Emerging Economies Geopolitics

The Impact of China’s Growing Influence in Africa

By David H. Shinn

China is not new to Africa but the

change over the decades in its relations
with the continent is as revolutionary
as China’s own internal revolution.

Historical backdrop
China is not new to Africa but the change
over the decades in its relations with the
continent is as revolutionary as China’s own
internal revolution. From Mao Zedong’s lead-
ership in 1949 until the end of the Cold War
in the late 1980s, China’s ideological foreign
policy, Chinese internal developments and
other events exogenous to Africa deter-
mined the nature of the China-Africa relation-
ship. Although the Cold War had the great-
est impact on China’s ties with Africa, the

beginning of the 1980s. This set the stage

China-Africa trade passed the $1 billion level in 1980 and for dramatically increased economic interac-
jumped to $10 billion by 2000 while China has experi- tion between China and Africa. The end of
the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cold War
enced an average 9 percent GDP growth rate since the opened additional possibilities for expanding
beginning of the 1980s. This set the stage for dramatically economic relations and ended any rationale
increased economic interaction between China and Africa. for supporting governments or movements
solely on the basis of their revolutionary ide-
ology. The African reaction to the events at
Sino-Soviet conflict that began in the late Algeria, in spite of its limited resources. Chi- Tiananmen Square provided an indication of
1950s and continued until the mid-1980s na even provided assistance in the late 1950s future China-Africa political relations. While
was almost as important. China’s Great Leap and 1960s to several left-wing movements in Tiananmen Square resulted in harsh criticism
Forward from 1958 until the early 1960s and countries such as Cameroon and the Congo from the West, African countries remained
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that that opposed the existing independent gov- largely silent and a few even publicly sup-
began in 1966 and continued in a milder ernment. The Great Leap Forward and the ported Beijing’s position. China avoids criti-
form until 1976 also had significant implica- Cultural Revolution restrained China’s inter- cizing governance deficiencies and human
tions for China’s relations with Africa. The est in engaging countries far from its shores rights abuses in African countries. Nearly all
1989 Tiananmen Square protests coincided and from providing economic aid. In 1971, African governments, even those with strong
with the end of the Cold War and marked a African countries played an instrumental role democratic credentials and good human
watershed in the way Africa viewed China. in helping Beijing replace Taipei as the oc- rights records, reciprocate and almost never
Only a few African countries were in- cupant of China’s seat in the United Nations. criticize China’s human rights policies or in-
dependent in the 1950s and China’s weak China frequently refers favorably to this sup- ternal political issues.
economy limited its ability to interact with port in its political interaction with Africa.
Africa. China-Africa trade was a paltry $12 China-Africa trade passed the $1 billion China flexes its economic mus-
million in 1950, although it grew to $100 level in 1980 and jumped to $10 billion by cle at the turn of the century
million by 1960. China strongly supported 2000 while China has experienced an aver- The 21st century ushered in a dramatic in-
African liberation movements, starting with age 9 percent GDP growth rate since the crease in China-Africa interaction. China be-

