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The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain, Louer, 2008

The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain, Louer, 2008

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Published by bahrain2
City & Society
Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 32–53, June 2008
City & Society
Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 32–53, June 2008

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Published by: bahrain2 on May 01, 2011
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The Political Impact of LaborMigration in Bahrain
LAURENCE LOUËRSciences Po./Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI) Paris
This paper shows that, in Bahrain, the main political consequence of migrationhas been the deepening of state/society conflict. While having old historical roots,this conflict has been fostered in the recent period by the collapse of the “castesystem” that, since the
s, used to regulate the relations between foreignersand nationals in the labor market by preventing the two groups from being incompetition for jobs. I conclude that in order to evaluate the possible politicalimpact of migration in the Gulf States, one has to look first at the structure of therelation between the national population and the migrants, rather than focus on thenumber of foreigners. [Keywords: Bahrain, governance, migrants, Shia, politicalmovements]
his paper is based on research in Bahrain during two one monthperiods of fieldworks between August and November
in thecontext of a larger project on Shia political mobilization in theGCC countries. The data includes a dozen tape-recorded biographicalinterviews of activists and sympathizers of one of the two Shia Islamicmovements based in Bahrain (al-Wifaq and the Islamic ActionSociety), informal conversations conducted in the same milieu, andobservations of events like political meetings, religious ceremonies, andmeetings in
(informal places of sociability typical of Gulf socialand political life). I also conducted interviews with foreign business-men, agents providing clearance services to people wishing to importforeign labor, and officials of the Ministry of Labor and the BahrainTraining Institute.
City & Society
, Vol. 20, Issue 1, pp. 32–53, ISSN 0893-0465, eISSN 1548-744X.© 2008 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved.DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-744X.2008.00004.x.
Discussions about the political impact of labor migration to thestates of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rarely identify explicitpolitical consequences of this migration. Nonetheless, there are sug-gestions that large-scale labor migration has led to fundamentalchanges in the social structure of the Gulf States that will eventuallyencourage forces hostile to the current regimes (Halliday
).To date, the only specific materialization of this kind of threatidentified in the literature is the significant role Arab migrants, inparticular Egyptians and Palestinians, played in popularizing ideas of pan-Arabism, Marxism, and Islamism in the
s and
s. Thisphenomenon is identified as one factor behind the consciousde-Arabization of the foreign workforce in favor of Asian workers whoare regarded as less likely to engage in internal politics (Kapiszewski
).The shift to Asian labor helped to alleviate the political challengefrom Arab migrants, and now the Asian work force has emerged as anew bugbear in the public discourse. Yet, the details and the scope of this “strategic threat”
are often ill defined, ranging from the putativeinfluence Asian laborers might have on the rulers (and therefore on thepolitical process) to the constitution of a fifth column serving foreigninterests. The idea of a cultural threat is also widespread, as migrants,who, for example, in the United Arab Emirates account for
percentof the population, are seen as negatively altering local values andIslamic values in particular. Although the prospect of naturalization isvery unlikely for most migrants, this issue is nonetheless a matter of concern among the citizenry since some migrants might eventuallyattain citizenship. Indeed, the Gulf States are home to long-establishedforeign communities. Egyptians, Yemenis and Lebanese have resided inthese states several generations and show little intention of returningto their countries of origin. Migrants from Iran or the Indian sub-continent often postpone their return home, renewing contract aftercontract (Kapiszewski
).Political mobilization has not been a central concern of migrantpopulations in the Gulf. Foreign laborers have occasionally organizedstrikes to demand improvements to working conditions or payment of wages owed. Such strikes never produced structured political move-ments. While not a direct actor in political mobilization, the foreignpopulation is nonetheless an increasingly important element of thepolitical scene in the Gulf. With a foreign population of 
percent(Bahrain Census
), Bahrain has a smaller foreign population thanits neighbors (Winckler
Yet, labor migrants in Bahrainhave had the deepest political impact. I argue in this paper that politi-cal challenges linked to migration have less to do with the size of the foreign population or its links to potentially hostile foreign powersthan with the structure of the relations between foreigners andnationals.
The shift to Asianlabor helped toalleviate the political challenge from Arabmigrants
The PoliticalImpact of LaborMigration inBahrain
Early labor migration and politicalmobilization (1930s–1960s)
ass migration of foreign workers to Bahrain is linked to thedevelopment of the oil industry in the early
s. Thesedevelopments entailed the modification of ancient and sea-sonal migration patterns associated with pearling (Seccombe
).Besides the recruitment of British and American professionals to fillmanagerial and higher technical positions, the labor requirements of the oil industry led to an influx of migrants from Iran and the Indiansubcontinent. These migrants filled skilled, semi-skilled and clericalpositions. This influx of foreign workers occurred despite the concessionagreement signed between the British and American oil companies, andthe rulers who stipulated that Bahraini workers should be favored foremployment in the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO). The Bahr-aini rulers hoped that the oil industry would end the economic crisis,which had followed the collapse of the local pearl trade in the early
s due to the launching of Japanese cultured pearls.BAPCO was ready to recruit competent workers, yet there were notnearly enough in the country. Also, with no experience in industrialemployment, Bahrainis were unable to occupy technical and clericalpositions in the new industry (Seccombe and Lawless
). In thefirst decades of its existence, BAPCO relied primarily on Iranian labor-ers. A significant population of Iranians already resided in Bahrain, andmany had experience in the oil industry in their home country. Inaddition, BAPCO did not have to pay for their trip to and from Bahrainorfortheiraccommodationontheisland.Indianlaborerswereimportedthrough lengthy bureaucratic procedures in accordance with the provi-sions of Indian emigration laws. Iranians did not have formal contractswith the company and thus provided a flexible labor force that was easyto recruit and dismiss. Iranians also had lower salary expectations(Seccombe and Lawless
). In contrast, Indian emigrationlaws required a contract of one to three years. Despite the higherrecruitment costs, the Bahraini rulers and their British protectors pres-sured BAPCO to recruit more Indians. While the oil company wasdriven by economic rationales, the Al-Khalifa and the British (Bahrainwas a British protectorate since
) had political concerns. Theyfeared that an increased Iranian presence might foster the Shah’s claimover Bahrain
.Bahraini citizens were a minority among BAPCO employees inthe early years of the oil industry. Some sources speculate that a sig-nificant number of those officially registered as Bahrainis were actuallyIranian migrants or their children (Seccombe and Lawless
).Gradually the proportion of Bahrainis increased due to pressure fromthe rulers and BAPCO’s investment in vocational training. Labor in
BAPCO wasready to recruitcompetentworkers, yet therewere not nearlyenough in thecountry
City & Society

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