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SIPRI Isigts  Pac ad Scurity
SUMMARY
w
All European Union (EU)member states are required tosubmit information on armsexport licences and armsexports for inclusion in the EUannual reports on armsexports.The example of CentralAsia— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan—shows that thedata in these EU annual reportshas only a limited utility formonitoring exports of arms andmilitary equipment. Thespecic case of Uzbekistan,which was subject to an EUarms embargo between 2005and 2009, shows that certaintransfers of apparent concernhave been reported but notinvestigated, while othertransfers have not appeared inthe annual reports.Although Central Asia is not amajor market for EU armsexports, the case highlights thechallenges of using the data inthe annual reports to assess theharmonization of arms exportpolicies in the EU.Specic steps can be taken toimprove the annual reports andto extend their utility. Theseinclude: expanding the coverage of the annual reportsto include more detail onspecic transfers, includingend-users; increasingparliamentary oversight at both the national and Europeanlevels;monitoring licensingarrangements for theproduction of arms andmilitary equipment outside theEU; andreconsidering the roleand purpose of EU armsembargoes and improving theirmonitoring.
The lIMITATIonS ofeURoPeAn UnIon RePoRTSon ARMS exPoRTS: TheASe of enTRAl ASIA
pl olom d mk boml*
No. 2010/5 September 2010
I. Introduction
Each year since 1999 the Eurean Unin (EU) has uishe infratinn its eer states’ issuing f ars exrt icences an actua arsexrts. These rerts are intene as a eans f nitring harniza­tin etween eer states an their ciance with the EU’s rues nars exrts—st recenty ene in the 2008 EU Cn Psitin.
1
Yet,whie the aunt f infratin in these rerts has increase with eachyear, they have een ut t ny iite use.This aer uses the exae f Centra Asia—that is, the ve states Kazah­stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiistan, Turenistan an Uzeistan—t assess hwthe cia ata n exrt icences an actua exrts cntaine in thesererts can e use fr nitring exrts f ars an iitary equient.By atteting t eterine th the genera attern f ars ws an thesecic iatera eas an reatinshis that are reveae y the uisheata, it aws an assessent f this transarency t. By ing as atthe cases where states have refuse t aw exrts, this aer erits anassessent f hw rigrusy an cnsistenty the criteria agree y a EUeers fr assessing exrt icence aicatins are eing aie.Centra Asia rvies a usefu case stuy fr this tye f assessent. First,the sa nuer f states in the regin an the reativey sa vue f ars, iitary equient an training rvie y EU eer states tCentra Asian states ean that it is ssie t ae a crehensive assess­ent f a avaiae ata. Secn, the interna situatin in any f thesecuntries—in ters f, fr exae, the resect fr huan rights an theris f are cnict—as aes the regin an exceent sae t testharnizatin f EU eer states’ exrt cntrs.
2
Whie the EU arsearg n Uzeistan, which was ise fwing a assacre f civi­
1
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP o 8 December 2008 defning common rules govern­ing control o exports o military technology and equipment,
Ocial Journal of the European Union
,L335, 8 Dec. 2008.
2
E.g. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are among the 9 countries judged to have the worst humanrights conditions in 2010 according to Freedom House. Freedom House, ‘Worst o the Worst 2010:
* The authors are grateul to the Open Society Institute’s Central Eurasia Project orunding the background research on which this paper is based. The fndings, inter­pretations and conclusions presented here are those o the authors.
 
2
p  o p d  o. 2010/5ians in Anijan in 2005 y Uze security frces, was ifte in Nveer2009, events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have again rawn attentin t the cn­uct f the state security frces in Centra Asia.Sectin II f this aer utines the EU fraewr fr harnizing thecntr f exrts f ars an iitary equient an escries the wayin which the EU ises ars earges. Sectin III resents the atacecte fr EU annua rerts n icences an exrtsf ars an iitary equient t Centra Asia fr EUeer states, an as etais the gruns n which exrticences have een enie. Sectin IV s at the secic casef Uzeistan, etaiing ars exrts efre the EU isean ars earg in 2005 an exaining susecte eargviatins. Drawing n the receing sectins, sectin V iscusses the cha­enges f using ata fr the EU annua rerts t nitr transfers f arsan iitary equient. It as cnsiers the icuty f using the ata frthese rerts t fuy unerstan icensing ecisins. The aer cncuesin sectin VI with a series f recenatins fr irving uic anariaentary versight f exrts f ars an iitary equient fr theEU.
II. European Union arms export controls
The EU Common Position
3
Since the 1957 Treaty f Re estaishe the EU’s reecessr, arsexrts, ang with ther efence­ an security­reate issues, have eenargey exete fr EU an Eurean Cunity rues.