16 The European Financial Review | April - May 2011


Most of China’s large infrastructure projects in Africa,
which are receiving significant publicity, are actually
based on loans. They usually come with low interest
rates and long-term repayment schedules.
gan to assert its global economic power at a
time when western nations were experienc-
ing pesky stock and housing market bubbles
and ill-advised financial dealings that result-
ed by 2008 in the most serious economic re-
cession since the American depression of the
1930s. China’s economy held up much bet-
ter than did western economies. At the same
time, western companies had been drawing
back from Africa while China and its state-
owned and private companies significantly
increased their engagement in Africa, in part
due to China’s voracious appetite for African
raw materials. China-Africa trade exceeded
$100 billion in 2008, fell back because of the
global recession to $91 billion in 2009 and
easily passed the $100 billion mark again in
2010. China also surpassed the United States
in 2009 as Africa’s most important bilateral
trading partner. Even with this phenomenal
growth in trade, Africa constitutes only about
4 percent of China’s global trade. On the oth-
er hand, more than 10 percent of Africa’s total
trade is with China.
While trade between China and Africa’s
fifty-three countries has been nearly in bal-
ance during the past decade, there are some
storm warnings. Because of the drop in the
price of oil, China had a $10 billion trade sur-
plus with Africa in 2009. About 70 percent
of Africa’s exports to China are crude oil and
another 15 percent is raw materials, mostly
minerals. Some fifteen African oil and min-
eral exporters have large trade surpluses with
China while more than thirty others have
sizeable trade deficits. In the case of those
African countries with consistently large
trade deficits, the trade relationship is prob-
ably not sustainable. China is taking steps
such as duty free imports from poorer African
countries to rectify the situation, but China’s
export power simply overwhelms most of its
trading partners. The African countries just
do not have significant amounts of products
other than raw materials that can crack the
Chinese market.
Chinese investment in Africa, which had
not been a significant factor until the begin-
ning of this century, reached according to of-
ficial Chinese statistics more than $9 billion
by the end of 2009. China actually reported
slightly higher direct investment in China by
African countries as of the end of 2009. While
China’s officially reported investment in Afri-
ca constitutes a modest amount compared
to western investment in Africa, it also seems
to understate significantly the magnitude of
Chinese investment, which would appear to
be at least double the official amount based
on informal calculations. Although accurate
statistics are elusive, China may have been
the single largest investor in Africa during
2009. In any event, in just ten years China has
gone from an insignificant investor in Africa
to one of its most important investors.
China remains well behind western coun-
tries in the amount of OECD-equivalent aid
that it provides to Africa. Most of China’s
large infrastructure projects in Africa, which
are receiving significant publicity, are actu-
ally based on loans. They usually come with
low interest rates and long-term repayment
schedules. While this component qualifies as
aid, they are also tied to Chinese construction
companies, sometimes with a significant Chi-
nese labor component. China does not pro-
vide annual country-by-country aid statistics.
In 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China
had provided $5.6 billion in foreign aid to Af-
rican countries since the beginning of its as-
sistance program. The African Development
Bank concluded in 2009 that China’s annual
aid to Africa is averaging between $1.4 billion
and $2.7 billion, while loans had reached $8.5
billion. While China remains an aid recipient,
it has also become an important aid donor to
Africa, although its total assistance remains
well behind that from the West.
Motivations of China and the
West in Africa
The motivations of China and western coun-
tries in Africa are surprisingly similar. Both see
Africa as a major source of oil and minerals.
The United States and Europe each import
about one-third of Africa’s total oil exports
while China takes only about 13 percent.
Higher total oil consumption in the West ac-
counts for this; about 90 percent of African
exports to the United States consist of oil.
China does import more mineral products
from Africa than does the United States. Nev-
ertheless, western countries need to exercise
care in criticizing China’s imports of raw ma-
terials from Africa when they are doing the
same thing on a larger scale.
Western countries need
to exercise care in criti-
cizing China’s imports of
raw materials from Africa
when they are doing the
same thing on a larger
scale.
On a global basis, Africa does not yet
constitute an important export market for
foreign goods because of its relative poverty
and underdevelopment. Africa purchases
only about 3 percent of total Chinese exports
and only about 2 percent of total American
exports. This situation is likely to change,
however, now that Africa’s population has
passed the 1 billion mark and African coun-
tries have achieved on average in the last five
years an annual GDP growth rate of about
5 percent. Both China and the West under-
stand that Africa is becoming a more impor-
tant market for their exports; they want to
