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French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962 Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq

French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962 Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq

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Published by: mihaisoric1617 on Jun 24, 2011
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06/24/2011

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVAL
MAJOR GREGORY D. PETERSON
 
Title of Monograph:
The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962:Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq.
Approved by: __________________________________ Monograph Director ___________________________________ Director,Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR School of AdvancedMilitary Studies ___________________________________ Director,Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate DegreePrograms
 
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Abstract
THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE IN ALGERIA, 1954-1962: BLUEPRINT FOR U.S.OPERATIONS IN IRAQ by MAJOR GREG PETERSON, 57 pages.In 1954 the French Armed Forces began a campaign in Algeria against the insurgentFront de Liberation Nationale (FLN) which had started a bloody uprising against Frenchsovereignty. Initially, the French military did not have a viable counterinsurgencydoctrine that was effective in defeating the FLN and destroying its network. It took themfour years of trial and error to develop a doctrine and operational concept able to defeatthe FLN inside Algeria and prevent outside assistance from reconstituting the FLN. By1960 it was apparent the FLN could not win the liberation of Algeria militarily. However,the political situation respective to France and Algeria internally and internationally bythen had changed to the point that military operations in the field were not going to affectthe political outcome in Algeria. The French Armed Forces took too long to adopt aneffective doctrine to combat the insurgent threat and by the time they were effective itwas irrelevant.Currently the U.S. is in occupation of Iraq and exercising sovereignty in that state. TheU.S. Armed Forces are conducting counterinsurgency operations to defeat and dismantlethe Former Regime Loyalists and various Islamic fundamentalist organizations inside thecountry. U.S. Armed Forces do not have an overarching counterinsurgency doctrine thatis applicable to their operations in Iraq and similar to the French in Algeria they are goingthrough a learning process. Even though the U.S. will turn sovereignty back over to theIraqis it is likely that U.S. forces will remain in the country for the foreseeable future.It is the author’s assertion that by studying the French experience in Algeria the U.S.Armed Forces can learn from the mistakes and victories of the French and hasten thelearning process for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The U.S. cannot afford towaste time through trial and error in developing doctrine and operational concepts todefeat the enemy. The French experience in Algeria demonstrates what can happen whena military takes too long to adapt to a changed battlefield. The U.S. must look at theoperations and doctrine the French employed in Algeria and apply those applicableconcepts now to develop a successful doctrine for current operations in Iraq.
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1THE FRENCH IN ALGERIA 6U.S COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 32CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47BIBLIOGRAPHY 53

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