TheGovernorcommitstobepresentatthemediationandtodevotehisfulltimeandattentiontoreachinganagreement.TheGovernorwantsabalancedcompromise,notagovernmentshutdown.
II.THEGOVERNOR'SANDTHECOURT'SPOWERTOSPENDMONEYNOTAPPROPRIATEDISLIMITEDBYTHEMINNESOTACONSTITUTIONANDBYSTATUTES.
In
theeventthatmediationisnotsuccessful,theCourtshouldproceedcautiously,toavoidinfringingontheinherentpowersofthelegislatureandthegovernor.TheCourtmusthonortheconstitutionalprincipleofseparationofpowers.PursuanttotheMinnesotaConstitution,ArticleIII,
§
1,theexecutivedepartmentmaynotexerciseanyofthepowersproperlybelongingtoeitherthelegislativeorthejudicialdepartments,exceptasexpresslyprovidedintheConstitution.
SeeBloom
v.
Am.ExpressCo.,
23N.W.2d570,575(Minn.1946)("Aconstitutionalgrantofpowertooneofthethreedepartmentsofgovernment...isadenialtotheothers.")While"[it]isemphaticallytheprovinceanddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis,"
Marbury
v.
Madison,
5U.S.(1Cranch)137,177(1803),neithermaythejudicialdepartmentexerciseanyofthepowersproperlybelongingtoeitherthelegislativeortheexecutivedepartments.
SeeStateexreI.Sviggum
v.
Hanson,
732N.W.2d312,322(Minn.Ct.App.2007)("Westartfromthefundamentalprinciplethatwecannotexercisepowersthatbelongtothelegislativebranch.")Separationofpowersispremisedonthebeliefthatexcessivepowervestedinonebranchpromotes"corruptionandtyranny."
State
v.
Baxter,
686N.W.2d846,851(Minn.Ct.App.2004);
seealso
TheFederalistNos.47,48,and51(TerenceBalled.,2003).3