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ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ

Current document represents educational material and it is based on non-classified sources

and on personal observations. In case of any other kind use of this publication, author is not
responsible. The opinions and recommendations represented by this document should not be
considered as official position of INFORMATION SECUIRTY STUDIES AND ANALYSIS
CENTER, which by itself represents this document.

© Ana Sulakvelidze
All Rights Reserved.

It is strictly forbidden copying and redistribution of this document, without author¶s

agreement.

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The research concerns the main trends of cyber warfare, and the challenges related to
cybersecurity. The cyber standards of the United States and several international legal
frameworks along with the practical measures are discussed in the paper. Moreover, the most
massive and popular cases of cyber warfare are mentioned in a chronological way. Country
specifics, particularly, divergent approaches to cybersecurity, are demonstrated through the
examples of the United States, Russia, and Georgia. Significance of cyber tools in intelligence
activities, and the increasing role of cyber terrorism are also discussed in the research. Finally,
the relevant conclusion is outlined which includes the main recommendations from the author.

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The article represents an overview of a newly released National Security Concept of Georgia
and the related papers published by American think-tanks: the American Progress, and the
American Interest. In addition to these materials, Georgian Law on Occupied Territories and
the State Strategy on Occupied Territories are also discussed in the article. The author offers
her own suggestions and opinions on the issue.c

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 !!"#

New Year started for Georgia with the discussions of a revised National Security Concept,
which will be adopted by the Georgian Parliament during the spring sessions. The new
document and its predecessor (Georgia¶s National Security Concept 2005) have much in
common, namely, major social, economical, and political approaches and directions.
Nevertheless, security aspects and challenges related to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia
and so-called South Ossetia are differently outlined in a new concept. The most significant
accent made by Georgian officials regarding Georgia¶s national security is Russo-Georgian
war of August and its consequences. Even though the final version of the concept is not yet
elaborated, and current document represents a draft which is permanently discussed by the
Georgian policymakers, global changes and shifts are not expected in the document¶s final
version. I had an opportunity to read this document. What I have read in a chapter dedicated
to security issues, inspired me to write this article, where I concentrate on a basic question
regarding the future of existing conflicts: does there exist a window for a resolution, or will
the conflicts freeze?

The National Security Concept of Georgia 2011 represents a core document where Georgia¶s,
as an independent and sovereign state¶s, major challenges, problems, and purposes are
delineated by the Georgian government, and which should be approved by the Georgian
legislative body, Parliament of Georgia. The ideas and approaches exposed in this document
will, unquestionably, have a dramatic impact on country¶s future development.

Particularly interesting to me appeared the chapter dedicated to the security issues, and
challenges related to Georgia¶s ³BIG´ neighbor and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
so-called South Ossetia. To start with the ³BIG´ neighbor, Russia is considered in the
document as an occupant and the main threat to Georgia¶s national security. Moreover, the
document emphasizes that an intense militarization of the breakaway regions represents a
potential threat of Russia¶s repeated invasion in Georgia. In addition, the Concept highlights
that, Russia¶s intrinsic purpose while triggering the August War was a forceful downfall of
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Georgia¶s democratic government, which means that Russia intended to return Georgia to
³Russian orbit´. The document strictly condemns the violation of the Sarkozy-Medvedev
Ceasefire Agreement (September 2008) by the
Russian party, and calls for the international
community to pressure Russia into meeting its
1
obligations. Here I would admit that increased
pressure on Russia from the European countries
regarding unmet obligations of the Sarkozy-
Medvedev agreement is under question. Current
revolutionary mood in Middle East and North Africa, and a volatile security environment
prevailing in the region, makes Europe more dependent on Russia¶s energy supplies,
subsequently, making it more reluctant to irritate the bloc¶s main energy supplier. 2

The document also outlines the major security challenges Georgia faces in terms of territorial
integrity, and the central aims country has to achieve. According to the document, Georgia¶s
government is willing and ready to restore country¶s territorial integrity through peaceful
mechanisms and dialogue between involved parties; furthermore, Georgia will resist Russia¶s
any attempt to change demographic and property situations in the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, including all formal agreements Russia tries to impose
on the populations of the regions. Peaceful mechanisms for ³de-occupation´ of Abkhazia and
so-called South Ossetia is outlined in two documents adopted by the Georgian government in
2010: State Strategy on Occupied Territories, Integration Policy3, and Integration Policy
Action Plan4. The first document mainly portrays how Georgian government and society
envisage a peaceful integration of the breakaway regions into Georgian life, and the second
one depicts by what means the process should be led in the future.

