Army and Marines on the China Station: A Study in Military and Political Rivalry Author(s): Louis Morton Source:

Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1960), pp. 51-73 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3636286 . Accessed: 14/06/2011 05:25
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Army and Marineson the China Station: A Study in Military and Political Rivalry
LOUIS MORTON
[For the last several years attached to the office of the chief of military history in Washington, Louis Morton has accepted appointment as professor of history at

DartmouthCollege.] FORTY from the turn of the century to the outbreak FORALMOST YEARS,

of World War II, the United States maintained military and naval forces in China. Assigned originally to protect the American legation in Peking and safeguard the line of communications to the sea, this garrison represented the visible sign of American involvement in China.
As a military force it was negligible and so exposed as to constitute a

military liability. But behind it, ready to come to its support, was the Asiatic Fleet, army forces in the Philippines, and, across the wide ocean, the great physical resources of the United States, committed since John Hay's day to the open door in China. The maintenance of a garrison in China created numerous problems. Not only did the Army and Navy have to maintain this force in the territory of a foreign sovereign nation-in itself a perplexing and complicated task-but they also had to develop and keep up to date elaborate plans to reinforce the garrison in the event of attack, or, if necessary, to withdraw it altogether. Furthermore, during most of these years, there were actually two forces in China, one consisting of marines and one of army troops, each under separate command and completely independent of each other. The opportunities for service disagreements in such a situation were numerous and constituted a source of constant irritation between the local commanders and their superiors in Washington.

These difficulties were further aggravated by the insistence of every secretary of state from Hay to Hull that army and marine troops were in China solely to assist and support the American minister discharge his responsibilities. What this meant was that the garrison in China was, in the final analysis, under the control of the State Department for all matters except administration and discipline. Neither the War nor the Navy Department could reinforce, move, withdraw, or alter the mission of its forces in China without the consent of the secretary of
* This article is based on research made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council under its program for the study of civil-military relations.
[51]

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state. Repeatedly the Army sought to wrest from the State Department control of its troops in China and to bring the marines there under its command. Each effort met with failure, but few problems present as instructive a study of civil-military relations as this forty-yearconflict between the State, War, and Navy Departments for control of the forces in China. American military forces first entered China to stay in the year 1900 as a result of the Boxer uprising. The Western powers and Japan had reacted promptly to the siege of their legations in Peking. Troops had been dispatched to North China and an Allied force organized to capture the Imperial capital. After occupying Tientsin near the coast, this Allied force had made its way inland with difficulty. Early in August, it 1900oo, reached the outer defenses of Peking and on the fourteenth of the month routed the Chinese defenders and raised the siege of day the legations.1 The negotiations between China and the interested powers that followed the operations against Peking resulted in the so-called Boxer
Protocol of September 7, i90i.2 In addition to providing for punish-

ment of the guilty and indemnities for damage, the agreement recognized in Articles VII and IX the right of the powers concerned to maintain military forces in China for two purposes: to guard the legation quarter in Peking, and to occupy certain points along the railway leading from the capital to the sea in order to keep open the line of communications in the event of renewal of an antiforeign outbreak. While the negotiations were in progress, Allied forces began to withdraw. First to pull out were the Americans. By the end of May the entire American force, except for 150 men left behind to guard the legation, had left China. The other powers withdrew their forces more slowly, and it was not until 1906 that all foreign troops, except those on duty with the legations at Peking and along the railroad between the capital and the sea, were out of the country.
From May, 1901, to September, 1905, the American garrison in China go

consisted only of the 150 soldiers (Company B, Ninth Infantry) left behind by General Chaffee as the legation guard at Peking. This use of army troops represented a departure from customary practice, for legation duty was usually assigned to the Marine Corps. In 1905 a detach'For an account of the Boxer uprising, see C. C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (N. Y., 1955); Correspondence relating to . . . The China Relief Expedition, War Department (Washington, 1902). William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-19o9 (Austin, Texas, 1958). 2 The signatories of the Protocol were: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, United States, China.

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ment of 300 marines replaced the army garrison, and thereafter the marines continued to furnish the legation guard. The reasons for this change are not clear. Certainly those given by the American Minister W. W. Rockhill when he requested the substitution can scarcely be considered convincing. A marine guard, he claimed, would be more economical, more easily reinforced or reduced, more flexible, and better disciplined. Besides, Rockhill asserted, guard duty was exactly what the marines were trained for and customarily performed. Then, somewhat cryptically, he had added, "Many other reasons for the change will certainly suggest themselves, but it seems unnecessary to dwell on them here."8As a matter of fact, he had submitted the matter to the President and secured his approval before leaving Washington for duty in China. In the circumstances, there was little the Army could do but accede to the substitution of marines for its own troops. This it did, but not without a point-by-point refutation from General Chaffee, army chief of staff, of the reasons given for the change. After challenging Rockhill's assertion that a marine guard would be more flexible, more economical, or better disciplined, Chaffee observed that " as a military proposition" he could see no reason why guard duty was more suitable for marines than for army troops. And somewhat dryly he observed that the "many other reasons for the change" that Rockhill had referred to did not "suggest themselves" to him and therefore he could not concur in them.'
The transfer took place on September 12, 1905, and for the next six

years the American garrison in China remained virtually unchanged. But events in China, culminating in the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in the autumn of i9 11, led to a request by the American minister for a battalion of marines, to be stationed in Tientsin. This time, the Army not the marines got the bid. A full regiment in Manila was alerted for dispatch on short notice, and the consent of the Chinese government secured. Eventually only 500 troops were required and on January 22, 1912, a battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry arrived in Tientsin, the first army troops to be stationed in China since 1905. With the contingents of other interested powers, this force provided protection to foreigners in the area and kept open communications between Peking and Tientsin during the disorders that followed.5
3 Rockhill to John Hay, June 8, 1905, copy in Army War Plans Division file WPD 938-12, in Federal Records Center of the National Archives in Alexandria, Virginia. 4 Memo, Chaffee for Secy. of War, July 21, 1905, WPD 938-12. This memo was forwarded to the State Department on July 24 in a letter to the secretary by Robert Shaw Oliver, acting secretary of war, same file. 5Secy. of State to Secy. of War, Jan. 9, 1912, Army War College file, WCD 6790-28,

