Department of History, National University of Singapore

Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence in 1945

Author(s): Ken'Ichi Goto
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, The Japanese Occupation in
Southeast Asia (Mar., 1996), pp. 37-48
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National
University of Singapore
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20071756
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 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, 1 (March 1996): 37-48
? 1996
by National University of Singapore

Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward

Indonesian Independence in 1945

KEN'ICHI GOTO
Waseda University

Introduction

On 2 September 1945, when the Japanese delegation signed the document of surrender
aboard theMissouri, the Japanese Army and Navy issued a General Order No. 1, ordering
"all military commanders both within Japan and abroad to completely disarm the Japanese
forces and other military forces under Japanese command, regardless of their location
... and to surrender all weapons and
equipment [to the Allied Forces] in their present
status and under safe and good conditions". Accordingly, the 16th Army of the Southern
General Army that had been assigned the task of occupying and ruling over Java was
also placed under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia
Lord Louis Mountbatten both in name and actuality, although all its fighting force was
intact.

The 16th Army in Java had, however, concretely promised "independence" to the
Indonesians at the beginning of August in order to obtain utmost cooperation from the
Indonesians in Japan's war efforts telling them that Japan and Indonesia are bound by the
same destiny. Now the defeat in the war obliged Japan to submit to the will of its former
enemies, and to suppress the Indonesian independence movement by the order of the
Allies. Under such circumstances, the Japanese military administration authorities and
civilian officials faced a dilemma. Although they wished to fulfill the promise they had
made, they had no alternative but to obediently return to the motherland as ordered by
the Allies, abiding by the wishes of their emperor.
There were, however, not a few in Indonesia who in the
Japanese sought participation
Indonesian independence movement for various reasons of their own, rejecting the course
of action followed by the majority. We shall call the former "renunciation type" Japanese
in contrast to the latter "allegiance type".
This paper to examine reactions of the Japanese in Indonesia, Java in
is intended
particular, following the surrender on 15August 1945 comparing the contrasting behaviour
patterns of the "allegiance type" and the "renunciation type".

I. Events Surrounding Indonesian Independence

(1) Japanese Reactions in Java on 15 August 1945
At noon on
15 August 1945 at the headquarters of the 16th Army in Jakarta,
Commanding Lt. General Nagano Y?ichir? and other top military officers were intently
listening to the very important broadcast from Tokyo. Major General Yamamoto Moichir?,
who was concurrently chief of staff of the 16th Army and superintendent of the
military
government, describes the situation in the following way: "All of us stood upright solemnly
unable to utter a single word ... Commander Nagano left the room totteringly with a

37
38 Ken'ichi Goto

grave and sorrowful look."1 The shock the general received from the defeat was so great
that the commander who had stood at the head of 70 thousand Japanese soldiers then in
Java lost the mental capacity to take command thereafter, leaving the actual leadership
in the hands of General Yamamoto. Yamamoto, who held the conviction that a commander
must not leave the scene in silence, instructed his staff officers "never to act on impulse
and wait for subsequent orders".2 By the phrase "act on impulse" he seems to have
warned against committing suicide under the shock of defeat or calling for radical actions
such as thorough resistance.
Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, an operations staff officer who was also at the headquarters,
recalls that he sensed the "smell of surrender" in strange changes in the Tokyo atmosphere
starting around 10 August, immediately after the Soviet Union declared war against
Japan. Miyamoto also recalls the desperation felt on the fatal days as follows:

The enemy against whom we had held up fierce fighting spirit suddenly turned into
a sort of great rock with our lives at its mercy. Under its heavy weight my
big
thoughts turned immediately to what would happen to Japan, to the 16th Army and
what should be done with the Japanese in Java....3

