31911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1101) and the venue provision found in the Copyright Act of 1909)
. Seealso Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that if the plaintiff’s causeof action was a claim under federal copyright law, “the suit may be brought only in the districtwhere the defendant ‘resides or may be found’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a)); Goldberg v.Cameron, 482 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (section 1400(a) governs venue forcopyright infringement suits (citing Lumiere)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also heldthat 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a related venue statute for patent infringement actions, “is the sole andexclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to besupplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).” Fourco Glass Co. v. TransmirraProducts Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reliance on § 1391(b)appears to be unfounded and venue is this case is only proper in a district in which “thedefendant or his agent resides or may be found.”
28 U.S.C. § 1400(a).Here, Plaintiff conceded at the status conference that the vast majority of the 23,322putative defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia. Furthermore, while counsel forPlaintiff has posited theories about how some of the putative defendants residing outside of this
Section 1400(a) contains the same relevant language as the Copyright Act of 1909, whichstated: “[t]hat civil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act may be instituted in thedistrict of which the defendant or his agent is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found.” Actof March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 35, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084
It is well established that § 1400(a)’s “may be found” clause refers to a judicial district in whicha defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. See Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. FjeldMfg. Co., Inc., 8 F.3d 441, 445-47 (7th Cir. 1993). This court may assert personal jurisdictionover a defendant only if the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute authorizes it and to theextent permitted by due process. The applicable long-arm statute provides that a District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction where a defendant either (1) causes tortiousinjury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia; or (2) causestortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbiaif he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, orderives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code § 13-324(a)(3)-(4).
Case 1:11-cv-00301-RLW Document 9 Filed 06/07/11 Page 3 of 5