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After 1912, the United States, in common with the other treaty powers, maintained military forces at Tientsin as well as Peking, and, on occasion, other locations mentioned in the Protocol of 1901o. In 1914, at

the request of the Japanese, the United States assumed responsibility for the German zone along the railway, and the remaining battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry (the old "China regiment") was transferred from Manila to Tientsin. Then, in September, 1921, with the consent of the State Department the Army withdrew one battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry, returning it to Manila.6 Thereafter, the garrison at Tientsin remained fairly stable, and with the marine legation guard at Peking constituted the entire American commitment, except for the Asiatic Fleet, in China. The existence of two separate forces, each with different missions was a matter of increasing concern to the War Department, which viewed with pessimism Japanese actions in the Far East. Various proposals were made shortly after World War I to correct the command in China, and finally in the summer of 1921, the secretary of war, John W. Weeks, officially recommended establishment of a single command. If this was not done, he said, it might be advisable to remove the army troops altogether. The State Department did not agree. Charles Evans Hughes, then secretary of state, preferred the existing arrangement and believed it should be continued. "This Department," he told Weeks, "strongly favors retaining the Marines as a legation guard under independent command."7The Chinese were accustomed to the marines and to replace them by army troops, Hughes believed, would "give rise to speculation and suspicion." He had no objection to a reduction of the army garrison, perhaps by as much as 50 per cent, if the War Department desired. But he refused outright to consider the withdrawal of the entire force. It was in China for political, not military reasons, and by its presence alone might avert a repetition of the Boxer uprising. The State Department objections in effect constituted a disapproval of the army proposal. The marines would continue to furnish the legaNational Archives. At the time, July, 19'1, the strength of the North China garrisons of other countries was as follows: British 2,000 (almost half Indian troops), French 1,165, German 143, Italian 227, Japanese 555, and Russian 40. The U. S. Marine legation guard then numbered only 138. Each of these powers also maintained naval forces on the Asiatic Station, the strongest being the British force. Memo, Brig. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Pres., Army War College for Chief of Staff, Nov. 14, 1911, sub: Role of Army... in China.... WCD 6790-15. 6Secy. of State to Secy. of War, July 9, 1921, Adjutant General Files, AG 370.21 China, in National Archives. 7Ibid.

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tion guard and the Army the railway guard at Tientsin. Faced with this situation, the War Department had to be satisfied with half measures, and in September, 1921, withdrew one battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry. The troops remaining it designated as "The United States China Expedition," under the commanding general, Philippine Department.8 The difficulties and confusion inherent in a divided command of troops of different services who took their mission from political authority in the person of the minister rather than from their military superiors were brought home sharply in the summer of 1922. The immediate occasion was the o.utbreakof hostilities between two contending Chinese factions in Tientsin. The army garrison, numbering 550 officers and men, was obviously inadequate to protect American lives and property in the area and at the same time carry its share of the joint responsibility for keeping open the railway from Peking to the sea. It was even doubtful that the entire Allied force, numbering about 2,700 men, could prevent rioting and looting should either of the contending Chinese groups get out of control.9 By the end of April, 1922, the situation was serious. On military advice, the American minister, Jacob Gould Schurman, urgently recommended that the Fifteenth Infantry (less one battalion) at Tientsin be reinforced. This request came at a most inopportune moment, for only recently there had been sharp criticism in Congress of the use of American troops in overseas garrisons. Secretary Hughes therefore declined to authorize the increase and asked Schurman to report specifically the reasons for the reinforcements, and "whether American lives and property are in danger," or likely to be.10 Schurman was nothing if not resourceful. With a keen appreciation of Hughes's position, he proposed a solution that would provide the needed reinforcements without additional army troops. Marines from the Asiatic Fleet, already in the area, he thought could be used instead of the Army. Would this be agreeable to the department? he asked. It would indeed, he was told, provided that Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, the Fleet commander, and Colonel William F. Martin, commander of the army garrison at Tientsin, approved.1'Both did, and early in May
8 Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, May 21, 1924, sub: Status and Command of Army and Marine Forces in China, AG 320.2 AF in China (4-7-24), National Archives. 9Great Britain had 256 men, Japan 979, and France 1,217 in May, 1922. The strength of the marine guard at Peking was 285. Message, Minister at Peking to Secy. of State, May 1, 1922, AG 370.5 China (5-3-22), National Archives. The citations immediately following are in the same file. 0Schurman to Hughes and Hughes to Schurman, Nos. 177 and 105, April 29, 1922. 11Schurman to Hughes and Hughes to Schurman, Nos. 178 and o108, May i and 2, 1922.

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Schurman was able to report to Washington that the 150 marines armed with machine guns had landed and were in Tientsin.'2 This reinforcement of an army regiment with marines on the recommendation of political authority and for purely political reasons was the beginning of a series of confusing events. Five days after the marines landed, Colonel Martin recommended to Schurman that they be relieved "as the emergency had passed." This the minister refused to do on the grounds that the situation was not yet stabilized and that the marines were needed to help guard the railway and safeguard American lives. On his own responsibility, he instructed Martin by telephone to keep the marines at Tientsin. At the same time, he sent a message to Admiral Strauss informing him of his action.3 Colonel Martin thereupon tried another tack. Without informing Schurman, he advised Admiral Strauss that the marines were no longer needed in Tientsin and could be safely withdrawn. On this advice, and his own estimate of the situation, Strauss withdrew the marines over the protest of both the consul general in Tientsin and the minister.1 The scene of battle now shifted to Washington. The issue was plain: did the army commander in China take his orders from the minister or did he have discretion to act on his own authority and judgment, responsible only to his military superiors? Secretary Hughes left no doubt about where he stood. When General Pershing inquired, a few days after the withdrawal of the marines from Tientsin, whether the State Department now thought the Army should reinforce the Fifteenth Infantry, Hughes replied he could see no necessity for such a move. Then he read the chief of staff a lecture on the role of the Army in China. Its sole duty, apart from the protection of American lives and property, he pointed out, was to guard its assigned sector of the railway. In the face of the overwhelming force the Chinese could bring to bear if they chose, it was impossible for the Army, Hughes admitted, to accomplish this mission by military means. All it could do was to call attention, by its presence, to the interest of the United States in protecting the railway and keeping open the route to the sea. And this, said Hughes, the garrison in Tientsin was already doing. It needed no reinforcements.' Hughes was not satisfied to let the matter rest there. Citing chapter and verse, he called to Pershing's attention Colonel Martin's "flagrant"
12Schurman to Hughes, No. 197, May 4, 1922. 13Schurman to Secy. of State, No. 213, May 1 , 14 Schurman to Secy. of State, No. 218, May 15,
165 Hughes 1922. 1922.

