(Ferdinand Marcos Historical/Contemporary Context) Source: U.S. State Department - http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.

.htm#history The history of the Philippines can be divided into four distinct phases: the pre-Spanish period (before 1521); the Spanish period (1521-1898); the American period (1898-1946); and the post-independence period (1946-present). Pre-Spanish Period The first people in the Philippines, the Negritos, are believed to have come to the islands 30,000 years ago from Borneo and Sumatra, making their way across then-existing land bridges. According to popular belief, Malays subsequently came from the south in successive waves, the earliest by land bridges and later in boats by sea. In contrast, modern archeological, linguistic, and genetic evidence strongly suggests that those successive waves of migrants came from Taiwan as the Austronesian subgroup, Malayo-Polynesians. From Taiwan, the Austronesians first spread southward across the Philippines, then on to Indonesia, Malaysia, and as far away as Polynesia and Madagascar. The migrants settled in scattered communities, named barangays after the large outrigger boats in which they arrived, and ruled by chieftains known often as datus. Mainland Chinese merchants and traders arrived and settled in the ninth century, sometimes traveling on the ships of Arab traders, who introduced Islam in the south and extended some influence even into Luzon. The Malayo-Polynesians, however, remained the dominant group until the Spanish arrived in the 16th century. Spanish Period Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan reached the Philippines and claimed the archipelago for Spain in 1521, but was killed shortly after arriving when he intervened in a dispute between rival tribes. Christianity was established in the Philippines only after the arrival of the succeeding Spanish expeditionary forces (the first led by Legazpi in the early 16th century) and the Spanish Jesuits, and in the 17th and 18th centuries by the conquistadores. Until Mexico proclaimed independence from Spain in 1810, the islands were under the administrative control of Spanish North America, and there was significant migration between North America and the Philippines. This period was the era of conversion to Roman Catholicism. A Spanish colonial social system was developed with a local government centered in Manila and with considerable clerical influence. Spanish influence was strongest in Luzon and the central Philippines but less so in Mindanao, save for certain coastal cities. The long period of Spanish rule was marked by numerous uprisings. Towards the latter half of the 19th century, European-educated Filipinos or ilustrados (such as the Chinese Filipino national hero Jose Rizal) began to criticize the excesses of Spanish rule and instilled a new sense of national identity. This movement gave inspiration to the final revolt against Spain that began in 1896 under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo (another Chinese Filipino) and continued until the Americans defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, during the Spanish-American War. Aguinaldo declared independence from Spain on June 12, 1898. American Period Following Admiral George Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, the U.S. occupied the Philippines. Spain ceded the islands to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898) that ended the Spanish-American war. A war of resistance against U.S. rule, led by revolutionary General Aguinaldo, broke out in 1899. During this conflict fighting and disease claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Filipinos and thousands of Americans. Filipinos and an increasing number of American historians refer to these hostilities as the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), and in 1999, the U.S. Library of Congress reclassified its references to use this term. In 1901, Aguinaldo was captured and swore allegiance to the United States, and resistance gradually died out until the conflict ended with a Peace Proclamation

on July 4, 1902. Armed resistance continued sporadically until 1913, however, especially among the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu. U.S. administration of the Philippines was always declared to be temporary and aimed to develop institutions that would permit and encourage the eventual establishment of a free and democratic government. Therefore, U.S. officials concentrated on the creation of such practical supports for democratic government as public education, public infrastructure, and a sound legal system. The legacy of the Thomasites--American teachers who came to the Philippines starting in 1901 and created the tradition of a strong public education system--continues to resonate today. The first legislative assembly was elected in 1907, and a bicameral legislature, largely under Filipino control, was established. A civil service was formed and was gradually taken over by the Filipinos, who had effectively gained control by the end of World War I. The Catholic Church was disestablished, and a considerable amount of church land was purchased and redistributed. In 1935, under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth. Manuel Quezon was elected president of the new government, which was designed to prepare the country for independence after a 10-year transition period. Japan attacked, however, and in May 1942, Corregidor, the last American/Filipino stronghold, fell. U.S. forces in the Philippines surrendered to the Japanese, placing the islands under Japanese control. During the occupation, thousands of Filipinos fought a running guerrilla campaign against Japanese forces. The full-scale war to regain the Philippines began when General Douglas MacArthur landed on Leyte on October 20, 1944. Filipinos and Americans fought together until the Japanese surrendered in September 1945. Much of Manila was destroyed during the final months of the fighting. In total, an estimated one million Filipinos lost their lives in the war. Due to the Japanese occupation, the guerrilla warfare that followed, and the battles leading to liberation, the country suffered great damage and a complete organizational breakdown. Despite the shaken state of the country, the United States and the Philippines decided to move forward with plans for independence. On July 4, 1946, the Philippine Islands became the independent Republic of the Philippines, in accordance with the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. In 1962, the official Philippine Independence Day was changed from July 4 to June 12, commemorating the date independence from Spain was declared by Emilio Aguinaldo in 1898. Post-Independence Period The early years of independence were dominated by U.S.-assisted postwar reconstruction. The communist-inspired Huk Rebellion (1945-53) complicated recovery efforts before its successful suppression under the leadership of President Ramon Magsaysay. The succeeding administrations of Presidents Carlos P. Garcia (1957-61) and Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) sought to expand Philippine ties to its Asian neighbors, implement domestic reform programs, and develop and diversify the economy. In 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-86) declared martial law, citing growing lawlessness and open rebellion by the communist rebels as his justification. Marcos governed from 1973 until mid-1981 in accordance with the transitory provisions of a new constitution that replaced the commonwealth constitution of 1935. He suppressed democratic institutions and restricted civil liberties during the martial law period, ruling largely by decree and popular referenda. The government began a process of political normalization during 1978-81, culminating in the reelection of President Marcos to a 6-year term that would have ended in 1987. The Marcos government's respect for human rights remained low despite the end of martial law on January 17, 1981. His government retained its wide arrest and detention powers, and corruption and cronyism contributed to a serious decline in economic growth and development. The assassination of opposition leader Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino upon his return to the Philippines in 1983 after a long period of exile coalesced popular dissatisfaction with Marcos and set in motion a

succession of events that culminated in a snap presidential election in February 1986. The opposition united under Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino, and Salvador Laurel, head of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). The election was marred by widespread electoral fraud on the part of Marcos and his supporters. International observers, including a U.S. delegation led by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), denounced the official results. Marcos was forced to flee the Philippines in the face of a peaceful civilian-military uprising that ousted him and installed Corazon Aquino as president on February 25, 1986. Under Aquino's presidency, progress was made in revitalizing democratic institutions and civil liberties. However, the administration was also viewed by many as weak and fractious, and a return to full political stability and economic development was hampered by several attempted coups staged by disaffected members of the Philippine military. Fidel Ramos was elected president in 1992. Early in his administration, Ramos declared "national reconciliation" his highest priority. He legalized the Communist Party and created the National Unification Commission (NUC) to lay the groundwork for talks with communist insurgents, Muslim separatists, and military rebels. In June 1994, President Ramos signed into law a general conditional amnesty covering all rebel groups, as well as Philippine military and police personnel accused of crimes committed while fighting the insurgents. In October 1995, the government signed an agreement bringing the military insurgency to an end. A peace agreement with one major Muslim insurgent group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was signed in 1996, using the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a vehicle for self-government. Popular movie actor Joseph Ejercito Estrada's election as president in May 1998 marked the Philippines' third democratic succession since the ouster of Marcos. Estrada was elected with overwhelming mass support on a platform promising poverty alleviation and an anti-crime crackdown. During his first 2 years in office, President Estrada was plagued with allegations of corruption, resulting in impeachment proceedings. Estrada vacated his office in 2001. In 2007, an anti-graft court convicted Estrada of plunder charges. He received a presidential pardon soon after the conviction. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, elected vice president in 1998, assumed the presidency in January 2001 after widespread demonstrations that followed the breakdown of Estrada's impeachment trial. The Philippine Supreme Court subsequently endorsed unanimously the constitutionality of the transfer of power. National and local elections took place in May 2004. Under the constitution, Arroyo was eligible for another term as president for a full 6 years, and she won a hard-fought campaign against her primary challenger, movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr., in elections held May 10, 2004. Noli De Castro was elected vice president. Impeachment charges were brought against Arroyo in June 2005 for allegedly tampering with the results of the 2004 elections, but Congress rejected the charges in September 2005. Similar charges were discussed and dismissed by Congress in later years. In 2010 elections, Liberal Party Senator Benigno S. Aquino III (son of Ninoy and Corazon Aquino) ran for and won the presidency, campaigning against corruption and on a platform including job creation, provision of health care and education, and other domestic issues. Makati City Mayor Jejomar Binay, a member of the PDP-Laban party, won the vice presidency. The election was the first in the Philippines to feature nationwide use of automated ballot-scanners, and, despite uncertainty about the technical reliability of the machines in the run-up to the election, most opinion-shapers lauded the election process as among the best in the Philippines history, quickly producing results that were widely accepted as legitimate.

(Ferdinand Marcos Personal History) Source: Encyclopedia Britannica - http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364302/FerdinandE-Marcos Ferdinand E. Marcos, in full Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (born Sept. 11, 1917, Sarrat, Phil.died Sept. 28, 1989, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.), Philippine lawyer and politician who, as head of state from 1966 to 1986, established an authoritarian regime in the Philippines that came under criticism for corruption and for its suppression of democratic processes. Marcos attended school in Manila and studied law in the late 1930s at the University of the Philippines, near that city. Tried for the assassination in 1933 of a political opponent of his politician father, Marcos was found guilty in November 1939. But he argued his case on appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court and won acquittal a year later. He became a trial lawyer in Manila. During World War II he was an officer with the Philippine armed forces. Marcos later claims of having been a leader in the Filipino guerrilla resistance movement were a central factor in his political success, but U.S. government archives revealed that he actually played little or no part in anti-Japanese activities during 194245. From 1946 to 1947 Marcos was a technical assistant to Manuel Roxas, the first president of the independent Philippine republic. He was a member of the House of Representatives (194959) and of the Senate (195965), serving as Senate president (196365). In 1965 Marcos, who was a prominent member of the Liberal Party founded by Roxas, broke with it after failing to get his partys nomination for president. He then ran as the Nationalist Party candidate for president against the Liberal president, Diosdado Macapagal. The campaign was expensive and bitter. Marcos won and was inaugurated as president on Dec. 30, 1965. In 1969 he was reelected, the first Philippine president to serve a second term. During his first term he had made progress in agriculture, industry, and education. Yet his administration was troubled by increasing student demonstrations and violent urban-guerrilla activities. On Sept. 21, 1972, Marcos imposed martial law. Holding that communist and subversive forces precipitated the crisis, he acted swiftly; opposition politicians were jailed, and the armed forces became an arm of the regime. Opposed by political leadersnotably Benigno Aquino, Jr., who was jailed and held in detention for almost eight yearsMarcos was also criticized by church leaders and others. In the provinces Maoist communists (New Peoples Army) and Muslim separatists undertook guerrilla activities intended to bring down the central government. Under martial law the president assumed extraordinary powers, including the ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos announced the end of martial law in January 1981 but continued to rule in an authoritarian fashion under various constitutional formats. He won election to the newly created post of president against token opposition in June 1981. Marcos wife from 1954 was Imelda Romuldez Marcos, a former beauty queen. Imelda became a powerful figure after the institution of martial law in 1972. She was often criticized for her appointments of relatives to lucrative governmental and industrial positions while she held the posts of governor of Metropolitan Manila (197586) and minister of human settlements and ecology (197986). Marcos later years in power were marred by rampant government corruption, economic stagnation, the steady widening of economic inequalities between the rich and the poor, and the steady growth of a communist guerrilla insurgency active in the rural areas of the Philippines innumerable islands. By 1983 Marcos health was beginning to fail, and opposition to his rule was growing. Hoping to present an alternative to both Marcos and the increasingly powerful New Peoples Army, Benigno Aquino, Jr., returned to Manila on Aug. 21, 1983, only to be shot dead as he stepped off the plane. The assassination was seen as the work of the government and touched off massive antigovernment protests. An independent commission appointed by Marcos concluded in 1984 that high military officers were responsible for Aquinos assassination. To reassert his mandate, Marcos called for presidential elections to be held in 1986. But a formidable political opponent soon emerged in Aquinos widow, Corazon Aquino, who became the