Now what were the reactions of the middle rank military officers in contrast with those
of the top leadership described above? Captain Yamazaki Hajime, who was the central
figure at the Education Division of the PETA (Army for the Defence of the Fatherland),
wrote in his diary on 15 August 1945: "Listening in to the Emperor's broadcast we all
shed bitter tears. At night, First Lieutenant Nishiyama tried to kill himself, which I
succeeded in stopping."4 The younger middle rank officers tended to believe wholeheartedly
in the cause of the Greater East Asia War, and their emotional wavering was much more
immediate and direct, especially those officers who were in daily touch with the Indonesian
officers and men participating in the PETA.
Next let us look at the reactions of the Japanese civilians who were at the core of the
military government. Sait? Shizuo, a civilian Foreign Service official who played an
important part in orienting the military administration as a whole in his capacity as the
chief of the planning section of the military government's general affairs department,
stated, not in actual combat service as are military officers, we were not in such
"Being

psychological strains as to think of death in direct connection with the defeat."5 It is

interesting to note that Sait? and Yamamoto, both part of the elite core of the military
government, were not so emotionally swayed in the immediate aftermath of the defeat.
Their thinking immediately turned to practical measures they should take as bureaucrats
as a consequence of the defeat.

?
Yamamoto Moichiro, Watashi-no Indonesia Dai Juroku Gun Jidai-no Kaiso [My Indonesia
? A Memoir on the Period of My Service in the 16th Army] (Tokyo: Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai,
1979), p. 77.
Shizuo, Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki [An Account of the Disposition of the End of the War
2Miyamoto
in Java] (Tokyo: Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki Kanko-Kai, 1973), p. 47.
3Ibid.
4Yamazaki Hajime, Kita-ni Minami-ni [To the North, to the South] (privately published, 1977],
p. 139.
5Sait? Shizuo, Watashi-no Gunsei-Ki [My Recollections of Military Administration] (Tokyo:
Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai, 1977), p. 221.
Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence 39

For example, although Yamamoto's initial reaction was that of a typical military officer
when he felt that he had no words to apologize to the Emperor or to the war-dead, he
soon reflected that his work did not end with the defeat in the war. He realized that the
Japanese military administration would be terminated only when the orders of the Allied
Forces were executed, the Japanese forces disarmed and repatriated together with all the
Japanese residents, and adjustments of relationships with the Indonesian people completed.6
Sait?, who claimed to have known of the deteriorating military situation through monitoring
foreign broadcasts,7 recalled that when it became certain that the war would be terminated,
his mind was swirling with speculations and thoughts concerning the attitude the Allies
would assume and measures the Japanese forces should take thereafter, especially with
regard to winding up the Japanese military administration in Indonesia.8
The top leaders of the Japanese military administration, both military and civilian,
were all concerned with the three major questions: (1) How to execute orders of the
Allied Forces; (2) Repatriation of Japanese military forces, of civilians who worked for
the armed forces, and of Japanese residents in Indonesia; (3) How to deal with the past
promise of independence that the Japanese side had given to the Indonesians. Examining
their thoughts and attitudes, we note that they were not so much concerned with the old
promise or the question of "face", and gave more attention to how to protect national
interests by adjusting to the new developments.
Next, in order to illustrate in specific terms the behavior of those Japanese who fall
under the "allegiance" pattern, we shall examine the stance of the military administration
leadership toward the question of Indonesian independence.
For a long time the central government of Japan was adamant about the policy of not
giving independence to Indonesia, but it at last declared by means of Premier Koiso
Kuniaki's pronouncement on 7 September 1944 that it "would give independence to the
East Indies in the near future" (emphasis added). About one year prior to this statement,
the government had proclaimed "Defend to the last the Absolute Defence Sphere".9 The
war situation, however, rapidly became unfavourable to the Japanese side, especially after
the fall of Saipan in June 1944. Premier andWar Minister T?j? Hideki had been cornered
and stepped down, to be succeeded by Koiso Kuniaki who also was a retired army
general. Subsequently in late October the naval battle at Leyte was lost, marking the
virtual first step toward Japan's defeat.
Facing an imminent crisis the Government of Japan moved toward giving
"independence" to Indonesia. In reality, however, the Japanese Government had neither
the interest nor the mental composure to put into effect the process for granting
independence to the southernmost region of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".
In contrast to Japan's stagnant attitude, nationalism and the move toward independence
had grown rapidly in Indonesia after the Koiso statement, when the military government
permitted use of the red-and-white Indonesian flag and the national anthem, forbidden
since the start of the Japanese military administration. Especially noteworthy was the rise
in strength of the politically conscious youth who received military and spiritual training

6Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], p. 78.

7Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 222.
8Ibid., p. 174.
9See Tanemura Sako, Daihonei Kimitsu Nitshi [Secret Diary of the Imperial headquarters]
(Tokyo: Daiamondo, 1952), p. 153.
40 Ken'ichi Goto

during and their emergence added an important new dimension

the occupation, to the
subsequent independence movement in Indonesia.10
The Japanese military government authorities were in need of more vigorous cooperation
from the Indonesian leadership in conducting the administration of Java, a place regarded
as the "sole supply base in the South", where there was no significant fighting.11 The
Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence inaugurated in
March 1945 was a reflection of this attitude on the part of the administration authorities:
they had no concrete instructions from Tokyo, but progressed toward its establishment
under the shock of PETA's anti-Japanese uprising in Blitar, East Java which demonstrated
the Indonesian zeal for independence.
This was the politico-military situation when Field Marshal Terauchi Hisakazu, Supreme
Commander of the Southern General Army and representing the Government of Japan,
formally delivered the message "granting independence" to Sukarno and Hatta at Da Lat,
in southern Vietnam, on 11 August.12 It was during the very last stage before granting
"independence", which was Japan's final card for winning Indonesian cooperation and
support in her war efforts, that the Government of Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration
on 14 August.
So itwas natural that the first thing that crossed the mind of the military administration
leadership in Java upon hearing about Japan's surrender was how to reconcile the Allies'
orders and the pre-surrender promise of "independence" given to the Indonesians. The
solution of this delicate problem would be closely related to successfully overcoming
another major problem, that is, smooth and early repatriation of the Japanese in Indonesia.
One question that greatly troubled the leadership of the military administration was what
course of action would spare Japan from being accused by the Allies of non-obedience
to their orders. To be so accused would jeopardize the "preservation of national polity"
(i.e., the Emperor institution), a situation that must be avoided by all means. And this was
the tacit understanding shared by all those concerned.
On 19 August, the 16th Army received a telegram from Commander Itagaki Seishir?
of the Seventh Area Army who was posted at Singapore, notifying them officially that
the Southern General Army would cease hostilities, "abiding by the Imperial mandate",
and that they would no longer support the concept of granting independence to Indonesia.13
The decision coincided with the course of action taken by the 16th Army since 15August.
Receiving this telegram the 16th Army reconfirmed the policy already set down, and
issued the instruction to its men stating, "You must perform the final obligations involved
in the surrender. Never cause any trouble to His Majesty the Great Marshal. Show the
discipline in perfect order of the proud Japanese Army."14
Concerning the question of "independence" the 16th Army authorities made it their
basic policy to "freeze the military administration as of the date of the termination of war,

10The most study on this theme is Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time
representative
of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
11
Jawa Shinbun-sha (ed.), Jawa Nenkan [Almanac of Jawa] (reprinted Tokyo: Biblio Shuppan,
1973), p. 25.
12About the meeting between Terauchi and Sukarno by other leader, see the
accompanied
memoir of Miyoshi Shunkichir? who served as the interpreter, "Jawa Senryo Gunsei Kaiko-roku

(14)" [My Recollections of theMilitary Occupation in Java], Kokusai Mondai 80 (Nov. 1966): 67.
13Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], pp. 90-91.

14Ibid., pp. 91-92.

Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence 41

maintain the status quo and transfer it to the Allied Forces".15 That indicated a stance on
the part of Japan that was tantamount to stating that Japan had nothing to do with
Indonesian independence, and that itwas an issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands.16

(2) The Allied Power's Orders to the 16th Army

After the military administration authorities had set up the basic policy of distancing
itself from Indonesian "independence", the next tough question was how to prevent
Japanese arms and ammunitions from flowing into Indonesian hands, and to guard against
emergence of Japanese men who would disobey orders and join the independence
movement. Should errors be committed in handling these two problems, it would enrage
the Allies and might hinder the smooth "repatriation in perfect order" of the three million
men overseas.
Japanese

