political support in Hungary.

Because of this we can identify two challenges. First, there are those voters who
would be average, volatile supporters of catch-all-parties in any political system.
Any randomly chosen group of them would be similar to the average structure of
Hungarian society. Second, there are four identifiable groups where the center-left
and the HSP lost even more votes—so there, in a comparative perspective, the
HSP is even weaker. These important groups are: less-educated people, inhabit-
ants of rural areas of the country, voters younger than 45, and residents of areas
where poverty is combined with local ethnic conflicts.

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Character of the supporters of the center-left parties

Since the political transition after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the HSP’s supporter
base has always been a little older than average and lived in larger numbers in big-
ger cities and the capital. And the HSP’s supporters were more often found among
the highly educated parts of society, or lived in relative poverty and were under-
educated. The former liberal party was popular in big cities, especially in Budapest
among voters from the middle class.

Nowadays, the HSP has become basically a “big exclusive club” of urban and aged
46 and older voters. And it’s hard to find any subgroup in society where the HSP’s
electoral support is even close to that of the new governing party, FIDESZ, even
though the HSP is still by far the second-most popular party of the country. On
the center-left the new movement of Politics Can Be Different has a support pat-
tern quite close to that of the former liberal party in its glory days, except that it is
relatively more popular among voters between 18 and 35.

The party system and political representation of voters on the

center-left

The general elections of 2010 were the last in the electoral system Hungary has had
since the transition. Without knowing the new system of parliamentary election
of a smaller parliament, it would be premature to define precisely a new strategy of
the center-left. A more majoritarian system would require a single to party to inte-
grate all the social groups that could support progressive change. A more propor-
tional system would require a new coalition of different movements and parties.

But one thing is clear: Either in a single movement or in a coalition of two to three
movements/parties, the interests now unrepresented by the center-left must be
represented again. Sadly, besides the Politics Can Be Different movement we
cannot now see any new political organization on the horizon. Of course it is true
that the distrust that the HSP faces opens up the possibility for something new to
appear on the Hungarian political scene. But due to the high entry barriers in the
political system, a tough electoral qualification system, campaign finance difficul-
ties, and a general lack of trust in political parties, it’s very hard for a totally new
movement to have an immediate chance of significant impact.

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New coalitions: Is there a need for them at all?

Given the fact that the HSP and the center-left lost so much of its support among
most social groups, and it lost even more support in some groups like young
voters, the question must be posed: Is there really a need for new electoral and
political coalitions in Hungary for the revival of the center-left?

My answer is: later yes, but first—sadly—not.

After more limited electoral losses, it’s a legitimate and rational strategy to focus
attention on those areas where a movement had lost more votes than in others,
find new target groups, and meanwhile hope that the mistakes of other parties
will move back some lost voters to the party. Sadly that’s not the case for the
Hungarian center-left at this time. Lost support won’t come back automatically to
the HSP and the left in Hungary.

First, the Hungarian center-left must regain credibility and the permission of
voters to talk to them at all. The main target group for this effort cannot be a small
subgroup of Hungarian voters. Instead the proper target is almost all the voters
older than 18, wherever they live, whatever they do, whatever they believe in, and
however educated they are. It is not a question of a new coalition but rather a
renewed coalition with former voters who either became fed up with the center-
left, or just suffered from the effects of the last decades of Hungary’s history.

After the general reconstruction of credibility and renewal of electoral base comes
a targeted healing of support among key groups of voters. Even if the aging of
the society and the still relatively high support for the left among elderly voters
currently limits the effects of the disastrous unpopularity of the movement among
voters younger than 45, support among these voters must be increased over the
mid to long term. Otherwise even in as little as 10 years the whole structure of
support for the Hungarian center-left could become unsustainable.

Parallel with this, the Hungarian center-left must reintegrate low-education voters
and those who live in the rural areas of the country, especially in areas where eth-
nic conflicts with the roma population are part of everyday life. No party on the
center-left can exist without strong and fair representation of those non-middle
class citizens who are on the periphery of our society and who really need protec-
tion and help to cope with their problems.

