Lyotard, Marin, Nancy Et Al - of The Sublime - Presence in Question (SUNY)

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OF THE 'SUBLIME:
PRESENCE IN QUESTION
@
S U N Y S e r i e s , I n t e r s e c t i o n s : P h i l o s o p h y a n d C r i t i c a l T h e o r y
R o d o l p h e G a s c h e a n d M a r k C . T a y l o r , e d i t o r s
OF THE SUBLIME:
PRESENCE IN QUESTION
@
Essays by
Jean -Franc;:ois Courtine
Michel Deguy
Eliane Eseoubas
Philippe Laeoue-Labarthe
Jean-Franc;:ois Lyotard
Louis Marin
Jean-Lue Nancy
Jaeob Rogozinski
translated and with an Afterword by
Jeffrey S. Librett
Bogazici University Library
111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ~
39001103265438
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
o r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n F r e n c h a s D u S u b l i m e
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P u b l i s h e d b y . . . . . .
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e x c e p t i n t h e c a s e o f b r i e f q u o t a t i o n s e m b o d i e d i n
c r i t i c a l a r t i c l e s a n d r e v i e w s .
F o r i n f o r m a t i o n . a d d r e s s S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k
P r e s s . S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P l a z a . A l b a n y . N Y 1 2 2 4 6
P r o d u c t i o n b y C h r i s t i n e L y n c h
M a r k e t i n g b y D a n a E . Y a n u l a v i c h
L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a
D u s u b l i m e . E n g l i s h .
O f t h e S u b l i m e : P r e s e n c e i n Q u e s t i o n : e s s a y s I b y J e a n
C o u r t i n e . . . r e t a l . l : t r a n s l a t e d a n d w i t h a n a f t e r w o r d
b y J e f f r e y S . L i b r e t t .
p . c m . - ( S U N Y s e r i e s . I n t e r a c t i o n s )
T r a n s l a t i o n o f : D u s u b l i m e .
I n c l u d e s b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e s .
I S B N 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 1 3 7 9 - 9 ( a l k . p a p e r ) . - I S B N 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 1 3 8 0 - 2 ( p b k . :
a i l e . p a p e r )
1 . S u b l i m e . T h e . I . C o u r t i n e . I I . T i t l e .
I I I . ' S e r i e s : I n t e r a c t i o n s ( A l b a n y . N . Y . )
B H 3 0 1 . S 7 D 8 1 3 1 9 9 3
I l l ' . 8 5 - d c 2 0
1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
9 1 - 9 4 4 7
C I P
CONTENTS
Note on the Translation
Preface to the French Edition
Jean-Lue Nancy
1. The Discourse of Exaltation (1\1.EyaATrYOpELV):
Contribution to a Rereading of Pseudo-Long in us
Michel Deguy -.'
2. The Sublime Offering
Jean-Lue Nancy
3. Kant or the Simplicity of the Sublime
Eliane Eseoubas
4. Sublime Truth
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
5. The Interest of the Sublime
Lyotard
6. The Gift of the World
Jacob Rogozinski
vii
1
5
25
55
71
109
133
7. Tragedy and Sublimity: The Speculative Interpretation of
Oedipus Rex on the Threshold of German Idealism
Jean-Franfois Courtine
157
8. On a Tower of Babel in a Painting by Poussin
Louis Marin
Afterword
Positing the Sublime: Reading Heidegger Reading Kant
Jeffrey S. Librett
Contributors
Notes
177
193
221
\. \) Ni
Index

UNIvERSITESI
KUTUPHANESI
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NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION
I have attempted in the translations below to find some middle ground
between an excessive proximity to the French and an excessive proximity to
idiomatic American English. If I have erred, as is my own impression, in the
direction of preserving to excess the syntactical letter of the originals, I can
only hope that the effect of estrangement thereby generated is in some non-
trivial way related to the kind of disorientation characteristic of the sublime.
With respect to quotations from German texts in general, I have
checked the French translations against the German originals and existing
English translations, referring to the English editions in the notes, but fre-
quently providing my own translations of these passages in the attempt to find
some reasonable compromise between readability, fidelity to the German, and
fidelity to the French editions quoted by the authors of these essays.
In the case of Kant, where applicable and unless otherwise indicated, the
references given parenthetically in the text provide the section number (), fol-
lowed by the page number of the French edition, and then by the page number
of the English edition. The German edition consulted was the Werkausgabe,
ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975). The
French editions cited, unless otherwise indicated, are: Critique de la raison
pure, trans. A. Tremesaygues and B. Pacaud (Paris: Presses universitaires de
France, 1986); Critique de la raison pratique, trans. J. GibeIin (Paris: Vrin,
1983); Critique de la faculte de juger, trans. A. Philonenko (Paris: Vrin, 1986);
and Premiere introduction a la Critique de la faculte de juger, trans. Guillernit
(Paris: Vrin, 1975). The English editions cited are: Critique of Pure Reason
(abbreviated CPR), trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965); Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR), trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949); and Critique of Judgment (CT), trans. J. H.
Bernard (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1951). In the case of refer-
ences to the first version of the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, the
English edition referred to is the translation by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapo-
lis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987) and is abbreviated CJI. These abbreviations
are omitted when it is clear from the context which work is being cited.
In the case of Heideggerian vocabulary, I have generally translated
'''l'etre'' (German: "das Sein") as "Being" and ''retant'' (German: "das Seiende")
as "the being."
vii
v i i i N O T E O N T R A N S L A T I O N
T h e f e w t r a n s l a t o r ' s n o t e s I h a v e a d d e d a r e i n e a c h c a s e f o r m u l a t e d i n
s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e y a r e o b v i o u s l y m y o w n . I h a v e t h e r e f o r e d i s p e n s e d w i t h
a n y f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y a r e n o t t h e o r i g i n a l a u t h o r s ' n o t e s .
I a m g r a t e f u l t o t h e a u t h o r s o f t h e e s s a y s t r a n s l a t e d h e r e f o r t h e t i m e
t h e y t o o k t o d i s c u s s t h e i r e s s a y s w i t h m e i n t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 8 9 . I a m g r a t e f u l
a l s o t o L o y o l a U n i v e r s i t y C h i c a g o f o r a S u m m e r R e s e a r c h A w a r d i n 1 9 8 9
w h i c h h e l p e d f i n a n c e t h i s w o r k . I a m i n d e b t e d f u r t h e r t o D a v i d W i l l i a m s f o r
h i s a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e s , t o G e e r t V a n C l e e m p u t f o r
h i s a s s i s t a n c e w i t h t h e q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e G r e e k , a n d t o t h e p a t i e n c e o f C a r -
o l a S a u t t e r o f S U N Y P r e s s a n d t h e e d i t o r s o f t h i s s e r i e s . T h e t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e
d e d i c a t e d t o P a u l a L i b r e t t a n d t o t h e m e m o r y o f I r v i n g L i b r e t t .
PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION
Jean-Lue Nancy
A Being beyond all beauty ... the sublime.
-Benjamin
One may be tempted to imagine that our epoch is rediscovering the sub-
lime, its name, concept, or questions. But clearly, this is by no means the case,
for one never returns to any prior moment in history. The sublime is not so
much what we're going back to as where we're coming from. Ever since
Boileau's translation of and commentary upon Longinus, aesthetics, or the
thought of art-but also thought insofar as it is provoked by art-has not
ceased to pursue, either explicitly or implicitly, the question of the sublime.
One could demonstrate this without difficulty throughout the entire modern
and contemporary history of art, aesthetics, and philosophy. The sublime
properly constitutes our tradition (in aesthetics at the very least, but then this
restriction already entangles us in some of the questions which are today tied
to the sublime). The tradition passes on [La tradition transmetl. What it
passes on to us in the name of the sublime is not an aesthetics. It is above all
not an aesthetics of the grandiose, the monumental, or the ecstatic, with
which the sublime is often confused-admittedly not without certain histori-
cal reasons, which must be handled with discretion, even as this all-too-heavy
word sublime must perhaps gradually be effaced. The tradition passes on the
aesthetic as question. Which means nothing other than: sensible presentation
as question.
Sensible presentation is a question (and it requires this phrase, "sensible
presentation," the unperceived tautology of which already contains, in a sense,
the whole problem) to the extent that thought is organized around the motif
of representation, which is by definition nonsensible (at least as long as it is still
necessary to speak in these terms). Representation constitutes the instance of
the "object" for that thought which is fundamentally the thought of the "sub-
ject"-that is, for philosophy conceived as the dominant structure and matrix
through which the West, as such, understands itself.
1
2 J E A N - L u c N A N C Y
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n t e r m s o f c o n f o r m i t y a n d s i g n i f i c a t i o n .
B u t p r e s e n t a t i o n p u t s i n t o p l a y t h e e v e n t a n d t h e e x p l o s i o n o f a n a p p e a r i n g
a n d d i s a p p e a r i n g w h i c h , c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e m s e l v e s . c a n n o t c o n f o r m t o o r s i g -
n i f y a n y t h i n g . T h i s e x p l o s i v e e v e n t i s w h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n p a s s e s o n t o u s i n t h e .
n a m e s o f b e a u t y a n d / o r s u b l i m i t y . F r o m t h e m o m e n t w h e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
c o m e s t o k n o w i t s e l f t o b e s u c h a n d c o m e s t o p r e s e n t i t s e l f a s s u c h ( t h a t i s . a l s o
t o c r i t i c i z e . d i s t a n c e . d e c o n s t r u c t . o r d e s t r o y i t s e l f ) . a m o m e n t w h i c h c o n s t i -
t u t e s t h e h i s t o r y o f m o d e r n a r t a n d t h o u g h t , i t t a k e s u p a t u n k n o w n c o s t a
q u e s t i o n - a t o n c e t r a d i t i o n a l a n d u n h e a r d o f - o f p r e s e n t a t i o n .
T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e i s p a s s e d o n a n d d o w n t o u s a s t h e q u e s t i o n
o f p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n t h i s c o l l e c t i o n , t h e r e a d e r w i l l e n c o u n t e r d i v e r s e s t a t e s o r
o r d e r s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( d i s c o u r s e , t h e s u m m o n s o f a p p e a r a n c e , o f f e r i n g .
t r u t h , l i m i t , c o m m u n i c a t i o n , f e e l i n g , w o r l d , t h u n d e r - b o l t . e t c . ) . I s h a l l n o t
a t t e m p t t o ( r e ) e s t a b l i s h t h e i r u n i t y . T h e y a r e n o t d i v e r s e f i g u r e s o r d e n o m i n a -
t i o n s o f a s i n g l e e s s e n c e . I t w i l l n o d o u b t b e c o m e c l e a r t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f
p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i s a t p l a y a t t h e l i m i t o f t h e e s s e n c e : t h u s ,
a t t h e l i m i t o f w h a t i s m o r e " e s s e n t i a l " t o a r t t h a n i t s e s s e n c e a s " a r t " i t s e l f , j u s t
a s t h e s u b l i m e i s m o r e " e s s e n t i a l " t o b e a u t y t h a n t h e v e r y e s s e n c e o f t h e b e a u -
t i f u l . I t i s a l s o t h e r e f o r e a m a t t e r o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t o v e r f l o w s a r t i n a r t i t s e l f ,
o r o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t o v e r f l o w s f r o m o u t o f a r t , a n d p u t s i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n
o r c o n t a c t a l l i n s t a n c e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( f o r e x a m p l e . h i s t o r y , c o m m u n i t y .
s e n s e , p o l i t i c s , t h o u g h t , a n d e v e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . w h i c h i s i t s e l f a l s o o n e o f
t h e s e i n s t a n c e s ) .
W e h a v e n o i n t e n t i o n o f g r a d u a l l y a e s t h e t i c i z i n g a l l o f e x i s t e n c e . Q u i t e
t h e c o n t r a r y . I f t h e e s s a y s i n t h i s c o l l e c t i o n h a v e o n e c o m m o n t r a i t , i t i s t h a t
t h e y c o n c e d e n o t h i n g t o a e s t h e t i c i s m . B u t t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i s , i n
f a c t , n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e q u e s t i o n o f e x i s t e n c e ( s h o u l d o n e s a y : s e n s i b l e
e x i s t e n c e ? ) a s s u c h . I f y o u l i k e : t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d .
I s i t t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t w e p u r s u e t h r o u g h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n t h e " s u b -
l i m e " ? N o t u n l i k e l y . A t l e a s t i t i s w o r t h p u t t i n g s u c h a q u e s t i o n t o t h e t e s t - b y
a t t e m p t i n g t o d a y , s o m e t h o u g h t s o f t h e s u b l i m e .
T h i s c o l l e c t i o n a r i s e s o u t o f t h e s e r i e s " A n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e " p u b -
l i s h e d i n t h e j o u r n a l . P o & s i e b e t w e e n 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 6 , t o w h i c h f o u r o t h e r
e s s a y s h a v e b e e n a d d e d .
T h e o r d e r a d o p t e d h e r e a t t e m p t s t o c o r r e s p o n d t o a c e r t a i n t h e m a t i c
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e t e x t s : f i r s t , M i c h e l D e g u y ' s s t u d y o f L o n g i n u s ( P o e t i q u e ,
v o l . 5 8 ) ; t h e n t h e e s s a y s t h a t t a k e a s t h e i r o b j e c t s u b l i m e p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f
O e a n - L u c N a n c y , E l i a n e E s c o u b a s , P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e - P o & s i e , v o l .
3 D , 3 2 , a n d 3 8 ) . N e x t , t h e t e x t s t h a t s p e c i f y t h e s u b l i m e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a n
o b j e c t o r e n d : t h o s e o f L y o t a r d ( h e r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m h i s a r t i c l e
i n P o & s i e , v o l . 3 4 ) a n d J a c o b R o g o z i n s k i ( a l s o a p r e v i o u s l y u n p u b l i s h e d a r t i -
c l e ) . w h i c h e x p r e s s l y l i n k s u p w i t h L y o t a r d ' s ; C o u r t i n e ' s s t u d y
Preface to the French Edition 3
(which appeared not as part of the original series in Po&sie, vol. 37) of the
place of the sublime at the heart of German Idealism; and Louis Marin's
(Po&sie, vol. 33), which no longer concerns a discourse of the sublime, but a
"sublime figuration."
March 1987
Chapter 1
~
THE DISCOURSE OF EXALTATION
(MeyuAXl'YOPE l v):
CONTRIBUTION TO A REREADING
OF PSEUDO-LONGINUS
Michel Deguy
Gush, pond, -Foam, roll over the bridge and over the
woods; -black sheets and organs, -lightning flashes
and thunder, -mount and roll; -waters and sadnesses,
mount and raise the floods anew.
-Arthur Rimbaud. "Apres Ie deluge"l
In the epilogue. which is perhaps dissimulated by being placed nearly at the
center of his great book,2 Ernst Robert Curtius suddenly raises a plaintive cry
over the fortune Longinus has suffered. He emphasizes what one is tempted to
call the "absolute" singularity of that work of unknown authorship-for
"Longinus" is a kind of pseudonym-IIEpt "ytjJOUS, which we know in its
badly translated title as Of the Sublime.
3
To be sure, what Curtius quotes from
this work consists in stereotypical formulae on elevation and grandeur, and
expresses nothing other than the pure enigma of grandeur insofar as it
remains a mystery. And yet. it is as if Curtius-after all those years of erudi-
tion, of the endless quotation of quotations-were to negate his life's work
with a strangely hasty gesture of dismissal: "Across two millenniums we
breathe [in Pseudo-Longinus] the breath oflife, not the mold of schools and
libraries. The appearance of this unknown Greek in the first century of our era
has something miraculous about it" (399). However, the anonymous author's
book has remained as good as lost and unread, always in reserve: it "has never
found a congenial spirit" (400)-except perhaps in Curtius himself, although
'he does not explicitly develop his own reading in any detail. The great recon-
structive genealogist of the tradition rather incredibly goes on to say: "'Longi-
5
6 M I C H E L D E G U Y
n u s ' w a s s t r a n g l e d b y t h a t u n b r e a k a b l e c h a i n , t h e t r a d i t i o n o f m e d i o c r i t y . I s
t h a t t r a d i t i o n p e r h a p s t h e s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t o f l i t e r a r y c o n t i n u i t y ? " ( 4 0 0 ) -
a n d t o h e l l w i t h B o i l e a u ! C u r t i u s s a y s n e x t t o n o t h i n g f u r t h e r o f t h i s l o s t b o o k
a n d t h i s u n p a i d d e b t . I e v o k e t h e m h e r e t h r o u g h h i m a s t h e m e m o r y o f w h a t
i s m o r e t h a n s i m p l y a n t i p a r o d y b u t r a t h e r t h e v e r y p a r a d i g m o f n o n p a r o d y , a
t h o u g h t i n s e a r c h o f t h e h i g h , a t h o u g h t a t t e m p t i n g t o d r a w a l l t h o u g h t t o w a r d
t h e h i g h . B u t w h a t i s t h e h i g h ?
T h e i n t a c t o r i g i n a l i t y o f a m i s s i n g o r f o r g o t t e n w o r k s u c h a s I I E p t " Y ! J 1 o u s
( C u r t i u s s p e a k s o f t h e " c o n s p i r a c y o f s i l e n c e " ) i s d u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s w o r k
h a s m a n a g e d t o a v o i d b e i n g a p p r o p r i a t e d a n d c a p i t a l i z e d o n , t h a t i t h a s m a n -
a g e d t o g e t l o s t , t h a t i t h a s m a i n t a i n e d i t s e l f a n d s t i l l m a i n t a i n s i t s e l f o n t h e
b r i n k o f d i s a p p e a r a n c e . C h a n c e a n d p r e c a r i o u s n e s s d o n o t c e a s e t o m a r k i t s
h i s t o r y . T h u s , t h e v a l u e s o f f r a g i l i t y , c o n t i n g e n c y , a n d p e r i s h a b i l i t y - n o t t h e
i n v e r s e - a r e p r e s e n t s i d e b y s i d e h e r e w i t h a s i n g u l a r s p e c i e s o f o r i g i n a l i t y .
I s t h e a n t i t h e s i s b e t w e e n t h e b a s e f o r t u n e o f m i s r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e h i d d e n
l i f e o f t h e b o o k o f t h e s u b l i m e , a n d i t s h i g h p u r p o s e , i t s d i s c o u r s e , w h i c h i s t h e
" d i s c o u r s e o f e x a l t a t i o n " ( I l E y a t - : r r Y O p E L V ) i s t h i s a n t i t h e s i s m e r e l y t h e e f f e c t o f
a c o n t r a r y c h a n c e , a m i s a d v e n t u r e , o r i s i t a s i g n i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e v e r y
n a t u r e o f t h e s u b l i m e " t h i n g " i t s e l f , a " t h i n g " t h a t w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y d e f y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a s t h e m o s t e l e v a t e d p e a k d i s c o u r a g e s a n d d e f i e s a s c e n t ? O b s c u -
r i t y d o e s n o t s i m p l y b e f a l l e x a l t e d l a n g u a g e b y c h a n c e . R a t h e r , i t s d i v e r t e d
c o u r s e , i t s c a r i c a t u r a l d e f o r m a t i o n , g r a n d i l o q u e n c e , m o c k i n g i t s s e m b l a n c e
w i t h a m a s k , d i s s i m u l a t e s i t f a t a l l y , e v e n m o r e s u c c e s s f u l l y t h a n s i m p l e i g n o -
r a n c e o r f o r g e t f u l n e s s , l e a v i n g t h e e n i g m a o f i t s e l e v a t i o n t o b e r e s o l v e d ,
a c c o r d i n g t o C u r t i u s , b y u s .
O f t h e H i g h
S o t h e a u t h o r o f I I E p t " Y ! J 1 o u s i s n o t t h e f a m i l i a r f r i e n d o f Z e n o b i a , Q u e e n o f
P a l m y r a , w h o w a s p u t t o d e a t h . H e h a s b e c o m e t h e a n o n y m o u s : P s e u d o - L o n g i -
n u s , A l t h o u g h w e k n o w a l m o s t n o t h i n g o f h i s l i f e , w e d o k n o w f r o m h i s b o o k
t h a t h e l i v e d i n t h e f i r s t c e n t u r y , i n t h e d e - p a g a n i z e d R o m a n E m p i r e - P a n w a s
d e a d a n d b u r i e d - a n d a t a d i s t a n c e o f c e n t u r i e s f r o m t h e H o m e r i c w o r l d
w h e r e , a s h e n o s t a l g i c a l l y r e c o u n t s , t h e r e h a d s t i l l b e e n i n t e r c o u r s e b e t w e e n
g o d s a n d m e n . H e w a s d e p r i v e d o f g o d s , t h e n , b u t o n f a m i l i a r t e r m s w i t h
H o m e r . A n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e w a s d o u b t l e s s f i r s t o f a l l a n a t t e m p t t o
m e a s u r e t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e O r i e n t , t o m e a s u r e t h e a u t h o r ' s d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e
t i m e o f g o d s a n d h e r o e s w h e n n a t u r e h a d s t i l l b e e n a t e m p l e o f l i v i n g h e r o i c p i l -
l a r s . T h e s u b l i m e w a s t h e w o r d a n d t h e t h o u g h t w i t h w h i c h t o e v a l u a t e t h e
g r e a t n e s s o f H o m e r , h i s s p e e c h o f g r a n d e u r o r e x a l t e d d i s c o u r s e ( I l E y a t - : r r
Y O P E U E L V ) w h i c h h a d b e e n t h e f i r s t s o n g o f h u m a n i t y . G i v e n t h a t H o m e r i s t h e
s u b l i m e , w h a t c a n w e m o d e r n l a t e c o m e r s d o t o r i v a l i n a m i m e t i c s t r u g g l e t h e
The Discourse of Exaltation 7
Elevated Model, where we will always be worsted, but where our relative great-
ness will be measurable by the honorability of our defeat?4
The sublime measures our failure. If it is a sacred relation to the divine
that constitutes the sublime,s then our failure will be equivalent to our dis-
tance from the sacred, or to our unbelief, our incapacity to navigate through
the straits of the difference (KplO'Ls) between immortal and mortal.
Is the sublime, then, an aesthetic category motivated by mere nostalgia?
Does it express the wistful longing to remain at least capable of gauging the
elevation of the source, of thinking the unity of the measure and the measure
of the unity that would permit us to judge the utterances and written works of
the ancients and the moderns? Is it a category our extreme distance of twenty
centuries ought to make us regard with suspicion, although we admire a belief
we nonetheless no longer want and which functions a bit like an alibi?
Perhaps, then, the fascinated relation of Curtius to Pseudo-Longinus
(and this was, in my case, the motivation for the reading) is the aggravated
repetition (as "homology") of Pseudo's relation to Homer. Are we so far from
the high origin that we can no longer even read the book Of the High, which
measured its own distance from the source? How forgetful we have become,
derivative, and dispersed!?
We have no choice but to respond in some way to ancient beliefs, to
transpose them for ourselves. Pseudo-Longinus is not so much an author who
enviously respects the gods of Homer while dissimulating his disbelief, as
rather one who looks at the past in order to reestablish through his own dis-
course some hope of a truly exalted discourse, precisely for the generation that
follows him: the Treatise Of the High is a letter to young Terentianus. The oth-
ers are not merely those who have preceded us.
In a certain sense, his interest is the "phenomenological" interest in a
return to the things themselves, in this case, insofar as they are those things
that had a meaning for one's ancestors, a return which inclines toward what
has been and a return which is carried out for the sake of a tradition or a cul-
ture by means of a reading of past utterances. Reading him, we pose ourselves
the same question he poses himself when he quotes Homer: what is "divine
transport"? In doing so, it would be inappropriate for us to despair and to
reduce the parameters of our world under the pretext that we no longer
believe as they did. Rather, we must simply attempt to translate, through the
exertions of our discourse, what can be comprehended of their experience in
order to transmit our own.
Homer
Thus, we are confronted with "Homer." In the beginning, as at the end,
Homer is there, the master as well as the meter of the sublime.
8 M I C H E L D E G U Y
O n e o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e s u b l i m e t e l l s u s ( K e h a t T O I 1 E V U t / J O S E : V
B t a P l 1 a T L [ X I I , 1 ; 7 5 ] ) t h a t i t c o n s i s t s i n t h e B t - u t P E L V : t h e r a v i s h m e n t t h a t
m a k e s o n e p a s s o n ; a m o v e m e n t o f b e i n g c a r r i e d a w a y , t r a v e r s a l , u p l i f t i n g , ,
t r a n s p o r t ( o f w h i c h t h e G r e e k w o r d I 1 E T a - c j > o p a e x p r e s s e s o n e o f t h e m o d e s ) .
B u t i n t h e c a s e o f H o m e r , t h e m e a s u r e i s g i v e n b y t h e g o d s : T I ' j v 6 p l 1 1 l v a t m ' i } v
K O O I 1 L K 4 i B L a O n l l 1 a T L K a T a l 1 e T p E L ( I X , 5 ; 5 5 ) . T h e d i v i n e i s t h e t r a n s p o r t t h a t
m e a s u r e s t h e c o s m i c d i a s t e m e . T h e c o s m o s a n d t h e i m p e t u o u s g o d s m e a s u r e
e a c h o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l l y . A n d H o m e r , c h i a s m i c a l l y c r o s s i n g g o d s a n d m e n , h a s
g i v e n t o t h e l a t t e r t h e i r p r i m o r d i a l m e a s u r e . " W h e n h e r e c o u n t s t h e w o u n d s o f
t h e g o d s , t h e i r q u a r r e l s , t h e i r v e n g e a n c e , t h e i r t e a r s , t h e i r i m p r i s o n m e n t i n
b o n d s o f r e l a t i o n , t h e i r p a s s i o n s o f a l l s o r t s , H o m e r s e e m s t o m e t o h a v e m a d e ,
a s w e l l a s h e c o u l d , t h e m e n w h o w e r e a t t h e s e i g e o f T r o y i n t o g o d s , a n d t o
h a v e m a d e t h e g o d s i n t o m e n " ( I X , 5 ; 5 5 - 5 6 ) .
T h e E n d
T h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e b o o k f u r n i s h e s u s , a s a l w a y s , w i t h w h a t w e o u g h t n o t t o
f o r g e t i n r e r e a d i n g i t . I t o f f e r s u s t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f o u r r e a d i n g .
W e o u g h t n o t t o i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s a l e t t e r t o a p r e c i s e a d d r e s s e e .
T h e e n d o f t h i s l e t t e r i s a n e t h i c o p o l i t i c a l e n d , a t t h e c e n t e r o f w h o s e n o s t a l g i c
t e a c h i n g i s t h i s : t h a t i t i s s u c h a s h a m e " w h e n m o r t a l m a n w o n d e r s u t t e r l y a t
h i s o w n b l o a t e d p a r t s a n d n e g l e c t s t o d e v e l o p w h a t i s d e a t h l e s s " ( X L I V , 8 ;
2 3 0 ) . 6 W h a t d o e s V r r e p - o . t p w m e a n : t o " e x c e e d , " t o o v e r h a n g a l l t h i n g s h u m a n
( c i v e p w m v a ) ? I t i s a m a t t e r o f l i f e a n d d e a t h , t h e g o d s a r e " i m m o r t a l s , " a n d
t h e e x h o r t a t i o n t o t h e s u b l i m e c o m m i t s u s t o e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i o n w i t h w h a t
e x c e e d s a l l p e r i s h i n g , w i t h w h a t i s n o t m o r t a l .
T h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l i n s i s t e n c e o f t h i s t h o u g h t m a k e s
i t s e l f f e l t i s i n o n e o f t h o s e p a s s a g e s w h e r e t h e a u t h o r r e i t e r a t e s w h a t o n e m u s t
u n d e r s t a n d b y o u r n a t u r e :
s h e [ n a t u r e ] i m p l a n t s i n t o o u r s o u l s a n i n v i n c i b l e e r o t i c p a s s i o n f o r
a l l t h a t i s g r e a t [ T O U I 1 E ' Y c l A O U ] a n d m o r e d e m o n i c [ B a L I 1 0 V L W T P O U ]
. t h a n w e . F o r j u s t t h i s r e a s o n n o t e v e n t h e e n t i r e c o s m o s t a k e n
t o g e t h e r c a n c o p e w i t h t h e t h r u s t o f h u m a n t h e o r i z i n g a n d p e r c e p -
t i v e n e s s , b u t m a n ' s i n t e n t n e s s o n p e r c e i v i n g o f t e n e v e r y w h e r e g o e s
o u t b e y o n d t h e l i m i t s o f w h a t h o l d s h i m i n , a n d i f a n y o n e g a z e
a r o u n d a t l i f e i n i t s c y c l e , h e w i l l s w i f t l y u n d e r s t a n d f o r w h a t p u r -
p o s e w e w e r e b o r n , b y s e e i n g h o w m u c h w h a t i s " t o o m u c h " a n d
g r e a t a n d f i n e h o l d s m o r e a d v a n t a g e i n a l l t h i n g s . . . w h a t i s c o n t r a r y
t o o p i n i o n i s o v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n w o n d e r f u l . ( X X X V , 2 - 3 ; 1 7 4 - 7 8 )
The c r i t i c a ~ ultimate pinnacle of the high is the pinnacle on which the
partition between mortal and immortal is made anew. A "life" that does not
revolt against its mortality, seeking instead the figure and flourishing of the
non mortal, is not "worthy of being lived."
The pinnacle of sublimity to which one must raise oneself in order to get
a view (a view "of the whole," i.e. a symbolic view) is named, among other
ways, thus: "Those who are capable of it, are all above the mortal .... The high
lifts these men almost to the greatness of mind of divinities" (XXXVI, 1; 181).
To elevate oneself to this high which was translated by sublime is to
carry oneself to the place from which one can get a view of the "mortal condi-
tion," to this perspective that is like the divine. From this light ledge, the height
of the high, which is like a beyond, one can attain a totalizing and "symbolic"
view of living-and-dying and find the equivalent of its enigma in a word, the
word of the end, the word for us, the survivors of the arrival of the death that
neither hides itself nor shows itself but gives sense (arUlalVEl) and ciphers
rhythm in numbers and formulae. Hyperbole is the movement by which
thought ravishes itself to attain all at once this elevated point. Hyperbole is a
flight of discourse, as distinct from amplificatio, which is the movement of
thought dilating itself in order to reunite and to succeed by abundance. A
view, a perspective, is always like a view, always a quasi view of what is not vis-
ible and has only the visible in which to appear (or has only appearance in
which to exist). What is sensible (to the view, to the naked eye) is the medium
of transport or translation, the place where what is not visible transposes itself.
Metaphor is what originally brings to visibility the figure of what is not visible.
The Theme, the Thesis: Death and the Sublime
What do Pseudo-Longinus's examples talk about? On what, on which themes
do they posit their thesis?
In the majority of cases,' it is a question of death. The mortal condition
and the moment of perishing are always at stake when the sublime appears.
The sublime is the concentration, the start of the startling that weighs in
speech against death. The genre of this speech could be multiplied by a typol-
ogy: benedictions or maledictions that fall back on the living as they echo off
the walls of tombs, hyperboles of the improvised epitaph, defiances, supplica-
tions, greetings, oaths, enigmas, execrations, sarcasms, or what the Latins call
de-votio.
The sublime is the ephemeral immortality of the point gained, adverse
speech snatched from deaths where the totality of becoming-and-passing-
away concentrates itself. Sublimity at once belongs to the mortal curve and
surmounts it, overhangs it tangentially like a remarkable "turning point"
[point de rebroussement], a pineal apex where the body is united with and sus-
1 0 M I C H E L D E G U Y
p e n d s i t s e l f i n t h e s o u l , a u t o p i a o f i n f i n i t e s i m a l w e i g h t l e s s n e s s a s a t t h e l a b i l e
p e a k o f t h e h i g h e s t l e a p . N o t h i n g r e m a i n s " i n t h e a i r , " a n d t h e f a l l a w a y f r o m
t h e s u b l i m e i s f a t a l .
9
T h e d e a d m a n i n t e r s h i m s e l f a n d d e s c e n d s - I o s t - " f r o m
t h e o t h e r s i d e . "
P e r h a p s t h e o n l y p r e s e n t i s a t t h i s m o m e n t , " s n a t c h e d f r o m t h e o r d e r o f
t i m e , " a s P r o u s t w i l l s a y , t h e p r e s e n t o f s a l v a t i o n . I n t h e I n f e r n o , ' a l l t h e p u n -
i s h e d w h o m D a n t e v i s i t s a r e r e n d e r e d c o n t e m p o r a r i e s b y v i r t u e o f t h e s e " s u b -
l i m e " u t t e r a n c e s t h e y r e p e a t f o r e v e r b e y o n d t h e t o m b , f i x e d i n t h e m o m e n t
w h e n t h e y c h o s e t h e i r d a m n a t i o n . T h e p o e t i s t h e w i t n e s s w h o p a s s e s o n t h e
l e g a c y o f t h e i r e t e r n a l f i n a l w o r d . T h e w i t n e s s - p o e t , h i s t o r i a n , n o v e l i s t - h a s
h e a r d t h e s u p p l i c a t i o n a t t h e i m p l a c a b l e k n e e s o f d e a t h . H e i n s c r i b e s i t s t r a c e
o n t h e g r a v e s t o n e o f t h e p a g e .
" T o o H e a v y , " , P o r t h o s c r i e d . " U p t o t h e t w o o f u s n o w . . . " " M e h r
L i c h t . . . " T h e m o m e n t b e c o m e s t h e f i n a l m o m e n t b y m e a n s o f t h e s p e e c h o f
t h e e n d a s r e c e i v e d l e g a c y .
T h e r e i s a l w a y s , t h e n , a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s u b l i m e a n d t h e t e s t a m e n -
t a r y . S u b l i m e w o r d s a r e w o r d s o f t h e e n d . A n d t h e e x a m p l e s o f t h e a n o n y -
m o u s o n e s p e a k i n c e s s a n t l y o f d e a t h .
T h e u l t i m a t e i s w h a t i s a t o n c e f a i l u r e a n d p r o m i s e , a b a n d o n m e n t a n d
s a l v a t i o n - s a l v a t i o n , t h a t i s , f o r t h e o t h e r s . T h e d y i n g o n e w h o s a y s t h e w o r d
o f t h e e n d c a r r i e s i t a w a y , i n t o t h e t o o - l a t e . H e i s v a n q u i s h e d , b u t i n p a s s i n g
d o w n a s p e e c h t h a t c a n b e t a k e n u p a g a i n . A n d s o - - d e a t h , w h e r e i s y o u r v i c -
t o r y ? - t h i s i s t h e p a s s w o r d , t h e s c h e m a o f t h e s u b l i m e . O n e d o e s b a t t l e w i t h a
d i s p r o p o r t i o n ( P a s c a l ) w h i c h i s r u i n o u s b u t n o n e t h e l e s s d e f e a t e d i n b e i n g
m u s i c a l l y t r a n s f i g u r e d . T h a t w h i c h l e v e l s u s i n a n y c a s e i s e q u a l l e d b y a s p e e c h
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a w o r k . U n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , d e f e a t w i t h n o t o m o r r o w
i s n o t d e f e a t . T h e " r u i n o u s " r e l a t i o n i s r e v e r s e d , s o m e t h i n g s u r m o u n t s t h e
" e n d " b y m a k i n g i t p a s s o n a n d s e r v e a s a r e c o m m e n c e m e n t : a s u b l i m e p o i n t
o f t i m e o f d o u b l e v a l u e . T h e d e f i n i t i v e b e c o m e s t r a n s m i s s i b l e . T h e e v e n t
r e q u i r e s a w i t n e s s . T h e a d d r e s s e e i s t h e w i t n e s s , a n d s p e e c h i s t h e e l e m e n t i n
w h i c h t r a n s m i s s i b i l i t y c a n b e t r a n s m i t t e d . T h e w i t n e s s h e a r s , r e c e i v e s ,
e n t r u s t s t o l a n g u a g e ; h e t a k e s u p s p e e c h " o n t h e l i p s o f t h e d y i n g , " i n o r d e r t o
p r o m i s e t o " r e a l i z e " i t . H e w i l l f a i l t o " r e a l i z e " i t a n d w i l l t r a n s m i t i n h i s t u r n
t o t h e s u r v i v o r t h e t r a n s m u t a t i o n o f h i s f a i l u r e .
I n t e r l u d e
I a s k m y s e l f w h a t o n e m i g h t l e a r n f r o m m u s i c a b o u t t h e s u b l i m e , w h a t o n e
m i g h t l e a r n f r o m t h e s u b l i m e r e n d e r e d a u d i b l e .
W h a t d o e s o n e m e a n t o d a y w h e n o n e m a k e s u s e o f t h e c a t e g o r y o f t h e
s u b l i m e ? I n w h a t c o n s i s t s f o r e x a m p l e t h e s u b l i m i t y o f S c h u m a n n ' s Q u i n t e t
o p u s 4 4 ? l O F r o m m u s i c o n e l e a r n s y e t a n o t h e r s e n s e o f t h e s u b l i m e .
It is a funeral march with a warmth and a reascending momentum
which seem to promise an esape from death; as if these tones led to some way
out in the direction of their ascent, although we know well-enough that the
summit is a dead end. And so we seek the way out while ascending toward a
dead end "summit." We act as if the direction of the summit revealed some
way out. The elevated point is that from which I get a glimpse of the land as
promised land, in complete knowledge of the as if. He glimpses the promised
land as that into which one does not enter; he experiences "in passing on" the
revelation of a liberty that will not come to pass in the form of a possession but
rather in the being-"liberated" into the possibility of relating to what there is
as to the promised land. In their turn, they will understand only by passing
this music on in their passing on. "Sublime" music provides a movement, the
schema of a movement of revelation. This revelation is not a trap, for it is
merely the revelation of the as, of relating to what is by means of the as. What
is is that which appears on behalf of what is.
The sublime work is an ark crossing the flood for those-the images of
those-who will come after.
A beautiful disorder is an effect of art, Boileau once said, summarizing
what he thought he had learned from "Longinus" about the sublime. The tradi-
tion justified the "disordered" character of the treatise on the Sublime by
means of the homology-itself a theoretical criterion of the sublime-between
the thing in question (the sublime) and the question of the thing (the treatise).
The "sublime" has the character of the same transgressing difference, car-
rying away the differences, and par excellence the difference par excellence,
that is, the difference which divides saying from what it says (the difference
between AE)'ELV and Tl, to take up the terms of the Aristotelian definition of
speech: AE)'ElV 'Tl Kan! TlVOS); the "sublime" has the character of the same-
ness of the Same, extending resemblance on both sides of the dividing bar
ll
now surmounted and floating one more instant adrift. The deluge, the sub-
lime, simulates the origin in reproducing it and reproduces it in simulating the
origin, the simplicity of the origin, dissimulating still, reserving the diversity of
multiplicity, turning itself "inside out" as it hides and "makes one forget" the
division one of whose names is the division between </>UUlS and TEXVT}. The
reascension to the postulated sameness can only be accomplished in the re
(reproduction, repetition), in the knowledge of the difference and the aware-
ness of the mechanisms (ruses, turns of phrase and pen: "technique") for feign-
ing forgetfulness of difference and its differentiations.
How does one repair and heal? How does one render forgotten the
unforgettable division, separation, and abstraction of things, things which
have "fallen apart" (auseinandergefallen sind), as a Hegelian might say, such
as--among others--"nature" (</>UUlS) and art (TEXVT})? In order to pursue
this problematic, one would have to develop its homology with the theological
(and then moral) schema of the loss of innocence.
