Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401450
Rationalizing Indirect Guilt
521feels guilty due to one’s actions or circumstances when any of the followingconditions hold:
Guilt for side effects
one has been a cause (part or whole) of some harm to another, though one recognizes oneself to haveacted rationally, without mistake, aiming to do what is best,morally speaking;
one recognizes oneself to be a member of agroup that has done harm to others, though one has neithercaused, directed, endorsed, nor perhaps even benefited fromsuch harming;
one has received a benefit relative to others which,though undeserved, was neither requested nor desired, norsomething one could transfer to those who did not receive it.
I will call these cases and their variations cases of “indirect” guiltbecause the relationship of the ethical fault with an agent’s actions and theguilty feelings that result from them is indirect or otherwise obscure.
Theexistence of indirect guilt raises puzzles for us insofar as guilt is supposedto have a practical import. In these cases, it would seem, the individualfeeling guilt has acted without flaw, and no particular restitution orremediation by the agent would seem to be required. If guilty feelingsnonetheless arise frequently without practical import, then it seems there isno good rational explanation for such feelings, and one would do well toextirpate them if possible. Here it seems a mistake has been made in thefeeling, rather than in the activity that leads up to it.A different puzzle arises when we ask what importance should beassigned to the phenomenological feeling of guilt. No doubt theunpleasantness of feeling guilty can be given a functional explanation,along the lines of its being a motivation to avoid wrongdoing, to make
Part II.A (discussing guilt for side effects).6.
Part II.B (discussing collective guilt).7.
Part II.C (discussing survivor guilt).8. My classification of cases here is similar to that of Herbert Morris.
220, 221–22 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (distinguishing “moral” from “nonmoral”guilt). To my category of “indirect” guilt, Morris’s conception of nonmoral guilt adds feelings of guiltfor mere thoughts (“states of mind”).
at 226–32. To Morris’s category of nonmoral guilt, I would addguilt for what I describe above as “side effects.”
177 (1995) (describing “cases of guilt without
” arising from dilemmas such as a young man’s choice between “abandoning his dependentmother and failing in his duty to join the French resistance”).