Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy Author(s): Jaap Mansfeld Source: Phronesis, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2003), pp.

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Zeno on the Unityof Philosophy

JAAP MANSFELD

ABSTRACT The formula 'the elements of logos' in the Zeno quotation by Epictetus at Arrian, Diss. 4.8.12 need not, pace e.g. von Arnim, pertain to the parts of speech, but

more probably means the elements i.e. primarytheoremsof philosophical theory, or doctrine. Theory moreover should become internalizedto the soul and 'lived': philosophy is also the so-called 'art of life'. These theorems are to be distinguished but should reciprocally entail each other. Philosophy according to Zeno is both tripartiteand one, and tripartite especially in that its parts (and subparts) cannot be transferred simultaneously: of necessity these have to taught and learned one after the other. 1. The interpretation of a passage of Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

quoting Zeno of Citiuml is difficult and disputed. Epictetus points out that
being a professional is not determined by externals, but by the possession

of the techne (art, skill, craft) at issue, and that each techne' a 'set of has
theorems, a (subject-)matter, and an aim' (Diss. 4.8.11, Oewpicaxra ... xcal

iSX.vicca'rcko;).This also holds for the philosopher (ibid., 8.12):

ti; oBv
Opop;V Tp4iova; 'la ?epi io
cye*

SXD oi toi

b Xoyo;. 'ri to T;; jsi nxOoa6pou; A' TpiowV; 0o, cxx& oi, a~X~L 6p06V i1EtV 'T6VX6YOV. zoia OewpilgaTa; Ttj ti TO lLcywv ?iya; yivrat fj 0g a cia;&xX jiXXv a Ziv(v)

"yvOvat ta Tto)X6yo0 atotXcia, noiov nt EKaacTOV avcoTveatt sat n p6; &XXia Ka" "Oca &ptroe'rat e TO`rot;&IoCoI)Oa av".

This may be rendered follows (I do not yet attempt translatelogos): as to

What, then, is the (subject-)matterof the philosopher?It is not a rough mantle,
isn't it? No, it is the logos. What is his aim? It is not to wear a rough mantle, isn't it? No, it is to keep his logos right. What kind of theorems? They do not

have to do with growing a beard, or wearing one's hair long, do they? Nay, rather,it is as Zeno says: "to understand elements of logos, (viz.) what each the of them is, and how they fit in with each other, and all that follows from them". As we shall see, iASXi here used both in the sense of 'subject-matter' is

and in that of the 'matter'that has to be informedby the elements of the

Accepted August 2002 l In the chapter entitled 'To those who hastily assume the guise of philosophers'. Epictetus stll read Zeno, see Diss. 1.20.15, 4.9.6. ? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 Also available online - www.brill.nl Phronesis XLV1II12

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logos. For the crafts as points of departure also Diss. 1.15.2-3, where see Epictetusdeals with the 'subject-matter' of the philosopher of phinot but losophy;in this passage philosophyis said to be 'the art of living'.2 The crux of our presentpassage is the meaningof the formula ra Toiv Xoyov the 'elementsof the logos'. A partof the text is printedby von rotoqeia, Arnimas SVF 1.51, that is to say as the last of the five texts which form the first section of his Zeno chapter:'A. Logica'. Since the other members of this set deal with dialectic, sophismsetc., von Arnim (following Pearson,The Fragmentsof Zeno and Cleanthes,London 1891, whom he excerpted to a degree in the first volume of the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta)clearlyattributes logical sense to the elementsof logos. But a one does not know exactly what he believes is meant, since he fails to providean exegetical note. Oldfather the Loeb Epictetus,and Long and in Sedley in the chapter'Dialectic and Rhetoric'of their Hellenistic Philosophers (1987) translate logos as 'reason'.3 Long and Sedley add a note:

rejectingthe meaning'partsof speech', or of 'discourse',4 which the formula has in othertexts and which may have been on von Arnim's mind, they argue that the elements of logos/reasonare concepts (Cvvotat)and
preconceptions (npoXP?et;). They adduce two proof-texts: one in Aetius,

or ratherps.-Plutarch,5 wherewe readthatthe 'logos/reason,for which we are called rational,is said to be completedfrom our preconceptions during our first seven years'. The other in Galen,6who quotes Chrysippus' On Affections(Hepinaa0v), where Chrysippus speaks of the partsof the soul which constituteits logos. By way of exegetical (but also polemical) commentGalen adds that presumably Chrysippus wishes us to remember what he wrote in anothertreatise,the On the Logos (Hep' 'oi X6you),' where he said that the soul is a collection of certain concepts and preconceptions.In favour of this translation may e.g. also refer to Pap. one
2 For v5XTI the subject-matter of the philosopher cf. Alcin. Did. 189.12-6 as Hermann,for that of philosophy Philo Congr. 144-5, Plu. Def. or. 410B. For the 'art of living' see below, n. 63 and text thereto. 3 Long and Sedley (hereafterL&S) vol. 1, Cambridgeetc. 1987 and later repr., 31J. 4 For this meaning of the expression in Stoic 'fragments' see below, text to nn. 4244. A.A. Long, in his recent Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, Oxford 2002, 20 translates"elements of discourse"and ibid. n. 20 states that "[th]is is unlikely to be an exact citation of Zeno", who would be a mere figure-head.I believe that the gist of the quotation goes back to Zeno, see n. 1. I Aet. 4.11.4 (ps.Plu. 900C only) - L&S Nr. 39E.4, SVF 2.83. 6 Gal. PHP 5.2.49 + 5.3.1 - L&S 53V (not translatedin L&S vol. 1), SVF 2.841; see also below, ? 2 ad init., and n. 59. 7 On this treatise see furtherbelow, n. 24 and text thereto.