T h e c o m p l e x , i n t r i c a t e , a n d d i g r e s s i v e a s p e c t o f P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s ' s
t e x t - p e r m e a t e d b y d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e a n n o u n c e d p l a n a n d t h e a c t u a l
c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e s e p a g e s i n a d o c u m e n t t h a t h a s b e e n i g n o r e d b y h i s t o r y ,
a n d a d o c u m e n t t h e c o n t i n g e n t l a c u n a e o f w h i c h i n c r e a s e f o r u s t h e d i f f i c u l t y .
o f r e a d i n g - h a s t o d o w i t h t h e o b s c u r i t y o f t h e m a t t e r i n q u e s t i o n , t h e m a t t e r
o f c r o v 9 W L S " i t s e l f . " ' E v B T o l S l l a A l . C J T a I l E ' Y E 9 0 T T O L E l T O . A E ' Y 6 I l E V a ,
K a 9 a T T E p T O . C J W l l a T a , ' I i T W V I l E A W V C J U V 9 E C J L S : " a b o v e a l l o f t h a t w h i c h r e n -
d e r s g r e a t s p e e c h a s w e l l a s b o d i e s , i t i s t h e e p i s y n t h e s i s o f t h e m e m b e r s . "
( X L , S ) . I s i t p o s s i b l e t o r e c o n s t i t u t e , d e s c r i b e , a n d u n d e r s t a n d t h i s f o r c e w h i c h ,
a s u n i f i c a t i o n , c u t s a c r o s s m u l t i p l i c i t y , f i t s t o g e t h e r t h e f i g u r a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s
o f d i s c o u r s e i n i t s i n d i v i d u a l i n s t a n c e s , t h i s f o r c e f r o m w h i c h p r o c e e d s i t s
t r o p o l o g i c a l s w a r m i n g ? D o e s t h e s u b l i m e s u m m a r i z e t h i s p o i n t w h e r e a s p r i n g
( 1 T 1 ) ' Y l l ) i s a l l e g o r i z e d , t h e s o u r c e o f t h e f i v e s o u r c e s o f t h e u t / n l ' Y o p l a ? t E T T E t B E
T T E V T E , W S d . v e L T T O L n s , 1 T 1 ) ' Y a l T L V E S E t C J L V a l T I t S u t / n l ' Y o p l a s ' Y o V L I l W -
T a T a L . . . ) ( V I I I , 1 ; 4 S f t ) .
I n o r d e r t o s u m m a r i z e t h e c o u r s e o f t h e t r e a t i s e - b e f o r e i n s i s t i n g o n c e r -
t a i n p o i n t s - a n d t o i n t r i g u e t o d a y ' s r e a d e r , I w i l l a d o p t t h e m a n n e r o f a n
e x h a u s t i v e l i s t o f a c h a p t e r ' s c o n t e n t s f r o m a b o o k o u t o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y :
T r o p e b y m e a n s o f w h i c h o u r n a t u r e s a r e g i v e n a d o s e o f g r a n d e u r . N o t
p e r s u a s i o n , b u t e c s t a s y ; t h e t h u n d e r b o l t . B u t i s t h i s n o t i n n a t e , w i t h o u t T X V E ?
L i k e S o c r a t e s , r a t h e r , t h e A u t h o r b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s c o m e s f r o m a T E X V E , w h i c h
c a n b e t a u g h t . O n l y a r t c a n r e v e a l n a t u r e a s f o u n d a t i o n . I t i s a m a t t e r o f a v o i d i n g
m i s t a k e s ; s p e e c h o f t h e g r e a t i s n o t g r a n d i l o q u e n c e - s w o l l e n d i c t i o n , e t c . , t o b e
a v o i d e d . D i a g n o s i s o f t h e t r u e s u b l i m e . E n u m e r a t i o n o f s u b l i m e t h i n g s ; j u s t a s
w h a t c a n b e r e g a r d e d f r o m o n h i g h ( U T T E p o p a o o ) i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t ( a d o m i n a t i n g
p e r s p e c t i v e p r o v i d e s t h e c r i t e r i o n ) , s o f o r w o r k s ; p s y c h e c a n b y i t s n a t u r e e l e v a t e
i t s e l f ; w h a t e l e v a t e s i t , w h a t i t s n a t u r e w a i t s u p o n , i s T O O i i l j I o s ; i t a p p r o p r i a t e s f o r
i t s e l f w h a t i t r e c e i v e s . T h e s u b l i m e i s w h a t p r o d u c e s u n a n i m i t y ; t h u s i t i s o b j e c t i v -
i t y . T h e r e a r e f i v e s o u r c e s o f t h e s u b l i m e : V 6 T ] C J L S , T T a 9 0 S , T T A a . C J L S o f t h e
s c h e m a s , g e n u i n e c p p a C J L S , a U v 9 E C J L S ; t h e f i r s t t w o a r e o f n a t u r e , t h e t h r e e o t h e r s
a r e o f T E X V T ] . T h e m e a s u r e o f d i v i n e t h i n g s i s i n H o m e r : a r e c i p r o c a l m e a s u r e o f
d i v i n e f o r c e a n d t h e c o s m i c ( a m p l i f i c a t i o n ) i s n o t
e l e v a t i o n ( B l a p l l a ) . O f i m i t a t i o n - W e a r e t h e l a s t o f t h e s e r i e s t h a t l e a d s f r o m
t h e d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n o f t h e P y t h i a n a n d H o m e r t o t h e a n c i e n t s a n d t h e m o d -
e r n s - O f i m a g e s , a V T a C J l a L , E t B o o A 0 1 T O L l a L w h i c h r e n d e r v i s i b l e ; t h e i r r e l a t i o n
t o T T a 9 0 S ; t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n p r o s e a n d p o e t r y - s c h e m a s o r f i g u r e s t h a t s u p -
p l e m e n t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o n t h e o b l i q u e p a t h o f o r a t o r s - R e c i p r o c a l s u p p o r t o f
t h e s u b l i m e a n d f i g u r e s : a m a t t e r o f M 9 T ] ; e x a m p l e s o f i n t o n a t i o n a s g r a m m a t i -
c a l f i g u r e - O f f i g u r e s : p a r a t a x i s , a p p o s i t i o n , a s y n d e t o n , s y m m o r y o f f i g u r e s ; c o n -
j u n c t i o n s , h y p e r b o l e s , p o l y p t o t e s ; h y p a l l a g e s ; m e t a t h e s i s ; p e r i p h r a s e s ; m e t a p h o r s .
D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n q u a n t i t y ( a p L 9 I l o s ) a n d g r e a t n e s s ( I l E ' Y E 9 o s ) . R e d e f i n i t i o n
o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s o u l i n t e r m s o f i t s l o v e f o r w h a t i s m o r e d e m o n i a c a l t h a n w e ;
i t s u r p a s s e s t h e K 6 C J l l o s . E x a m p l e o f V u l c a n . T o e l e v a t e o n e s e l f a b o v e t h e m o r t a l
The Discourse of Exaltation l3
condition-metaphor, repetition, hyperboles, aVTtBoO"ls-the fifth part or oW-
9EO"lS; rhythm or harmony, music of words, melopoeia. Attention to abjection; of
political liberty, of the debasement of morals, conclusion.
Pseudo-Longinus treats not the relation between rhetoric and persua-
sion but the relation between the "stupefying" (9alJl1eiO"LOv) and "ecstasy"
(EKO"TaO"lS). There is a power of discursive abduction that overcomes all
obstacles,J2 all Eq,' TJI11V (1,4; 9), all that "which depends on us." The ques-
tion is whether there is an art of teaching this access to the dimension of
(3ei90s and of vtlsos (of the profound and the elevated), a TEXVl'J, a I1E90Bos
(II, 2; 12). Thus, Pseudo-Longinus interweaves two main threads: (1) he
reminds his reader that the sublime exists, that there is this high in things to
the level of which the Myos of a Being who is "by nature logicar' ought to ele-
vate itself, and (2) he teaches his reader how this can be done.
The sublime is what provokes unanimity-and Paul Valery is faithful to
the spirit of Pseudo-Long in us when he has M. Teste say: "the sublime simpli-
fies them." Power in speech (TliJ AEYElV BUVal1lS) (VIII, 1; 45), poorly trans-
lated in Lebegue's French as "oratorical talent") is that which is capable ofhar-
monizing speech with sublime things, of raising the psyche up to its natural
place, which is at once the high and the profound, traversing and surmounting
differences and diversity. The relation of the sublime to the "Whole" (Bla
'!TaVTOS Kat '!TaO"lV), which our classics will subsequently call the uni-versal
and which characterizes our "innate disposition" or our "nature," is realized
through and in the Myos, and it is teachable. The text remarks the connection
between the constitutive passivity of a nature (YEwatov mi90S) and the
megalegorical, the "great-in-discourse" (I1EyaX.Tjyopos). ITei90s, our affectable
nature, our "sensible intuition," can achieve the great in its speech, provided
that TEXVl'J, categorical activity, ally itself synthetically with this pathos,
(re)producing elevated discourse through the schematism of figures: the sub-
lime thing attains to speech and takes place in the "poem."
The order of figures or the figural is a schematism: it lends figure to that
which would otherwise have no figure; it con-figures speech with that which is
spoken. To speak of schematism is to speak of a principle of unification of the
manifold, a mode of unfolding of unity, but of a unity that cannot be thema-
tized apart from the play of contrasted manifoldness in which it unfolds. To
speak of schematism is to speak of a constitutive activity: not of an easy classi-
fication after the fact, but of what makes both speech and the thing to be spo-
ken attain speech-in dia-lle4 it is with this highest possibility of gathered-
gathering speech, as rare as it is, that the norm-i.e., excellence-manifests
itself, and it is the "inferior" rest which is the exception, not the inverse.
The high (utlsos) is a question of (re)ascent. That to which thought
(re)ascends is indivisibly the origin, unity, the elevated. The problematic of
( r e ) a s c e n s i o n i s a p r o b l e m a t i c o f l o g i c o r , a s o n e w i l l l a t e r s a y , r e a s o n ( w h i c h
a l w a y s a s k s i t s e l f h o w i t g o t w h e r e i t i s , t h a t i s , a l w a y s b e g i n s i n a n e x p e r i e n c e
o f d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , d e c e p t i o n , p r o f u s i o n , a n d t h e w i l l t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n e x -
t r i c a b l e t h r o u g h t h a t w h i c h h a s " c a u s e d " i t ) . T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c o v e r v a l u e s
w h a t c o m e s b e f o r e i t , l o n g s f o r i t n o s t a l g i c a l l y , w a n t s t o r e l a t e i t s e l f t o i t , b o t h
i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d i n o r d e r t o r e p r o d u c e b y " i m i t a t i o n " i t s i n i m i t a b l e
e v e n t u a t i o n . T h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e m u l t i p l e t o t h e o n e - g a t h e r i n g - i s a n a l o -
g o u s t o t h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e l o w t o t h e e l e v a t e d . T h e v i e w f r o m o n h i g h
( I l E T E W P O A O Y ( a . ) i s s y n o p t i c . T h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f ( r e ) a s c e n s i o n o r " t h e o r i g i n "
s c h e m a t i z e s o r f i g u r e s i t s e l f i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i m a g e o f t h e h i g h , t h e
r e t u r n t o t h e s o u r c e , t h e ( r e ) u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m a n i f o l d . T h e h i g h i s w h a t
d o m i n a t e s b y g a t h e r i n g , h o l d s g a t h e r e d f r o m a b o v e a n d " b e h i n d . " I m a g e s o f
t h e s o u r c e o f t h e r i v e r o r o f t h e f i r e a b o v e ( v o l c a n o ) . U n i t y , a n t e r i o r i t y , a n d
h e i g h t - o r s y n t h e s i s , a p r i o r i c i t y , a n d e l e v a t i o n - a r e h e l d t o g e t h e r , m a i n -
t a i n e d a s c o - c o n c e i v a b l e , b y t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n w h i c h c o m p a r e s t h e m r e c i p r o -
c a l l y : s c h e m a t i z a t i o n b y i m a g e s . U n i f i c a t i o n , a s c e n s i o n , a n d p a l i n g e n e s i s s a y
o n e a n o t h e r ( n o t i n p a r a l l e l b u t ) i n d i a - l l e l m e t a p h o r s .
T h e m a i n d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e t e x t r e s i d e s i n t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n
o r c r U v e E a l S ( " s y n t h e s i s , " a r e c u r r e n t t e r m , b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f t h i s t h e m e ) o f
t h e " a u t o g e n o u s " w i t h t h e a r t i f i c i a l ( T E X V T ] ) . T h e m o d u l a t i o n o f t h e s c h e m a s
( T W V 0 X T J I l < l T W V 1 T A c l C 7 1 S ) , o r t h e p l a s t i c s c h e m a t i s m , i s t h i s t e c h n i c a l s u p p l e -
m e n t , t h i s l e a v e n i n g o f t h e i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n w h i c h m a k e s s p e e c h r i s e t o t h e
e c s t a t i c ( E K O T a . O l S ) h e i g h t s o f t h e s u b l i m e . T h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e t e x t h a s t o d o
w i t h t h i s : t h a t a t e a c h s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l o f t h e a n a l y s i s , t h e r e i s a l o c a l s y n t h e -
s i s w h i c h i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n a m o r e r a d i c a l o r " g e n e r a l " s y n t h e s i s .
F o r e x a m p l e , t h e " s c h e m a t i s m " i n c l u d e s t h e o r i g i n a l u t t e r a n c e ( Y E V V a . ( a .
c p p a o l S ) , w h i c h c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t o t h e c h o i c e o f n o u n s a n d t r o p i c a l l e x i s , o f
w h i c h , i n t u r n , t h e r e m u s t t h e r e f o r e a l s o b e a s y n t h e s i s ( V I I I , 1 ; 4 5 - 5 0 ) .
S y n t h e s i s
L e t u s s t a r t a g a i n .
T h e r e i s m U l t i p l i c i t y o r m a n i f o l d n e s s ; h e n c e , t h e r e a r e i n g r e d i e n t s , c o m -
p o n e n t s , c o m p o s i t i o n s o f p a r t s f o r a n d i n a w h o l e . A n d y e t n o p a r t , n o n e o f
t h e c o m p o n e n t s , o u g h t t o b e v a l i d o r t o v a l i d a t e i t s e l f f o r i t s e l f . O n e m u s t
i n d e e d s p e a k o f e a c h s e p a r a t e l y , a n a l y z e i t i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d r e c o n -
s t i t u t e i t , b u t - a n d t h i s i s t h e p a r a d o x - t h e ( n e c e s s a r y ) p a r t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t i f
i t i s " s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , " i f i t b e l i e v e s i t s e l f t o s u f f i c e ( t o i t s e l f ) .
T h e w h o l e : t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e t o t h e w h o l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f o u r
i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n o r n a t u r e a c c o m p l i s h e s i t s e l f i n t h e M y o s , a n d a s w e h a v e
s e e n , t h i s i s t e a c h a b l e . H o w e v e r , i t i s t r a n s p o r t w h i c h , " c a r r y i n g t h e w h o l e
a w a y , " s o m e h o w g r a n t s b e i n g t o t h e w h o l e . T h e s u b l i m e i n d i s c o u r s e , t h e d i s -
course of exaltation, will have the form of the carried away, of rapture. The goal
(the excellence to be attained) is in general to resolve all the parts through a
movement, a carrying away that renders their unity heard and understood
anew-through a TEXVTl, therefore, that gathers together <j>oolS and TEXVTl. The
"whole," which exists only through its composition, is at play in each of its
parts, in each of its levels. The whole is at stake in each part, the part includes
the wholeY For the anonymous author, then, it is a matter of contriving a
(re)unification of complementary opposites in each "moment."
There are five sources of vl/nlyopta, chapter VIII instructs, and the fifth;
which encloses all the others within itself, not being a part like the others, is
synthesis: ,; EV Kat BUlpaEl aw8WLS (Lebegue translates this as
"organization in view of the dignity and elevation of style"; one could translate
it: synthesis in judgment and elevation). Forty pages further on, in chapter
XXXIX, we read: the fifth of the parts which are "syn-telic for the High" is ,;
BUI Tiiiv Mywv airriiiv lTOLcl aUV8EC1LS: synthesis across the MYOl. Here it
will be a question of harmony and rhythm, of what Ezra Pound will call
I!EAOlToLta (XXXIX, 3; 196-98).
Locally, that is, as "fifth part," synthesis will be characterized as a ques-
tion of rhythm, but at the same time, synthesis is in general the unification of
all parts, including the fifth. Fatally, the author appeals here to the organic
comparison: what makes for greatness (J.LEYE80lTOLEt) in verbal matters is, as
with bodies, "the episynthesis of the members." Unity is unity of proportion,
"the completion in a system of each by the others" (mlVTa BE J.LET' clAAll>-WV
EKlTATJPOt TEAELOV auaTT]J.La, XI, 1; 73)-and not at all, of course, in the sense
of quantitative extension but rather of proper measure. This is why rhythm too
should not be heard "on its own"; it ought not to uncover itself, or more pre-
cisely, it ought not to tap out a cadence without concern for the matter at
hand or, as we would say, for the "sense."
The general construction can be divided into two levels: the level of the
five ingredients (one of which is the synthesis that is immanent to this level)
and the level of their synthetic ordering as union of cpuaLS and TEXVT].
<f>UOlS

1. thought 2. passion
synthesis of syntheses
TEXVT)

3. figures 4. phrasis 5. synthesis
(schemas) (choice of (rhythm)
words and
tropicallexis)
There is always a <j>uaLS-TEXVTl synthesis to operate. On the subordinate
level, at the level of each component and its articulation-for example, in No.
3 the synthesis of volis and aXfiJ.La, or in 5 the synthesis of pveJ.L6sand
lTpuYJ.La-there is the danger of a scission, a fall back into disunion. On the
o t h e r h a n d , i t m a y b e t h a t u n i t y , o r t h e t o t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e w h o l e , i s a s e f f e c -
t i v e l y m a d e m a n i f e s t b y t h e t e a r i n g a s u n d e r o f s y n t h e s i s a s b y j u n c t i o n a n d
r a p p r o c h e m e n t .
T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e m o v e m e n t t h a t t r a n s p o s e s t h e c o h e s i o n o f a l l t h e
c o n s t i t u e n t s i n t o a m i m e s i s o f t h e m o d e l u n i t y w h i c h i s " N a t u r e . " A n d j u s t a s
N a t u r e ( X L I I I , 5 ; 2 1 7 ) h a s h i d d e n t h a t w h i c h i s l o w o r b a s e ( e x c r e t i o n ) , s u g -
g e s t i n g t h u s t h a t o n e o u g h t n o t t o a l l o w a b j e c t i o n t o s h o w i t s e l f , s o t h e n a t u r a l
i n t h e s p e e c h o f t h e g r e a t c o n s i s t s i n h i d i n g t h e t e c h n i q u e o f t h e h i g h ( I r e t u r n
t o t h i s i n s p e a k i n g o f > . . T j 6 r J b e l o w ) .
< P u a L S a n d T E X V T ]
I t i s a m a t t e r o f a c q u i r i n g t h e i n n a t e . T h e i n n a t e i s t o b e e d u c a t e d . S u b l i m a -
t i o n ( e l e v a t i o n t o t h e s u b l i m e ) i s e d u c a t i o n i t s e l f . T h e a u t h o r a s k s h i m s e l f i f
t h e r e i s a T E X V l l o f t h e h i g h - a n d - d e e p . O n e c a n n o t j u s t l e t n a t u r e d o w h a t i t
w i l l . R a t h e r , t h e r e i s a m e t h o d , s p u r a n d r e s t r a i n t f o r m a k i n g t h e f u l l n e s s o f
c u l t u r e ( t h e s u b l i m e ) p r o c e e d t o t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f i t s n a t u r e , t h a t i s , t o
t h e " p s y c h i c " n a t u r e w h i c h i s a l s o l o g i c a l a n d m a d e f o r t h e b e y o n d ( i n r E p ) . T o
p r o c u r e a " d i s c e r n m e n t " ( 8 u l : y v w ( J L s ) c a p a b l e o f p u r i f y i n g t h e " l o g i c " o f t h e
s u b l i m e o f i t s f l a w s i s a p r e l i m i n a r y p a r t o f t h e t a s k .
T h e e l e v a t i o n t o t h e s u b l i m e i s a s t r a n g e o p e r a t i o n . I t i s a m a t t e r o f r e a t -
t a i n i n g t h e g r o u n d , o f r a i s i n g u p a n d c a r r y i n g a w a y - w h a t ? C u l t u r e ( T E X V l l :
8 l 8 a K T l K 6 s ) l e a d s b a c k t o n a t u r e ( < / > O O l K 6 s : ) ' w a l o s ) o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t
n a t u r e - f o r e x a m p l e , t h e g i f t o f i n n a t e e l o q u e n c e ( a p e r s o n i s b y n a t u r e a
b e i n g o f l o g o s ) - i s c o n c e i v e d a s a m o v e m e n t o f s e l f - s u r m o u n t i n g .
N a t u r e i s a t t a i n e d a s g r o u n d o n l y i f u p h e a v a l m a k e s i t
( r e ) a s c e n d . " P e r s u a s i o n " c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , b u t o n l y t h e s u b l i m e , w h i c h
i s a t r a n s p o r t .
A n i m p o r t a n t p a s s a g e s a y s :
w h a t o n e a d m i r e s i n a r t ( E 1 T l ' \ . . T E X V l l S ) i s t h e m o s t p a i n s t a k i n g
( T O a K P l I 3 E U T a T O V ) , a n d i n w o r k s o f n a t u r e ( T o o V < / > U U l K o o V
e p ) , w v ) , g r e a t n e s s ( I l E ) , E 9 o s ) . B u t b y n a t u r e ( < / > V U E l ) m a n i s o f -
t h e - l o g i c a l ( > " 0 ) , l K 6 v ) . . . i n d i s c o u r s e o n e s e e k s t h a t w h i c h s u r -
p a s s e s h u m a n t h i n g s ( X X X V I , 3 ; 1 8 2 - 8 3 ) .
T e c h n i q u e , t h e n , a p p l i e d t o t h e n a t u r a l , c o n t r i v e s p a i n s t a k i n g l y , c u n n i n g l y , i n
t h e s m a l l e s t d e t a i l , w h a t i s f i t t o t r a n s p o r t n a t u r e t o t h e p o i n t o f r e c o g n i z i n g
i t s e l f i n i t s " l o g i c a l " g r a n d e u r : i . e . , i n t h e d i s c o u r s e o f e x a l t a t i o n . T h e t w o
e r r o r s t o a v o i d a r e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , f o r g e t t i n g " t h e e x a l t e d , " i n t h e s e n s e o f
t h e t r a n s - h u m a n , a n d o n t h e o t h e r , n e g l e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o . m i n u t e d e t a i l s i n
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e a r t e f a c t .
The sublime in speech-speech in harmony with things "which sur-
pass" the human in elevation--exploits all resources, all artifices (among
which are the figures. or O'Xlll!aTa). and grounds them (synthesis) in a "solar"
unity which dissimulates
l4
them.
Images, Rhythms, Figures
Did Pound take his famous distinction between phanopoeia, melopoeia, and
logopoeia from Pseudo-Longinus? Perhaps.
Pseudo-Longinus speaks similarly of images (El8wAOlTOlLa), rhythm
(apI!OVLa), and schematic tropology.
In chapter XV (1; 87), he speaks of images (q,avmoLm) in relation to
and calls them el8wAOlTOlLm, which Lebegue translates as "men-
tal figuration," apparently in intimate proximity to what Pound translated into
pseudo-Greek as phanopoeia: "something in the mind" (Evv6nl!a 1TapLCJ
TclI!EVOV) capable of "engendering" (YEvvnTLK6v) "discourse" (A6yov). A
topology which refers to two different "intentions" 30UAeTat), that of the poet
and that of the orator, differentiates two types of images, and this distinction
seems sufficiently radical to separate the poetry of the poets from the rhetoric of
the orators.
The former seek EK1TAnO'Ls, "terror" or the striking, and tend to "trans-
mythologize" (I!V9LKWTEpav) to exceed the credible (XV. 8; 93). But the lat-
ter, the orators, seek EvclPYELa. clarity and evidence of exposition.
Pseudo-Longinus pa$ses from images to AOyo1ToELa by means of this
difference of will or intent characteristic of poetry and prose (eloquence).
respectively. Fantasy shows, makes one see-too much; its images eclipse evi-
dence. The imagination must therefore be relayed and restrained by figures
that are schemas oflogos and not "projections of view on the mental screen."
as Pound had said. No longer el8wAOlTOLla ("you've got crazy ideas; you're liv-
ing in a movie" [tu te fais des idees; tu fais du cinema] as one might say in
[French] slang today) but AOyo1TolLa. tropology. Demosthenes is the example
here: he does not make us see directly, the author tells us, but suggests in accor-
dance with a figural schema of the imagination, which we could call grammat-
ical and which is, in this case. apostrophe. IS
What we would call in our schools grammatical analysis represents lan-
guage as if it were purely objective, without discourse. subject, "orator," or
rhetoric: schemas are forgotten. (I mean that a student of the lycee practicing
grammatical analysis is not supposed to remark the "figures of rhetoric"
because the objectified statement is not referred to the intention of the
speaker.) But "back in those days," the grammatical structure (an interroga-
tion, an exclamation) was understood as a rhetorical figure, as the schematic
disposition of the sentence with respect to its intended message. Further, far
f r o m b e i n g r e s e r v e d f o r o r a t o r s , t h i s t r o p o l o g y , e v e n m o r e t h a n " i m a g e s , " i s
f o r P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s t h e s i t e o f t h e p o e t ' s t r u e g e n i u s . A c r u c i a l p a s s a g e ( X , 6 ;
6 8 ) s h o w s t h a t H o m e r ' s s u b l i m i t y c o n s i s t s i n h i s p o e m s ' c o n j u n c t i v e f o r c e ;
T h e a u t h o r g l o r i f i e s H o m e r f o r h a v i n g k n o w n h o w t o f o r c e a n d f o r g e i n t h e
E 1 T o s o f A 6 y o s a t u r n b y w h i c h t h e p o e m " i m i t a t e s " i n i t s w a y t h e p a t h o s o f
w h i c h i t s p e a k s : g r a m m a t i c a l " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " S p e c i f i c a l l y , ' h e s o l d e r s
t o g e t h e r s e p a r a t e p r e p o s i t i o n s ( t h e G r e e k s a y s : a s y n t h e t i c p r o s t h e s e s ) . C o m -
p r e s s i n g l i r r 6 a n d E K i n t o o n e ( i r r r K 8 a V C l T O L o ) . h i s v e r s i f i e d s p e e c h i t s e l f p e r -
f o r m s a t t h i s m o m e n t ( l i k e ) w h a t i t s p e a k s a b o u t . B y c o n s t r u c t i n g p o r t m a n t e a u
w o r d s ( T t l 8 T O U E 1 T o U S ' ' a u v 8 ) J ! j . s E L ) , H o m e r h a s f a s h i o n e d ( a 1 T E 1 T N l a a T o )
f e a r i n t h i s p a s s a g e w h e r e h e i s d e s c r i b i n g a s h i p w r e c k ; h e h a s " r e p r e s e n t e d " i t ,
t h a t i s , h e h a s i m p r i n t e d o n h i s l o c u t i o n t h e p r o p e r c h a r a c t e r ( l 8 t w J l a ) o f
" d a n g e r . " T h e p o e m d o e s w h a t i t s a y s , a s m o d e r n p o e t i c i a n s w i l l i n s i s t t h o u -
s a n d s o f y e a r s l a t e r .
B u t n o n e o f t h e s e c o n s t i t u e n t s s h o u l d b e t h e r e " f o r i t s o w n s a k e , " t o
s e r v e i t s e l f a n d t o b e s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . N o t e v e n l o g o s i n i t s t r o p i c a l A o y o 1 T O L t a ,
w h i c h i s i n t h e s e r v i c e o f t h i n g s t o b e s a i d , " e x a l t e d t h i n g s . " T h e c o n s t i t u e n t
s h o u l d r e n d e r i t s e l f f o r g o t t e n i n o r d e r t o e n t e r i n t o a w 8 w l S : A l l e r , a n d t h e
a u x i l i a r y c h a r a c t e r o f A a V 8 c l V E a 8 m a r e c o n c e i v e d h e r e a s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f s y n t h e s i s . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s , l e t u s m a k e a d e t o u r b y
w a y o f r h y t h m , t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t w h i c h , a s I r e m a r k e d a b o v e , E z r a P o u n d
t r a n s l a t e d b y J l E A o 1 T o d a .
O f R h y t h m
c p 8 6 y y O L K L 8 c l p a , s o u 8 v a 1 T A W S C T T J J l a t v o V T E S . . . " T h e g u i t a r , t a k e n i n i t s e l f ,
s i g n i f i e s n o t h i n g a t a l l ( X X X I X , 2 ; 1 9 6 ) .
I f i t i s t a k e n a l o n e - o n i t s o w n , a s y n t h e t i c a l l y ( n o t a s y n d e t i c a l l y f o r
a s y n d e t o n a u g m e n t s t h e f u s i o n a l t e m p e r a t u r e o f t h e s u b l i m e m i x t u r e ) , b e r e f t
o f a l l a l l i a n c e o r g r o u n d i n g i n t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n t h e i n g r e d i e n t s o f w h i c h
P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s t r e a t s e x h a u s t i v e l y a s t h e c a t a l y s t s o f t h e w h o l e - r h y t h m -
t h i s c o r y b a n t i c r h y t h m t h a t " c o n s t r a i n [ s l t h e l i s t e n e r t o m o v e r h y t h m i c a l l y "
( X X X I X , 2 ; 1 9 6 ) - r u n s a w a y w i t h i t s e l f , l e t s f a l l i t s s e n s e , c o m m u n i c a t e s o n l y
t h e t r e p i d a t i o n s o f t r a n c e , t r a c e l e s s o f s e n s e . A s o p p o s e d t o t h o s e v o t a r i e s o f
t h e f r e n e t i c , t h e " c r a z y " r o c k e r s o f t o d a y , P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s t a k e s t h e r i s k o f
r i s k i t s e l f . S e n s e t o o c o m p r i s e s t h e t i e a n d m e d i u m . H e n c e , t h e c o m p a r i s o n
w i t h t h e o r g a n i c : u n i t y o f t h e b o d y a n d o f t h e b o d y w i t h w h a t i s n o t i t s e l f , s o u l
o r s e n s e ; " g a t h e r i n g " w h i c h i s s u p p o s e d - i n d e e d , h e r e i n c o n s i s t s i t s s e n s e - : - t o
t r a n s p o r t t h e w h o l e t o t h e b o r d e r o f n o n - s e n s e , h o v e r i n g a b o v e t h e a b y s s o f
t h e q u e s t i o n w h y . T h u s , t h e g a t h e r i n g i s a t o n c e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a n e n d ( t h e
u n i t y o f w h i c h i s c o n c e i v e d i n t e r m s o f a f f i n i t y ) , a n d e n d l e s s . T h e s u b l i m e a s
r e u n i f i c a t i o n ( m i 8 0 s , v 6 1 1 a l S , s c h e m a s . r h y t h m ) i s t h e n a m e o f t h e u n i t y t h a t
renders forgotten its constitutive elements, the operators of the unity. This
unity is related not simply to humans, to artifice (work, "production"), but
also to that of which human work is an avciAoyov, to that of which one of the
names is "nature" (<t>OOlS). And the god is one "creator" among others; he too
is caught up in the world (K60IlOS) of which he is one of the tensors or exten-
sors (see the section on Homer above).
Figures (Resumed)
At the center of the question of "discourse of the high" (iJtJnlyopta), there is a
relation of reciprocal complementarity, of mutual assistance (of d i a - l l e ~ or
l3oTjgela) between the sublime (u!JJOs) and figures (oxilllaTa): "that by nature
in a certain sense the schemas struggle with the high and in return they receive
from it marvellous competition" (XVII, 1; 104-5) (OlJllllaxeLTal; the high
allied with figures in a single combat). Secret alliance: the figure, that "puerile"
artifice, should hide itself in the sublime which is its best hideout. For figures,
Pseudo-Longinus tells us, are "first of all" suspect like ruses-like Ulysses.
Ulysses 1TOAtJIlTJTLS is the allegory of the schematism. The high does not raise
itself without the support of the low, of what is underneath; height can only
hold by rising in a pile from the low, which renders itself forgotten in the ser-
vice that is "naturally" its own, specifically, to support like a slave that in
which it consists and into which it disappears: the high. Figures comprise the
ladder-or the flight machine, if one prefers-up which "we" (that is, t/roxil)
can climb to this natural site, this elevated site, from which one no longer sees
them, because they permit the one who has flown or fled (wepl3oATj, for
example) to see something else: specifically, exalted things. As we have already
read, the most high is in fact the point closest (e-yytn-epov) to our nature, by
which it comes into contact with the superhuman, the nonmortal. TEXVl'J
transports the soul in raising it up to its nature {<t>VO"LS ),which is "logical"
(>-OYlK6v); logos measures the "high-deep" (IlEya"f3a9v)-as Homer's "divine
horses" measured the entire span of the cosmos.
But the diversity of figures is considerable. And it is not my intention here
to comment on them or even to restate the list Pseudo-Longinus treats. One
might imagine that the tradition up to our own times had collected the names
of these schemas and fixed their definitions. Curiously, this is not at all the case.
And one observes with surprise, by simply confronting the "Longinian" ono-
mastics with today's "dictionaries of poetics and rhetoric" (for example, the
Morier or the Gradus-but of course, not the Lausberg, which lets nothing
escape), that such and such a fundamental "schema" in the text, symmoria (the
schema of schemas), or polyptoton or antimetathesis, does not even appear by
name in our taxonomies, or that certain others (hyperbaton or enallage) don't
have the same definitions, as if the lists had no memory of their origins.
2 0
M I C H E L D E G U Y
F o r e x a m p l e . i f H e n r i L e b e g u e p r o f i t s f r o m i t - o n p a g e 3 2 o f h i s e d i -
t i o n . i n a s p e c i o u s n o t e - - w h e n h e ( r e ) i n t r o d u c e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ( i f n o t v e r y
c l e a r ) d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f i g u r e s o f t h o u g h t a n d f i g u r e s o f s t y l e . h e d o e s s o
b e c a u s e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n d o e s n o t a p p e a r i n P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s ' s t e x t . B u t L e b e g u e
n o n e t h e l e s s c l a i m s t h a t t h e e n o r m o u s l a c u n a o f t h e " a r c h e t y p a l " m a n u -
s c r i p t - f o u r p a g e s - - - c o n t a i n s - " p e r h a p s " - t h e f a m o u s d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h
h a s b e e n " a n n o u n c e d b y t h e a n o n y m o u s a u t h o r i n c h a p t e r V I I . " T h i s i s n o t
s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r u s t o i n t r o d u c e i t . R a t h e r . i f i n c h a p t e r X X X ( 1 ; 1 4 7 ) t h e
t e x t i n f o r m s u s t h a t w e a r e l e a v i n g t h e v 6 T ) c r t S T O U M y o u i n o r d e r t o e n t e r
i n t o t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f < P p a c r t s . w h i c h i s t h e f o u r t h p a r t a n n o u n c e d b y t h e
e n u m e r a t i o n o f c h a p t e r V I I I ( 1 ; 4 5 - 5 0 ) . i t i s b e c a u s e w e w e r e i n t h e t h i r d .
w h i c h i s c a l l e d b o t h T W V c r X l l l l a T w v 1 T A c i c r t s . " t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e
p l a n " ( V I I I . 1 ; 4 7 ) a n d v 6 T ) c r t s T o D M y o u . " t h e r e c a p i t u l a t i o n " ( X X X . 1 ;
1 4 7 ) . I t i s n o t t h e s u s p e c t p a r e n t h e s i s o f p a g e 1 0 o f t h e B u d e e d i t i o n ( B t c r c r a
B E 1 T O U T a D T a . T e l I l E V V O i J c r E W , s 9 a T E p a B E w h i c h L e b e g u e
t r a n s l a t e s a s : " t h e r e a r e t w o s o r t s o f f i g u r e s . t h o s e o f t h o u g h t a n d t h o s e o f
w o r d s " ) w h i c h w i l l a r r e s t o u r a t t e n t i o n : t h e f a s h i o n s o f s c h e m a s ( 1 T A c i c r t S T W V
c r X l l l l a T w v ) c a n n o t b e d i v i d e d - t h e r e a r e o n l y f i g u r e s o f t h o u g h t .
L o g o p o e i a , t o o . w i l l i n d u c e i t s o w n o b l i v i o n . F o r e x a m p l e . j u s t l i k e t h e
o t h e r f i g u r e s . h y p e r b o l e ( X X X V I I I . 3 ; 1 8 9 - 9 0 ) i s s u p p o s e d . u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e
o f p a t h o s ( U r r o E K 1 T a 9 E L a s ) . t o r e f e r i n c o n s o n a n c e ( U W E K < p w v W V T a t ) t o s o m e
g r e a t n e s s o f c i r c u m s t a n c e ( I l E Y E 9 n T L v L . . 1 T E p t c r T a c r E w s ) . T h e f i g u r e s r e n d e r
t h e m s e l v e s f o r g o t t e n i f s o m e t h i n g " o t h e r t h a n s a y i n g - f o r - i t s - o w n - s a k e m o b i l -
i z e s t h e m . H e n c e . h y p e r b o l e o u g h t t o i s s u e f r o m t h e m a t t e r a t h a n d t h r o u g h t h e
m e d i a t i o n o f p a t h o s . n o t t h e i n v e r s e . W h a t " s u r p a s s e s t h e h u m a n " a n d t a k e s i t
b e y o n d i t s e l f o u g h t t o c u t b a c k a c r o s s i t a n d m a k e i t b e g i n a n e w . T h e s a m e
t h i n g g o e s . i f y o u w i l l . f o r n a m e s ( 6 v 6 I l a T a ) : t h e y a r e t h e l i g h t o f t h e s p i r i t
( c P w . T O U v o \ ) a s l o n g a s t h e y d o n o t r e l a t e t o t r i v i a l c o n c e r n s ( I l t K P O l S 1 T p a y -
l l a T l O L S ) ( X X X , 1 ; 1 4 8 ) . T h e v o D s w o u l d b e w h a t a d j u s t s w o r d s t o t h i n g s w i t h i n
t h e o c c a s i o n ( K a t p O s ) ( X X X I I . 1 ; 1 5 2 ) . t h a t i s . w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s .
T h e f o r c e w h i c h c o n t a i n s e v e r y t h i n g a l w a y s m a k e s i n a c e r t a i n w a y
( T p 6 1 T O S ) " t h e w h o l e " b e . i n t h e f o r m o f r a p t u r e . a n d h e r e w e a r e a s i n t h e d e l -
u g e . i n r e - f u s i o n . i n t h e u w E v 9 0 u c r t n v .
T h e " s y n "
T h e p l a y o f t h e s u b l i m e a s a w h o l e i s i t s e l f a g a t h e r i n g ; a u n i f i c a t i o n ; a s e a l o f
1 T a e O S . a n d V 6 T ) c r L S . a n d t h e r e f e r e n c e o r c i r c u m s t a n c e o f t h e g r e a t : i n
t h e i m m i n e n c e o f m o r t a l d a n g e r , t h e p o w e r o f p a t h o s a n d t h e l e x i s w h i c h i s o f
s u f f i c i e n t s t a t u r e t o m o b i l i z e a l l r e s o u r c e s ( T E X V T ) . t h a t i s . i n g e n e r a l t h e
a n t a g o n i s m o f c o n j u n c t i o n a n d d i s j u n c t i o n i n o r d e r t o e x p r e s s - - a s w i l l b e
r e p e a t e d a c r o s s t h e c e n t u r i e s - t h e o r d e a l o f t h i s d a n g e r . T h e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e
multiple can either take the "weak" form of hyperbaton, a ruse of disorder
which renders in a certain way the power of conjunction which is at work, or it
can bring the entire charge of speech to bear on one point of the discourse: and
this is the symmory (or synody) of the figures which makes the asyndetons,
anophoras, diatyposes, and so on play into one another (XX). Pseudo-Longi-
nus's example on this point is that of a counsel's plea in the matter of a brawl:
as if the advocate's discourse could report what could not be reported by the
injured party. In the heat of the action (or passion), the subject submerged by
what he is suffering cannot bear witness. But the (descriptive) plaidoyer per-
mits one to see in the place of the offended party and to understand him. The
speech which replays the events has the power to reveal their truth, by acting
on the judges "like the aggressor."
Mimesis
If the "natural" is the instance and event of pathos-laden, disordered discourse
this side of the "rhetorical" situation-that is, in action or real dialogue -,
then correspondingly, art as J.l.tJ.l.1lcrlS consists in the controlled reproduction
of this situation, a retelling which reflexively places into figures (hyperbaton)
themselves set apart from the vividness or naturalness of the "real" situation.
Mimesis is a representation of what has come before by means of a spe-
cial effort of retrospective preparation, as "at the beginning." For to be sure, it
is the great and the pathos-laden which are at the beginning. One of the insis-
tent key terms of TIEpl "YtjJous is rapprochement. For example:
Therefore ... the passions and the heights of discourse, which lie
nearest to our minds [')"ylJTpwJ through a sort of natural kin-
ship and through their light, glitter of their own radiance before
the figures, whose art they throw into the shade and as it were
keep in concealment. (XVII, 3; 105-6)
Figures favor a general rapprochement of the before and after, of natural and
artificial. In short, the reorganization and reunification of all that is separate.
