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ONCASE STUFF
ADVANTAGE 1: IRAN PROLIFERATION

TURN: In response to his Kahili 2010 card:

The United States’ military presence is actually currently warding off Iran’s growing nuclear arsenal.

―US Boosts missile presence in Gulf as warning to Iran,‖ The Guardian, January 31, 2010
The Obama administration is intensifying pressure on Iran by increasing its missile defences in
the Middle East to defend against potential missile strikes in the region by Tehran, it emerged today.
The US military has boosted the capability of land-based Patriot defensive missiles in several Arab
nations in the Gulf, and one official told the Associated Press the navy was also increasing the presence
of ships capable of knocking out hostile missiles in flight.
The move – reported in several US newspapers this morning – appears to be a deliberate attempt by the
White House to ratchet up pressure on Iran ahead of attempts to increase sanctions against the country.
The US is reappraising its Iran policy after months of unsuccessful diplomatic moves, and is attempting
to win broad international consensus for sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, believed to
control a covert nuclear arms programme, the New York Times reported.
Last week, in his state of the union speech, Barack Obama spoke of "consequences" if Iran failed to
comply with UN demands to stop nuclear fuel production.
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And, US presence is key to deterring Iran from nuclear weapons. Withdrawing incurs many impacts.
―Losing the Moment? The United States and the World after the Cold War,‖ Zalmay Khalilzad, Washington
Quarterly Reader, Order and Disorder after the Cold War, editor Brad Roberts, 1995, p. 60
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination.
Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-
rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To
preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps purchase, their own nuclear
weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain
a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony
would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well
as gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf
by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination
because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace
process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the
Israelis.
The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf
would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid
involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.
Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps
reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total
imports and exports are equal to a quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary
adjustments might be high.
The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery. Already several rogue states such as
North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only
increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous
world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would
increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United
States, would be harmed.

ADVANTAGE 2: TERRORISM THINGY

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In response to his Turner 2006 card:

Al Qaeda is not just biding its time. His evidence is from 2006 and Al Qaeda would’ve attacked by now.

MUELLER 2006 (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks
took only about two years to prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks
in Madrid in 2004 were conceived, planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off
less than two months after the conspirators purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's
attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took less than a year to plan.) Given
the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in
2003, one would think that terrorists might be inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if
they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just around the corner? It was in
2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United
States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey)
but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those
attacks were tragic, but their sparseness could be
taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and
puffing.

Even if the Al Qaeda do have plans, they can’t get nuclear weapons by any means

FROST 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear
Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that must inform this speculation and narrow its range.
First, there are technical considerations. Assembling enough fissile material for even the crudest nuclear
device – and the amounts needed vary inversely with sophistication – would be very difficult and
probably extremely expensive for a terrorist organisation. The theoretical knowledge and practical skills
required to design and build a nuclear weapon are of a high order, while setting up, equipping and
successfully operating an undetectable clandestine weapons laboratory would be difficult and
expensive, even for the best-funded terrorist organisation. Aum Shinrikyo, which operated relatively
openly under Japanese laws regarding religious organisations that made it all-but-untouchable, and
which had a billion-dollar war chest, gave up the attempt to develop a nuclear weapon very early on in
the process, preferring to work with chemical and biological agents instead. The evidence, much of it
admittedly negative, suggests that buying or stealing a functional nuclear weapon would be an even
more difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Nuclear weapons are guarded like national treasures; indeed,
nuclear weapons are in some sense national treasures, symbols of national strength and modernity
bought at immense cost. No state that possessed them, whether established or ‘rogue’, would be likely
to hand over such weapons to terrorists unless they were acting as mercenary agents of the state itself.
The threat of nuclear retaliation, even if the possibility of tracing the weapon back to its source were
thought to be low, should be enough to deter any rational state from using a nuclear weapon against
another nuclear-weapon state, or a country under the protection of one.