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1
National Security Concept of Georgia. 2011. Draft version.

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cPutin Questions Europe¶s Foreign and Energy Policies. New York Times. Stephen Castle. February 24, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/europe/25putin.html?_r=3&partner=rss&emc=rss

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State Strategy on Occupied Territories. Integration Policy. 2010.
http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_132584_SMR-Strategy-ge(1).pdf
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Integration Policy Action Plan. 2010. http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_382248_action_plan_ge.pdf
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One important point which is mentioned in the National Security Concept of Georgia as a
priority for Georgian state is an intensified cooperation with the North Caucasus. According
to the document, Georgia intends to strengthen its ties with the North Caucasus, and to
contribute its efforts to the process of conflict resolution in the region. Georgia¶s support of
the North Caucasus people and their activities is considered by Russian policymakers as a
flagrant encouragement of separatism. Worthy to note that, in the US Intelligence Community
annual report to the Senate ³Georgia¶s public efforts to engage with various ethnic groups in
Russian North Caucasus´ are appreciated negatively, as they contribute to the escalation of
regional tensions. 5

While pondering on Georgia¶s national security and its regional conflicts, it is entirely
inescapable that the US position is inserted in the discussion. Generally speaking, the United
States is reluctant to recognize Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia as independent states.
US considers Russia¶s activities in the breakaway regions as illegitimate and inconsistent
with the International law. In short, US supports Georgia¶s territorial integrity. The US
supportive policy toward Georgia was demonstrated several times, and with quite precise
messages for Russia. US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in January 2009
represents the core document in US-Georgia relations, where Georgia is viewed as an
important strategic partner for
6
the United States.
Moreover, the United States
appreciates Georgia¶s
contributions to the Coalition
efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan military
operations as an important
step toward NATO
membership. Furthermore,
America¶s support to Georgian state is not circumscribed with the military and financial
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cStatement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. February 10, 2011.
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110210_testimony_clapper.pdfc
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United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. 2009. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/121029.htm
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³subsidies´ ; American non-profit, non-governmental, and governmental organizations such
are: National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), USAID,
and IREX contribute considerable efforts and funds in order to strengthen democratic
processes in Georgia. In addition, US high ranked officials¶ frequent visits to Georgia, and,
vice-versa, Georgian top officials¶ visits to the United States represent an extra evidence of
US-Georgia strategic partnership.

Needless to cite all of the US political and financial ³gifts´ to Georgia in order to demonstrate
how supportive and sympathetic America is toward its strategic partner. Nevertheless, several
American think-tanks judge differently.

The National Security Concept of Georgia 2011 was not the only document issued on the
Georgian national security issues. The Center for American Progress released in February
2011 a comprehensive report on Georgia¶s regional conflicts: Ô
 
  Ô 
          

The first and foremost alarm accentuated by the report is the fact that, Georgia will be unable
to focus on development while it faces serious regional conflicts. Consequently, Georgian
political elite has to concentrate first on these conflicts. Nevertheless, Georgian policymakers
alone without a more proactive American approach to the conflicts will fail to find a workable
solution to the existing territorial challenges. The document calls for the American
government to adopt a more proactive policy, and to engage in the conflict resolution process
to a greater extent. Particularly, the authors of the document outline specific steps that should
be addressed by the US government in current security situation prevailing the region:
conflict resolution and Russo-Georgian relations should be declared as a centerpiece of US
approach to the region; US should promote a neutral narrative regarding the August War (all
parties are responsible for creating ³a highly volatile security environment in the region,
which led to the outbreak of hostilities´); the normalization of Russo-Georgian ties and future
engagements with the breakaway regions must be considered by the US officials as a core part