presidential candidate of the opposition. It was widely asserted that Marcos managed to defeat Aquino and retain the presidency in the election of Feb. 7, 1986, only through massive voting fraud on the part of his supporters. Deeply discredited at home and abroad by his dubious electoral victory, Marcos held fast to his presidency as the Philippine military split between supporters of his and of Aquinos legitimate right to the presidency. A tense standoff that ensued between the two sides ended only when Marcos fled the country on Feb. 25, 1986, at U.S. urging, and went into exile in Hawaii. Evidence emerged that during his years in power, Marcos, his family, and his close associates had looted the Philippines economy of billions of dollars through embezzlements and other corrupt practices. Marcos and his wife were subsequently indicted by the U.S. government on racketeering charges but in 1990 (after Marcos death) Imelda was acquitted of all charges by a federal court. She was allowed to return to the Philippines in 1991; in 1993 a Philippine court found her guilty of corruption.

The annual salary of Ferdinand Marcos as president of the Philippines was 5,700 dollars. After 20 years in office, it was estimated that he had built a personal fortune in excess of 5 billion dollars. When he and his wife, Imelda, were forced to flee the country in 1986, the economy of the Philippines was in ruins, the treasury had been looted, and money from foreign aid had been siphoned off by Marcos and his friends.

(Ferdinand Marcos Immediate Context, Use of Power) Source: Time Magazine - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,960859-1,00.html "Senator, what do you think? Should I step down?" It was the second time that Paul Laxalt, the Nevada Republican and personal friend of Ronald Reagan's, had spoken that day with Ferdinand Marcos, the beleaguered President of the Philippines. At 2 o'clock (EST) last Monday afternoon, Marcos telephoned Laxalt, who had visited Manila in October as a special emissary, with an urgent question: Was it true, as U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth had told him, that President Reagan was calling for a "peaceful transition to a new government" in the Philippines? While the two men talked, Laxalt said later, it became apparent that Marcos was "hanging on, looking for a life preserver. He was a desperate man clutching at straws." He asked whether the reference to a "peaceful transition" meant he should stay on until 1987, when his current term was originally supposed to end, and he wondered whether some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the Philippine opposition could be worked out. Marcos spoke of his fear that his palace was about to be attacked, but seemed determined to stay on as President. At Marcos' request, Laxalt then went to the White House, where he discussed the conversation with Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz. The President repeated his desire for a peaceful, negotiated settlement in the Philippines and said once more that Marcos would be welcome if he decided to seek sanctuary in the U.S. But Reagan said he thought the idea of power sharing was impractical and that it would be undignified for Marcos to stay on as a "consultant." At 4:15 p.m. Laxalt called Marcos, who immediately asked whether Reagan wanted him to step down. Laxalt said the President was not in a position to make that kind of demand. Then Marcos put the question directly to Laxalt: What should he do? Replied the Senator: "Mr. President, I'm not bound by diplomatic restraint. I'm talking only for myself. I think you should cut and cut cleanly. The time has come." There was a long pause that to Laxalt seemed interminable. Finally he asked, "Mr. President, are you still there?" Marcos replied, in a subdued voice, "Yes, I'm still here. I am so very, very disappointed." In Manila it was after 5 o'clock in the morning of the longest day of Ferdinand Marcos' life. Before it was over, he would attend his final inauguration ceremony, a foolish charade carried out in the sanctuary of his Malacanang Palace. That evening, a ruler no more, he would flee with his family and retainers aboard four

American helicopters to Clark Air Base on the first leg of a flight that would take him to Guam, Hawaii and exile. That same night, to mark the end of his increasingly authoritarian 20-year rule, millions of his countrymen would stage one of the biggest celebrations in the Philippines since its deliverance from the Japanese in 1945 and its independence from the U.S. in 1946. At the Malacanang Palace, giddy with excitement, hundreds of Filipinos would scale fences and storm their way through locked doors in order to glimpse-and in some cases to loot--the ornate Spanish-style palace that had served as Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos' seat of almost absolute power. If there was something inexplicable about the mass phenomenon that rescued the island nation from a failing dictatorship, enabling thousands of unarmed civilians to protect one faction of the armed forces from the other, there was no doubt when the process began. It was Aug. 21, 1983, on the tarmac at Manila international airport. On that day, Opposition Politician Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino Jr., 50, returning from three years of self-imposed exile in the U.S., was slain by a single bullet as he stepped off a jetliner into a crowd of soldiers and well-wishers. Though Marcos tried to put the blame on Communist agitators, one Filipino civilian and 25 members of the military, including General Fabian Ver, the armed forces Chief of Staff and Marcos stalwart, were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit murder. The defendants were acquitted in December after a yearlong trial, but few Filipinos doubted their guilt. The Aquino murder shocked and angered the country, sparking popular demonstrations and intensifying the disaffection with Marcos. It infuriated thousands of professional military men, who bitterly resented the politicization that the armed forces were undergoing and the hatred that this process was engendering. Of the assassination, Colonel Gregorio Honosan says today, "From a military viewpoint, it is technically impossible to get inside a cordon of 2,000 men, so this reinforced our belief that nobody in government could be safe." The assassination produced a sharp increase in the size and intensity of Communist guerrilla activity by the military organization called the New People's Army. Though the insurgency is concentrated on Mindanao and some other southern islands, it spread after the Aquino assassination to 60 of the country's 74 provinces. In addition, the killing of Aquino created a nationwide crisis of confidence that caused the already stagnant economy to spiral downward, even as most other Southeast Asian nations were prospering. After the assassination, says an American official, "all these concerns took a quantum leap." Two of the most important elements of Philippine society, the church and the military, began quickly turning against Marcos. The Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, is a powerful figure in a country nominally 85% Roman Catholic, and his opposition to Marcos was clear. He increasingly and openly encouraged opposition political figures. The revolt in the armed forces began to take shape as long ago as 1977, when a power struggle within the Marcos government eroded the influence of the President's longtime political ally Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. "It began as a self-defense action," recalls Navy Captain Rex Robles, a spokesman for the Reform the Armed Forces Movement, which Enrile now confirms he clandestinely helped establish. Realizing that he was being pushed aside in a power struggle with General Ver, Enrile, a Harvard-trained lawyer, began to work secretly to protect himself and lay the groundwork for the inevitable post-Marcos period. Late last fall events began to move rapidly. In November, Marcos declared that he would hold a special presidential election to convince the Reagan Administration that he still enjoyed popular support. A month later, immediately following the acquittal of Ver, Corazon Aquino announced that she would challenge Marcos for the presidency. Cardinal Sin then helped persuade former Senator Salvador Laurel to join the Aquino ticket. In the meantime Enrile had been building his reform-movement, a highly visible band of about 100 well-trained soldiers whose aim was not to topple Marcos but to pressure him to reorganize the military. Throughout the election campaign, while Enrile publicly supported Marcos, his reformers

conducted a crusade for honest voting that angered the President and the Ver faction in the military. The reformers in turn were enraged by the strong-arm methods used by the pro-Marcos forces in the vote counting, and even more by the assassination of Evelio Javier, a leading opposition figure. Nonetheless they remained inactive because they wanted to appear impartial. The military men had already established links with Corazon Aquino, and before the campaign had helped train her security detail. Once the voting was over, the reformers prepared to take a more active part in the efforts to topple Marcos. By this time they had won the support of some of the Marcos family's closest security forces. Says one reformist: "I don't think the President thought that so many of his praetorian guards would turn against him. He thought money could buy loyalty. He underestimated the basic decency of Filipinos." The group tested palace security by smuggling cars filled with empty boxes into the palace grounds. Since nobody bothered to stop them, they realized they would be able to bring in explosives if they should choose to do so. Two weeks ago the reformers learned that they were in imminent danger. As the first step in a byzantine crackdown, Marcos arrested a group of soldiers. Though these troops were not members of the reform movement, the reformers theorized that the men would be used to incriminate them. The rebels suspected that the threatened crackdown was a maneuver by Ver and his supporters to reinforce their links with Marcos. At the same time, however, there were reports that some sort of coup might actually be in the making. Immediately the reformers decided to accelerate their plans. They reached Enrile, who was sitting in the coffeehouse in the Atrium building in Makati, and informed him of what was happening. On Saturday, Feb. 22, Enrile resigned from the government and announced that he was joining the opposition forces. Some of Enrile's reformist colleagues tried to convince him that such a move would merely forewarn Marcos of the group's intentions, but he insisted, "I just cannot do this to the President otherwise." The decision made, he sought Lieut. General Fidel Ramos' help. "I called Eddie. I had never discussed anything with him over the years, except in terms of the reform movement's general lack of aggressive intentions and its interest in institutional change. I told him, 'My boys are in this predicament, and I will have to be with them. I would like to find out whether you will join us or not.' General Ramos said, 'I am with you all the way.' " At the moment of showdown, Cardinal Sin again played a crucial role. He publicly praised Enrile and Ramos, and called on the Philippine people to take to the streets in peaceful support of them. Radio Veritas, the Catholic station, became the unofficial broadcaster of the rebellion, reporting on military units that had joined the opposition and giving instructions to crowds. In the end the ailing Marcos, who is reported to be suffering from a form of systemic lupus erythematosus, a disease in which human antibodies attack the body's tissue, especially the kidneys, was woefully uninformed as to what the reformers were really up to and how much support they had gained. Says Enrile: "Evidently the President was a captive of a group in the military. That was the sad thing about it." Reagan Administration policy during the final hours of the Marcos reign was set during a meeting last Sunday morning in the Bethesda, Md., home of Secretary of State George Shultz, at which the President's special envoy, Philip Habib, who had returned from Manila only hours before, presented a report on his trip. In attendance were Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense; Admiral William Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Gates, deputy director for intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency; and John Poindexter, the National Security Adviser. Also present were three officials who had been preoccupied with the Philippine crisis for months: Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. The group agreed on four principles, which were subsequently presented to President Reagan: Marcos' ability to govern with the consent of his people had ended; any effort by him to crush the reform movement would only worsen the situation; it was of great importance to the U.S. that force not be used; and it would