to Pershing,

May 22, 1922.

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disregard of the minister's advice. "It seemed to the Department of State," he told the chief of staff, that the exigencies of the situation at Tientsin demanded the utmost cooperation and this Department had every reason to believe that Colonel Martin would be guided so far as possibleby the Minister'sjudgment in all matters relating to the terms of the protocol, except of course those of a purelymilitarycharacter. Clearly, Martin had refused to accept the minister's estimate of the situation and it could not be remedied now, Hughes observed sharply, by sending in a contingent of infantry from the Philippines. He was not disposed, he said, to interfere in military matters, but he did "venture to suggest" that General Pershing might wish to give considerationto the desirability of instructing the Commanderof the ExpeditionaryForcein China to cooperateto the fullest possiblemeasure with the American Minister in matters connected with the enforcementof
the protocol of 19go .1

General Pershing could not miss the meaning of Secretary Hughes's letter. Military commanders in China would take their orders from the State Department's representative; that had been true since o901 and Hughes had no intention of relinquishing this control. General Pershing therefore ordered the commander of the Philippine Department to investigate Colonel Martin's actions. A report clearing the colonel was duly forwarded to Washington, but before the year was out Martin had received orders to return to the United States. With him he carried a letter from Mr. Schurman expressing regret at his departure and disavowing any implication that the colonel had not always been most cooperative. Schurman even sent a copy to Washington to be placed in Martin's record. But he could afford to be generous. The victory was clearly his.17 The lesson of the Martin incident was not lost on the Army: the forces in China would have to be withdrawn or else placed under a single commander. In the summer and fall of 1922, therefore, the general staff began to explore both possibilities. The first course, withdrawal, it abandoned quickly. American troops were needed in China, the general staff believed, to maintain the prestige of the United States in the Far East, to meet its commitments to the other Western powers, and, most important, to check Japanese aggression. "Under no condition should our troops be withdrawn from China," wrote a G-2 officer,
16Ibid. 17 Schurman to Martin, Nov. i6, 1922; Secy. of State to Secy. of War, Feb. 23, 1923.

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without first entering into a definite agreement with Japan and Great Britain that no Japanese troops would be employed in China except with our expressedconsent and in conjunction with troops designatedby us to form partof the expedition.?8 The second alternative, establishment of a unified command in China, was preferable on all counts to withdrawal. But in view of the State Department's opposition to earlier efforts to establish such a command, there seemed little likelihood of success. For a time the army planners considered working through the Joint Board, the accredited agency for all interservice matters requiring co-operation of the Army and Navy.19 But they abandoned this approach in favor of a plan presented in October, 1922, by Brigadier General William D. Connor, assistant chief of staff, G-4. Instead of a single command composed of Army and marines, Connor proposed that the army force be established as an independent command under a brigadier general, reporting directly to the War Department rather than to the Philippine Department commander. The advantages of this proposal were apparent immediately. It could be put into effect by the Army as a matter of internal administration, without reference to the Navy or State Department, and it would give the Army the senior ground officer in China, one who could deal on more nearly equal terms with the American minister.20 There were many more reasons that could have been advanced in support of General Connor's plan, but they were much the same as those already presented on other occasions. What made this solution so attractive was its simplicity and practicability. On the surface, it made no change in the composition or status of the forces in China or their relationship to the American minister. But by assigning a general officer and making him responsible to the War Department, the Army hoped ultimately to bring about the changes it desired. The secretary of war frankly admitted this to the Philippine Department commander when he wrote, It is the intention of the War Department to propose action at a more appropriate time having for its object the consolidation of the command
18Memo, Maj. Walter C. Short for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, June 6, 1922, sub: Reasons for Maintaining U.S. Troops in China, WPD 938. 19 Draft Memo (not used), Joint Planning Committee for Joint Board, Sept. 23, 1922, sub: Command of American Troops in China, WPD 938-12. 20 Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 17, 1922, sub: Organization of American Forces in China into a Separate Command, WPD 938. The author could not locate General Connor's memorandum of October 5 to the chief of staff, but it is summarized in the memo cited.