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Herc. 1020 (perhapsby Chrysippus), 1.11-24,8 on why the wise never col. make mistakes:'In the first place, philosophyis either a strivingafter the correctness logos, or the understanding of thereof,or moreparticularly the systematicstudy devoted to logos. For once we are thoroughlyfamiliar with the partsof the logos and theircombination,we shall use it the right way. By logos I mean the one all rational living beings possess'. Note that Chrysippus(?) emphasizes the importanceof doing philosophyas a preliminary the achievementof sophia, wisdom. to As to the 'fittingin with each other', Long and Sedley referto a paper by Long first publishedin 1971, in which among other things he proved that the important terma&coXoOico ('entailment')has the same functionin each of the three partsof philosophy.9 A different logico/epistemicinterpretation the Zeno fragment advoof is catedby F. Ild6fonsein her bookLa naissance de la grammaire dans l'antiquitegrecque.'0 I understand correctly,her argument as follows: If her is the four so-called Stoic categorieswhen taken togetherallow a "determinationdiff6rencide", ever moredifferentiated refinedsequential an and determinationof what is perceived and apprehended,which culminatesin a propositioncontaininga complete perceptionof somethingreal, such as 'if this is a man, it is a living being which partakesof reason'." She argues that this categorialchain is statedexplicitly (!) in Epictetus'Zeno fragment,but fails to explain in what way. I suppose she thinksthat the 'elements of logos' are the categories."2 This interpretation hard to is refute, but not necessarilyirresistible.

8 SVF 2.298a, text as at FDS (for this siglum see below, n. 14) Fr. 88, Kca[i yap] ai]frv Xp[(iia6iicOa EVTo; OvTe; Tcov To[iV] Xoyot gopiowv xai T5 muv[Tat?ew 6e E[E4(p(o a[U4]'r X6oyov [Xf]yo tov I Ka[ra8qnpa]tv n&alt 4[oi;] Xoyt?ot; Also cf. Arius Didymus ap. Stob. 2.7.5w, p. 63.1-5 W., (7n?p te TO KaXiancpXovTa. TV TE TaWV gEwX(V KaOEGOTCt)CV aL)T(p icpo; 'acXXX11aKai Xo;oqiJ 'iRaTo;iOat a4UjiE'Tpicx "p;t 0 Xov, oiStwc o X6'youKca' ToV rY; WuX~i;a KcxXXo E 1)T ica'ttOb 'oT't -1Itt KaoX ?tI cxgg?pta Xpo5 OOV, ToutDWa @ (TO)OXov rt aurfj; caL ipo; a&ikia [thus Meineke, geXiiv mss.] au'oi xp6P; 1gcpciv ('. . . the beauty of the soul is a due proportionof the logos and its constituent parts,

both in relation to the whole of the soul and in relation to each other'). I A.A. Long, 'Language and thought in Stoicism', in A.A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, repr. 1996, 94 ff. Followed e.g. by I. Sluiter,AncientGrammar in Context, diss. Amsterdam 1990, 13 ff.
10 Paris 1997, 234-5.

Based on Cic. Varro 21, but Cicero does not mention the categories. Also see A. Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme, Berlin/New York 1975, 14 ff.
12

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In his book Logic and the Imperial Stoal3 JonathanBarnes discusses logical terms to be found in Epictetus' Discourses. He refers to Diss. 2.9.7-9: a man is saved if he is actually what the term 'man' promises thathe is. In a footnotehe refers to our text, where it is said (in Barnes'
rendering) "that you must first learn xa toi Xo6you rotXs-ia". It is clear

thatBarneswould like to take this expressionin a logical sense ('partsof discourse',I presume),but he does not commit himself, statingthat 'this is a notoriouslypuzzling text'. He refers to Karl-HeinzHulser, who in volume I of his Fragmenteder Dialektikder Stoiker of 1987'4points out thatbecause of the context in Epictetusit is not certainthat the fragment shouldbe taken in a logical sense. I agree with Hulserand Barnes,which is not difficultbecause all I am doing is in fact agreeingwith myself.'5 2. A questionwhich one may pose is, though the answer,naturally,can only be a guess: to what work by Zeno may we attribute fragment? the My suggestionis: to the On Logos, nfepi 6you.'6 This Zenonianbook-titleis attestedtwice, both times in Diogenes Laertius7.39-40,'7 thatis to say in the section of the Stoic book of the Lives dealing with the partsof philosophy, or ratheron the partsof what is called 'the logos pertaining phito losophy' (6ov iax& (ptXoao(piav o6yov).'8 Only 'Zeno of Tarsusand some others' are affirmedto have held that the parts concernedare 'not parts of the logos [of philosophy,that is], but of philosophyitself (D.L. 7.41).19

Leiden etc. 1997, 29 with n. 30. Stuttgart/BadCannstatt 1987, FDS Fr. 79. He translates (1.83) "Elemente der Vemunft (Rede?)". 15 See Huilser, op. cit. l.xxi-ii, and my paper 'Zeno of Citium: critical observations on a recent study', Mnemosyne 31 (1978) 139. 16 Not listed in the catalogue of Zeno's works at D.L. 7.4 - SVF 1.41. Another candidate, perhaps a less likely one, is the Kazotca' listed ibid. to which no furtherreferences are extant. The meaning of this title is not clear: perhaps 'universals', as at Sext. M. 11.8-11 - SVF 2.224, L&S 30I (still, the proposition 'if some things are existents, they are either good, or bad, or intermediate' is a theorem), perhaps as in Epictetus, for which see below, n. 56 and text thereto.
3
"4

17

SVF 1.45, 1.46, 2.37; L&S 26B.

On the meaning of this formula at D.L. 7.39 ff. see K. Ierodiakonou,'The Stoic division of philosophy', Phronesis 38 (1993) 57 ff., who translateslogos as 'discourse' and provides several parallels. The interesting section 'La philosophie et l'ambiguit6 du discours philosophique' in P. Hadot, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?, Paris 1995, 265 ff. is not helpful in our present context. 19 SVF 3 Zeno Tars. Fr. 3; L&S 26B. See below, text after n. 59.
18

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JAAP MANSFELD

Furtherinstances of the formula, of Stoic provenance,are (1) Comut. ND 15.4-5 Lang, who states that there are 'three kinds of issues (or: speculations)by which the logos concerned with philosophy is made complete' ('rpia'yEvilaKeoIgaTcov eivat, 8t' Wv o KcaTa ptXoao(piav X6yo; auv tXipoi'rat - for this 'completion' see immediately below, D.L. 3.56 on Plato), and an explanation of the name Tpv'royivem,ibid. 37.14-6, 'others say that therebythe three kinds of issues (or: speculations) of the theory concernedwith philosophyare placed before the mind' (iXxot E (paoa ata tourouirapiataacr6at 'rpia yEvq 'rv c;xsCg6amv rTj; KcaTa qnXoao(piav Ieopia;).20This equivalence of logos and theoria is most interesting. For the 'issues' or 'speculations' comparethe book-title TCov qtxoao(poiu roiv oxeggal(v in Chrysippus'catalogue at D.L. 7.189. The similar formulas'ost; ?V ?V qPnXoao0pia aciggaatv and rCov (ptkouo(pita aiccggsxtwvare found Plu. Virt. mor. 447F and Procl. In Tim. 1.169.27 Diehl, respectively. (2) Philo Agr. 14 SVF 2.39 (he goes on with the similes):2' I'Ov yov Ka'a qtXoaotiav Xoyov `p ov O6vra'rot; akiaot; a&ypi qpatv ancticaiaat (simarly at Mut. 74).