be damaging to U.S. standing in the world if Marcos were treated like the Shah of Iran, who was admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment but was not permitted by the Carter Administration to remain. As it turned out, Marcos was less worried about the fate of the Shah than about what happened to Ngo Dinh Diem, the South Vietnamese President who was assassinated during a 1963 coup. Says one senior American official: "He wanted to make sure he did not leave with a bullet." President Reagan, who had once solidly supported Marcos, quickly accepted the four-point policy. Reagan's views had already been shifting during the previous three weeks. Indeed, in response to Marcos' deteriorating situation, he had moved rapidly from his dismaying remark after the election that there had probably been voting fraud on both sides to a White House statement condemning the election as fatally flawed by fraud, most of it on the part of the Marcos forces. At a Sunday-afternoon meeting of the National Security Council, Special Envoy Habib reported flatly, "The Marcos era has ended." Shultz summarized the views of the participants by saying that "not a person here" believed Marcos could remain in power, adding, "He's had it." President Reagan agreed but remained concerned about the fate of Marcos. Said Reagan: "We'll treat this man in retirement with dignity. He is not to wander." By then the Administration was emphasizing as strongly as possible that Marcos should avoid a military showdown. On Saturday, Reagan sent the Philippine leader an appeal not to use force to remain in power. Next day he dispatched a second message, advising Marcos that he as well as his family and close associates was welcome to live in the U.S. White House Spokesman Larry Speakes announced that American military aid to the Philippines would be cut off if troops loyal to Marcos used the army against the Philippine reform movement forces led by Enrile and Ramos. On Sunday evening, Shultz and Under Secretary of State Armacost met at the State Department with Blas Ople, Marcos' Minister of Labor, who had come to Washington to plead the Philippine President's case. According to Ople, the American diplomats gave him a blunt message: Marcos had lost control of his army, the troops under General Ver were ineffectual, and if Marcos did not step down, the country could be heading for civil war. A similar statement was sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Manila, Stephen Bosworth, who took it to Marcos. It was early Monday morning before Ople finally managed to talk to Marcos by telephone. The Philippine President was angry that while his palace was being threatened and his television station taken over, the U.S. was telling him not to defend himself. He told Ople that Mrs. Marcos was there beside him and "she doesn't want to leave." Later that day, at about the same time Marcos was calling Senator Laxalt, Imelda Marcos telephoned Nancy Reagan. The message was the same: Mrs. Reagan urged the Marcoses to avoid bloodshed, expressed concern for their family, and assured Mrs. Marcos that they were welcome to come to the U.S. The Administration was worried about General Ver, who on Monday was still in a position to attempt a last-gasp military move. There were reports that he was about to send tanks to attack the reformers. Accordingly, the National Security Council sent a message to Ver advising him that it would not be in his "interest" to make a military move. Translation: if he called out troops, he would forfeit his chance of being included in the Marcos rescue operation. The warning was heeded. In the period following the Aquino assassination, American policymakers had become increasingly concerned about the Philippines' rapid political and economic decline. One particular concern was the future status of the two large U.S. military installations in the Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The leases on those facilities will run out in 1991, but the U.S. hopes that they can be renegotiated. Following a 1984 policy review by the National Security Council, which concluded that Marcos would "try to remain in power indefinitely," the Administration began to work for economic, political and military reform in the Philippines. Shultz laid down the overriding principle: the U.S. must be loyal to the institutions of democracy, not to Marcos.

In October, Reagan sent Senator Laxalt to Manila to tell Marcos that changes had to be made. Said Laxalt last week: "He was getting messages through State, but he just wasn't believing them." Laxalt told him that the Philippine army had to spend more time dealing with the Communist insurgents. Pressure on Marcos was also building in the U.S. Congress. Senator Richard Lugar, Indiana Republican and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who headed an official American team of poll watchers that observed the elections, concluded that there had been many instances of fraud, vote tampering, violence and intimidation by Marcos partisans. In a telephone conversation with Marcos just after the voting, Laxalt observed that certain aspects of the elections had been "rather strange," such as reports that Marcos had carried one province by a vote of 13,000 to 0. That was not a province, it was a precinct, said Marcos, and "it was family." When Laxalt answered, "I doubt very much if I ran in my home district I would get all the votes of my family," Marcos, who knew that the Senator's parents were French Basque immigrants, replied, "Well, Filipinos are more clannish than you independent Basques." Washington's fear of a bloodbath was not unfounded. Early Monday morning a crowd of Marcos supporters armed with batons and tear gas moved toward Camp Crame, where the reformers were gathered. Over transistor radios, Marcos was ! heard vowing, "We'll wipe them out. It is obvious they are committing a rebellion." And over Radio Veritas came Enrile's reply, "I am not going to surrender." Tanks arrived. When helicopters from the 15th strike wing of the air force began circling overhead, it looked as if the reformist rebellion was all over. If the choppers had fired into the Enrile-Ramos headquarters, the reformers would have been helpless. But then the choppers landed, and out came airmen waving white flags and giving the "L" sign for laban (fight), a symbol of the opposition. Suddenly the crowd, realizing that the air force was now defecting, went wild. Perhaps the most ominous moment came that same morning, shortly after Marcos announced on a televised news conference that he was declaring a state of emergency. At that point his armed forces Chief of Staff, General Ver, whispered to Marcos in a voice that was audible to the whole nation, "Sir, we are ready to annihilate them at your orders . . . We are left with no option but to attack." Marcos did not respond. Whether he knew it or not, his failure to move swiftly against Enrile and Ramos, one of the more honorable acts of his tarnished presidency, had already cost him the office he was fighting so desperately to retain. Instead he went on with his press conference, but at 8:47 he was interrupted in mid-sentence as the government-run television station, Channel 4, suddenly went off the air. When it reappeared three hours later, the newscaster jubilantly declared, "This is the first free broadcast of Channel 4 . . . The people have taken over." Beside him was Colonel Mariano Santiago, who until last year had been the Marcos-appointed chairman of the country's Board of Transportation. To many Filipinos, the seizure of Channel 4 was one of the most remarkable events of an endlessly astonishing week. Tuesday was the day of the twin inaugurals. Aquino had wanted a daylight ceremony because, as she said in her address, "it is fitting and proper that, as the rights and liberties of our people were taken away at midnight 14 years ago (when martial law was declared), the people should formally recover those rights and liberties in the full light of day." An hour later Ferdinand Marcos stepped onto the balcony at Malacanang Palace before a crowd of 4,000 cheering supporters and took the oath of office. "Whatever we have before us, we will overcome," he promised, while Imelda vowed to serve the people "all my life up to my last breath." Though she was choked with emotion, few people outside the palace sensed that this was to be the Marcoses' farewell. Then the Marcoses sang favorite songs, at one point offering a duet to the cheers of the invited guests. Conspicuously absent was Marcos' Vice President, Arturo Tolentino, who later said that he had not wanted to take the oath of office because he hoped to play an intermediary role between Marcos and the reformists. An hour after the ceremony, Marcos telephoned Enrile and demanded that he "stop firing at the palace." Enrile said he had no troops there. Marcos asked him to call Ambassador Bosworth to find out if the U.S. could provide the Marcoses with security in flying out of the palace. Enrile promised to do so. Marcos had

previously raised the possibility of retiring to Ilocos Norte, his home province in the northern Philippines, but had been discouraged from doing so by his family and by the new government. At 9:05 p.m., four American helicopters picked up the President, Imelda and a contingent of relatives and aides, including General Ver, and flew them to the U.S. air base. As the week ended, Reagan Administration policymakers breathed a great sigh of relief that their plans and strategies, so painstakingly worked out over the past two years, had gone so well. Both Republicans and Democrats praised the handling of the Philippine crisis. Officials counted themselves incredibly lucky. Noting that events had passed without appreciable bloodshed, a senior U.S. official in Washington ruefully remarked that the Lord surely looks after "fools, children, the Philippines and the U.S.A." After its initial concern about how the inexperienced Corazon Aquino would fare as President, the Administration was relieved that she gave important jobs to Laurel, Enrile, Ramos and other centrists, and adopted so conciliatory a tone toward her former opponents. Already there were hints of trouble ahead over the Marcoses' relocation, whether they decided to settle in Hawaii, California, New York or elsewhere, and over the legal status of Marcos' properties abroad. Though Marcos' only known income was his presidential salary of $5,700 a year, the Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly estimated the value of his family's worldwide holdings at perhaps $2 billion. New York's Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz observed mildly last week, "There is a strong presumption that he had a very good financial adviser ^ or acquired the millions of dollars he has through presumptively improper means." Aboard the plane that carried Marcos to Hawaii, federal authorities found $1.2 million in Philippine currency, and another planeload of Marcos' personal effects arrived at week's end. Solarz said that while he thought it was appropriate for Reagan to offer Marcos sanctuary, the President had certainly not offered Marcos "immunity against civil proceedings brought by the government of the Philippines to recover a fortune stolen from the Philippines." But for the moment the Administration was relieved to have passed the center of the storm. Even as he praised Marcos for his "difficult and courageous decision" to step down, Reagan congratulated Aquino on the "democratic outcome" of the elections and promised to work closely with her government in rebuilding the Philippine economy and armed forces.

(Ferdinand Marcos Ideas, Guiding Principles, Public Values) Source: Time Magazine - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913829-1,00.html

When Ferdinand Marcos was elected the sixth President of the Philippines ten years ago, his island nation was in political turmoil. Even his opponents concede that Marcos, 58, has revived the Philippine economy and brought the country safely through a period of "anarchy, public confusion, terror and despair. "But the price has been high. Three years ago, Marcos imposed martial law and made himself a virtual dictator. Today an estimated 6,000 political prisoners are still in jail, including former Liberal Party SecretaryGeneral Benigno Aquino Jr., 43, who might have defeated Marcos if elections had been held in 1973 according to the constitution. Last week TIME Correspondent David Aikman interviewed Marcos and his wife Imelda, 46, at Manila 's Malacaang Palace and sent this report: It is after 1 o'clock in the afternoon in the ornate, white stucco Spanish mansion that sits upon Manila's Pasig River. Malacaang's huge second-floor reception hall used to be filled with the guests and functionaries of Spain's colonial governors. Now the great men of Philippine national independence stare down from the wallsAguinaldo, Quezon, Roxas, Magsaysay. The hall most conveniently serves as a waiting area for the diverse individuals and groups who daily seek audience with the President. Saudi Arabian princes, American bankers, Jaycee delegationsall get their turn and are ushered one by one into

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the simple, wood-paneled presidential office. Most of the day's visitors have gone, and Marcos, only slightly wearied, is preoccupied by year-end economic projections. Says he, as aides hover around with neat folders of documents: "We thought we were going to have a whopping $1 billion deficit in the balance of payments, but we have been able to cut it by half. We made an across-the-board budget cut in all departments. Ruthless, but what can you do? There is no other way." Front Men. When Marcos grins, it is hard to believe that the man could be ruthless. He has charm and accessibility in equal abundance. But his steely quality emerges clearly when he discusses his seizure of absolute power and the imposition of martial law. "I am one of those who felt guilty about the old system," he says. "But I realized I was a captive of it and so did a lot of other people. The [earlier] Presidents seemed to me as if they were just front men for the oligarchs behind them and, well, I wasn't going to be a front man for anyone. I wanted to reform and bring about a new society." He insists that even opposition leaders urged him to impose martial law in order to prevent chaos. One of Marcos' curious attributes is his refusal to become emotional or defensive when accused of dictatorial methods. He does not meet criticism or serious problems head-on, but either lets them peter out or attacks them from the side. Thus Marcos has adopted a strangely non-confrontational approach to the Moslem insurgency movement in the southern Philippines. He refused to allow the military an untrammeled hand in putting down the revolt and agreed to recognize the Moro National Liberation Front. Then he undercut its leadership by coaxing Moslem local field commanders into surrendering with generous amnesty conditions and promises of "utmost autonomy" in the Moslem areas.