The condition of this rapprochement is that figures themselves-having
become "abstract" (detached, distant, etc.) through historical, cultivated
abuse as through the lie of their cunning polyvalence-be refinalized,
reunited, raised up and justified anew in "the sublime"-in the transport of
the utterance that serves exalted matters. Thus, the illumination their light
favors covers figures over again with the very shadow of their "brightness"
(KUTUKUMtjJEl) (XVII, 3; 106).
There is literature (for Pseudo-Longinus: tragedy, epic, lyric poem, ora-
torical discourse) which, by means of a special situation (reading, recitation,
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t r i b u n a l , a g o r a ) , b e c o m e s i n l i f e a s l i f e : i . e . , i m i t a t e s . S u c h l i t e r -
a t u r e i s a p a r t o f t h e w h o l e w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s t h e w h o l e a n d w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e
w h o l e w o u l d n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d o r " r e f l e c t e d . " M e t o n y m y w o r k s f o r t h e s y m -
b o l ; a s i t u a t i o n w h i c h " i m i t a t e s " w h a t i s c o m i n g t o p a s s . . . w h e n i t d o e s n o t
t a k e p l a c e . I m i t a t i o n s p e a k s o f t h i s r e l a t i o n o f i n c l u s i o n - e x c l u s i o n f r o m t h e
M y o s , w h i c h a d d s ( T E X V l l ) t o w h a t e x i s t s ( < p u a L S ) i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
T h e A Q v 8 u V E a B a l
T h e h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t a r t i f i c e d o e s n o t r e i g n " a t t h e b e g i n n i n g . "
B u t t h a t s o m e t h i n g l i k e a c r i s i s h a s - a l w a y s a l r e a d y ? - t a k e n p l a c e , c o n -
s t i t u t i n g a s e c o n d b e g i n n i n g , o r r a t h e r a b e g i n n i n g a f t e r " t h e o r i g i n . " A s e p a -
r a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e , o r h a s t a k e n p l a c e , i n s u c h a w a y t h a t r h e t o r i c a l r e f l e x i o n
c a n " n o w " d i s t i n g u i s h , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e s t r i c t l y i n d e s c r i b a b l e " n o r m " o f
s p e e c h - w i t h o u t - f i g u r e a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a r t i f i c e , p r o c e d u r e , a n d e x c e s s ,
t h e t h r e a t w h i c h d i s c u r s i v e p r o c e d u r e s b r i n g t o b e a r u p o n s p e e c h . F i n a l l y ,
r e f l e x i o n , o r s y n t h e s i s ( y e s , a l r e a d y h e r e , t h e r e i s " s y n t h e t i c s u b l a t i o n " ) , m i m -
i n g i n a w a y t h e o r i g i n , s e p a r a t e s a r t f r o m t h e c u n n i n g o f f i g u r e s i n o r d e r t o
r e n d e r i t s e l f f o r g o t t e n : t h i s i s i n d e e d a l e t h a l e v e n t ( A l l 6 T J ) , t h e s i m u l a t i o n o f a
p r i m o r d i a l , e x a l t e d s t a t e o f l a n g u a g e , t h e r h e t o r i c a l o p e r a t i o n o f w h i c h w o u l d
r e n d e r i t s e l f f o r g o t t e n i n t h e e x a l t a t i o n i t - l e t h a r g i c a l l y - p r o c u r e s .
M y t h o f t h e o r i g i n o f s p e e c h : a t t h e b e g i n n i n g t h e r e i s a n e x c h a n g e , a n
a n t i - d o s i s , b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o : t h e h i g h a n d f i g u r e s . P a t h o s , t h a t w h i c h a f f e c t s
a n d t r o u b l e s , t r a n s p o r t s a n d u n b r i d l e s , m u s t t a k e p a r t i n t h e s t r u g g l e , b u t a s
i n t e g r a t e d , c o n t r o l l e d , e n l i s t e d , a n d m a s t e r e d ; i t m u s t b e b r o u g h t b a c k i n t o
t h e p i c t u r e a s e x c e s s . B u t h o w d o e s o n e m a k e t h e a - l o g o s e n t e r i n t o t h e l o g o s ?
B y t h e s e c r e t a c t i o n o f a r t i f i c i a l f i g u r e s , a s c h a p t e r X V I I ( 1 ; 1 0 5 ) s p e l l s o u t :
" F u r t h e r , t h e b e s t o f f i g u r e s d i s s i m u l a t e s t h a t i t i s a f i g u r e . " B u t h o w d o e s o n e
h i d e t h e f i g u r e ; h o w d o e s t h e o r a t o r ( f > l l T W p ) b u r y a w a y ( C l 1 T E : K p u l j J e ) t h e f i g u r e
( T O a x f i j J . a ) ? t . i i A O V ( S T L T 4 i < P W T L a i r r 4 i . M a n i f e s t l y b y i t s b r i l l i a n c e , i t s
l i g h t i t s e l f . F i g u r e s s u p p o r t ( a n d i n g a t h e r i n g e n a b l e ) s p e e c h i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e
" s u b l i m e a n d p a t h o s " w h i c h c o n s u m e s , s u b s u m e s , a n d a s s u m e s t h e m : f o r t h e
r a p p r o c h e m e n t o f o u r p s y c h e s . P s y c h e d e s i r e s t o b e b r o u g h t c l o s e r t o w h a t i s
n a t u r a l t o h e r , t o h e i g h t a n d l i g h t : f i g u r e s a i d
1 6
h e r i n t h i s r a p p r o c h e m e n t b y
l e n d i n g s c i n t i l l a t i o n t o t h e s u b l i m e t h a t l i v e s o n t h e i r " t e c h n i q u e . " T h e " S u n "
t h e y h a v e h e l p e d c a u s e t o g l o w c a n t h u s , b y i l l u m i n a t i n g , k e e p t h e m i n t h e
s h a d o w s . ( I s t h i s t h e w a y r o y a l t y w o r k s i n g e n e r a l ? )
T h e h e i g h t o f a r t c o n s i s t s i n d i s s i m u l a t i n g o n e ' s a r t i f i c e s , i n c o v e r i n g u p
o n e ' s t w i s t s a n d t u r n s , i n r e n d e r i n g n o n a p p a r e n t o n e ' s f i g u r e s , o n e ' s u n a c -
k n o w l e d g e a b l e r u s e s : t h e f i r e o f t h e s u b l i m e , f o u n d i n g a l l o f i t s c o m p o n e n t s ,
t r a n s p o r t s t h e l i s t e n e r s ( r e a d e r s ) i n t o E K a T a a L S , t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y s e e
n o t h i n g b u t f i r e . L e t u s h e a r i n t h i s t h a t t h e i r d i s d a i n w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r o c e -
dures and turns of rhetoric is transported, submerged, and deafened by the
elevation to the sublime, as if the thing itself appeared each time in its bril-
liance thanks to the light of speech, of discourse, eclipsing, suppressing, and
absorbing the conditions of its apparition, the undergirdings and supports,
the multiplicity below, the "inferior" diversity .... There must be a swooning
syncopation in the listener-in all listeners, including the speaker-or a loss of
knowledge, in order for the rhetorical moment to be identified with the
moment of natural perfection; a AaVeUVEOeaL, or "over-looking," a ATJful, as
the condition of the utterance of the "truth" (aAi}eEla): aATJeELa in Mful and
thanks to ATJful, which renders forgotten (unremarkable) the contradictory
conditions, the paradox of the striking utterance of an "exalted truth."
What happens when, in Britannicus, Burrhus tells us that he will speak
with the frankness "of a soldier who knows ill I How to disguise the truth"?
He uses the figure of the captatio benevolentiae, the excusatio, the emphatic
humility of the "nonorator" who is incapable of all ... but truth! As simple as
that-or rather at the point of confusion of the greatest presumption and
"naivete." And he says this in verse, Alexandrines no less, that is, as nobody in
the world actually, "naturally," speaks: the height of disguise which makes the
naked truth appear.
The proper is a figure, the denegated figure, the figure of the denegation
of figure.
The figural-rhetoric, which is what one is always dealing with, the
place within which all lexis takes on form-deforms the straight path
"denuded of artifice," which itself does not exist, but by whose phantom all of
our "expressions" are haunted. The road is and is not the road.
It remains to comprehend what is at stake in the difference stubbornly
maintained between, on the one hand, the "naive ones" (naturalists) who
believe in the simple-dual and natural-difference between the proper
(direct) and the figural (tortuous) as a situable, controllable difference
17
and,
on the other hand, the twisted ones, the "Ulysseans," who--from Pseudo-
Longinus to, say, Paulhan-want to reveal the lethargic syncopation, want to
make us understand the turns of figuration, the paradox of the cunning utter-
ance of the "undisguised" statement, to insist on machination, to reject the
proper and natural as impossible and treat it as a figure. What must the inces-
santly desired and invoked natural be in order for figurallanguage-distorted
beyond distorsion, "polymetic," anti-economical with respect to a "more
proper" mode of speech-to be constantly suspected, accused, in need of" dis-
simulating" itself? One must dissimulate simulation, feign ignorance of figu-
ration. Once the turn is unveiled, known as such, one exposes oneself to the
accusations' of treachery and trickery, of the original sin of lexis-but against
the background of what postulated radical innocence?18
In general and radically, it is, as "people" say, "words," speech, or dis-
course, that are suspect; and they will always be suspect because the same is
t h e m i l i e u o f t h e t r u t h a n d t h e l i e ( v e r u m i n d e x s u i ) . W h a t t h e a u d i e n c e g r u m -
b l e s a b o u t i s " b e i n g d u p e d b y p r e t t y w o r d s . " A n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e f e a r , a n d t h e
s w i n d l e r i s t h e o n e w h o s p i c e s h i s o w n d i s c o u r s e s w i t h t h e g r u m b l i n g s o f t h i s '
f e a r i t s e l f , i n o r d e r t o c l e a n s e t h e m o f t h e s u s p i c i o n o f b e i n g n o t h i n g b u t
w o r d s . I t i s a p a r a d o x t h a t h a s b e e n d e f i n i t i v e l y r e f l e c t e d u p o n a t l e a s t s i n c e
G o r g i a s ' s E n c o m i u m o f H e l e n : w o r d s a r e f o r e v e r r u s e s , a n d i t i s o n l y i n a n d
t h r o u g h w o r d s t h a t w h a t o n e d e s i r e s w i l l a p p e a r , t h e ( i n ) c r e d i b l e s a l v a t i o n ,
w h i c h i s o t h e r t h a n w o r d s , t h e o t h e r o f w o r d s , a n d w h i c h o n e c a l l s s i l e n c e . D i s -
c o u r s e s a r e f o r m a k i n g s i l e n c e , a n d P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s h i m s e l f d o e s n o t e s c a p e
f r o m t h e t o p o s o f s i l e n c e w h e r e w o r d s a b o l i s h t h e m s e l v e s .
1 9
I t i s t h u s i n w o r d s i n s o f a r a s t h e y r e n d e r t h e m s e l v e s f o r g o t t e n , i n s o f a r a s
t h e y a p p e a r a s w o r d l e s s ! W h a t I a m t e l l i n g y o u i s n o t ( a ) t e l l i n g . D o n o t t h i n k
t h a t w h a t I a m t e l l i n g y o u , w h i c h c o n s i s t s o n l y o f w o r d s , i s o n l y a n e x p r e s s i o n
o f m y i n t e n t i o n s . I s d e n e g a t i o n i n s c r i b e d i n t h e v e r y h e a r t o f s p e e c h ? A s a k i n d
o f " p e r f o r m a t i v e " c o n s t i t u t i v e o f e l o q u e n c e ? T h i s n e g a t i v i t y o f a w o r k a g a i n s t
o n e s e l f : a s o r t o f s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n a t w o r k i n t h e h e a r t o f " w o r d s " a n d o f t h e
p o e m ? P o e t r y a n n u l s t h e p o e m w h i c h a n n u l s i t s e l f i n p o e t r y ( c o n s u m e s i t s e l f
t h e r e i n f a v o r o f w h a t s u r p a s s e s i t a n d w h i c h i s i t s e l f ? ) .
Chapter 2
~
THE SUBLIME OFFERING
Jean-Lue Nancy
The sublime is in fashion.' All fashions, in spite of or thanks to their futility,
are means to the presentation of something other than fashion: they are also
of the order of necessity or destiny. For destinies, indeed, fashions are perhaps
only a particularly secret and discreet way of offering themselves. What then
offers itself or what is offered in this recent fashion of the sublime? I will
attempt to answer: the offering itself, as the destiny of art.
But the fashion of the sublime has the supplementary privilege of being
extremely old. It is at least as old as Boileau's translation of Longinus and the
distinction Boileau drew between "the sublime style" and the sublime taken in
the absolute sense. From that point on, what had once been, under the names
of hypsos or subIimitas, a category of rhetoric
2
-the discourse that specialized
in subjects of great elevation-become a concern, a demand, an adoration, or
a torment, more or less avowed but always present, for aesthetics and philoso-
phy, for philosophy of aesthetiCs and philosophy in the aesthetic, for the
thought of art and for art as thought. In this sense, the sublime forms a fash-
ion that has persisted uninterruptedly into our own time from the beginnings
of modernity, a fashion at once continuous and discontinuous, monotonous
and spasmodic. The "sublime" has not always taken this name, but it has
always been present. It has always been a fashion because it has always con-
cer,Qed a break within or from aesthetics (whether "aesthetics" designates taste
or theory). And this break has been willed, intended, evoked, or demanded
more than it has been truly revealed or demonstrated: it has been a kind of
defiance with which aesthetics provokes itself-"enough beauty already, we
must be sublime!" But at the same time, it has not been a matter of mere fash-
ion, as I said, but necessity itself.
The motif of the sublime (the name and category of which are perhaps
not even up to the standards of what they indicate, being too used up, already
25
> BOOaZICI Umversnesi Kmuohanesl ~
2 6 J E A N - L u c N A N C Y
o r s t i l l t o o a e s t h e t i c , t o o e t h i c a l , t o o v i r t u o u s , t o o e l e v a t e d , i n s h o r t , t o o s u b -
l i m e , a n d I w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s b e l o w ) - t h e m o t i f o f t h e s u b l i m e , t h e n ,
a n n o u n c e s t h e n e c e s s i t y o f w h a t h a p p e n s t o a r t i n o r a s i t s m o d e r n d e s t i n y . A r t
i t s e l f i s d o u b t l e s s t h a t w h i c h i s h a p p e n i n g p a r e x c e l l e n c e t o u s ( t o u s o t h e r s , t h e
O c c i d e n t a l s ) , t h a t w h i c h i s o f f e r i n g u s o u r d e s t i n y o r d e r a n g i n g o u r h i s t o r y .
B u t i n t h e s u b l i m e , a r t i t s e l f i s d e r a n g e d , o f f e r e d t o y e t a n o t h e r d e s t i n y ; i t h a s
i t s o w n d e s t i n y i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e o u t s i d e o f i t s e l f . T h e s u b l i m e i s t I e d i n a n
e s s e n t i a l w a y t o t h e e n d o f a r t i n a l l i t s s e n s e s : t h a t f o r w h i c h a r t i s t h e r e , i t s d e s -
t i n a t i o n o r t e l o s , a n d t h e c e s s a t i o n , o v e r c o m i n g , o r s u s p e n s i o n o f a r t .
T h e r e i s n o c o n t e m p o r a r y t h o u g h t o f a r t a n d i t s e n d w h i c h d o e s n o t , i n
o n e m a n n e r o r a n o t h e r , p a y t r i b u t e t o t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , w h e t h e r o r
n o t i t e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r s t o t h i s t h o u g h t . O n e c o u l d r e s e a r c h a n d r e t r a c e t h e
g e n e a l o g i e s , f i l i a t i o n s , a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n s , f r o m W a l t e r B e n j a m i n - w h o s e r o l e
i s c e r t a i n l y d e c i s i v e - t o o u r s e l v e s . B u t n e c e s s i t y i s a l w a y s d e e p e r t h a n
g e n e a l o g i e s , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y t h a t r e l a t e d B e n j a m i n h i m s e l f t o
K a n t , o r w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y t h a t r e l a t e d K a n t , a n d a l l o f t h e o t h e r s w i t h h i m , t o
t h e d e s t i n y o r t a s k o f a r t i n t h o u g h t .
3
I w i l l n o t e x p l o r e t h i s h i s t o r y o r n e t w o r k . I w i l l c o n t e n t m y s e l f w i t h
p l a c i n g h e r e , b y w a y o f o p e n i n g , s e v e r a l f r a g m e n t s t h a t o u g h t t o s p e a k f o r
t h e m s e l v e s :
F o r t h e s a k e o f t h e u n i t y w h i c h t h e v e i l a n d t h a t w h i c h i s v e i l e d
c o m p r i s e i n i t , t h e I d e a c a n b e e s s e n t i a l l y v a l i d o n l y w h e r e t h e
d u a l i t y o f n a k e d n e s s a n d v e i l i n g d o e s n o t y e t o b t a i n : i n a r t a n d i n
t h e a p p e a r a n c e s o f m e r e n a t u r e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m o r e d i s -
t i n c t l y t h i s d u a l i t y e x p r e s s e s i t s e l f , i n o r d e r f i n a l l y i n m a n t o r e a c h
i t s g r e a t e s t f o r c e , t h e m o r e t h i s b e c o m e s c l e a r : i n v e i l - l e s s n a k e d -
n e s s t h e e s s e n t i a l l y b e a u t i f u l h a s w i t h d r a w n a n d i n t h e n a k e d
b o d y o f t h e h u m a n b e i n g a B e i n g b e y o n d a l l b e a u t y i s a t t a i n e d -
t h e s u b l i m e , a n d a w o r k b e y o n d a l l i m a g e s { G e b i l d e n J - t h e w o r k
o f t h e c r e a t o r . ( B e n j a m i n
4
)
I n t h e w o r k , t r u t h i s a t w o r k a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t m e r e l y s o m e t h i n g
t r u e . . . . T h e a p p e a r a n c e a r r a n g e d i n t h e w o r k i s t h e b e a u t i f u l .
B e a u t y i s a m o d e o f b e i n g a n d o f p r e s e n c e o f t r u t h q u a u n v e i l i n g .
( H e i d e g g e r
5
)
T h e K a n t i a n t h e o r y o f t h e s u b l i m e d e s c r i b e s . . . a n a r t w h i c h s h u d -
d e r s w i t h i n i t s e l f : i t s u s p e n d s i t s e l f i n t h e n a m e o f t h e c o n t e n t o f
t r u t h d e p r i v e d o f a p p e a r a n c e , b u t w i t h o u t , q u a a r t , r e n o u n c i n g i t s
c h a r a c t e r a s a p p e a r a n c e . ( A d o r n 0
6
)
J u s t a s p r o s e i s n o t s e p a r a t e d f r o m p o e t r y b y a n y t h r e s h o l d , a r t
e x p r e s s i v e o f a n g u i s h i s n o t t r u l y s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h a t e x p r e s s i v e o f
The Sublime Offering
joy ... it is no longer a matter of dilettantism: sovereign. art accedes
to the extremity of the possible. (Bataille
7
)
It would still be necessary to investigate whether this placing-in-
question of art, which the most illustrious part of the art of the
past thirty years represents, does not presuppose the sliding, the
displacement of a force at work in [puissance au travail dans] the
secrecy of works and refusing to step into the light of day. (Blan-
chot
S
)
27
What is at stake in the sublime is a suspension of art, a placing in ques-
tion of art within art itself as work or as task. In the name of the sublime, or
under the pressure of something that often (but not exclusively) has carried
this name, art is interrogated or provoked in view of something other than art.
More precisely, it is a matter of a double suspense or a double placement in
question. On the one hand, it is aesthetics as a regional philosophical disci-
pline that is refused in the thought of art seized by the sublime. Kant is the first
to do justice to the aesthetic at the heart of what one can call a "first philoso-
phy": but he is also, and for this very reason, the first to suppress aesthetics as
a part or domain of philosophy. As is well known, there is no Kantian aesthet-
ics. And there is not, after Kant, any thought of art (or of the beautiful) that
does not refuse aesthetics and interrogate in art something other than art: let
us say, truth, or experience, the experience of truth or the experience of
thought. On the other hand, it is art that suspends itself and shudders, as
Adorno says, art that trembles on the border of art, giving it$elf as its task
something other than art, something other than the world of the fine arts or
than beautiful works of art: something "sublime."
It is as if "aesthetics" as object, as well as the aesthetic object, had dis-
solved upon the touch of philosophy (and it makes no difference whether they
have offered themselves to philosophy or whether philosophy has attempted
to conquer them by violence), to leave room for something else (nothing less,
in Kant, than the sublime destination of reason itself: freedom). But it is also
as if, at the same time, the capture and flight of these objects had required phi-
losophy to think of both art and itself otherwise. In the suspension of art, the
task of thought is in question.
But it is in question in such a manner that it does not take over the relay
where art leaves off, where art would be both suppressed and conserved in the
"true" presentation of truth. Such a thought of the relay, or of the sublation
[reieve, Aufhebung] of art by philosophy forms the most visible part of Hegel's
thought of the end of art. But the essential point is precisely that the claim of
the sublime forms the exact reverse of the sublation of art.
9
The thought of the end of art as its sublation and, consequently, as its
completion or achievement-which suppresses art as art and consecrates it as
p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h s u p p r e s s e s p h i l o s o p h y a s d i s c o u r s e a n d c o n s e r v e s i t a s a r t ,
a s t h e p u r e a r t o f p u r e t h o u g h t - , s u c h t h o u g h t r e v e r s e s t h e s u b l i m e . T h i s
d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o s y m m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d w a y s o f t h i n k i n g a r t .
I t m e a n s r a t h e r t h a t t h e r e i s o n e t y p e o f t h o u g h t t h a t r e a b s o r b s a r t a n d
a n o t h e r t h a t t h i n k s i t i n i t s d e s t i n a t i o n . T h e l a t t e r i s t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b -
l i m e . T h e f o r m e r t h o u g h t , t h a t o f H e g e l - p h i l o s o p h y a s s u c h - d o e s n o t i n
f a c t t h i n k a r t a s d e s t i n y o r a s d e s t i n a t i o n b u t r a t h e r t h e r e v e r s e , t h e e n d o f a r t ,
i t s g o a l , r e a s o n , a n d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . I t p u t s a n e n d t o w h a t i t t h i n k s : i t t h u s
d o e s n o t t h i n k i t a t a l l , b u t o n l y i t s e n d . I t p u t s a n e n d t o a r t b y p r e s e r v i n g a r t
i n a n d a s p h i l o s o p h y . I t p u t s a n e n d t o a r t i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t r u t h . T o b e
s u r e , s u c h t h o u g h t v i e w s a r t a s h a v i n g h e r e t o f o r e c o m p r i s e d t h i s p r e s e n t a -
t i o n - a s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d p e r h a p s a s p r e s e n t a t i o n i n g e n e r a l , a l w a y s s e n -
s i b l e , a l w a y s a e s t h e t i c - b u t i t v i e w s a r t a s n o l o n g e r a d e q u a t e t o t h i s t a s k o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n n o w t h a t t r u t h h a s b e c o m e c a p a b l e o f p r e s e n t i n g
i t s e l f o n i t s o w n . T h u s t h e e n d o f a r t i s a t t a i n e d , a n d a r t i s p r o p e r l y s u b i a t e d a s
p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t r u e . I t i s s u p p r e s s e d a s a r t a n d p r e -
s e r v e d a s p u r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
W h a t i s t h e c a s e t h e n w i t h a r t a s a r t ? W h a t r e m a i n s o f i t a n d w h e r e ? A r t
a s s u c h - a s a l l t h a t i s d e s i g n a t e d a s " a r t " i n H e g e l o r e l s e w h e r e a n d , f o r e x a m -
p l e , a s f i g u r a t i o n o r e x p r e s s i o n , a s l i t e r a t u r e o r p a i n t i n g , a s f o r m o r b e a u t y , a s
w o r k o r v a l u e - a r t a s s u c h c a n r e m a i n n o w h e r e b u t i n t h e e l e m e n t o f r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n , t h e e n d o f w h i c h w a s p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f . T h e a r t t h a t r e m a i n s t h e r e
( i f s u c h a n " a r t " e x i s t s , o r i f i t s t i l l m e r i t s t h i s n a m e ) , t h e a r t t h a t c o n c e i v e s
i t s e l f a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r a s e x p r e s s i o n i s i n f a c t a f i n i t e a r t - f i n i s h e d , d e a d .
B u t t h e t h o u g h t t h a t f i n i s h e d i t o f f s u p p r e s s e d i t s e l f a s t h e t h o u g h t o f a r t . F o r
i t n e v e r t h o u g h t t h a t w h i c h i t b r o u g h t t o c o m p l e t i o n .
I t n e v e r t h o u g h t w h a t i t b r o u g h t t o c o m p l e t i o n b e c a u s e a r t , i n t r u t h , w a s
a l r e a d y n o l o n g e r d w e l l i n g i n t h e e l e m e n t o f ( r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n . P e r h a p s a r t n e v e r
s e r v e d t o ( r e ) p r e s e n t e x c e p t i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a r t . A r t w a s
e l s e w h e r e : H e g e l ( a t l e a s t a c e r t a i n H e g e l ) w a s n ' t a w a r e o f i t , b u t a s f o r K a n t , h e
h a d b e g u n t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t w h a t w a s a t s t a k e i n a r t w a s n o t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
o f t h e t r u t h , b u t - t o p u t i t b r i e f l y - t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f l i b e r t y . I t w a s t h i s r e c o g -
n i t i o n t h a t w a s e n g a g e d i n a n d b y t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e . N o t o n l y w a s a r t
n o t c o m p l e t e d b y p h i l o s o p h y i n t h i s t h o u g h t , b u t a r t b e g a n t o t r e m b l e t h e r e ,
s u s p e n d e d o v e r i t s e l f , u n a c h i e v e d , p e r h a p s u n a c h i e v a b l e , o n t h e b o r d e r o f p h i -
l o s o p h y - w h i c h a r t t h u s m a d e s h u d d e r o r i n t e r r u p t i t s e l f i n i t s t u r n .
F o r K a n t , t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e h a v e i n c o m m o n t h a t t h e y h a v e
t o d o w i t h p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d o n l y w i t h p r e s e n t a t i o n ( C I , 2 3 , 8 4 ; 8 2 ) . 1 0 I n b o t h
n o t h i n g p l a y s i t s e l f o u t b u t t h e p l a y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f , w i t h o u t a n y r e p r e -
s e n t e d o b j e c t . ( T h e r e o u g h t t h e r e f o r e t o b e a c o n c e p t , o r a n e x p e r i e n c e , o f p r e -
s e n t a t i o n t h a t w o u l d n o t b e s u b m i t t e d t o t h e g e n e r a l l o g i c o f ( r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
t h a t i s , o f t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y a s u b j e c t a n d f o r a s u b j e c t : b a s i c a l l y , t h e e n t i r e
q u e s t i o n i s t h e r e ) . O n t h e o c c a s i o n o f a n o b j e c t o f t h e s e n s e s , t h e i m a g i n a -
The Sublime Offering 29
tion-which is the faculty of presentation-plays at finding a form in accord
with its free play. It presents (to itself) this: that there is a free accord between
the sensible (which is essentially multiple or manifold) and a unity (which is
not a concept, but rather free indeterminate unity). The imagination thus pre-
sents the image, or rather that there is (such a thing as) "image" (Bild). The
image here is not the representative image, and it is not the object. It is not the
placing-in-form of something else but form forming itself, for itself, without
object: fundamentally, art, according to Kant represents nothing in either the
beautiful or the sublime. The "imagination" does not signify the subject who
makes an image of something but rather the image imaging itself, not as a fig-
ure of something else but as form forming itself, unity happening upon mani-
foldness, coming out of a manifoldness, in the manifold of sensibility, simply
as unity without object and without subject-and thus without end. It is on
the basis of this general situation of free aesthetic presentation that one must
attempt to appreciate the respective stakes of the beautiful and the sublime.
Kant calls the free Bild that precedes all images, all representations, and
all figurations (one is tempted to say the non figurative Bild) a schema in the
first Critique. He says in the third Critique that aesthetic judgment is nothing
other than the reflexive play of the imagination when it "schematizes without
concepts": that is, when the world that forms itself, that manifests itself, is not
a universe of objects but merely a schema (skema, "form," or "figure"), merely
a Bild that makes a "world" on its own, because it forms itself, because it
designs itself. The schema is the figure-but the imagination that figures with-
out concepts figures nothing: the schematism of aesthetic judgment is intran-
sitive. It is merely the figure that figures itself. It is not a world nor the world
that takes on figure, but the figure that makes world. It is perhaps indissocia-
ble from the fake, the fiction, and the dream of a Narcissus: but all of that
comes only after the fact. In order that there should be these figures and this
scene of representations, there must first be the throw, the surging and beat-
ing, of a design, a form, which figures itself in giving itself figure, in conferring
upon itself a free unity. It confers this unity upon itself, or it receives this
unity-for at first it does not have any unity at its disposal. Such is the essen-
tial characteristic of imagination, of Einbildung operatirig without a concept:
imagination is unity that precedes itself, anticipates itself, and manifests itself,
free figure prior to any further determination.
From this starting point-that is, barely having entered into the first
modern philosophical assignation of the aesthetic-one can finish very quickly
if one likes. By pursuing the logic of this initial constellation of the aesthetic
schematism, one can very quickly arrive at the end of art. Indeed, in a sense one
must pursue it if only in order to discover that it can function only by ignoring
the sublime, which nothing I have said thus far has distinguished as such.
In the first Critique, the schematism was said to be a "technique hidden
in the depths of the soul." Does the secret of this technique unveil itself in the
a e s t h e t i c s c h e m a t i s m , w h i c h p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e p u r e f o r m o f t h e s c h e m a -
t i s m ? I t i s t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k s o . T h e s c h e m a t i s m w o u l d t h e n b e a e s t h e t i c . T h e
t e c h n i q u e o f t h e s c h e m a w o u l d b e a n a r t . A f t e r a l l , i t i s t h e s a m e w o r d , a r s o r
d i e K u n s t . R e a s o n w o u l d b e a n a r t i s t , t h e w o r l d o f o b j e c t s a w o r k - a n d a r t
w o u l d b e t h e f i r s t o r s u p r e m e t e c h n i q u e , t h e c r e a t i v e o r s e l f - c r e a t i v e t e c h -
n i q u e , t h e t e c h n i q u e o f t h e u n i t y o f s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , u n i t y p o s i t i n g i t s e l f i n
t h e w o r k . O n e c a n b e l i e v e t h i s a n d p r o c e e d t o d r a w t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s .
O n e w i l l v e r y q u i c k l y o b t a i n t w o v e r s i o n s o f a t h e r e b y c o m p l e t e d
t h o u g h t o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m : e i t h e r t h e v e r s i o n o f a n o r i g i n a r y a n d i n f i n i t e a r t ,
a p o e t r y n e v e r c e a s i n g t o g i v e i t s e l f f o r m i n g i v i n g f o r m t o t h e w o r l d a s t o
t h o u g h t - a n d t h i s i s t h e r o m a n t i c v e r s i o n - - o r e l s e t h e v e r s i o n o f a t e c h n i q u e
o f o r i g i n a r y j u d g m e n t , w h i c h d i v i d e s j u d g m e n t i n o r d e r t o r e l a t e i t t o i t s e l f a s
u n i t y a n d s o t o g i v e i t i t s a b s o l u t e f i g u r e - a n d t h i s i s t h e H e g e l i a n v e r s i o n .
E i t h e r a e s t h e t i c s s u b l a t e s p h i l o s o p h y o r t h e c o n v e r s e . I n b o t h c a s e s , t h e
s c h e m a t i s m i s u n d e r s t o o d ( i t s s e c r e t r e v e a l e d ) a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d : a r t o r t e c h -
n i q u e - a n d d o u b t l e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p l a y o f c o m p l i c i t o u s e x c h a n g e
b e t w e e n t h e t w o v e r s i o n s , a r t a n d t e c h n i q u e , t e c h n i q u e o f a r t a n d a r t o f t e c h -
n i q u e - t h e s c h e m a i s t h e o r i g i n a r y f i g u r e o f f i g u r a t i o n i t s e l f . T h a t w h i c h f i g -
u r e s ( o r t h a t w h i c h p r e s e n t s , f o r h e r e , f i g u r i n g i s p r e s e n t i n g ) , t h e f a c u l t y o f
f i g u r a t i o n o r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n h a s i t s e l f a l r e a d y a f i g u r e , a n d h a s a l r e a d y p r e -
s e n t e d i t s e l f . I t i s r e a s o n a s a r t i s t o r t e c h n i c i a n , w h i c h c o m e s d o w n t o t h e s a m e
t h i n g : D e u s a r t i f e x .
T h u s , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n t h a t s c h e m a t i z e s w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t w o u l d
s c h e m a t i z e i t s e l f o f i t s e l f i n a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t . A n d t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y , i n o n e
s e n s e , w h a t i t d o e s : i t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f a s u n i t y a n d i t p r e s e n t s i t s u n i t y t o i t s e l f ,
p r e s e n t i n g n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n i t s e l f , p r e s e n t i n g t h e f a c u l t y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i n
i t s f r e e p l a y , t h a t i s , a g a i n , p r e s e n t i n g t h e o n e p r e s e n t i n g , o r r e p r e s e n t i n g ,
a b s o l u t e l y . H e r e , t h e p r e s e n t i n g o n e - t h e s u b j e c t - i s t h e p r e s e n t e d . I n t h e
b e a u t i f u l a n d i n t h e s u b l i m e - w h i c h a r e n e i t h e r t h i n g s n o r q u a l i t i e s o f o b j e c t s
b u t j u d g m e n t s , a n d m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a e s t h e t i c j U d g m e n t s , i . e . , t h e p r o p e r j u d g -
m e n t s o f s e n s i b i l i t y w h e n i t i s d e t e r m i n e d n e i t h e r b y c o n c e p t s n o r b y e m p i r i -
c a l s e n s a t i o n ( w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e a g r e e a b l e , n o t t h e b e a u t i f u l ) - t h e u n i t y o f
s p i r i t , t h e s p i r i t a s u n i t y , a n d t h e a c c o r d o f t h e f a c u l t i e s o p e r a t e d i n t h e i m a g i -
n a t i o n o r , m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a s i m a g i n a t i o n p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t o i t s e l f .
I t i s n o t s o m u c h t h a t a r t c o m e s t o f i n d i t s r e a s o n o r r e a s o n s h e r e b u t
r a t h e r t h a t R e a s o n t a k e s p o s s e s s i o n o f a r t i n o r d e r t o m a k e o f i t t h e t e c h n i q u e
o f i t s s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t h u s t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
v e r y t e c h n i q u e o f r e a s o n , o f a t e c h n i q u e c o n c e i v e d a s t h e p r i m a r y o r u l t i m a t e
n a t u r e o f r e a s o n , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h r e a s o n p r o d u c e s , o p e r a t e s , f i g u r e s ,
a n d p r e s e n t s i t s e l f o n i t s o w n . T h e s c h e m a t i s m i s o n t h i s a c c o u n t t h e a n t i c i p a -
t i o n o f t h e u n i t y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( o r o f t h a t w h i c h p r e s e n t s ) i n p r e s e n t a t i o n
i t s e l f ( o r i n t h e p r e s e n t e d ) , a n a n t i c i p a t i o n w h i c h d o u b t l e s s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e
o n l y p o s s i b l e t e c h n i q u e ( t h e o n l y H a n d g r i f f , " s l e i g h t o f h a n d , " a s t h e f i r s t C r i -
tique puts it) by means of which a presentation, in this strict philosophic
sense, could ever take place. How would I trace any figure at all, if I did not
anticipate its unity, or more precisely, if I did not anticipate myself, the one
who presents this figure, as its unity? There is a kind of fore-sight or pro-
vidence at the heart of reason. The schema is reason which fore-sees and pre-
figures itself. It is thus of the nature of the schematism, this artistic coup de
main of reason, to be "hidden in the depths of the soul": the prefiguration
escapes in its anticipation. And it is even basically the hidden, secret character
of the schematism that unveils it for what it is: the technique, already dissimu-
lated behind all visible figures, of figurative or presentational anticipation.
In this "schematism without concepts," in this "free legality" or in this
"sketch" of the world
ll
for the free subject, the cosmetic is the anticipation of
the cosmic. The beautiful is not here a quality, intrinsic or extrinsic, subjective
or objective, it is more than a quality. Indeed, it constitutes the status and the
very being of the subject which forms itself and which presents itself in order to
be able to (re)present for itself a world of phenomena. The aesthetic is itself the
anticipation of knowledge, art is the anticipation of technical reason, and taste
is the schema of experience-the schema or the pleasure, for precisely here the
two are confounded. Did not Kant write that a primitive pleasure must have
presided over the very first knowledge, "a remarkable pleasure, without which
the most common experience would not have been possible"? (C/, VI, 34; 24).
There is a pure, painless pleasure, then, at the philosophical origin of knowl-
edge and world domination. (That there is no admixture of pain in this plea-
sure implies that the sublime is not yet involved, a point to which I will return
below.) This pleasure consists in the satisfaction provided by unity in general,
by (re)discovering (re)union of the manifold, the heterogeneous, under a prin-
ciple or law. Anticipation arises out of or resides within this enjoyment Uouis-
sancel of unity which is necessary to reason. Without unity, the manifold is
nothing but chaos and vertiginous danger. United with its unity-a unity
which one must therefore have anticipated in order to be able to rediscover and
(re)present it, and a unity thus technically and artistically produced-the man-
ifold becomes enjoyment: at once pleasure and appropriation.
Enjoyment, according to Kant, belongs to the agreeable, which must be
carefully distinguished from the beautiful. The agreeable is attached to an
interest, whereas the beautiful is not. The beautiful is not linked to any inter-
est, for in aesthetic judgment I do not depend at all on the existence of the
object, and what is important is merely "what I discover in myself" on the
occasion of this object (C/, 2, 50; 39).
But does not self-enjoyment arise out of a supreme and secret interest
of reason? The disinterestedness of the judgment of beauty, caught in the
logic of the ratio artifex, is a profound interestedness: one has an interest in
the being-anticipated of unity, in the (pre)formation of the figure, in the
avoidance of chaos.
H e r e , t h e c a t e g o r y o f t h e b e a u t i f u l b e g i n s t o r e v e a l i t s e l f i n i t s e x t r e m e
f r a g i l i t y . T h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e a g r e e a b l e a l r e a d y h a v e i n c o m m o n t h a t t h e y
" p l e a s e i m m e d i a t e l y , " i n d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e g o o d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e
s u b l i m e , o n t h e o t h e r . I f o n e m u s t a l s o e s t a b l i s h a r a p p o r t b e t w e e n t h e m i n
t e r m s o f i n t e r e s t - i n t e r e s t i n t h e o b j e c t i n t h e c a s e o f t h e a g r e e a b l e a n d i n t e r -
e s t i n o n e s e l f i n t h e c a s e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l ( a n d a r e t h e s e t w o t h i n g s r e a l l y s o d i f -
f e r e n t ? ) - , t h e n o n e w i l l h a v e t o s a y t h a t t h e b e a u t i f u l t o o i n v o l v e s e n j o y m e n t ,
t h e e n j o y m e n t o f a n t i c i p a t i o n a n d s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e b e a u t i f u l i n K a n t ,
a n d p e r h a p s a l l s i m p l e b e a u t y s i n c e K a n t , a r i s e s f r o m t h e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e
s u b j e c t , a n d i n d e e d c o n s t i t u t e s t h e s u b j e c t a s e n j o y i n g i t s e l f , i t s u n i t y a n d i t s
f r e e l e g a l i t y , a s t h a t a r t i s t - r e a s o n w h i c h i n s u r e s i t s e l f a g a i n s t t h e c h a o s o f s e n -
s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e a n d c l a n d e s t i n e l y r e - a p p r o p r i a t e s f o r i t s e l f - t h a n k s t o i t s
" h i d d e n a r t " - t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n s t h a t i t h a d l o s t w i t h G o d . U n l e s s - e v e n m o r e
b r u t a l l y - i t w a s t h e s u b j e c t - a r t i s t ( t h e s u b j e c t o f a r t , p h i l o s o p h y , a n d t e c h -
n i q u e ) w h o r a v i s h e d G o d o f H i s e n j o y m e n t .