4
Hwever, since1991–92, when the Eurean Cunci ate eight criteria against whichEU eer states agree t assess their ars exrts (see x 1), there haseen a cncerte ert t eve harnize ars exrt icies ang eer states.
5
These eight criteria were incrrate int the EureanUnin Ce f Cnuct n Ars Exrts (the EU Ce f Cnuct), whichwas ate as a iticay ining instruent y the Cunci f the Eur­ean Unin in June 1998.
6
Meer states ust eny an exrt icence if thetransfer is eee t cnict with any f criteria 1–4 an ust ‘tae int
the world’s most repressive societies’, 3 June 2010, <http://www.reedomhouse.org/template.cm?page=137>.
3
This section draws on Bromley, M.,
The Impact on Domestic Policy of the EU Code of Conducton Arms Exports: The Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Spain
, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 21 (SIPRI:Stockholm, 2008); and Bromley, M., ‘10 years down the track: the EU Code o Conduct on ArmsExports’,
European Security Review
, no. 39 (July 2008), pp. 11–13.
4
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty o Rome), signed 25 Mar. 1957,entered into orce 1 Jan. 1958. The ormal title was changed in 1992 to the Treaty Establishing theEuropean Community and again in 2009 to the Treaty on the Functioning o the European Union.Article 223 o the original, 1957 text was renumbered as Article 296 in 1992, and is now Article 346o the 2009 version o the treaty. The various versions o the Treaty o Rome are available at <http:// eur­lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/>.
5
European Council, Conclusions, DOC/91/2, Luxembourg, 29 June 1991, Annex VII, ‘Declarationon non­prolieration and arms exports’; and European Council, Presidency Conclusions, DOC/92/3,Lisbon, 27 June 1992, p. 14.
6
Council o the European Union, European Union Code o Conduct on Arms Exports,document 8675/2/98 Rev 2, Brussels, 5 June 1998, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pd>.
Events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have againdrawn attention to the conduct o thestate security orces in Central Asia
 
 lmo o  po o m po
3
accunt’ the factrs iste in criteria 5–8 when cnsiering a icence ai­catin.Uner the EU Ce f Cnuct, eer states citte theseves tset ‘high cn stanars which shu e regare as the iniu frthe anageent f, an restraint in, cnventina ars transfers’ an ‘treinfrce ceratin an t rte cnvergence in the e f cnven­tina ars exrts’ within the fraewr f the EU’s Cn Freign anSecurity Picy (CFSP).
7
T he achieve this, the eer states agree tcnentiay share infratin n the exrt icences grante an eniean n actua exrts f ars an iitary equient. This infratin hassince een incue in uicy avaiae annua rerts.Fwing its creatin, the EU Ce f Cnuct unerwent signicantchanges. First, in 2000 the Cunci intruce the Cn Miitary List,escriing the 22 categries f ars, unitins, iitaryequient an techngies suject t the EU Ce. Thisist is reguary uate.
8
Secn, the egree f etai neer states’ exrt icences an actua exrts thataears in the EU annua rerts has increase sustantiay. Thir, in 2003the Cunci uishe the rst versin f a uicy accessie user’s guie,aie at assisting with the ieentatin f the EU Ce, in articuarreating t avice n the interretatin f the eight criteria. The user’s guiehas een uate n a reguar asis.
97
Council o the European Union (note 6), p. 2.
8
For the latest version, see Council o the European Union, Common Military List o the Euro­pean Union, adopted by the Council on 15 Feb. 2010,
Ocial Journal of the European Union
, C69,18 Mar. 2010.
9
The current version o the user’s guide is Council o the European Union, User’s Guide to Coun­cil Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defning common rules governing the control o exports o military technology and equipment, document 9241/09, Brussels, 29 Apr. 2009.
There has been a concerted efort todevelop harmonized arms export policies
Box 1.
The eight criteria o the European Union’s Common Position defning common rules governing control o exports o military technology and equipment
1. Respect or the international obligations and commitments o Member States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UNSecurity Council or the European Union, agreements on non­prolieration and other subjects, as well as other internationalobligations.2. Respect or human rights in the country o fnal destination as well as respect by that country o international humanitarianlaw.3. Internal situation in the country o fnal destination, as a unction o the existence o tensions or armed conicts.4. Preservation o regional peace, security and stability.5. National security o the Member States and o territories whose external relations are the responsibility o a Member State,as well as that o riendly and allied countries.6. Behaviour o the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism,the nature o its alliances and respect or international law.7. Existence o a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re­exported underundesirable conditions.8. Compatibility o the exports o the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity o therecipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and deence needswith the least diversion o human and economic resources or armaments.
Source
: Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP o 8 Dec. 2008 defning common rules governing control o exports o mili­tary technology and equipment,
Ocial Journal of the European Union
, L335, 8 Dec. 2008.
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