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of all Americantroopsin China,Armyand Marines,into a single command. The actionnow being takenwill facilitatethe accomplishment this object.2 of Much discussion on the highest levels of the War Department must have preceeded General Connor's proposal for in one day it cleared the chief of staff'soffice,was approved by the secretary,and came back down to the deputy chief of staff for necessary action. The job was assigned to the War Plans Division of the General Staff, which added one important new element to General Connor's plan. The separate command, it suggested, should be designated "American Forces in China"-a term that implied a broader authority than it would actually possess. War Plans recognized this objection, but justified the designation on two grounds: first, that the Army's troops in Germany were officially designated as "American Forces in Germany"; and, second, "that it provides for including without further change in name the Marines and any other American forces that may subsequently be added."22 Action followed rapidly. Within a week, the War Department had published a general order, effective April 1, 1923, establishing the new command, and a special order assigning General Connor as commander. A letter of instructions outlining his mission and responsibilities was drafted and approved, and letters were dispatched to the secretary of state and the Philippine Department commander announcing the action of the War Department.2' As the War Plans Division had foreseen, the Navy objected to the designation "American Forces in China" for a command consisting solely of Army troops. It raised the point at a meeting of the Joint Board, but no action was taken when the army deputy chief of staff insisted that the matter was one to be handled by the War Department.24 The Philippine Department commander protested also, but for different reasons. The War Department's decision to establish an independent command in China, he declared, was a bad one on military and political grounds. The primary reasons for placing American troops in China, he reminded the secretary of war, was to assure the safety of the legation and to keep open the line to the sea. In an emergency, this
21The Adjutant General to Commanding General, Philippine Department, Oct. 21, 1922, WPD 938. 22 Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 17, 1922, sub: Occupation of American Forces in China ..., WPD 938. 23Ibid. The general order was dated October 24, all the other papers, including letters to the secretary of state, Philippine Department commander, and General Connor's were dated the twenty-first. See WPD 938 for copies. 24Minutes, Joint Board Meeting of Nov. 8, 1923, cited in Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Deputy Chief of Staff, Jan. 19, 1924, sub: Unity of Command... in China, WPD 938-12.

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latter task might well be beyond the capacity of an independent China command. If that proved to be the case, reinforcements would have to come from his command, and the separation of the two would only complicate the task.'2 The Philippine commander's protest was futile, but the voice of the secretary of state did not go unheeded. Mr. Hughes noted "with particular pleasure" Secretary Weeks's desire for increased co-operation, but observed that the maintenance of armed forces in China created a situation that invited differences over the duties of these forces and their freedom of action. When such differences arose, the final word, Hughes asserted flatly, must be the minister's. Military forces were maintained in China to protect the diplomatic mission at Peking, and had no separate status except "as an organization ancillary to the legation." That being the case, instructions to the military commanders must be so clear as "to obviate any possibility of dualism in the policy directing the activities of these forces." The orders to the commander of the marines at Peking, dating from 1906 and 1907, Hughes thought a model

in this respect. These he quoted at length for the secretary of war, and commended to him as the basis for co-operation between the legation and the army comamnder in China.' There was no misunderstanding the secretaryof state's meaning. The quoted instructions to the marine commandant made co-operation with the American minister essential to the performance of his duty, and enjoined him to give "due weight" to the opinions and advice of State Department's representative. A request of the minister's was to be declined only for the most cogent military reason. The minister, it was true, could not order but only "request or desire," something to be done. Such request, however, according to the instructions of the marine commander, had the same force as an order. Here was a rule, Hughes thought, that might well serve as a guide for the newly appointed army commander in China. The secretary of state's lecture on the proper relationship between the army commander in China and the American minister was dutifully heeded by the War Department. It modified General Connor's letter of instructions to meet the objections of the secretary of state, and enjoined the general be guided in his relations with the minister by the principles set forth in Hughes's letter. Thus, the letter of the
1922; Secy. of War to Commanding General, Philippine Dept., Oct. 21, 1922, WPD 938-5. 26Hughes to Weeks, Nov. 8, 1922, WPD 938-3; Weeks to Hughes, Oct. 21, 1922, AG 320 China Expedition (10-17-22), National Archives.

25Commanding General, Philippine Dept. to The Adjutant General, No. 1743, Dec. 26,

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secretary, including the instructions to the marine guard commander, became, in effect, a part of General Connor's instructions. There could be no doubt, if any had existed before, that army forces in China were under the American minister in all matters but internal administration.' "I trust and beg," Secretary Weeks told Hughes after the matter was satisfactorily concluded, "that you will continue, on suitable occasion, to frankly inform me of your valuable views," on the conduct of army troops in China.2 After his arrival in China, General Connor waited a year before officially requesting establishment of a unified command. The reasons he advanced made a persuasive case, but presented nothing new.2 More revealing was his personal note to the chief of the Army War Plans Division, Brigadier General Stuart Heintzelman. Officially, he had rested his case on operational necessity; privately he stressed the practical aspects of the problem. Before he had left for China, Connor explained, it had been agreed that he would wait until he had been on his assignment for some time before recommending any changes. The time had come, he believed, to take action. So far as he could judge, the minister would not oppose any effort now to establish a unified command, but might even favor it actively. It was quite possible also that the Marine Corps might not be averse to such a move, though the Navy, Connor warned, would probably oppose it.8 The mechanics of the change, Connor believed, would not present any great difficulty. If necessary, the marines could be given the over-all command three years out of every twelve, a ratio comparable to the strength of the two detachments. But the matter would have to be handled "diplomatically," Connor cautioned Heintzelman, to keep the Navy and the marines "from blowing up and refusing to hear of it." The War Department was heartily in favor of merging the marine legation guard and the China expedition into a single command. But it was not prepared to do anything about it at the moment. General Pershing was in Europe, and, in view of the expected opposition from the Navy, it would be better to await his return. Moreover, the Washington planners thought it would be preferable to wait for the State Department to intiate acion.1 "I feel that the outcome...," General
27The Adjutant General to Commanding General, American Forces in China, Nov. 21, 1922, WPD 938. 28 Weeks to Hughes, Nov. 21, 1922, AGO 320 China Expedition (10-17-22). 29Connor to Adjutant General, Dec. 19, 1923; sub: Unity of Command... in China, AG 320.2 AF in China (12-19-23), National Archives. 30Letter, Connor to Heintzelman, Dec. 21, 1923, WPD 938-12. 31Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Feb. 21, 1922, sub: Unity of Com-