For the expression icara ptXocopiav X&yo;see also Philo Decal. 150, Quaest. Gen. bk. 2 Fr. 41; Stob. 2.31.104, 4.44.81, 4.50a.27. Cleanthes ap. Phld. Mus., PH 1497, col. 28.1 ff. (~ SVF 1.489) speaks of 'rot)[Xyy]o. ri; ptXOOo(pia;. Note that according to D.L. 3.56 the i; XptoGopfrx; Xoyo; eventually became complete i.e. tripartitethanks to Plato who added dialectic, and that according to ibid. 5.28 Aristotle divided the logos concernedwith (Kcaxa')philosophy into two
parts (5vrr6%v tJivatOrv
KcaraQ (piocoiav

X&yov):the formula had become what

today is often called 'doxographical', or so it appears.In later authors the formula X6yot (or X6yo;) rri; wtXoao(pioi; about equivalent to 'philosophy', e.g. is Iambl. VP 87, Eus. Contra Marc. 1.4.24. We are rather poorly informed about the contents of Zeno's treatise, but are told at least one important thing, or rather two related things. Zeno according to Diogenes Laertius was the first22 to say that the logos pertaining to philosophy falls into three parts: a physical part, an ethical part,

Cf. Chrysippus' three kinds of theorems, below n. 22. See below, n. 31 and text thereto. 22 I do know that this priority is also attributedto the Old Academy, more particularly to Xenocrates (Sext. M. 7.16 - Xenocr. Fr. 1 Heinze, 82 Isnardi-Parente), and that this is accepted by many scholars. Arist. Top. 1.14.105bl9-25 divides 'statements' and 'problems' into 'three parts' (Rep' rpia), viz. ethical, physical and logical. This is not yet an explicitdivision of philosophy,pace e.g. E. Berti,Lafilosofladel <<primo>> Aristotele, 2nd rev. ed. Milan 1997, 414. ChrysippusOn Lives book IV at Plu. SR 1035A - SVF 2.42, L&S 26C (cf. below, n. 30) speaks of the 'three kinds of theorems of the philosopherformulatedby the ancients'; cf. Comutus, quoted above, ? 2 ad init. But by his time the division had become firmly established, so one cannot be sure who these ancients are. Zeno, the first part of whose life overlaps with the last part of Xenocrates', may well be included (cf. the 'ancients' at Philo Agr. 14, above, ? 2 ad init.) Let us compromise by saying that Zeno was the first Stoic to advocate the tripartition.
20 21

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and a logical part.He was followed by Chrysippus the firstbook of the in latter's treatisewith the same title (On Logos), in the first book of his Physics, and by numerousother Stoics of which the names and some book-titles given:Apollodorus are Ephillus, Eudromus, Diogenesof Seleucia
and Posidonius (D.L. 7.39).23
Two other testimonies are extant which inform us about the contents of Chrysippus'On Logos: (1) at D.L. 7.54 - SVF 2.105, L&S 40A (where the title is translatedas On Reason) we read that in book I he also dealt with the criteria of truth,mentioningsense-perceptionand preconception;(2) according to Gal. PHP 5.3.1-2 - SVF 2.841, L&S 53V24he said - book-numbernot specified that logos/reason is a collection of concepts and preconceptions,' and that these are parts of logos/reason (X6yoi ... 6opia).So this treatise dealt with more topics than the parts of (the logos of) philosophy, viz. epistemology and theory of mind. One cannot be certain that these were also dealt with in Zeno's On Logos,26 though this is not to be rejected out of hand.

The second piece of informationconcerningZeno's treatiseis about the orderof these parts:logic first, physics second,ethics third.Among those who advocated order saidto be Zenoin theOnLogos,andChiysippus, this are Archedemus and Eudromus (D.L. 7.40;27 no titles given). Diogenes Laertiuscontraststhis groupwith others(no names mentioned) who held that 'no part is separatedfrom another,but they are blended, so they taught them as a blend' (D.L. 7.40).28 We happento know that this contrast is flawed, at the very least insofar as Chrysippus concerned.To is give only one example, in another treatise,the On How to Use Logos he (Iepi X6you xpiiesw;) quotedby Plutarch,29 arguedthatwhen studying logic one shouldalso make use of 'the others'(wv akkXov), is to say that of what belongs with the other parts of philosophywheneverthis turns out to be required.Chrysippus severely criticisedby Plutarchfor thus is disturbinghis own systematicorder of the partsof philosophy,in which
23 SVF Apoll. Fr. 1, Eudr. Fr. 1, Diog. Fr. 2, and Posid. Fr. 87 E.-K.; L&S 26B. The title of Eudromus' book, significantly enough, is 'H0uci roItxEIC0at; (later also used by Hierocles; see G. Bastianini and A.A. Long at Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini, I 1**, Florence 1992, 373: "trattazione 'elementare' nel senso di 'fondativa' e non nel senso di 'rudimentale' o 'semplice"'; references to the literature ibid., 374). 24 Long and Sedley omit PHP 5.3.1; tidtle again translatedas On Reason. 25 Cf. above, text to n. 8 and below, n. 59. 26 For Long's and Sedley's translation of Zeno's title see below, n. 57. 27 SVF 1.46, 2.34, Arch. Fr. 5, Eudr. Fr. 1, Diog. Fr. 16; L&S 26B. 28 SVF 2.41, L&S 26B. 29 SR 1035E - SVF 2.50. More examples at Ierodiakonouop. cit., 68 ff.