W h e n i t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f i n p h i l o s o p h y , o r r a t h e r w h e n i t a n t i c i p a t e s i t s e l f
i n p h i l o s o p h y ( a n t i c i p a t i n g , i n K a n t ' s t i m e , t h e e s s e n t i a l l y t e c h n i c a l a n d a r t i f i -
c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f m o d e r n r e a s o n ) , a e s t h e t i c s i s s u p p r e s s e d t w i c e i n a s i n g l e
i n s t a n t : o n c e i n t h e e n d o f a r t a n d o n c e i n t h e e n j o y m e n t o f i m a g i n a t i v e r e a -
s o n . T h e t w o a r e t h e s a m e , a s o n e c a n c l e a r l y s e e : a r t m e e t s i t s e n d , f o r i t c o n -
s i s t s i n t h e e n j o y m e n t i n w h i c h i t a c h i e v e s i t s e l f . K a n t i s n o t i n t h i s t h e o t h e r o f
H e g e l : i n b o t h , w h a t i s a t s t a k e i n t h e a e s t h e t i c i s p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n o f t r u t h r e s t s o n t h e t [ t l l : l : t o f p r e s e n t a t i o n , w h i c h i s t h e e n j o y m e n t o f p r e ~
f i g u r e d u n i t y . T h e H e g e l i a n s p i r i t d o e s n o t e n j o y i t s e l f i n a n y o t h e r w a y : t h e
K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n i s w h a t i t e n j o y s . O r a g a i n , t h e H e g e l i a n s p i r i t i s i t s e l f t h e
f i n a l s e l f - a p p r o p r i a t i n g e n j o y m e n t o f t h e K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n . A n d p h i l o s o -
p h y g e t s o f f o n a r t , m a k e s o f a r t a n d t h e b e a u t i f u l i t s o w n e n j o y m e n t , s u p -
p r e s s e s t h e m a s s i m p l e p l e a s u r e s , o n e c o u l d s a y , a n d p r e s e r v e s t h e m a s t h e
p u r e s e l f - e n j o y m e n t o f R e a s o n . T h e A u f h e b u n g o f a r t i n p h i l o s o p h y h a s t h e
s t r u c t u r e o f e n j o y m e n t - a n d i n t h i s i n f i n i t e s t r u c t u r e , a r t i n i t s t u r n e n j o y s
i t s e l f : i t c a n b e c o m e , a s p h i l o s o p h i c a r t , a s a r t o r t e c h n i q u e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l
p r e s e n t a t i o n ( f o r e x a m p l e , d i a l e c t i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c , o r p o e t i c p r e s e n t a t i o n ) , t h e
o r g i a s t i c s e l f - e n j o y m e n t o f S p i r i t i t s e l f .
O n c e u p o n a t i m e , t h e b e a u t i f u l w a s " t h e s p l e n d o r o f t m e t r u e " : b y a s i n -
g u l a r p e r v e r s i o n , w h i c h i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c o n s i d e r w i t h o u t u n e a s e , t h e s p l e n d o r
o f t h e t r u e h a s b e c o m e t h e s e l f - e n j o y m e n t o f r e a s o n .
T h i s i s p e r h a p s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c f a t e o f t h e a e s t h e t i c a s w e l l a s t h e a e s -
t h e t i c f a t e o f p h i l o s o p h y . A r t a n d b e a u t y : p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e t r u e , w h i c h u s e s
t h e m f o r i t s o w n e n j o y m e n t , a n t i c i p a t e s i t s e l f i n t h e m , a n d f i n i s h e s t h e m o f f .
B u t f a r f r o m f i n i s h i n g , w e h a v e h a r d l y b e g u n b y p r o c e e d i n g t h u s . W e
h a v e n o t e v e n b e g u n t o d e a l w i t h t h e s u b l i m e , a n d a r t , i n K a n t , d o e s n o t o f f e r
i t s e l f t o a n a l y s i s b e f o r e o n e h a s p a s s e d b y w a y o f t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e s u b l i m e ,
which in several respects feeds into the examination of art, in particular by
way of the decisive motif of genius. (This is not the place to dwell on it, but let
me at least mention here that one can only thoroughly comprehend the Kant-
ian theory of the arts, regardless of Kant's intentions, if one understands its
dependence upon the theory of the sublime. This dependence is manifested,
for example, by the ordering of his apparently poorly justified table of con-
tents, which places the theory of art within the "Analytic of the Sublime,"
whereas the latter was supposed to be "a mere appendix" to the Analytic of
Aesthetic Judgments.")
One can gain access to the sublime by passing argumentatively through
the insufficiencies of the beautiful. We have just seen beauty thicken suddenly,
if I dare put it this way, into the pleasure or satisfaction of reason. This signi-
fies nothing other than that the beautiful is an unstable category, insufficiently
contained or retained in the order that was to be properly its own (the pure
presentation of presentation). The beautiful is perhaps not quite as
autonomous as it appears and as Kant would like. Taken literally as the pure
pleasure of pure presentation, the beautiful reveals itself to be responsive to
the interest of reason which is all the more interested because it is hidden: it
satisfies itself with and is satisfied by its power to present and to present itself.
It admires itself on the occasion of its objects, and it tends, according to what
is for Kant the law of all pleasure, to preserve its current condition, to preserve
the enjoyment of its proper Bild and Ein-bildung. Doubtless the beautiful, rig-
orously considered, is not in this state of enjoyment, but it is always about to
slide into it, to become confused with it: and this ever imminent sliding is not
accidental but belongs to the very structure of the beautiful. (In the same
manner, one can apply to the judgment of taste the rule applied to moral
judgment: one can never say for certain that an action has been accomplished
by pure morality; likewise, one can never say that a judgment of taste is a pure
judgment of beauty: it is always possible that some interest-empirical or
not-has intruded itself. Even more radically or rigorously, it is possible that
there is no such thing as a pure judgment of taste and that its disinterest is
always interested in the profound self-enjoyment of the imagination.)
However, the same instability, the same constitutive lability that makes
the beautiful slide into the agreeable can also carry it off into the sublime.
Indeed, the beautiful is perhaps only an intermediate, ungraspable formation,
impossible to fix except as a limit, a border, a place of equivocation (but per-
haps also of exchange) between the agreeable and the sublime, that is, between
enjoyment and joy [la jouissance et la joie] , to which I will return below.
If a transport of the beautiful into the sublime is indeed the counterpart
or reversal of its sliding into the agreeable-and this is what we shall verify-
and if in the agreeable the beautiful ultimately loses its quality of beauty (for in
enjoyment, in the beautiful as satisfied or satisfying, the beautiful is finished-
and art along with it), then one must expect the beautiful truly to attain its
" p r o p e r " q u a l i t y o n l y i n a n o t h e r s o r t o f d e p a r t u r e f r o m i t s e l f - i n t o t h e s u b -
l i m e . T h a t i s , t h e b e a u t i f u l b e c o m e s t h e b e a u t i f u l o n l y b e y o n d i t s e l f , o r e l s e i t
s l i d e s i n t o t h e s p a c e t h i s s i d e o f i t s e l f . B y i t s e l f , i t h a s n o p o s i t i o n . E i t h e r i t
a c h i e v e s i t s e l f - i n s a t i s f a c t i o n , o r p h i l o s o p h y - o r i t s u s p e n d s i t s e l f ,
u n a c h i e v e d , i n t h e s u b l i m e ( a n d i n a r t , o r a t l e a s t i n a r t t h a t h a s n o t b e e n s u b -
l a t e d b y p h i l o s o p h y ) .
T h e s u b l i m e f o r m s n e i t h e r a s e c o n d w i n g o f a e s t h e t i c s n o r a n o t h e r k i n d
o f a e s t h e t i c . A f t e r a l l , i t i s r a t h e r u n a e s t h e t i c a n d u n a r t i s t i c f o r a n a e s t h e t i c .
A n d i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i t w o u l d s e e m m o r e l i k e a n e t h i c s , i f o n e h o l d s t o t h e
d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n s o f K a n t . B u t K a n t d o e s n o t s e e m t o s e e q u i t e w h a t i s a t
s t a k e w h e n h e i n t r o d u c e s t h e s u b l i m e . H e t r e a t s t h e s u b l i m e a s a m e r e
" a p p e n d i x " t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t ( C I , 2 3 , 8 6 ; 8 5 ) , b u t i n r e a l -
i t y , t h e s u b l i m e r e p r e s e n t s i n t h e C r i t i q u e n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n t h a t w i t h o u t .
w h i c h t h e b e a u t i f u l c o u l d n o t b e t h e b e a u t i f u l o r w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e b e a u t i f u l
c o u l d b e n o t h i n g b u t t h e b e a u t i f u l ( w h i c h p a r a d o x i c a l l y c o m e s d o w n t o t h e
s a m e t h i n g ) . F a r f r o m b e i n g a s u b o r d i n a t e k i n d o f a e s t h e t i c , t h e s u b l i m e c o n -
s t i t u t e s a d e c i s i v e m o m e n t i n t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d o f a r t a s s u c h . I t
d o e s n o t m e r e l y a d d i t s e l f t o t h e b e a u t i f u l b u t t r a n s f o r m s o r t h e
b e a u t i f u l . C o n s e q u e n t l y - a n d t h i s i s w h a t I a m a t t e m p t i n g t o s u b -
l i m e d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e i n t h e g e n e r a l f i e l d o f ( r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n j u s t o n e m o r e
i n s t a n c e o r p r o b l e m a t i c : i t t r a n s f o r m s o r r e d i r e c t s t h e e n t i r e m o t i f o f p r e s e n -
t a t i o n . ( A n d t h i s t r a n s f o r I P a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o b e a t w o r k i n o u r o w n d a y . )
T h e r e i s n o t h i n g n e w a b o u t t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s u b l i m e r e p r e s e n t s t h a t
w i t h o u t w h i c h b e a u t y i t s e l f w o u l d n o t b e b e a u t i f u l , o r w o u l d b e m e r e l y b e a u t i -
f u l , t h a t i s , e n j o y m e n t a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e B i l d . I t d a t e s f r o m t h e m o d e r n
( r e ) n a i s s a n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e . B o i l e a u s p o k e o f " t h i s j e - n e - s a i s - q u o i w h i c h
c h a r m s u s a n d w i t h o u t w h i c h b e a u t y i t s e l f w o u l d h a v e n e i t h e r g r a c e n o r
b e a u t y . " B e a u t y w i t h Q u t b e a u t y i s b e a u t y w h i c h i s m e r e l y b e a u t i f u l , t h a t i s ,
m e r e l y p l e a s i n g ( a n d n o t " c h a r m i n g " ) . F e n e l o n w r i t e s : " T h e b e a u t i f u l w h i c h
i s o n l y b e a u t i f u l , t h a t i s , b r i l l i a n t , i s o n l y h a l f - b e a u t i f u l . " I n a s e n s e , a l l o f
m o d e r n a e s t h e t i c s , t h a t i s , a l l " a e s t h e t i c s , " h a s i t s o r i g i n a n d r a i s o n d ' e t r e i n
t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a t t r i b u t i n g b e a u t y m e r e l y t o b e a u t y a n d i n t h e c o n s e q u e n t
s k i d d i n g o r o v e r f l o w i n g o f t h e b e a u t i f u l b e y o n d i t s e l f . W h a t i s m e r e b e a u t y ?
M e r e b e a u t y , o r b e a u t y a l o n e a n d i s o l a t e d f o r i t s e l f , i s f o r m i n i t s p u r e s e l f -
a d e q u a t i o n , i n i t s p u r e a c c o r d w i t h t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e f a c u l t y o f p r e s e n t a -
t i o n ( o r f o r m a t i o n ) . M e r e b e a u t y , w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t , c o n c e p t , o r i d e a , i s t h e
s i m p l e a c c o r d - w h i c h i s b y i t s e l f a p l e a s u r e - o f t h e t h i n g p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e
p r e s e n t a t i o n . A t l e a s t , t h i s i s w h a t m o d e r n b e a u t y h a s b e e n o r a t t e m p t e d t o b e :
a p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t i s s u c c e s s f u l a n d w i t h o u t r e m a i n d e r i n a c c o r d w i t h i t s e l f .
( A t b o t t o m , t h i s i s s u b j e c t i v i t y q u a b e a u t y . ) I n s h o r t , i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h e
s c h e m a i n t h e p u r e s t a t e o f a s c h e m a t i s m w i t h o u t c o n c e p t s , c o n s i d e r e d i n i t s
f r e e a c c o r d w i t h i t s e l f , w h e r e f r e e d o m i s c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e s i m p l e n e c e s s i t y
that form should be adequate to its proper form, should present just the form
that it is, or should be just the form that it presents. The beautiful is the figure
that figures itself in accord with itself, the strict accord oOts contour with its
design.
'Form or contour is limitation, which is the concern of the beautiful: the
unlimited, to the contrary, is the concern of the sublime.
The unlimited maintains doubtless the closest, the most intimate rela-
tions with the infinite. The concept of the infinite (or its different possible
concepts) gives us in a sense the internal structure of the unlimited. But the
infinite does not exhaust the being of the unlimited, it does not offer the true
moment of the unlimited. If the analysis of the sublime ought to begin, as it
does in Kant, with the unlimited, and if it ought to transport into itself and
replay the analysis of beauty (and thus of limitation), it must above all not
proceed simply as the analysis of a particular kind of presentation, the presen-
tation of the infinite. Nearly imperceptible at the outset, this frequently com-
mitted error can considerably distort the final results of the analysis. In the
sublime, it is not a matter of the presentation or nonpresentation of the infi-
nite, placed beside the presentation of the finite and construed in accordance
with an analogous model. Rather, it is a matter-and this is something com-
pletely different-of the movement of the unlimited, or more exactly, of "the
unlimitation" (die Unbegrenztheit) that takes place on the border of the limit,
and thus on the border of presentation.
The unlimited as such is that which sets itself off on the border of the
limit, that which detaches itself and subtracts itself from limitation (and hence
from beauty) by an unlimitation that is coextensive with the external border
oflimitation. In one sense, nothing sets itself off thus. But if it is permissible to
speak of the "unlimited" as of "something" that sets itself off "somewhere," it
is because in the judgment or the feeling of the sublime we are offered a
seizure, an apprehension of this unlimitation that comes to raise itself up like
a figure against a ground, although strictly speaking, it is always simply the
limit that raises a figure up against a nondelimited ground. In the sublime, it is
a question of the figure of the ground, of the figure that the ground cuts, but
precisely insofar as the ground cannot constitute a figure and yet remains a
"raising that razes" [un "enlevement"J, an unlimiting outline, along the lim-
ited figure.
The unlimited begins on the borde!, of it does
nothing is neither that of a
simprepotentiruprogression 'to infinity nor that of a simple actual infinity (or
of "infinity collected into a whole," as Kant puts it, and he in fact uses both of
these figures or concepts of the infinite). Rather, it is the infinity of a beginning
(and this is much more than the contrary-ora'ccimpletioi:J., much more-Ulan
the inversion of a presentation). It is not simply the infinite sprawl of a pure
absence of figure. Rather, the unlimited engenders and engages itself in the
v e r y t r a c i n g . o f t h e l i m i t : i t r e t r a c e s a n d c a r r i e s o f f , s o t o s p e a k , " u n t o t h e
g r o u n d " w h a t t h i s t r a c i n g c u t s o n t h e e d g e o f t h e f i g u r e a s i t s c o n t o u r . I t
r e t r a c e s " u n t o t h e g r o u n d " t h e o p e r a t i o n o f E i n - b i l d u n g : b u t t h i s d o e s n o t
c o n s t i t u t e a r e p l i c a t i o n , e v e n a n e g a t i v e r e p l i c a t i o n , o f t h i s o p e r a t i o n . I t d o e s
n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n i n f i n i t e f i g u r e o r i m a g e b u t t h e m o v e m e n t o f a c u t t i n g , d e -
l i n e a t i o n , a n d s e i z u r e . T h e s u b l i m e w i l l a l w a y s i n v o k e - t h a t i s , i f i t i s a n y t h i n g
a t a l l a n d i f i t c a n c o n s t i t u t e a n a e s t h e t i c s - a n a e s t h e t i c s o f m o v e m e n t a s
o p p o s e d t o a n a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e s t a t i c o r t h e s t a t e . B u t t h i s m o v e m e n t i s n e i t h e r
a n a n i m a t i o n n o r a n a g i t a t i o n , a s o p p o s e d t o a n i m m o b i l i t y . ( O n e c o u l d
d o u b t l e s s e a s i l y b e m i s l e d , b u t i t i s n o t a v e r s i o n o f t h e n o t N i e t -
z s c h e a n - d o c t r i n e o f t h e c o u p l e D i o n y s o s / A p o l l o . ) I t i s p e r h a p s n o t a m o v e -
m e n t i n a n y o f t h e a v a i l a b l e s e n s e s o f t h i s w o r d . I t i s t h e u n l i m i t e d b e g i n n i n g
o f t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n o f a f o r m a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , o f t h e s t a t e o f a f o r m a n d o f
t h e f o r m o f a s t a t e . T h e u n l i m i t e d g e t s c a r r i e d a w a y w i t h d e l i m i t i n g . I t d o e s
n o t c o n s i s t b y i t s e l f i n a d e l i m i t a t i o n , e v e n i f n e g a t i v e , f o r t h e l a t t e r w o u l d s t i l l
b e , p r e c i s e l y , a d e l i m i t a t i o n , a n d t h e u n l i m i t e d w o u l d e n d u p h a v i n g i t s
p r o p e r f o r m - s a y , t h e f o r m o f a n i n f i n i t e .
B u t t h e i n f i n i t e , K a n t d e c l a r e s , c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t " a s c o m p l e t e l y g i v e n . "
T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t K a n t , c o n t r a r y t o w h a t I i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , h a s i n m i n d
e x c l u s i v e l y a p o t e n t i a l i n f i n i t y , t h e b a d i n f i n i t y , a s H e g e l w o u l d s a y , o f a p r o -
g r e s s i o n w i t h o u t e n d . I t m e a n s , o n c e a g a i n , t h a t i n t h e u n l i m i t a t i o n i n v o l v e d
i n t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e i t i s n o t e x a c t l y a m a t t e r o f t h e i n f i n i t e . T h e i n f i -
n i t e w o u l d b e m e r e l y t h e " n u m e r i c a l c o n c e p t , " t o s p e a k l i k e K a n t , o f t h e
u n l i m i t e d , t h e " p r e s e n t a t i o n " o f w h i c h i s a t s t a k e i n t h e s u b l i m e . O n e w o u l d
h a v e t o s a y t h a t t h e u n l i m i t e d i s n o t t h e n u m b e r b u t t h e g e s t u r e o f t h e i n f i n i t e
( C I , 2 7 , 9 8 ; 9 8 ) . 1 2 T h a t i s , t h e g e s t u r e b y w h i c h a l l ( f i n i t e ) f o r m g e t s c a r r i e d
a w a y i n t o t h e a b s e n c e o f f o r m . I t i s t h e g e s t u r e o f f o r m a t i o n , o f f i g u r a t i o n
i t s e l f ( o f E i n - b i l d u n g ) , b u t o n l y i n s o f a r a s t h e f o r m l e s s t o o s t a n d s o u t - w i t h -
o u t i t s e l f t a k i n g o n a n y f o r m - a l o n g t h e f o r m t h a t t r a c e s i t s e l f , j o i n s i t s e l f t o
i t s e l f , a n d p r e s e n t s i t s e l f .
B e c a u s e u n l i m i t a t i o n i s n o t t h e n u m b e r b u t t h e g e s t u r e , o r i f o n e
p r e f e r s , t h e m o t i o n , o f t h e i n f i n i t e , t h e r e c a n b e n o p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e u n l i m -
i t e d . T h e e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t K a n t d o e s n o t c e a s e t o a t t e m p t t h r o u g h o u t t h e
p a r a g r a p h s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s u b l i m e , t h o s e o f " n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " o r
" i n d i r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n , " a s w e l l a s a l l t h e " s o t o s p e a k s " a n d t h e " i n a c e r t a i n
s e n s e " s t r e w n t h r o u g h o u t t h e t e x t , i n d i c a t e m e r e l y h i s d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e c o n -
t r a d i c t i o n o f a p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h o u t p r e s e n t a t i o n . A p r e s e n t a t i o n , e v e n i f i t i s
n e g a t i v e o r i n d i r e c t , i s a l w a y s a p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t o t h i s e x t e n t i t i s a l w a y s i n
t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s d i r e c t a n d p o s i t i v e . B u t t h e d e e p l o g i c o f K a n t ' s t e x t i s n o t a
l o g i c o f p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d d o e s n o t p u r s u e t h e t h r e a d o f t h e s e c l u m s y e x p r e s -
s i o n s . I t i s n o t a m a t t e r o f i n d i r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s o f s o m e a n a l o g y o r
s y m b o l - i t i s h e n c e n o t a m a t t e r o f f i g u r i n g t h e n o n f i g u r a b l e
l 3
- a n d i t i s n o t
a m a t t e r o f n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e s e n s e o f t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a p u r e
absence or of a pure lack or in any sense of the positivity of a "nothingness."
To this (double) extent, one could say that the logic of the sublime is not to be
confused with either a logic of fiction or a logic of desire, that is, again, with
either a logic of representation (something in the place of something else) or a
logic of absence (of the thing that is lacking in its place). Fiction and desire, at
least in these classical functions, perhaps always frame and determine aesthet-
ics as such, all aesthetics. And the aesthetics of mere beauty, of the pure self-
adequation of presentation, with its incessant sliding into the enjoyment of
the self, indeed, arises out of fiction and desire.
But it is precisely no longer a matter of the adequation of presentation.
It is also not a matter of its inadequation. Nor is it a matter of pure presenta-
tion, whether this presentation be that of adequation or of inadequation, nor
is it even a matter of the presentation of the fact that there is such a thing as
the nonpresentable.
14
In the sublime-or perhaps more precisely at a certain
extreme point to which the sublime leads us-it is no longer a matter of
(re)presentation in general.
It is a matter of something else, which takes place, happens, or occurs in
presentation itself and in sum through it but which is not presentation: this
motion through which, incessantly, the unlimited raises and razes itself,
unlimits itself, along the limit that delimits and presents itself. This motion
would trace in a certain way the external border of the limit. But this external
border is precisely not an outline: it is not a second outline homologous to the
internal border and stuck to it. In one sense, it is the same as the (re)presenta-
tional outline. In another sense, and simultaneously, it is an unlimitation, a
dissipation of the border on the border itself-an unbordering or overborder-
ing, or overboarding, an "effusion" (Ergieflung), Kant says. What takes place
in this going overboard of the border, what happens in this effusion? As I have
indicated above, I call it the offering, but we need time to get there.
In the sublime, then, presentation itself is at stake: neither something to
be presented or represented nor something that is nonpresentable (nor the
nonpresentability of the thing in general), nor even the fact that it [fa] pre-
sents itself to a subject and through a subject (representation), but the fact
thatit presents itself and as it presents itself: it presents itself in unlimitation, it
presents itself always at the limit.
This limit, in Kantian terms, is that of the imagination. For there is an
absolute limit to the imagination, a maximum of Bild and Bildung. We receive
an analogical indication of this maximum in the greatness of certain objects
both natural and artificial, for example, in oceans or pyramids. But these objec-
tive grandeurs, these very great figures, are precisely nothing but analogical
occasions for thinking the sublime. In the sublime, it is not a matter of great
figures but of absolute greatness. Absolute greatness is not greater than the
greatest greatness: it designates rather that there is, absolutely, greatness. It is a
m a t t e r o f m a g n i t u d o , K a n t s a y s , a n d n o t o f q u a n t i t a s . Q u a n t i t a s c a n b e m e a -
s u r e d w h e r e a s m a g n i t u d o p r e s i d e s o v e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m e a s u r e i n g e n e r a l : i t
i s t h e f a c t i n i t s e l f o f g r e a t n e s s , t h e f a c t t h a t , i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o b e f o r m s o f f i g -
u r e s w h i c h a r e m o r e o r l e s s l a r g e , t h e r e m u s t b e , o n t h e e d g e o f a l l f o r m o r f i g -
u r e , g r e a t n e s s a s s u c h . G r e a t n e s s i s n o t , i n t h i s s e n s e , a q u a n t i t y , b u t a q u a l i t y ,
o r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , i t i s q u a n t i t y q u a q q . a l i t y . I t i s i n t h i s w a y t h a t f o r K a n t t h e
b e a u t i f u l c o n c e r n s q u a l i t y , t h e s u b l i m e q u a n t i t y . T h e b e a u t i f u l r e s i d e s i n f o r m
a s s u c h , i n t h e f o r m o f f o r m , i f o n e c a n p u t i t t h i s w a y , o r i n t h e f i g u r e t h a t i t
m a k e s . T h e s u b l i m e r e s i d e s i n t h e t r a c i n g - o u t , t h e s e t t i n g - o f f a n d s e i z u r e o f
f o r m , i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e f i g u r e t h i s f o r m d e l i m i t s , a n d h e n c e i n i t s q u a n t i t y
t a k e n a b s o l u t e l y , a s m a g n i t u d o . T h e b e a u t i f u l i s t h e p r o p e r o f s u c h a n d s u c h a n
i m a g e , t h e p l e a s u r e o f i t s ( r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e s u b l i m e i s : t h a t t h e r e i s a n
i m a g e , h e n c e a l i m i t , a l o n g w h o s e e d g e u n l i m i t a t i o n m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t .
T h u s , t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , i f t h e y a r e n o t i d e n t i c a l - a n d
i n d e e d , q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y - t a k e p l a c e o n t h e s a m e s i t e , a n d i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e
t h e o n e u p o n t h e o t h e r , t h e o n e a l o n g t h e e d g e o f t h e o t h e r , a n d p e r h a p s - I
w i l l c o m e b a c k t o t h i s - t h e o n e t h r o u g h t h e o t h e r . T h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b -
l i m e a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b u t i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e b e a u t i f u l i s t h e p r e s e n t e d
i n i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n , w h e r e a s t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n i t s m o v e m e n t -
w h i c h i s t h e a b s o l u t e r e - m o v a l o f t h e u n l i m i t e d a l o n g t h e e d g e o f a n y l i m i t .
T h e s u b l i m e i s n o t " g r e a t e r t h a n " t h e b e a u t i f u l , i t i s n o t m o r e e l e v a t e d [ e l e v e ] ,
b u t i n t u r n , i t i s , i f ! d a r e p u t i t t h i s w a y , m o r e r e m o v e d [ e n l e v e ] , i n t h e s e n s e
t h a t i t i s i t s e l f t h e u n l i m i t e d r e m o v a l o f t h e b e a u t i f u l .
W h a t g e t s r e m o v e d a n d c a r r i e d a w a y i s a l l f o r m a s s u c h . I n t h e m a n i -
f e s t a t i o n o f a w o r l d o r i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f a w o r k , f o r m c a r r i e s i t s e l f a w a y
o r r e m o v e s i t s e l f , t h a t i s , a t o n c e t r a c e s i t s e l f a n d u n b o r d e r s i t s e l f , l i m i t s i t s e l f
a n d u n l i m i t s i t s e l f ( w h i c h i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e m o s t s t r i c t l o g i c o f t h e
l i m i t ) . A l l f o r m a s s u c h , a l l f i g u r e i s s m a l l w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e u n l i m i t e d n e s s
a g a i n s t w h i c h i t s e t s i t s e l f o f f a n d w h i c h c a r r i e s i t a w a y . " T h a t i s s u b l i m e , "
w r i t e s K a n t , " i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h w h i c h a l l t h e r e s t i s s m a l l . " T h e s u b l i m e i s
h e n c e n o t a g r e a t n e s s t h a t w o u l d b e " l e s s s m a l l " a n d w o u l d s t i l l t a k e p l a c e
a l o n g , e v e n i f a t t h e s u m m i t o f , a s c a l e o f c o m p a r i s o n : f o r i n t h i s c a s e , c e r t a i n
p a r t s o f t h e r e s t w o u l d n o t b e " s m a l l , " b u t s i m p l y l e s s g r e a t . T h e s u b l i m e i s
i n c o m p a r a b l e , i t i s r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h a l l t h e o t h e r s a r e
" s m a l l , " t h a t i s , a n , a n d a r e t h e r e f o r e n o
l o n g e r p r o p e r l y c o m p a r a b l e .
T h e s u b l i m e m a g n i t u d o r e s i d e s - o r r a t h e r b e f a l l s a n d s u r p r i s e s - a t t h e
l i m i t , a n d i n t h e r a v i s h m e n t a n d r e m o v a l o f t h e l i m i t . S u b l i m e g r e a t n e s s i s :
t h a t t h e r e i s s u c h a t h i n g a s m e a s u r a b l e , p r e s e n t a b l e g r e a t n e s s , s u c h a t h i n g a s
l i m i t a t i o n , h e n c e s u c h a t h i n g a s f o r m a n d f i g u r e . A l i m i t r a i s e s i t s e l f o r i s
r a i s e d , a c o n t o u r t r a c e s i t s e l f , a n d t h u s a m u l t i p l i c i t y , a d i s p e r s e d m a n i f o l d
c o m e s t o b e p r e s e n t e d a s a u n i t y . - U n i t y c o m e s t o i t f r o m i t s l i m i t - s a y ,
t h r o u g h i t s i n t e r n a l b o r d e r , b u t t h a t t h e r e i s t h i s u n i t y , a b s o l u t e l y , o r a g a i n
)
39
that this outline should make up a whole, comes-to put it still in the same
manner-from the external border. from the unlimited raising and razing of
the limit. The sublime concerns the totality (the general concept of which is
the concept of unified multiplicity). The totality of a form. of a presentation. is
neither its completeness nor the exhaustive summation of its parts. Rather.
this totality is what takes place where the form has no parts. and consequently
(re)presents nothing. but presents itself. The sublime takes place. Kant says. in
a "representation of the unlimited to which is added nonetheless the thought
of its totality" (and this is why. as he specifies. the sublime can be found in a
formless object as well as in a form). A presentation takes place only if all the
rest. all the unlimitedness from which it detaches itself. sets itself off along its
border-and at once. in its own way. presents itself or rather sets itself off and
upsets itself all along the presentation.
The sublime totality is not at all the totality of the infinite conceived as
something other than finite and beautiful forms (and which by virtue of this
otherness would give way to a second. special aesthetics which would be that
of the sublime). nor is it the totality of an infinite that would be the summa-
tion of all forms (and would make of the aesthetics of the sublime a "superior"
or "total"IS aesthetics). The sublime totality is rather the totality of the unlim-
ited. insofar as the unlimited is beyond (or this side of) all form and all sum.
insofar as the unlimited is. in general. on the far side of the limit. that is.
beyond the maximum.
The sublime totality is beyond the maximum. which is to say that it is
beyond everything. Everything is small in the face of the sublime. all form. all
figure is small. but also. each form. each figure is or can be the maximum. The
maximum (or magnitudo. which is its external border) is there whenever the
imagination has (re)presented the thing to itself. big or small. The imagina-
tion can do no more: it is defined by the Bildung of the Bild.
However. the imagination can do more--or at least. if it is no longer at
this point properly a "power" (Kraft). it receives more-there where it can do
no more. And it is there that the sublime is decided: the imagination can still
feel its limit. its powerlessness, its incommensurability with relation to the
totality of the unlimited. This totality is not an object, it is nothing (re)pre-
sented. neither positively nor negatively, but corresponds to this: that presen-
tation takes place. It is not presentation itself-neither the exhibition of what
is presented nor the presence of what presents-but rather it is that presenta-
tion takes place. This is the formless form or the form of the formless. the set-
ting-off of the limit's external border from the limit itself. the motion of the
unlimited.
This totality is not. in fact. exactly the unity of the manifold: the unlim-
ited offers properly neither a manifold nor the number of a unity. But what
Kant calls "the Idea of a whole" is the union through which the unity of a whole
is possible in general. The sublime is concerned with union. as the beautiful is
c o n c e r n e d w i t h u n i t y . B u t u n i o n i s t h e w o r k o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ( a s u n i t y i s i t s
p r o d u c t ) : i t u n i t e s c o n c e p t a n d i n t u i t i o n , s e n s i b i l i t y a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e
m a n i f o l d a n d t h e i d e n t i c a l . I n t h e s u b l i m e , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n n o l o n g e r h a s t o
d o w i t h i t s p r o d u c t s b u t w i t h i t s o p e r a t i o n - a n d t h u s w i t h i t s l i m i t .
F o r t h e r e a r e t w o w a y s o f c o n c e i v i n g o f u n i o n . T h e r e i s t h e H e g e l i a n ,
d i a l e c t i c a l w a y , w h i c h c o n s i d e r s u n i o n a s a p r o c e s s o f r e u n i o n , a s a p u r p o s i v e -
n e s s o r f i n a l i t y o f u n i f i c a t i o n , a n d a s i t s r e s u l t , w h i c h i s s u p p o s e d t o b e a u n i t y .
T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t r u t h o f t h e u n i o n o f t h e s e x e s f o r H e g e l i s t o b e f o u n d
i n t h e u n i t y o f t h e c h i l d . T h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t o f u n i o n i s d i f f e r e n t . T h u s , i n
t h e A n t h r o p o l o g y t h e u n i o n o f t h e s e x e s r e m a i n s a n a b y s s f o r r e a s o n , j u s t a s t h e
s c h e m a t i z i n g " u n i o n r e m a i n s a n " a r t " t h a t h a s f o r e v e r e s c a p e d o u r g r a s p . T h i s
m e a n s t h a t K a n t t a k e s i n t o a c c o u n t u n i o n a s s u c h , p r e c i s e l y i n i t s d i f f e r e n c e
f r o m u n i t y , p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r a s i t i s n o t o r d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e b y i t s e l f a u n i t y
( n e i t h e r a n o b j e c t n o r a s u b j e c t ) . U n i o n i s m o r e t h a n t h e s u m o f t h e p a r t s a n d
l e s s t h a n t h e i r u n i t y : l i k e m a g n i t u d o , i t e s c a p e s a l l c a l c u l a t i o n . A s " I d e a o f t h e
w h o l e , " u n i o n i s n e i t h e r t h e o n e n o r t h e m a n y : i t i s b e y o n d e v e r y t h i n g , i t i s t h e
" t o t a l i t y " o n t h e f a r o r n e a r s i d e o f t h e f o r m a l u n i t y o f t h e w h o l e , e l s e w h e r e ,
n o n l o c a l i z a b l e , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s i t t a k e s p l a c e . O r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , i t i s t h e t a k -
i n g p l a c e o f a l l o r t h e w h o l e i n g e n e r a l ( t h u s , i t i s t h e c o n t r a r y o f a t o t a l i z a t i o n
o r o f a c o m p l e t i o n a n d i n s t e a d a c o m p l e t i n g o r d a w n i n g ) . T h a t t h i s s h o u l d
t a k e p l a c e , t h a t i t s h o u l d p r e s e n t i t s e l f , t h a t i t s h o u l d t a k e o n f o r m a n d f i g u r e ,
t h i s " t h a t " i s u n i o n , i s t h e t o t a l i t y b e y o n d t h e w h o l e - i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h a l l
p r e s e n t a t i o n i s s m a l l a n d a l l g r e a t n e s s r e m a i n s a l i t t l e m a x i m u m w h e r e t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n r e a c h e s i t s l i m i t .
B e c a u s e i t r e a c h e s t h i s l i m i t , i t e x c e e d s t h i s l i m i t . I t o v e r f l o w s i t s e l f , i n
r e a c h i n g t h e o v e r f l o w i n g o f t h e u n l i m i t e d , w h e r e u n i t y g e t s c a r r i e d a w a y i n t o
u n i o n . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e s e l f - o v e r f l o w i n g o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . N o t t h a t t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n i m a g i n e s b e y o n d i t s m a x i m u m ( a n d s t i l l l e s s t h a t i t i m a g i n e s
i t s e l f : w e h a v e t o d o h e r e w i t h e x a c t l y t h e r e v e r s e o f i t s s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n ) . I t
i m a g i n e s n o l o n g e r a n d t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y t h i n g t o i m a g i n e , t h e r e i s n o B i l d
b e y o n d E i n b i l d u n g - a n d n o n e g a t i v e B i l d e i t h e r , n o r t h e B i l d o f t h e a b s e n c e o f
t h e B i l d . T h e f a c u l t y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( i . e . , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ) p r e s e n t s n o t h i n g
b e y o n d t h e . l i m i t , f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n i s d e l i m i t a t i o n i t s e l f . H o w e v e r , i t g a i n s
a c c e s s t o s o m e t h i n g , r e a c h e s o r t o u c h e s u p o n s o m e t h i n g ( o r i t i s r e a c h e d o r
t o u c h e d b y s o m e t h i n g ) : u n i o n , p r e c i s e l y , t h e " I d e a " o f t h e u n i o n o f t h e
u n l i m i t e d , w h i c h b o r d e r s u p o n a n d u n b o r d e r s t h e l i m i t .
W h a t o p e r a t e s t h i s u n i o n ? T h e i m a g i n a t i o n i t s e l f . A t t h e l i m i t , i t g a i n s
a c c e s s t o i t s e l f a s i n i t s s p e c u l a t i v e s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n . B u t h e r e , t h e r e v e r s e i s t h e
c a s e : t h a t " p a r t " o f i t s e l f t h a t i t t o u c h e s i s i t s l i m i t , o r i t t o u c h e s i t s e l f a s l i m i t .
" T h e i m a g i n a t i o n , " K a n t w r i t e s , " a t t a i n s t o i t s m a x i m u m , a n d i n t h e e f f o r t t o
g o b e y o n d t h i s l i m i t i t s i n k s b a c k i n t o i t s e l f , a n d i n s o d o i n g i s d i s p l a c e d i n t o a
m o v i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n " ( 2 6 , 1 7 4 ; 9 1 ) . ( T h e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s i m m e d i a t e l y , s i n c e
t h e r e i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o r e n j o y m e n t h e r e , w h y i s t h i s n o t a m e r e r e p e t i t i o n o f
self-presentation? Nothing is pure here, nothing made up of simple opposi-
tions, everything happens as the reversal of itself, and the sublime transport is
the exact reverse of the dialectical sublation.)
At the limit, there is no longer either figure or figuration or form. Nor is
there the ground as something to which one could proceed or in which one
could exceed oneself, as in the Hegelian infinite, that is, as in a nonfigurable
instance which, infinite in its way, would not cease to cut a figure. (Such is, in
general, it seems to me, the concept with which one ends up as soon as one
names something like "the nonfigurable" or "the nonpresentable": one
(re)presents its nonpresentability, and one has thus aligned it, however nega-
tively, with the order of presentable things.) At the limit, one does not pass on.
But it is there that everything comes to pass, it is there that the totality of the
unlimited plays itself out, as that which throws into mutual relief the two bor-
ders, external and internal, of all figures, adjoining them and separating them,
delimiting and unlimiting the limit thus in a single gesture.
It is at once an infinitely subtle, infinitely complex operation, and the
most simple movement in the world, the strict beating of the line against itself
in the motion of its outline. Two borders in one, union "itself," nothing less is
required by all figures, as every painter, writer, and dancer knows. It is presen-
tation itself, but no longer presentation as the operation of a (re)presenter
producing or exhibiting a (re)presented. It is presentation itself at the point
where it can no longer be said to be "itself," at the point where one can no
longer say the presentation, and where it is consequently no longer a question
of saying either that it presents itself or that it is nonpresentable. Presentation
"itself' is the instantaneous division of and by the limit, between figure and
elimination, the one against the other, the one upon the other, the one at the
other, coupled and uncoupled in a single movement, in the same incision, the
same beating.
What comes to pass here, at the limit-and which never gets definitively
past the limit-is union, imagination, presentation. It is neither the produc-
tion of the homogeneous (which is in principle the ordinary task of the
schema) nor the simple and free accord of self-recognition in which beauty
consists, for it is this side of or beyond the accord of beauty. But it is also not
the union of heterogeneous elements, which would be already too romantic
and too dialectical for the strict limit in question here. The union with which
one has to do in the sublime does not consist in coupling absolute greatness
with finite limits: for there is nothing beyond the limit, nothing either pre-
sentable or nonpresentable. It is indeed this affirmation, "there is nothing
beyond the limit," that properly and absolutely distinguishes the thOUght of
the sublime (and art) from dialectical thought (and the end of art as its com-
pletion). Union does not take place between an outside and an inside in order
to engender the unity of a limit where unity would present itself (according to
this logic, the limit itself becomes infinite, and the only art is that which traces
t h e H e g e l i a n " c i r c l e o f c i r c l e s . " ) B u t t h e r e i s o n l y t h e l i m i t , u n i t e d w i t h u n l i m -
i t a t i o n i n s o f a r a s t h e l a t t e r s e t s i t s e l f o f f , s e t s i t s e l f u p , a n d u p s e t s i t s e l f i n c e s -
s a n t l y o n i t s b o r d e r , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y i n s o f a r a s t h e l i m i t , u n i t y , d i v i d e s i t s e l f
i n f i n i t e l y i n i t s o w n p r e s e n t a t i o n .
