Stephen G. Brooks
International relations scholars have tended to focus on realism’s common featuresrather than exploring potential differences.
Realists do share certain assumptionsand are often treated as a group, but such a broad grouping obscures systematicdivisionswithin realist theory. Recently, some analysts have argued that it is neces-sary to differentiatewithin realism.
This article buildson this line of argument.Thepotential,and need,todividerealism onthebasisof divergentassumptionshas so farbeen overlooked.
In this article I argue that realism can be split into two competingbranches by revealing latent divisionsregarding a series of assumptions about statebehavior. The rst branch is Kenneth Waltz’s well-known neorealist theory;
a sec-ond branch, termed here ‘‘postclassicalrealism,’’ has yet to be delineatedas a major
Thismaterial is based on work supported under a National Science FoundationGraduate Fellowship. Ithank Deborah Jordan Brooks, Joseph Grieco, Ian Hurd, David Lumsdaine, Sylvia Maxeld, John Odell,Barry O’Neill, Jonathan Rodden,Frances Rosenbluth,Allan Stam, Stephen Skowronek,Nigel Thalakada,Shaoguang Wang, Brad Westereld, the members of Yale University’s International Relations ReadingGroup, the anonymous reviewers for
and especially Bruce Russett and AlexWendt for their helpfulcomments on earlier drafts.1. See, for example, Gilpin 1984, 290–91; Keohane 1986, 164–65; Grieco 1995, 27; Vasquez 1983,26–28; Stein 1990, 4–5; Kapstein 1995, 753; Keohane and Nye 1977, 23–24; Grieco 1990, 3–4; andGilpin 1996,7–8.2. See, for example, Snyder 1991, 11–12; Lynn-Jones and Miller 1995, x–xiii; Deudney 1993, 8;Glaser 1994–95,378–81;Mastanduno1996,2;Walt 1992,474;Mearsheimer 1994–95,fns.20,27;Frankel1996, xv–xviii; Grieco 1997; Wohlforth 1993, 11–14; Zakaria 1992, 190–93; Miller 1996; and Jervis1993,55–56.3. Someanalystsidentifytheneed tomakedistinctionswithinrealism butemphasize onlythoseassump-tions that realists hold in common; see, for example, Mearsheimer 1994–95, 11–13; Lynn-Jones andMiller 1995, ix–x; Glaser 1994–95, 54–55; Walt 1992, 473; and Mastanduno 1996, 3–5. Other scholarsoutline divisions within realism only with respect to particular issue areas; see, for example, Deudney1993;Miller 1996;andDesch 1996.Somesuggest that realistsmay divergeregardingcertain assumptionsbut do not address whether realism should be divided on this basis; see, for example, Grieco 1997; andWayman and Diehl 1994, 9. The division between ‘‘aggressive’’ and ‘‘defensive’’ realists is the mostcomprehensiveoutlinedso far; see, for example, Snyder1991,11–12; Zakaria 1992,190–93; and Frankel1996, xv–xviii. Section two argues that this aggressive/defensive distinction is useful but is reective of the deeper divergence within realism over assumptionsoutlinedin thisarticle.4. Waltz 1979.
51, 3, Summer 1997, pp. 445–77
1997 by The IO Foundationand the Massachusetts Institute of Technology