Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Adam Shatz
For Richard Armstrong and NEAT, the uprooting of the Middle East’s most
ancient Jewish community was not a mere business transaction: it was a
mission. Armstrong was really Shlomo (né Selim) Hillel, an Iraqi-born
Mossad agent; NEAT was secretly owned by the Jewish Agency; and Israel,
not Cyprus, was the refugees’ ultimate destination. It’s unlikely that al-
Suwaida and the minister of the interior, Saleh Jabr, were fooled. Hillel
claimed to be the ‘swarthy-skinned son’ of a British colonial official who’d
worked in India, but he didn’t look much like an Armstrong. And he’d been
arrested a few years earlier in Baghdad, where, under the alias Fuad
Salah, he’d been training Zionist militants in attics and cellars. But if the
Iraqis knew who he was, they didn’t call his bluff: they owned shares in
the tourism agency in Baghdad through which NEAT had chosen to
operate, and stood to benefit from the deal. ‘We parted on the most
cordial terms,’ Hillel remembered in his memoir, Operation Babylon. By
the end of 1952, almost all of Iraq’s Jews had fled, in what Mossad called
Operation Ezekiel and Nehemiah.
The exodus of Mesopotamia’s Jews, who traced their origins back to the
destruction of the first temple in 587 BCE, would have seemed
unthinkable at the beginning of the 20th century. As Violette Shamash
writes, Babylon was the home of ‘our patriarch Abraham Abinou’; the
place where the Talmud was written and Jewish law codified. And if distant
memories weren’t enough to bind Jews to their ancestral home, something
more tangible did: security and the promise of a good life. Of all the
Jewish communities in the Middle East, the Mesopotamian Jews were the
most integrated, the most Arabised, the most prosperous. Not only had
they freely practised their faith under the Ottomans, they had become the
country’s most powerful economic group. And there was hardly an area of
Mesopotamian culture on which Jews had not left their imprint, from the
style of music performed in Baghdad’s cafés to the wafting amba, a
mango pickle that Baghdadi Jews working in India brought home with
them.[*]
Jewish life under the Ottomans wasn’t without its hardships: few Jews lived
in palaces like the Shamash family, and as members of a non-Muslim
‘millet’ community they were obliged to pay a discriminatory tax, but they
were mostly left to look after their own affairs, and further advance
seemed inevitable. The vast majority lived in cities, apart from a handful
of Kurdish Jews. As bankers, traders and money-lenders the wealthier
members of the community had made themselves indispensable: so much
so that Baghdad’s markets shut down on the Jewish Sabbath, rather than
the Muslim day of rest. By the 19th century, Baghdad was famous for its
Jewish dynasties – the Sassoons, the Abrahams, the Ezras, the Kadouries –
with their empires in finance and imports (cotton, tobacco, silk, tea,
opium) that stretched all the way to Manchester, Bombay, Calcutta,
Singapore, Rangoon, Shanghai and Hong Kong.
Baghdad’s Jews failed to grasp that the rules of the Ottoman game, with
its special protections for non-Muslim minorities, no longer applied in the
British-ruled provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, where a mandate
was established in 1919. Shamash writes that Baghdad’s Jews and the
British felt an ‘instant connection’: ‘the British saw that there was much to
gain from befriending us, with whom they had already had contact during
a century of trade under colonial rule in India.’ True: but the wealthier
members of the community expected more from this friendship than the
British could offer if they hoped to maintain peaceful relations with the
Muslim majority of what, in 1921, would become the Arab kingdom of Iraq.
Jewish fear of majority rule led, early on, to fateful miscalculations. When
the British conquered Baghdad in 1918, the president of the Jewish lay
council and the acting chief rabbi appealed for direct British rule, on the
grounds that their Muslim neighbours weren’t ready ‘to undertake with
success the management of their own affairs’. After this was rejected, a
group of Jewish notables petitioned for British citizenship, giving the
distinct impression that they regarded themselves as separate from and
superior to the emerging national community. The British, seeking to
harness – and neutralise – the energies of Arab nationalism, were in no
position to grant this request. ‘The Jews of Baghdad were defeated from
the start,’ Elie Kedourie, a British historian of Baghdadi Jewish origin,
concluded in 1970 in The Chatham House Version. ‘The situation was
completely beyond their understanding.’