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A More Proactive US Approach to Georgia Conflicts. February 15, 2011. Samuel Charap & Cory Welt.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/georgia_report.html
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of conflict resolution; a balanced policy on defensive arms provision should be adopted by
US in order to lessen Russia¶s anxiety regarding Georgia¶s militarization. 8

The report emphasizes that Georgia has three conflicts, not one: with Russia, with Abkhaz,
and South Ossetians. And even if a miracle occurs and Russia withdraws its troops from
Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, Georgia¶s conflicts with the breakaway regions will
9
remain unresolved. Consequently, according to the report, Georgia has to focus its efforts
not only on Russo-Georgian conflict, calling Russia an occupant party, but also has to depict
feasible ways for the resolution of its internal conflicts.

Regarding the internal conflicts, two major state documents are discussed in the report: Law
on Occupied Territories (October 23, 2008) and State Strategy on Occupied Territories,
Integration Policy (2010). The authors of the report underscore the major inconsistencies of
these documents, that may bring to certain ambiguities in the future. Indeed, the two
documents are contradictory. On the one hand, the Law on Occupied Territories bans any
type of economical and financial activities in the breakaway regions, imposes restrictions on
freedom of movement, declares the local authorities as entirely illegal, and provides several
other limitations.10 On the other hand, a newly released Georgia¶s Strategy on Occupied
Territories, Integration Policy supports economical/financial activities, and freedom of
movement in the regions. According to the Strategy, Georgia¶s government intends to
cooperate with the local residents and even local authorities; plans to build an infrastructure
which will link the bifurcated societies; considers to make available the advantages of
Georgian social and educational policies for the residents of the breakaway regions; is
committed to improve information transparency and ease of access for the region populations,
and to boost public diplomacy.11 It doesn¶t take much effort to notice a substantial
contradiction between these documents.

Another important point made in the report concerns Russia¶s necessary involvement in the
process of conflict resolution. Russia is certainly part of the problem, and it should be part of
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8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
Law on Occupied Territories. 2008, October. Parliament of Georgia.
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=69&kan_det=det&kan_id=3089
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State Strategy on Occupied Territories. Integration Policy. 2010.
http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_132584_SMR-Strategy-ge(1).pdf
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the solution.12 Consequently, Georgia¶s position to continue calling Russia occupant is not
pragmatic, and needs to be overseen. Similarly, according to the report, Russia must oversee
its positions toward the current situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, withdrawing its
active military forces from the regions, and soften the attitude toward Georgia¶s democratic
government. In addition, Russia should show its commitment to nonuse of force against
Georgia.

Nevertheless, the situation in the breakaway regions and the relations between involved
parties are tensed, Charap and Welt believe that, the window for a conflict resolution exists,
and that 2011 is the best time for this. The authors¶ enthusiastic approach to the issue raises
from a belief that, regardless the August War and its consequences, Russia and Georgia have
never stopped being ³partners´. Russia¶s financial investments, import-export statistics 13, and
currently spread news that Russia¶s INTER-RAO may seek to increase its share of 75% to
95% in Tbilisi Telasi, the main source of Tbilisi power14, demonstrate that Russo-Georgian
conflict was not a big deal for the financial partnership.

Finally, Charap and Welt believe that, several short term policies and action plans may be
adopted by the parties without altering
their positions on the fundamental
disagreements that divide them. Such
short term policies and steps will
prepare a background for the conflict
resolution in a peaceful way.15

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cA More Proactive US Approach to Georgia Conflicts. February 15, 2011. Samuel Charap & Cory Welt.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/georgia_report.htmlc


c A More Proactive US Approach to Georgia Conflicts. February 15, 2011. Samuel Charap & Cory Welt.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/georgia_report.htmlc