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This means that the a simple reconstruction of the electoral base of 2006 cannot
be enough, due to the unsustainable structure of support for the left among youth,
highly educated urban professionals, and rural less-educated voters. When the
new, right wing government loses its credibility, the latter group will be relatively
easy to reach by a trusted movement on the left. But the cases of youth and urban
professionals are harder ones. In these groups the credibility of the progressive
left in Hungary is so broken that the coming years will decide whether any single
party or a combination of a new and a reformed old party can reach these voters
with a progressive message.

The possibility of continuing electoral failure

The single-biggest common denominator of lost supporters is simply that they

were once supporters of the HSP. Nothing else. It’s hard to find any other social
characteristic that unites them. That means that for them the HSP itself is the
problem first, and the specific problems of specific groups are second.

Because of this, there’s a chance that the HSP and its electoral base cannot be
repaired. Perhaps the brand and the social movement of the center-left cannot be
saved. This will take years to decide—and could require a new movement on the
political center-left of Hungary that fits today’s society and the new system of elec-
tions. Such a new party might be attractive for younger and/or rural voters and
could reintegrate former supporters of the center-left.

28  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

The framework of a new
progressive vision in Hungary

When we talk about a new progressive vision, we mean the narrative, ideology, key
policies, and values of the progressive movement in Hungary. While creating this
we must learn from the mistakes of recent years, reflect on the post-transitional
crisis of our society 20 years after the democratic transition, and offer a political
program of policies and symbolic acts that is in harmony with our values and
attractive to a sufficient amount of voters.

Despite the possibility of long-term electoral failure of the Hungarian center-left,

creating a new framework for electoral progress is still quite possible. The key issues
are credibility, relevance, and capability of representation. These are more important
than targeting different groups of different voters with different complicated policies.

20, 8, 4, and 1

The Hungarian left in 2010 lost because of the perceived failures of the last 20
years, the incompetent, corrupted governance of the last eight years that failed to
address real problems, the failed reforms and continuously decreasing real wages
of the last four years, and the tough crisis managing acts of the last year in power.
The center-left in 2010 was punished for the combined mistakes of these years.

People were promised a better life—and then they lost that or at least the per-
ception of it. While they faced the unfairness of Hungary’s postmodern capital-
ism on a daily basis, they were told to accommodate to a new world of bigger
insecurities and weaker support by the state. The problems the government
appeared to want to solve were alien to the problems of Hungarians’ everyday
life. This liability was intensified by a political language that segregated the gov-
erning elite from the average voter.

But the biggest mistake of the governing elite was that it defended the status quo
when it had lost its legitimacy, rather than finding ways to renew it. The instinctive
defense of the status quo by governing parties was an unintended but poisonous
consequence of their years in power.

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Understand concerns, then talk about them to get understood

The first task is to understand the problems and concerns of all targeted voters.
Then the HSP must find a new language to discuss and represent these problems.
The Hungarian center-left must show voters that it understands the problems of
those whom it wishes to represent. The first step to reaching this goal is to talk
about those issues that are truly relevant to voters and reflect their concerns.

The difficult ideological issue here is Hungary’s postmodern capitalism and the
center-left’s relation to it, especially the system of social redistribution. This
system is still generous with the middle classes but is seen by the middle classes as
insufficient. Now in power, the right wing is capitalizing on the anti-establishment
sentiments of different groups in Hungarian society—and portraying the center-
left and mainly the HSP as the establishment.

The current government follows a strange mix of populist antibusiness but pro-
upper-middle-class social policies, combined with actions that are damaging the
democratic system of Hungary and limiting the effects of the system of checks and
balances. Disillusionment will eventually come since for most voters FIDESZ is
offering rhetoric rather than concrete improvements in their lives.