(Nelson Mandela Historical/Contemp. Context) Historical and Contemporary Contexts Beck, R.B. (2000). The History of South Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Chamber, D.L. (2000). Civilizing the Natives: Marriage in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Daedelus, vol.129, Issue 4, 2000. Kitchen, J.C. (1994). South Africa: Twelve Perspectives on the Transition. Westport, CT: Praeger. Historical Context: Economic, Social, and Political Forces

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Beck, 77-83, 87-101, 107-09 Discovery of Diamonds and Gold: Transformation of Economy and Society For over three hundred years the great powers of Europe had little interest in South Africa except for its strategic value and ability to service their passing fleets. Then, in April 1867, two children playing along the banks of the Orange River found a shiny pebble. That pebble transformed South Africa into one of Britain's most valuable possessions. The pebble was a diamond, the first evidence of a deposit of mineral riches unrivaled anywhere in the world. (77) The large quantity of diamonds produced, and the unregulated market for their sale, precipitated a dramatic price drop. Making a profit became difficult without investing huge amounts of capital Cape officials initially tried to protect the small, independent miners. They also enforced laws guaranteeing Coloured [mixed-race] and African claims, which caused bitter resentment among White miners. Some small-scale White miners formed a Defense Association to protest these developments. In June 1875 imperial troops suppressed an open revolt at Kimberley [mines]. Soon thereafter officials instituted a color bar [known as the Kimberley Color Bar] to prevent Coloureds and Africans from making claims, and they lifted the limitation on the number of claims an individual might have. Small-scale mining quickly came and went. (78) In 1886 Frederick and Henry William Struben discovered gold along the Witwatersrand (White Water Reef) 30 miles south of Pretoria What made South African gold mining commercially viable was the immense, unequaled quantity of gold ore. Gold eventually had a far greater impact on South Africa than diamonds did, transforming its economy from agricultural to industrial and its society from rural to urban. Gold also became the underlying cause for war between the British and the two Afrikaner [Dutch] republics, and the eventual unification of the country. (78-79) The discovery of diamonds and gold also created secondary industries, such as railroads, ports, and various public works, to support mining. The enormous infusion of people and new capital into the country also bolstered economic activity in other areas. Agricultural production, for example, increased to feed the growing immigrant population and provided African farmers with enough income that for a while they could continue to live independently and not work for Whites as wage laborers. But the greatly expanded need for mine, railroad, and farm laborers put even greater strains on the always limited African labor supply The labor shortage soon forced White employers to draw in migrant African workers from areas in South Africa that were not under White control, and from neighboring regions in the area of modern Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. A migrant labor system thus developed at an early date, with Africans leaving their families and working as contracted laborers for periods ranging from several months to a year or more. (79-80) Kimberley Color Bar: Racial Discrimination Institutionalized [The] Kimberley color barnot only prevented Africans and Coloureds from staking claims but also created a racially divided labor force. Whites took the skilled, supervisory, and other high-paying positions, whereas Africans performed all the unskilled and semi-skilled tasks for low wages. Well-paid Whites moved about freely, lived with their families, and received subsidized housing. Africans came to the mines alone, lived in all-male compounds, and slept in dormitories with dozens of men to a room. They had to carry passes and were closely watched by their supervisors. They could advance only so far before encountering a color bar. White protests led to higher wages, job protection, and better working conditions. African protests were violently crushed. (79) British Tribal Conquests The discovery of South Africa's enormous mineral wealth came just as Europe began its great age of colonization and imperialist acquisitions. European powers scrambled for some of what King Leopold II of Belgium called "that magnificent African cake," and Britain took the biggest slice. In South Africa the British, with some Afrikaner help, conquered one African people after another, culminating in the defeat of the last independent African society, the Venda, in

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1897. Britain then conquered the two Afrikaner republics and brought all of South Africa into the empire. (80) By the 1860s the Xhosa [the main native South African tribe] had already lost their independence (80) The Zulu possessed the strongest African military force in southern Africa but were troubled by internal factionalism and segmentation of royal families. Despite the Mfecane [the crushing or scattering of clans], Shaka's assassination, Blood River [site of battle between Afrikaner emigrants and the Zulu], and a subsequent civil war, the Zulu had managed to hold together and maintain their independence... (81) When the British became serious about winning the war, their superior military technology and more efficient supply systems gave them the advantage Having defeated the Zulu army, the British tried to destroy the Zulu nation. They split Zululand into thirteen separate chiefdoms under thirteen appointed chiefs (82-83) South African [a.k.a. Boer] War: British Conquest of Afrikaner Republics The new spirit of nationalism popular in western Europe in the late nineteenth century also touched the Afrikaners [Whites of Dutch descent] A Cape Dutch Reformed minister, S.J. du Toit, founded a newspaperand wrote a book (The History of our country in the language of our people), which gave expression to this new spiritIn them he argued that the Afrikaner were a unique people, chosen by God to rule over the "heathen" peoples of southern Africa. Du Toit garnered little support for his views at the time, but National Party ideologues adopted his nationalist philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s. (88) During the 1880s and 1890s southern Africa became a great chess board, with the two Afrikaner republics [Transvaal and Orange Free State] and the British making move and countermove (89) The South African War beganon 11 October 1899. (91) The British called it the Boer (or Anglo-Boer) War, and the Afrikaners referred to it as the Second War of Freedom (the first being the Anglo-Transvaal War). The British fought to bring all of South Africa under imperial rule and to gain total control over South Africa's mineral wealth. The Afrikaners fought to defend their independence. Initially a war between Afrikaner and British, all South Africans were eventually pulled into it, White and Black. It divided families, pitted region against region, and left a legacy of animosity that continues to the present. It was an imperialist war but also a civil war. For these reasons, many historians today call it the South African War. (91) Lord Kitchener [British commander] responded to [Afrikaner] guerrilla warfare in a manner that makes the South African War the twentieth century's first "total war." He ordered his troops to wage war against the entire Afrikaner population, not just its army. They adopted a scorched earth policy, destroying an estimated 30,000 farmsteads, burning the crops and confiscating the livestock. They sent captured commandos into exile and imprisoned White civilian women, children, and the elderly in concentration camps Lord Kitchener's tactics, particularly the camps, stirred a humanitarian outcry in Britain and left a bitter memory in the Afrikaner community. (93-94) South African Unification: Guarantee of White Supremacy The Treaty of Vereeniging required that the [Afrikaner] republics surrender their independence. In return, they were promised eventual political autonomy, the right to maintain their language in schools and courts, and massive economic assistance for postwar reconstruction. Afrikaner prisoners-of-war were to be released. Bowing to Afrikaner sensitivities, the British turned their backs on South Africa's African population (94) It took the last armed rebellion organized by a traditional ruler in South Africa, however, for Whites finally to see the value of a political union. (96) The four colonies [Cape, Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free State] all agreed that some form of centralized federal government was necessary.... All partieswanted a central government that would regulate railroad, trade, and tariff issues and legislate countrywide laws guaranteeing White supremacy

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The 1910 Act of Union created a single nation with a population of 1,275,000 Whites, 150,000 Indians, 500,000 Coloureds, and 4 million Africans. Only White South Africans, however, were truly citizens (101) Poor Whites v. Blacks: Effects of Afrikaner Voting Block During the [next] forty years the South African economy prospered, driven by the enormous wealth produced by the gold mining industry. English-speakers initially benefited the most from this prosperity, as they dominated the commercial and financial sectors and the professions. The majority of Afrikaners still farmed, although in the early 1900s many lost their land to commercial agricultural interests. Refusing to do common farm labor, menial "kaffir work" as they termed it, they became impoverished "poor Whites" instead. Forced to the cities, they formed a largely unskilled and poorly educated labor pool that competed with Blacks for jobs. The government could not ignore Afrikaner votes, however, for they made up more than 55 percent of the electorate. Job reservations, artificial wage levels, government subsidies and loans, and economic growth caused White poverty to diminish over the next four decades, but always at Black expense. (101) The worldwide Great Depression that began in October 1929 caused a dramatic downturn in the South African economy (109) The economic state of both rural and urban Afrikaners had been deteriorating since the late 1800s, but the Depression worsened their plight government policies [instituted to address Afrikaner concerns] such as job reservations, wage bars, social welfare programs, and credit loans that gave preferences to Whites only made Black South Africans' lives more wretched. (109) Deluca, 68 The election of 1948 was a major turning point in the history of South Africa and the struggle for black freedom and independence. The surprising triumph of a Nationalist Dutch Afrikaans government [reflecting beliefs of the Afrikaner subculture]and the introduction of apartheid [legal classification and separation of races] sent shock waves throughout South Africa What followed was a new wave of racist legislation, including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act; the Immorality Act, outlawing sexual relations between blacks and whites; the Population and Registration Act, which defined groups by race; and the Group Areas Act, which divided living areas within cities on the basis of race. (68) When the government announced its plan to create "bantustans" or homelands on marginal land with poor soil and inhospitable living conditions as separate territories of development for the black people of South Africa [similar to Indian reservations in the U.S.], the intention was clear. The Nationalist government had decided to turn South Africa into a patchwork of "ethnic enclaves" or "Reserves" in "poverty-stricken areas" in violation of the principles of "democracy," "sovereignty," and "self-determination" Supported by the tribal chiefs, who viewed their authority as hereditary and not elective, the government exploited the divisions within the African community and pursued a policy of apartheid on a grand scale by relegating 70 percent of the population to live on only 13 percent of the land. (72) [Note from Dr. Perkins: Black South Africans were considered citizens of their Bantustan, not of South Africa, so they had no right to vote on South African leaders or laws.]