14
Georgia to Have Russian Company Finance Sale of Shares in State-Owned Power Company. www.Oilprice.com
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Georgia-to-Have-Russian-Company-Finance-Sale-of-Shares-in-State-Owned-
Power-Company.html

c A More Proactive US Approach to Georgia Conflicts. February 15, 2011. Samuel Charap & Cory Welt.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/georgia_report.htmlc
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Worthy of note, that the report represents a scrutinized analysis of Georgia¶s internal and
external conflicts. The document comprehensively explores past conflicts, present situation,
and future perspectives. Nevertheless, I would agree with the several ideas expressed by the
authors of the report, there are some that I consider to be overly optimistic. I agree with
Charap and Welt that, Georgia has three conflicts, and the problem of bifurcated societies has
to be addressed with the relevant steps; however, I would admit that these conflicts (with
Abkhaz and so-called South Ossetians) were triggered by Russia, particularly by the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union, and then Russia supported separatism in the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia in order to maintain the role of a region guard, while
retaining its positions in South Caucasus. This was an effective implementation of an
³ethnic conflict policy´ by a former empire that did not want to accept its own moribund.
Consequently, the likelihood that Russia is interested in conflict resolution is very low.
Nonetheless, I agree that Georgia¶s position to call Russia occupant is not pragmatic.
Accentuating the fact that Russia is an occupant party in legal documents is entirely
acceptable and necessary, but aggressive rhetoric toward Russia only exacerbates the
situation.

Mentioned contradictions between Georgia¶s core documents on the occupied territories:

Law on Occupied Territories and the State Strategy on Occupied Territories, Integration
Policy, are obvious and worth of criticism. I agree with the report, that these discrepancies
should be eliminated and edited by the Georgian authorities. Otherwise, this incongruity will
negatively impact the process of policy implementation.

Another point I would like to concentrate on is the economical partnership between Russia
and Georgia, which, according to Charap and Welt, prevailed on the August War. I do believe
that this partnership has nothing to do with Russia¶s policy and positions toward Russo-
Georgian conflict. Even though, Russian direct investments in Georgia raised from 3.81
million US dollars in 2008 to 41.22 million US dollars in 200916, and Russian power
company INTER-RAO may seek to increase its shares in Tbilisi Telasi from 75 percent to 95
percent, these facts do not provide a warrant for Russia¶s readiness to contribute to the conflict
resolution. On the contrary, if these funds do not come from Russia¶s private sector, and the
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Ibid
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investments are controlled by the Russian state, this puts Georgia¶s national security in a
very undesirable situation.

Finally, I would agree with Charap and Welt that specific short term policies and action plans
can be adopted without any global changes in the fundamental positions of the conflict parties.
Nonetheless, a chasm between the fundamental positions of Russia and Georgia is so big
that, it would be a naiveté to believe the short term policies can fill this chasm. Specific short
term action plans and steps can solve the problem of bifurcated societies, and positively
impact Georgia¶s conflicts with Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, however, the
resolution of Russo-Georgian conflict needs fundamental changes in Russia¶s foreign policy.
Interesting enough to consider Russian officials¶ points regarding the Ceasefire Agreement
and the status of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia. They say, the agreement¶s initial text
was altered, Russia has never considered to be a party of the conflict. Moreover, they assert
that, Russia fulfilled its obligations and withdrew the forces that fought, however, they were
replaced by the new ones. Finally, Russian officials contend that, the world where
17
independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not exist has gone. Based on the
points expressed by Russian party, it is more than obvious that without fundamental change in
Russia¶s approach to the conflict, a stalemate is guaranteed.

Another American think-tank, The American Interest, has published a spring issue paper: The
Vulnerability of Peripheries. The publication is dedicated to the US foreign policy analysis; in
particular, how the policy should be modified by the US officials in order to avoid deep crisis
in the peripheries, and how America should persuade its allies and foes that the notion about
the US approaching decline is wrong.

According to the document, current crises in the US peripheries (Caucasus, Persian Gulf, and
South China Sea) should be understood as the experiments that are predetermined to probe
America¶s reactions on altering security environment in its peripheries. The authors of the
publication believe that, Russo-Georgian War of August was an outstanding demonstration of

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Russia¶s ³probing´ policy toward the United States. Moreover, postwar situation which
18
remains tense represents a further probing action performed by Russia.