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theology, the so to speak mysticalculmination(eXeri) of physics, comes last.30 The famous Stoic similes for the partsof philosophy:a walled garden richin fruits,an egg withits white,yolk andshell,cappedby Posidonius' simile of the living being consistingof blood and flesh, bones and sinews, and soul,3" also demonstrate unity of philosophyand the interdepenthe dence of its parts. As a matterof fact, the systematicunity of Stoic philosophyis emphasized by both ancient authorsand modem scholars. In the illuminating pages dealingwith this issue in his book Le systemestoicien et l'idee de temps32 Victor Goldschmidt appealsto the Stoicdoctrine the(XvtaKxo1)Oia of
riov a&pr7w-v, 'reciprocal implication of the virtues': one cannot have the

one virtue alone and not have the others as well. In book I of his On VirtuesChrysippus said thatthis is so because the virtuessharetheirtheorems.33 This inter-entailment doctrine (though not the term a&vrancoXou90a)

is attestedfor Zeno by Plutarch:m cardinalvirtues'are inseparablebut the yet distinctand differentfrom one another';Zeno next definedeach individual virtue.Goldschmidtarguesthat this inter-entailment holds for also the partsof Stoic philosophy.35 for the momentwe forget about Stoics If such as Ariston,who limited philosophyto ethics, we cannot but admit that he is right.
I For this order and terminology see the verbatim quotation from Chrysippus' On Lives book IV at Plu. SR 1035A - SVF 2.42, L&S 26C (cf. above, n. 22). See e.g. my paper 'Providence and the destruction of the universe in early Stoic thought', in J. Vermaseren,ed., Studies in Hellenistic Religions, Leiden etc. 1979, 134 ff. (repr. with same paginationas StudyI in my Studies in LaterGreekPhilosophy and Gnosticism, London 1989). 31 Sext. M. 7.17-9 (- SVF 2.38 1st text, Posid. Fr. 88 E.-K., L&S 26D); D.L. 7.40 (- SVF 2.38, 2nd text, L&S 26B; Diogenes Laertius does not cite names but begins with Posidonius' simile, and adds that of a walled city governed according to logos). For Philo on this theme see above, text to n. 21. See furtherK.-H. RohLke,Bildhafte Vergleiche bei den Stoikern, Hildesheim/New York 1975, 410 f. 32 First publ. Paris 1953; I quote from the 4th rev. ed. of 1979, 64-7. Also cf. Ierodakonou,op. cit. 63, and J. Brunschwig, 'Les Stoiciens' in M. Canto-Sperber (ed.), Philosophie grecque, Paris 1997, 516-21. 33 SVF 3.295 (D.L. 7.125-6); cf. 2.299 (Plu. SR 1046E - L&S 61F). 34 SR 1034C - SVF 1.200, L&S 61C. 3S Aet procem. (ps.Plutarch 2 only, 874D - SVF 2.35, L&S 26A) reportsthataccording to the Stoics the most general virtues (of the wise man, I presume) are three in number,which is the reason why philosophy is tripartite,physics being concernedwith the enquiryconcerning the cosmos, etc. Paralleled at ps.Andron.De pass. 3.2, 241.356 (not in SVF) and 50-4 Glibert-Thiny (- SVF 3.267) on the virtues subordinateto (ppoviat;, where in the summary at the end logic is replaced by its subdisciplines

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3. It would be nice if we had an explicit statementby Zeno to the effect that the partsof philosophy,or ratherof the logos of philosophy,form a systematicand consistentwhole. What I would like to suggest is that in fact we do have such a statement:I submitthatwe may interpret fragmenttransmitted Epictetus the by as dealing with the systematic coherence of the logos of philosophy,as eventuallyincarnated,so to speak, in the philosopher.I have suggested above that the treatisein which this fragmentwould be at home is Zeno's On Logos. In this On Logos the logos of philosophyis divided into three parts.It is quite apt to neutralizethis division to some extent by insisting thatthese partsbelong together,that is to say form a unified, or unifiable, whole. The elements(crotXFita) the logos, a term anticipatedby Epicof tetuswith the term 'theorems',would then be the principlesof (each part of) the logos of philosophy,and it would be these principleswhich 'fit in with each other' in the sense that each principlepresupposesthe others, and leads to the others.For the formula'with each other' here entails that this relationis reciprocal,is an inter-relation.36 is, then, the task of the It
dialectic and rhetoric. Glibert-Thirry brackets ethics (also omitted by von Arnim) which is lacking in some mss. and in William of Moerbeke's translation,but one need not concur; moreover, ethics is representedby several of its subordinate virtues, just as logic is at the beginning of the chapter. Further parallels at A. Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo-Andronicusde Rhodes <<? EPI IAef2N>>, Corp. lat comm. in Arist. graec. suppl. 2, Leiden 1977, 306 f. The earliest evidence is Cic. Fin. 3.72-3 - SVF 3.28182, on dialectic, physics and (by implication) ethics as virtues. Add Strabo 2.5.2 (not
p in SVF), i1 8vdi" a&pe ntt;- tc 8' xpETaravv1no0EtoEI atFIv CEaivv &J ilpn?va;, Kcal iv aiorat; c%oI(saq ate iati t; apxa&; t&a;repit to{v itaCtt;, and D.L. 7.46, Triv 6taK-ttdv .v [.. &pET' v ?V e6t neptexo'xav petz, D.L. 7.83 &pe (both

at SVF 2.130); D.L. 7.92 - SVF 3.261, others say the virtues are three: koytd1v icaA itrlmv. (epX)t flv KcaXt 36 See e.g. Alcin. Did. 169.7 Hermann, on the Platonic elements: apiooacOvtov nav-rv avakoyi'a npo; a&XXikia. Compare, in Epictetus' report about the Kurieu6n (Diss. 2.19.1 - SVF 2.283), the phrase about the mutual incompatibility of its component statements:KotvT .. . oikn1; paXr; Toi; tpta'tro&rot; ip'O; aXXTIka; Cleom. Cael. 1, 1.11-3 Todd (- SVF 2.534), on the interrelationof the parts of the cosmos:
5; o-enaOFrtGai v Ev ai4 gptpv (see R. Goulet, Cleomede, Theorie tpo; a&XXriXa

ilkmentaire, Paris 1980, 179-80). Furthere.g. Marc. Aur. 3.13.1, 6.38.1. - The descriptive formula oi X6yov crrotcia which apg6o,retat ipob; iXkXka is to some extent paralleledby one of the two definitions of a philosophical hairesis cited and applied Sext. P. 1.16 (irpo6oaktaiv86'ygaal toXXoi;a&icoXojOIiav k. EXouatnpo; a k1hi - cf. Clem. Strom. VIII 5.16.2, printed SVF 2.121), at D.L. 1.20 (np6oacktaiv a&okoX0iav exovastv: 'adhesion a des doctrines presentant un enchaine8oypocccLv ment', tr. Goulet) - Diogenes' version being obviously abridged,and at ps.Galen Hist. phil. 7 (itpoacXktotv &aXllXao-qxpvcov KC..). Boyga'uovnokXXv pbo;