Looking at the situation from the Indonesian side, the advance of the Allied Forces
would certainly mean the return of Dutch colonialism. It was, therefore, imperative for
their independence movement to reassemble men of the PETA and Heiho (Auxiliary
Forces) that had been disbanded by the Japanese orders, and to obtain arms and ammunition
from the Japanese military. Otherwise, the Japanese arms and ammunition would be
delivered to the Allied Forces and would certainly be used against them.
As was pointed out earlier, the Japanese side did not want weapons and ammunition
to flow into the hands of the Indonesians. The Allies would accuse Japan of non-obedience
to their orders, and worse still, these arms might be used against Japanese themselves.
Extremely wary of such a situation, the 16th Army authorities, following instructions
from the Seventh Area Army, took two steps on 29 August to avoid troubles with the
Indonesians concerning weaponry. First, they concentrated arms and ammunition not
in use, and second, in the case of those arms retained as necessary, five
currently only
bullets were allocated for each weapon.17
Despite these precautions, there were active Indonesian attempts in various parts of the
country to acquire Japanese weapons, and in some cases, they led to conflicts between
the two sides. The Japanese side had "anticipated the situation where they might have to
use force when all other means have been exhausted", but they stressed that they "should
refrain from it unless it is considered as actual looting".18 This guideline reflected a
complex stand taken by the Japanese Army which, following Allied orders, had to make
an about-face and take steps to suppress the independence movement in Indonesia.
The 16th Army staff held an operations conference on 21 September, being wedged
between the Allies' orders and Indonesian nationalist pressure surrounding the weapons
disposal. This conference was of particular importance for its reconfirmation of the basic
policy of "absolute avoidance of any steps that might jeopardize national polity".19 The
members unanimously concluded that the best policy was to leave thematter of Indonesian
independence to Indonesia and the Netherlands, and that Japanese and British forces
should withdraw as soon as possible. Their conclusion was based upon the judgement

15Saito, [My Recollections], p. 175.

16Miyamoto, [The End of theWar in Java], p. 75.

17Ibid., p. 36.
18Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 226.
19Ibid., p. 42.
42 Ken'ichi Goto

that as long as the Japanese army remained in Indonesia, there would be endless difficulties
in connection with the weapons and Japanese "deserters" cooperating with the Indonesian
nationalists, thus inviting reprisals from the Allies.
The Japanese side decided to deal with the Indonesian demand for transfer of Japanese
weapons without using force, although they were extremely wary of doing anything
to "jeopardize national polity".20 In practice, however, the manner of dealing with this
problem differed from unit to unit scattered throughout the area, depending on the local
commander's personality, outlook on the war and view of Indonesia. In the opinion of
Sait? Shizuo there were at least three distinct approaches. The first may be observed in
the case of themilitary police in Surabaya where the Japanese complies with the Indonesian
demand and delivered the weapons without use of armed force, seeing that refusal would
endanger themselves; the second is illustrated in the case of the Kido unit in Semarang,
whose refusal of the Indonesian demand led to serious fighting, and the third is found in
the majority of cases where the Japanese side gave up the weapons after limited fighting.21
About half of the weapons of the Japanese forces had come into the possession of the
Indonesians in Central and Eastern
Java by the end of 1945.22
During their encounters with the Indonesians over the weapons, the Japanese side
suffered casualties of 402 men dead, 239 wounded and 88 missing by the beginning of
November.23 This figure was very high when we recall that the Japanese only lost 957
men during their offensive in Java against the Dutch forces. Despite these casualties the
Japanese force were rebuked by the Allies for failing to carry out orders and the Japanese
dilemma grew all the more serious.

It was not only concerning the weapons that Allied Forces pressed Japan to exercise
firmer control. When the war ended, not a few Japanese identified themselves with the
newly-born "Republic of Indonesia" for various reasons of their own, disregarding the
Army's order. Many of these Japanese joined Indonesian military or paramilitary
organizations and played significant parts in obtaining weapons from the Japanese army
or in fighting against the Allied Forces.
The Allied side was greatly displeased with these Japanese who cooperated with the
Indonesians in their struggle for independence, and on 22 October demanded that the
General Army issue a statement that "those Japanese who desert their military units and
fight on the Indonesian side are traitors to the Emperor".24 The British army in Java, in
particular, observed Japanese guidance behind the Indonesian armed force, and was
especially afraid of participation of senior officers who were well-versed in the handling
of weapons or who had extensive experience in combat operations.25