Terrorists can’t steal a nuclear weapon–security is tight and the weapons are too complicated
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ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004 (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Of these, the first is the least likely. It

would be extremely difficult for terrorists to acquire an intact weapon from
one of the eight nuclear weapon states. The security of these weapons, especially those in Russia and Pakistan, is a valid concern. But to
detonate an intact, stolen Russian nuke, a terrorist would have to get past security safeguards built into
the weapon, such as authorization codes. And Pakistani nuclear weapons (believed to number up to 50) are
reportedly stored separately from the weapons' cores. Besides the difficulties associated with obtaining a
ready-made, good-to-go nuke, there would be other barriers--such as transporting and preparing to
deliver it undetected. This is perhaps the lowest probability , highest consequence scenario of nuclear
terrorism.

ALSO, THERE’S A LITTLE CONFUSING PART ABOUT HIS AFF. HE CLAIMS IN HIS 1AC AND CROSS X THAT
IRAN IS PROLIFERATING AS A RESULT OF VIEWING TURKEY AS A THREAT AND TRYING TO KILL THE
NON-BELIEVERS.

BUT, IN HIS BEN MEIR 2009 CARD, IT SAYS THAT TURKEY IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT IRAN WILL
TRUST IN NEGATIONS OF NUCLEAR TALK. CONTRADICTION! HE TRIES TO CLEAR THIS UP IN CROSS X BY
PUTTING OUT MULTIPLE REASONS WHY IRAN IS PROLIFERATING, BUT HE IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SURE
WHICH ONE IS TRUE. THIS LEADS ME TO MY NEXT OFFCASE WHICH IS VAGUENESS.

ALSO, THIS MEANS THAT HE HAS NO SOLVENCY AT THE MOMENT FOR HIS
ADVANTAGE 1.

OFFCASE 1: VAGUENESS
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A.) Violation- The affirmative has a vague and crappy plan that he cannot explain why it
solves.
1) I explain why he violates in the last page.
2) Stating goals or generalized actions makes plan vague.
Dorsey Dictionary of American Govt. and Politics ‘88
A statement of goals that can be translated into a plan or program by specifying the
objectives to be obtained. Goals are far more general statement of aims than are
objectives. Goal- objective ambiguity may exist for a variety of reasons. The original
sponsors of the policy or program may not have had a precise idea of the end results
desired. Formal statements of objectives may be intentionally ambiguous, it such vagueness
makes it easier to obtain a consensus on action; value judgments underlying the objectives
may not be shared by important groups. Consequently, some as implying ill effect for them
may perceive the end result intended. So explicit statements of objectives, which tend to
imply a specific assignment of priorities and commitment of resources, may be purposely
avoided.
B. In round implications:
1) Abuse: Vagueness breeds abuse. The 1nc is the speech in which we develop our whole
strategy. If the plan is vague, we cannot develop a coherent negative strategy.
2) Kills ground: Vagueness allows the Aff to become a moving target. Since we never fully
know the initial intent of the plan, the aff can always mutate this intent to get out of all 1NC
arguments.
3) Destroys Solvency, Means you vote neg.
Electric Law Library ‘96
Vagueness- Uncertainty. Certainty is required in contracts, wills, pleadings, judgments, and
indeed in all the acts on which courts have to give a judgment, and if they be vague, so as
not to be understood, they are in general invalid. A charge of “frequent intemperance” and
“habitual indolence” are vague and too general.
4) Real World Implications: A policy maker cannot vote for a vague plan. In the real
world, Congress would only vote for a plan if they knew exactly what actions would be
taken. In a debate round, you cant vote for a plan unless you know exactly what it does.
5.) Standards: The aff is killing fairness, education, and the meaning of policy debate. The
judge must vote neg to make this fair.

