Quimiguing vs Icao Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and had close and confidential relations.

Defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant and had to stop studying. Later she gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an action to recover damages from the defendant. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff appealed. Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages and WoN the unborn child is entitled to support Held: Yes A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code). It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says

Article 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Rosario de Braganza et.al vs Fernando De Villa Abrille Facts: Petitioners received from respondent as a loan P70k in Japanese War notes. In consideration, they promised in writing that to pay 10k after the cessation of the hostilities plus 2% interest per annum. Petitioners were not able to pay, thus VillaAbrille sued them. Petitioner Rosario claimed that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note. CA ruled in favor of respondent stating that Guillermo and Rodolfo did not make it appear in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age. They should have appraised Villa Abrille on their capacity and if the former in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with is money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. Further the CA stated that when a minor, pretended to be of legal age in fact they were not, they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or have it annulled.

(1) WoN the Guillermo and Rodolfo are

liable as when they contracted with respondent they were minors. No, the minors cannot be legally bound by their signatures. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In the Mercado case the minor is guilty of active misrepresentation, they specifically stated that

they were of age, thats why they are liable. If the minors in this case were guilty at all, it is of passive misrepresentation. (2) WoN the action has prescribed. No. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. Indeed when the action was interposed Rodolfo is already emancipated however, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment. They merely interposed an excuse from liability. Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money. Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal vs People of the Philippines Facts: Petitioners were convicted of murder. Mirandilla, the common law wife of the deceased Llona narrated that on the day of the crime, she and Llona had attended a fiesta. They went to the house of Desder. As she was seated in the sala, she heard gun shots, then she saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona, that seeing Atizado about to shoot to Llona again, she told them to stop, that while aiding Llona she heard three clicking sounds at and she saw Monreal point his gun at her while moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun. CA found them guilty. They appealed to the SC their conviction. The Court found them guilty however, CA failed to appreciate Monreals minority. Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed. law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges

and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary. In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and reintegration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Insanity 1. Marriage 2. Contracts 3. Criminal Liability US vs Vaguilar People of the Philippines vs Fernando Rafanan Facts: Rafanan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape committed against Filomena. Filomena was orphaned by her father. With the desire to finish her studies and to help her family, she decided to leave her place and go to Cabanatuan where she worked as a helper to the Rafanans. Fernando Rafanan was the high school principal of the Philippine Wesleyan College in Cabanatuan City and Mrs. Rafanan was an accountant of the same school. In the house, the spouses Rafanan sleep at the 2nd floor while their 2 younger children. Filomena slept in the first floor beside the stairs with Emalyn, an 8 year old daughter of the Rafanans. Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Juan Codina Arenas and Others Facts: Defendants were sued by Plaintiff for payment of a loan plus interests. CFI declared them in default and ordered them to pay Plaintiff. While

the judgment is in the course of execution, Elissa Villanueva the wife of Sixto Villanueva(one of the defendants) appeared and alleged that July 24, 1909, Sixto was declared insane by the CFi and that she was appointed as guardian and as a guardian she is authorized to institute legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds issued by Sixto in state of insanity in behalf of plaintiff. Further, that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for which reason he neither appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him in the suit before mentioned. The CFI ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Issue: WoN Sixto Villanueva should not be made liable to Plaintiff because when he contracted with Plaintiff he was in the state of insanity? Held: No that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. In this case Villanuevas insanity was not proven. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct and they testified that Mr. Villanueva is not insane at the time when he executed the bonds in favor of Plaintiff.

Cecila Hernandez Juan Santos Facts:

