IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

Wonderstores Ltd (Appellant)

and

Sidebottom (Respondent)

SKELETON ARGUMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE JUNIOR APPELLANT
JASLEEN GILL

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an appeal against the findings of the local county court,

which dismissed the claim of the Appellant (Wonderstores)
against the Respondent (Sidebottom) with regards to the
decision that the advertisement placed in the newspaper
amounted to a unilateral offer, acceptance of which could begun
to be performed by queuing outside the store. Wonderstores
asks the court to allow the appeal on the basis that the county
court’s decision was incorrect and that its reasoning cannot be
sustained.

2. The Junior Appellant will be dealing with the second ground of appeal by which it
is claimed that if indeed an offer, the advertisement amounted to a unilateral offer
and had not been accepted by Sidebottom before the offer was revoked by
Saturday’s advertisement.

JUNIOR COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: MISS JASLEEN GILL

First Submission

3. It is submitted that if the advertisement is to be viewed as an offer, the terms of

the offer amount to a unilateral offer and not a bilateral offer

a) As per the defining character of unilateral offers, there was a one-sided promise
by Wonderstones Ltd. If complied with according to the terms of the offer, this
would result in a binding unilateral contract. (Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball
 Company [1892] EWCA Civ 1)

4. It is submitted that the unilateral offer was effectively revoked by appropriate

means on Saturday

a) The revocation of a unilateral offer can be made “before any rights had accrued
under it” so long as it is “withdrawn through the same channel in which it was
made” (Shuey v United States (1875) 92 US 73, Article 2.202 of the Principles
of European Contract law) . The offer was made in an advertisement in the local
newspaper on a Friday and was withdrawn the subsequent day via the same local
newspaper

5. It is submitted that according to the terms of the offer, acceptance of the offer
would commence when the item is brought to the till and paid for, and not when
one joins the queue

a) It is submitted that based on the terms of the contract, it would be highly

impractical and self-defeating to insist that queuing is a condition to acceptance
that must be fulfilled

I. Not fulfilling the queuing requirement if indeed there is no queue

cannot be expected to bar customers from concluding a contract

II. It would be impractical to understand queuing as beginning to

perform the contract as there would then be an obligation to serve every
single person in the queue and enable purchase of the advertised item they
wish to purchase, as an offer cannot be revoked when already embarked
on

III. There would be an implication that until the first person in the
queue is entirely satisfied with his or her purchase and has concluded a
contract (or explicitly refused to conclude one), no one else can conclude a
contract since ‘first come first serve’ would apply from the queue itself.

b) It is submitted that queuing is not a necessary condition according to the terms of

the offer

For the reasons set above, it is accordingly submitted that the court should allow the
appeal.