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Protecting the United States
AgainstTerrorist Nuclear Attacks
A system of systems approach
Alan ShawDTRA/ASCO
This paper was produced for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of theDefense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in partially fulfillment of purchase orderDTRA01-00-P-0155.25 October, 2001
 
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SUMMARY
The threat of a nuclear weapon delivered against a US city by unconventionalmeans has been recognized and studied for almost 50 years. For most of that time thethreat was assumed to emanate from the Soviet Union, and as the Soviet arsenal of longrange ballistic missiles and bombers grew, the threat of unconventional delivery receded.During the 1990s, the demise of the USSR, the end of the cold war, and improvingrelations with Russia all signaled a further decline in the threat. However, that samedecade saw an increase in “rogue states”, state-sponsored terrorists, and non-state actorswith great antipathy toward the US, and displaying greater success in obtaining weaponsof mass destruction than in acquiring long-range means of delivering them. There wasalso an increase in nuclear proliferation—aided in part by the partial chaos that followedthe end of the Soviet Union, and in part by the increasing accessibility of nuclearweapons technology now about 60 years old. There is ample reason for renewed concernabout a terrorist nuclear threat.Most studies of preventing terrorist nuclear attacks have reached the same basicconclusion--none of the available basic techniques is sufficiently capable to preclude asuccessful attack with a high degree of confidence. These techniques are generally: (1)arms control and related diplomatic measures to control proliferation and access totechnology and materials for making nuclear weapons; (2) physical security and controlof existing weapons and materials; (3) pre-emptive actions; (4) deterrent threats of retaliation for attacks; (5) border controls and related domestic security measures aimedat preventing the movement of weapons or materials into the US; and (6) intelligencecollection and law enforcement measures leading to the discovery and apprehension of would-be perpetrators. Effective consequence control and mitigation—still a long wayfrom reality—could be at best a distant second in desirability.Draconian measures--such as stringent border controls, greatly expandeddomestic controls, or the application of military force against any suspicious activity inanother country--would be extremely destructive of commerce, foreign relations, or civilliberties. These measures would also be virtually unaffordable. Moreover, nothing thathad occurred prior to September 11, 2001 was sufficiently dramatic to generate publicsupport for any such approach. While that attack and its aftermath have producedincreased support for the institution of more security measures, such severe measures arestill remote possibilities.Nevertheless, the threat cannot be dismissed. And it is reasonable to believe thatin the absence of counter measures it will increase over time. The technology willbecome more accessible, and new methods that make aspects of bomb manufacture easiermay emerge. Groups can exploit time to accumulate nuclear materials and tools, or toestablish access to bombs, materials, tools, and expertise. Commercial globalization willincrease the difficulties of controlling what moves into and within the US. Hostile
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