Taking the core idea of this document into consideration, Georgia appears entirely powerless
to achieve any type of success regarding its territorial conflicts, and that any policy, action
plan, and strategy adopted for the resolution of internal conflicts with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are predestined to fail. Because Georgia and its territorial conflicts are simply tools
exploited by one dominant power against another.

The recommendations for the US policymakers provided by the publication have much in
common with those from the American Progress report, A More Proactive Approach to
Georgia Conflicts. In particular, both papers emphasize the idea that America should
demonstrate more willingness to be involved in the political lives of its peripheries, especially
when it comes to the security issues.

Ô  

Each conflict should it be regional or global cannot be understood and discussed out of the
World Politics context. International political environment differently affects different regions
of the world, and these regions always have to consider what their neighbors, allies, and foes
intend, how they behave, and in what particular circumstances they pursue their aims.

Georgia¶s case is difficult, because along with the two internal conflicts, it also has an external
one. Nonetheless, all the three conflicts are tightly connected to each other, or even triggered
by one another, Georgia has to concentrate on each conflict separately.

Starting with the internal conflicts, Georgia¶s State Strategy on Occupied Territories,
Integration Policy and The Action Plan of this policy might play a significant role in the
process of conflicts resolution. Nevertheless, the Georgian government has to harmonize the
Strategy with the Law on Occupied Territories in order to facilitate the integration process.
The most important part of this action plan is the mechanisms of building public diplomacy;
without concentrating on the bifurcated society problem the prospects of integration are

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The Vulnerability of Peripheries. A. Wess Mitchell & Jakub Grygiel. The American Interest. March-April Issue.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=923c
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limited. Georgia¶s main focus in its internal conflicts should become the process of regaining
trust among the breakaway populations for deeper cooperation.

The path of peaceful conflict resolution is much harder for the involved parties, than a forceful
approach, but the atrocities of war are devastating for everybody. Georgia should persuade
Abkhaz and South Ossetian
societies that it will never use
force against them.

Georgia¶s positions toward

Russia and North Caucasus
should be cautiously assessed
by the Georgian
policymakers; aggressive
rhetoric in Russia¶s direction
should be moderated, and engagement in the North Caucasus political processes should also
be carefully appraised in order to avoid ³BIG´ neighbor¶s anxiety. A scenario of Russia¶s
potential dismemberment is quixotic at the moment, and Georgia shouldn¶t base the future of
its territorial integrity on this probability.

Russia¶s position toward Georgia is ambiguous, but the position toward the breakaway
regions of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia is clear. Russia asserts that, it is ready to
cooperate with Georgia in order to resolve the existing conflict, however, it continues to
recognize independence of the breakaway regions providing them financial and military
support. It is of vital significance for Georgian party not to forget about Russia¶s imperial
psychology. Russia is very unlikely to contribute to the process of conflicts resolution without
the fundamental change in its political platform. International pressure on Russia can alleviate
the security environment in the South Caucasus and contribute to the relative stability, but an
intrinsic change in Russian politics through the international influence should not be expected.

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Finally, when it comes to the American position in the above-mentioned conflicts, I believe
that this position is reasonable and doesn¶t need to be altered. The United States¶ supportive
policy toward Georgia in terms of economy, democratic progress, education, fiscal
modernization, military trainings and supplies, and in several other fields clearly demonstrates
that US considers Georgia as a partner and friend. A moderate and balanced approach to
Georgia conflicts does indicate that, America respects its partner¶s independence and
sovereignty, and believes that Georgia has to lead the process of conflict resolution without
the major intervention coming from foreign forces. Moreover, America¶s more proactive
approach and intense engagement in conflict situations in the South Caucasus will
unquestionably irritate Russia and exacerbate the security environment in the region. Even if
the ³the vulnerability of peripheries´ approach is accurate, and Georgia is a probing tool in
Russia¶s hands for testing America¶s reactions, then Georgia¶s regional conflicts become a
trap for the United States. Consequently, America has a stronger motivation not to engage
more actively in the South Caucasus conflicts, and to maintain its balanced approach.