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Heintzelman told Connor in a personal letter, "will depend very largely upon your ability to convince the American Minister of its desirability."32 General Connor was correct indeed in his estimate of navy opposition to a unified command, but quite mistaken in his belief that the marines would support him. He was not long in learning his error. The marine commandant of the legation guard, a colonel, had for almost a year been viewing General Connor's activities with increasing concern and a growing sense of injury. Finally he protested to Rear Admiral Thomas Washington, Asiatic Fleet commander.'3 None of the incidents of which the marine commandant complained were of any importance and the matter was settled amicably. Connor offered to make amends and the marine commander, whose tour of duty was soon to end, assured the general that there was nothing personal in the complaint. But the incident was a warning of further possible disputes, and ended all hopes that the marines would favor a unified command under the Army. Connor's hope for support from the State Department also proved illusory. In April he discussed with the American minister in Peking the whole question of command in China, but received no encouragement. The minister, he reported, had not recommended to the State Department a merger of the two forces, as he had hoped, and probably would not do so. Moreover, Admiral Washington had requested him not to take up with the minister any "matters of policy" affecting the marines without consulting him first, and Connor, in the interests of Thus, by April, 1924, two co-operation with the Navy, had agreed.34 years after Connor had assumed command, the Army was no closer to a unified command than it had ever been. Still unsettled was the propriety of the designation "American Forces in China" for an army command. At the time this designation had been made, the Army hoped that Connor's command would ultimately include the Marines and the choice of words was deliberate. But by May, 1924, when the army planners reviewed the whole question of China for the chief of staff, there seemed no further justification for its use. They recommended, therefore, that the term be dropped and the command be redesignated U. S. Army Forces in China.35 General Connor
mand ... in North China, WPD 938-13; Letter, Adjutant General to Commanding General, China, February 25, 1924, same sub, AG 320-2 AF in China (12-19-23). 32Letter, Heintzelman to Connor, Feb. 21, 1924, WPD 938-12. 33Connor to Washington, Feb. 21, 1924, WPD 938-12. See also Connor to Heintzelman, Feb. 25, 1924, idem. 34 Connor's letter is summarized in Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, May 21, 1924, sub: Status and Command of Army Forces in China, WPD 938-12. 35Ibid.

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should be told, also, the planners advised, that there would be no change in the strength, status, or command of the army and marine forces in China. This decision was a hard one for the Army and was not made lightly. First the planners had reviewed the entire situation in the Far East to determine whether army forces were, in fact, needed in China. They found conditions so unsettled and the threat to American lives and property so real that they were forced to conclude that withdrawal of these forces would be most unfortunate. There was no doubt in their minds that a unified command would assure the most effective employment of the garrison, but obviously it was impossible to hope for such a solution. There was nothing left but to continue the existing arrangement with its imperfections and hope "that a clear understanding of the mis, sion of the two forces and a proper spirit of cooperation" could be achieved. This was the course the planners recommended and their superiors approved. General Connor was notified of the decision and on June 4th a general order was published redesignating American Forces in China as U.S. Army Forces in China.8 "In plain English," General Heintzelman told him in a personal letter, the War Departmenthas abandonedcompletely the joint commandidea in China which existed at the time you went out of there.... Now that is off the War Department's your chests,cooperationto the mutual satisfaction and of all concernedshouldbe easy.37 The conditions that had led to the establishment of an American garrison in China had by the mid-192o's altered radically. The original mission of the force had been to prevent a repetition of the Boxer incident, an uprising by a mob. To this had been added the further mission of protecting American lives and property, keeping open the line of communications to the sea, and maintaining the prestige of the United States in the Far East. These tasks and the conditions existing at the turn of the century had determined the size and composition of the forces sent to China. Since then, there had been no change in the mission, though it had become perfectly clear, in view of the growing military strength of the Chinese and the power position of Japan, that American forces in China were entirely inadequate to carry out the assigned tasks. To have attempted to do so would have been to invite disaster for the garrison and the serious risk of international complications. The truth was that short of sending in large bodies of troops and
36Ibid.

37Heintzelman to Connor, June 7, 1924, WPD 938-12.

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making war there was no way the foreign powers could compel the contending factions in China to observe the Protocol of 1901. The last official act of General Connor was to raise a warning about the consequences that might result from this situation. In his final report to the American minister, J. V. A. MacMurray,written on the termination of his duty in China in January, 1926, he declared that under existing conditions the foreign garrisons constituted more of a handicap than a help to the diplomats in China.3 "We have the armed power of such considerable numbers that we are bound to assert ourselves," he pointed out, "and yet we are too few to do anything in reality if our bluff fails to work." Against the vast numbers the Chinese could muster the foreign troops would be impotent. But if they did nothing, they would suffer a loss of prestige that would destroy whatever moral usefulness their presence served. "Our moral ascendancy,"Connor asserted, "comes from our nationality and our flag and not from our numbers." The best course for the United States, Connor thought, would be to recognize that a repetition of the Boxer uprising was improbable and to withdraw its garrison. In the event of trouble, the Asiatic Fleet could be trusted to intervene. "Now is the time to discuss the matter calmly,"
he told the minister, "... now is the opportunity to act of our own

volition. If the responsible agencies do not so act, the next crisis may suddenly force the question under circumstances where calmness and deliberation are denied to us. ..."39 Brigadier General J. C. Castner, who succeeded General Connor, arrived at the same conclusion. In his firstreport to the War Department, he confirmed Connor's estimate of the situation and declared that the original mission was outdated and his instructions no longer an adequate guide. But his request that they be changed was denied, and he was told, as Connor had been before him, that nothing would be done until the Two years later he tried again to have the minister so recommended.40 mission changed but again the War Department ruled against him. "The mission," wrote the chief of the War Plans Division, "is clear cut and well adapted to the situation there."41
38Connor to MacMurray, Jan. 13, 1926, sub: Report to American Minister on Situation in China, copy to The Adjutant General, Jan. 26, 1926, 350.05 AF in China (1-22-26), National Archives. a Ibid. 40General Castner's report and the War Department reply are summarized in Memo, Col. Walter Krueger for Chief of Staff, Aug. 13, 1937, sub: Reasons Why American Troops are Maintained at Tientsin, WPD 3533-9. 41Annual Report, Commanding General, US Army Forces in China, July 30, 1928, AG 319.1; Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 4, 1928, sub: Annual Report, WPD 2718-2.