be in a position to take advantage of Africa’s
growing prosperity.
China and western countries, especially
the United States, look to African countries
for political support in international forums.
China has a particular interest in mobilizing
African support in the UN Human Rights
Council where it is sometimes under pres-
sure from the West. Western nations and
China welcome African support in the World
Trade Organization. African states have three
non-permanent members on the UN Secu-
rity Council where China, the United States,
France, the United Kingdom and Russia all
www.europeanfinancialreview.com 17
 Emerging Economies Geopolitics
solicit their backing on key issues. China has
often been more successful than the West in
recent years in obtaining the support of Afri-
can governments in international forums.
China has one interest in Africa that is not
shared by the West—ending African diplo-
matic recognition of Taipei and replacing it
with Beijing. Only four African countries—
Burkina Faso, Gambia, Swaziland and São
Tomé and Principe—still recognize Taiwan.
Since Taiwan’s election in 2008 of President
Ma Ying-jeau, there has been an informal
truce between Beijing and Taipei concerning
competition for diplomatic recognition. The
truce is probably temporary; this competition
could return at any time as a major Chinese
interest in Africa.
Western countries are motivated by sev-
eral concerns that so far have little relevance
to China’s policy in Africa. Although both the
West and China generally seek political sta-
bility in Africa, western countries, especially
France, the United States and the United
Kingdom, have traditionally had stronger
security ties with certain African countries.
France continues to maintain several military
facilities in Africa while the United States has
a base in Djibouti for countering terrorism
in the region. The same western countries
continue to rely on the consent of African
governments for military aircraft over flight
and landing rights and access by their naval
vessels to African ports.
Key western nations give a higher priority
than China to a number of negative concerns
such as terrorism, money laundering, illegal
immigration and drug trafficking that plague
Africa and other world regions. The West
seeks to minimize these threats so that they
do not harm western interests in Africa or
manifest themselves in Europe and the Unit-
ed States. China is demonstrating increasing
concern about them. For the past two years,
China has been an active participant in the
anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden as
its own shipping interests have been threat-
ened. China is also increasing its cooperation
with the African Union on counterterrorism
and money laundering.
Strong China-Africa govern-
ment-to-government ties
China gives its highest foreign policy priority
to developing strong links with governments
18 The European Financial Review | April - May 2011
irrespective of the nature of the governing
regime. China has close relations with the
Islamist government in Sudan, democratic
governments in Botswana and Mauritius
and authoritarian governments in Togo and
Equatorial Guinea. China works hard to de-
velop the government-to-government re-
lationship and in recent years has generally
been more successful than western coun-
tries in establishing close ties with most Af-
rican leaders. The heads of state and/or gov-
ernment from countries as varied as Ethiopia,
Kenya, Senegal, Sudan and South Africa have
been effusive in recent years in their praise of
China. It is difficult to find similar warm state-
ments by these leaders directed at western
countries.
The Africans understand
the need to bring in Chi-
nese for highly skilled
positions, but not for
work requiring minimal
skills.
To its credit, China has made a more seri-
ous effort to establish personal ties with Afri-
can leaders than has any single western coun-
try. Hu Jintao has made six trips to multiple
African countries, two as vice president and
four as president. Wen Jiabao has also been a
frequent visitor to Africa. The Chinese foreign
minister has made his first overseas visit each
year since 1991 to a country in Africa. Senior
Chinese Communist Party and military offi-
cials have a regular schedule of trips to Africa.
China also gives a high priority to inviting
African chiefs of state, heads of government,
ministers and senior military and ruling party
officials to China. This attention has paid off
handsomely in assuring high level access for
China in Africa and in helping to assure that
African leaders do not criticize China. It helps
that China refrains from criticizing even the
most egregious African human rights and
governance practices.
Mixed relations with other
elements of African society
Governments do not, of course, represent
the views all elements of society. China has
not been as successful in developing strong
ties with other important groups in Africa.
Most Chinese engagement has been in the
economic sphere. For the most part, Chinese
companies have developed a reputation as
reliable and reputable business partners. Al-
though there are some complaints about the
poor quality of some Chinese goods, most
African consumers appreciate the low prices
and understand you get what you pay for.
If you want higher quality products, China
produces them so long as you are willing to
pay the price. A problem that China has not
solved is the export of counterfeit and adul-
terated products, especially medicine, to Afri-
ca. African countries do not have institutions
that are able to keep these products from
