to help ease economic woes and jump-start recovery. While the experimentin scal stimulus may have been eective in averting a deeper recession,and while many in the mainstream media suggested that this indicated asignicant policy shi was underway, upon closer examination we see thatstimulus was instead relatively shallow, selective, and temporary. Despite theclear need for government intervention in order to help cushion the blow of the nancial crisis and subsequent economic recession, there has been littleintrusion on neoliberal ideological dominance. is is made evident by thecontent of the stimulus packages, and in this chapter we briey examine thoseof the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Canada. Despite dierences in emphasis,including the proportion of stimulus provided through spending versus taxreduction measures, they are equally timid and do not indicate a break withneoliberal rule. e Canadian government in particular appears to have takena typical approach to crisis management — denial, minimalism, and policy harmonization with the U.S. In the face of a crisis of these dimensions, thedisinclination to re-examine fundamental policy choices that had been madeover previous decades is striking.
e recent global nancial crisis is only the latest occurrence of instability and volatility in the neoliberal era. ere has been a series of spectacularand mostly unpredicted nancial crises in emerging markets; for example,Mexico in 1994–95, East Asia in 1997–98, Russia 1998, Turkey 2000, andArgentina 2001–03 (Kenen 2001). A key source of trouble intrinsic to theneoliberal global governance model has been the lack of clear leadershipwith respect to the regulation of global nancial ows. Instead, governanceof the international nancial architecture () consists of a web of public andprivate forums, institutions, and organizations which together play varied,overlapping, and/or discrete roles in the functioning of capital markets. isgroup includes international nancial institutions, such as the InternationalMonetary Fund (), World Bank, Bank for International Settlements (),and regional development banks; private regulatory and standard settingbodies, such as the International Accounting Standards Board and ratingagencies; international organizations, such as United Nations agencies; andmultilateral forums, such as the G-7; and the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (); and a host of national regulationsthat are not always synchronized with one another.A recognition that recurring crises in international capital marketsmight become chronic began to emerge in the mid-1990s, yet suggestions forreform were largely monopolized by neoliberal technocratic interventions.Common to this line of reasoning was that enhanced standards, informa-