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The American minister, though he did not support Castner's recommendations, agreed with his estimate of the situation. "Internal developments in China," he reported to his own department in June, 1928, "have virtually relegated to abeyance what was under the Protocol of 1901 the primary mission of United States Army forces." Their main mission had in fact become the protection of American lives in the Tientsin area, a mission that called for an entirely different set of assumptions than had existed before. The State Department was reluctant to reopen the question of China and nothing was done until, under the pressure for economy in the early 1930's, the War Department began to look for ways to stretch its slender appropriations. The garrison in China, numbering about one thousand men, appeared an expensive luxury, and the deputy chief of staffdirected his planners in April, 1931, to study the wisdom of withdrawing the Fifteenth Infantry. The army planners found, to no one's surprise, that the China garrison was neither vital nor important to the national defense and that its withdrawal would not only save money but would also remove a possible source of friction with the Nationalist government of China. These considerations, they thought, should be balanced against the purpose the garrison served in providing protection and upholding American prestige in the Far East. Withdrawal of the garrison, the planners warned, would probably be opposed by the State Department and would undoubtedly involve many political problems. The most interesting argument they presented against withdrawal was that it would leave the field clear for the marines. In view of the recent trend to replace army troops with marines for use as expeditionary forces, the planners thought the withdrawal of the Fifteenth Infantry might well be against the best interests of the Army.42 Despite this injunction, Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley sought the consent of the secretaryof state to the evacuation of the army garrison in China. The reasons he gave did not differ materially from those that had been advanced so often before and which had been summarized so well by General Connor in his final report. To these Hurley added the compelling reasons of the moment. The War Department, he frankly stated, was finding it difficult to provide the increases required under law for the organization of the Air Corps and other vital missions of national defense. Besides, an isolated garrison cost much more to main< Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, April 3, 1931, sub: Reduction of Porto Rican Regiment and China Garrison, WPD 3533.

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tain than a similar force in the United States. Thus, the withdrawal of the Fifteenth Infantry would produce savings far out of proportion to the number of men involved. "If you can see a way to concur in withdrawal," Hurley closed, "it will be in the best interest of the government and aid the War Department in solving certain perplexing problems."43 But Henry L. Stimson, then secretary of state, could not see his way clear at all to concurring in the move. The other powers concerned would have to be consulted first, he told Hurley, and he did not think the time was opportune for such consultation. The War Department could, if it wished, reduce the number of troops in Tientsin, declared Stimson, providing it did so gradually and inconspicuously." When the time was right, he assured Hurley, he would be glad to take the initiative "internationally, if circumstances warrant," to secure the withdrawal of troops in China. With this Hurley had to be content, and there the matter rested until events in the Far East again forced the War Department into action. The danger in China for some years had come not from the Chinese but from the Japanese who in 1931had embarked on the road that would utimately lead them into World War II. The seizure of Manchuria was but the first in a series of steps clearly aimed at control of North China. The next step came in the fall of 1935, when the Japanese moved to set up a pseudoautonomous state embracing both Tientsin and Peking in North China. In this situation, the retention of the Fifteenth Infantry in China, the War Department believed, not only failed to serve any useful purpose but constituted a grave risk. Any time the Japanese desired, they could create an international incident that might have serious consequences. And in an emergency it might well prove impossible to relieve or withdraw the small American force. Thus, the secretary of war felt compelled once more to recommend to the State Department the withdrawal of the army garrison at Tientsin "immediately upon the setting up of an autonomous State in North China."'5 In the view of the secretary of state, there was no real danger from the Japanese at present. The War Department, he observed, persisted in thinking of the Army's mission in China as combat or coercion, but its real mission had always been and still was guard duty and protective escort. The original mission was not obsolete; it had merely been "sub43Hurley to Stimson, April 9, 1931, WPD 3533-1. "44 Stimson for Hurley, May 20, 1931, idem. 46Secy. of War to Secy. of State, Nov. 19, 1935, WPD 3533-4; Memo, no addressee, undated, sub: Mission of 15th Infantry in China, Joint Board 305, Serial 573, Joint Planning Committee Development File.

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stantially modified" to make the garrison, in common with those of other nations "a psychological influence of a reassuring and stabilizing There was, of course, the possibility of an incident with character."46 Japanese troops, Hull admitted, but this was always true when the armed forces of two nations were in such close juxtaposition during periods of tension. Further, the withdrawal of American forces from China could well have harmful results, and contribute toward the further deterioration of American relations with Japan. Moreover, the United States, Hull pointed out, had responsibilities to the signatories of the Boxer Protocol that could not be ignored, and an obligation to consult with them before withdrawal. Also, the effect on China of withdrawal was certain to react unfavorably on American nationals in China, Hull thought, and would undoubtedly be used for propaganda purposes by the Japanese. It might even encourage them to bolder measures in their campaign of aggrandizement on the mainland. Thus, Hull concluded, withdrawal of the Fifteenth Infantry would not be in the best interests of the United States. And if in the future the War Department planned to make any substantial reduction or reorganization of the garrison in China, Hull asked that he be informed in advance so that his department could consider the political implications of such a move. SecretaryHull's note clearly reflected the views of his chief Far Eastern expert, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. In November, 1935, at the request of the War and Navy secretaries, Hull had designated Hornbeck to represent the department in a comprehensive review by the Joint Board of America's position in the Far East. In the opinion of the two service secretaries, developments in the Far East had so weakened the military position of the United States vis-a-visJapan that there was a real danger the country might be forced into war under conditions that would make victory impossible. It was to this situation, and the measures required to meet it, that the joint board planners, assistedby Hornbeck as political
adviser, turned in the winter of 1935-1936.'"