Cultural Context: Race, Religion, and Subcultures Demographics of South Africa

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Beck, 3-4 South Africa's population in 1999 was 40.5 million. Of these, there were 31.1 million Africans, one million Asians, 3.6 million Coloureds (mixed-race), 4.4 million Whites, and 0.4 million others/unspecified. South Africa has eleven official language groups, with Zulu-speakers being the largest at 22.9 percent of the total population, followed by Xhosa (17.9%), Afrikaans (14.4%), Pedi (9.2%), English (8.6%), Tswana (8.2%), Sotho (7.7%), Tsonga (4.4%), Swazi (2.5%), Venda (2.2%), Ndebele (1.5%), and others (0.6%). Afrikaans, which evolved from Dutch, is the first language of nearly all Afrikaners (mainly of Dutch descent) and of many Coloureds. Afrikaners make up about two-thirds of the White population. English is the first language of about one-third of the White population and of the majority of Coloureds. English is also the most widely used language for all peoples. Most Indians speak English as well as one of the languages of India. (3) Nearly 80 percent of the South African population is Christian, mainly Protestant. ManyAfricans attend syncretic churches that combine elements of traditional African religious beliefs with those of Christianity. Many Africans continue to adhere to traditional African belief systems. The majority of Indians are Hindus or Muslims, and the extensive Malay population practices Islam. South Africa's Jewish community numbers about 100,000. (4) Afrikaner Subculture: Foundation of Apartheid Deluca, 68 In brief, apartheid, meaning segregation, was built upon the [Afrikaner] premise of baasskap or "boss-ship" and by way of extension the much larger notion of white supremacy. The formula was simple: "Eie volk, eie taal, eie land-Our own people, our own language, our own land," and it obviously echoed in tone and spirit the pernicious words and message of Adolf Hitler's venomous racism. The Dutch Reformed Church also played a prominent role in underwriting the government's racist message, as did a powerful, influential "secret society, the Broederbond," meaning Band of Brothers. (68) South African Tribal Subculture Chambers (online article excerpts) Nearly half of all black Africans still live in rural areas, the great majority in traditional groups headed by hereditary kings or chiefs and by headmen and subchiefs. The largest of these groups are the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Pedi, the Sotho, the Tswana, the Tsonga, and the Swazi. All are hierarchically organized, and, in nearly all, only men can be chiefs or senior counselors. Each of these cultural groups has its own customs and rules--rituals and practices at birth, at the coming of age, at marriage, and at death Whether these practices are appropriately regarded as "law" is debatable, for they have no definitive textual form and are modified over time by the actions of those who adhere to them. Still, Africans of all sorts speak as if these practices were "law". The chiefs, of course, also believe in customary laws and consider themselves the authoritative voice of their content. They or other senior leaders preside over local customary courts where they apply their view of the "law" to resolve disputes. Most black South Africans who live in rural areas follow customary practices in their daily lives. For them, the chiefs still play central roles as the keepers and promoters of traditions and as political leaders. Kitchen, 5-6 Christian Churches: Social and Moral Focal Point Among Africans, Christian churches have long played an influential role. Early missions, many of them American in origin, were the first to bring Western education to blacks and remained the bulwark of African education until the 1950s (5) Today, as in the past, and particularly in rural areas, much of white social life revolves around Sunday worship and after-church gatherings. In black townships, the churches are jammed on Sundays. Among both whites and blacks, the church is the venue for elaborate ladies' hats, spitshined shoes, and the best clothes one can afford. Even in the white suburbs where black

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domestic workers are far from their congregations, one sees them, decked out in bright, clean uniforms, holding Sunday services in small groups in an open field They have provided a language, a set of values, and a historical focal point around which South Africans can communicate. (5-6) These factors are reflected in the moral values that predominate in both white and black society. (6) Black and Afrikaner Family Traditional African and Afrikaner family and social units not only have a strong religious focus but are morally conservative. The central, patriarchal family is the norm. Men rule and elders are sacrosanct. Promiscuity is not acceptable (although definitions of promiscuity may differ). Extended families are the rule and are accepted as responsibilities and opportunities. The young and the old are cared for. Hospitality is a social obligation and no one is turned away or goes unfed. One does all one can to help a family member or a neighbor. (6) (Nelson Mandela Personal History) Mandela, N. (2000) Long Walk to Freedom. Holt, Rinehart & Winston Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Personal History Mandela, 3-4, 10-11(excerpts) Rolihlahla: Son of a Village Chief Apart from life, a strong constitution, and an abiding connection to the Thembu royal houses, the only thing my father bestowed upon me at birth was a name, Rolihlahla. In Xhosa, Rolihlahla literally means pulling the branch of a tree, but its colloquial meaning more accurately would be troublemaker My more familiar English or Christian name was not given to me until my first day of school (3) I was born on the eighteenth of July, 1918, at Mvezo, a tiny villageinthe Transkei Mvezowas a place apart, a tiny precinct removed from the world of great events, where life was lived much as it had been for hundreds of years. (3) The Transkei is eight hundred miles east of Cape Town, five hundred fifty miles south of Johannesburg. It is home to the Thembu people, who are part of the Xhosa nation, of which I am a member. (3) My fatherwas a chief by both blood and custom. He was confirmed as chief of Mvezo by the king of the Thembu tribe, but under British rule, his selection had to be ratified by the government, which in Mvezo took the form of the local magistrate Although the role of chief was a venerable and esteemed one, it hadbecome debased by the control of an unsympathetic white government. (3-4) Tribal Heritage The Thembu tribe reaches back for twenty generations. According to tradition, the Thembu peoplemigrated toward the coast in the sixteenth century, where they were incorporated into the Xhosa nation. The Xhosa are part of the Nguni people. The Nguni can be divided into a northern group the Zulu and the Swazi people and a southern group, which is made up of [eight tribes], and together they comprise the Xhosa nation. (4) The Xhosa are a proud and patrilineal people withan abiding belief in the importance of laws, education, and courtesy. Xhosa society was a balanced and harmonious social order in which every individual knew his or her place. Each Xhosa belongs to a clan that traces its descent back to a specific forefather. I am a member of the Madiba clan. I am often addressed as Madiba, my clan name, a term of respect. (4)

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 Although I was a member of the royal household, I was not among the privileged few who were trained for rule. Instead, as a descendant of the Ixhiba house [a minor house whose task was to settle royal disputes], I was groomed, like my father before me, to counsel the rulers of the tribe. (4) [Note from Dr. Perkins: Mandelas tribal heritage is as follows: Ixhiba House Madiba Clan Thembu Tribe Xhose Nation (comprised of eight tribes) Nguni People] Knowledge through Observation Like all Xhosa children, I acquired knowledge mainly through observation. We were meant to learn through imitation and emulation, not through questions. When I first visited the homes of whites, I was often dumbfounded by the number and nature of questions that children asked of their parents and their parents unfailing willingness to answer them. In my household, questions were considered a nuisance; adults imparted information as they considered necessary. (10) My life, and that of most Xhosas at the time, was shaped by custom, ritual, and taboo All of these beliefs seemed perfectly natural to me. (10) I came across few whites as a boy. I was aware that they were to be treated with a mixture of fear and respect. But their role in my life was a distant one, and I thought little if at all about the white man in general or relations between my own people and these curious and remote figures. (10) Deluca, 64 (excerpts) In elementary school his English-speaking teacher provided him with a proper British name, Nelson, which he believed derived from the celebrated British hero, Lord Nelson. As the son of a chief, he was groomed from childhood to serve as a leader of the people of the Xhosa nation. Nestled amidst the lovely hills and fertile valleys of the Transkei, the secure surroundings of the village provided Mandela with an idyllic opportunity to play at will, experience the beauty of nature, herd sheep and cattle, expose himself to the values of tribal culture, and learn as a boy to respect his opponents and refrain from humiliating them in defeat (64) Mandela, 11 (excerpts) Christian Faith Despite the proselytizing, my father remained aloof from Christianity and instead reserved his own faith for the great spirit of the Xhosas (11) While the faithdid not rub off on my father, it did inspire my mother, who became a Christian I myself was baptized into the Methodist, or Wesleyan Church as it was then known. (11) Deluca, 64-67, (excerpts) Death of Father: Life in the Royal Court When Mandela was nine years old his father died and his life suddenly changed. He left behind his comfortable life among the village huts to live in the palace of the Chief Jongitaba Dalindyebo, the chief regent of the Thembu people. Uprooted from his humble origins and thrust into the life of the tribal court, the chief and his wife raised him as if he were their own son. His presence at the royal court also exposed him to a life of wealth and authority and to the political culture of the Thembu tribe. As a young man he was able to attend meetings and learn how to give advice and counsel to a king. For example, when comparing the leader's role to that of a shepherd, who directs the flock from behind, Mandela remarked how the regent protected the right of everyone to speak and listened carefully to what his people had to say. The process was open and democratic. No opinions or decisions were forced, nor was the majority allowed to impose its will upon the minority. As a member of the royal family, he participated in the ritualistic passage into

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manhood, including the painful ceremony of circumcision, which he described as "a trial of bravery and stoicism." (64) British Education: Part of the Black Elite As part of his formal training, Mandela was sent to Clarkebury, a Methodist boarding school, where he followed in the footsteps of the distinguished black leader and educator, Z. K. Matthews, who believed that education provided the best means of integrating South African society and achieving the goal of racial peace and harmony. he enthusiastically immersed himself in the tradition of disciplined study, competitive games, and team sports Since many of his peers could also lay claim to their own distinguished lineages, he also discovered that his privileged background was by no means unique. (64-65) He eventually left boarding school to attend Healdtown, a Methodist college [secondary school], whose character and physical presence exceeded Clarkesbury's. The "rigorous" academic and genteel social atmosphere also bred in Mandela and his classmates the same desire Gandhi had experienced in wanting to acquire the respect and status of an educated Englishman. But Mandela's search for his own identity was by no means limited to his quest for the virtues of a British education.... By mingling with students from different tribes and backgrounds, he was exposed to new ideas, including intertribal marriage, which, when combined with his strong Xhosa roots, produced a powerful "feeling of kinship with other Africans." (65) By the time he had arrived at the University College of Fort Hare at the age of twenty, Mandela felt in his own words that I was being groomed for success in the world." Representing the apex of scholarship and learning for young black Africans, who came from near and distant parts of the continent, Fort Hare bred in its faculty and students a sense of elitism. Mandela was no exception... (65) Young Man of Principle While Mandela was at Fort Hare, the Second World War broke out. The conflict, which further politicized many of the students, also led to a discussion over Britain's fortunes in the war and the real meaning of the term "black Englishmen." More militant voices now came forward to argue that the British had oppressed the African people at the same time they were trying to "civilize" them. But as fate in an institution of higher learning would have it, the fortunes of the Great Powers were not the only issue of power at stake at Fort Hare. Student dissatisfaction with the food at the university led members of the student council to resign and call for a boycott of new elections if their demands were not met. As an elected representative to the council, Mandela resigned. When the authorities accepted the resignations and cleverly called for new elections, the climate shifted. As the one remaining dissident voice within the council, Mandela resigned for a second time, because he believed that while the majority of the student body had been present, the majority of those in attendance had not voted. Threatened with expulsion, he was allowed to go home over the summer break and rethink, in his words, the question of "sabotaging [his] academic career over an abstract moral principle that mattered very little." And in what eventually became the hallmark of his political career, he remained true to himself and refused to compromise. (6566) A few weeks after his return home, Mandela faced a new conflict over principle, and in this instance the potential for domestic bliss. The regent confronted him and Justice, the regent's son, with plans for arranged marriages for both the young men. Unequivocally opposed to the thought of such a marriage, Mandela, accompanied by Justice, managed to flee from the prospect. When the regent foiled their attempt to take a train to Johannesburg, they opted for a ride in a car that cost more than a train ticket and left them virtually broke (66) Johannesburg: Birth of a Political Dissident and Founding of ANC Youth League But the glitter that was Johannesburg had been built upon the back of black Africans. [The] contrast between affluent Johannesburg with its "For Europeans Only" signs and the local poor in the townships was stark and overwhelming Mandela met Walter Sisulu, a gentle, highly respected community leader.... Sisulu and his wife Albertina had turned their home into a meeting place and refuge for political dissidents. Sisulu remained Mandela's friend for life and arranged for Mandela to get a job as clerk at his law firm of Witkin, Sidelsky, and Eidelman.

