(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,Vol. 9, No. 3, March 2011
captures and saves the authentication messages sent by thelegitimate RS/SS. Thus adversary impersonates the legitimateRS/SS and resends this message after specific period of time.Denial of service (DoS) is also one of the major attacks inwireless networks especially in WiMAX networks. Here,consider an adversary that eaves-dropping the message cannotderive the AK as it does not have the corresponding privatekey. This adversary still can replay AUTH-REQ messagemultiple times and thus exhaust MR-BS capabilities and forceMR-BS to deny this adversary. This may happen, if the MR-BS sets a time out value which makes MR-BS reject AUTH-REQ message from the same RS/SS with an interval of time.Thus, MR-BS denies the legitimate RS/SS AUTH-REQ,which actually owns the certificate. DoS are common inauthentication, key management protocols and M & Bservices. Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attack is another criticalattack and is generally applicable in communication protocolscheme where mutual authentication is absent especially inPKMv1. This attacks leads to message modification andmasquerading problems, specially node spoofing, rogue baseas well as relay stations, theft of service (ToS). To avoidMiTM attack on PKM protocol, mutual authentication wasproposed i.e. PKMv2. No doubt PKMv2 is soundly safe forMiTM but it cannot help allowing adversary to playinterleaving attack.Interleaving attack in complex to be explained but easy toattempt. An adversary attempts this attack with the help of twodifferent instances. In the first instance, adversaryimpersonates as SS/RS and sends the interrupted message tothe MR-BS. MR-BS authenticates and replied withcorresponding keys. Adversary needs to reply these keys toRS/SS to be successfully authenticated, as it cannot decryptthe message encrypted by the SS/RS’s public key in order toget the AK to encrypt the nonce challenge. Thus, it cannot doauthentication currently. Now to solve this technicality,adversary force RS/SS to run another protocol instance toanswer the challenge. Once RS/SS send the request, adversaryreplies SS with the same nonce challenge which the MR-BSsends him. Thus RS/SS send nonce and AK to adversarywhich later sends to MR-BS to finish this authenticationsuccessfully. This attack normally can occur only on PKMv2or where mutual authentication is present. In IEEE 802.16Multihop networks, the number of wireless devices engross isincreased, thus produce wide space for interleaving attack .IV.
Centralized Security Control
In this mode, the intermediate RS is not involved with theestablishment of the security association (SA) between MSand MR-BS in the multihop relay system. The RS only simplyrelays the user data or MAC management message that itreceives from the MS, but the RS does not process it. RS doesnot have any key information relevant to the MS, and all thekeys related to MS are maintained at the MS and MR-BS .When the SA is established between RS and MR-BS in theMR system, key data is shared and maintained at the particularRS and MR-BS, such as AK, and the intermediate RS does nothave this key information. The intermediate RS use particularshared keys to authenticate management messages whichreceived from other RSs .
B. Distributed Security Control
In this mode, an access RS, which provides a point of access into the network for an MS or RS, can derive theauthentication key established between MS and MR-BS. AnRS can be configured to operate in distributed security modebased on its capability during the registration process, andrelays initial key management messages between the MR-BSand MS/subordinate RS. Upon master session keyestablishment, access RS securely acquires relevantAuthorization Key of the subordinate RS/MS from the MR-BS. Using PKM protocol, the access RS can derives allnecessary keys. Different traffic encryption keys (TEKs) areused for relay link and access link in distributed securitycontrol mode. They are distributed by MR-BS and RSrespectively . The SA will be created between an MS,an access RS and the MR-BS in distributed security mode.Each MS shall establish an exclusive primary SA with the RS,interacting with the RS as if it were a BS from the MS’s view.Similarly, each RS shall establish an exclusive primary SAwith MR-BS .V.
Non-transparent Relay-based WiMAX network mayrequire the following security function, which have not widelybeen studied by others until now.
Localized and hop-by-hop authentication is required.In Relay-based WiMAX network. NRS in introducedfor coverage extension and throughput enhancement,for this purpose, hop-by-hop authentication betweenNRS, NRS/MS and NRS/MR-BS should besupported for self organized network operations.
All the participating devices must be validated andauthenticated by AAA server through MR-BS,because digital certificates of participating devicesare only registered in AAA server database, however,NRS should authenticate other NRS/MS on behalf of MR-BS, and basically this concept leads ourproposed scheme towards self organized way.
Conventional MS should be used in non-transparentRelay-based WiMAX network without any functionalmodification in MS.
Overall authentication overhead should beminimized.In this paper we proposed self organized distributed andlocalized authentication and key management, where initiallyparticipating devices validated and authenticated by MR-BSand afterward NRSs are responsible for authenticating andmanaging freshness of AK/TEK. The proposed schemealleviates above security problems and examined how itsatisfies the security requirements of non-transparent Relay-based WiMAX networks.
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