As friends of the British, Iraq’s Jews were an easy scapegoat for anti-
colonial fury. As if one mandate weren’t enough of a burden, they were
identified with the British mandate – and with Jewish colonisation – in
Palestine. In fact, they were indifferent, and often hostile, to Zionism:
whatever pride some took in the creation of a Jewish ‘national home’ was
more than offset by the worry that it would endanger them in Iraq. But the
Zionists in Palestine claimed to speak in the name of the Jewish people,
and thus in their name as well. Already resented for their enormous
economic power – 2 per cent of the population, Jews handled 75 per cent
of imports – they were twice guilty by association. Nothing they said or did
to oppose Zionism – even donations to Palestinian fighters – protected
them from being portrayed in the Iraqi press and radio as a fifth column,
especially after the death of King Faisal in 1933. Faisal’s son and
successor, King Ghazi, who styled himself a Pan-Arabist and dabbled in
Nazi doctrine, imposed a tax on Jews whenever they left the country, and
befriended Hitler’s assiduous ambassador to Baghdad, Fritz Grobba. The
Germans had their eyes on the country’s oil, and shrewdly cultivated Arab
nationalists in the Iraqi army by playing on anti-British and anti-Zionist
sentiments, as they were also doing in Jerusalem and Cairo. The Futuwaa,
a paramilitary brigade modelled on the Hitler Youth, began to threaten
Jews in the streets. As Shamash recalls, ‘our men started coming home
early, worried about staying too long in the city.’
Jewish nerves were calmed somewhat when, in 1939, Ghazi was killed in a
car accident – possibly an assassination engineered by Nuri al-Said and
the British – and replaced by his pro-British uncle, Emir Abd al-Ilah.
(Ghazi’s four-year-old son was too young to serve as king.) That same
year, however, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, took refuge in
Baghdad after the defeat of the Arab revolt in Palestine. The mufti
launched a campaign of incitement against the Jews, and became a key
adviser to the Golden Square, a group of pro-German, pan-Arab colonels
led by Rashid Ali al-Gailani. For the Golden Square, Iraq was part of a
larger Arab nation, in which Jews were an irremediably foreign element. In
April 1941, the Golden Square overthrew the regent and concluded a
secret treaty with the Axis that would have allowed them oil and pipeline
concessions, the lease of ports, and the right to build naval and military
bases. In May the British invaded to restore the regent. Had they not done
so, Iraqi oil might have fuelled Operation Barbarossa.
The British invasion, however, led to the worst assault on Jewish life and
property in the history of Iraq, the farhud (‘breakdown of law and order’)
of June 1941. Despite threats from al-Gailani’s supporters that the Jews
would be punished for ‘treason’, the British refused to secure the capital.
‘There will be many people killed if our troops do not enter,’ one
intelligence officer warned, but Cornwallis ordered British soldiers to
remain on the outskirts of Baghdad when the regent returned. The
presence of British bayonets, he argued, would be ‘lowering to the dignity
of our ally’. To preserve the fiction that Britain had not so much occupied
Iraq as restored its legitimate government, defeated but fully armed
Golden Square soldiers were permitted to enter Baghdad, singly rather
than in formation. It was 1 June, the Jewish holiday of Shavuot.
As these soldiers crossed the Khir Bridge to the western side of Baghdad
that morning, they passed small groups of Jews walking in the opposite
direction after prayer services to welcome the regent. They were furious
to see the Jews in all their finery, and since it was Sunday, not the Jewish
Sabbath, they assumed they had dressed up for the regent. The Jews were
set upon, first with fists, then knives. The farhud continued for two days,
an orgy of murder, rape and arson that left two hundred Jews and a
number of Muslims dead. Most Jews hid in their basements; some, like
Shamash’s family, were given shelter by Muslim neighbours. No help
came from the British, who remained on the right bank of the Tigris, out of
respect for Iraqi sovereignty.