? ?
20See Kinoshita Hajime, Murdeka Indonesia Dokuritsu Hishi [Merdeka A Secret History
of Indonesian Independence] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1958), p. 112.
21Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 227.
the War in Java], p. 204. On the "Semarang see Ken'ichi
22Miyamoto, [The End of Incident",
Goto, Kankeishi Josetsu" [A Preliminary Study on the Postwar
"SengoNippon-Indonesia Kenky?
Relations], Shakai
Kagaku Tokyu 117 (1994): 3-32.
Japanese-Indonesian
23Yamamoto, Indonesia],
[My p. 165.
[The End of the War in Java], p. 187.
24Miyamoto,
25Ibid., p. 267. See also Ian Nish, "Britain and the End of the War in Asia and the Termination
of Empire", a paper at the International Conference on "1945 in Europe and Japan",
presented
Berlin, 6-9 Apr. 1995.
 Attitudes toward Indonesian 43
Japanese Independence

II. A Dilemma between the "Promise" and the New "Role"

(1) Behaviours of "Renunciation" Type

The Allies probably ordered the Japanese army to stigmatize those Japanese men who
joined the Indonesian independence force as "Traitors of the Emperor" for political and
psychological reasons. The Allied side was fully aware that the Japanese were in extreme
fear of "jeopardizing national polity", and they used this fear to put pressure on the
Japanese army to provide stricter surveillance on deserters. They assumed, in all likelihood,
that the appeal would have a powerful spiritual influence on those Japanese who had
chosen to join the Indonesian forces.
In this section the writer wishes to examine the conduct of the type of Japanese who
identified with the Indonesians, and of the "allegiance" type, in the overall picture of
responses or reactions in the Indonesia.
Japanese post-surrender
Then what were the responses of the "renunciation" type Japanese who chose to stay
in Indonesia? These people may be divided into two groups: (1) Those who killed
themselves, and (2) those who sought to identify themselves with the newly-born "Republic
of Indonesia" or the Indonesian community.
The first group can be subdivided based on their motives: (A) At the defeat of the
Great Japanese Empire that had been alleged to be imperishable and everlasting, some
"wanted to atone for the disloyalty to the Emperor" by committing suicide; (B) others
killed themselves out of shame or guilt because Japan had pledged to share a common
destiny with the Indonesians and support their independence, but betrayed them
unabashedly after the defeat.
Men in the second group, who sought identification with Indonesia, may also be
subdivided into (A) men who for various personal reasons decided to remain in Indonesia
to live and to die as Indonesians in the kampung community, and (B) men who were
enraged at the complete about-face in Japan's policy and opted to take positive action
by getting involved in the Indonesian independence movement in one way or another,
disobeying orders both of the Japanese and Allied Forces.26
When we look closer at the subsequent way of life of the latter, we find that (i) some
were killed in the Independence War as "combatants"; (ii) some others survived the war
and continued to stay in the "Japindo" (Japanese Indonesians), opening up a new horizon
in their newly independent second homeland, regardless of whether they succeeded or
not; and (iii) still some others who decided to return to Japan after Indonesian independence
in December 1949. The chart below shows the groups and sub-groups:

Conduct of the Japanese in Indonesia after 15 August 1945

I. "Allegiance" type
II. "Renunciation" type
1. Those who chose to die
(A) Apologies to the Emperor
(B) Sense of responsibility and shame toward the Indonesians

26Motivations of persons belonging to this type of "renunciation" are categorized as follows: (1)
sympathy for the Indonesian independence movement, (2) affection for the land of Indonesia, (3)
feeling of repulsion against the Allies, (4) fear of being arrested as a war criminal, (5) marriage
with an Indonesian woman, and (6) ambition to make a success in Indonesia. See Oku Genzo,
? ?
Dasso Nihon-hei Indonesia Dokuritsu Senso-no Kageni [Japanese Deserters Behind the
Indonesian Independence War] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun-shya, 1980), p. 224.
44 Ken'ichi Goto

2. Those who identified themselves with Indonesians

(A) Immersion into the Indonesian community
(B) Participation in the independence war
(i) Killed in the war
(ii) "Japindo"
(iii) Return to Japan

Sinceone of the main themes of the present paper is Japanese involvement in the
independence war of Indonesia, the writer would like to take up for further discussion the
men who got involved in one way or another in the Indonesian independence war against
the Dutch troops.
The number of Japanese in Java under the jurisdiction of the 16th Army who fell into
this category is shown in the table below. We may observe some outstanding tendencies
from the data in the table.