F o r d i a l e c t i c a l t h o u g h t , t h e c o n t o u r o f a d e s i g n , t h e f r a m e o f a p i c t u r e ,
t h e t r a c e o f w r i t i n g p o i n t b e y o n d t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l a b s o l u t e o f a
( p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e ) t o t a l p r e s e n t a t i o n . F o r t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , t h e
c o n t o u r , t h e f r a m e , a n d t h e t r a c e p o i n t t o n o t h i n g b u t t h e m s e l v e s - a n d e v e n
t h i s i s s a y i n g t o o m u c h : t h e y d o n o t p o i n t a t a l l , b u t p r e s e n t ( t h e m s e l v e s ) , a n d
t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n p r e s e n t s i t s o w n i n t e r r u p t i o n , t h e c o n t o u r , f r a m e , o r t r a c e .
T h e u n i o n f r o m w h i c h t h e p r e s e n t e d o r f i g u r e d u n i t y a r i s e s p r e s e n t s i t s e l f a s
t h i s i n t e r r u p t i o n , a s t h i s s u s p e n s i o n o f i m a g i n a t i o n ( o r f i g u r a t i o n ) i n w h i c h
t h e l i m i t t r a c e s a n d e f f a c e s i t s e l f . T h e w h o l e h e r e - t h e t o t a l i t y t o w h i c h e v e r y
p r e s e n t a t i o n , e v e r y w o r k , c a n n o t b u t l a y c l a i m - i s n o w h e r e b u t i n t h i s s u s -
p e n s i o n i t s e l f . I n t r u t h , t h e w h o l e , o n t h e l i m i t , d i v i d e s i t s e l f j u s t a s m u c h a s i t
u n i t e s i t s e l f , a n d t h e w h o l e i s n o t h i n g b u t t h a t : t h e s u b l i m e t o t a l i t y d o e s n o t
r e s p o n d , d e s p i t e c e r t a i n a p p e a r a n c e s , t o t h e s u p r e m e s c h e m a o f a " t o t a l p r e -
s e n t a t i o n , " e v e n i n t h e s e n s e o f a n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r a p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( f o r t h a t a l w a y s p r e s u p p o s e s a c o m p l e m e n t , a n
o b j e c t o f p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t h e e n t i r e l o g i c o f r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n : h e r e t h e r e i s
n o t h i n g t o p r e s e n t b u t m e r e l y t h a t i t [ f a ] p r e s e n t s i t s e l f . ) T h e s u b l i m e t o t a l i t y
d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o a s c h e m a o f t h e W h o l e , b u t r a t h e r , i f o n e c a n p u t i t t h i s
w a y , t o t h e w h o l e o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m : t h a t i s , t o t h e i n c e s s a n t b e a t i n g w i t h
w h i c h t h e t r a c e o f t h e s k e m a a f f e c t s i t s e l f , t h e c a r r y i n g a w a y o f t h e f i g u r e
a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e c a r r y i n g a w a y o f u n l i m i t e d n e s s d o e s n o t c e a s e t o d o b a t t l e ,
t h i s t i n y , i n f i n i t e p u l s a t i o n , t h i s t i n y , i n f i n i t e , r h y t h m i c b u r s t t h a t p r o d u c e s
i t s e l f c o n t i n u o u s l y i n t h e t r a c e o f t h e l e a s t c o n t o u r a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e
l i m i t i t s e l f p r e s e n t s i t s e l f , a n d o n t h e l i m i t , t h e m a g n i t u d o , t h e a b s o l u t e o f
g r e a t n e s s i n w h i c h a l l g r e a t n e s s ( o r q u a n t i t y ) i s t r a c e d , i n w h i c h a l l i m a g i n a -
t i o n b o t h i m a g i n e s a n d - - o n t h e s a m e l i m i t , i n t h e s a m e b e a t i n g - f a i l s t o
i m a g i n e . T h a t w h i c h i n d e f i n i t e l y t r e m b l e s a t t h e b o r d e r o f t h e s k e t c h , t h e s u s -
p e n d e d w h i t e n e s s o f t h e p a g e o r t h e c a n v a s : t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e
d e m a n d s n o m o r e t h a n t h i s .
I n s u m , f r o m t h e b e a u t i f u l t o t h e s u b l i m e o n e m o r e s t e p i s t a k e n i n t h e
" h i d d e n a r t " o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m : i n b e a u t y t h e s c h e m a i s t h e u n i t y o f t h e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n ; i n t h e s u b l i m e , t h e s c h e m a i s t h e p u l s a t i o n o f t h e u n i t y . T h a t i s , a t
o n c e i t s a b s o l u t e v a l u e ( m a g n i t u d o ) a n d i t s a b s o l u t e d i s t e n s i o n , u n i o n t h a t
t a k e s p l a c e i n a n d a s s u s p e n s i o n . I n b e a u t y , i t i s a m a t t e r o f a c c o r d ; i n t h e s u b -
l i m e , i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h e s y n c o p a t e d r h y t h m o f t h e t r a c e o f t h e a c c o r d , s p a s -
m o d i c v a n i s h i n g o f t h e l i m i t a l l a l o n g i t s e l f , i n t o u n l i m i t e d n e s s , t h a t i s , i n t o
n o t h i n g . T h e s u b l i m e s c h e m a t i s m o f t h e t o t a l i t y i s m a d e u p o f a s y n c o p a t i o n
a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m i t s e l f : s i m u l t a n e o u s r e u n i o n a n d d i s t e n s i o n o f
t h e l i m i t o f p r e s e n t a t i o n - - o r m o r e e x a c t l y , a n d m o r e i n e x o r a b l y : r e u n i o n a n d
43
distension, positing and vanishing of simultaneity (and thus of presentation)
itself. Instantaneous flight and presence of the instantaneous, grouping and
strewn division of a present. (I will not insist further on this here, but it is
doubtless in terms of time that one ought finally to interpret the aesthetics of
the sublime. This presupposes perhaps the thought of a time of the limit, of a
time of the fainting of the figure, which would be the proper time of art?)
That the imagination-that is, presentation in the active sense-attains
the limit, that it faints and vanishes there, "sinks back into itself," and thus
comes to present itself, in the foundering of a syncopation or rather as this
syncopation "itself," this exposes the imagination to its destiny. The "proper
destiny of the subject" is definitively the "absolute greatness" of the sublime.
What the imagination, in failing, avows to be unimaginable, is its proper
greatness. The imagination is thus destined for the beyond of the image. This
beyond is not a primordial (or ultimate) presence (or absence) which images
would represent or of which images would present the fact that it is not
(re)presentable. Rather, the beyond of the image, which is not "beyond," but
on the limit, is in the Bildung of the Bild itself. and thus at or on the edge of the
Bild. the outline of the figure. the tracing. the separating-uniting incision. the
beating of the schema: the syncopation. which is in truth the other name of
the schema. its sublime name. if there be such things as sublime names.
The imagination (or the subject) is destined for, sent toward. dedicated
and addressed to this syncopation. That is. presentation is dedicated,
addressed to the presentation of presentation itself: this is the general destiny of
aesthetics, of reason in aesthetics, as I said at the outset. But in the sublime, it
turns out that this destiny implies an unbordering or a going overboard of the
beautiful, for the presentation of presentation itself, far from being the imagi-
nation of the imagination and the schema of the schema. far from being the
figuration of the self-figuration of the subject. takes place in and as syncopa-
tion. and thus does not take place, does not have at its disposal the unified
space of a figure, but rather is given in the schematic spacing and throbbing of
the trace of figures, and thus only comes to pass in the syncopated time of the
passage of the limit to the limit.
However, syncopated imagination is still imagination. It is still the fac-
ulty of presentation. and like the beautiful the sublime is still tied "to mere
presentation." (In this sense. it is not beyond the beautiful: it is merely the
beautiful's unbordering. on the border itself. not going beyond the border-
and this is also why. as I will consider further below. the entire affair of the
sublime occurs on the edges of works of "fine art." on their borders. frames, or
contours: on the border of art. but not beyond art.)
How. then. does the imagination (re)present the limit, or rather-for
this is perhaps the same question-how does it present itself at the limit?
The mode of presentation of a limit in general cannot be the image
p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g . T h e i m a g e p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g p r e s u p p o s e s t h e l i m i t w h i c h
p r e s e n t s i t o r w i t h i n w h i c h i t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f . B u t t h e s i n g u l a r m o d e o f t h e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f a l i m i t i s t h a t t h i s l i m i t m u s t b e r e a c h e d , m u s t c o m e t o b e
t o u c h e d . T h i s i s , i n f a c t , t h e s e n s e o f t h e w o r d s u b l i m i t a s : w h a t s t a y s j u s t b e l o w
t h e l i m i t , w h a t t o u c h e s t h e l i m i t ( l i m i t b e i n g c o n c e i v e d , i n t e r m s o f h e i g h t , a s
a b s o l u t e h e i g h t ) . S u b l i m e i m a g i n a t i o n t o u c h e s t h e l i m i t , a n d t h i s t o u c h l e t s i t
f e e l " i t s o w n p o w e r l e s s n e s s . " I f p r e s e n t a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e a b o v e a l l i n t h e r e a l m
o f t h e s e n s i b l e - t o p r e s e n t i s t o r e n d e r s e n s i b l e - s u b l i m e i m a g i n a t i o n i s
a l w a y s i n v o l v e d i n p r e s e n t a t i o n i n s o f a r a s t h i s i m a g i n a t i o n i s s e n s i b l e . B u t
h e r e s e n s i b i l i t y n o l o n g e r c o m p r i s e s t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a f i g u r e b u t r a t h e r t h e
a r r i v a l a t t h e l i m i t . M o r e p r e c i s e l y , s e n s i b i l i t y i s h e r e t o b e s i t u a t e d i n t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n ' s s e n t i m e n t o f i t s e l f w h e n i t t o u c h e s i t s l i m i t . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n
f e e l s i t s e l f p a s s i n g t o t h e l i m i t . I t f e e l s i t s e l f , a n d i t h a s t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b -
l i m e i n i t s " e f f o r t " ( B e s t r e b u n g ) , i m p u l s e , o r t e n s i o n , w h i c h m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t a s
s u c h a t t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e l i m i t i s t o u c h e d , i n t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f t h e
i m p u l s e , t h e b r o k e n t e n s i o n , t h e f a i n t i n g o r f a d i n g o f a s y n c o p a t i o n .
T h e s u b l i m e i s a f e e l i n g , a n d y e t , m o r e t h a n a f e e l i n g i n t h e b a n a l s e n s e ,
i t i s t h e e m o t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t a t t h e l i m i t . T h e s u b j e c t o f t h e s u b l i m e , i f t h e r e
i s o n e , i s a s u b j e c t w h o i s m o v e d . I n t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , i t i s a q u e s t i o n
o f t h e e m o t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t , o f t h a t e m o t i o n w h i c h n e i t h e r t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f
s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d b e a u t y n o r t h e a e s t h e t i c s o f f i c t i o n a n d d e s i r e i s c a p a b l e o f
t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h , f o r t h e y t h i n k n e c e s s a r i l y a n d s o l e l y w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f
t h e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e s u b j e c t ( a n d o f t h e s u b j e c t a s e n j o y m e n t ) . A n d e n j o y -
m e n t q u a s a t i s f a c t o n o f a n a p p r o p r i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n c u t s e m o t i o n s h o r t .
T h u s i t i s a q u e s t i o n h e r e o f t h i s e m o t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h , t o b e s u r e ,
t h e r e w o u l d b e n o b e a u t y , a r t w o r k , o r t h o u g h t - b u t w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t s o f
b e a u t y , t h e w o r k , a n d p h i l o s o p h y , b y t h e m s e l v e s a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , c a n n o t
t o u c h . T h e p r o b l e m i s n o t t h a t t h e y a r e t o o " c o l d " ( t h e y c a n b e q u i t e l i v e l y
a n d w a r m ) b u t t h a t t h e y ( a n d t h e i r s y s t e m - b e a u t y / w o r k l p h i l o s o p h y ) a r e
c o n s t r u c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l o g i c I h a v e d e s i g n a t e d a b o v e a s t h e l o g i c o f t h e
s e l f - e n j o y m e n t o f R e a s o n , t h e l o g i c o f t h e s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i m a g i n a t i o n . I t
i s t h e a e s t h e t i c l o g i c o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l o g i c o f a e s t h e t i c s .
T h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e , i n i t s e m o t i o n , m a k e s t h i s l o g i c v a c i l l a t e , b e c a u s e i t
s u b s t i t u t e s f o r t h i s l o g i c w h a t f o r m s , a g a i n , i t s e x a c t r e v e r s e , o r r a t h e r ( w h i c h
c o m e s d o w n t o t h e s a m e t h i n g ) a s o r t o f l o g i c a l e x a s p e r a t i o n , a p a s s a g e t o t h e
l i m i t : t o u c h i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n o n i t s l i m i t , o r r a t h e r , b e i n g t o u c h e d , a t t a i n e d b y
i t . T h i s e m o t i o n d o e s n o t c o n s i s t i n t h e s w e e t l y p r o p r i e t a r y p a t h o s o f w h a t o n e
c a n c a l l " a e s t h e t i c e m o t i o n . " T o t h i s e x t e n t , i t w o u l d b e b e t t e r t o s a y t h a t t h e
f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e i s h a r d l y a n e m o t i o n a t a l l b u t r a t h e r t h e m e r e m o t i o n
o f p r e s e n t a t i o n - a t t h e l i m i t a n d s y n c o p a t e d . T h i s ( e ) m o t i o n i s w i t h o u t c o m -
p l a c e n c y a n d w i t h o u t s a t i s f a c t i o n : i t i s n o t a p l e a s u r e w i t h o u t b e i n g a t t h e
s a m e t i m e a p a i n , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e a f f e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e K a n t i a n
s u b l i m e . B u t i t s a m b i v a l e n c e d o e s n o t m a k e i t a n y l e s s s e n s i b l e , . d o e s n o t r e n -
der it less effectively or less precisely sensible: it is the sensibility of the fading of
the sensible.
Kant characterizes this sensibility in terms of striving and transport
[elan]. Striving, transport, and tension make themselves felt (and perhaps this
is their general logic or "pathetics") insofar as they are suspended, at the limit
(there is no striving or tension except at the limit), in the instant and the beat-
ing of their suspension. 16 It is a matter, Kant writes, of the "feeling of an arrest
of the vital forces" (Hemmung, "inhibition," "impinging upon," or "block-
age"). Suspended life, breath cut off-the beating heart.
It is here that sublime presentation properly takes place. It takes place in
effort and feeling:
Reason ... as faculty of the independence of the absolute total-
ity ... sustains the effort, admittedly sterile, of the spirit to harmo-
nize the representation of the senses with Totality. This effort and
the feeling that the Idea is inaccessible to imagination constitute
in and of themselves a presentation of the subjective purposive-
ness of our spirit in the use of the imagination concerning its
super-sensible destiny. (CI, 29, 105; 128)17
"Striving," Bestreben, is not to be understood here in the sense of a p r o ~
ject, an envisioned undertaking that one could evaluate either in terms of its
intention or in terms ofits result. This striving cannot be conceived in terms of
either a logic of desire and potentiality or a logic of the transition to action and
the work or a logic of the will and energy (even if all of that is doubtless also
present and is not to be neglected if one wishes to provide an account of Kant's
thought, which is not my intention here). Rather, striving is to be understood
on its own terms, insofar as it obeys in itself only a logic (as well as a "pathetics"
and an ethics) of the limit. Striving or transport is by definition a matter of the
limit. It consists in a relation to the limit: a continuous effort is the continuous
displacement of a limit. The effort ceases where the limit cedes its place. Striv-
ing and exertion transport the limit into themselves: it becomes their structure.
In striving as such-and not in its success or failure-it is less a question of a
tendency toward something, of the direction or project of a struggling subject,
than of the tension of the limit itself. What tends, and what tends here toward
or in the extreme, is the limit. The schema of the image, of any image-or the
schema of totality, the schematism of total union-is extended toward and
tensed in the extreme: it is the limit at the limit of its (ex)tension, the tracing-
which.is no longer quantifiable or hence traceable-of magnitudo. Stretched to
the limit, the limit (the contour of the figure) is stretched to the breaking point,
as one says, and it in fact does break, dividing itself in the instant between two
borders, the border of the figure and its unlimited unbordering. Sublime pre-
sentation is the feeling of this striving at the instant of rupture, the imagination
s t i l l f o r a n i n s t a n t s e n s i b l e t o i t s e l f a l t h o u g h n o l o n g e r i t s e l f , i n e x t r e m e t e n s i o n
a n d d i s t e n s i o n ( " o v e r f l o w i n g " o r " a b y s s " ) .
( O r a g a i n , t h e s t r i v i n g i s a s t r i v i n g t o r e a c h a n d t o u c h t h e l i m i t . T h e
l i m i t i s t h e s t r i v i n g i t s e l f a n d t h e t o u c h i n g . T o u c h i n g i s t h e l i m i t o f i t s e l f : t h e
l i m i t o f i m a g e s a n d w o r d s , c o n t a c t - a n d w i t h t h i s , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h e i m p o s s i -
b i l i t y o f t o u c h i n g i n s c r i b e d i n t o u c h i n g , s i n c e t o u c h i n g i s t h e l i m i t . T h u s ,
t o u c h i n g i s s t r i v i n g , b e c a u s e i t i s n o t a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s b u t a l i m i t . I t i s n o t o n e
s e n s o r y s t a t e a m o n g o t h e r s , i t i s n e i t h e r a s a c t i v e n o r a s p a s s i v e a s t h e o t h e r s . I f
a l l o f t h e s e n s e s s e n s e t h e m s e l v e s s e n s i n g , a s A r i s t o t l e w o u l d h a v e i t ( w h o ,
m o r e o v e r , e s t a b l i s h e d a l r e a d y t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o t r u e c o n t a c t , e i t h e r i n t h e
w a t e r o r i n t h e a i r ) , t o u c h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e o t h e r s e n s e s t a k e s p l a c e o n l y i n
t o u c h i n g i t s e l f . B u t m o r e t h a n t h e o t h e r s a l s o , i t t h u s t o u c h e s i t s l i m i t , i t s e l f a s
l i m i t : i t d o e s n o t a t t a i n i t s e l f , f o r o n e t o u c h e s o n l y i n g e n e r a l ( a t ) t h e l i m i t .
T o u c h i n g d o e s n o t t o u c h i t s e l f , a t l e a s t n o t a s s e e i n g s e e s i t s e l f . )
T h e s u b l i m e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a p r e s e n t a t i o n b e c a u s e i t g i v e s i t s e l f t o b e
s e n s e d . B u t t h i s s e n t i m e n t , t h i s f e e l i n g i s s i n g u l a r . A s a s e n t i m e n t o f t h e l i m i t ,
i t i s t h e s e n t i m e n t o f a n i n s e n s i b i l i t y , a n o n s e n s i b l e s e n t i m e n t ( a p a t h e i a ,
p h l e g m a i n s i g n i f i c a t u b o n o , K a n t s a y s ) , a s y n c o p a t i o n o f s e n t i m e n t . B u t i t i s
a b s o l u t e s e n t i m e n t a s w e l l , n o t d e t e r m i n e d a s p l e a s u r e o r a s p a i n b u t t o u c h i n g
t h e o n e t h r o u g h t h e o t h e r , t o u c h e d b y t h e o n e i n t h e o t h e r . T h e a l l i a n c e o f
p l e a s u r e w i t h p a i n o u g h t n o t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f e a s e a n d u n e a s e , o f
c o m f o r t a n d d i s c o m f o r t c o m b i n e d i n o n e s u b j e c t b y a p e r v e r s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
F o r t h i s s i n g u l a r a m b i v a l e n c e h a s t o d o f i r s t o f a l l w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s u b j e c t
v a n i s h e d i n t o i t . I t i s a l s o n o t t h e c a s e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t g a i n s p l e a s u r e b y m e a n s
o f p a i n ( a s K a n t t e n d s t o p u t i t ) ; i t d o e s n o t p a y t h e p r i c e o f t h e o n e i n o r d e r t o
h a v e t h e o t h e r : r a t h e r , t h e p a i n h e r e i s t h e p l e a s u r e , t h a t i s , o n c e a g a i n , t h e
l i m i t t o u c h e d , l i f e s u s p e n d e d , t h e b e a t i n g h e a r t .
I f f e e l i n g p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d i s a l w a y s s u b j e c t i v e , i f i t i s i n d e e d t h e c o r e o f
s u b j e c t i v i t y i n a p r i m o r d i a l " f e e l i n g o n e s e l f ' o f w h i c h a l l t h e g r e a t p h i l o s o -
p h i e s o f t h e s u b j e c t c o u l d p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e m o s t " i n t e l l e c t u a l -
i s t " a m o n g t h e m , t h e n t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e s e t s i t s e l f o f f - o r a f f e c t s
i t s e l f - p r e c i s e l y a s t h e r e v e r s a l o f b o t h f e e l i n g a n d s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h e s u b l i m e
a f f e c t i o n , K a n t a f f i r m s , g o e s a s f a r a s t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f a f f e c t i o n , t h e p a t h o s o f
a p a t h y . T h i s f e e l i n g i s n o t a f e e l i n g - o n e s e l f , a n d i n t h i s s e n s e , i t i s n o t a f e e l i n g
a t a l l . O n e c o u l d s a y t h a t i t i s w h a t r e m a i n s o f f e e l i n g a t t h e l i m i t , w h e n f e e l i n g
n o . l o n g e r f e e l s i t s e l f , o r w h e n t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y t h i n g t o f e e l . O f t h e b e a t -
i n g h e a r t , o n e c a n s a y w i t h e q u a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n e i t h e r t h a t i t f e e l s o n l y i t s b e a t -
i n g o r t h a t i t n o l o n g e r f e e l s a n y t h i n g a t a l l .
O n t h e b o r d e r o f t h e s y n c o p a t i o n , f e e l i n g , f o r a m o m e n t , s t i l l f e e l s ,
w i t h o u t a n y l o n g e r b e i n g a b l e t o r e l a t e ( i t s e l f ) t o i t s f e e l i n g . I t l o s e s f e e l i n g : i t
f e e l s i t s l o s s , b u t t h i s f e e l i n g n o l o n g e r b e l o n g s t o i t : a l t h o u g h t h i s f e e l i n g i s
q u i t e s i n g u l a r l y i t s o w n , t h i s f e e l i n g i s n o n e t h e l e s s a l s o t a k e n u p i n t h e l o s s o f
w h i c h i t i s t h e f e e l i n g . T h i s i s n o l o n g e r t o f e e l b u t t o b e e x p o s e d .
Or in other words. one would have to construct a double analytic of
feeling: one analytic of the feeling of appropriation. and another analytic of
the feeling of exposition: one of a feeling through or by oneself and another
of a feeling through or by the other. Can one feel through the other. through
the outside. even though feeling seems to depend on the self as its means and
even though precisely this dependence conditions aesthetic judgment? This is
what the feeling of the sublime forces us to think.
18
The subjectivity of feeling
and of the judgment of taste are converted here into the singularity of a feel-
ing and a judgment that remain. to be sure. singular. but where the singular
as such is first of all exposed to the unlimited totality of an "outside" rather
than related to its proper intimacy. Or in other words. it is the intimacy of
the "to feel" and the "to feel oneself' that produces itself here. paradoxically.
as exposition to what is beyond the self. passage to the (in)sensible or
(un)feeling limit of the self.
Can one still say that the totality is presented in this instant? If it were
properly presented. it would be in or to that instance of presentification (or
(re)presentation) which is the subjectivity of feeling. But the unlimitedness
that affects the exposed feeling of the sublime cannot be presented to it. that is.
this unlimitedness cannot become present in and for a subject. In its syncopa-
tion. the imagination presents itself. presents itself as unlimited. beyond (its)
figure. but this means that it is affected by (its) nonpresentation. When Kant
characterizes feeling. in the striving for the limit. as "a representation." one
must consider this concept in the absence of the values of presence and the
present. One must learn-and this is perhaps the secret of the sublime as well
as the secret of the schematism-that presentation does indeed take place but
that it does not present anything. Pure presentation (presentation of presenta-
tion itself) or presentation of the totality presents nothing at all. One could no
doubt say. in a certain vocabulary. that it presents nothing or the nothing. In
another vocabulary. one could say that it presents the nonpresentable. Kant
himself writes that the genius (who represents a parte subjecti the instance of
the sublime in art) "expresses and communicates the unnamable." The with-
out-name is named. the inexpressible is communicated: all is presented-at
the limit. But in the end. and precisely at this limit itself. where all is achieved
and where all begins. it will be necessary to deny presentation its name.
It will be necessary to say that the totality-or the union of the unlim-
ited and the unlimitedness of union. or again presentation itself. its faculty.
act. and subject-is offered to the feeling of the sublime or is offered. in the
sublime. to feeling. The offering retains of the "present" implied by presenta-
tion only the gesture of presenting. The offering offers. carries. and places
before (etymologically. of-fering is not very different from ob-ject). but it does
not install in presence. What is offered remains at a limit. suspended on the
border of a reception. an acceptance-which cannot in its turn have any form
other than that of an offering. To the offered totality. the imagination is
o f f e r e d - t h a t i s , a l s o " s a c r i f i c e d " ( a u f g e o p f e r t ) , a s K a n t w r i t e s .
1 9
T h e s a c r i f i c e d
i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o f f e r e d t o i t s l i m i t .
T h e o f f e r i n g i s t h e s u b l i m e p r e s e n t a t i o n : i t w i t h d r a w s o r s u s p e n d s t h e
v a l u e s a n d p o w e r s o f t h e p r e s e n t . W h a t t a k e s p l a c e i s n e i t h e r a c o m i n g - i n t o -
p r e s e n c e n o r a g i f t . I t i s r a t h e r t h e o n e o r t h e o t h e r , o r t h e o n e a n d t h e o t h e r ,
b u t a s a b a n d o n e d , g i v e n u p . T h e o f f e r i n g i s t h e g i v i n g u p o f t h e g i f t a n d o f t h e
p r e s e n t . O f f e r i n g i s n o t g i v i n g - i t i s s u s p e n d i n g o r g i v i n g u p t h e g i f t i n t h e
f a c e o f a l i b e r t y t h a t c a n t a k e i t o r l e a v e i t .
W h a t i s o f f e r e d i s o f f e r e d u p - a d d r e s s e d , d e s t i n e d , a b a n d o n e d - t o t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r e s e n t a t i o n t o c o m e , b u t i t i s l e f t t o t h i s c o m i n g a n d d o e s n o t
i m p o s e o r d e t e r m i n e i t . " I n s u b l i m e c o n t e m p l a t i o n , " K a n t w r i t e s , " t h e s p i r i t
a b a n d o n s i t s e l f , w i t h o u t p a y i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f o r m o f t h i n g s , t o t h e i m a g i -
n a t i o n a n d t o r e a s o n , w h i c h o n l y e n l a r g e s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . " T h e a b a n d o n i s
t h e a b a n d o n t o t o t a l e x t e n s i o n , u n l i m i t e d , a n d t h u s a t t h e l i m i t . W h a t c o m e s
t o p a s s a t t h e l i m i t i s t h e o f f e r i n g .
T h e o f f e r i n g t a k e s p l a c e b e t w e e n p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
b e t w e e n t h e t h i n g a n d t h e s u b j e c t , e l s e w h e r e . T h i s i s n o t a p l a c e . y o u w i l l s a y .
I n d e e d , i t i s t h e o f f e r i n g - i t i s b e i n g o f f e r e d t o t h e o f f e r i n g .
T h e o f f e r i n g d o e s n o t o f f e r t h e W h o l e . I t d o e s n o t o f f e r t h e p r e s e n t
t o t a l i t y o f t h e u n l i m i t e d . N o r , d e s p i t e c e r t a i n p o m p o u s a c c e n t s a u d i b l e i n
K a n t ' s t e x t ( a n d i n e v e r y t e x t d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s u b l i m e , i n t h e w o r d s u b l i m e
i t s e l f ) , d o e s i t o f f e r t h e s o v e r e i g n s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a s p i r i t c a p a b l e o f t h e i n f i n i t e .
F o r i f s u c h a c a p a c i t y , a t t h e l i m i t , i s s u p p o s e d t o b e a t t a i n e d , i t c o n s i s t s i n
n o t h i n g b u t a n o f f e r i n g , o r i n b e i n g - o f f e r e d . I n f a c t , i t i s n o t a m a t t e r h e r e o f
t h e W h o l e o r t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o f t h e W h o l e . I t i s a m a t t e r o f i t s I d e a a n d o f t h e
d e s t i n y o f r e a s o n . T h e I d e a o f t h e W h o l e i s n o t a s u p r e m e i m a g e , n o r i s i t a
g r a n d i o s e f o r m - n o r d e f o r m i t y - b e y o n d a l l i m a g e s , a n y m o r e t h a n t h e d e s -
t i n y o f r e a s o n c o n s i s t s i n a t r i u m p h a n t I d e a l . T h e I d e a o f t h e w h o l e m e a n s
r a t h e r ( f i n a l l y , n e i t h e r " I d e a " n o r " W h o l e " ) t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n g a g i n g a t o t a l -
i t y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n v o l v i n g o n e s e l f i n t h e u n i o n o f a t o t a l i t y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o f b e g i n n i n g , a l o n g t h e e d g e o f t h e u n l i m i t e d , t h e o u t l i n e o f a f i g u r e . I f i t i s a
m a t t e r o f t h e w h o l e , t h e n a s " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y o p e n " o f w h i c h D e l e u z e
s p e a k s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s u b l i m e .
2 0
T h e o p e n i n g i s o f f e r e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o f g e s t u r e w h i c h " t o t a l i z e s " f i g u r e s , o r t r a c e s . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y o f a b e g i n n i n g i s
f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m i s t h e s u b l i m e i d e a k a t ' e x o c h e n . T h i s m e a n s n e i t h e r t h a t
f r e e d o m i s t h e c o n t e n t o r t h e o b j e c t o f t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e s u b l i m e n o r t h a t i t
i s f r e e d o m t h a t m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t i n t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e . I n a l l l i k e l i h o o d ,
t h a t w o u l d m a k e n o s e n s e w h a t s o e v e r , f o r f r e e d o m i s n o t a c o n t e n t , i f i n d e e d
i t i s a n y t h i n g a t a l l . I n s t e a d , o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h i s : t h a t t h e s u b l i m e o f f e r -
i n g i s t h e a c t - o r t h e m o t i o n o r e m o t i o n - o f f r e e d o m . T h e s u b l i m e o f f e r i n g
i s t h e a c t o f f r e e d o m i n t h e d o u b l e s e n s e t h a t f r e e d o m i s b o t h w h a t o f f e r s a n d
w h a t i s o f f e r e d - j u s t a s t h e w o r d o f f e r i n g d e s i g n a t e s n o w t h e g e s t u r e , n o w t h e
p r e s e n t o f f e r e d .
In the sublime, the imagination qua free play of presentation comes into
contact with its limit-which is freedom. Or more exactly, freedom itself is a
limit, because its Idea not only cannot be an image but also cannot-in spite
of Kant's vocabulary-be an Idea (which is always something like a hyper-
image, a nonpresentable image). It must be an offering.
21
The sublime does not escape to a space beyond the limit. It remains at
the limit and takes place there. This means, further, that it does not leave aes-
thetics in order to penetrate ethics. At the limit of the sublime, there is neither
aesthetics nor ethics. There is a thought of the offering which defies this dis-
tinction.
The aesthetics of the beautiful transports itself into the sublime when-
ever it does not slide into mere enjoyment. The beautiful by itself is nothing-
the mere self-accord of presentation. The spirit can enjoy this accord, or it can
carry itself to the limit of this accord. The unlimited border of the limit is the
offering. The offering offers something. I said above that it offers liberty. But
liberty is also what does the offering here. Something, a sensible thing, is
offered in the offering ofliberty. It is in this sensible thing, on the edge of this
sensible thing that the limit makes itself felt. This sensible thing is the beauti-
ful, the figure presented by schematism without concepts. The condition of
the schematism is nothing other than liberty itself. Kant declares this explicitly
when he writes: "the imagination itself is, in accordance with the principles of
the schematism of the faculty of judgment (consequently, to the extent that it
is subordinate to liberty), the instrument of reason and its Ideas" (Cf, 29;
106; 109-10). Thus, it is liberty that offers the schematism, or again, it is lib-
erty that schematizes and offers itself in this very gesture, in its "hidden art."
The sublime offering takes place neither in a hidden world withdrawn
from our own nor in a world of "Ideas" nor in any world of a "nonpre-
sentable" something or other. The sublime offering is the limit of presenta-
tion, and it takes place on and all along this limit, along the contour of form.
The thing offered can be a thing of nature, and this is ordinarily, according to
Kant, the occasion of the feeling of the sublime. But since this thing, as a thing
of liberty, is not merely offered but also offers itself, offers liberty-in the
striving of the imagination and in the feeling of this striving-then this thing
will be instead a thing of art (moreover, nature itself is always grasped here as
a work of art, a work of supreme liberty). Kant places poetry above all the
other arts, describing it as follows: "it enlarges the soul by giving liberty to the
imagination and by offering
22
within the limits of a given concept, among the
limitless diversity of forms which might accord with it, that form which links
the presentation of this concept with a plenitude of thoughts, to which no
expression of language is perfectly adequate, and which in so doing elevates
itself aesthetically to the level of the Ideas."
There is thus in art more than one occasion for experiencing sublimity.
T h e r e i s - i n p o e t r y a t l e a s t
2 3
- a n e l e v a t i o n ( t h a t i s , a s u b l i m e m o t i o n : K a n t
u s e s t h e v e r b , e r h e b e n h e r e ) t o t h e " I d e a s " w h i c h , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s a n e l e v a -
t i o n , r e m a i n s a e s t h e t i c , t h a t i s , s e n s i b l e . W o u l d o n e h a v e t o c o n c l u d e f r o m
t h i s t h a t t h e r e c o u l d b e a n o t h e r f o r m o r m o d e o f s u b l i m e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a r t ,
t h a t o f m o r a l f e e l i n g , w h i c h w o u l d b e d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e f i r s t m o d e ? B u t i n
t r u t h , i t i s i n a r t a n d a s a r t t h a t t h e s u b l i m e o f f e r i n g h a p p e n s . T h e r e i s n o
o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n a n a e s t h e t i c s o f f o r m a n d a n e t h i c a l m e t a - a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e
f o r m l e s s . T h e a e s t h e t i c a l w a y s c o n c e r n s f o r m ; t h e t o t a l i t y a l w a y s c o n c e r n s t h e
f o r m l e s s . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e i r m u t u a l o f f e r i n g . I t i s n e i t h e r s i m p l y t h e f o r m a -
t i o n o r f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f t h e f o r m l e s s n o r t h e i n f i n i t i z a t i o n o f f o r m ( w h i c h a r e
b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o c e d u r e s ) . I t i s h o w t h e l i m i t o f f e r s i t s e l f t o t h e b o r d e r o f
t h e u n l i m i t e d , o r h o w t h e l i m i t m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t : e x a c t l y o n t h e c u t t i n g e d g e o f
t h e f i g u r e t h e w o r k o f a r t c u t s .
I t w o u l d n o t b e d i f f i c u l t t o d e m o n s t r a t e - a n d I d i s p e n s e w i t h d o i n g s o
h e r e - t h e s y s t e m a t i c e n g e n d e r m e n t o r d e r i v a t i o n o f a r t , i n K a n t , o n t h e b a s i s
o f b o t h t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e . O n l y i n t h i s w a y c a n o n e u n d e r s t a n d
b o t h t h e o r d e r o f K a n t ' s t a b l e o f c o n t e n t s i n t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e a n d t h e d o c -
t r i n e o f g e n i u s , a s w e l l a s t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a s " s y m b o l " o f t h e e t h i -
c a l l y g o o d .
B e g i n n i n g w i t h K a n t . t h e s u b l i m e w i l l c o n s t i t u t e t h e m o s t p r o p e r , d e c i -
s i v e m o m e n t i n t h e t h o u g h t o f a r t . T h e s u b l i m e w i l l c o m p r i s e t h e h e a r t o f t h e
t h o u g h t o f t h e a r t s . t h e b e a u t i f u l m e r e l y i t s r u l e . T h i s m e a n s n o t o n l y t h a t . a s I
h a v e s a i d . m e r e b e a u t y c a n a l w a y s s l i d e i n t o t h e a g r e e a b l e ( a n d , f o r e x a m p l e ,
i n t o t h e " s u b l i m e s t y l e " ) b u t p e r h a p s , a b o v e a l l . t h a t t h e r e i s n o " p u r e " s u b -
l i m e p u r e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e b e a u t i f u l . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h a t t h r o u g h
w h i c h t h e b e a u t i f u l t o u c h e s u s a n d n o t t h a t t h r o u g h w h i c h i t p l e a s e s u s . I t i s
j o y a n d n o t e n j o y m e n t [ I a j o i e . n o n l a j o u i s s a n c e ] : t h e t w o w o r d s a r e o r i g i n a l l y
t h e s a m e w o r d . T h e s a m e w o r d . t h e s a m e l i m i t a f f e c t e d b y t h e b e a t i n g o f j o y
a n d e n j o y m e n t . T o b e t o u c h e d i s s u b l i m e b e c a u s e i t i s t o b e e x p o s e d a n d t o b e
o f f e r e d . T o e x p e r i e n c e j o y i s t o b e e x p o s e d i n e n j o y m e n t , t o b e o f f e r e d t h e r e .
T h e s u b l i m e i s i n t h e c o n t a c t o f t h e w o r k . n o t i n i t s f o r m . T h i s c o n t a c t i s
b e y o n d . t h e w o r k . a t i t s l i m i t . i n a s e n s e b e y o n d a r t : b u t w i t h o u t a r t , i t w o u l d
n o t t a k e p l a c e . T h e s u b l i m e i s - t h a t a r t s h o u l d b e [ s o i t ] e x p o s e d a n d o f f e r e d .
S i n c e t h e e p o c h o f K a n t - - o f D i d e r o t . K a n t , a n d H o l d e r l i n - a r t h a s
b e e n d e s t i n e d f o r t h e s u b l i m e : i t h a s b e e n d e s t i n e d t o t o u c h u s , i n t o u c h i n g
u p o n o u r d e s t i n y o r d e s t i n a t i o n . I t i s o n l y i n t h i s s e n s e t h a t o n e m u s t c o m p r e -
h e n d , i n t h e e n d , t h e e n d o f a r t .
W h a t a r t i s a t s t a k e h e r e ? I n a s e n s e , o n e h a s n o c h o i c e . n e i t h e r b e t w e e n
p a r t i c u l a r a r t s n o r b e t w e e n a r t i s t i c t o n a l i t i e s a n d r e g i s t e r s . P o e t r y i s e x e m -
p l a r y - b u t w h i c h p o e t r y ? Q u i t e i n d i r e c t l y . K a n t h a s g i v e n u s a n e x a m p l e .
W h e n h e c i t e s " t h e m o s t s u b l i m e p a s s a g e o f t h e B o o k o f t h e L a w o f t h e J e w s . "
t h a t w h i c h a r t i c u l a t e s t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f i m a g e s . t h e s u b l i m e , i n f a c t . i s p r e s e n t
t w i c e . I t i s p r e s e n t f i r s t i n t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e d i v i n e c o m m a n d m e n t , i n t h e d i s -
tancing of representation. But a more attentive reading shows that the sublime
is present also, and perhaps more essentially, in the "form" of the biblical text
For this passage is quoted in the middle of what properly constitutes the search
for the genre or aesthetics of "sublime presentation." This presentation must
attempt neither to "agitate" nor to "excite" the imagination but ought always
to be concerned with the "domination of reason over sensibility." And this
presupposes a "withdrawn or separated presentation" (abgezogen, abgesondert)
which will be called a bit further on "pure, merely negative." This presentation
is the commandment, the law that commands the abstention from images.
24
The commandment, as such, is itself a form, a presentation, a style.
And so sublime poetry would have the style of the commandment?
Rather, the commandment, the categorical imperative, is sublime because it
commands nothing other than freedom. And if that comprises a style, it can-
not be the muscular style of the commandment. It is what Kant calls simplic-
ity: "Simplicity (purposiveness without art) is so to speak the style of nature in
the sublime, as of morality which is a second nature."