To come to the point, the narrative about Russia-Georgia-America triangle needs to be

disentangled. America¶s more proactive policy toward Georgia conflicts is not a key for the
resolution of these conflicts. Georgia¶s internal conflicts with Abkhazia and so-called South
Ossetia may not freeze if Georgian authorities implement the Integration Policy in the
regions, and if they do their best to strengthen public diplomacy in order to regain trust
among the local populations. Concerning the Russo-Georgian conflict, it is already frozen.
Several factors make this conflict to freeze: on the one hand, Russia¶s firm position to impede
Georgia¶s Euro-Atlantic integration, and to continue recognizing the independence of
Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia; on the other hand, Georgia¶s reluctance to cooperate
with occupant Russia that doesn¶t respect Georgia¶s territorial integrity. The US role in
melting the ice between Georgia and Russia is best to remain moderate and balanced:
supportive for Georgia, and reminding of its unmet obligations for Russia.

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1.c National Security Concept of Georgia. 2011. (draft version)

2.c New York Times.
www.nyt.com
3.c State Strategy on Occupied Territories. Integration Policy. 2010. Government of
Georgia.
www.government.gov.ge
4.c Integration Policy Action Plan. 2010. Government of Georgia.
www.government.gov.ge
5.c Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
February 10, 2011.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
www.dni.gov
6.c United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. 2009.
Department of State
www.state.gov
7.c The American Progress. Report: A More Proactive US Approach to Georgia Conflicts.
www.americanprogress.com
8.c The American Interest. Publication: The Vulnerability of Peripheries.
www.the-american-interest.com
9.c Law on Occupied Territories. 2008, October. Parliament of Georgia.
www.parliament.ge
10.cOILPRICE. Online magazine.
www.oilprice.com

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Information Security Studies and Analysis Center is the first and only in the Caucasus region
oriented towards the field of Information Security.

Establishment of the organization was caused by the new reality to develop after 2008
Russian-Georgian conflict. The war in 2008 showed us that there were no systems developed
so far to provide protection against the means of informational warfare and cyber-terrorism,
this equally is a challenge to both public and private sectors. Non-existence of respective law
basis, governmental institutions and appropriate means to fight against cyber-crime and cyber-
terrorism affects not only the homeland security but economy of the country also.

Currently in both private or governmental sectors there are modern technologies actively
implemented, the bigger is the process automation scale the more dificcult is its control. In the
conditions where there are espionage and other security challenges, that are of a technological
character, there are new threats to rise, consequently security of the information becomes vital
to not only governmental organizations, but private sector also.

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Opposite to the named above threats and challenges our organization gathered a team of
experienced professionals, that gives us the opportunity for the first time in Georgia to
establish institutional mechanisms to fight cyber-terrorism, piracy, corporate espionage and so
on.

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We offer unique services to private and governmental sectors, such as:

3c Training of specialists in the fields of Information Secuirty, intelligence and anti-

terrorism;
3c Staffing;
3c Training to different type of employees of private and governmental sectors;
3c Audit in terms of informational security aspects and preparation of respective
recommendations;
3c Development of standards and SOPs;
3c Creation of organizational units for threat monitoring and incident reaction;
3c Consultancy in IT infrastructural issues, legal part of IT projects;
3c Development of software/hardware solutions, provision and implementation;
3c IT outsourcing, protected hosting on US servers, domain registration and etc.

The first priority to the center still remains study of the technological, geopolitical and
military challenges existing in the country, at the same time in-depth analysis of such, and
timely provision of the objective information to public. For this purpose analytical unit of
ISSAC periodically prepares and publishes analysis of modern threats and global trends. We
are maximally transparent in our activities and we help out those interested in these fields, we
give them knowledge base and encourage them to become part of the various projects
conducted by the center.
Our goal is to cooperate with as much governmental institution and educational units as
possible in order to ensure more effective fight against modern threats, create general/common
standards and means of implementation of these standards, increase the quality of
informationin this field to the society and provide our services to those who really needs it.

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