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There, Mandela's "gadfly" role [questioner of society norms] led him to the world of political activism by associating with members of the African National Congress (ANC), meeting with radical whites, and attending local meetings of the Communist party (66) While working at the law firm, Mandela continued his studies through correspondence courses and passed his final examination from the University of South Africa in 1942, enabling him to receive his B.A. To prepare for his entry into South Africa's political life, he became the only black student enrolled in the law faculty at the Afrikaans University of Witwatersrand, where he forged some of his most important lifelong relations with white Marxists. (67) Mandela's circle of friendships also extended to Indian students, who along with his white companions enabled Mandela to broaden his political vision and realize that there were people of privilege who were willing "to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the oppressed." Moreover, Mandela discovered that he too had occasionally acquiesced to "paternalistic" British attitudes and the creation of a black elite, which helped to perpetuate British rule by coopting blacks and encouraging them to feel welcome as "cultured," "civilized" members of the colonial system (67) The vehicle for his protest was the formation of a Youth League within the ANC whose conservative leadership continued to function in keeping with British thinking and manners During this period he also met his first wife, Evelyn Mase. Their marriage, which produced two children, did not survive an elegant Mandela's wandering eye or his consuming commitment to his political work (67) (Nelson Mandela Ideas, Guiding Principles, Public Values) Ideas, Guiding Principles, and Public Values Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Mandela, N. Address to a Rally in Cape Town on His Release from Prison in Copeland, Lamm, & McKenna, The Worlds Greatest Speeches, 4th ed. Deluca, 67-69, 72, 75 (excerpts) Views on Nationalism Mandela's circle of friendships also extended to Indian students, who along with his white companions enabled Mandela to broaden his political vision and realize that there were people of privilege who were willing "to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the oppressed." Moreover, Mandela discovered that he too had occasionally acquiesced to "paternalistic" British attitudes and the creation of a black elite, which helped to perpetuate British rule by coopting blacks and encouraging them to feel welcome as "cultured," "civilized" members of the colonial system. Although he viewed nationalism as an "unreliable friend and an unsafe historian" in an age in which technology and communication had begun to eradicate the "imaginary differences among people," he willingly embraced the cause of "militant African nationalism." But he also adopted Gandhi's more global view that "no people in one part of the world could really be free while their brothers in other parts were still under foreign rule." (67) Guiding Principle: Grassroots Movement of Civil Disobedience In response to the government's political offensive, the Youth League urged the ANC leadership to take action and engage the masses through a nonviolent, political campaign. In this particular context, it is important to note that Gandhi's failure to concern himself with African rights did not prevent Mandela from studying Gandhi's campaigns of civil disobedience in South Africa and realizing the symbolic importance of passive resistance and the political meaning of going to jail for violating the law (68) Views on Communism: Appealing Ideology and Practical Partners Mandela, who now found himself totally consumed by the struggle, also discovered that his attitudes toward communism were changing. By expanding upon his earlier exposure to Fabian

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socialism [socialism through gradual reform] and reading the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and other Marxist thinkers, he discovered in Marxism the virtues of a communal life he had already encountered in African culture, the appeal of an analytical perspective, based upon dialectical materialism with its emphasis on built-in profit mechanisms within a capitalist economy, and the desirability of reallocating wealth and resources from the haves to the havenots. He also acknowledged the Soviet Union's support for the liberation of colonial peoples, and while he did not convert to communism, he realized that he could work with communists. (69) Political Views: Racism and Fascism Mandela turned to the pen and published a series of articles in the left-leaning journal Liberation from June 1953 to May 1959, outlining his political views. He cataloged the widespread human suffering brought about by inadequate food, disease, poor medical care, and people's hunger for land. He also condemned the abusive labor policy, which contributed to the cycle of misery and frustration among South Africa's blacks. He openly criticized the government's desire to create a pool of migrant laborers, separated from their families and forced to live in hostels as a means of undermining the emergence of a powerful African labor movement. And he condemned the "forcible detention of Africans . . . for spurious statutory offenses" as a means of creating a "vast market of cheap labor" to feed South Africa's economic expansion. He and his colleagues also exposed white reluctance to advocate the "democratic principle [of]' one adult, one vote'" and labeled the Liberal Party's "high-sounding principles" of economic growth and expansion reactionary, because they perpetuated the de facto existence of the underclass. Moreover, he openly accused the white Liberal government, despite its denials of being inspired by any of Hitler's ideas, of being a "fascist regime" and of raising the "specter of Belsen and Buchenwald" in South Africa. (72) Mandela (in Copeland, Lamm, & McKenna), 884-85 (excerpts) Speech upon release from prison in 1990 Guiding Principle: Flexibility in Tactics Today the majority of South Africans, black and white, recognize that apartheid has no future. It has to be ended by our own decisive mass action in order to build peace and security. The mass campaign of defiance and other action of our organization and people can only culminate in the establishment of democracy Our resort to the armed struggle in 1960 with the formation of the military wing of the ANCwas a purely defensive action against the violence of apartheid. The factors which necessitated the armed struggle still exist today. We have no option but to continue. We express the hope that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement will be created soon so that there may be no longer the need for the armed struggle (884) Public Values: Democracy and Equality On the question of democratic practice, I feel duty bound to make the point that a leader of the movement is a person who has been democratically elected at a national conference. This is a principle which must be upheld without any exceptions. (884) Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the overwhelming demand of our people for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa. There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly democratized. (885) Vision for South Africa It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured Universal suffrage on a common voters roll in a united democratic and non-racial South Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony. (885) ... In conclusion I wish to quote my own words during my trial in 1964 [I have fought against white domination and I fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities] (885)

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(Nelson Mandela Immediate Context) Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Immediate Context Deluca, 69-91, 165 Leader Strength: Political Strategist and Tactician To counteract the government's campaign of formal, legal segregation, the ANC [African National Congress] with Mandela serving as Youth League president agreed to join with South African communists and Indians in a Defiance Campaign scheduled for June 26, 1952.... Admitting to having some reservations about the newly expanded political alliance, Mandela nonetheless participated fully in the protest. But he was careful to acknowledge that his willingness to embrace nonviolent protest based on Gandhi's model of "passive resistance" was not absolute but conditional, since the government's overwhelming military and police superiority dictated the choice to be one of nonviolence as a "practical necessity." He also realized that he had to convey to his followers that the very nature of nonviolent conflict ultimately required "more courage and determination" than more violent forms of aggressive political action. In his role as a political strategist, he also maintained that a boycott had to be viewed as a "tactical weapon to be employed if and when objective conditions permit" and not as an inflexible principle to be applied irrespective of the immediate circumstances. Since Mandela also believed that the British in India were far "more realistic and farsighted" than the Afrikaners in South Africa, he viewed the boycott more as a question of tactics than principle, because the approach could readily be changed to accommodate changes in the political situation. (69) Leader Traits Responsible for the nationwide effort to recruit volunteers for the Defiance Campaign, Mandela constituted a "magnificent figure," handsome and "immaculately dressed" in his elegantly tailored three-piece suits. Both blacks and whites found him attractive.... It quickly became apparent to friend and foe alike that Mandela "was a born mass leader" who possessed a commanding, magnetic appeal (69) Mandela was a "passionate," "combative" man, who asserted himself whenever the occasion presented itself. He would, for example, intentionally enter court through the whites-only entrance, much to the dismay of court officials. And although practicing law in South Africa was not an easy task for a black man, he somehow managed to draw from the "racial tension in the courtroom" and distinguish himself by his wry wit, defiant manner, and "flamboyant" courtroom style. (70) Transforming Leadership But the campaign had an equally powerful impact within the ANC, which was transformed from an elitist group into "a mass-based organization," where the previous "stigma" of imprisonment now became an emblem of courage. In reviewing his own role in recruiting, organizing, and speaking on behalf of the Defiance Campaign, Mandela recalled how he felt empowered by the events and his ability to "walk upright like a man, and look everyone in the eye with the dignity that comes from not having succumbed to oppression and fear." (69-70) Problem: Government Banning Leads to MPlan That dignity was tested again when Mandela and fifty-one other leaders of the ANC were banned. The detested practice of banning meant that the government could severely restrict the travel of individuals and prevent them from speaking or participating in the activities of named organizations. In Mandela's view banning was a form of "walking imprisonment".... The government's smothering tactics also led to a dramatic change in ANC strategy and to Mandela's

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drafting of the MPlan, which was named for its author. According to the plan, the ANC would establish an intricate network of underground cells to prepare for the time when the government would outlaw its activities and force its membership to alter the nature of the struggle (70) In the atmosphere of "increasing repressiveness," Mandela emerged as a "rabble-rousing" speaker who ignited the crowds, redefined the movement, and moved in the direction of endorsing violence (71) Problem: Bantu Education Act In 1953 the passage of the Bantu Education Act extended the policy of racial subjugation. The new legislation clearly reflected the racist premises of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the Minister of Bantu education, who rigidly believed that "There is no place for the Bantu in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor" (71) Problem: Revolutionary Program of Action Leads to Treason Trial In 1955 the ANC was instrumental in coordinating the Congress of the People. A multiracial gathering that included Indians, Coloureds, and whites within a predominantly black audience, the congress was a unique event in South African history The congress itself created a "South Africa in micro-cosm" and openly reflected the socialist orientation of its leadership By calling for the nationalization of wealth and its distribution among the people, the Charter set forth a revolutionary "programme of action." (71-72) On December 5, 1956, Mandela and other members of the ANC leadership were arrested for high treason and sent to jail Faced with the charge of violent revolution and aware that the scales of justice were tilted against them in a predominantly Afrikaner court, the defendants chose to turn their trial into a countertrial and indict the government, its unjust racial policies, and the tyrannical domination of 13 million blacks by 3 million whites. (73) During a recess in the preparatory phases of the trial, Mandela happened to spot a beautiful young woman, Winnie Nomzano, on the streets of Johannesburg, only to see her again in his office a few weeks later. What followed was a whirlwind romance in which Mandela by his own admission both courted Winnie Nomzano and politicized her Their union produced three children, who possessed their father's warmth and magnanimity, despite his reputation as a stern authority figure and disciplinarian, and the crusading, restless spirit of their mother. (73) [The] Treason Trialbecame, in Mandela's words, "a test of the power of a moral idea versus an immoral one." He, in fact, used the trial as a platform to denounce imperialism, lecture on commercial exploitation, and expose the fallacy of foreign investment as a means of raising people's standard of living by citing "low wages, poverty, . . . misery, . . . illiteracy," and the rise in "squalid tenements" as proof to the contrary. When the government, basing sections of their case on Mandela's writings and speeches, tried to portray him as a communist, he took the opportunity to thank the communists in his testimony for the support the ANC had received, while scrupulously making the point that he was not a communist When the court finally rendered its verdict and declared the accused not guilty, it did so on the grounds that the government had failed to prove that the ANC had "acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the state by violence," irrespective of all its inflammatory rhetoric. The victory, however, was bittersweet because Mandela and his colleagues realized that in future proceedings the government would make sure that the courts would return a guilty verdict. (74) Life Underground Leads to Chang of Tactics Sabotage [He] also came to the conclusion that since he had been forcibly "denied the night to live a normal life," he had no choice but to go underground, "live the life of an outlaw," organize a guerrilla campaign, and embrace the use of violence as a political weapon. (75) For Mandela "living underground require[d] a seismic psychological lift," which turned him into a "creature of the night." As South Africa's "Black Pimpernel," an obvious adaptation of the fictional Scarlet Pimpernel of the French Revolution, he surreptitiously made his way through the country in an assortment of motley disguises. With all his energy now focused on making the case for revolution in the immediate political environment, he believed, as had Fidel Castro, that the movement should not rigorously follow "textbook conditions" or slavishly adhere to the