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philosopherto understand what precisely each of these principlesis, i.e. to distinguish them from each other (just as one has to distinguishthe individual virtues from each other although they are 'inseparable'),but also to understand what way they hang together,thatis to say to underin stand in what way the logos of philosophyis one and unifiable.And as a next step one should understand whatfollows from this set of interrelated principles:not only the rest of the logos of philosophy,I presume, but also the correctuse of this logos by the humanagent. This may be illustratedin a simple manner.Zeno's telos-formulahas been transmittedin two versions: (1) 'to live in agreement with nature, thatis to live accordingto virtue;for natureleads us towardsvirtue'(D.L. 7.87, Zeno in the On the Nature of Man), and (2) 'to live in agreement; this is to live according to one logos which is in harmony' (Arius Didymus37 Stob. 2.7.6a.1; no book-title).38 ap. Whichof these two versions is the original one, or whetherthe added explanationsare original,it is hard to say, but these issues need not detain us now.39 us first take Let the second and simplerversion, which does not referto nature.Even so, it shows thatknowledge(belongingwith the domainof 'logic' in the Stoic sense of the word) and ethics go together.That the logos accordingto which one has to live has to be 'in harmony'(as the added explanation has it) entails thatit has partswhich have to form a consistent whole. The authenticityof Diogenes Laertius'version is shoredup by the fact that the tide of the treatiseby Zeno where it was to be found is mentioned, and because Zeno also wrote a treatiseentitled On the Life Accordingto
Nature

(nepi Toi

acTat (piD6otv jiou).40 This

first version is even clearer. To

live in agreementis: to live in agreementwith nature.Ethicsdependson physics, but also, of course, on logic i.e. knowledge,becauseone has to understand naturein orderto be able to live in agreement with it. And we are able to understand naturebecause we are part of nature,or of the
37 ogoboyoue'vco; 4inv- roiso 8' er'd ica0' i?va X6yov at' uPoWVo v. Arius Didymus can no longer be identifiedwith Augustus' court philosopherArius (a Stoic), so not only his affiliation but also his precise date are uncertain.See T. Goransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Goteborg 1995, 208 ff. 38 Both texts at SVF 1.179 (cf. L&S 63C and 63B). Diogenes' version is supported by Cic. Fin. 4.14, likewise printed SVF 1.179. 39 See my paper 'Diogenes Laertius on Stoic philosophy', Elenchos 7 (1986) 331 ff. (repr. with same pagination in my Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy, Assen/Maastricht1990), where I argue that both definitionsmay be attributed to Zeno. See furtheresp. G. Striker,Essays in Hellenistic Epistemologyand Ethics (Cambridge 1996) 2234, and Brunschwig, op. cit. 551-2. 40 D.L. 7.4 - SVF 1.41.

ZENO ON THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY

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world,4' ourselves: so nature enables us to acquire the knowledge by means of which, in its turn,it can be known by the knower,and followed by the agent. And understanding principleson which a morally corthe rect action is based entails knowingwhy one is doing what one is doing, and so entails knowing oneself, viz. knowing one's position vis-a-vis natureand as partof nature,and so presupposes knowledgeof nature. 4. But we shouldreturnto the Zeno fragmentin Epictetus,and more particularly to the expression a toi X6oyoi atotxeia, the 'elements of the
logos'. Galen PHP 8.3.14 (- SVF 2.148) says that Chrysippus called 'the

noun, verb, preposition, article and conjunction' ou X6oyou aToIxeia,'elements of discourse'.There are also two titles in the second series of the third section of the logical part of Chrysippus' which point bibliography in this direction.42 his accountof the view of Diogenes of SeleuciaconIn cerned with the noun, name, verb, conjunction and article Diogenes Laertiususes the formulasgipo; Xoyoi and cTotXciov Xoyou interchangeably, though it would seem that Diogenes of Seleucia used gipo; and unnamedothers ToltXEoV.43This, as far as I know, is al the indubitable and clear evidencerelatingto the Stoics we have about oi X6oyoi atColxEta as 'elements of discourse' or, if you wish, 'of language', or 'speech', translatedby CiceroLuc. 92 as elementaloquendi.4

41 D.L. 7.142-3 - SVF 2.633 (cf. L&S 53X), laudatio of Chrysippus'On Providence book I, Apollodorus' Physics (- SVF Apoll. Fr. 10), and Posidonius (- Fr. 99a E.-K.). I. Kidd, Posidonius vol. II, The Commentary(i), Cambridge1988, 404 plausibly argues that the substance of this argument derives from Zeno. Compare the argument concerning spermatic reason attributedto Zeno at Sext. M. 9.101-3 (not in SVF; on this passage see the forthcoming paper of T.L. Tieleman, 'Zeno and Psychological Monism: The Evidence Reconsidered'), as well as Chrysippus' view at D.L. 7.87 SVF 3.4, L&S 63C ('our natures are part of the natureof the whole'). 42 Ap. D.L. 7.192-3, two out of five: Hepit W-vFTo0tXEiWV X6you Icaci oil tdv YOAE,vcov a' j' y' 5' ?', and Hep'ttv aowiXiwv 'ro X6yo) ip6; Ntidcava'. 43 D.L. 7.58 (- SVF Diog. Fr. 22, L&S 33M). I Cf. also Cic. Luc. 143, quod in elementis dialectici docent.... Simpl. in Cat. 10.21 ff. Kalbfleisch cites Pophyry (Porph. Fr. 46F Smith - Thphr. Fr. 683 FHS&G), who says that Theophrastusin his treatise Hcp't rCov X6you a'rotXriVw discussed roil the question 'whether only noun and verb are elements of logos, or also articles and conjunctions etc., which are parts of diction' (or 'expression', X?_4Eo ... gk pi). But this treatise is elsewhere cited with the more appropriate title nepp't Xeco;, see W.W. Fortenbaugh & al., Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought & Influence vol. 2, Leiden etc. 1982, p. 510 at 17a-b. Simplicius may have made a mistake.