entering the market and China has not taken
measures to prevent private Chinese manu-
facturers from exporting them to Africa.
There are serious complaints from African
manufacturers (textiles come to mind) who
have been unable to compete with Chinese
imports and small African traders who have
been driven out of business by Chinese
traders who have established shops in their
markets. In some cases, the Chinese traders
benefit from integrated supply sources con-
nected to relatives and friends in China. In
other cases, the Chinese traders simply work
longer hours and in less desirable rural loca-
tions. Africans also complain when Chinese
companies import a high percentage of Chi-
nese labor to build infrastructure projects.
The Africans understand the need to bring
in Chinese for highly skilled positions, but
not for work requiring minimal skills. China
has tried to respond to these complaints, but
with limited success especially in the case of
private Chinese traders over whom the gov-
ernment has limited control.
China’s relations with several other seg-
ments of African society are more problem-
atic. Although China has been surprisingly
successful at establishing relations with new
governments as they change in Africa, it has
not made any particular effort to cultivate
ties with opposition political parties. West-
ern countries reach out to viable opposition
parties; China normally does so only if the
opposition has a role in a governing coalition
or is operating in a country where the ruling
party has made clear that it has no objection
to contact with the political opposition. Chi-
na has had some difficulty interacting with
strong African labor unions, which do not
exist in China. Fortunately for China, most
African labor unions are either weak or effec-
tively creatures of the government. Powerful
labor unions in countries such as South Af-
rica, Zambia and Kenya are, however, another
matter where western countries are more
comfortable interacting with them.
Non-governmental organizations and
civil society groups are more important in
many African countries than they are in
China. While China increasingly recognizes
the need to engage these groups, at least in
African countries where they are strong, its
lack of experience in dealing with them suc-
cessfully is evident. China’s recent attention
to improved corporate social responsibility
both in China and in its commercial activities
in Africa suggests that Beijing is beginning to
take civil society more seriously.
Looking forward
Africa offers for the time being enough eco-
nomic opportunity for both China and the
West, not to mention the rest of the world, to
compete amicably. There is normal competi-
tion for contracts, commercial deals and the
African import and export markets. There is
no reason this should result in any significant
conflict between China and western nations.
The most serious tension over the short-
term is likely to result from the different ap-
The most serious tension over the short-term is likely to
result from the different approach that China and the West
have on human rights and democratization in Africa.
proach that China and the West have on
human rights and democratization in Africa.
China has demonstrated repeatedly that it
will not criticize African practices or encour-
age improvement of African governance.
Western countries, on the other hand, con-
tinue as a matter of principle to urge other
nations, including those in Africa, to pursue
economic policy reform, better human rights
practices and more democratic governance.
The strength of the recent protests and calls
for reform across North Africa has clearly giv-
en China reason for concern. Beijing’s silence
is deafening.
African governments welcome China’s
non-interference policy; no African govern-
ment has announced that it seeks criticism
from outside concerning its governance and
human rights practices. This different ap-
proach to interaction with African govern-
ments does result, however, in some tension
with the West. For example, western coun-
tries imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe that
China strongly opposed. China and the West
will not likely reach an accommodation on
these competing philosophies.
While it is not an issue at the moment,
Chinese security engagement in Africa be-
yond its highly positive contributions to UN
peacekeeping operations could pose a fu-
ture challenge for the West. China currently
has no military bases in Africa and says it has
no desire to establish any. At the same time,
it has discovered the difficulty of operating
three naval vessels over the past two years
in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of
Aden. Naval sources in China are beginning
to suggest publicly that China might need
permanent access agreements for its ships.
As China rapidly expands its navy, the Indian
Ocean has become an object of its attention.
The Indian and American navies are finding
the ocean is much more crowded than it
once was.
About the author
David Shinn has been an adjunct professor
in the Elliott School of International Affairs at
George Washington University since 2001.
He served for thirty-seven years in the U.S.
Foreign Service at embassies in Lebanon, Ke-
nya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Su-
dan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and
Ethiopia. He is the co-author of a book to be
published in 2011 on China-Africa relations.
He has a PhD in political science from George
Washington University.
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