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Marxist concept of inherent contradictions in the social structure to justify the use and timing of violent political action (75) Mandela found temporary "sanctuary" in the Liliesleaf Farm located in Rivonia, a northern suburb of Johannesburg, which provided a temporary safe haven for MK's guerrillas within the confines of what he described as an "idyllic bubble." The decision to pursue sabotage as the primary form of violence reflected the movement's desire to inflict as little harm as possible on individuals and to focus its attack on military targets, communications, and transportation as a means of frightening away foreign capital and investments and calling attention to the plight of South Africa's black community (76) On his way home [from travel that took him to Egypt and England] he stopped in Ethiopia for military training and affirmed his belief that military training must be combined with appropriate forms of political training "to create a just and fair society." (77) Problem: End of Freedom Mandela's brief freedom ended abruptly on August 5, 1962, after his return to South Africa. Charged with having left the country illegally and having incited workers to strike, Mandela decided to represent himself in court to accentuate the symbolic plight of a "black man in a white man's court" (77) The five-year sentence he received might have led some to question his resolve, particularly when confronted with the deplorable conditions in South African jails.... (77) In the summer of 1963 [while in prison on Robben Island] Mandela learned that government authorities had discovered Rivonia, the small farm outside Johannesburg that had served as a safe haven for the ANC leadership. Mandela also learned that he and his colleagues had been charged with sabotage and that they now faced the death penalty. The evidence included the plans for guerrilla warfare, known as Operation Mayibuye, and documents in Mandela's own handwriting (78) [In making his plea before the court] On the thorny question of violence and plans for sabotage, Mandela emphasized that once the government denied the black community an avenue of "peaceful protest," the movement decided to undertake "violent forms of political struggle.... He also managed to contextualize the source of black unrest when he spoke of poverty, malnutrition, disease, unequal education, the lack of a "living wage," and job practices that separated workers from their families and the implacable perpetuation of the hated pass laws, all of which contributed to the degradation of human values and the deterioration of individual and collective morality. Moreover, the blind pursuit of these benighted policies resulted in the institutionalization of black inferiority and a growing fear of democracy among the white minority population (79) As the world watched, Judge Quartus de Wet rendered his verdict and pronounced all of the defendants guilty on all counts. The next day the defendants appeared before the judge for sentencing. When he declared that this was not a case of "high treason" and sentenced them to life in prison, the men, who had just looked death directly in the face, were jubilant. (79) Problem: Degradation of Prison Life Upon his return to [prison on] Robben Island, Mandela continued to confront the layers of institutional racism and the degrading nature of prison life. Deprived of hot showers and sharing his cell with a lightbulb that burned both day and night, Mandela confronted the inhumane conditions, psychological abuse, and "corrupt and demeaning" classification system, which placed black political prisoners at the bottom of the prison hierarchy..... Cut off from the outside world and allowed to write only one letter of 500 words to his family every six months, Mandela and his fellow prisoners waged their own internal war against routine, repression, and despair. (80) Task: Improve Prison Conditions Personality Traits Revealed As conditions slowly improved over the years, it was Mandela who emerged as the natural spokesman for the group, and his persistent demands to the prison administration gained valuable privileges for the inmates, including the right to enroll in correspondence courses and study for degrees They even established a system in which inmates taught courses to one another and established their own university (80)

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They also devised ingenious means of communications to coordinate their protests and air their complaints, including the use of false bottoms in matchboxes to relay messages, the placing of messages wrapped in plastic tape under the lip of toilet bowls, and the use of milk to write invisible messages in a "tiny, coded script." They even established a "clandestine communications committee," which enabled them to share information through the assistance of some sympathetic warders As an advocate of prisoners' rights, Mandela drew upon one of his favorite strategies, dating back to his early law office experience, when he learned to pepper authorities with so many requests and interrogatories that a hostile accusation would be dropped or a basic need would be met. But his forceful personality and unforgiving candor also revealed the "dogmatic," "overbearing" side of his personality, which he frequently visited upon his colleagues when they engaged in fierce political discussions and debate. (80-81) Task: Record the Struggle [The sea] continued to serve as the "uncrossable moat" surrounding Robben Island." In an attempt to straddle that barrier and provide people with a record of the struggle, Mandela began work on his memoirs, only to have a buried draft accidentally discovered by prison officials, which led to the suspension of his study privileges for no less than four years. (82) Problem: Generation Gap between Leaders and Young Followers In the wake of the brutal suppression of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, Mandela also received his first look at some of the young militants who made up the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1960s. Stephen Biko, who led the BCM, managed to fill the vacuum created by the imprisonment of the ANC leadership by appealing directly to the concept of "black assertiveness".... Beginning as a "cultural awakening process" designed to provide blacks with hope for the future, the movement soon became overtly political and challenged the government's authority. The violent circumstances surrounding Biko's death in the custody of police officials only served to antagonize and radicalize Biko's followers. The rise of the Black Consciousness movement, however, created a generation gap between the ANC and Biko's followers. Mandela, for example, remained uncomfortable with the attitudes, tactics, and style of this new breed of black revolutionary Rejecting their "exclusionary . . . philosophy," he continued to mediate amongst the various prison factions and stress to the newcomers the importance of taking a more inclusive approach. (82) Problem: International Criticism of Tactics The physical beginning of Mandela's deliverance began in 1982, when he unexpectedly left his craggy island home of eighteen years and was transferred to the Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town on the South African mainland. Compared to the prison at Robben Island, Pollsmoor was a "five star hotel" with "palatial" accommodations In 1984 the new minister of justice, Kobie Coetsee, whom Mandela both liked and admired, began testing the waters by allowing Mandela to visit with prominent foreign political and legal officials. (83-84) But despite the changed mood and circumstances, Mandela still waged the political struggle. For example, in an interview with journalists from the conservative Washington Times, Mandela had to defend himself against claims that he was a communist and point out the difference between Martin Luther King's ability to work within a democratic system, which affirmed constitutional rights and upheld "nonviolent protest," and the nature of the South African "police state with a constitution that enshrined inequality." When faced with a government offer of freedom in return for his unconditional rejection of "violence as a political instrument," Mandela declined. He insisted, as he would throughout the entire process leading up to his release, that it was the government that had initiated the violence and that the ANC had been forced to reply in kind. Moreover, given the genesis of the problem, he believed that the government should be the first to give guarantees that it would refrain from violence. He also insisted that the existing process of discussions was fatally compromised, since "only free men can negotiate." (84) Leadership Style Mandela's attitude did not mean, however, that he was reluctant to act independently from the members of his group. When he wrote that "there are times when a leader must move out

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ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way," he clearly staked out his position. Part of Mandela's political genius also lay in his ability to "revert to a more moderate position" and seek out "unifying points among people of differing views," a gift that mirrored his tolerance and ability to listen. And it was the combination of his "diplomatic strength and refusal to accept a conditional release," coupled with [President] de Klerk's open style and risk-taking leadership, that initiated the historic change in South African politics. (84) As his relationship with Coetsee [Minister of Justice] continued to grow, Mandela became more convinced of the government's goodwill and his own independent role in achieving a solution and having to present his colleagues with a "fait accompli" Hereassured his interlocutors that their fear of majority rule was misplaced and stated that in a multiracial state, belonging to both white and black South Africans: "We do not want to drive you into the sea." (84-85) Problem: Follower Opposition to Peace and Reconcilliation [In the summer of 1989, President] De Klerk quickly sent out signals that the future was now. He opened South African beaches to blacks and put an end to segregated parks, restaurants, theaters, and government facilities. De Klerk also decided to give Mandela his freedom.... (85) On February 11, 1990, Mandela walked through the gates of Pollsmoor Prison with a clenched fist victory salute from his right hand.... After twenty-seven years in prison he was greeted by a swarm of international media and an audience of exuberant supporters, who saw "their hour of deliverance in his face." Once again, his charismatic presence exuded hope and selfconfidence. To cite the words of Archbishop Tutu, Mandela had what black South Africans called "shadow," "substance," or "presence," which contributed to his "regal" stature and demeanor. In an emotional speech to his followers, he thanked them for the sacrifices they had made to obtain his release.... The next morning he spoke before a crowd of more than 100,000 people in a soccer stadium in Soweto. By no means a great orator, he addressed the yearnings of the gathered throng in disciplined, schoolmasterly tones He did, however, face a new and different enemy among suspicious blacks, who viewed his elegant suits, cultivated tastes, and enthusiastic receptions abroad as a sign that he had compromised with the white establishment. By focusing his criticism on the apartheid system and not on the "white community," his message of peace, reconciliation, and forgiveness caught many of his supporters off guard. But it also reinforced his moral stature at home and his reputation abroad. (85-86) Mandela also had to deal with fractious internal issues dividing different generations of leadership within the ANC. By exercising his legendary "authoritarian streak" and invoking the power of his moral standing, he managed to allay the fears of radicals and conservatives within his own party as well as those of extremists within the white political community (87) Tasks: Negotiated Revolution and Reinvention of South Africa Despite the clearly less than euphoric mood within the country, the tortuous process of negotiations between the ANC and white South African parties began on December 20, 1991, under the auspices of CODESA, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (88) With an agreement in place, South Africa was ready to plan for its first free, open, and truly democratic election on April 27, 1994. As a candidate, Mandela emphasized a new political realism, telling crowds not "to expect to be driving a Mercedes the day after the election or swimming in your own backyard pool." But he also focused upon the thrill of enjoying a new sense of "self-esteem" and earnestly urged whites not "to leave the country." (89) Going to the polls for the first time was obviously a liberating experience for blacks The ANC won a resounding victory.... (89) Once he had secured a "negotiated revolution" and led his country in jubilant celebration, Mandela faced the daunting task of having "to reinvent the South Africa." The economic chasm between whites and blacks was enormous, the disparity in incomes overwhelming, with whites earning eight times as much as blacks. While wealthy whites lived in the affluent suburbs and middleclass whites lived in dean, well-serviced residential communities, a large number of blacks