West Java

?D
a ?
I O
WO c
03 O o
U W ES Remarks

(Officer) (i) ( ) indicates

Captain the Navy.
1st Lieutenant (ii) Excludes men
2nd Lieutenant who rejoined
their unit or
(N.C.O.) were dead.
Warrant Officer (1) (1)
Sergeant Major 3 1 8 12
Sergeant 3 11 12 27
Corporal 5 6 15
(Soldier)
Lance Corporal 23 6 35
Superior Private 15 6 36
Private 1st Class 14 13 34
Private 2nd Class 9 2 13
Civilian worked
for army 3 13 1 26
Civilian in general 3 25 2 31
Sub-total 19 46 127 31 233
Total 24 46 166 31 277

Source: Miyamoto Shizuo, op. cit., p. 375.

First, no officers with the rank of major or above are found among the deserters, while
43 per cent of them (119) were ordinary soldiers, and when the figure for non-commissioned
officers (70) is added, the figure reaches 68.2 per cent of the total. One reason for this
difference may be that whereas those in upper ranks, the elite in the military hierarchy,
Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence 45

had stronger military discipline and loyalty to the organization, and a very keen sense of
belonging to the fatherland, the rank and file were relatively young and free from such
limitations.
Secondly, non-military civilians working for the army and other civilians in general
amounted to about 30 per cent of the total (84). Incidentally, out of some 68,000 Japanese
staying in Java at the time of termination of war, approximately 18,000 were estimated
to fall under those categories, and their "renunciation" ratio stood at 0.47 per cent. The
"renunciation" ratio on the part of the military who were estimated to be about 50,000
was 0.39 per cent, and there is no significant difference between the figure for the
military and for the non-military.
Thirdly, there was much difference depending on the locality. The figure was highest
for West Java with 85.2 per cent (236). In particular, Bandung alone accounted for
59.9 per cent of the total number (166). This was partly because Bandung was a major
concentration centre for the Japanese forces, but in addition to that, this area as a whole
was the fiercest battleground of the struggles for independence, culminating in the
"Bandung Sea of Fire" incident of March 1946.27

(2) Ichiki Tatsuo alias Abdul Rachman

Among those fluctuating minds there was a small minority of men who chose to
take the "renunciation" course with a lucid mentality ? criticizing Japan and identifying
with the Indonesian desire for independence. Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegor?
were typical of these Japanese, and the mention of these two names would be supported
unanimously by those who knew the actual circumstances of the time.28
At the termination of war, 15 August 1945, Ichiki and Yoshizumi were respectively
working at the Education Division of the PETA and the Naval Office as non-regular staff
members.29 They did not participate directly in the military administration, but their jobs
put them in close touch with PETA officers and soldiers, and with young Indonesian
nationalists in general. Through their daily contact with these people the two men came
to feel their nationalistic desires in both spiritual and physical terms. And this probably
accounts, at least in part, for their conducts after 15 August 1945.
Moreover, both Ichiki and Yoshizumi had long prewar experiences of living in Indonesia
(Ichiki had married a Sundanese woman), and of particular importance in this connection
is the fact that they worked as reporters for the T?indo Nipp? (the East Indies Times),
the only Japanese language newspaper in Indonesia during the latter part of the 1930s,
thus developing a deep interest in the affairs of Indonesia. Furthermore, they shared an
inclination toward the ideology of Asian solidarity and both had been expelled and
declared "persona non grata" by the Dutch for their connection with the southern advance

