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The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze, by Paula Garb

The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze, by Paula Garb

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Published by circassianworld
Central Asian Survey
Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2009, 235–246

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives on the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians in August 2008 could not be heard above the noise generated around the geopolitical implications of the larger Russian–Georgian clash. The population of Abkhazia experienced the violence in South Ossetia as though it was occurring on their own territory. This confirmed their complete lack of trust in the Georgian government’s commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as the international community’s absence of criticism of Georgia’s actions and lack of concern for the safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence has taken the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity off the negotiation table indefinitely. It also has set back the formal peace process with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessary foundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and other interested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all levels, demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well being of all the people affected by the conflict.
Central Asian Survey
Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2009, 235–246

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives on the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians in August 2008 could not be heard above the noise generated around the geopolitical implications of the larger Russian–Georgian clash. The population of Abkhazia experienced the violence in South Ossetia as though it was occurring on their own territory. This confirmed their complete lack of trust in the Georgian government’s commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as the international community’s absence of criticism of Georgia’s actions and lack of concern for the safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence has taken the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity off the negotiation table indefinitely. It also has set back the formal peace process with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessary foundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and other interested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all levels, demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well being of all the people affected by the conflict.

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The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze
Paula Garb
Ã
 Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine, USA
The Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives on the fighting between Georgians and SouthOssetiansinAugust2008couldnotbeheardabove thenoisegeneratedaround thegeopoliticalimplications of the larger Russian–Georgian clash. The population of Abkhazia experiencedthe violence in South Ossetia as though it was occurring on their own territory. This confirmedtheir complete lack of trust in the Georgian government’s commitment to peaceful resolutionof the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as theinternational community’s absence of criticism of Georgia’s actions and lack of concern forthe safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’sand Abkhazia’s independence has taken the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity off thenegotiation table indefinitely. It also has set back the formal peace process with both SouthOssetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessaryfoundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and otherinterested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all levels,demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well being of all the peopleaffected by the conflict.
Keywords:
conflict; culture; Abkhazia; South Ossetia
Introduction
Georgian–Abkhazian official relations since the end of the 1992–1993 war have offered littlecommon ground for a mutually acceptable resolution. Long before the August 2008 militaryaction in South Ossetia, the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict had become intractable. In October1999, the post-war population of Abkhazia voted in a referendum for independence (Whitfield2007). Until then, the parties discussed a variety of federative arrangements as possible terms of a settlement. At negotiations since the declaration of independence, Abkhazian authorities haverefused to discuss with Georgians any settlement other than independence, while Georgia hasconsistently sought to maintain its territorial integrity. Since the accession to power of EduardShevardnadze in 1992, the US and other Western countries involved in the peace process haveconsistently supported Georgia’s territorial borders from the Soviet period,When major fighting erupted in South Ossetia between South Ossetians and Georgians inAugust 2008, there had been no official talks between the two sides for two years (InternationalCrisis Group 2007). Similarly, the gulf between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides had beenwidening, resulting in fundamentally different and mutually exclusive visions of future relations.Fear, stereotypes and little understanding of life on the other side dominated popular discourse inboth communities. The August 2008 events in South Ossetia simply cemented these trends,further persuading people in Abkhazia that the Georgian government was not negotiating ingood faith. The Abkhazians had predicted that the Georgian government was willing to takemilitary action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to get its way, and now believed that Abkhaziawould be the next target.
ISSN 0263-4937 print/ISSN 1465-3354 online
#
2009 Central Asian SurveyDOI: 10.1080/02634930903034856http://www.informaworld.com
Ã
Email: pgarb@uci.edu
Central Asian Survey
Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2009, 235–246
 D o w nl o ad ed B y : [i nf o r m ai n t e r n al u s e r s ] A t :09 :3710 A u g u s t2009
 