After the farhud wealthy Jews began to leave Iraq; some, like Shamash
and her family, joined relatives in India, where there were entire
communities of Baghdadi Jews. Yet Sasson Somekh insists that the farhud
was not ‘the beginning of the end’. Indeed, he claims it was soon ‘almost
erased from the collective Jewish memory’, washed away by ‘the
prosperity experienced by the entire city from 1941 to 1948’. Somekh,
who was born in 1933, remembers the 1940s as a ‘golden age’ of
‘security’, ‘recovery’ and ‘consolidation’, in which the ‘Jewish community
had regained its full creative drive’. Jews built new homes, schools and
hospitals, showing every sign of wanting to stay. They took part in politics
as never before; at Bretton Woods, Iraq was represented by Ibrahim al-
Kabir, the Jewish finance minister. Some joined the Zionist underground,
but many more waved the red flag. Liberal nationalists and Communists
rallied people behind a conception of national identity far more inclusive
than the Golden Square’s Pan-Arabism, allowing Jews to join ranks with
other Iraqis – even in opposition to the British and Nuri al-Said, who did
not take their ingratitude lightly.
Many of the writers Somekh knew in Iraq were in the orbit of the
Communist Party, which became the most powerful opposition force in the
1940s, leading protests against the British and strikes in the oil industry,
and developing an Iraqi civic identity that transcended sect. Until 1948,
according to Somekh, the Communists succeeded in ‘channelling popular
anger against “imperialism” and “Zionism” rather than specifically
towards the Jews’. In 1946, a group of Jewish Communists formed the
League for Fighting Zionism, which braved threats from the Zionist
underground and would later, absurdly, be accused of being a Zionist
front itself by Nuri al-Said, who felt betrayed by Jewish involvement in the
Communist opposition. The league published a newspaper that had a
readership of six thousand, larger than the entire Zionist movement in
Iraq. And Jews marched in the demonstrations of February 1948 known as
the Wathba, or ‘leap forward’, in which Iraqis of all sects protested against
the Portsmouth Treaty, which ensured Britain’s dominance over Iraq’s
economy and foreign policy for the next 25 years.
The event that shook Iraq’s Jews most profoundly was the show trial and
execution in 1948 of a businessman with strong connections to the
monarchy, on charges of supplying British army scrap to Israel. Shafiq
Adas, who was hanged outside his Basra mansion before cheering crowds,
was by all accounts an apolitical man: if he wasn’t safe, no one was. The
Jewish population grew more receptive to the overtures of Mossad, which
had become increasingly active in Iraq since the Golden Square took
power, some agents entering the country as volunteers with the British
army during the 1941 invasion. Mossad’s objective was not to improve the
position of the Jews in Iraq, but to hasten their departure. Pamphlets
appeared discouraging Jews from mixing with Arabs, and arguing that any
attempt to do so ‘leads to butchery’.
By 1950, thousands of Jews had fled; many crossed into Iran on horseback
with the help of Arab and Kurdish smugglers. Embarrassed by this ‘wildcat
immigration’, the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies decided to take matters into
its own hands with the Denaturalisation Law of 4 March 1950. The US
Embassy in Baghdad agreed with Tawfiq al-Suwaida that mass emigration
was unlikely, so long as Israel ‘pursues a policy of moderation and agrees
to a peace settlement considered not too unreasonable by the Arabs’. But
the ‘ingathering of the exiles’, not a peace settlement, was Israel’s goal,
for strategic as much as sentimental reasons. Israel had conquered 20 per
cent more territory than it had been allotted under the partition
agreement, and it needed more Jews to settle the land, particularly along
the border. As Kedourie bitterly remarked, Israel ‘set out to help the Iraqi
government to achieve its national unity; it was one of these tacit,
monstrous complicities not entirely unknown to history.’ The Foreign
Office learned of the agreement between al-Suwaida and ‘Richard
Armstrong’ of Near East Air Transport through its channels in Tel Aviv, not
Baghdad.
By 8 March, when the deadline was due to expire, more than one hundred
thousand Jews had registered. The next day the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies
froze Jewish assets, fearing that neither the economy nor the state itself
could survive the transfer of capital to a country that had expelled most of
its Arab population. Jews would be allowed to leave with only 50 dinars.
The British and the Americans weren’t pleased about this decision, but
saw no way of protesting the Jews’ expropriation when Israel had refused
to compensate Palestinian refugees.