27The classical study on the independence struggle around the Bandung area is John Smail,
Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1964).
28Ichiki and Yoshizumi are usually referred side by side. This is not only due to their strong
comradeship, but also to the fact that Ichiki and Yoshizumi the Army side and Navy
"represent"
side respectively.
29For the life of Ichiki written in English, see Ken'ichi Goto, "Life and Death of Abdul Rachman,
1906-1949: One Aspect of Japanese-Indonesian Relationships", Indonesia 22 (Oct. 1976): 57-68.
 46 Ken'ichi Goto

policy of the Japanese military.30 It was natural perhaps that they had strong anti-Dutch
feelings.
Of the two men Yoshizumiwas active and jovial whereas Ichiki was more or less a
meditative introvert, and his disappointment in and anger against the Japanese military
administration, that now undertook to suppress the Indonesian desire for independence in
outright contrast to their former slogans, became increasingly deep-rooted in his heart.
He was convinced that the Indonesians had a solid base for independence and were ready
for it, and he openly asserted his belief through his writings. In particular, he was second
to none among the Japanese on the spot in understanding the firmness of Indonesian
nationalism that had grown up through the medium of the Indonesian language. His
insight is well revealed in his article written during the later stage of the wartime period
entitled "Independence and Language ? Future Course for the Indonesian Language".
In this article Ichiki asserted that in the future the "Indonesian language will be the
standard tongue not only in the so-called East Indies but also in the whole southern
Indonesian area defined by both geography and racial distribution". He was vehemently
opposed to the views held by some in themilitary administration who "refused to recognize
existence of the Indonesian language" saying "it should be termed the Malay language",
or who said "the so-called Indonesian language should be eradicated". He wrote, "I have
persistently protested against such views and made representations to my superiors about
such arguments being erroneous. Moreover, I have pertinaciously stuck to using the
words 'the Indonesian nation' or 'the Indonesian language' in my articles or reports
written in the Malay language."31
At any rate, Ichiki had a firm conviction supported by his personal experiences about
the "growth of the Indonesian nation and the accompanying development of the Indonesian
language during the past 30 years".32
In view of the close relationship Ichiki had with Indonesia, it would be easy to
understand the great shock he had when he learned that the promise of "independence"
? ?
indeed, the word meant only a qualified independence that seemed close to realization
was suddenly repealed completely. Ichiki must have felt indignant against the army
authorities who in the name of maintaining the status quo unilaterally disbanded PETA
and took away arms from them, as he had poured his heart and energy in the training of
"fighters", stressing the need for military force and spiritual power that must accompany
efforts toward independence.33

the Netherlands Indies Government's anxiety and fear of the Japanese propaganda
30Concerning
activities in Java, see the Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the
Netherlands East Indies (published in the United States in Feb. 1942).
3 ? no
ichiki Tatsuo, "Dokuritsu to Gengo Indonesia-go Susumubeki Michi" ["Independence
? Should Shin Jawa
and Language The Direction which Indonesian Language Take"], 1,2 (Nov.
1944): 50.
32Ibid., p. 51.
33Ichiki evaluates the Bushido chivalry) in the true sense of the word.
highly spirit (Japanese
This is clear from the editing policy of the Pradjurit magazine for Heiho which he himself was an
editor. Furthermore, Ichiki's strong wish to transplant Bushido spirit in Indonesia is suggested from
the following words: "Not only words of command but also names of weapons as well as operation
terms should be in Japanese. The military terms used in the Peta at present should be permanently
continued." Ichiki Tatsuo ["Independence and Language"], p. 53.
Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence 41