We need a pragmatic centrist alternative that isn’t afraid of the problems of people
in poverty, that isn’t defending the status quo, and that is attentive to the needs of
urban voters, like their growing environmental concerns. This will require imple-
mentable, competent, and sometime groundbreaking policies that boldly address
the real problems of our society.

The biggest challenge: Responsible and sustainable policies and

the voters

Perhaps the biggest challenge for Hungarian progressives comes when voters sup-
port unsustainable, irresponsible, and intolerant policies. People in Hungary don’t
like to pay taxes but want to receive even more from the welfare system. They want
to retire as soon as possible while the sustainability of the pension system is at risk.
They oppose socially beneficial education programs to integrate the roma minority
into our communities—they would like to deny even the existence of this problem.
These problems must be addressed even if voters do not see them as important.

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If citizens who don’t recognize the need to change themselves are inflamed by
populist movements on the center-right and on the far right, then the task of the
center left is not to defend the status quo that has already lost its legitimacy even if
the status quo can boast some real accomplishments. The center-left must instead
offer something new for the post-transition phase in Hungary—something pro-
gressive that still meets the real concerns of our voters.

The Hungarian right-wing government denies the existence of the real problems
of our country and in fact runs away from them. They create “enemies” to chan-
nel the anger of their supporters with populist rhetoric. The progressive left in
Hungary must choose a different way forward.

We must address the real problems of our society with well prepared, sustain-
able, and fair policies. We must not defend the status quo just because we were
involved in its creation. We must understand the legitimate concerns behind the
electorate’s support of irresponsible or intolerant policies, and review the poli-
cies based on this without any denial of our principles. And we must have better
regulation, more accountability, better and stronger policing, tougher action on
crime while defending minorities, and continued social integration programs for
minorities that also seek to raise their standard of living.

Our problem was that we addressed the real problems of our society incompe-
tently and without credibility, and denied the existence of those things that were
problems for our voters. Our task for the future is to be better on policies address-
ing key problems, even while we integrate the concerns of insecure voters.

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Endnotes
1 I’m grateful for the research work of the team of András Keszthelyi, 4 Kolosi Tamás-Keller Tamás, “Kikristályosodó társadalomszerkezet
the PM’s chief strategic adviser and to my colleague Balázs Vető for [Crystallizing social structure],” In TÁRKI Társadalmi Riport 2010 [So-
collecting data for this work. cial Report 2010], Tamás Kolosi and István György Tóth, eds. p. 119.

2 Gábos András-Szivós Péter, “Jövedelmi szegénység és anyagi 5 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “TÁRKI Household research and
depriváció Magyarországon [Income based poverty and material TÁRKI Társadalmi Report 2010 [Social Report 2010].”
deprivation in Hungary],” In TÁRKI Társadalmi Riport (2010) [Social
Report 2010], Tamás Kolosi and István György Tóth, eds. p.69. 6 Kolosi Tamás-Keller Tamás, “Kikristályosodó társadalomszerkezet
[Crystallizing social structure],” In TÁRKI Társadalmi Riport 2010 [So-
3 Tóth István György, “Jövedelemeloszlás a konszolidációs csomagok cial Report 2010], Tamás Kolosi and István György Tóth, eds., p. 126.
és a válságok közepette Magyarországon [Income distribution dur-
ing fiscal consolidation and crisis in Hungary],” In TÁRKI Társadalmi
Riport (2010) [Social Report 2010], Tamás Kolosi and István György
Tóth, eds. p. 32.

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About the author

Viktor Szigetvári is the CEO of his own consultancy firm, Szigetvári and Partners.
In 2009 as a state secretary, he was chief of staff to the prime minister of Hungary,
Gordon Bajnai. In 2004 and 2005 he was the director of communications for
prime ministers Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsány. He was also the national
campaigns director of the Hungarian Socialist Party during the parliamentary and
municipal election campaigns of 2006 and 2010.

33  Center for American Progress  |  Regaining the Right to Speak

 The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute
dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity
for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to
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