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I have said above that one cannot deny with absolute confidence that this sense is valid for the Zeno fragment,but also suggestedthat another meaningmay be put to the test. The meaningI have in mind is elements not in the sense of 'what somethingis composed of (though this is not ruled out, as we shall see) but in the sense of 'what somethingis based I primitives.Furthermore, am on': principles,firsts, points of departure, though this less concernedwith their form (as propositionsor arguments, is relevantas well) than with their systematicfunction. This meaning can be amply documented. Lucretius 1.81 speaks of rationis ... elementa,where ratio pertainsto "a system of philosophy".45 k6you,or so I presume, just as does Cicero's loquendi Rationis translates (see above); Latin speakers when translating the Greek word had to choose. Bailey in his comments on this line of Lucretiusaptly refers to Epic. Ep. Hdt. 47, 'it is useful to grasp this principleas well' (Xp#noluov Horacewrites to Maecenasin his -to &hlcadtoito ICcvCaoeIv cTolXsov).46 first Epistle that he has renounced frivolous poetry and now studies which is difficultto put into practice.But one can (mostly Stoic) ethics,47 try; Horace holds himself in check and consoles himself with its 'elements' (Ep. 1.27, elementis).He providesa strikingexample of such an 'element', ibid. 41-2, 'virtueis to flee from vice, and the most important wisdom to be free from stupidity'.The Stoic doctrineinvolved is too well

4 Books I-111 See C. Bailey, T. LucretiiCari De RerumNatura vol. II, Commentary, (Oxford 1947 and later repr.) ad loc., and p. 605-6 on the various meanings of ratio. 46 Transferred by Bailey to before ? 63 (not by Arrighetti, who translates in the same way as Bailey: "e utile tenere a mente anche questo principio").Cf. also Epic. Ep. Men. 123, 'principles of the good life'. I retract a remark made in my paper Epicurus Peripateticus,in A. Alberti. ed., Realtd e ragione. Studi sulla filosofi antica, Acc. <<La Colombaria>>Studi 140, Florence 1994, p. 47, where I argue that at Epic. Ep. Pyth. 86 the use of otxoqciain the sense of physical elements is due to Peripatetic influence. Other authors too, e.g. Aristotle, Lucretius, and Cicero use GtotXEta/elementa both in the sense of physical elements (and even letters of the alphabet) and in that of principles. 47 In the next Epistle he recommends the study of Homer, who is even better than Chiysippus and Crantoron what is good, evil, useful, and useless (Ep. 2.3-4). Horace's tongue was in his cheek in the first Epistle, but that does not detract from the value of the informationprovided;what is more, Homer is better than the philosophers only because of the exempla provided. Compare Porphyrio's comment, p. 270.20-71.4 Meyer: scribens Lollio ait lecto a se poemate Homeri manifestumsibi factum esse, melius exprimi ab eo philosophiae praecepta quam ab optimis eius professionis auctoribus Chrysippoet Crantore.In Iliade enium ostendit vitia hominum,in Odyssia per Ulixis personam virtutesdemonstrat. The rest of the 2nd Epistle to a large degree is again concernedwith moral philosophy.

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known to stand in need of Belege; note that Horace says 'to flee from vice', not 'to be free fromvice'."8 One may comparethe concludingparagraphof Philo's De agricultura,in which he says that 'Noah, the righteous man, having made himself master of the primaryelements of the
craft of agriculture, lacked the strength to reach its final stages'.49

Galen in the De dignoscendispulsibus speaks of 'the first issues and so to speak elementsof the account(or theory, logos)' - viz., of pulses and of 'the firstsand elements,so to speak, of the whole account (or theory, logos) concerningpulses'.S Earlierin the same work he uses a differentformula,speakingnot of the elements of the doctrine at issue, but of those of the art, techne: 'yet these are the firsts and so to speak elements of the art dealing with pulses; if these are not known it is impossible to have certainknowledgeof the others',viz. of the other theorems.5' Elsewherehe speaksof 'the elementsof the art of Hippocrates'.52 Stobaeus Anth.3.14.7has preserved long fragment a comedyby a certainNicolaus a of (date not known), in which a parasiteinstructsthe public about his art; this figuregives quite a few examples, and says (line 31): 'these are the elementsof my whole art' (atotXeia piv taiY' at'ai ri; O'kXi; rvXvr).153 This use of oYotXFia the sense of 'principles'can also be documented in from Aristotle'sTopics.5A is, for instance,a atotX6yov the extension It that
48 See Porphyno's comment on line 28, p. 269.3-5 Meyer: 'this is his reply to those who discourage the study of wisdom [i.e. philo-sophy] by denying that anyone has ever acquired perfect wisdom' (his respondet, qui a studio sapientiae deterrentes negant perfectam sapientiam quemquamadsecutum). 4 Philo Agric. 181, N&e ov 8icatov, '6; r'c i pGaicaz OTotXeu.'6&i yeopytC,; tr;

cta?ci.RsVOo; T?viI; axpt td@v nepa6Tov a&Srf; EEXOIv i'1a9iviacT. 50 8.818.14-5 Kuhn, t-a o5v OOV rpata xat oiove't crotXcia TroO 6yo, 7Tcxga and ibid. 934.13-4, TcaiT' Eati ra rp&ta icat oiov atotxeta TroO navro; ncpt rv om)yv

x6yoii. 51 8.771.9-12 Kuhn,icait'rot )CZETa' npiTa Kcai OtOvarot%Ea T; ?v oto; yc xa axygot; t' C~s;~tv v&vo~cvo~ 'r&v&Xov UEOO vvt TE%'-VII 'FT,iV, COVaVOO'UgEVCOV 0D6 TVa 'a kvoiU'Bv OTOv ijv yvwvatIeki; OcPai's;; cf. ibid. 776.6-9, ci go6vov xcpi' n&ipGxa KcaitoiovEdatotxeia "-; T?nvi ticcavov;tir
V

-rTetp4q.vo;.
52

Adv. Lycum, 18A.197.6-7 Kuhn, 8jX6; iatt g8ra ta

ootia

-; 'Inoicpa6tol);