It is not the commandment that is simple but rather simplicity that
commands. The art of which Kant speaks--or of which, at the limit, he does
not manage to speak, while speaking of the Bible, poetry, and forms of union
in the fine arts-is the art of which the "simplicity" (or the "withdrawal" or
the "separation") commands by itself, that is, addresses or exposes to free-
dom, with the simplicity of the offering: the offering as law of style.
"Purposiveness without art" (without artifice) is the art (the style) of
purposiveness without purpose, that is, of the purposiveness of humanity in
its free destination: humans are not devoted to the servility of representation
but destined to the freedom of presentation and to the presentation of free-
dom-to their offering, which is a withdrawn or separate presentation (free-
dom is offered to them, they offer it, they are offered by it). This style is the
style of a commandment or proscription because it is the style of a literature
that proscribes for itself to be "literature," that withdraws from literary pres-
tige and pleasure (which Kant compares to the massages of the "voluptuous
orientals"): the effort by means of which it withdraws is itself a sublime offer-
ing. In short, the offering of literature itself, or the offering of all art-in all
possible senses of the expression.
But "style" is doubtless here already one concept too many, like
"poetry," "literature," and perhaps even "art" itself. They are certainly inap-
propriate and superfluous here if they remain caught up in a logic of lack and
its substitute, presence and its representation (such as this logic still governs,
at least in part, the Kantian doctrine of art as a "symbol"). For nothing is lack-
ing in the offering. Nothing is lacking, everything is offered: the whole is
offered (opened), the totality of freedom. But to receive the offering, or to
offer oneself to it (to joy), presupposes precisely the freedom of a gesture--of
reception and offering. This gesture traces a limit. It is not the contour of a fig-
5 2 J E A N - ' L u c N A N C Y
u r e o f f r e e d o m . B u t i t i s a c o n t o u r , a n o u t l i n e , b e c a u s e i t a r i s e s i n f r e e d o m ,
w h i c h i s t h e f r e e d o m t o b e g i n , t o i n c i s e , h e r e o r t h e r e , a n o u t l i n e , a n i n s c r i p -
t i o n , n o t m e r e l y a r b i t r a r i l y , b u t s t i l l i n a c h a n c y , d a r i n g , p l a y f u l , a b a n d o n e d
m a n n e r .
A b a n d o n e d b u t n o n e t h e l e s s r e g u l a t e d : t h e s y n c o p a t i o n d o e s n o t t a k e
p l a c e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a l l s y n t a x , b u t r a t h e r i m p o s e s o n e , o r b e t t e r , i t i s o n e
i t s e l f . I n i t s p u l s a t i o n - w h i c h a s s e m b l e s - , i n i t s s u s p e n s i o n - w h i c h e s t a b -
l i s h e s a n d e x t e n d s a r h y t h m - , t h e s y n c o p a t i o n o f f e r s i t s s y n t a x , i t s s u b l i m e
g r a m m a r , o n t h e e d g e o f t h e l a n g u a g e ( o r t h e d r a w i n g , o r t h e s o n g ) . C o n s e -
q u e n t l y , t h i s t r a c e i s s t i l l o r a g a i n a r t , t h i s i n s c r i p t i o n s t i l l o r a g a i n s t y l e ,
p o e t r y : f o r t h e g e s t u r e o f l i b e r t y i s e a c h t i m e a s i n g u l a r m a n n e r o f a b a n d o n i n g
o n e s e l f ( t h e r e i s n o s u c h t h i n g a s g e n e r a l l i b e r t y , n o s u c h t h i n g a s g e n e r a l s u b -
l i m i t y ) . T h i s i s n o t s t y l e " i n t h e a c c o u s t i c o - d e c o r a t i v e s e n s e o f t h e t e r m "
( B o r g e s ) , b u t i t i s a l s o n o t t h e p u r e a b s e n c e o f s t y l e o f w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
2 5
d r e a m s ( p h i l o s o p h y a s s u c h a n d w i t h o u t o f f e r i n g , a s o p p o s e d t o o r r a t h e r d i f -
f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m t h o u g h t ) : i t i s s t y l e , a n d t h e t h o u g h t o f a " w i t h d r a w n , s e p a -
r a t e d p r e s e n t a t i o n . " I t i s n o t a s t y l e - t h e r e i s n o s u b l i m e s t y l e , a n d t h e r e i s n o
s i m p l e s t y l e - b u t c o n s t i t u t e s a t r a c e , p u t s t h e l i m i t i n t o p l a y , t o u c h e s w i t h o u t
d e l a y a l l e x t r e m i t i e s - a n d i t i s p e r h a p s t h i s t h a t a r t o b e y s .
I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e r e i s p e r h a p s n o s u b l i m e a r t a n d n o s u b l i m e
w o r k , b u t t h e s u b l i m e t a k e s p l a c e w h e r e v e r w o r k s t o u c h . I f t h e y t o u c h , t h e r e
a r e s e n s i b l e p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n - a l l p l e a s u r e i s R h y s i c a l , K a n t r e p e a t s w i t h E p i -
c u r u s . T h e r e i s e n j o y m e n t , a n d t h e r e i s j o y i n e n j o y m e n t . T h e s u b l i m e i s n o t
w h a t w o u l d t a k e i t s d i s t a n c e f r o m e n j o y m e n t . E n j o y m e n t i s m e r e e n j o y m e n t
w h e n i t d o e s n o t h i n g b u t p l e a s e : i n t h e b e a u t i f u l . B u t t h e r e i s t h e p l a c e ( o r t h e
t i m e ) w h e r e ( o r w h e n ) e n j o y m e n t d o e s n o t m e r e l y p l e a s e , i s n o t s i m p l y p l e a -
s u r e ( i f t h e r e i s e v e r s u c h a t h i n g a s s i m p l e p l e a s u r e ) : i n t h e s u b l i m e , e n j o y m e n t
t o u c h e s , m o v e s , t h a t i s , a l s o c o m m a n d s . I t i s n o t c o m m a n d e d ( a n o b l i g a t i o n t o
e n j o y i s a b s u r d , K a n t w r i t e s , a n d L a c a n r e m e m b e r e d t h i s ) , b u t c o m m a n d s o n e
t o p a s s b e y o n d i t , b e y o n d p a t h o s , i n t o e t h o s , i f y o u l i k e , b u t w i t h o u t c e a s i n g t o
e n j o y : t o u c h i n g o r e m o t i o n q u a l a w - a n d t h e l a w i s n e c e s s a r i l y a - p a t h e t i c .
H e r e , " s o v e r e i g n a r t , " a s B a t a i l l e w r i t e s , " a c c e d e s t o t h e e x t r e m i t y o f t h e p o s s i -
b l e . " T h i s a r t i s i n d i s s o c i a b l y " a r t e x p r e s s i v e o f a n g u i s h " a n d " t h a t e x p r e s s i v e o f
j o y . " T h e o n e a n d t h e o t h e r i n a n e n j o y m e n t , i n a d i s p r o p r i a t e d e n j o y m e n t -
t h a t i s , i n t r a g i c j o y , o r i n t h i s a n i m a t e d j o y o f t h e " v i v a c i t y o f t h e a f f e c t s " o f
w h i c h K a n t s p e a k s ( 5 4 ) a n d w h i c h e x t e n d s t o t h e p o i n t o f l a u g h t e r a n d g a i -
e t y - t h e y t o o b e i n g s y n c o p a t e d , a t t h e l i m i t o f { r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n , a t t h e l i m i t o f
t h e " b o d y " a n d t h e " s p i r i t , " a t t h e l i m i t o f a r t i t s e l f .
. . . a t t h e l i m i t o f a r t : w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n " b e y o n d " a r t . T h e r e i s a l l t h e
l e s s a b e y o n d a s a r t i s a l w a y s a n a r t o f t h e l i m i t . B u t a t t h e l i m i t o f a r t t h e r e i s
t h e g e s t u r e o f t h e o f f e r i n g : t h e g e s t u r e t h a t o f f e r s a r t a n d t h e g e s t u r e t h r o u g h
w h i c h a r t i t s e l f r e a c h e s , t o u c h e s u p o n , a n d i n t e r f e r e s w i t h i t s l i m i t .
53
As offering. it may be that the sublime surpasses the sublime-passes it
by or withdraws from it. To the extent that the sublime still combines pathos
and ethos. art and nature. it continues to designate these concepts. and this is
why. as such. it belongs still to a space and problematic of (re}presentation. It
is for this reason that the word. "sublime." always risks burdening art either
with pathos or morality (too much presentation or too much representation).
But the offering no longer even arises out of an alliance of pathos and ethos. It
comes to pass elsewhere: offering occurs in a simplicity anterior to the distinc-
tion between pathos and ethos. Kant speaks of "the simplicity which does not
yet know how to dissimulate"; he calls it "naivete." and the laughter or rather
the smile in the face of this naIvete (which one must not confuse. he insists.
with the rustic simplicity of the one who doesn't know how to live) possesses
something of the sublime. However. "to represent naIvete in a poetic charac-
ter is certainly a possible and beautiful art. but a rare one."
Would he characterize this extremely rare art as being henceforth a telos
of art? There is in the offering something of the "naive" in Kant's sense. There
is sometimes. in today's art. something of the offering understood in this way.
Let us say: something of a childhood (doubtless nothing new about this but a
more strongly marked accent). This childlike art no longer inhabits the
heights or the depths as did the sublime but simply touches the limit. without
any disarticulating excess. without "sublime" exaltation. but also without
puerility or silliness. It is a powerful but delicate vibration. difficult. continu-
ous. acute. offered upon the surfaces of canvasses. screens. music. dance. and
writing. Mondrian spoke. apropos of jazz and "neo-plasticism." of "the joy
and the seriousness which are simultaneously lacking in the bloodless culture
of form." In what offers art today to its future. there is a certain kind of seren-
ity (Mondrian's word). It is neither reconciliation nor immobility nor peace-
ful beauty. but it is not sublime (self-)laceration either. assuming the sublime
is supposed to involve (seID-laceration. The offering renounces (self-)lacera-
tion. excessive tension. and sublime spasms and syncopations. But it does not
renounce infinite tension and distance. striving and respect. and the always
renewed suspension that gives art its rhythm like a sacred inauguration and
interruption. It simply lets them be offered to us.
My painting. I know what it is beneath its
appearances. its violence. its perpetual play of
force; it is a fragile thing in the sense of the
good. the sublime. it is fragile like love.
-Nicolas de Stael
Chapter 3
~
KANT OR THE SIMPLICITY
OF THE SUBLIMEl
Eliane Escoubas
Preamble
I shall begin by advancing a working hypothesis to be developed in the fol-
lowing pages. This hypothesis will be secured through an analysis of the Kant-
ian sublime.
The working hypothesis is this: despite its architectonic "fa.yade," Kant's
text constitutes itself through the operation of the "imagination" (Einbil-
dungskraft). The mode of its "constitution," of its textualization, is not that of
a bauen ("construction"), but of a bilden: the bilden of the Einbildungskraft. It
is that of a bilden which is a "fictioning or fashioning" as in the Latin fingere
("fashioning" or "forming"), of a bilden which erects no edifice and makes use
of no scaffolding or platform but "fashions" by tracing conceptual curves,
producing thematic turns and folds. It is the work of the turn, of returns,
detours, and (dis)torsions; a work of the trope or the strophe which, far from
letting the text congeal into the topology or topography which the all too
apparent "divisions" of concepts (Einteilungen) would seem to comprise, pro-
duces instead an involution of oppositions.
Take the play of dichotomies in the Kantian text. Each time, a third
term-a Mittelglied--intervenes not to serve as a "passage" between the two
previously "exposed" terms but utterly to transform the course of the given
conceptual elaboration. For example, the bipartition of the faculties of know 1-
edge, sensibility and understanding, is turned or re-turned by a third "fac-
ulty," the imagination. Similarly, the "division" of understanding and reason
is turned or re-turned by the "faculty of judgment" (Urteilskraft). And it is on
the basis of their common status, as the "intermediate member" (Mittelglied),
55
5 6 E L I A N E E S C O U B A S
t h a t E i n b i l d u n g s k r a f t a n d a e s t h e t i c U r t e i l s k r a f t t e n d t o c o i n c i d e . T h i s " e q u i v a -
l e n c e " o f E i n b i l d u n g s k r a f t a n d U r t e i l s k r a f t i s s o s t r o n g t h a t , a s b e c o m e s e v i d e n t
i n w h a t f o l l o w s , i t i s t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n f l w h i c h c o m p l e t e s t h e K a n t i a n
t h e o r y o f i m a g i n a t i o n .
T h e K a n t i a n " r e t u r n " a n d r e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n w i l l
g i v e i t s e l f t o b e r e a d h e r e a s a " f a s h i o n i n g " i n s c r i b e d i n d i v e r s e v e r s i o n s a n d
d i v e r s i o n s : t h o s e o f r e f l e x i o n , o f D a r s t e l l u n g o r p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d o f s y n t h e s i s .
T h e s e v e r s i o n s w i l l b e t h e e v i d e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e a n d i t s s i m p l i c i t y .
I m a g i n a t i o n - R e f l e x i o n
E i n b i l d u n g s k r a f t a n d a e s t h e t i c U r t e i l s k r a f t a r e r e l a t e d , i f n o t i d e n t i c a l , b y v i r t u e
o f t h e i r c o m m o n n o n o b j e c t i v i t y . T h e y c o i n c i d e i n t h e r e t r e a t [ r e t r a i t ] o f t h e
o b j e c t . B u t t h i s r e t r e a t o f t h e o b j e c t d o e s n o t h a v e t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a l a c k .
T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n a l y t i c o f t h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n c l o s e s w i t h t h e t a b l e
o f t h e c o n c e p t o f " n o t h i n g " ( N i c h t s ) . T h i s t a b l e o f n o t h i n g i s o r g a n i z e d i n f o u r
d i r e c t i o n s . T h r e e o f t h e m a r e i n s c r i b e d i n t h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e " n o t o n e "
( k e i n ) : t h e s e a r e t h e e n s r a t i o n i s , t h e n i h i l p r i v a t i v u m , a n d t h e n i h i l
n e g a t i v u m - s u p p r e s s i o n , p r i v a t i o n , a n d n e g a t i o n . O n e o f t h e m , t o t h e c o n -
t r a r y , p r o c e e d s a f f i r m a t i v e l y , a t t h e v e r y h e a r t o f t h e r e t r e a t o r e v a c u a t i o n o f
t h e o b j e c t : i t i s t h e e n s i m a g i n a r i u m . T h e r e t r e a t o r e v a c u a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i s
h e r e n e i t h e r s u p p r e s s i o n n o r p r i v a t i o n n o r n e g a t i o n , b u t e v i d e n c e o f f o r m ,
a f f i r m a t i v i t y o f f o r m : " s i m p l e [ o r " m e r e , " b l o f i e - I . L . ] f o r m . . . , w i t h o u t s u b -
s t a n c e , i s n o t a n o b j e c t i n i t s e l f , b u t t h e s i m p l e f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h i s o b j e c t
( a s p h e n o m e n o n ) , l i k e p u r e s p a c e a n d p u r e t i m e w h i c h , w h i l e t h e y h a v e t h e
q u a l i t y o f f o r m s o f i n t u i t i o n , a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s o b j e c t s o f i n t u i t i o n [ e n s i m a g -
i n a r i u m J " ( C P R , 2 4 9 ; 2 9 5 ) . T h e r e t r e a t i s h e r e p r o p e r l y a r e - t r e a t m e n t o r r e -
t r a c i n g w h i c h c a n c l a i m t o b e p r o p e r l y " s o m e t h i n g " ( e t w a s ) : f o r m . T h e i m a g -
i n a t i o n g i v e s i t s e l f o u t a s t h e f a c u l t y o f f o r m a t t h e h e a r t o f o b j e c t i v e
n o t h i n g n e s s . T h e c h a p t e r o n t h e s c h e m a t i s m a l r e a d y e x p o s e d t h i s a f f i r m a t i v -
i t y o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , f o r t h e s c h e m a h e r e a r o s e f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r e o f n e u -
t r a l i z a t i o n ( n e i t h e r . . . n o r ) : n e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n n o r c o n c e p t . T h i s " n e u t r a l i t y " o f
t h e s c h e m a d i d n o t m a k e o f i t t h e s i t e o f a l a c k b u t t h e s i t e o f p l a y ( i n s o f a r a s
t h e s c h e m a i s a " g e n e r a l p r o c e d u r e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n f o r p r o c u r i n g f o r a c o n -
c e p t i t s i m a g e " ) . F o r m a l i t y a n d n e u t r a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i n r e t r e a t
f r o m t h e o b j e c t , i n r e t r e a t f r o m t h e i m a g e . N o n o b j e c t i v i t y q u a r e t r e a t i s t h e
a f f i r m a t i v i t y o f a p r o p r i e t y o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e " t u r n " t h a t g i v e s t o t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n i t s e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y : f o r m a l i t y .
T h e s a m e i s t h e c a s e f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g -
m e n t . F r o m t h e s t a r t , t h e b e a u t i f u l , a s e x p r e s s i o n o f a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t , i s
d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f i t s q u a l i t y n o t a s t h e " r e l a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o i t s
o b j e c t , " b u t a s t h e " r e l a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e e n t i r e f a c u l t y o f r e p r e -
The Simplicity of the Sublime 57.
sentations" (CJ, l, 50; 38). Here too, the retreat of the object occurs; the
judgment of taste, the beautiful, as imagination, constitutes a taking of dis-
tance from the other of representation, a taking of distance from what stands
over against it (the Gegen-stand). The result of this nonobjectivity or nonop-
position is that aesthetic judgment cannot be the site where knowledge occurs.
Let us now look more closely at this loss of knowledge, this sort of imaginative
or aesthetic hysteria. For the aesthetic judgment is stated through the opera-
tion of the "pure cut" and the Kantian text is in mourning for beauty.3 And
yet, in spite of everything, the object is there; the statement of the beautiful is
only possible through a certain presence of the object. A strange presence,
indeed, for the statement that it is beautiful provides me with no knowledge of
this object, and the nonobjectivity of this presence reads as the flip side of my
indifference to the existence of the object. Nonetheless, it is of the object that I
state beauty; I act "as if;.!als ob) the beautiful were a "quality" (Beschaffenheit)
of the object (7). The "without" of the retreat of the object is never unaccom-
panied by the simulacrum [semblantl ofits presence. This simulacrum, this "as
if' (als ob), this play of simulation, traverses from one end to the other the
entire Critique of Judgment and constitutes its thematic matrix, but the course
of the development of this simulacrum across the Critique of Judgment takes
various twists and turns which will inflect it in a direction quite different from
that of Tiiuschung, of the mere "illusion" or trap. The primary effect of the
simulacrum is to prevent the "pure cut" (Spaltung) and the determination of
beauty-or of art or the imagination-as absolute mourning.
If there is simulation, it is because the imaginary, or the aesthetic, is
inscribed in an operation of the simul, in the articulation of the simulacrum
and the similar: in a mimetics. How is this mimetics determined, if not as mir-
ror of the subject-since the beautiful is "the relation of the representation to
the faculty of representations itself'-as the "returning" of the subject to itself
in a pure auto-affection? The purposiveness of aesthetic judgment, which is a
formal purposiveness because it is without concept or purpose, is in fact a
subjective purposiveness. This is the sense of aesthetic "pleasure" (Wohlge-
fallen), in its dual aspect as the delectable (the beautiful as feeling of taste) and
as pathos (the sublime)-mimicries or affects of the subject. But what is this
pantomimic play, this play of the relay or return of the subject to itselft As we
know, this pantomimic play also provides no knowledge of the subject itself
(C/, 3, 51; 39-40). The statement of the beautiful states nothing, neither of
the object nor of the subject: aesthetic judgment is not determinant but reflex-
ive. As retreat of the subject, mirror of mirrors, relay of relays, and reflexion
without determination or end, reflexive judgment is declined in the neuter. it
is not inscribed in any opposition of same and other, inside and outside. The
simul of the simulacrum will have to take some form other than that of simili-
tude and reproductive mimesis. Moreover, we can now get a glimpse of the
singular strangeness of aesthetic judgment: qua judgment, it is the site on
w h i c h a n a t t r i b u t i o n o c c u r s , w h e r e a s q u a a e s t h e t i c , i t c a n n o t a t t r i b u t e t h e
b e a u t i f u l t o t h e o b j e c t o f w h i c h i t s t a t e s t h e b e a u t y .
I s t h e r e n o t s o m e t h i n g o f t h e m o n s t r o u s ( u n g e h e u e r ) a n d , h e n c e , t h e
s u b l i m e i n t h i s s t r a n g e s t a t u s o f t h e c o p u l a , i n t h e " i s " o f t h e " i t i s b e a u t i f u l " ?
T h r o u g h t h i s m o n s t r o s i t y , o n e o f t h e t w o m o d e s o f a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t , t h e
s u b l i m e m o d e , c o m e s t o b e t h e o r i g i n o f a l l a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t , t h a t i s , t h e o r i -
g i n b o t h o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d o f t h e s u b l i m e i t s e l f . T h r o u g h t h i s m o n s t r o s i t y ,
t h e r e c o m e s t o b e a s u b l i m i t y a n t e r i o r t o a l l a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t . F u r t h e r , i t
m a y b e t h a t t h i s u n g e h e u e r o f t h e " i s " o f t h e " i t i s b e a u t i f u l " r e v e a l s i t s e l f t o b e
t h e s i t e o n w h i c h a t u r n o f m i m e s i s c o m p l e t e s i t s e l f . T h i s u n g e h e u e r o f t h e " i s "
o f " i t i s b e a u t i f u l " i s a n e n t h u s i a s t i c e x p l o s i o n o f m i m e s i s : c o n f u s i o n o f a l l
t e r m s a n d t e r m i n o l o g y , p r o d u c t i o n w i t h o u t e n d o f t h e n e u t e r ( n e i t h e r t h e
s a m e n o r t h e o t h e r ) a s t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f f o r m .
N e i t h e r t h e s a m e n o r t h e o t h e r , b u t t h e m i d d l e , d i e M i t t e , d a s M i t t e l -
g l i e d : s u c h i s t h e K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n . A s t h e o p e r a t i o n o f m e d i a t i o n , t h e
m i d d l e t e r m b e t w e e n s e n s i b i l i t y a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t s e c u r e s i n t h e C r i t i q u e
o f P u r e R e a s o n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e , w h e r e a l l b e g i n s i n t h e m i d d l e .
B u t a s t h e m i d d l e t e r m , i t a l s o c o n f o u n d s f r o m t h e s t a r t a l l t e r m i n o l o g i e s , f o r
i m a g i n a t i o n i s , l i k e s e n s i b i l i t y , t h e f a c u l t y o f " p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r i n t u i t i o n s "
( D a r s t e l l u n g e n o d e r A n s c h a u u n g e n ) . A n d l i k e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t i s s p o n t a -
n e o u s , w h i l e s e n s i b i l i t y i s r e c e p t i v e . T h e j u d g m e n t t o o i s a M i t t e l g l i e d . I t i s
t h e m i d d l e t e r m b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n - t h e f a c u l t y o f c o n c e p t s
a n d t h e f a c u l t y o f i d e a s . H o w e v e r , a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t i s n o t f o u n d e d o n t h e
c o n c e p t o f t h e o b j e c t , b u t o n t h e s u b j e c t ' s " f e e l i n g " ( G e f U h l ) o f p l e a s u r e o r
p a i n . W h a t i s t h i s M i t t e w h e r e r e f l e x i o n o r r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t i s e l a b o r a t e d ?
W h a t d o e s t h e j u d g m e n t o f t a s t e , t h e b e a u t i f u l , r e f l e c t ? I t r e f l e c t s t h e S t i m -
m u n g o f t h e f a c u l t i e s o f t h e s u b j e c t : t h e i r a c c o r d , t h e i r h a r m o n i o u s a g r e e -
m e n t . T h e S t i m m u n g i s t h e M i t t e t h a t r e n d e r s p o s s i b l e t h e s t a t e m e n t , " i t i s
b e a u t i f u L " A n d K a n t i n t e r m i n a b l y r e i t e r a t e s t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e S t i m m u n g o f
t h e f a c u l t i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t ( e v e n w h e n t h i s S t i m m u n g
i s d e t e r m i n e d a s c o n f l i c t o f f a c u l t i e s , w h i c h i s t h e c a s e f o r t h e s u b l i m e ) . A n
i n c e s s a n t p u n c t u a t i o n o f t h e t e x t o f t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , S t i m m u n g
m i g h t w e l l b e t h e M i t t e o f K a n t i a n c r i t i q u e , o f t h e e n t i r e c r i t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e :
S t i m m u n g m i g h t w e l l o p e r a t e t h e e r a s u r e o f t h e E i n t e i l u n g - a " h a r m o n y "
( S t i m m u n g ) o r a " p l a y " ( S p i e l ) w h i c h w o u l d d o u b l e ( a n d d i s t o r t ) i n a d v a n c e
a l l p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r t i t i o n . F o r t w o u t t e r l y r e m a r k a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f S t i m -
m u n g n e e d t o b e e m p h a s i z e d . T h e f i r s t i s t h a t t h e M i t t e l g l i e d ( L e . , i m a g i n a -
t i o n o r f a c u l t y o f j u d g m e n t ) , w h i c h o p e r a t e s S t i m m u n g , i t s e l f b e c o m e s o n e o f
t h e t w o t e r m s b e t w e e n w h i c h t h e S t i m m u n g o p e r a t e s : f o r i t i s s a i d t h a t S t i m -
m u n g i n t e r r e l a t e s i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d i m a g i -
n a t i o n a n d r e a s o n i n t h e s u b l i m e - a n d t h i s t u r n o r t r o p e b l u r s a n y t o p o l o g y
o r t o p o g r a p h y o f t h e f a c u l t i e s . T h e s e c o n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o n s i s t s i n t h i s : t h a t
i n t h e b e a u t i f u l , S t i m m u n g m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f d i r e c t l y a s t h e a c c o r d o r h a r m o n y
The Simplicity of the Sublime 59
of the imagination and the understanding, whereas in the sublime, Stimmung
does not at first seem to be able to play any role, since there is here a "con-
flict" (Streit) between imagination and reason. One could oppose the conflict
of the sublime to the Stimmung of the beautiful. But the opposition does not
hold up, for the conflict between imagination and reason, in the sublime,
occurs as Stimmung of pleasure and pain, as their conjunction, whereas the
Stimmung of the beautiful manifested itself in their disjunction: pleasure or
pain. This is the second blurring of bauen by bilden.
What is the sense of Stimmung in Kant? An accord of the faculties of
representation, Stimmung is expressed in judgments (as "feelings") of the
beautiful and the sublime, which give us no knowledge of either their objects
or their subjects but simply manifest their subjects' "pleasure" (Wohlgefallen).
The Stimmungofthe beautiful and the sublime effects itself thus in the retreat
of the statement [l'enonce]: it is nothing that can be stated, and it itself states
nothing but rather coincides with the process itself of stating [1' enonciation]. It
coincides, that is, with the work of saying, which does not say itself in what is
said, or which says itself in what is said without saying itself there. And what is
this "pleasure" (Wohlgefallen) that Stimmung manifests? The beautiful (and
then the sublime) turns out to be nothing other than the pleasure of thinking-
"to feel with pleasure the representational state" (GI, 39, 126; 135)-which
can accompany the knowledge of an object but is never this knowledge itself.
Pure pleasure of thinking-this is what Kant will uncover and at the same time
cover up when, concerning the sublime, he refers to the super-sensible faculty,
which is not the knowledge of an object but is nonetheless attached to a "field"
(Feld). And through this gesture of territorialization, Kant tilts his text toward
the partition of a topos, indeed toward a topology.
Is this "play" (Spiel) of Stimmung a play of "mirroring" (Spiegelung)?
Clearly, as the process of stating and the pleasure of thinking, what returns in
the play of reflexion and Stimmung is neither the simul of simulation nor the
simui of similitude (neither simulacrum nor resemblance). We are dealing
here with something completely different from a reproductive mimetics: the
play of distanciation and proximity that inserts the statement into the hollow
of its being-stated and, conversely, inserts the process or event of stating into
the hollow of what it states. We are dealing with a difference without opposi-
tion, without ob-jectivity. According to Kant, this play of the faculties is noth-
ing other than contemplative pleasure (C], 12), and it consists in "preserving
the representational state and the activity of the faculties of knowledge": "we
linger over [ verweilen] the contemplation of the beautiful." What is the mean-
ing of this Verweilung of 12 that determines contemplation? Doubtless it is
an "activity" of the subject and thus a possibility of the "inner sense" (qua
essential property of the subject), that is, a possibility of time as auto-affection
of the subject. But through Verweilung, time inscribes itself as quite other than
the simple form of succession; the Weile of Verweilungis neither a partition or
6 0 : t L I A N E E S C O U B A S
p a r t o f t i m e n o r t h e i n c e s s a n t f l i g h t o f t i m e b u t t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f t i m e -
a n o t h e r n a m e f o r c o n t e m p l a t i o n . T h e t i m e o f t h e s o j o u r n , o f t h e A u f e n t h a l t l -
w h e r e t h e s o j o u r n i s n o t a p l a c e , a t e r r i t o r y , b u t a t a k i n g - p l a c e . I t i s a p u r e
f o r m o f t i m e , f o r i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n K a n t s a y s t h a t " t i m e i t s e l f d o e s
n o t f l o w a w a y , b u t r a t h e r t h i n g s f l o w a w a y i n t i m e . " S u s p e n s i o n o f t i m e , S n e i -
t h e r r e g r e s s i v e m e m o r y n o r p r o g r e s s i v e a n t i c i p a t i o n b u t t h e i n s c r i p t i o n o f a n
i m m e m o r i a l i t y : s u c h i s t h e s e n s e o f t h e K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e r e f l e x i o n
a n d S t i m m u n g o f i m a g i n a t i o n i n i t s p l a y t h u s c o i n c i d e , i n t h i s f i r s t t u r n , w i t h
t h e " a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A u f f a s s u n g ) o f t h e p u r e f o r m o f t i m e , t h e p u r e f o r m o f
t a k i n g - p l a c e - w h i c h i s a l s o , i n i t s a d j u d i c a t i v e a s p e c t , t h e v e r y p r o c e s s o f s t a t -
i n g i n t h e h o l l o w o f t h e s t a t e m e n t ,
6
t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a m i m e s i s w h i c h i s n o t
r e p r o d u c t i v e b u t p r o d u c t i v e .
I m a g i n a t i o n - D a r s t e l l u n g
F o r t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e f a c u l t y o f " p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r i n t u i t i o n s " ( D a r s t e l l u n -
g e n o d e r A n s c h a u u n g e n ) . W h a t i s t h e n i t s p l a y w i t h s e n s i b i l i t y , w h i c h i s i t s e l f
a l s o a f a c u l t y o f i n t u i t i o n s ? S e n s i b i l i t y i s r e c e p t i v e , w h e r e a s i m a g i n a t i o n i s
s p o n t a n e o u s ( f o r i t o p e r a t e s i n t h e a b s e n c e o r s e l f - e v a c u a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t ) .
B u t i n o r d e r t h a t a n o b j e c t s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e m a n i f o l d
o r t h e d i s p e r s i o n o f t h e w o r l d t o b e r e c e i v e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e f o r m s o f
s p a c e a n d t i m e . B e c a u s e o f t h e r e c e p t i v i t y o f s e n s i b i l i t y , w e h a v e t o d o w i t h
m e r e " o b - j e c t s " ( G e g e n - s t a n d e ) , w h i c h f a c e u s , i n a m e r c i l e s s o p - p o s i t i o n a n d
f r o m a n i r r e d u c i b l e a n d u n m a s t e r a b l e d i - s t a n c e : o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s i n t u i t u s
d e r i v a t u s - w h e r e a s f o r a n i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( i n t u i t u s o r i g i n a r i u s ) t h e
o b j e c t w o u l d b e " c r e a t i o n " ( E n t s t a n d ) . F o r u s , t h e w o r l d m u s t b e " g i v e n "
( g e g e b e n ) . I n t h i s d i - s t a n c e , i n t h i s d r i f t o f t h e g i f t o r d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e d o n a -
t i o n [ d e r i v e d u d o n ] , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n e n t e r s t h e " g a m e " ( S p i e l ) .
O n e m u s t t h e r e f o r e r e m a r k f i r s t o f a l l t h a t a s " f a c u l t y o f p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r
i n t u i t i o n s " t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s , e n i g m a t i c a l l y , t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e r e a l . H o w d o e s
i t i n t e r v e n e , w h a t i s i t s p a r t i n t h e g a m e ? I n t h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n , t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n e f f e c t s t h e m e d i a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s e n s i b i l i t y ,
b y p r e s e n t i n g t h e c o n c e p t w i t h i t s i n t u i t i o n . T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n i s c a l l e d t h e
s c h e m a . T h e s c h e m a , " m o n o g r a m o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n " ( C P R , 1 5 3 ; 1 8 3 ) , i s n o t
a s i m p l e i m a g e o r " c o p y " ( N a c h b i l d ) b u t a p r o c e s s , a r e l a t i o n , a p l a c i n g - i n t o -
r e l a t i o n : t h e s c h e m a i s t h e w o r k ( o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m ) , t h e w o r k o f t h e t u r n ,
e l a b o r a t i n g a t r o p o l o g y o f t h e c o n c e p t .
T h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s - a n d i s t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e r e a l - i n a n d a s t h i s l a b o u r .
T h e i m a g e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s a " v i e w " ( A n b l i c k ) a n d t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e
f a c u l t y o f . " a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A u f f a s s u n g ) . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o i n s i s t o n t h i s . I n
K a n t , t h e i m a g i n a r y i s q u i t e e n t i r e l y i n t h e r e a l . A s a f a c u l t y o f D a r s t e l l u n g o r
e x h i b i t i o , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e r e a l . I n f a c t ,
/
Versinnlichung, the sensible transposition operated by the schematism, is
hypotyposis, "subjectio sub aspectum" (Cf, 59,173; 197): it subjects to the gaze
or exhibits beneath the aspect. The aspectum and Anblick are the "giving-one-
self' of what gives itself.7 A "faculty of giving" (Vermogen des Gebens), a faculty
of the appearing of what appears, the imagination "differs" from sensibility in
that the latter receives the being in its this, in its quid, and the imagination
gives it in its form, its aspect: appearing-the faculty of the geben, of the es gibt,
of ontological difference.
I have said above that the faculty of aesthetic judgment judges in the
presence of the object, but in the withdrawal of its ob-jectivity. In the with-
drawal of the ob-jectivity of the being [l'etantl, this presence is neither
essence, the Wesen of Anwesenheit, nor subsistent presence, Vorhandensein. It
is the pure scintillation of appearing. The "gift" of the "giving" of imagination
resides in this scintillation. This is why, further, the imagination is most evi-
dently at playas faculty of the beautiful and sublime in the exclamation of the
beautiful and sublime (for the "judgment" of the beautiful and the sublime is
not an attribution but an exclamation), where a kind of formulation of the
scintillation of appearing takes place.
Let me adduce three indications of this in the text of the Critique of Judg-
ment. The first indication, in Section 26 (92; 91): "One ought not to demon-
strate the sublime in products of art ... nor in the things of nature
[Naturdingenl, the concept of which involves already a determinate purpose
[deren Begriff schon einen bestimmten Zweck bei sich fuhrt] ... but rather in raw
nature [an der rohen Natur] insofar as it contains greatness." What is the sense
of this rohe Natur, as opposed to the Naturdingen which involve a determinate
purpose? At first glance, rohe Natur is wild nature, as opposed to natural things
that have been transformed by humans toward the realization of their "ends"
(Zwecke). Rohe Natur includes such things as the ocean, storms, the setting of
the sun, and the light of the moon in their evident independence of any human
manipulation. Through this independence, raw nature is opposed to cultivated
fields, vegetable gardens, and groves, but also to rivers and forests, to land-
scapes, which are always more or less engendered by the passage of humans,
even if one doesn't realize it in looking at them. Where then is the line to be
drawn between Naturdingen and rohe Natun Does it pass between artisanal
manipulation and in-tact wildness? Does not the notion of "purpose" (Zweck)
authorize a more precise, more profound elucidation? To say that these natural
things have a purpose, that their concept involves a determinate purpose, is to
say that they are themselves determined, that their presentation is the presenta-
tion of their quiddity, that they are "what" they are. If on the other hand, die
rohe Natur makes us express sublimity, it does so not through what it is, not
through these ontic determinations, but through its how ("it contains great-
ness"). When rohe Naturimpels us to astonishment, at times to admiration, to
the exclamation of the sublime, it does so not through its what but through its
a p p e a r i n g , i t s " s h o w i n g i t s e l f ' a s s u c h . I t s " g r e a t n e s s " i s n o t t h e m e a s u r e o f t h e
b e i n g , t h e q u a n t i t y o f t h e b e i n g i n i t s t h i s ; i t s g r e a t n e s s i s n o t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
t h e b e i n g , b u t m e a s u r e l e s s , i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e , t h e a p p e a r i n g o f w h a t a p p e a r s .
T h e r o h e N a t u r o f S e c t i o n 2 6 t h u s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e f a c u l t y o f
t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d s u b l i m e , i s t h e m a t i z e d a s t h e f a c u l t y o f o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e ,
a s t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e " i s " i n " i t i s b e a u t i f u l " o r " i t i s s u b l i m e . "
A s e c o n d i n d i c a t i o n c a n b e f o u n d i n t h e " g e n e r a l r e m a r k " o f S e c t i o n 2 9
( 1 0 7 ; 1 1 0 - 1 1 ) :
I f w e c a l l t h e s i g h t [ A n b l i c k ] o f t h e s t a r r y h e a v e n s u b l i m e , w e m u s t
n o t p l a c e a t t h e b a s i s o f o u r j u d g m e n t c o n c e p t s o f w o r l d s i n h a b -
i t e d b y r a t i o n a l b e i n g s a n d r e g a r d t h e b r i g h t p o i n t s , w i t h w h i c h
w e s e e t h e s p a c e a b o v e u s f i l l e d , a s t h e i r s u n s m o v i n g i n c i r c l e s
p u r p o s i v e l y f i x e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e m ; b u t w e m u s t r e g a r d i t ,
j u s t a s w e s e e i t , a s a d i s t a n t , a l l - e m b r a c i n g v a u l t [ s o n d e r n b l o f i , m e
m a n i h n s i e h t , a l s e i n w e i t e s G e w o l b e , d a s a l l e s b e f a f i t ] . A n d t h e
s a m e g o e s f o r t h e s p e c t a c l e o f t h e o c e a n , w h i c h m u s t n o t b e
v i e w e d a s w e t h i n k o f i t , . . . w e m u s t r e g a r d i t a s p o e t s d o , m e r e l y b y
w h a t s t r i k e s t h e e y e [ s o n d e r n b l o f i , w i e d i e D i c h t e r t u n , n a c h d e m ,
w a s d e r A u g e n s c h e i n z e i g t J .
W h a t i s t h e s e n s e o f t h i s s e h e n b l o f i , w i e m a n i h n s i e h t ? I s n o t t h i s A u g e n -
s c h e i n t h a t g i v e s i t s e l f t o t h e g a z e o f t h e p o e t t h e " s l f o w i n g i t s e l f ' a s s u c h t h a t
t r a v e r s e s a l l o n t i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ? T h e v a s t v a u l t o f t h e s k y w o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y
b e n o t o n e t h i n g a m o n g o t h e r s , a b e i n g i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y , b u t " w h a t c o n t a i n s
a l l " ( d a s a l l e s b e f a f i t ) , n o t i n t h e s e n s e o f a c o n t a i n e r i t s e l f c o n t a i n e d i n a s t i l l
l a r g e r c o n t a i n e r , b u t i n t h e s e n s e o f w h a t i s c o n t a i n e d i n n o t h i n g b u t s i m p l y
m a k e s a l l h a n g t o g e t h e r , t h e a p p e a r i n g o f w h a t a p p e a r s - c l o s e t o w h a t t h e C r i -
t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n c a l l e d t h e a f f i n i t y o f t h e m a n i f o l d ( 1 2 7 ; 1 3 9 ) . T h e i m a g i -
n a t i o n , f a c u l t y o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d s u b l i m e , i s t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e p u r e " g i v i n g
t o b e s e e n " w h e r e t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o b e s e e n , t h e f a c u l t y o f s e i z i n g t h e b e i n g i n
i t s B e i n g , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s m a n n e r o f B e i n g : " a p p e a r i n g " [ A u g e n s c h e i n J ,
w h e r e t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ' s i m a g e i s n o t t o i m i t a t e b u t t o a p p e a r .