During the course of these discussions, Hornbeck set forth at some length his department's views on American policy in China and the withdrawal of army forces. Contraryto the opinion of many, he declared, the United States did have a policy in China and had followed it consistently for many years. This policy derived from American interests
State to Secy. of War, Feb. 7, 1936, WPD 3533-4. 47Joint Letter, Secy. of War and Secy. of Navy to Secy. of State, Nov. 26, 1935; Secy. of State to Secys. of War and Navy, Nov. 27, 1935, Joint Board 305, Serial 573, Joint Planning Committee Development File. Citations immediately following are from the same file.
4a Secy. of

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in the area, and was represented by missionaries and economic enterprises. It was possible to withdraw military and naval forces physically, Hornbeck pointed out, but not to tell the business men and missionaries to get out. And as long as they remained, the government had an obligation to protect them.'4Nor did Hornbeck believe that the presence of American nationals in China increased the chance of war with Japan. They did not cause the Japanese any inconvenience or come into conflict with them. The fact was, he asserted, the Japanese were not yet ready for war with the United States. When they were, they would have no difficulty finding the pretext they needed to open hostilities. The argument that military and naval forces in China added greatly to the danger of the conflict with Japan, Hornbeck held, was not only incorrect but actually directly contrary to the facts. The presence of American forces, he believed, had done much to prevent an open conflict by serving as a deterrent to Japan. To withdraw them, especially when the situation was chaotic and hazardouswould imply fear of Japan; it would endanger American and foreign nationals, disturb the Chinese, and possibly encourage the Japanese to further aggression.4 Moreover, if evacuated, American nationals and even the Embassy would have to be evacuated also. American armed forces were in China as a symbol, Hornbeck told the joint planners. They were not there to fight other organized forces, but for psychological reasons and for guard escort duties. He was well aware, he said, that American forces were so weak that they would probably be wiped out quickly in the event of war. To reinforce them would change their character completely. "We must think of their duty as State duty rather than military," he declared, as diplomatic troops, a symbol of co-operation.50 The Army planners did not agree with Hornbeck. As one of them wrote, the objectivesof our national policy are, in the final analysis,incompatible with the implementationof that policy. We cannot indefinitelysustain and imperialismbased on force withprotectour objectivesagainstan aggressive out the use of force.5' To the military, force was the ultimate arbiter in the relations among nations, and a garrison that was at the mercy of any aggressormust either be removed or strengthened. The army planners admitted that the forces
48

Hornbeck Memo by 50Hornbeck 51Memo by

49

Statement, First Meeting, Joint Planning Committee, no date. Stanley Hornbeck, no date, sub: Objectives of American Foreign Policy. Statement, First Meeting, Joint Planning Committee. Col. Sherman Miles, no date, sub: U.S. Military Position in Far East.

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in China, though militarily negligible, did provide protection for American nationals, but argued that as Japan tightened its hold over North China, American nationals would become dependent on the Japanese rather than the American garrison for protection. Ultimately the garrison would find itself in an anomalous position vis-/a-vis Japan, "irritatto that power, and provocative of trouble with it." Thus, because ing the garrison did serve a useful if limited purpose at the present time, the Army recommended it be retained temporarily and withdrawn when it was no longer needed-an innocuous statement with which few could
disagree.52

The view of the navy planners was closer to that of the State Department. While the Army looked inward, preoccupied with the defense of the continental United States and its vital outposts, the Navy looked abroad, across the oceans, for the fulfillment of its mission. One was isolationist and conservative in outlook, the other offensive-minded and aggressive. Thus the navy planners agreed with Hornbeck that weakening American forces in China might lead only to further Japanese expansion while lowering American prestive in the Far East. But they also accepted the Army's conclusion that when American forces were no longer required there they should be withdrawn.' Since everyone agreed, though for different reasons, that American troops could still perform a useful service in China, nothing further was done about their withdrawal. Having lost another round in the long struggle to' extricate the Fifteenth Infantry, the Army in 1936 reverted to an earlier tack and tried to get the regiment's mission changed. Again, the State Department was the main opponent. By this time, Hornbeck was meeting regularly with the army and navy officersconcerned with Far Eastern matters and at one of these meetings the subject of the mission came up. Hornbeck read a draft that had been prepared in his office,but neither of the army representatives found it to his liking. During the heated discussion, Hornbeck asked Lieutenant Colonel Leonard T. Gerow of the War Plans Division if he felt the army should withdraw from the Far East. Gerow answered frankly that he did, "because of our untenable military position out there and the possibility of friction between our military
forces and those of Japan."'
62Memo Joint Planning Committee for Joint Board, March 5, 1936, sub: Military Position in Far East, End. A; Report of Army Section. 3 Ibid., Encl. B; Report of Navy Section. 56 Memo, Gerow for Chief, War Plans Division, Nov. 24, 1936, sub: Monday Conference at State Department, WPD 3533-8.

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If the War Department felt that way, why, asked Hornbeck, did it not try to get the policy changed rather than have the agencies assigned to its support removed. Gerow's reply is a revealing comment on the role of the military in the formulation of national policy. "I told him," he reported, that the War Department was not the state policy making agency, that being a State Department responsibility. But that the War Department was responsible for the military aspects of any policy adopted and that it was a duty of the War Department to point out the extent to which we might become involved through military commitments and make recommendations accordingly.5` In the end, it was the Japanese who finally resolved the question of American forces in China. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese attacked Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking to begin a war that did not end until the defeat of Japan in August, 1945. The attack brought into dramatic relief the exposed position of the foreign garrisons and opened the final phase of the War Department's campaign to withdraw its forces from China. On its side was a strongly isolationist public opinion, anxious to avoid any incident that might lead to war, and a Congress that was asking why the army maintained troops in China.' The army answer was simple-the State Department. And it was the State Department that was now anxious to clarify the mission of the commanders in China. On August 3 Hornbeck was in the chief of staff's office to talk about the situation in China with the secretary of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Eichelberger. He wanted to know something about Colonel McAndrew, commander of the army forces in China, whether he had been given any fresh instructions since the start of the conflict, and what McAndrew was likely to do "if a bunch of Japanese troops should come up to the compound and demand that they evacuate." He did not think there would be any trouble with the Japanese, he told Eichelberger, but would draft fresh instructions for the minister. Before he left, he promised to send the draft to the chief of staff, General Malin Craig, for his comments.57 Before the day was over, the draft was in the chief of staff's hands. His comment, after a quick reading, was that the mission assigned under
6'

Ibid.

