33.Intentional infliction of emotional distress;4.Intentional interference in contractual relationships;5.Intentional interference with business relationships;6.Copyright infringement;7.DefamationPending is Summit’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. 13]. For the reasons that follow, Summit’smotion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
In essence, Summit claims that plaintiff’s complaint is long on conclusory assertions and soshort on factual allegations that it must be dismissed under
.I agree with regard to plaintiff’s claim in Count II of fraud. The complaint, even when readwith the attachments and in plaintiff’s favor, is too conclusory to withstand the motion to dismiss.The allegations of fraud fail to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).This is particularly so with regard to plaintiff’s assertion of detrimental reliance on anyassertion by defendant of a copyright interest. Plaintiff knew that he, and he alone, had a validcopyright in his song, and he cannot plausibly contend that he relied to his detriment on receivingdefendant’s first notice.
See Evans v. Pearson Enterprises, Inc.
, 434 F.3d 839, 853 (6th Cir. 2006)(“Conclusory statements of reliance are not sufficient to explain with particularity how [the plaintiff]detrimentally relied on the alleged fraud”).To the extent that plaintiff may be alleging that defendant’s statements to the websites werefraudulent, the motion is also meritorious with regard to such claim. Plaintiff does not have standing
Case: 3:11-cv-00348-JGC Doc #: 20 Filed: 06/06/11 3 of 9. PageID #: 146