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inhabited meager shacks without clean water, sanitation, or electricity and faced a diet of unemployment, lawlessness, and violent crime. As he had during the campaign, Mandela cautioned his followers not to expect a quick, effortless trip to a land of milk, honey, and luxury cars. But he now went one step further, urging his followers to "shed their bad habits" and raise themselves from poverty by working hard, learning how to cook a decent meal and polish floors, as he did. But the "lack of urgency" within Mandela's government to address the fundamental economic causes of the problem bred a new wave of disillusionment. Inspirational Leadership Faced with the enormous, seemingly insurmountable obstacles at hand, Mandela preferred to turn to personal diplomacy and make "national reconciliation [a] personal crusade" But one gesture more than any other stood out as a mark of Mandela's inspirational leadership. Making it a practice of adopting national sports teams, Mandela extended the same support to the national rugby team during the Rugby world cup held in Cape Town in 1995, when he openly proclaimed how "proud" he was of "our boys." Since rugby had always been viewed as a "Boer [Afrikaner] game," symbolizing "white supremacy," Mandela's appearance in the stadium, sporting a green rugger's cap and the number 6 jersey of the team captain, Franoisl Pineaar, electrified the white crowd, who shouted in response "Nel-son! Nel-son!" Contributing mightily to the legend of "Madiba magic," his actions also inspired members of an all-white team, with the exception of a single black player, to win the championship. When Mandela congratulated Pineaar for "what you have done for South Africa," the team captain eloquently replied, "Thanks for what you have done to South Africa." (90) Enigmatic but Principled Leader [Despite] the waves of public adulation, Mandela still remained the same enigmatic, "intensely private," and austere individual he was during the decades of resistance, and his punctilious manners and courteous behavior continue to frame his personality On the diplomatic front it also came as no surprise that his distinctively maverick approach to politics extended equally to matters of foreign policy. For example, he would later stir the diplomatic pot by acknowledging the support of Libya and Cuba for the black liberation movement. And he refused to disavow Moammar Khadafi's and Castro's leadership, because he refused to compromise his principles and jettison those who had rendered assistance while others had barely lifted a finger to advance the black cause in South Africa (91) Leader Assessment: Revolutionary, Political Prisoner, and President Although his term of office has come to an end, the debates concerning his presidency will continue. One thing is clear, and that is that the assessment of Mandelas career as an underground revolutionary and political prisoner differs significantly from the assessment of his years as South Africa's first black president. There can be no doubt that the political atmosphere of the first appealed more directly to the cast of his character and psychological makeup. As a moral leader he was without rival. But as a head of state and of the government of South Africa, he suddenly had to face the more practical side of administrative affairs. This is not to suggest that despite a seemingly chronic economic slump, scant capital investment, high unemployment, and continued violence that Mandela did not leave his mark. From his support of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to his government's ability to expand both the scope and the quality of public services in many areas of South Africa, Mandela demonstrated qualities of presidential leadership. (165) For the most part, however, Mandela was concerned with the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of his office, and not with the day-to-day administration of things. And as had been the case during the struggle for freedom, it was Mandelas charismatic presence that served as the indispensable link during the period of political transition (165-66) As a leader, Mandela was tall and splendid in his appearance. He was a powerful speaker who inspired his listeners with unwavering conviction and a real sense of purpose. He also possessed the rare and wonderful gift of being able to listen patiently to the fears and anxieties of his white opponents and address those concerns with sincerity and compassion. Throughout it all, he somehow managed to emerge with his sense of humor and his aristocratic demeanor intact. He

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also provided his people with an extraordinary model of cultural, individual and national pride. His courage and ability to set a moral example in the face of overwhelming odds also served as a symbol for the struggle to overcome personal humiliation through political activism and honor a commitment to the demands of one's own individual conscience. It also endowed him with his political legacy and enabled him to leave his ultimate gift to his countrymen in the form of a nation-maker, who was above all else committed to justice and the construction of a new South Africa. (166) (Nelson Mandela Use of Power) Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Use of Power and Decision Making Deluca, x, 69-70, 86-87, 91-92, 163-66 (excerpts) Utilitarian and Machiavellian Decision Making: Practical and Tactical To counteract the government's campaign of formal, legal segregation, the ANC with Mandela serving as Youth League president agreed to join with South African communists and Indians in a Defiance Campaign scheduled for June 26, 1952, in the spirit of the first Day of National Protest. Admitting to having some reservations about the newly expanded political alliance, Mandel nonetheless participated fully in the protest. But he was careful to acknowledge that his willingness to embrace nonviolent protest based on Gandhi's model of "passive resistance" was not absolute but conditional, since the government's overwhelming military and police superiority dictated the choice to be one of nonviolence as a "practical necessity" In his role as a political strategist, he also maintained that a boycott had to be viewed as a "tactical weapon to be employed if and when objective conditions permit" and not as an inflexible principle to be applied irrespective of the immediate circumstances. Since Mandela also believed that the British in India were far "more realistic and farsighted" than the Afrikaners in South Africa, he viewed the boycott more as a question of tactics than principle, because the approach could readily be changed to accommodate changes in the political situation (69) Sources and Use of Power Mandelas search for his own political identity, his views on revolution and political change, communism, violence, his espousal of Marxist principles, his long imprisonment, and his ultimate political victory were a testament to his strength of character in the pursuit of his own identity, the political identity of his people, and their common struggle for freedom. (x) It quickly became apparent to friend and foe alike that Mandela "was a born mass leader" who possessed a commanding, magnetic appeal. And while the campaign failed to reverse any of the government's repressive racist legislation, it provided the government with cause for concern about the future of African-Indian cooperation. It also led to the arrest and trial of the campaign's leaders, including Mandela, under the terms of the Suppression of Communism Act. But the campaign had an equally powerful impact within the ANC, which was transformed from an elitist group into "a mass-based organization," where the previous "stigma" of imprisonment now became an emblem of courage. In reviewing his own role in recruiting, organizing, and speaking on behalf of the Defiance Campaign, Mandela recalled how he felt empowered by the events and his ability to "walk upright like a man, and look everyone in the eye with the dignity that comes from not having succumbed to oppression and fear." (69-70) By focusing his criticism on the apartheid system and not on the "white community," his message of peace, reconciliation, and forgiveness caught many of his supporters off guard. But it also reinforced his moral stature at home and his reputation abroad. (86)

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 Mandela also had to deal with fractious internal issues dividing different generations of leadership within the ANC. By exercising his legendary "authoritarian streak" and invoking the power of his moral standing, he managed to allay the fears of radicals and conservatives within his own party as well as those of extremists within the white political community Mandela also emerged as a national leader, following the assassination of Chris Hani, whom Mandela greatly admired and who served as a "legendary . . . hero to millions of black youths." At a time when de Klerk's government seemed to disappear into the political shadows, it was Mandela who emerged as a model of statesmanship and restraint. When many clamored for revenge, he called for calm and peace in the streets as the best means of expressing one's honor to Hani's memory. The theme was not new to Mandela. On many occasions, when faced with an angry crowd boiling over with frustration, he would advocate a similar approach, maintaining that "the solution is peace; it is reconciliation; it is political tolerance" (87) To see Mandela in his eighties, however, one would think that, despite his less than nimble pace and his long history of personal suffering, he had led a charmed, privileged existence. He was in his ascendancy the world's most respected living monument to resilience, human courage, and the strength of individual conscience As a leader in our time, Mandela has truly been without peer, because no contemporary political figure possessed the distinctive character trait that made Mandela truly exceptional, namely his moral authority. Moreover, his generous spirit, tenacious personality, and passion for tolerance have enabled him to transform the racial politics of South Africa and bequeath to his country a rare legacy of political compassion and new hope for racial harmony. Out of his own deep suffering and that of his people, Mandela constructed his own political statement, grounded in the virtues of "humanity" and "solidarity." It is one that builds character from the "depth of oppression" and defines courage not in the "absence of fear" but in the ability to triumph over fear. What is more, Mandela sees in "goodness . . . a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished," a flame that generates power in times of adversity, a flame that ensures victory over oppression and frees both the oppressed and the oppressor. (91-92) [In] the case ofMandela, issues of identity represent a major consideration in an analysis of [his] political development. As [a member] of [the] local [elite] who aspired to [a] leadership [role], [he] found [himself] attracted to the West through European education, social habits, foreign [lifestyle], and political power (163) [The] careers of Gandhi and Mandelacombined a deep interest in the Western world with preservation of native traditions. Yet, despite their educational opportunities as members of the British empire and their genuine respect for the values of an English education, both Gandhi and Mandela broke with the British model and proceeded to create political movements that identified with the native cultural traditions of India and South Africa (163) By all accounts, including his own, [Mandela] was impressed with British culture and studied to become a lawyer in British South Africa. Like Gandhi, who also trained as an English barrister, Mandela too wore Western suits and was drawn to the lights of the city. In his case, the primary attraction was the vibrant, urban culture of Johannesburg. But he never lost the recollections of his youth, of his tribal upbringing, of his ritualistic passage into manhood, and of his having been trained to serve someday as a chief to his people. the trials of his political passage weighed so heavily upon the man that his political leadership and his struggle to obtain justice for his people bore the joint insignia of pride and prejudice. [It} is the sheer strength of Mandelas personality and the power of his convictions that provide the deepest form of inspiration. This becomes particularly apparent when reading the sections on his seemingly interminable years of imprisonment. These passages, in which he faithfully describes his own ordeal, poignantly reveal the depth of his own pride and humility and his enormous reservoirs of personal strength. One realizes immediately that one is in the presence of a truly unique historical figure who was able to transform the strengths of his personality into a rare and charismatic political persona. (164-65)

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It should also be clear that it was the power of his intelligence and his ability to outwit and withstand his British and Afrikaans opponents--not to mention his ability to outlast them after a grueling twenty-seven years in prison--that gave shape to his remarkable personality and conferred upon him the title of the leader of a movement for a free South Africa rooted in human justice and tolerance [Like] Gandhi, he too managed to merge the world of two different cultures. Where they differed, however, was in the style of the two mergers. Gandhi's represented the strength of passive, nonviolent resistance, whereas Mandela avowed the use of force against the political establishment as a means of overcoming tyranny and racism and providing the vast majority of South Africans with an opportunity to live in peace, dignity, and freedom. For example, when he openly entered the public arena, he brought with him the same independence and legendary self-control that had served him for nearly three decades as the silent but legendary victim of South Africa's cruel and inhumane system of apartheid. Once again, his moral rectitude, his capacity for forgiveness, and his ability to listen to friend and foe alike made him the indispensable man, the only figure who was capable of bridging the gap between black and white South Africans. (165-66)

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