et al vs. Jovita San

Lulu was the only daughter of Maria and Felix Hernandez. After giving birth with Lulu, Maria died. Felix left Lulu under the care of her uncle Sotero San Juan. Felix married Natividad. The union produced the petitioners. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from San Juan Family. Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. Lulu went to school however because of her violent personality; Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. When Lulu reached the age of majority she was given full control of her estate but because she did not finish her elementary education, her father Felix, continued exercise of administration over her property. Felix died and the administration of her property was transferred to Petitioners. Petitioners made Lulu sign an SPA for the protection of her property but such SPA is authorizing here in Petitioners to sell her properties. Because Lulu, did not know about it, she signed the SPA. One of her properties was sold to Manila Electric Company. They undertook various projects involving Lulus real properties. Lulu sought the assistance of her cousin, herein Respondent where Respondent found out that Lulu was being abused. She stayed in a room where there is no toilet. Respondent brought Lulu to a physician and there she found out the Lulu was found to be afflicted with several health complications. Respondent filed a petition for guardianship where she was declared guardian. Petitioners filed this petition asking to reverse lower Courts decision. They alleged that all the transactions made involving the properties of Lulu were made with the consent of Lulu and that Lulu was in a normal state of mind. Issue: WoN Lulu is incompetent who requires appointment of a guardian? Held: Yes where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Alienage Gaudencio Cordora vs. COMELEC and Gustavo Tambunting Facts: Cordora filed a complaint before the COMELEC accusing Tambunting of an election offense. Cordora alleged that Tambunting made false assertions about his citizenship and residency on his COC. Cordora stated that Tambunting is not eligible to run for public office because he lacked required citizenship and residency requirements. Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentations as what Cordora asserted. Tambunting presented his birth certificate that he is born to a Filipino mother and an American Father. He denied that he is not a naturalized American. The certificate of citizenship conferred by US after his father petitioned him merely confirmed Tambuntings citizenship he acquired from birth. Further, he took an oath of allegiance pursuat to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Issue: WoN Tambunting is eligible to run for public office? Held: Yes. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law. Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. He possessed it prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him to run for public office. Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office. Dual Citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises, when as a result of a concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state

which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows jus soli. Such person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states Tambuntings residency. Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon citizenship. Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made misrepresentations. Insovency and Trusteeship Miguela Villanueva et.al vs CA, Ildelfonso Ong and PVB Facts: Celestino Villanueva and Miguela Villanueva originally owned the disputed acquired by Miguela. Sometime in 1975, Miguela sought the help of one Jose Viudez, the then OIC of PVB if she could obtain a loan from the bank. Jose Viudez told Miguela to surrender the titles of said lots as collaterals. And to facilitate a bigger loan, Jose in connivance with Andres swayed Miguela to execute a deed of sale which she did but without the signature of her husband Celestino. Miguela however did not get the loan that she was expecting. Miguela found out that the new titles were issued in the name of PVB. It appeared that the original titles were cancelled

and new ones were issued under the name of Jose Viudez which in turn were cancelled and issued under the name of Andres until finally to PVB after the lots were foreclosed for failure of Andres to pay the loan. Miguela sought to repurchase the lots. Ong on the other hand, while still in abroad offered to purchase the said lots from PVB. He deposited 10k. PVB approved his offer. PVB, upon his return, was placed under receivership finding that it was insolvent, illiquid and cannot operate. PVB was then prohibited to do business, and the receiver appointed was directed to "immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes." He informed CB of his desire to pay the balance. The letter was not answered. CB however accepted Ongs payment of the remaining balance, thus Ong asked for the latter to execute the deed of conveyance but CB did not answer. Issue: WoN PVBs acceptance of Ongs offer, being under receivership, is binding to confer Ong with the right over the lot? Held: No It has been said that where upon the insolvency of a bank a receiver therefor is appointed, the assets of the bank pass beyond its control into the possession and control of the receiver whose duty it is to administer the assets for the benefit of the creditors of the bank. Thus, the appointment of a receiver operates to suspend the authority of the bank and of its directors and officers over its property and effects, such authority being reposed in the receiver, and in this respect, the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way. In a nutshell, the insolvency of a bank and the consequent appointment of a receiver restrict the bank's capacity to act, especially in relation to its property, Applying Article 1323 of the Civil Code, Ong's offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective because the PVB became insolvent before the bank's acceptance of the offer came to his knowledge. Hence, the purported contract of sale between them did not reach the stage of perfection. Corollarily, he cannot invoke the resolution of the bank approving his bid as basis for his alleged right to buy the disputed properties. Nor may the acceptance by an employee of the PVB of Ong's payment of P100,000.00 benefit him

since the receipt of the payment was made subject to the approval by the Central Bank liquidator of the PVB. Gender Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC Facts: Ang Ladlad filed an application for accreditation as a party-list organization to the COMELEC. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court. Comelec dismissed the Petition based on moral grounds. Ang Ladlad defines sexual orientation as that which refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender. This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. Issue: WoN Ang Ladlad complied with the legal requirements for accreditation Held: Yes Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."

Based on the foregoing, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Equal Protection. Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the partylist system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

Freedom of Expression and Association Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. Homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well. A number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as the Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. Non Discrimination and International Law The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR. the principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.