Soon after
15 August 1945 Ichiki, following an irrepressible urge, disobeyed the
"Imperial mandate" and "renounced" his fatherland. Logically he had no other alternative
if he wanted to express his sympathy toward Indonesian nationalism and support the
independence which Japan (and Ichiki personally) had promised. As of this date, he
changed his name to Abdul Rachman.34
Ichiki's activities after he joined the Indonesian independence forces are described in
detail in a booklet entitled Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan [Struggles for Independence
in the Southern Area of the Mt. Sumeru], edited by Captain Sukardi of the Indonesian
National Army.35 In this booklet, Ichiki is described as an instructor at the Madiun
Military Academy where his main task was to write papers on subjects necessary for
building up a national army. After April 1946 Ichiki began to lead guerilla troops based
at a stronghold inWest Java. InAugust, he was leading a "special scouting unit" composed
of "runaway" Japanese soldiers, first in the vicinity of Bandung, and later, after the
conclusion of Linggadjati Agreement, in Central Java where they engaged in hit-and-run
operations.36
The group moved to Malang district in East Java in August 1948, still fighting a
resistance war against the Dutch forces. On 9 January 1949 Ichiki was killed in battle at
a small village called Dampit to the east of Malang. He was 42 years of age. About half
a year prior to Ichiki's death, Yoshizumi Tomegor?, his bosom friend who had always
been with him, died of lung ailment on 10 August 1948 in the Segon mountains near
Blitar, East Java.

Conclusion
The sense of values made a 180 degree turnabout on 15 August
Japanese 1945.
Overnight, Japan's "sacred war" became an "unjust war of aggression", and the Allied
Forces, "Devilish and beastly Americans and Britishers", abruptly changed into symbols
of peace and democracy. The song "Fire at the Nimitz and MacArthur" was now replaced
by a letter of praise entreating "Dear General MacArthur" to "please stay in Japan for
ever and ever".37 Moreover, when the use of the term the "Greater East Asia War", which
had connotations of "self-sustenance and self-defence" and the "liberation of Asia", was

banned by GHQ, the Japanese people came to talk about the "Pacific War" with little
psychological or mental resistance.
Let us now turn over our eyes to Indonesia in 1945. From the start of the military
administration, the Japanese authorities told the Indonesians that Japan and Indonesia
were "bound by the same destiny", and promised independence in the framework of the
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, thus seeking their loyalty and submission to
Japan in her efforts to carry through the "sacred war".

34Japanese who joined the Indonesian side usually changed their names into Indonesian ones.
Ichiki's name, Abdul Rachman, was given him by the elderly Sutan Perang Bustami, a former

journalist, whom Ichiki respected as a colleague in the Education Division of PETA. Interview,
Colonel Kamal, Jakarta, 26 May 1977.
35Sukardi (ed.), Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan (Jakarta, 1950).
36Concerning the general political situation of Indonesia during this period, see George McT.
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), ch. 6.
37HataDcuhiko and Sodei Rinjiro, Ninon Senryo Hishi (II) [SecretHistory of theAllied Occupation
of Japan] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-shya, 1977), p. 170.
48 Ken'ichi Goto

In the old there was a "A samurai's word is final". The army,
Japan saying, Japanese
however, was not true to the samurai spirit and reversed its attitude completely after 15
August 1945, saying "Japan has nothing to do with the Indonesian independence".
According to their logic, involvement in the Indonesian independence meant going against
the orders of the Allied Forces that ordered "maintenance of status quo", and, at the same
time, a step that might jeopardize national polity.
In order to explain the sudden about-face to the Indonesians, the Japanese said that
Japan's assistance in their independence would be detrimental to them as it would hurt
their prestige, and that it would weaken the position of nationalist leaders who were
already being labeled pro-Japanese cooperators.
The military authorities who stood at the summit of 70,000 Japanese in Java gave top
priority to the task of repatriating the Japanese in "perfect order" in faithful observance
of the Imperial mandate. Many Japanese were puzzled by this sudden change in values,
and some were deeply troubled, remembering the pledge Japan had made concerning
"independence", but altogether 98 per cent of the Japanese returned docilely to their
native country.
On the other hand, there were a number of non-elite class Japanese who did not
want to follow the "allegiance" type way of life. They took it upon themselves to put
into effect the promise Japan had once made. Although their motives and methods
differed, they wanted to accomplish something on the individual level. Putting aside the
question of whether or not they really believed in the Asian solidarity principle, we
may say that they chose to identity with the Indonesian people rather than follow the
will of the state.
From the point of view of the "allegiance" type logic ? which was the starting point
of the postwar Japan ? it was inexcusable to deviate from the course set by "His
Majesty" as did the "renunciation" type men. The fact that until 1991 those men were
labeled "deserters" or "men who fled and remained on the spot", suggests psychological
discrimination on the part of "allegiance" type men against the "renunciation" type.