The Abkhazians do not regard the South Ossetians as ethnic cousins because of differencesin history and language (Ossetian is an Iranian based Indo-European language, whereasAbkhazian belongs to the North-West Caucasian language group). There is also a considerablephysical distance between them. Yet, both have a sense of affinity that comes from similarities inculture and in terms of their relationship to Georgians. Most relevant to their conflicts is that,first, they both see themselves as victims of Georgian nationalism and regard the Georgian pol-itical elite as aggressors, shown by the Georgians’ violent resistance to Abkhazian and SouthOssetian demands for independence. Second, they both consider their struggles against the Geor-gians as a right of self-determination. Third, the people of both entities have chosen to takeRussian citizenship primarily to obtain a passport that allows them to travel outside their terri-tories. They refuse to take Georgian passports, and the Georgian government has prevented theissuing of UN travel documents (Allin 2008, Khashig 2008a). In total, 80–90% of the people inAbkhazia and the vast majority in South Ossetia have Russian citizenship, which Russia claimsmakes it duty bound to protect its citizens by military means if necessary (Allin 2008).What distinguishes each conflict from the other is that, first, the Abkhazians are unequivocalin their desire for independence from Russia and Georgia. It is not entirely clear whether mostSouth Ossetians want to become an independent country or to join with North Ossetia andbecome part of Russia. Second, until the resumption of armed conflict between South Ossetiansand Georgians in the fall of 2004, the South Ossetians, unlike Abkhazians, travelled into‘Georgia proper’ and engaged extensively in trade with Georgians. This suggested to somethat the South Ossetians might be more willing to be part of Georgia as a natural economicunit. Third, South Ossetians are open to reuniting with North Ossetia, but no such sentimentexists among the Abkhazians regarding their ethnic cousins, such as the Kabardians, Adygheand Abazinians in the Russian controlled North Caucasus.
1
What ismissingfrommostinternational and Georgiansources aboutthe August2008 eventsisany real discussion about what keeps the South Ossetians and Abkhazians from agreeing tobe partof Georgia. If this question is raised, the answer usually focuses on Russia as the primary obstacle,as though the Abkhazians or South Ossetians have no opinion of their own, or are mere pawns of the Russians (Gleason 2008). This unwillingness to consider seriously the viewpoint of the‘pawns’, and insistence on pursuing a peace process without a commitment toconfidence-buildingmeasures that take into account the grievances of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians against theGeorgian government,isa significant reason why peace negotiationshave notmadeprogress. Thisarticle shows how the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians not only set back the peaceprocess with the South Ossetians, but also had the same negative impact on Georgian–Abkhazianrelations. The article highlights a perspective that has not been heard due to the global andgeopolitical implications of the Russian–Georgian conflict in August and September 2008.My observations of the perceptions of the conflict are based on studying the Abkhazian–Georgian peace process since 1994, and on experience facilitating Abkhazian–Georgian non-governmental dialogues. The focus of this work has been on the Abkhazian–Georgian conflict,based onthemylong-termexpertiseinAbkhazia, dating backtothelate 1970s,butnoequivalenttrackrecordinSouthOssetia.
2
Ihavealsobeeninvolvedinnon-governmentaldialoguesinwhichSouth Ossetians participated. Most recently, in December 2008, I co-facilitated a dialoguebetweenGeorgiansandSouthOssetiansthroughGeorgeMasonUniversity’sInstituteforConflictAnalysis and Resolution with funding by the United States Agency for International Develop-ment (USAID). The discussions in this dialogue about the August events have made it possibleto identify common perceptions of these territorial conflicts and paths to peace shared by bothAbkhazians and South Ossetians. Written sources about the conflicts have also providedinsights, including published articles by US, Western and Abkhazian authors who present theperspectives of the Abkhazians they have interviewed.236
P. Garb
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The article offers a description of how the people of Abkhazia experienced the conflict thatunfolded in August 2008, and an explanation of their reaction to fighting in South Ossetia asthough the violence was occurring on their own territory. The article presents the ways inwhich Abkhazians assess the different roles that Georgia, the US, Europe and Russia playedin the conflict. It concludes with an examination of the consequences of the South Ossetian con-flict for Abkhazia and implications for future engagement of Western countries and Georgia inthe peace process with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Abkhazia experiencing South Ossetia in flames
On the morning of 8 August 2008, when the news broke in Abkhazia that the previous nightGeorgian forces had shelled Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, many began packing suit-cases and planning their departure. Some of them left forRussia immediately. Tensions had beenbuilding since the spring in Abkhazia over the shooting down of Georgian military drones. Thepeople of Abkhazia, in a state of alarm for several months, were convinced that Georgian forceswould soon turn in their direction. Inal Khashig (2008a), the editor of an Abkhazian newspaper,reflecting the perspectives of Abkhazian civil society, recalled:
For the last two years at least, since Georgian troops entered the upper reaches of Abkhazia’s Kodorgorge, the shadow of a new war has been hanging over the region like the sword of Damocles.Experts tried to guess who Georgia would attack first – South Ossetia or Abkhazia? In April of this year [2008 – PG], only prompt action by Russia, which moved quickly to increase its peace-keeping contingent in the zone of the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict, saved Abkhazia from anattempt at military revenge from Georgia.
Soon after fighting broke out in South Ossetia on 8 August, the portrayal by Abkhazian state TVof the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians was emotional and one-sided, accordingto Nick Lazaredes, a Western TV producer reporting from Abkhazia in mid August. The directorof Abkhaz TV, Guram Akuab, told Lazaredes (2008) what he had seen in South Ossetia duringthe fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians. According to Lazaredes, it was an exampleof the type of reporting carried out in Abkhazia. Akuab declared:
I interviewed a family who had lost their daughter, a sniper killed the 14-year-old girl, she died in hermother’s arms. For a long time she was carrying her daughter’s body in her arms, suddenly she feltshe had ran out of strength, so she abandoned her child in the forest, in the wilderness and keptrunning with her three other children
. . .
I could never imagine that today, in the 21st century, some-body could get away with opening fire on a sleeping town. Opening fire on the people who wereasleep
. . .
Dozens, hundreds of people died at night in their sleep, not knowing what had happened.
Former residents of Abkhazia who had remained in Russia after the 1992–1993 war and werevisiting for the summer, left Abkhazia immediately when they heard about the military devel-opments in South Ossetia. The panic increased among residents of Abkhazia when they sawthe vacationing Russian military families leave abruptly. They assumed that these familieshad information from the Russian military about an impending Georgian invasion. Abkhazianswho had not left Abkhazia during the first war with the Georgians prepared to flee. An Abkha-zian colleague told me that her mother, who had insisted on remaining in Sukhumi throughoutthe 1990s war, said this time she would definitely leave, that she could not cope one more timeunder Georgian occupation.An official from an international organization in Sukhumi during this period in a personalemail echoed information I was receiving from Abkhazian colleagues, that the population feltas though the military events in South Ossetia were actually happening in Abkhazia. Onereason was the sense of shared victimhood, noted above. The events in South Ossetia and thefear of becoming the next target triggered a wartime psychological trauma experienced
Central Asian Survey
237
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