OFFCASE 2: BUNKER BUSTERS COMPENSATION (AKA ISRAEL DA) HEHE…

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Israel will get scared from withdrawal – fears loss of deterrence against Iran
Susser 04 (Leslie Susser, Staff Writer, Israel Worried About U.S. Iraq Withdrawl, April 15 2004)
http://www.jewishjournal.com/world/article/israel_worried_about_us_iraq_withdrawl_20040416/

Israel's defense
As Shiite and Sunni resistance to the American presence in Iraq intensifies,
establishment is worried that a U.S. withdrawal under fire could have devastating
consequences for the battles against weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism.
And Israel could be one of the big losers: Israeli officials believe a loss of American
deterrence would encourage Iran to continue its nuclear weapons program, and its support
for terrorism could lead to a hardening of Syrian and Palestinian attitudes against accommodation with
Israel and could spark more Palestinian and other terrorism directed against Israeli targets. Without
American deterrence and a pro-Western Iraq, the officials say, Israel might have to
rethink its attitude on key issues like the concessions it can afford to make to the
Palestinians, its readiness for a land war on its eastern front and the size of its defense
budget. But there is an opposing, minority view in Israeli academic and intelligence circles: The quicker
the Americans leave, this view holds, the quicker the Iraqis will have to get their act
together. And once they do, they will not necessarily pose a threat to Israel or the West.

Israel asks for American bunker buster bombs to feel safer

UPI 6/9/10
(“Israel asks U.S. for more precision bombs” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/06/09/Israel-asks-US-
for-more-precision-bombs/UPI-58021276096834/)

Amid growing fears of a new Middle Eastern war, Israel's defense ministry has asked
Washington for more JDAM precision-guided bombs for its air force , the Haaretz daily
reports.
The ministry has also asked the Pentagon to expand the U.S. arsenal pre-positioned in
the Jewish state in December 2009 so that Israeli forces can access the weapons in an
emergency, the liberal newspaper reported Tuesday.
Israel first used the Joint Direct Attack Munitions in combat against Hezbollah forces in its 34-day war in
July-August 2006. They were used again in Operation Cast Lead, the 22-day invasion of the Gaza Strip
launched Dec. 27, 2008, against fighters of the Hamas fundamentalist Palestinian group.
JDAM systems provide precision guidance for "dumb bombs," making them immensely
more accurate.
There was nothing to indicate that the request pointed to any imminent operations by the Israeli air force
against the Jewish state's main foes, Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.
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Israeli bunker busters causes Iran strikes and war with Iran
Institute for Research Middle Eastern Policy 05
(5/1/2005“Arming an Israeli Attack on Iran: Why the US should cancel "Bunker Buster" Bombs for Israel”
http://www.irmep.org/GBU.htm)

There are many factors motivating Israel to strike Iran immediately upon receipt of
GBU-28's. Its current status as a nation under pressure to conform with the quartet's road-map for to
peace is causing an internal situation close to civil war and leave Israel's Likud leadership looking for a
way to solidify its hold on occupied territories. The US presence in Iraq will at some point wind down,
leading to troop withdrawal and a diminished possibility of drawing the US into a costly "regime change"
exercise in Iran. The Israeli option of disrupting the road map for peace while drawing the
US into a conflict with Iran by conventional means is more likely with bunker busters.
Israel has many motivations to immediately use the GBU-28. Tactically, it is not in the
US interest to enable any catalyst of a three way conventional war with Iran. Strategically,
the US will have to deal with Israeli nuclear weapons if it hopes to encourage regional players to enter the
NPT and disavow nuclear weapons.

Iranian War causes extinction

Jorge Hirsch, a professor of physics at the University of California San Diego. He is one of the originators of the
physicists' petition on nuclear weapons policies started at the UCSD, 1/3/ 2006, America's nuclear ticking bomb,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news_mz1e3hirsch.html

If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities ,
Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well
as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to
withstand. Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be
impossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in
1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State
Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear bombs with
better bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile
installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be
argued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would
also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear
attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is a
line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary,
the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty will rightly feel at
risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can.
A new world with many more nuclear countries, and a high risk of any regional conflict
exploding into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence . The scientific community
(which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to
reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over
1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S.
scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of
WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp
line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons . An
escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization . There is no fundamental
difference between small nuclear bombs and large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting
underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.
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OFFCASE 3: TURKEY COMPENSATION AND REARMAMENT