American Troops are Maintained at Tientsin, WPD 3533-9; Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Aug. 13, 1937, same sub. AG 320 U.S. Forces in China (8-13-37), National Archives. 67 Memo, Eichelberger for Chief of Staff, Aug. 3, 1937, no sub, AG 380.3 (7-13-37) Sec. i, National Archives.

56Memo, Chief of Staff for Chief, War Plans Division, Aug. 6, 1937, sub: Reasons Why

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the Protocol of 19go01 impossible of execution with the Japanese in was possession of the Tientsin-Peking area of the railroad. He was opposed also to any instructions that might hamper the initiative of the commander and give him the impression he was not to fight if attacked. If the secretary of state wanted the orders of the army commander in China changed, the chief of staff remarked, he ought to put the matter up to the secretaryof war officially.58 There is no record of any effort on the secretarial level to clarify the role of the commanders in China, but on August o fresh instructions from the State Department went out to all American officials in the area.59In the view of the War Department, these instructions were scarcely adequate to meet the situation. More than ever it believed the garrison there must be evacuated. The position of the troops in a war zone was completely untenable, and the State Department's most recent instructions made their position more anomalous than ever. According to these instructions, the garrison could defend itself, if attacked by disorganized soldiery, but was not to do so if the attack was made by organized units acting on higher command. How was the American commander to know on whose orders the Japanese or Chinese might be acting? Moreover, to accomplish the primary mission of protecting American lives, the army commander might very well have to defend himself against organized forces, no matter under whose orders they were acting. Conceivably, he might even have to undertake offensive operations within the limits of his capabilities. Clearly, the garrison must be extricated from this situation, and as quickly as possible. At the least, the War Department must have a voice in the determination of policy in China. No longer could the State Department call the tune without reference to its view. Having made this decision, the War Department appealed once more to the State Department. Again it was turned down. But this time the War Department refused to accept defeat, and on September i appealed directly to the President. "I find this action of the State Department in ignoring military advice," wrote Assistant SecretaryLouis Johnson, "has been characteristic of its attitude for many years past." Such an attitude, he told the President, was not in the best interests of the nation and was contrary to the practice of every other great power. None of them, he declared, "embarks upon a foreign policy having any military imMemo, Eichelberger for Hornbeck, Aug. 3, 1937, idem. 59State Dept. to American Embassy in China, Aug. 10, 1937, idem. The message was sent by the War Department to the commanders in the Philippines and China.
58

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plications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of the

responsible military authorities."'? The State Department's refusal to ask for or even consider military advice seemed to Johnson "a matter of the gravest concern." Recommendations for certain naval dispositions, presumably from British sources, he claimed, were being seriously considered by the State Department. These dispositions might commit the United States "irrevocably" to the employment of large forces in the Far East, yet "as far as I can find," Johnson told the President, "no advice has been asked of the War Department upon these matters." It was a situation that had no counterpart in any other nation and he asked the President to direct the secretary of state "to afford an opportunity to the War Department to express its views upon all matters having a military implication,
immediate or remote."6'

This was strong language, but the record does not disclose what action, if any, Roosevelt took. Perhaps the State Department on its own initiative decided it must act quickly. At any rate, the Navy early in September ordered the evacuation of all naval dependents from China "in furtherance of Government policy," as soon as possible. "Evacuation," wrote the Asiatic Fleet commander "is obligatory and not a matter of personal choice."62 The Army was slower in acting, and on September 15, a State Department official called on the deputy chief of staff to ask what plans had been made for the evacuation of dependents. On being informed of the visit, the chief of staff wanted to know whether the State Department felt the time for evacuation had arrived, and if so whether the State Department or the Navy would handle the matter. The answer came the same day. The State Department did indeed believe that the time had come to evacuate dependents, and was already evacuating its own dependents. The Navy was doing the same, and would arrange for the Army's dependents.' The evacuation of dependents was the prelude to the close of the struggle between the State and War Departments over the role of army forces in China. On this last act of the drama, the military records are strangely silent. Perhaps, despite Johnson's protest, it was made by the State Department without reference to the Army's desires; perhaps it
Johnson for the President, Sept. 1, 1937, sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 3533-11. 61Ibid. 62Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to All Asiatic Stations, o090o6,Sept. 6, 1937, WPD 4026. 63Memos, Eichelberger for Chief, War Plans Division, Sept. 15, 1937; Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, same date, sub: Evacuation of Army Dependents from China, both in WPD 4026.

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was a political decision made on a higher level. All the record shows is a brief memorandum, dated February 3, 1938, directing the commanding general, Philippine Department, to return the Fifteenth Infantry, with attached military personnel, civilian employees, and legal dependents from China to Fort Lewis in Washington, by order of the secretary of war. A detachment of marines from Peking would move in to replace the Fifteenth Infantry at Tientsin.6 By the end of March, 1938, the Army was out of China; the marines would remain until a month before Pearl Harbor. The withdrawal of army forces from China after more than thirty years of garrison duty marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between the civilian and military authorities. Under the pressure of Axis aggression in Europe and Asia and the threat of war, the State, War, and Navy Departments drew closer together. In April, 1938, a committee consisting of the under secretary of state, the chief of staff, and the chief of naval operations was formed to deal with the Axis threat in Latin America. This was but the first in a series of steps designed to achieve a closer coordination between the Army and the Navy and between them and the State Department. By the time of Pearl Harbor, consultation among these departments had been established on a regular and continuous basis, though largely through informal means. In itself, the experience in China was neither important nor decisive in establishing these relations. But by emphasizing in dramatic form the weaknesses and frustrations arising from a lack of co-ordination, it contributed in no small measure to the development of the means for coordinating the political and military elements of national policy.
v4Memo, Deputy Chief of Staff for The Adjutant General, Feb. 3, 1938, sub: Return of i5th Infantry from China, WPD 3533-11.