A n d o n e m u s t u n d e r s c o r e t h a t t h i s t u r n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e i n t h e
" m o m e n t " o f t h e m o d a l i t y o f t h e s u b l i m e .
A t h i r d i n d i c a t i o n , a l s o i n t h e " g e n e r a l r e m a r k " o f S e c t i o n 2 9 ( 1 1 1 ; 1 1 6 ) :
" S i m p l i c i t y ( p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t a r t ) i s s o t o s p e a k t h e s t y l e o f n a t u r e i n t h e
s u b l i m e [ E i n f a l t i s t g l e i c h s a m d e r S t i l d e r N a t u r i m E r h a b e n e n J , a n d s o a l s o o f
m o r a l i t y , w h i c h i s a ( s u p e r - s e n s i b l e ) s e c o n d n a t u r e . " A c o n t r a d i c t i o n a p p e a r s
a t o n c e . F i r s t t h e s t y l e o f n a t u r e i n t h e s u b l i m e , a s o f m o r a l i t y , i s c a l l e d " s i m -
p l e " ( E i n f a l t ) . H o w e v e r , t h i s s i m p l i c i t y g i v e s w a y t o a d u p l i c i t y : a s e c o n d
" n a t u r e , " a s u p e r - s e n s i b l e n a t u r e , t h r o u g h w h i c h K a n t ' s t e x t i n s c r i b e s i t s e l f i n
t h e s y s t e m o f a r c h i t e c t u r a l d i c h o t o m i e s . T h e r e w o u l d t h u s s e e m t o b e a k i n d
of second-floor of nature, a level analogous to that of the sensible but consti-
tuted by nonsensible determinations. Nonetheless, interfering with this estab-
lishment of various levels or this staged division of nature, a difference
inscribes itself, without high or low, between nature and its style. Its style is
simple. Style is not topologically assignable; nature cannot be divided into
itself and its style. Style is the "how" of its presentation. And this "how" of its
presentation is simple. If the "division" (Einteilung) passes between a sensible
nature and a super-sensible "nature," this division is a lapsus of the difference
that unites nature with its style, that unites them in the unity of a style, that is,
of the simple (Einfalt).
The simple (Ein-falt, the "One-fold") is the mode of presentation of
nature. It is this Ein-falt or this One-fold that the imagination gives to be
"seen" in the sublime. With the Kantian imagination, the One-fold is at stake,
there is One-foldness-in the greatest possible proximity to the One-in-all of
Heraclitus.
8
This One-fold makes of the imagination not a faculty of the dou-
ble, the redoubling of the sensible being by a super-sensible being, but a fac-
ulty of the "fold" (Falte) of the being in its Being, a faculty of the ontological
difference.
The Kantian imagination is the Darstellung of the Einfalt, the One-fold
as ontological difference. The Kantian imagination is not at all the operation
of a "cutting" (Spaltung), and the aesthetic Urteil is not a Teilung, a partition
or regionalization of the being. Also in Section 29, it is a question of the
Absonderung, the abstraction in which the sublime is inaugurated. However, it
is not at all a matter of a Teilung, but of the showing of what, at "work" (Werk)
in all showing, does not show up at all: Kant speaks thus of "negative presen-
tation," of "presentation of the infinite." That which, though it is at work in
every show and all showing, does not put in a showing (and only in this sense
steals the show), is form-another name for style. It is form, or space and time
themselves, insofar as there is no intuition of space and time. The imagination
is "simply" (blofi) "negative" presentation or the presentation "of the infini-
tude" of forms--of space and time, which are not the "cutting up" (Spaltung)
of things, but the "fold" (Falte), the Faltung of things. The Kantian imagina-
tion is also the faculty of the reality of the real.
Note on Style
Kant's text returns a second time to the theme of form, as style, as fashion and
fashioning in the dimension of the One-fold. And in a symptomatic way, this
occurs in the return of the text upon itself, in the elucidation of the "textual-
ity" of the text. In Section 49 (148; 162), one reads:
There exist in fact two fashions (modus) of organizing the exposi-
tion of one's thoughts, of which the one is called a manner (modus
6 4 E U A N E E s c o u B A s
a e s t h e t i c u s ) a n d t h e o t h e r a m e t h o d ( m o d u s l o g i c u s ) . T h e y d i f f e r i n
t h a t t h e f i r s t h a s n o m e a s u r e o t h e r t h a n t h e f e e l i n g [ G e f U h l ] o f
u n i t y i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w h e r e a s t h e s e c o n d o b e y s d e t e r m i n a t e
p r i n c i p l e s ; o n l y t h e f i r s t i s l e g i t i m a t e f o r f i n e a r t .
A n d i n S e c t i o n 6 0 ( 1 7 6 ; 2 0 0 ) , o n e r e a d s : " t h e r e i s t h u s n o t a m e t h o d [ L e h r a r t ]
( m e t h o d u s ) , b u t o n l y a m a n n e r ( m o d u s ) f o r t h e f i n e a r t s . " I t i s m a n i f e s t h e r e
t h a t t h e m a n n e r o f t h o u g h t o r a r t , l i k e t h e s t y l e o f n a t u r e , i s w h a t c a n n o t b e
a s s i m i l a t e d t o a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d d o e s n o t t h e r e f o r e c o m p r i s e t h e o b j e c t .
o f a p r e s e n t a t i o n b u t c o n s t i t u t e s r a t h e r t h e v e r y p r o c e s s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t i s
n o t t h e p u r e a n d s i m p l e d i s p o s i t i o n ( o r g a n i z a t i o n ) o f e l e m e n t s , t h e i r s t r u c -
t u r e , f o r t h e l a t t e r i s r e l a t e d t o m e t h o d b e c a u s e i t n e e d s " d e t e r m i n a t e p r i n c i -
p l e s . " T h e " m a n n e r , " a s o p p o s e d t o s t r u c t u r e a n d m e t h o d , c a n n e i t h e r b e
l o c a l i z e d n o r o t h e r w i s e a c c o u n t e d f o r . E s c a p i n g e v e r y i n v e n t o r y o f b e i n g s
( t o w a r d w h i c h t h e L e h r a r t a l l u d e s ) , i t i s . t h e i n c a l c u l a b l e t r i a l o r o r d e a l o f
B e i n g - E r f i n d u n g a s i n v e n t i o n ( n o t i n v e n t o r y ) o r a s e n c o u n t e r [ r e n c o n t r e ] :
" t h e f e e l i n g o f u n i t y i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n " : i t i s t h a t w h i c h u n i q u e l y f a s h i o n s
i t s e l f i n B i l d e n . T h u s , w i t h K a n t a n o t i o n o f f o r m i s i n a u g u r a t e d w h i c h i s n o t
s t r u c t u r a l b u t o n t o l o g i c a l . T h e i n v e n t u s , t h e " d i s c o v e r y " o f t h e i n v e n t i o n -
t u r n o r t r o p e ( t r o p a r e m e a n s " t o f i n d " ) , " m a n n e r " o f t h o u g h t a n d a r t , " s t y l e "
o f n a t u r e - i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e " b e c o m i n g - f o r m " o f n a t u r e , o r t h e
" b e c o m i n g - f o r m " o f t h e t e x t : i t i s n e i t h e r a p u t t i n g - i n t o - f o r m o f c o n t e n t n o r a
" d e s i g n " ( Z w e c k o r A b s i c h t ) n o r a " s t r u c t u r e " ( B a u ) b u t t h e p h e n o m e n o n a s a
m o d e o f e n c o u n t e r . T h e p h e n o m e n o n a n d t h e " m a n n e r " a r e t w o f a c e s o f t h e
s a m e e n c o u n t e r , r o o t e d i n t h e d o u b l e s e n s e o f K a n t i a n a i s t h e s i s - - t h e a s t o n i s h -
i n g c o n j u n c t i o n o f t h e " a e s t h e t i c s " o f t h e s e n s i b l e a n d t h e a e s t h e t i c s o f a r t , a
c o n j u n c t i o n t h e e x p l o r a t i o n o f w h i c h i s t h e m a t r i x i t s e l f o f K a n t ' s t e x t . T h i s
c o n j u n c t i o n i s w h a t , i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , K a n t c e a s e l e s s l y e n c o u n t e r s
( o r " f i n d s " o r " i n v e n t s " ) a s w h a t a l w a y s r e m a i n s t o b e i n t e r r o g a t e d , o r r a t h e r
q u i t e s i m p l y s a i d . T h i s " t o b e s a i d , " t h i s " s a y i n g " o f a i s t h e s i s , i n i t s d o u b l e
s c i n t i l l a t i o n , b u t a l w a y s a l r e a d y u n i f i e d i n t h e " O n e - f o l d , " ( E i n f a l t ) , a r t i c u -
l a t e s i t s e l f o r i s a r t i c u l a t e d a s " m a n n e r . "
I m a g i n a t i o n - S y n t h e s i s
T h i s " m a n n e r , " t h i s " f e e l i n g o f u n i t y i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " i n s c r i b e s i t s e l f a n d
K a n t ' s t e x t i n a n o t h e r t u r n : t h e t u r n o f s y n t h e s i s . T h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n , i n
f a c t , i n s t a l l s i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e M i t t e : a s M i t t e l g l i e d b e t w e e n s e n s i b i l i t y a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b e t w e e n t h e s e n s i b l e m a n i f o l d a n d t h e u n i t y o f t h e c o n c e p t . A s
t h e M i t t e l g l i e d , i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e " c o m p o s i t i o n " ( Z u s a m m e n s e t -
z u n g ) o f t h e m a n i f o l d o r t h e f a c u l t y o f " c o n n e c t i o n " ( V e r b i n d u n g ) . C o m p o s i -
t i o n a n d c o n n e c t i o n a r e e q u i v a l e n t t o s y n t h e s i s , t o t h e w o r k o f g a t h e r i n g . H e r e ,
on the architectural edge of the text, Kant will playa double game. On the one
hand, the first edition of 1781 determines imagination in the operation of its
own overflowirig. In fact, three modalities of gathering, three a priori syntheses,
are at work in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and the synthesis
of imagination can be found to be at once a part and the whole of synthesis. .
Synthesis is triply declined. First of all as synthesis of "apprehension"
(Auffassung) , seizure of the sensible manifold, resumption of what is dis-
persed, in the play of time as form of the successive; the synthesis of apprehen-
sion is a serial synthesis, in the form of "one after the other," of "one by one,"
installing the series as a series of slices of time, a succession of "nows," the
gathering of each "now" into the "now" as such. The synthesis of apprehen-
sion is the apprehension of the instant, the Augenblick, play of the wink of an
eye-and thus Augenblick is properly a schema. Secondly, there is the the syn-
thesis of reproduction, also for Kant an operation of imagination, a regressive,
anamnesic synthesis, in accordance with the schema of "anew," "one more
time," for here too the schema is at play but as the schema of repetition, re-
production of the Abbild, image, imitation, copy, replication, in relation with
the principle of the association and affinity of the diverse. Thirdly, there is the
sYnthesis of recognition, the synthesis of the progression toward the unity that
constitutes the concept of the object-here the one, the unit, is the schema.
One can thus see that the imagination is at the same time one of the
three syntheses ("there are three sources of our knowledge: sensibility and the
synopsis of the manifold, imagination and the synthesis of the manifold, and
apperception as unity of this synthesis" [CPR, 105-6; 127]) and the operation
of synthesis within each of these three moments, for in each a schema, the
product of Einbildung itself, must intervene. Hence, "imagination" (Einbil-
dung) exceeds itself as a topologically situable instance and is at work on all of
these levels, in each of these moments. The play of the imagination as play of
synthesis functions within each faculty, confounding all dichotomies and tri-
chotomies.
But Kant will then proceed to efface this confusion, in the second edition
of 1787, where the imagination comes to be placed henceforth in the "service"
of the understanding, contained within certain limits, more or less assigned to
the tasks of reproduction and "comparison" (Vergleichung). It gives way
before "the original synthetic unity of apperception," which is another name
for the "I think." A bungled revision on Kant's part, for synthesis in general
continues to be the operation of imagination: "synthesis in general is the sim-
ple [blofle] effect of imagination, that is, of a blind function of the soul" (CPR,
93; 112). This passage is maintained in the second edition, but in his own copy
Kant replaced "soul" (Seele) with "understanding" {Verstand}.
The result is incomprehensible. Either the understanding thus becomes
the entire soul, but then one could no longer comprehend how understand-
ing, in its eminent clear-sightedness, could involve a blind function. Or the
i m a g i n a t i o n , a s f a c u l t y o f s y n t h e s i s , i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e " I t h i n k " - t h e b l i n d
s p o t o f w h i c h i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t a r t i c u l a t e s ( u n i t e s ) t h e s t a t i n g a n d t h e
s t a t e m e n t . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e - w h i c h i s b l i n d i n g ( b u t n o t i n c i s i v e o r c u t t i n g ) i h
t h e s e n s e s o f b o t h " t o m a k e b l i n d " a n d " t o b e e v i d e n t , o b v i o u s " - i s p u r e l y
c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e o n e a n d t h e o t h e r ( d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d i t s " c o m p a n i o n , " s i n c e t h e " I t h i n k m u s t b e c a p a b l e o f
a c c o m p a n y i n g a l l o f m y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " ) . T h i s i d e n t i t y o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
a n d t h e " I t h i n k " w i l l f i n d i t s e c h o i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , w h e r e t h e b e a u -
t i f u l , w h i c h i s i m a g i n a t i v e p l a y , c o i n c i d e s , a s w e h a v e s e e n , w i t h t h e p u r e p l e a -
s u r e o f t h i n k i n g .
T h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t t a k e s u p a g a i n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a s f a c u l t y o f
g a t h e r i n g . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s i n f a c t d e s c r i b e d h e r e a s t h e f a c u l t y o f a d o u b l e
o p e r a t i o n : " a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A u f f a s s u n g ) a n d " c o m p r e h e n s i o n " ( Z u s a m m e n -
f a s s u n g ) ( 2 6 , 9 1 ; 9 0 ) . T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n t a k e s p l a c e i n t h e a n a l y t i c o f t h e m a t h -
e m a t i c a l s u b l i m e . W i t h r e g a r d t o a q u a n t u m , a s i n t h e c a s e o f t h e m a t h e m a t i -
c a l s u b l i m e , c o m p r e h e n s i o n i s n o t , l i k e a p p r e h e n s i o n , t h e s i m p l e s e r i a l a c t o f
s u m m a t i o n " o n e b y o n e " o r o f t h e p a s s a g e f r o m t e r m t o t e r m b u t r a t h e r " c o n -
n e c t i o n " ( V e r b i n d u n g ) a n d t h i s i s w h y i t c a n a t t a i n i t s m a x i m u m :
A s t o a p p r e h e n s i o n t h e r e i s n o d i f f i c u l t y , f o r i t c a n g o o n a d i n f i n i -
t u m , b u t c o m p r e h e n s i o n b e c o m e s h a r d e r t h e f u r t h e r a p p r e h e n -
s i o n a d v a n c e s , a n d s o o n a t t a i n s i t s m a x i m u m , v i z . t h e g r e a t e s t
p o s s i b l e a e s t h e t i c a 1 f u n d a m e n t a l m e a s u r e f o r t h e e s t i m a t i o n o f
m a g n i t u d e . F o r w h e n a p p r e h e n s i o n h a s g o n e s o f a r t h a t t h e p a r -
t i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f s e n s u o u s i n t u i t i o n a t f i r s t a p p r e h e n d e d
b e g i n t o v a n i s h i n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , w h i l e t h i s e v e r p r o c e e d s t o t h e
a p p r e h e n s i o n o f o t h e r s , t h e n i t l o s e s a s m u c h o n t h e o n e s i d e a s i t
g a i n s o n t h e o t h e r ; a n d i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n t h e r e i s a m a x i m u m
b e y o n d w h i c h i t c a n n o t g o .
T h i s " f a i l u r e " o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n m a k e s c l e a r l y e v i d e n t t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n i s n o t r e t e n t i o n , f o r i t s c a p a c i t y f o r
r e t e n t i o n h a s l i m i t s . R a t h e r , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a -
t i o n r e s i d e s i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f a n o n s u r p a s s a b l e p o i n t , o f a m a x i m u m - t h e
r e s u l t o f a s y n t h e s i s w h i c h i s n o t a n e n u m e r a t i o n o r s u m m a t i o n " o n e b y o n e , "
b u t t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f a s u m m u m , a n d t h i s s u m m u m i s t h e e n g e n d e r -
m e n t o f t h e s u b l i m e . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h u s , s t r a n g e l y , t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e p r o -
d u c t i o n o f t h e u n i m a g i n a b l e ; i t i s t h i s u n i m a g i n a b l e i n s t a n c e , a s a n e f f e c t o f
i m a g i n a t i o n , t h a t t h e s u b l i m e
9
d e s i g n a t e s . T h e u n i m a g i n a b l e , o r t h e s u b l i m e ,
i s t h e e f f e c t o f a g a m e o f " w h o e v e r l o s e s w i n s " p l a y e d b y t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ; t h i s
g a m e i s r u l e d b y t h e " f u n d a m e n t a l m e a s u r e " ( G r u n d m a j J ) , w h i c h K a n t d e t e r -
m i n e s b y t u r n s a s t h e u n i t o f m e a s u r e m e n t a n d a s t h e m a x i m u m : i t i s t h e
o p e r a t i o n o f B e i n g - t o g e t h e r .
Comprehension and summum secure for the imagination the status of
the faculty of the "together" (zusammen), of the in-simul. Thus the simul takes
a turn, changes its direction and sense: Kantian imagination is not at all the
faculty of the "simulacrum," but the faculty of Being-together. This gathering
or logos of the sensible world, this convocation of beings in the Open, this
phuein of physis or economy of physis no longer has anything to do with an
economy of mimesis.
The Kantian moment of the imagination is thus that which decisively
and definitively rejects the mimetic status of the imagination, with which it
was confused from Plato to Descartes. The imagination is no longer the place
of "imitation" (Nachahmung) after the fact, of "aping" (Nachiiffung). Through
this "turn" (Kehre), Kant inaugurates a different epoch of thought and of the
sense of Being.
Let me mark two further principle traits concerning the Kantian themes
of the imagination and the sublime.
1. At first view, the play of Kantian imagination seems to be play of sub-
traction. The imagination of the Critique of Judgment seems to be the faculty
oflack, the trope of -los. Is not its immediate determination in fact the "with-
out" of the "without relation" to the object, of the "without theme," the
"without concept, n the "without purpose," the "without charm," the "without
interest," the denial of the existence of the object, the denial of perfection?
And this goes all the way to the pure form of the beautiful (formal purposive-
ness or form of purposiveness)-a pure remainder. Even more, the beautiful
marks a mere arrest in the middle of the chain of "withouts," for the sublime
takes the chain up again, and with the sublime even form itself is foreclosed.
The sublime is "without form" or "formless" (formlos) (25, 89; 87).
However, the imagination of the Critique of Judgment, faculty of the
beautiful and sublime, is the vehicle of another "view" (Anblick) of the being,
inscribed in another logic, the logic of "pleasure" (Wohlgefallen) (or as the
French translation says, of satisfaction). The logic of Wohlgefallen is an addi-
tive logic, a logic of the "more," a logic of excess. It is this "more," this excess
of Wohlgefallen that, ceaselessly echoing itself, amplifying itself in this echo,
traverses the entire text of the Critique of Judgment-to culminate in the
"deduction of the judgments of taste" which is purely and simply the deduc-
tion of this "more," this excess of Wohlgefallen. In Section 36 (122; 130), one
reads: "However, with a perception, a feeling of pleasure (or pain) and satis-
faction [Wohlgefallen] can be linked immediately, which accompanies the rep-
resentation of the object and takes the place of any predication; and thus an
aesthetic judgment, which is not a judgment of knowledge, can be produced."
And further on: "It is easy to see that judgments of taste are synthetic judg-
ments, because they go beyond the concept and even beyond the intuition of
the object, and add something to that intuition as predicate which is not a cog-
6 8 : E L I A N E E s c o u B A s
n i t i o n , v i z . a f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e ( o r p a i n ) " ( 1 2 3 ; 1 3 1 ) . ( I n t h e s e t w o q u o t a -
t i o n s , e m p h a s i s a d d e d - E . E . ) . T h i s w o r k o f d e d u c t i o n , w h i c h r e i n s c r i b e s a e s -
t h e t i c j u d g m e n t a s a p r i o r i s y n t h e t i c j u d g m e n t i n i t s p r o x i m i t y t o t h e o r e t i c a l
j u d g m e n t , i s p r o p e r l y t h e e l a b o r a t i o n o f a l o g i c o f t h e " m o r e " : t h e " m o r e " o f
" a c c o m p a n i m e n t " ( B e g l e i t u n g ) , t h e c o m p e n s a t o r y a n d s u b s t i t u t i v e " m o r e "
( m e h r ) o f " t a k i n g t h e p l a c e o f , " t h e " m o r e " o f " a d d i n g t o " ( e t w a s a l s P r i i d i k a t
h i n z u t u n ) . P a r a g r a p h 4 9 t a k e s u p a g a i n a n d r e d o u b l e s t h i s l o g i c o f t h e m e h r ,
b y i n s t a l l i n g t h e n o t i o n , a s u n e x p e c t e d a s i t i s e n i g m a t i c , o f a e s t h e t i c I d e a s ( t h e
a e s t h e t i c I d e a i s t h u s p o s i t e d i n a t o t a l e q u i v a l e n c e w i t h W o h l g e f a l l e n ) . L e t u s
r e a d S e c t i o n 4 9 ( 1 4 3 - 4 4 ; 1 5 7 ) : " A n d b y a n a e s t h e t i c I d e a I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n w h i c h o c c a s i o n s m u c h t h o u g h t , w i t h o u t
h o w e v e r a n y d e f i n i t e t h o u g h t , i . e . , a n y c o n c e p t , b e i n g c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a d e -
q u a t e t o i t ; i t c o n s e q u e n t l y c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e l y c o m p a s s e d a n d m a d e i n t e l l i -
g i b l e b y l a n g u a g e . " A n d f u r t h e r ( 1 4 4 ; 1 5 8 ) :
I f n o w w e p l a c e u n d e r a c o n c e p t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a -
t i o n b e l o n g i n g t o i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t w h i c h o c c a s i o n s i n i t s e l f
m o r e t h o u g h t t h a n c a n e v e r b e c o m p r e h e n d e d i n a d e f i n i t e c o n -
c e p t a n d w h i c h c o n s e q u e n t l y a e s t h e t i c a l l y e x t e n d s t h e c o n c e p t
i t s e l f i n a n u n b o u n d e d f a s h i o n , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s h e r e c r e a t i v e ,
a n d i t b r i n g s t h e f a c u l t y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a s ( t h e r e a s o n ) i n t o
m o v e m e n t ; i . e . , b y a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m o r e t h o u g h t ( w h i c h i n d e e d
b e l o n g s t o t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e o b j e c t ) i s o c c a s i o n e d t h a n c a n i n i t
b e g r a s p e d o r m a d e c l e a r .
A n d a l s o ( 1 4 5 ; 1 5 8 ) : .
[ A e s t h e t i c a t t r i b u t e s ] d o n o t , l i k e l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s , r e p r e s e n t
w h a t l i e s i n o u r c o n c e p t s o f t h e s u b l i m i t y a n d m a j e s t y o f c r e a t i o n ,
b u t s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t , w h i c h g i v e s o c c a s i o n t o t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
t o . s p r e a d i t s e l f o v e r a n u m b e r o f k i n d r e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t
a r o u s e m o r e t h o u g h t t h a n c a n b e e x p r e s s e d i n a c o n c e p t d e t e r -
m i n e d b y w o r d s . T h e y f u r n i s h a n a e s t h e t i c I d e a , w h i c h . . . e n l i v e n s
t h e m i n d b y o p e n i n g u p f o r i t t h e p r o s p e c t o f a n u n f o r e s e e a b l e
f i e l d [ e i n u n a b s e h l i c h e s F e l d ] o f r e l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . ( I n t h e s e
q u o t a t i o n s , e m p h a s i s a d d e d - E . E . ) .
T h e s a m e l o g i c t i e s h e r e t h e t h e m e o f t h e " m o r e " t o t h a t o f E r w e i t e r u n g - o f
t h e e x t e n s i o n o r e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t . T h e e x t e n s i o n i s h e r e f i r s t o f a l l
t h a t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f n a t u r e ( " T h i s p u r p o s i v e n e s s [ o f n a t u r a l b e a u t y ] d o e s
n o t i n f a c t . e x t e n d o u r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e o b j e c t s o f n a t u r e , b u t o u r c o n c e p t o f
[ 2 3 , 8 6 ; 8 4 ] ) a n d r e s i d e s i n t h e g i f t o f " g i v i n g " ( g e b e n ) , i n t h e a r t i c u -
l a t i o n o f t h e e s g i b t . B u t i t i s a l s o t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i t s e l f i n t h e
sublime: "it is not a matter of a satisfaction [Wohlgefallen] occasioned by the
object [am Objekte), as for the beautiful ... but of a satisfaction occasioned by
the extension of the imagination itself [an der Erweiterung der Einbil-
dungskraft)" (25, 89; 87).
What is this Erweiterung? What is this Unabsehliche? What are this
unlimitation and this unforeseeable? They are the modality itself of the sub-
lime. At this point we can confirm that the sublime is another name for the
imagination itself: the unimaginable as such. Erweiterung is nothing other than
the "disproportion" (Unangemessenheit) of the imagination, which is its very
definition. It is in this that the Kantian imagination is the faculty which con-
founds and interferes with all the other faculties, which confuses the terms of
all dichotomies and trichotomies. It is the antifaculty.
2. Unlimitation, "free play" (freies Spiel), legality "without law" (ohne
Gesetz): such is the imagination-Urheberin (22, 80; 77): "faculty" of begin-
nings.
Where does the imagination "begin"? It "begins" in Wohlgefallen, in the
event of the sensible, in its announcement. What is it th3:t in sensation deter-
mines "pleasure"? Not what it gives, but that it gives itself, the taking-place of
the sensible itself determines "pleasure." Wohlgefallen is not any property of
the object, but the coming of the world to the gaze (subjectio sub aspectum):
the summoned appearing [comparaitre), the presence of the present presenta-
tion. In this "summoned appearance" an entirely other mode of temporality
inscribes itself: a temporality which is no longer the form of the successive, but
the mode of suspension.
Kantian imagination-the image of which does not complete itself in
imitating but in appearing-is the other name for Being. the Kantian name for
Being. For what is Erweiterung, as essential operation of imagination. if not the
work of "Openness" (Offenheit)? The imagination begins in Offenheit. The
sublime is the mode of human feeling on the edge of Offenheit; the sublime is
the pure "affect" of Offenheit. It is the feeling one has in the face of "raw
nature" (rohe Natur) and when one gazes at the starry sky. the ocean, or even
the human form. simply "as one sees them." according to the Augenschein.
when the gaze does not install itself. does not enclose itself in the determina-
tions of beings. In the Augenschein. the gaze is not arrested by the being in its
this-ness. is not immobilized. but "seizes" physis in its phuein. The resistance
by means of which the imagination elaborates the sublime is not the position
of the ob-ject, but the very position of Offenheit. Not the yawning of the abyss.
but the patency of Openness.
Thus. the "affect" of Offenheit culminates in the "pathetics" of the sub-
lime. Concerning the dynamic sublime. Kant explains himself in a manner
which is at the very least astonishing. He asserts that. before the spectacle of
unbound nature. such as storms. tempestuous oceans. volcanoes, we feel the
sublime. on the condition however of not being endangered but in "safety"
( S i c h e r h e i t ) . D o e s t h e s u b l i m e c o n s i s t t h e n i n a m e r e s i m u l a c r u m o f f e a r ?
W h a t s e n s e d o e s K a n t g r a n t t o t h i s S i c h e r h e i t ? I s h e s a y i n g t h a t w e p l a y a t
b e i n g a f r a i d , t h a t w e a c t a s i f w e w e r e a f r a i d , t h u s r e i n s c r i b i n g t h e s u b l i m e i n '
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l u r e ? I s h e s a y i n g t h a t t h e f e e l i n g o f s a f e t y m a k e s u s r e j o i c e
i n a n e g o i s t i c a l a n d c o w a r d l y m a n n e r b e f o r e a h a r r o w i n g s p e c t a c l e ? I f t h i s
w e r e t h e c a s e , h o w c o u l d K a n t a f f i r m t h a t t h e s u b l i m e p a r t i c i p a t e s i n m o r a l
f e e l i n g ? C a n o n e n o t d e c i p h e r i n a n o t h e r w a y t h i s S i c h e r h e i t , t h i s f e e l i n g o f
s a f e t y a n d s e c u r i t y ? F o r i f I a m s a f e , I a m s a f e f r o m t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e s t o r m o r
t h e u n c h a i n i n g o f t h e o c e a n , I a m s a f e f r o m t h e t h r e a t o f d r o w n i n g i n w h a t i s
h a p p e n i n g , i n t h i s o r t h a t e v e n t , b u t I a m n o t s a f e b e f o r e t h e ( u n f o r e s e e a b l y )
b l i n d i n g l i g h t o f t h e h a p p e n i n g a s s u c h , o f t h e c o m i n g t o b e a s s u c h , I a m n o t
s a f e b e f o r e t h e U n g e h e u e r , t h e t e r r i b l e t r i a l o f B e i n g - t h e r e . I t i s i n t h i s " d i f f e r -
e n c e " t h a t S i c h e r h e i t , a s c o n d i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e , i s i n s c r i b e d .
T h e K a n t i a n s u b l i m e , t h e n , i s a d i s t a n t a n d i n t e r m e d i a t e g l i m p s e o f t h e
o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e : a n i n t e r m e d i a t e g l i m p s e o f t h e a p p e a r i n g o f w h a t
a p p e a r s . O f a p p e a r i n g i t s e l f . S u c h i s t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f t h e s u b l i m e .
Chapter 4
~
SUBLIME TRUTH
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
1.
In the passages of the Critique of Judgment where he treats the sublime, Kant
twice quotes examples of utterances which nothing could surpass in sublimity,
examples of what has been most sublimely said and thought-absolutely.
The first quotation occurs in the "General Remark" which closes the
"Analytics of the Sublime" proper. Kant is in the process of positing that the
sublime "ought always to have a relationship to the mode of thought, that is,
to maxims which attempt to procure for what is intellectual and for the Ideas
of Reason domination over sensibility." And he adds:
We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose by so
abstract [abgezogen] a mode of presentation-which is quite neg-
ative in respect of what is sensible-for the imagination, although
it finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself,
yet feels itself unbounded by this removal of its limitations; and
thus that very abstraction is a presentation of the Infinite, which
can be nothing but a mere negative presentation, but which yet
expands the soul. Perhaps there is no sublimer passage in the Jew-
ish law than the command, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any
graven image, nor the likeness of anything which is in heaven or
in the earth or under the earth," etc. This command alone can
explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people in their moral
period felt for their religion, when they compared themselves with
other peoples, or explain the pride which Mohammedanism
inspires. (29, 110; 115)
71
7 2 P H I L I P P E L A C O U E - L A B A R T H E
T h e s e c o n d q u o t a t i o n ( t h e s e c o n d a n d l a s t t i m e : n o w h e r e e l s e i n t h e
t h i r d C r i t i q u e d o e s o n e f i n d a s i m i l a r l y h y p e r b o l i c p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n e x a m -
p i e ) o c c u r s i n s e c t i o n 4 9 , o n e o f t h e p a r a g r a p h s d e v o t e d t o t h e g e n i u s , t h a t i s ;
t o t h e s u b l i m e a r t i s t o r t h e a r t i s t o f t h e s u b l i m e . T h i s t i m e , t h e q u o t a t i o n t a k e s
p l a c e i n a f o o t n o t e a n d t h e e x a m p l e c o n c e r n s , a s i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e s u b l i m e
" o f t h o u g h t . " K a n t w r i t e s :
P e r h a p s n o t h i n g m o r e s u b l i m e w a s e v e r s a i d a n d n o s u b l i m e r
t h o u g h t e v e r e x p r e s s e d t h a n t h e f a m o u s i n s c r i p t i o n o n t h e T e m -
p l e o f I s i s ( M o t h e r N a t u r e ) : " I a m a l l t h a t i s a n d t h a t w a s a n d t h a t
s h a l l b e , a n d n o m o r t a l h a t h l i f t e d m y v e i l . " S e g n e r [ a u n i v e r s i t y
P r o f e s s o r a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y o f K a n t ] a v a i l e d h i m s e l f o f t h i s i d e a
i n a s u g g e s t i v e v i g n e t t e p r e f i x e d t o h i s N a t u r a l P h i l o s o p h y , i n
o r d e r t o i n s p i r e b e f o r e h a n d t h e p u p i l w h o m h e w a s a b o u t t o l e a d
i n t o t h a t t e m p l e w i t h a h o l y a w e , w h i c h s h o u l d d i s p o s e h i s m i n d
t o s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n . ( 1 4 6 ; 1 6 0 )
B e f o r e s p e c i f y i n g t h e r e a s o n s I h a v e f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o e x a m p l e s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t I d w e l l a b i t o n t h e c o n t e x t o f
t h i s n o t e .
S e c t i o n 4 9 ( " O f t h e F a c u l t i e s o f t h e M i n d t h a t c o n s t i t u t e G e n i u s " ) i s o f
p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e f o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d h e n c e f o r t h e v e r y p o s s i b i l -
i t y o f a s u b l i m e a r t , a n d n o t m e r e l y , i n a r e f l e x i v e m o d e , o f a s u b l i m e a f f e c t o r
e m o t i o n . K a n t i s d e f i n i n g h e r e w h a t h e c a l l s t h e " s o u l " o f a w o r k o r t h e " l i f e
p r i n c i p l e o f s p i r i t " : t h a t s u p p l e m e n t o r s u r p l u s o f l i f e - f o r t h e l o g i c o f t h e s u b -
l i m e i s ( a l m o s t ) a l w a y s a l o g i c o f t h e s u p p l e m e n t - w h i c h e x c e e d s w h a t o n e
c o u l d c a l l , w i t h D i d e r o t , m e r e " t e c h n i q u e . " T h e s o u l i s o f c o u r s e l i t e r a l l y t h a t
w h i c h a n i m a t e s a p o e m , a n a r r a t i v e , o r a d i s c o u r s e , a c o n v e r s a t i o n . N o w , t h i s
p r i n c i p l e , K a n t a s s e r t s , " i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
a e s t h e t i c I d e a s , " t h a t i s , o f t h o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n w h i c h g i v e
" m u c h t o t h i n k " ( t h e e x p r e s s i o n i s , a s i s w e l l k n o w n , p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y t r a n -
s c r i b e d f r o m L o n g i n u s ) , " w i t h o u t a n y d e t e r m i n a t e t h o u g h t , i . e . , a n y c o n c e p t ,
b e i n g c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a d e q u a t e t o [ t h e m ] , a n d w h i c h c o n s e q u e n t l y n o l a n -
g u a g e c o u l d c o m p l e t e l y e x p r e s s a n d r e n d e r i n t e l l i g i b l e " ( 1 4 3 - 4 4 ; 1 5 7 ) . A s a
k i n d o f i n v e r s i o n o f t h e I d e a s o f R e a s o n , t h e s e a e s t h e t i c I d e a s a r e p u r e i n t u -
i t i o n s w i t h o u t c o n c e p t . B u t l i k e t h e I d e a s o f R e a s o n , " t h e y t e n d a t l e a s t t o w a r d
s o m e t h i n g w h i c h i s l o c a t e d b e y o n d t h e l i m i t s o f e x p e r i e n c e . " T h e i r a i m i s t h u s
p r o p e r l y m e t a p h y s i c a l b e c a u s e t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s , K a n t w r i t e s , " ( a s p r o d u c t i v e
f a c u l t y o f k n o w l e d g e ) . . . v e r y p o w e r f u l i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n o t h e r n a t u r e a s i t
w e r e o u t o f t h e r e a l m a t t e r t h a t r e a l n a t u r e g i v e s i t " e m p h a s i s a d d e d - P o 1 . ) .
A s o n e c a n s e e , K a n t i s b e i n g f a i t h f u l t o t h e t r a d i t i o n h e r e : w h a t i s a t s t a k e i n
t h e s u b l i m e , s i n c e L o n g i n u s , w i l l a l w a y s h a v e b e e n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
m e t a - p h y s i c a l a s s u c h . A n d i t i s m o r e o v e r t h i s v e r y f a i t h f u l n e s s w h i c h m a k e s
Sublime Truth 73
him say that "it is in poetry that the faculty of aesthetic Ideas can manifest
itself in its entire strength" (144; 158). Poetry would be then the sublime art
par excellence: an old TOlTOO', which however owes nothing, or very little, to
the supposedly "rhetorical" origin of the aforementioned tradition.
Such aesthetic Ideas are clearly "sensible forms." Kant calls them aesthetic
attributes, by contrast to logical attributes: they are the attributes "of an object
the concept of which, as an Idea of Reason, can never be presented adequately."
For example, the eagle of Jupiter, "holding the lightning in its talons," or the
peacock of "the superb Queen of the sky," representing the sublimity and
majesty of creation. These attributes do not provide any concept of creation,
but they "permit one to think much more than what one can express by words
in a determinate concept": poetry and eloquence owe to them "the soul that
animates their works" and, in another hyperbolic formulation, they "give to the
imagination an impulse for thinking ... more than one can think" (145; 159).
I insist on this only because here Kant summarizes the classical thought
of the sublime.
Kant illustrates his position with respect to this thought with two exam-
ples. These examples will come to be completed in a note, by the example-
infinitely more sublime-of the inscription on the pediment of the temple of
Isis. But it happens that these two examples, and this is what I wanted to get
to, as if by a sort of magnetism or constraint which ought indeed to have its
reason, are comparisons where each time, it is a sun that appears, either rising
or setting.
The first example is well known:
1
it is the poem by Frederic the Great
("Thus the star of day, at the end of its path ... ") in which the great king. Kant
writes, "animates his rational Idea of a cosmopolitan disposition at the end of
life by an attribute which the imagination (in remembering all the pleasures of
a beautiful summer day that are recalled at its close by a serene evening) asso-
ciates with that representation" (145; 159). The second example, in which the
comparison (the relation between sensible and supersensible) is inverted, is
this verse by a certain Withof. professor of morals, eloquence, and medicine at
Duisburg: "The sun arose, as calm from virtue springs" (145; 159).
Since the publication of "White Mythology" by Jacques Derrida.
2
we are
aware that a certain heliotropism is from the start constitutive of the discourse
of philosophy upon its object: the meta-physical. That one sees it at work,
with respect to the sublime. has therefore nothing very surprising about it.
However. I ask myself-and this will be perhaps finally my question-if this
heliotropism or, more broadly, this native phototropism of philosophy is as
homogeneous and univocal as it appears. And above all as simple. I ask myself
if, under certain conditions, in the motif o flight. brilliance, refulgence. bedaz-
zlement, and so on, here or there something might intrude or occur which
would be completely foreign to the metaphysical assumption of sight and the
unbroken coercion of the theoretical. One should perhaps allow another
q u e s t i o n o f l i g h t t o d a w n , a n d r e e x a m i n e q u i t e c l o s e l y t h e e n t i r e " s y s t e m o f
l i g h t i n g " o f p h i l o s o p h y . I w i l l n o t a p p l y m y s e l f t o t h a t h e r e , e x c e p t q u i t e a l l u -
s i v e l y , b u t I w o u l d l i k e t h e r e a d e r t o k e e p p r e s e n t t o h i s o r h e r m i n d t h i s '
h e l i o t r o p i c c o n t e x t o f t h e s e c o n d o f t h e e x a m p l e s I a m d r a w i n g , l e s s a r b i t r a r i l y
t h a n i t s e e m s , f r o m K a n t ' s t e x t .