About six thousand Jews chose to remain in Iraq. Their lot improved
fleetingly in the late 1950s under the revolutionary government of
General Abdel Karim Qassem, who abolished the monarchy and espoused
a cosmopolitan vision of Iraqi identity. But soon after the Baath Party
seized power in 1963, in a CIA-backed coup, Jews were forced to carry
yellow identity cards. The Arab defeat in 1967 led to an ‘anti-Zionist’
campaign that culminated in the 1969 hanging of eight Jewish ‘spies’ in
Liberation Square. Saddam Hussein urged listeners to Baghdad Radio to
‘come and enjoy the feast’, and hundreds of thousands duly turned out.
About a dozen Jews remain in Iraq today.
Somekh flew to Israel on 21 March 1951 with two hundred other Jews.
Their ‘exile’ had ended, but he ‘saw no one kneeling down to kiss the
sacred ground’. Before they could leave the plane, passengers were told
to remain seated while a man sprayed them with DDT – a greeting none of
them forgot. They landed in Lydda, where, on 13 July 1948, Israeli forces
led by Yitzhak Rabin had driven more than thirty thousand Palestinians
from their homes in one of the largest, most brutal expulsions of the war.
Scores of refugees from Lydda and the neighbouring town of Ramleh died
of hunger and thirst on the forced march eastwards to Ramallah. The
towns were looted afterwards, their homes occupied: scenes with which
the Jews who remembered the farhud were all too familiar.
[*] The contribution of Iraqi Jews to Arabic and Kurdish music is surveyed
in a startling new anthology of archival recordings, Give Me Love: Songs of
the Brokenhearted – Baghdad, 1925-29 (Honest Jon’s Records).
*********
Letters
Vol. 30 No. 23 · 4 December 2008
The Jews did not leave because they were pushed by Zionist rumours or
bombs. Bombs and murders in 1936 had not led to a mass exodus, and
sixty thousand Jews had registered to leave before the only fatal bombing
in January 1951. Until Iraq permitted legal emigration, Jews were being
smuggled out at a rate of a thousand a month – because they were
banned from higher education, could not travel abroad, were denied work
and suffered restrictions in business. ‘But for these severe handicaps,
Iraqi Jews would not have gone so far as to attempt large-scale flight from
the country,’ the Jewish senator Ezra Daniel said, making his last futile
appeal against the Denaturalisation Bill in March 1950.
Shatz implies that Israel encouraged the Jewish exodus, but already in
1949 the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Said, had floated the idea of a
population exchange and threatened to expel the Jews as revenge for the
Iraqi army’s defeat in Palestine. He schemed to bring Israel to its knees by
dumping thousands of stateless and destitute Jews on Israel’s borders.
The Jewish Agency could not cope with the influx and told the Zionist
movement in Baghdad not to rush. It was only when Iraq passed a law in
March 1951 freezing Jewish assets that Israel said it would be forced to
confiscate the property of Palestinian refugees. Iraq reneged on its part of
the exchange, accepting only fourteen thousand Palestinian Arabs, while
Israel took in 120,000 Iraqi Jews.
The Iraqi Jews had every right to be bitter when they arrived in Israel,
having lost everything. They were housed in dusty refugee camps for up
to 12 years. At the time, they did experience prejudice, but so did
Holocaust survivors, taunted on arrival as ‘sabon’ (soap). Today the Iraqi
community is one of the most successfully integrated in Israel. Iraq-born
Palestinians, meanwhile, have been denied citizenship and expelled from
Iraq.
Incidentally, the airlift to Israel was named Operation Ezra (not Ezekiel)
and Nehemiah. It ended in 1951, not 1952.
Lyn Julius
London SW5
Julius cites Ezra Daniel’s protest against the Denaturalisation Bill, but she
doesn’t quote his plea to ‘restore to Iraqi Jews their sense of security,
confidence and stability’, and while Daniel was speaking out against the
bill, the Israeli government and Mossad were doing everything in their
power to speed its passage. Shlomo Hillel, Mossad’s man in Baghdad,
makes no secret of the fact that in setting up Zionist cells, he had only
one objective: to promote mass emigration. He collaborated covertly with
the Iraqi government to co-ordinate Operation Ezra and Nehemiah (as
Julius rightly calls it). ‘We are carrying on our usual activity in order to
push the law through faster and faster,’ the Mossad office in Baghdad
reported to Tel Aviv before the Denaturalisation Act was passed,
according to Tom Segev in 1949: The First Israelis. Israel wanted to
populate the land with Jews, and their emigration from Arab countries had
the advantage of supplying a further alibi for denying Palestinians their
right of return.