Turkey’s committed to nonproliferation now—strong NATO nuclear commitment is key.
Tarik Oguzlu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, July 200 9. [SETA
Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research Policy Brief No. 33, Turkey and the Transformation of
NATO, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-182507-159-turkey-and-the-transformation-of-nato.html]
Today, there is an intra-alliance consensus that contemporary threats concern transnational
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, organized crime,
cyber-terrorism, the spreading of epidemics, piracy, environmental pollution, and the lack of good
governance in failed or weak states. From the contemporary perspective, the maintenance of standing
mass armies in anticipation of conventional territorial attacks no longer serves to address today’s global
and soft security challenges. The old strategies of deterrence and containment do not suffice in dealing
with the asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors. This consensus, however, does not relieve
Turkey of anxiety regarding the question of whether NATO’s transformation will erode
its traditional territorial/nuclear security commitments. Two occasions in the recent pas t
appear to have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether the European members of the
alliance continue to view Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities .
Both took place in the context of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. First, although in 1991 and 2003 Turkey
asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to Turkish territory
against the possibility of an Iraqi attack, some European members of the alliance initially
hesitated to respond to Turkey’s demands positively. Second, the reluctance of some western
European members of the alliance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization or to
commit to ending the PKK’s activities in their territories has worried Turkey. As long as Turkish
public opinion remains convinced that the PKK owes its existence, at least in part, to support coming
from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO will be bound to decrease in the
years to come.4
Turkey has signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has thus far adopted a
position of non-nuclearization in its foreign policy. However, the changing nature of regional
politics in the Middle East in the wake of the latest war in Iraq might pose challenges in this
regard. For example, Iran’s nuclear ambitions raise strong concerns that it may acquire the technology to
produce nuclear weapons. It is no secret that other countries in the region might then follow suit.
Turkish decision-makers will find it hard to resist domestic calls for nuclearization if
NATO prevaricates in offering a full nuclear commitment to Turkey.
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Turn: In response to his Kibaroglu 2007 card, TNW withdrawal would actually cause
Turkey to proliferate because US deterrence would be gone.
Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, Kelleher was defense adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO and
deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, 10- 09, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical
Nuclear Weapons”, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher#bio
The role of tactical nuclear weapons in these discussions has not loomed large in much of the public or
private Washington discourse. It has received more informal play in Brussels, where the efforts to craft a
new NATO strategic concept quickly ran into private concerns about the ultimate fate of tactical
weapons. Several new working papers circulated by opponents of continued tactical nuclear deployment
in Europe have garnered quiet support from others. Germany, in particular, stimulated the push for
elimination of tactical weapons, as Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who also was a candidate
for chancellor in the September 2009 elections, advocated the elimination position . Turkey, however,
has reportedly suggested in internal conversations that a decision by the United States to
reduce its tactical nuclear weapons further would mark the end the grand alliance
bargain of the 1960s: Turkey, like other hosts, would have the U.S. nuclear shield and
would share in the physical control of the weapons in return for Ankara’s promise not to
develop its own nuclear weapons.[9]

TNW reductions cause Turkish nuclearization even though weapons symbolic

Arbman and Wigg 02 (Gunnar Arbman and Lars Wigg, security analysts at Pugwash. From the Pugwash
meeting number 270, Workshop on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Sigtuna, Sweden. May 24th-25th, 2002,
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/situgna.html)
The discussion then turned to American TNWs deployed in some NATO states. Arguments
for and against this deployment were presented, and it was regretfully concluded by the participants that
there seems to be no unanimous European wish to have them removed at present, even if
they mostly have a symbolic, political value. One view was that Turkey might decide to
develop an indigenous nuclear arsenal if NATO TNWs were withdrawn from it s territory.
Moreover it was argued that there is a general American belief, perhaps erroneous, that its European
allies want TNWs to remain deployed in some NATO countries.

Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and
Terror
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14- 07, “The EU Facing
Nuclear Weapons Challenges” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-
Conference.pdf
One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live
with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into
the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go
its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including
Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also
will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The
dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political,
economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice
for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor
this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing
such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt,
Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear
powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear
terrorism and war.
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OFFCASE 4: HEG GOOD DA

US – NATO relations high but remains vulnerable to US unilateralism

Slocombe 10 (WALTER B. SLOCOMBE June 2010 PERSPECTIVE Towards A New NATO Strategic
Concept A View from the United States http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07299.pdf)

Nonetheless, NATO remains for the US, as stated in the new national security strategy, »the pre-eminent
securi-ty alliance in the world today«, both the »cornerstone for US engagement with the world and a catalyst
for international action«. Most of the US’s other formal alliance relationships and all its less formal security
partnerships are essentially one-way streets where the US commits itself to help partners in their own defense
but without expecting much, if any, help from them outside the strict confines of the joint defense of the
partner in question. NATO is – with the partial excepti-on of Australia and to a much lesser extent Japan –
the only case where the US can realistically regard its part-ner as a potential source of assistance outside the
con-text of the US guarantee. This broader relationship is not, however, without its problems simply because
the US expects more of its NATO partners – so it is more likely that the partners will seem to fall short of
what the US expects, and that the allies will believe the US is pres-sing them to act more in its interests than
their own.

TNW withdrawal kills US credibility and hegemony, spurs allied prolif and
collapses NATO cohesion.
Yost, 2009

[Dr. David S., Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, International Affairs, “Assurance and US
extended deterrence in NATO,” July, 85: 4 (2009) 755–780, Wiley InterScience Database]

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries,

Possible consequences of a rupture with established arrangements
notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be

deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to

European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons
could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to
the security of NATO Europe. Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in
Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and

interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions
about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy
as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence
in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and
security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging
measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The United States has been engaged in nuclear
force cooperation with its allies in Europe since the 1950s, and this half-century of history has a certain political weight. If
the United
States unilaterally withdrew its remaining nuclear forces, the European allies would recognize that
something fundamental had changed in their relationship with Washington. If the withdrawal was undertaken at
the behest of the Europeans, US political leaders could for their part come to question the commitment of the European allies to bear their
VDEBATE 1NC

share of the risks and responsibilities associated with the alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture. Withdrawal
of the remaining US
weapons could lead to an erosion of confidence on both sides . Some allied observers are concerned that depending
on offshore and distant US central strategic systems to protect the European allies would not have the
same political significance as continued allied involvement in risk- and responsibility-sharing. NATO’s
nuclear burden-sharing arrangements help to maintain a common security culture within the alliance and to
prevent a division between the allies that possess nuclear arms and those that do not. The involvement
of non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear-sharing arrangements creates a quality of engagement and
solidarity distinct from that which would be feasible without that involvement. The political dynamics of the
alliance might well change without US nuclear weapons in Europe—and not for the better, in the view of some allied observers. Over time the
non-nuclear-weapon-state allies would almost certainly have less expertise regarding nuclear issues and less influence over (and less insight
into) US policy-making.70 Some allied observers fear that with no US nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States might be less likely to
engage in consultations with allies in defining doctrine and in making operational decisions. In short, some allied observers are concerned that
giving up the shared nuclear response capability could weaken the bonds that tie the NATO allies
together as a security community. Because the US extended deterrent provides NATO with a capability that is
jointly owned and operated, there is a high level of cohesion based on shared risks and responsibilities,
particularly among the NATO DCA states. Moreover, some allied observers maintain, some current non-nuclear weapon- state NATO allies
cannot be protected from aggression or coercion without nuclear deterrence capabilities. If
the allies gave up the current nuclear
sharing arrangements and relied solely on the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United
States, the alliance’s nuclear deterrent posture could be seen as less credible by the non-nuclear-weapon-

state allies, if not by potential adversaries . A security gap dividing the nuclear-weapon-state allies from non-nuclear-weapon-
state allies could emerge in the perceptions of the latter group of countries. Indeed, if the British and French forces were reduced further, the
political gap between the United States and most of its NATO allies in nuclear risk- and responsibility- sharing could be widened. Moreover,
the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe could be seen as a break with the historic
transatlantic bargain whereby the United States plays a leading role in return for providing a security guarantee. It could
contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment to the collective defence
pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a time when the meaning of collective defence is being reconsidered, owing
in part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyber warfare. Some European allied observers hold that the complete withdrawal of
US nuclear weapons from Europe would be interpreted, at least in some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso
facto weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent . The implications for assurance of the NATO European
allies could therefore be profound. The consequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in