53 This is Com. graec. Nicolaus fr. 1 Kassel and Austin, who tentatively date the author to the 2nd cent. CE (i.e. roughly make him a contemporaryof Epictetus) and for arotxcicx appositely refer to Epic. Ep. 3.123. S4 As is recognized by P. Slomkowski, Aristotle's Topics, Leiden etc. 1997, 49, who moreover points out that there are topoi which closely resemble the Aristotelian principles of the principium contradictionis and the excluded middle. For further examples (and parallels in other Aristotelian treatises) see ibid., loc. cit. and 45 ff. Also compare another early treatise, Cat. 12.14a36-bl, on mathematics: 'the elements are

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of the genus is wider than that of the species and the specific difference
(Top. 4.1.121b1 1-3). At Top. 4.5.128a21-9 three such aroiXEia are listed:

(2), (1), the extension of the genus is wider than thatof the difference; as to the definition of the 'what it is' the genus is more fitting than the difference;and (3), the differencealways means a quality of the genus, but not conversely. Clearly, principlessuch as these are of fundamental One importanceto the whole of Aristotle'sdialectic in the Topics.55 canwithout having them not practisethe techniqueof dialecticaldisputation continuouslyat the back of one's mind.
5. My hypothesis, then, is that the elements of logos in the Zeno fragment

of and principles transmitted Epictetusare the elementary fundamental by doctrine,system,orgeneral of tie logos te'sfilosofias, the Stoicphilosophical theory.56 These principlescan be taughtand learned,and the theorycan in grow (as it did duringthe historyof the school). Hicks' translation, the viz. Expositionof Loeb Diogenes Laertius, of Zeno's title Hepi X'6you, Doctrine, is in my view on the right track.57 Theory, or doctrine,when assimilatedby a human being, becomes part of his soul and so informs
his logos, or reason.58 The logos, or doctrine, of philosophy becomes

This part of and so determinesthe logos, or reason, of the philosopher. by explainswhy Epictetusis in a positionto lead up to his quotation twice using the term logos in the sense of 'reason':logos/reasonis the '(subprior to the proofs' - which holds in analogous ways for other disciplines. The title ax j' y' in the Aristoteliancatalogue at D.L. 5.23 may also be relevant, see P. Moraux, Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote, Louvain 1951, 8283 (note that M. Narcy in M.-O. Goulet-Caze,ed., Diog6ne Laerce, Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres, Paris 1999, 578 n. 1, who argues in this direction is a bit imprecise), though it may well be a misplaced title of a physical work. ss Cf. Cic. Top. 25, 'the topoi presentedas the elements (elementis) for discovering any argument have now been describedand defined'. (cf., perhaps, "6 Epictetus' own term for these principlesseems to be ta (ca6o0k1ca the Zenonian book-title quoted above, n. 16). See Diss. 4.4.29-30, where examples of general rules are given, and 4.12.7, where it is said that they must always be at one's " jsi a0E11etv). See R. Dobbin, Epictetus. ewv cat Xwp't; iEiCriVWV disposal (s pxetpa Discourses Book 1, Transl. with Introd.& Comm., Oxford 1998, 155 ff. For np6Xetpov see e.g. Epict. Diss. 3.29.95, 4.4.34, on Cleanthes' four lines of prayer to Zeus-andDestiny; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-romischeTradition der Seelenleitung, Berlin 1969, 58 n. 107. 57 Long and Sedley vol. 1 159 translate Discourse, while they translate Chrysippus' On identical title as On Reason (above, n. 24). 58 Comparethe explanationof the difference logos tesfilosofias betweenthe incorporeal and corporeal philosophy by Ierodiakonou,op. cit. 60 f.

nfep't aTotsiowv

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and ject-)matter'of the philosopher, his 'aim' is to keep his logos/reason right. Accordingto Zeno, in orderto do this he must know, that is to say have imitated,the elements of logos/doctrine.He must be able to distinguish each of them individuallyas well as be aware of their interdependence. And he must searchfor and be aware of whatfollows from these
principles.

As principlesper se the elements of logos are principlesof doctrine. As principlesthat have been reproduced copied, and thus been incorand poratedor corporealized, they are partsof humanreason:cognitions,rational ingredientsof our soul. Philosophyhas become a part of the human mind.59 This explains why Zeno of Tarsusand otherscould hold that the parts concernedare parts of philosophy,not of the logos of philosophy; but this is by the way. Epictetus began his diatribeagainst the pseudo-philosophers with the artsandcrafts,the technai:thesehave a (subject-)matter, aim, andtheoan rems. According to him this also holds for philosophy.Evidence exists A that other Stoics too saw philosophyas a techne'. definitionof philosophy as the 'practisingof the techne of what is appropriate' (a`a"at;
enct'riou tCXv%)is transmitted by ps.Plutarch/Aetius.0 This rather late

snippetof informationcomes quite close to one of the definitionsof philosophy at Pap. Herc. 1010 col. 1.14-5 as the 'pursuitof rightnessof 6p[0]6t0o;),6' which is attributed logos/reason' ([]mnTJu[c;t];ko6yoi to An by Chrysippus Isidorusof Pelusion.62 exampleof the well-known(but presumablyalso a bit late) definitionof philosophyas ars vitae is provided at Epict. Diss. 1.15.3 (ri; iep't iov tXV ).63 In his overview of
59 Chrysippus is taken to task by Gal. PHP 5.2.49-5.4 (cf. above, text to nn. 6-8) because in the flep' iuxaiv he said that 'there are parts of soul (tri; 4mxyIs; 'ppT) through which its logos/reason and its disposition are constituted', while in the On Logos he said that 'concepts and preconceptionsare part of logos/reason'. To Galen, who defends the tripartitepsychology of Plato (and, as he believes, of Hippocrates), soul and logos/reason are not identical, but for a Stoic this view is standard,since the affections are perversions of logos, or reason in a perverteddisposition. Note moreover the precision of Chrysippus'expression; he does not say 'all the parts of soul'. 6 Procem.2 (ps.Plu. 874E) - SVF 2.35, L&S 26A. Cf. ps.Gal. Hist. phil. ? 5 (not in SVF), oi &? 9acfnOIv avop6not; eintnbcia; dxvii; 0piaavro [sc. tiv PtXoqPIdavl,
?n&icaV &? xvilv tVi aoqiav 6vogatcava(icrlcriav &vlrriv pnXoao(pixv Eiivtet;, ec; "X. For aalcytn; of the virtues/technaiconsisting of theorems see Ar. Did. ap.

Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b4, 61.15-9 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.278. 61 Translated above, text after n. 8. 62 Migne PG 77, 1637. 63 See also above, text to n. 2; the formula is often found in Sextus. On the relation

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Stoic ethics AriusDidymussays that 'all the virtueswhich are knowledge (in the plural)and crafts share their theoremsand aim'."'The subscription of the second section of the part listing the ethical works in Chrysippus'catalogueat D.L. 7.201 suggests that the 'crafts and virtues producedby the logos which is common'may amountto the same thing.65 We should recall on the one hand that Epictetusin the Zeno quotation speaks of the aim and theoremsof the crafts and of the philosopher, and on the otherthatChrysippus statedthatthe virtuesare inseparable because they share theirtheorems.66 Finally, as we have seen the parts of philosophy are virtues(aboven. 35), andthe (moreimportant) virtuesare technai. 6. Even so, I do not know any text where philosophyis called a science tout court. To be sure,Diogenes Laertiustells us that accordingto 'some the logical partis dividedinto two epistemai,dialecticand rhetoric'(7.41); and in the definitionsof these sub-partsof logic which follow (7.42) we again find the word episteme.67 Posidonius'differentdefinitionof dialectic as the 'knowledge(perhaps:discipline) of the true, the false and the neitherof these' (D.L. 7.62), modelledafter the definitionsof the virtues, also calls it an epistme.68Perhapsthe 'episttmai the graspingof which is thwarted conceit'accordingto an apophthegm by attributed Zeno are to logic, ethics and physics.!9
between this art of living and the others, esp. the stochastic arts (e.g. medicine) see G. Striker, 'Antipater,or the art of living', in M. Schofield and G. Striker, eds., The Norms of Nature, Cambridge 1986, 194 ff., repr. in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge 1996, 306 ff. 4 Ap. Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b5, 63.6-7 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.280, L&S 61D: nadsa; 6i
ta; apeta; oaat eintaTfiati Eiot
I(X

TLtval

Kotva Te, 0eFp-Ra)

a "xctv icSa'tTX'o;.

The inseparabilityof the virtues is mentioned next. See also, among the definitions of episteme which are found in the section on the good (not printed in SVF vol. 1) ibid. 2.7.5', 73.23-74.1 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.112, L&S 41H.3 (in the section 'Knowledge and opinion'): 'another(definition of knowledge [Long and Sedley translate'science']) is a system of technical pieces of knowledge which contains certainty in itself, as are the virtues' (&XXo; [Wachsmuth,&aXiv ms., followed by L&S] - scil., ?itar'STV - e au, rlxa e', cntaTr1jePv tCXvuC0VEt arroiv Exov sob P3fcalov, b; Coi.otv Etval I 'The ethical topos dealing with the logos that is common and the crafts and virtues that arise therefrom'. I See above, text to n. 33. I suppose that Chrysippus (and Arius Didymus) are thinking of the primarytheorems, for the virtues/technaican hardly have all their theorems in common. 67 SVF 2, L&S 31A (who translatec'ntag as 'sciences'). 6 SVF 2.122, Posid. Fr. 188 E.-K. 69 D.L. 7.23 - SVF 1.71 (and 321), "ckeyc 86' Tv &XX)ooiaco; grnv civat
at apera); this text too implies that the virtues are inseparable.

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131

But other Stoics call dialectic a techne',as in Diogenes of Seleucia's and Crinis' book-titlesat D.L. 7.71 (AtaXe1icti'T%Xvi), the catalogue in
of Sphaerus at D.L. 178 (TEXvi; 8taXElcxtcii; Hvo), and, particularly

important,as the fifth title of Chrysippus'catalogueat D.L. 190 (T?xvll 5taXFeictuiirpb; 'AptcT?ay6pav a').'0 According to PlutarchChrysippus also called rhetorica techne.&7 Perhaps the best course to follow is to
assume that in Stoic (and Stoicizing) texts inta"Sgn either means 'knowl-

or edge' or 'understanding', is more or less equivalentto techne'. our In Zeno fragmentand severalrelatedtexts we are, afterall, dealingwith the philosopherand philosophy,not with the wise man and wisdom. Admittedlypartof this evidence is late, and not all of it is concerned with individualStoics, but it helps to explain the context in Epictetus.I do not wish to argue that Epictetus'theoremsand Zeno's elementshave the same extension.Yet I submitthat all elementsof this type are theorems, or can be convertedinto theorems,while the converse is presumably false. Zeno's 'elements' are the primarytheoremswhich should be known individuallyas well as collectively, that is to say insofaras they are inter-entailed. the philosophershould also try hardto understand But what follows fromthese primary theotheorems,thatis to say any further rems that can be known, and all of this knowledgeshouldbe appliedand practised.The philosopheris to be recognizedfrom what he knows and does. Long hair, a beard or a rough mantle are irrelevant and even misleading externals."2* Utrecht University, Department Philosophy of

TpuoKepov 7tpo6;icatk6lxiv tiv intrTqgrv. One cannot help thinking of Arist. Top. 1.2, 101a27-8, &aS; cxara4pXoaopixv at'taTqga;, with Alexander's comment, in Top. 28.26-7, car"a(ptXoao(pfrav ?'ntarIjc; else t1 V (puautcv, tiiV I0otuV, TiV Xoyuft V, &E riv jeTa t&a qptcx6 (substractingmetaphysics, of course).
70 SVF 3 Diog. Fr. 26, Crin. Fr. 4; SVF 1.620 (Sphaerus).For Chrysippusalso compare D.L. 7.193, TEXvi k6oywv xaKt po'ov ip6; Atoawoupi8iivc', and the subscription in the ethics section at D.L. 7.201 quoted above, n. 65. 71 Plu. SR 1047A - SVF 3.297; L&S 31H (who translate tcvTi here as 'expertise'). 72 The objection that the Stoics failed to practise what they preached(e.g. Plu. SR 1033BC on Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus - SVF 1.27 and 1.262 (2nd text); not in the Cleanthes section of SVF vol. 1, and not in vol. 3 either) is beside the point in the present context. * This paper was read at the Zeno Conference (Larnaca,Cyprus), 9-13 September 1998, and to university audiences at the Westfalische Wilhelms-Universitait, Munster, on 28 April 1999, and at the Humboldt-Universitait, Berlin, on 5 May 1999. Thanks are due to my critics on those occasions and to the anonymousreferee of Phronesis.