LIMJOCO v.

INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE FACTS: Fragante filed an application for a CPC to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan. Pending application with the Public Service Commission (PSC), Fragante died and he was substituted by the legal representative of his estate. The PSC granted the application. Petitioner contends that the PSC erred when it allowed the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante as the party applicant in the case pending before the commission. ISSUES: 1. W/N the PSC erred in granting the application for CPC NO. 2. W/N the estate of Fragante is a person YES. 3. W/N the estate of Fragante may be considered as a citizen YES. RATIO: 1. The right of Fragante to prosecute the application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the PSC might have denied the application. Rule 88, Sec. 2 provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. It is true that a proceeding upon an application for a CPC before the PSC is not an action . But the provisions of the law go to prove that the decedent s rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any and the heirs of the decedent. 2. There would be a failure of justice unless the estate is considered a person . Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term person used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. The fiction of such extension of Fragante s citizenship is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment which he had already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding.

3.

JUDGMENT: Decision affirmed.

SUNTAY v. SUNTAY FACTS: This case involves the probate of 2 purported wills of the decedent Jose Suntay; the first will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 and the second will executed in Fookien, China on January 1931. Maria, the second and surviving spouse, filed a petition with the CFI for the probate of the first will. the petition was denied because of the loss of the will after the filing of said petition and because of the insufficiency of evidence to establish loss of the will. On appeal, the SC held that evidence was sufficient to prove the loss and remanded the case to the CFI for further proceedings. CFI denied motion for continuance of the hearing and eventually dismissed the petition. After the liberation, Silvino (child with Maria) filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for probate of the will executed in the Philippines or the will executed, filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Fookien, China. ISSUE: W/N any of the 2 wills should be probated NO.

RATIO: As to the will executed in the Philippines There were 3 witnesses who testified as to the provisions of the lost will: Go Teh (attesting witness), Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay (daughter with first wife). Although Ana suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication and saw only the signature of her father and of the witness Go Teh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto. If it is true that Go saw the draft of the will in the office of Barretto, then that part of his testimony that Barretto handed the draft to the decedent cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. At any rate, all of Go s testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay because he came to know or learned of them from the information given him by the decedent and from reading the translation of the draft into Chinese. Granting there was a will duly executed by the decedent placed in an envelope and that it was in existence at the time of and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least 2 credible witnesses . As to the will executed in China The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, china is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Rep of China are inadmissible the Consul General does not qualify as an expert on Chinese law on procedure in probate court and adverse party would be deprived of his right to cross-examine the witness Purpose of the proceedings in the municipal district court: take testimony of 2 attesting witnesses to the will. the order of the court of Amoy was not for probate. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is required for the validity of the proceedings that personal notice or by publication or both be made to all interested parties. In this case, the interested parties were known to reside in the Philippines. No such notice was received by these interested parties. The proceedings in the court of Amoy may be likened to a deposition and does not come uo to the standard of proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties. Therefore, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court in the Philippines. JUDGMENT: CFI decision affirmed.