Europe would include the loss of the crisis management options provided by an alliance deterrent posture involving
aircraft from multiple allies. This arrangement makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signal—one of a united and resolute
alliance—distinct from a US (or British or French) national action. It is difficult to imagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear
risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent benefits for alliance cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but
the examination of other approaches may well be an issue in the alliance’s Strategic Concept review. In this review assurance and extended
deterrence will be considered in a dynamic context involving other NATO policy challenges—including missile defence, relations with Russia,
the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms control and disarmament,
and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made remain to be seen.
VDEBATE 1NC

In response to Kahili 2010, we are not hypocritical in foreign policy because

we are the only nation that should stands in the way of great power conflict.

Scenario 1: US heg collapse will indefinitely result in nuclear wars around the
globe
Kagan, 2007

[Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , “End of Dreams, Return
of History” Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the
United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and

Compared to the
because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations.

ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace-loving equals,
conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar
system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however,
it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers . It is also comparatively benevolent,
from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance

does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world.

The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European
Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a
post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it
is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical
tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since
the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not
mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now
competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the

the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to

desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world,

what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European,
postmodern view that power is passé; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing
to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security,

Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern
are important for a nation.

power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more
traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about
North Korea's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little
brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this
competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn
between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more

Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being
like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past.

driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply
seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant
influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as

means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and
Japan, is

moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about
threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16
Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make
insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with

traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on
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Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself,
correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its
nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a
pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe
supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority,
to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a
nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that
would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their
national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its
"century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who
are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant
America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations,
Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently,
Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing

Even as it
through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in
these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with
Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though
Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic
reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just
want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be

Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is

nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.

international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents
these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United
States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations
would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past : sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but
often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar
world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between
them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of
stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their
home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw
materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not.

Conflict between nations would involve struggles on

Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond.

the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major
conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible . Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of
peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations

Europe's stability depends on

after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today

the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the U nited S tates could step in to check any dangerous
development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without
renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often
succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished,
the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations
of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of
power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the
interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it
would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict

Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers
among the world's great powers.

may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between
Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory.
Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern

states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States
pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the U nited S tates weakens or withdraws from its positions of

regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American
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power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region . That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China,
which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an

ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In

Europe, too, the departure of the U nited S tates from the scene -- even if it remained the world's
most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially

forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the
Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe,

If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it

history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism.

adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict
involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the U nited States back in under unfavorable
circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine

that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive,
"offshore" role would lead to greater stability there . The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access
open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more
"even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became
threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the

In the Middle
region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation.

East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least
two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more
threatening dimension to the competition , which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate
American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and

peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American
influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper
involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran,
to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia,
China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new
instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of
burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the
future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Scenario 2: Allied prolif causes nuclear war.

Millot, Defense Analyst at RAND, 1994 [Marc Dean, Washington Quarterly, Summer, Lexis]
The outcome of this refusal to face the emerging reality of regional nuclear adversaries is that the United States is not preparing seriously for the possibility of

If
having to fight in a regional nuclear war. If it continues down this path, it will be unable to cope with the potential threat of nuclear aggression against its allies.

it cannot assure the security of its allies against this threat, the result is likely to be further proliferation
among these allies, highly unstable regional military situations, a severe reduction of the U nited States'
international influence, and a growing probability of regional nuclear wars involving U.S. forces.
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NATO solves multiple escalatory nuclear wars.

Duffield, 1994
[John Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia,
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 109, 1994, p. 766-7.]

important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring

Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three

relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the
alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory.
These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in
neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institu tional adaptation. Since
the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing

and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts
from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that
the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the

NATO has contributed to making

past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies,

the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable . In all these ways, NATO clearly
serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical
and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by

the United States could easily be drawn into a future major

American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover,

war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past,
given the existence of nuclear weapons.