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to transit and conduct surveys. China insists that its domestic laws restricting such
activity are permissible under international law. The U.S. continually conducts
surveillance missions in China’s EEZ and China responds by various forms of
harassment.
The U.S. does not take sides on territorial dispute in the South China Sea. A country
that borders the sea may claim a 200 nautical mile EEZ. That gives the state
sovereignty over the resources in the EEZ. The U.S. rejects claims to maritime
territory that is not based on land. It therefore rejects the basis of Chinese claims to
“indisputable sovereignty.”
The U.S. is concerned with safety and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
China is not directly threatening these interests.
The U.S. has an interest in preventing any one country – China for example – from
exercising hegemony over the South China Sea. U.S.‐China rivalry therefore impacts
on each state in Southeast Asia and its relations with the major powers. China seeks
to undermine U.S. alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. China also seeks to
undermine U.S. political influence. The U.S. seeks to prevent the erosion of its
political influence.
Q3. Will the flashpoints in the South China Sea lead to armed violence? What can be
done to prevent this?
ANSWER: An armed incident between the naval vessels of two states is always
possible; but it is unlikely to escalate into armed conflict. Incidents at sea are easier
to contain than along land borders because they are more isolated and involve fewer
forces.
The best way to prevent friction and tensions from erupting into violence is to get all
the navies concerned to negotiate an incidents at sea agreement. This would be a
code that would regulate how warships should behave when they encounter each
other. Such an agreement should be accompanied by mechanisms that could be
used if violence erupts – hot lines, crisis management committees etc.
Q4. What are the roles of ASEAN, each ASEAN member, the US, and China?
ANSWER: ASEAN has issued two declarations of concern in response to Chinese‐
instigated friction. The first was issued in 1992 and the second in 1995 following the
Mischief Reef incident. In 2002 ASEAN also negotiated a Declaration on Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with China. ASEAN has also adopted a Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation which has been signed by China, the United States and other
major powers. This treaty enjoins its signatories from threatening or using force in
their relations.
ASEAN’s role is to maintain its autonomy over Southeast Asia and its waters from
intervention by major powers. ASEAN should present a united front to major powers
such as China on the South China Sea.
ASEAN also has a special role under the UN Charter as a regional association. Under
the Charter it has responsibility for acting when conflict breaks out. ASEAN should
therefore directly discuss the South China Sea with China and if violence continues,
report the matter to the UN Security Council.
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Each ASEAN member has a different set of bilateral relations with China. But on the
South China Sea only four members did not raise this issue at the 17th ASEAN
Regional Forum meeting in July last year: Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.
Each of these countries has strong economic links to China. Brunei’s case is not clear.
But those states with a direct interest in the South China Sea – Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam – all raised the issue. They want the U.S. to
remain engaged to balance China. And they want ASEAN to maintain a united front
in its dealings with China.
The U.S. role is to contribute to regional order by maintaining the status quo and
providing diplomatic support to countries that come under Chinese pressure. The
U.S. has offered to facilitate a multilateral settlement of territorial disputes in the
South China Sea.
China’s role is to convince the states of Southeast Asia that it is replacing the United
States as the pre‐eminent power in the region and that regional states should align
themselves with Beijing and/or stop policies that harm China’s interests.
Q5. Some analysts argue that recent Chinese activities are designed to test ASEAN, the
United States and international bodies. Do you share that assessment?
ANSWER: China seeks to divide ASEAN members by treating the South China Sea as a
bilateral matter. China seeks to prolong discussions on guidelines to implement the
DOC, as well as a code of conduct, in order to build up its strength. China seeks to
create an East Asia security region that excludes the United States. The main vehicle
for this was the ASEAN Plus Three process. ASEAN responded by expanding
membership in the East Asia Summit to include Russia and the United States. The
test for ASEAN is to maintain its centrality in regional security architecture.
China is testing the U.S. particularly its Mutual Security Treaty (MST) with the
Philippines. The treaty was signed in 1954 two years before the Philippines took
possession of what it now calls the Kalayaan Island Group. The U.S. says the MST
does not cover territory acquired after 1954. But the U.S. says if Filipino military
vessels are attacked the U.S. will come to the aid of the Philippines. On March 2
Chinese patrol boats ordered a Philippines seismic exploration vessel to leave the
waters around Reed Bank. Since the Chinese vessels were not warships and no shots
were fired the Philippines could not count on U.S support.
Q6. What are the best policy options for Vietnam?
ANSWER: Vietnam must deal with this matter on three levels. The first is self‐
strengthening. Vietnam needs to adopt a strategy and allocate the resources to build
up capacity to monitor and exercise sovereignty over its EEZ. At the same time,
Vietnam needs to maintain unity at home. Second, Vietnam must rely on high‐level
diplomacy with China, including summit meetings, to work out how to prevent
incidents like the cutting of the cable towed by Binh Minh 02 for reoccuring. The
leaders should direct a joint working group to adopt appropriate guidelines. Third,
Vietnam must work with Indonesia as ASEAN Chair, to maintain unity and a common
approach towards China. At the same time Vietnam needs to lobby other ASEAN
members.
Q7. Will recent incidents in the South China Sea influence the Shangri‐La Dialogue
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and what impact will discussions at the Shangri‐la Dialogue have on the South China Sea
issue?
ANSWER: The Shangri‐la Dialogue is just a forum for states to express their views and
to hear the concerns of other states. Its utility is that it provides a venue where key
defence ministers and high‐level security officials can meet on the sidelines and
agree on common approaches to problems such as the South China Sea. China is
sending its defence minister for the first time and he should hear firsthand what
other major powers and regional states suggest to lower tensions in the South China
Sea. The discussions at the Shangri‐la Dialogue will influence how states approach
South China Sea issues at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July and at the East
Asia Summit in October.