T h u s : M o s e s a n d I s i s . T h e t w o u t t e r a n c e s w h i c h s t r i k e K a n t c e r t a i n l y d o
n o t s a y t h e s a m e t h i n g . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n a f f i n i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e m ,
a s i d e f r o m t h e i r r e m a r k a b l e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
I n b o t h c a s e s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e s u b l i m e u t t e r a n c e i s a d i v i n e u t t e r a n c e : i t
i s a g o d w h o s p e a k s . I n b o t h c a s e s , h o w e v e r , t h i s u t t e r a n c e i s n o t r e a l l y d i r e c t ,
d e s p i t e g r a m m a t i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s : i t i s n o t i n h i s o r h e r o w n v o i c e t h a t t h e g o d
s p e a k s ; i t s s p e e c h i s r e p o r t e d a n d i n s c r i b e d ( o n t a b l e s , o n t h e p e d i m e n t o r i n
t h e i n t e r i o r o f t h e t e m p l e ) . F i n a l l y , i n b o t h c a s e s , a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r
c o m m o n i n d i r e c t i o n , t h e u t t e r a n c e h a s t o d o w i t h t h e n o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
t h e g o d ( t h e g o d c a l l s " i t s e l f ' n o n p r e s e n t a b l e ) : e i t h e r i n t h e f o r m o f t h e p r o h i -
b i t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e g o d , a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h i t s e l f e n t a i l s a p r o -
h i b i t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n g e n e r a l , o r i n t h e f o r m o f a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i m p o s -
s i b i l i t y ( I c a n n o t b e u n v e i l e d ) , w h i c h i s p e r h a p s n o t h i n g b u t a m o r e s u b t l e - i f
n o t m o r e m e n a c i n g - f o r m o f p r o h i b i t i o n . O b v i o u s l y , t h e s e a f f i n i t i e s a r e n o t
m e r e l y f o r m a l . W h a t e v e r t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e e n u n c i a t i o n s , t h e s e
a f f i n i t i e s a r i s e f r o m t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s , w h i c h i s i n e a c h c a s e t h a t t h e
g o d i s n o t p r e s e n t a b l e . W e a r e c o n f r o n t e d t h e n , i n K a n t i a n t e r m s ( b u t a l s o i n
p r e - K a n t i a n t e r m s , f o r t h i s h a s b e e n s a i d i n a n y n u m b e r o f w a y s s i n c e L o n g i -
n u s ) , w i t h t h e c a n o n i c a l d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e : t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n o f t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e o r , m o r e r i g o r o u s l y , t o t a k e u p t h e f o r m u l a o f
L y o t a r d , t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( o f t h i s : ) t h a t t h e r e i s t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e .
B u t a g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e r e m a i n s b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o u t t e r a n c e s : t h e y d o n o t
d r a w o n t h e s a m e m e t a p h o r s . T h e q u e s t i o n t h e y p o s e i s i n d e e d t h a t o f p r e s e n -
t a t i o n a n d o f t h e l i m i t o f p r e s e n t a t i o n : n o t e v e r y t h i n g p r e s e n t s i t s e l f . B u t i n
t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s c o n c e i v e d i n t e r m s o f t h e f i g u r e , t h e f o r m , t h e
i m a g e ( o r i n b i b l i c a l t e r m s , t h e " g r a v e n i m a g e " ) . I f t h e r e i s a q u e s t i o n , i t o p e n s
a n d c a n o n l y o p e n o n t o a p r o b l e m a t i c o f t h e c u t [ d e c o u p e ] a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
a s N a n c y 3 h a s s h o w n , o f d e l i m i t a t i o n a n d u n l i m i t a t i o n . ( T h a t i t o p e n s , a n d i n
a c l a s s i c a l m a n n e r , o n t o a p r o b l e m a t i c o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n t h e s e n s e o f r e p r o -
d u c t i o n a n d t h u s i m i t a t i o n , i s p r o b a b l y o n l y a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s . I w i l l
a t t e m p t t o r e t u r n t o t h i s . ) I n t h e s e c o n d c a s e , t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t h o u g h t a s
u n v e i l i n g . A n d p e r h a p s t h a t c h a n g e s e v e r y t h i n g .
2 .
P e r h a p s t h a t c h a n g e s e v e r y t h i n g . A t l e a s t t h i s i s t h e h y p o t h e s i s i n t e r m s o f
w h i c h I s h a l l r e g u l a t e m y d i s c o u r s e h e r e .
Sublime Truth 75
I take my departure in the formation of this hypothesis-to announce it
at the outset-from the Heideggerian delimitation of aesthetics. But not, I
should immediately add, without a certain reticence, that is, not without ques-
tioning this delimitation or without believing in the necessity of testing, at
least concerning one point, its rigor or solidity.
When, in 1935-36, Heidegger undertakes the deconstruction of aesthet-
ics, directly ("The Origin of the Work of Art") or indirectly (the first course
on Nietzsche: "The Will to Power as Art"), he calls "aesthetics," in the broad
sense, the totality of the philosophy of art since Plato and Aristotle. The chap-
ter of Nietzschs..entitled, "Six Fundamental Facts taken from the History of
Aesthetics," is perfectly clear in this regard:
The term, "aesthetics," applied to the reflexion on art and on the
beautiful, is of recent formation and dates from the eighteenth-
century. As for the thing itself, which this name fittingly denomi-
nates-the manner of questioning concerning art or the beautiful
from the point of view of the state of feeling of the one who pro-
duces them or the one who enjoys them-it is as old as the reflex-
ion on art and the beautiful in occidental thought. It is already as
an aesthetics that philosophy begins to reflect on the essence of art
and the beautiful ..
This delimitation orients the deconstruction toward an interrogation of
the work itself, in its essence,s unless of course it is the other way around. In
any case, things could not be more neat.
High or great [grofie] Greek art remains without any correspond-
ing cognitive-conceptual reflexion [Besinnung], which would not
necessarily have to be the same thing as an aesthetics .... Aesthetics
does not begin in Greece until the moment when great art, but
also great philosophy, which follows the same course, are
approaching their end. It is in this epoch, the age of Plato and
Aristotle, that, in connection with the formation of philosophy,
the fundamental concepts are forged [gepriigt, frappes, "imprinted,"
"coined," "impressed," "typed out"] which will delimit in the future
the circumscription of any interrogation concerning art. (95; 80)
"Aesthetics," then, designates for Heidegger the metaphysical (Platonic and
post-Platonic, including Nietzsche) apprehension of art and the beautiful.
But exactly how are these fundamental-and, until our own times,
determining-concepts "imprinted"?
Here's what Heidegger writes:
F i r s t , t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o u p l e I J X : r n . l o p < f l l l , m a t e r i a - f o r m a , c o n t e n t -
f o r m . T h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n h a s i t s o r i g i n i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n -
f o u n d e d b y P l a t o - o f t h e e n t i t y w i t h r e g a r d t o i t s a p p e a r a n c e :
E 1 8 o s i . 8 a . W h e r e t h e e n t i t y i s c o n s i d e r e d a s a n e n t i t y , a n d i s d i s t i n -
g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r e n t i t i e s w i t h a v i e w t o i t s a p p e a r a n c e , t h e c o n -
t o u r a n d t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f w h a t i s c o m e s i n t o v i e w a s o u t e r a n d
i n n e r d e l i m i t a t i o n . W h a t d e l i m i t s , h o w e v e r , i s f o r m a n d w h a t i s
d e l i m i t e d i s c o n t e n t . I n t o t h e s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t h a t i s b r o u g h t
w h i c h s t e p s b e f o r e o u r e y e s a s s o o n a s t h e a r t w o r k i s e x p e r i e n c e d a s
t h e s e l f - s h o w i n g , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s E 1 B o s , < j > a t V E 0 0 a l . T h e E K ' "
c p a v E O T a T o v , t h a t w h i c h a u t h e n t i c a l l y s h o w s i t s e l f a n d t h e m o s t
a p p e a r i n g o f a l l , i s t h e b e a u t i f u l . B y w a y o f t h e i d e a , t h e w o r k o f a r t
p a s s e s i n t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a s E K < j > a v E O T a T o v .
( 9 5 - 9 6 ; 8 0 )
T h e o p e r a t i o n t o w h i c h H e i d e g g e r c o m m i t s h i m s e l f h e r e i s , I b e l i e v e ,
r e l a t i v e l y s t r a n g e . I n a n y c a s e , i t i s s u r p r i s i n g a n d p r o v o k e s a f i r s t r e s e r v a t i o n .
I t i s s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o u p l e f o r m - m a t t e r d e r i v e s f r o m
t h e p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e e n t i t y o r b e i n g ( i n i t s B e i n g ) a s l B o s . F r o m t h e
m o m e n t w h e n t h e e n t i t y i s c o n c e i v e d a s a s p e c t o r f i g u r e - t h a t i s , i n t e r m s o f
t h e c u t o r c o n t o u r o f d e l i m i t a t i o n - i t d i v i d e s i t s e l f n e c e s s a r i l y i n t o l i m i t i n g
a n d l i m i t e d . B u t d o e s t h i s m e a n t h a t t h e c p a L v E 0 8 a t , t h e s e l f - s h o w i n g o r t h e
a p p e a r i n g o f t h e e n t i t y , i t s B e i n g - l u m i n o u s a n d v i s i b l e , d e r i v e s i n i t s t u r n f r o m
s u c h a p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n ? T h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e a p p e a r i n g i n g e n e r a l d o e s n o t
d e p e n d o n t h e e i d e t i c s e i z u r e o f t h e e n t i t y , e v e n i f i t d o e s s o f o r P l a t o h i m s e l f .
I t i s n o n e t h e l e s s n o t P l a t o w h o " i n v e n t e d " t h e ' T T T l a l V E O T T ] a t , t h a t i s , t h e d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n o f p r e s e n c e a s a p p e a r i n g . W h a t P l a t o d i d , h o w e v e r , i n v e n t , a n d i t i s
i n t h i s t h a t h e i s r e p o n s i b l e f o r p h i l o s o p h y ( a n d f o r a e s t h e t i c s ) , i s a s H e i d e g g e r
c o r r e c t l y s a y s t h a t t h e e n t i t y s h o u l d a p p e a r " i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s E 1 B o s . "
T h e i n a u g u r a l g e s t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h y ( o f a e s t h e t i c s ) i s t h e e i d e t i c s u b j u g a t i o n
o f t h e c p a L v E 0 8 a t a n d n o t - I . w i l l r i s k t h e w o r d - t h e " p h a n t i c " s e i z u r e o f p r e s -
e n c e . O t h e r w i s e , w h a t c o u l d b e a t s t a k e , w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e d e s t i n y o f m e t a -
p h y s i c s , i n a p h e n o m e n o l o g y ? I t i s c o n s e q u e n t l y d i f f i c u l t t o s u p p o r t t h e a r g u -
m e n t t h a t t h e P l a t o n i c d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l i n t e r m s o f t h e
E K c p a v E o T a T o v i s s i m p l y P l a t o n i c ; n o r c a n o n e s a y t h a t " b y w a y o f t h e i d e a , t h e
w o r k o f a r t p a s s e s i n t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a s E K c p a v E O T a -
T O V . " A l l o n e c a n s a y i s t h a t w i t h P l a t o t h e e i d e t i c o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e E K -
c p a v E O T a T o v - n o d o u b t d e f i n i t i v e l y - i n t r o d u c e s i t s e l f . 6
T h i s s o r t o f p o w e r p l a y w o u l d h a v e e v e r y c h a n c e o f p a s s i n g u n p e r c e i v e d
i f , i n t h e s a m e p e r i o d , H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l , t a k i n g i n t o
a c c o u n t t h e " s t e p b a c k " i n ( a n d v i s - a . - v i s ) a e s t h e t i c s i n g e n e r a l , c o u l d n o t i n i t s
t u r n b e r e l a t e d t o t h e E K < p a v E o T a T o v . A g a i n s t a l l e x p e c t a t i o n .
Sublime Truth 77
I shall remove this definition, for the moment, from its context which is
in itself, moreover, quite "illuminating":
In the work, it is the truth which is at work, and not simply some-
thing true .... That is how self-concealing Being is illuminated
[gelichtet]. Light of this kind joins its shining [sein Scheinen] to
and into the work. This shining [das Scheinen], joined in the
work, is the beautiful. Beauty is one way in which truth essentially
occurs as unconcealedness. (The Origin of the Work of Art, 42; 56)
That makes much (of) light. But it is less the motif oflight and of the light-
ing/clearing itself (Licht, Lichten, Lichtung, etc.) that is decisive here than the
manner in which the motif restores to "appearing" (Scheinen) all of its seman-
tic density, which is, as is well known, the same as that of the Greek <pat-
VEo9aL: "to glitter and glow," "to shine," "to show oneself," or "to appear."7
And Heidegger does not cease to base himself on this semantic density when,
apropos of the work of art and the beautiful, he foregrounds the Scheinen and
treats it, in his way, phenomenologically.
What is the sense, then, and under these conditions, of Heidegger's
operation--or power play, as we have called it above?
There is perhaps an indication and the occasion of a conjecture in the
fate Heidegger reserves precisely for Kant. In the course of his recapitulation
of the history of aesthetics, Heidegger does not mention Kant's name even
once. In addition, curiously, he does not make the slightest allusion to the
problematic of the sublime: "sublime" is a word which does not belong to the
Heideggerian lexicon, even if the concept-and the thing itself-are every-
where present (if only under the name of "greatness"). That Kant doesn't
appear in such a history, which after all claims to be simply "indicative," does
not mean that he is simply omitted from the unfolding of aesthetics or that
one ought to reserve a place for him outside of it: Heidegger will have multi-
plied traces of allusions to the third Critique and clearly marked the insuffi-
ciency of Kantian categories with regard to the question of the essence of art.
8
The absence of Kant means simply that he does not make up a moment in the
history of aesthetics or, if you prefer, that he belongs to the unfolding of aes-
thetics proper, of modern aesthetics as Hegel completes and closes it, tracing
at the same time the closure of aesthetics in general, i.e., the closure of the phi-
losophy of art in its totality.9
However, and nearly at the same time, Heidegger excepts Kant from this
tradition (and Schiller with him: "the only one who, with relation to the Kant-
ian doctrine of the beautiful and of art, understood the essential"), as if Kant
and Schiller, at least when read in a certain manner, had something to say-in
the very language of aesthetics which is inevitably their own but in secretly
exceeding, and from the interior, the limits of aesthetics-'-which touches on
t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d o f a r t . T h i s h a p p e n s t w o c h a p t e r s f u r t h e r o n i n
t h e l e c t u r e s , w h e r e H e i d e g g e r u n d e r t a k e s t o p l e a d t h e c a u s e o f K a n t a g a i n s t t h e
v i o l e n t a n d r e p e a t e d a c c u s a t i o n s o f N i e t z s c h e ( 1 2 6 - 3 4 ; 1 0 7 - 1 4 ) . N i e t z s c h e ' s
a c c u s a t i o n s c o n c e r n t h e n o t i o n o f " d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s u r e . " H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u -
m e n t t a k e s t h e f o r m o f t h e a t t e m p t t o c o r r e c t w h a t h e s e e s a s a m i s u n d e r s t a n d -
i n g o r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . N o t o n l y i s N i e t z s c h e t h e v i c t i m o f S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s
e r r o n e o u s a n d e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y w e a k r e a d i n g o f K a n t - w h i c h r e a d s d i s i n t e r e s t
a s i n d i f f e r e n c e a n d t h e r e f o r e a s t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f w i l l i n g - b u t h e d o e s n o t
c o m p r e h e n d t h e e s s e n c e o f i n t e r e s t , i . e . , o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t i v e d e s i r e w h i c h
o b l i g e s o n e a l w a y s t o t a k e a n d r e p r e s e n t t h e o b j e c t o f o n e ' s i n t e r e s t " i n v i e w o f
s o m e t h i n g e l s e . " H e d o e s n o t c o m p r e h e n d t h a t d i s i n t e r e s t i s t h e l e t t i n g - b e a n d
l e t t i n g - c o r n e - f o r t h o f t h e o b j e c t , t h e " l e t t i n g . . . t h e o b j e c t p r o d u c e i t s e l f o f
i t s e l f , p u r e l y a s i t s e l f , i n i t s p r o p e r r a n k a n d d i g n i t y , " w h i c h d i c t a t e s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e b e a u t i f u l t h a t b e h a v i o r w h i c h K a n t c a l l s " f r e e f a v o r " ( d i e j r e i e
G u n s t ) b y w h i c h , s a y s H e i d e g g e r , " w e m u s t s e t f r e e w h a t w e e n c o u n t e r a s s u c h
i n t o w h a t i t i s , l e a v e t o i t a n d g r a n t i t t h a t w h i c h b e l o n g s t o i t a n d w h i c h i t
b r i n g s t o u s . " I n s h o r t , t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n s t h i s : f a r f r o m d i s t a n c -
i n g t h e o b j e c t i n a n i n d i f f e r e n c e , d i s i n t e r e s t ( o r f r e e f a v o r ) o p e n s r a t h e r t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e l a t i n g o n e s e l f t o i t i n a n e s s e n t i a l m a n n e r . T h i s i s w h y H e i d e g -
g e r c a n s a y t h e f o l l o w i n g - a n d h e r e t h e o p e r a t i o n b e c o m e s t r u l y q u i t e s t r a n g e ,
s i n c e i t i s n e a r l y h i s o w n d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l t h a t h e p r o p o s e s :
F r o m t h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f " i n t e r e s t " c o m e s t h e e r r o r o f
b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t w o u l d s u p p r e s s a n y
e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t . H o w e v e r , t h e c o n t r a r y i s t r u e . F o r
i t i s p r e c i s e l y b y v i r t u e o f t h e l a c k o f i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l r e l a -
t i o n w i t h t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f c o m e s i n t o p l a y . O n e h a s n o t s e e n t h a t i t
i s o n l y f r o m t h i s m o m e n t o n t h a t t h e o b j e c t a s p u r e o b j e c t m a k e s
i t s a p p e a r a n c e [ z u m V o r s c h e i n k o m m t ] , t h a t t h i s a p p e a r a n c e
[ d i e s e s i n - d e n - V o r s c h e i n - k o m m e n : K l o s s o w s k i a d d s b e t w e e n
p a r e n t h e s e s t o t h e F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n , i n o r d e r t o r e n d e r p a l p a b l e
t h e r e s o n a n c e o f S c h e i n e n : " t h i s c o m i n g t o l i g h t " ( c e v e n i r a u
j o u r ) ] c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b e a u t i f u l . T h e w o r d , " b e a u t i f u l , " m e a n s t h e
s h o w i n g - u p i n t h e s h e e n o f s u c h a s h i n i n g [ D a s W o r t " s c h o n "
m e i n t d a s E r s c h e i n e n i m S c h e i n s o l c h e n V o r s c h e i n s J . ( 1 3 0 ; 1 1 0 )
H e i d e g g e r g e n e r a l l y l e a v e s v e r y l i t t l e t o c h a n c e . I t i s n e c e s s a r y t h e r e f o r e
t o u n d e r s t a n d : ( 1 ) t h a t K a n t i s a s c l o s e a s c a n b e t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e
b e a u t i f u l i n i t s e s s e n c e , t o a n o n - a e s t h e t i c ( n o n - e i d e t i c ) d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e
b e a u t i f u l , a n d ( 2 ) t h a t o n l y t h e S c h e i n e n , t h o u g h t t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y ( t h a t
i s , i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e G r e e k s ) , p e r m i t s a c c e s s t o t h i s e s s e n c e . T h i s r e c o g n i -
t i o n o f K a n t d o e s n o t , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e x c l u d e c e r t a i n r e s e r v a t i o n s . B u t i t i s
s t r i k i n g t o s e e t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h H e i d e g g e r ' s l a n g u a g e h e r e i s c o n s o n a n t
Sublime Truth 79
with that of certain major propositions from "The Origin of the Work of Art."
Concerning "free favor," for example: "wouldn't this be rather [if one does
not misinterpret it in the manner of Schopenhauer) the supreme effort of our
essence, the liberation of ourselves in favor of the restitution [Freigabe) of that
which in itself has its own dignity, in order that it should have this dignity
purely?" Or again, concerning the "pleasure ofreflexion [Lustder Reflexion):
The Kantian interpretation of the aesthetic stance as "pleasure of
reflexion" penetrates into a fundamental state of being-human in
which man first attains the grounded plenitude of his essence. It is
that state which Schiller understood as the condition of the possi-
bility of the historical-Le., of the history-grounding-existence
[Daseins] of man.
Read in this manner-in other words, with and against Nietzsche (but
also with the help of Schiller )-Kant does not properly belong to aesthetics. In
his text, a comprehension of the beautiful surfaces that is more archaic (which
does not mean more ancient: it is, to the contrary, as comprehension, entirely
to come) than the philosophical comprehension. And this comprehension is
indicated by one word: Scheinen.
Heidegger's complex gesture with respect to the EK</>avEO'TaTov and his
equally complex gesture with respect to the Kantian determination of the
beautiful find perhaps their explanation in the nearly insurmountable diffi-
culty Heidegger encounters when he attempts to delimit aesthetics. This diffi-
culty, as one knows, has a name: Hegel.
As he expressly states in the epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of
Art,"IO Heidegger doubts that one can free oneself without further ado from
the Hegelian verdict concerning the end, death, or agony of art. After having
cited the principal propositions from the Aesthetics on art as a "thing of the
past," he adds:
One can hardly avoid this thought and aU that it implies by
objecting to Hegel that, since the final lecture of his Aesthetics-
winter 1828-29 at the University of Berlin-, one has seen the
birth of many new works of art and artistic movements. Hegel
never wanted to deny this possibility. But the question still
remains: is art still an essential and necessary manner in which the
truth which is decisive for our historical Dasein occurs? And if it is
this no longer, the question remains still as to why this is the case.
The decision on this dictum of Hegel has not yet been made; for
behind this dictum stands all of occidental thought since the
Greeks. This thought corresponds to a truth of the being which
has already occurred. The decision will be made-supposing that
i t s h o u l d b e m a d e - f r o m t h i s t r u t h o f t h e b e i n g i t s e l f a n d w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h i s t r u t h [ D i e E n t s c h e i d u n g . . . f a I l t . . . a u s d i e s e r
W a h r h e i t d e s S e i e n d e n u n d t i b e r s i e ] . U n t i l t h e n , H e g e l ' s d i c t u m
r e m a i n s v a l i d . T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y w h y t h e q u e s t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y a s t o
w h e t h e r t h e t r u t h t h a t t h i s t h o u g h t u t t e r s i s d e f i n i t i v e , a n d w h a t
f o l l o , , " , - , s i f t h i s i s t h e c a s e . ( 6 6 ; 8 0 )
T h u s , H e i d e g g e r s u b s c r i b e s t o t h e H e g e l i a n v e r d i c t . M o r e p r e c i s e l y , h e
r e c o g n i z e s t h e t r u t h a n d t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h i s v e r d i c t f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f
t h e s e l f - a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f m e t a p h y s i c s ( h e p r e s e n t s t h e L e c t u r e s o n A e s t h e t i c s
a s " t h e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e m e d i t a t i o n - b e c a u s e t h e y a r e t h o u g h t o n t h e
b a s i s o f m e t a p h y s i c s - t h a t t h e O c c i d e n t p o s s e s s e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e e s s e n c e o f
a r t " ) . H e g e l c o m p l e t e s a n d a c c o m p l i s h e s a e s t h e t i c s a s t h a t s c i e n c e w h i c h s a n c -
t i o n s a n d p r o n o u n c e s t h e e n d o f a r t , o n t h e b a s i s o f w h i c h d e a t h - s e n t e n c e a e s -
t h e t i c s i t s e l f a s s c i e n c e i s r e n d e r e d p o s s i b l e . B u t s c i e n c e , i n t h e H e g e l i a n s e n s e
o f t h e t e r m , t a k e s s h a p e a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f a " t r u t h o f t h e b e i n g w h i c h
h a s a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d . " T h i s i s w h y n o t h i n g e x c l u d e s i n p r i n c i p l e t h e p o s s i b i l -
i t y o f s a y i n g a w o r d , i f n o t t h e l a s t o r " d e c i s i v e " w o r d , o n t h e H e g e l i a n c l o s u r e
" f r o m t h i s t r u t h o f t h e b e i n g i t s e l f , a n d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h i s t r u t h . " A n d i t i s
m o r e o v e r s u c h a w o r d t h a t t h e l e c t u r e s o n " T h e O r i g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t "
s t r i v e t o a r t i c u l a t e .
H e i d e g g e r ' s p o s i t i o n h e r e i s ( n e c e s s a r i l y ) d o u b l e . O r t o p u t i t a n o t h e r
w a y : H e i d e g g e r g i v e s H e g e l w i t h o n e h a n d w h a t h e t a k e s b a c k w i t h t h e o t h e r .
W h a t h e t a k e s b a c k - a n d t h i s i s q u i t e c l e a r d e s p i t e H e i d e g g e r ' s p r u -
d e n c e a n d h i s a w a r e n e s s o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y - i s t h e d e f i n i t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w . I ' l l c o m e b a c k t o i t i n a m o m e n t .
W h a t h e g i v e s , h o w e v e r , i s u t t e r l y s u r p r i s i n g . I t i s n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n t h i s :
F i r s t , a n d i t i s a m a t t e r h e r e , n o d o u b t , o f a v e r y p r o f o u n d p o l i t i c a l c o m -
p l i c i t y : a r t c e a s e s t o b e " g r e a t " - a n d c e a s e s t o b e i t s e l f , i f e v e r i t w a s i t s e l f - a s
s o o n a s i t i s n o l o n g e r c o n s t i t u t i v e o r i n s t i t u t i v e o f a f u n d a m e n t a l p o s s i b i l i t y
o f e x i s t e n c e , i . e . , o f a B e i n g - a - p e o p l e . H e g e l w o u l d h a v e s a i d : a s s o o n a s i t
c e a s e s t o b e r e l i g i o n . H e i d e g g e r s a y s : a s s o o n a s i t c e a s e s t o h a v e a h i s t o r i c a l
d e s t i n y .
T h i s i s h o w H e i d e g g e r t r a n s l a t e s H e g e l i n t h e c o u r s e o n N i e t z s c h e :
P a r a l l e l t o t h i s e l a b o r a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c s [ i t i s a q u e s t i o n t h i s t i m e
o f a e s t h e t i c s i n t h e m o d e r n s e n s e ] a n d t o t h e e f f o r t s t o e l u c i d a t e
a n d g r o u n d t h e a e s t h e t i c s t a t e , a n o t h e r d e c i s i v e p r o c e s s a c c o m -
p l i s h e s i t s e l f i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a r t . I n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l a s c e n t a n d
t h e i r B e i n g , g r e a t a r t a n d i t s w o r k s o n l y g i v e e v i d e n c e o f t h e i r
g r e a t n e s s i n a s f a r a s t h e y a c c o m p l i s h a d e c i s i v e t a s k i n t h e h i s t o r -
i c a l e x i s t e n c e o f m e n : s p e c i f i c a l l y , t o m a k e t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e t o t a l -
i t y o f b e i n g s r e v e a l i t s e l f i n t h e m o d e o f t h e w o r k , a n d t o p r e s e r v e
Sublime Truth
in the work this revelation. Art and its work are only necessary as
a path and sojourn of man, where the truth of the totality of
beings, that is, the unconditioned, the absolute, opens itself up to
him. Great art is not great solely on the basis or in virtue of the
high quality of the created thing, but because of the fact that it
constitutes an "absolute need. " ... Parallel to the elaboration of the
reign of aesthetics and of the aesthetic relation to art, one observes
in modern times the decadence [Veifall] of great art in the sense
indicated. This decadence does not consist in the reduction of
"quality" or the debasement of style, but in this: that art loses its
essence, the immediate relation to its fundamental task, which is
to present [darsteIlen] the absolute and to install it [steIlen] as such
as measure in the domain of historical humanity. (99-100; 83-84)
81
The philosophico-political complicity is moreover so strong that having
remarked that "the Hegelian accomplishment of aesthetics is great in that it
recognizes and pronounces this end of great art," Heidegger responds-for
Hegel-to the objection by what one can call the "survival" of art:
Hegel never pretended to deny the possibility that afterward,
other works of art would still be produced and appreciated. The
fact that such isolated works are only valid as works within the
sphere of artistic taste proper to some social levels
[Volksschichten] does not speak at all against Hegel but precisely
for him. This fact proves that art has lost the power of the
absolute, its absolute power. (101; 85)
Second, and this is a direct consequence, art and reflexion on art are
mutually exclusive. As soon as a theory of art appears, a knowledge or a sci-
ence, "it's all over for great art." This is the fundamental axiom on which rests
the entirety of the introduction to the Lectures on Aesthetics and which the fig-
ure of Schiller emblematizes quite well, all in all, that "man gifted at once with
a great artistic sense and with a profound philosophical spirit" who, in sacri-
ficing in part his art to science, "did nothing other than pay tribute to his
epoch." It is the same axiom, or perhaps the same naivete, that subtends the
entire Heideggerian meditation: great art is absolutely anterior to all thought
or conceptual "reflexion" [Besinnung]. Which sounds much like an evocation
of the properly philosophical sense of the conceptual. It is obviously not a
question of attributing an aesthetics, in the sense of a theory of production
and of reception, even to the Greeks of the fifth century. But if I use the word
naiVete it is because it is difficult to see how one could dissociate art from some
sort of thought, if not from Thought in its philosophical sense. Moreover,
Heidegger is the first, as is well known, to recognize this and to affirm it. With-
o u t g o i n g i n t o d e t a i l s , h o w e v e r , a n d i n a p e r e m p t o r y m a n n e r , e v e n i f t h e a l l u -
s i o n t o t h e e s s e n c e o f T E J ( V T l i s p e r f e c t l y t r a n s p a r e n t :
T h e a b s e n c e o f a n y s u c h c o n c e p t u a l r e f l e x i o n o n t h i s g r e a t a r t
w h i c h w a s t h e i r c o n t e m p o r a r y a l s o d o e s n o t p r o v e t h a t a r t w a s
o n l y " l i v e d " [ " e r l e b t " ] i n t h i s e p o c h a s t h e o b s c u r e e m e r g e n c e o f
" l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s " [ " E r l e b n i s s e " ] , u n t o u c h e d b y a n y c o n c e p t o r
k n o w l e d g e . F o r t u n a t e l y , t h e G r e e k s h a d n o l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t
i n t u m t h e y w e r e s o o r i g i n a l l y e n d o w e d b y a c l e a r k n o w l e d g e a n d
b y s u c h a p a s s i o n f o r k n o w l e d g e , t h a t i n t h i s c l a r i t y o f k n o w l e d g e
t h e y h a d n o n e e d f o r a n y " a e s t h e t i c s . " ( 9 5 ; 8 0 )
I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , H e g e l - a f f i r m i n g t h a t a r t " i s f a r f r o m b e i n g t h e m o s t
e l e v a t e d e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e t r u t h , " o r t h a t " t h e p e o p l e s h a v e d e p o s i t e d i n a r t
t h e i r h i g h e s t i d e a s , " b u t n o t y e t i n t h e " e l e m e n t o f t h o u g h t " - i s m o r e c o h e r e n t .
B u t i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s c o h e r e n c e t h a t H e i d e g g e r r e f u s e s ( o t h e r w i s e , " T h e O r i g i n
o f t h e W o r k o f A r t " a n d t h e c o m m e n t a r y o n H o l d e r l i n w o u l d s t i l l b e a e s t h e t -
i c s ) . A n d i t i s s u c h a r e f u s a l t h a t c o m p r i s e s t h e e n t i r e d i f f i c u l t y o f h i s o p e r a t i o n .
I n a n y c a s e , w e c a n e x p l a i n i n t h i s w a y t h e s u r p r i s i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n H e i -
d e g g e r i m p r i n t s u p o n t h e H e g e l i a n v e r s i o n o f t h e b i r t h o f a e s t h e t i c s ( o r t h e
e n d o f g r e a t a r t ) . B e c a u s e t h e e n d o f a r t , i t s T E A O S o r d e s t i n y , i s t r u t h ( b u t w h a t
e l s e i s i t f o r H e g e l ? ) , t h e r e a r e t w o e n d s o r t w o " d e a t h s " o f a r t : t h e o n e i s p r o -
d u c e d i n t h e d e c l i n i n g f i f t h c e n t u r y t h a t w i t n e s s e s t h e b i r t h o f p h i l o s o p h y
i t s e l f ( b u t H e g e l s t i l l a c c e p t e d , a s g r e a t a r t , t h e " g o l d e n a g e o f t h e l a t e M i d d l e
A g e s " I l ) ; t h e o t h e r i s c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a e s t h e t i c s p r o p -
e r l y s p e a k i n g w h i c h H e g e l d e l i b e r a t e l y c o m p l e t e s . I n r e a l i t y , H e g e l i s c o n -
c e i v e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a s t h e o n e w h o p o s s e s s e s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h o f a r t
a n d t h e e n d o f a r t , t h u s m a k i n g i t i m p o s s i b l e t o b e t a k e n i n b y N i e t z s c h e ' s
" r e v e r s a l " o r t h e l a b o r i o u s a t t e m p t s o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t
o r r e c o n s t i t u t e a g r e a t a r t ( W a g n e r
1 2
) , a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ; a s t h e o n e w h o
c a n b e e n c l o s e d i n t u m w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f a e s t h e t i c s , t h e f i e l d o f t h e p h i l o s o -
p h y o f a r t , f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a b r o a d e r a n d d e e p e r v i s i o n o f a e s t h e t i c s ,
f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a m o r e " a r c h a i c " e n d o f a r t a n d a - t o t a l l y - o t h e r
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t r u t h . T h e H e i d e g g e r i a n c l o s u r e o f a e s t h e t i c s e x c e e d s t h e
H e g e l i a n c l o s u r e b e c a u s e i t c o m p r e h e n d s t h e " t r u t h o f t h e b e i n g " i n t e r m s o f
w h i c h t h i s H e g e l i a n c l o s u r e h a d t r a c e d i t s e l f o u t .
O n e h a s t o m a k e a d e c i s i o n t h e n - i f o n e c a n - a b o u t t h i s v e r y t r u t h o f
t h e b e i n g . B u t w h a t i s t h i s t r u t h ? T h e c o u r s e o n N i e t z s c h e , b u t a l s o " T h e O r i -
g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t " ( i n c l u d i n g t h e e n o r m o u s e f f o r t e x p e n d e d u p o n w i t h -
d r a w i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f G e s t a l t f r o m a n y H e g e l i a n o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n
1 3
) ,
l e a v e s n o d o u b t o n t h i s s u b j e c t : i t i s t h e e i d e t i c t r u t h o f t h e b e i n g , f r o m w h i c h
p r o c e e d s t h e e n t i r e c o n c e p t u a l i t y o f a e s t h e t i c s , i n c l u d i n g i t s m o d e r n v e r s i o n s .
F o r f r o m i t s i n c e p t i o n p h i l o s o p h y o r g a n i z e s a c o m p l i c i t y b e t w e e n t h e e i d e t i c
Sublime Truth 83
apprehension of the being and the conceptualization of art in terms of the cre-
ator and the amateur and not of the work itself. And this complicity condi-
tions an impoverished interpretation ofTEXVTJ as mere know-how, activity of
fabrication. 14
Therefore, the entire question is whether or not there is a determination
of the being more "archaic" than the eidetic determination. If the response is
in Scheinen (cpa(vEaOat) and if the debate with Hegel requires more or less
secretly are-evaluation of Kant and Schiller, that means-and this is the result
of the entire operation:
1. That Kant is obviously included in the Hegelian closure of aesthetics,
less for the reason that the third Critique still proposes itself as a theory of taste
than because Kant still formulates the problematic of the beautiful and the
sublime in terms of eidetic presentation-in this case, in terms of imagination.
2. That Kant, no less obviously, exceeds the limits of such a closure: first
of all, because the subjectivism of the third Critique can be wrenched, with the
help of Schiller, from the terrain of "subjectivity" (the "pleasure of reflexion"
points in the direction of the historical essence of man); secondly, and above
all, because the comprehension of the beautiful in its essence as pure Scheinen
translates a complete rupture with the eidetic apprehension of art. IS
3.
"Complete rupture" is perhaps saying quite a bit.
Finally, however, a certain Kantian relinquishment of aesthetics-but
neither in the form of a renunciation nor, indeed still less, in the form of an
explicit denunciation-entails that Kant, according to Heidegger, withdraws
in part from aesthetics, even though he seems in all respects to inscribe him-
self within it. Beneath the emphatic and unjust vociferations of Nietzsche, one
can hear, with the attentive ear of Schiller, a completely other voice resonating
in the third Critique: a voice already fundamentally incapable of articulating
the language of aesthetics or of sustaining its discourse up to the end.
16
And
this relinquishment-this manner of letting-go secretly pursued with respect
to aesthetics-precedes (and herein lies part of its enigma) the Hegelian clo-
sure of aesthetics: within aesthetics, and before it completes itself, the ground
of aesthetics itself begins to yawn. Or at least, it is as if a sort of "pocket of
resistance" had formed, an invisible enclave, which would have escaped in
advance from the imperious and gigantic encirclement of Science. Indeed, the
stakes are immensely high: nothing less than the historical possibility of a
great art. That is to say, the possibility, still to come, of art itself.
Now, it is my hypothesis that such a relinquishment is perhaps precisely
what enters into Kant's thought by way of the sublime or to be more accurate:
by way of a certain thought of the sublime.
T h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , i n f a c t , a b s o l u t e l y d o e s n o t i n t e r e s t H e i d e g -
g e r . E v e n i n K a n t a n d S c h i l l e r . H e m a i n t a i n s o n t h i s s u b j e c t a t o t a l s i l e n c e
w h i c h , a s a l w a y s i n H e i d e g g e r , m e a n s t h a t i t i s " i n e s s e n t i a l . " W e d o n o t
k n o w - a n d t h i s i s n o t b y c h a n c e - t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h i s s i l e n c e . I b e l i e v e h o w -
e v e r t h a t , o n t h e m o d e l o f o t h e r H e i d e g g e r i a n o p e r a t i o n s , i t i s n o t t o o d i f f i c u l t
t o i m a g i n e t h e m .
T h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , f o r e x a m p l e , i s a b e l a t e d t h o u g h t , b o r n i n
t h e w o m b o f t h e H e l l e n i s t i c s c h o o l s , n o t t r u l y o r a u t h e n t i c a l l y G r e e k , b u t c o n -
t a m i n a t e d b y L a t i n i t y - a n d e v e n p a r a - J u d a i c a n d C h r i s t i a n ( T O " Y t / s o s , f r o m
t h e f i r s t d i a s p o r a o n G r e e k s o i l , d e s i g n a t e s t h e G o d o f t h e B i b l e : t h e M o s t -
h i g h ) . A s i d e f r o m t h i s , i t i s a t h o u g h t t h a t c o m e s f r o m r h e t o r i c : i t d o e s n o t
a t t a i n t o p h i l o s o p h y , a f t e r i t s r e s u r g e n c e i n m o d e r n t i m e s , e x c e p t b y t h e p a t h
o f F r e n c h p o e t i c s a n d E n g l i s h a e s t h e t i c s . I t a c t u a l l y f o r m s a m i n o r t r a d i t i o n .
E v e n a s a t h o u g h t o f e x c e s s , o f u n b o r d e r i n g , o f b e y o n d - b e a u t y , e t c . , i t a t t e s t s
t o a n e x h a u s t i o n o f t h e s e n s e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l . I t i s n o t b y c h a n c e , t h e r e f o r e ,
t h a t a e s t h e t i c s s t r i c t u s e n s u l a y s c l a i m t o i t . C o n t r a r y t o a p p e a r a n c e s , i t w a n t s
t o p r o v i d e a w e a k t h o u g h t , t h a t i s , a t h o u g h t p r e c i s e l y w i t h o u t g r a n d e u r .
B u t t h e s e a r e s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y e x t e r i o r r e a s o n s . T w o o t h e r s s e e m t o m e
m o r e d e c i s i v e .
F i r s t , s i n c e L o n g i n u s , a n d i n i t s v e r y c o n c e p t , t h e s u b l i m e h a s b e e n
c o n c e i v e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n p a r e x c e l l e n c e ,
t h a t i s , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e n s i b l e a n d t h e s u p e r -
s e n s i b l e w h i c h w e i n h e r i t f r o m P l a t o n i s m . U p t h r o u g h K a n t , i t i s s i m p l y t h e
t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n t o a n e t h i c o - a e s t h e t i c a l , i . e . , t h e o l o g i c o - a e s -
t h e t i c a l m o d e .
S e c o n d , i n s o f a r a s i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f n e g a t i v e l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e b e a u t i f u l ,
t h e s u b l i m e o f f e r s e s s e n t i a l l y n o t h i n g m o r e ( m o t i f o f e x c e s s ) a n d , m o r e o v e r ,
n o t h i n g l e s s ( m o t i f o f t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e ) t h a n t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l
o n w h i c h i t d o e s n o t c e a s e t o d e p e n d . I t o f f e r s i n d e e d n o t h i n g o t h e r : i t i s q u i t e
s i m p l y a c o u n t e r c o n c e p t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l .
A l l o f t h i s a m o u n t s t o t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t H e i d e g g e r w a s c a p a b l e o f s u b -
s c r i b i n g t o t h e H e g e l i a n v e r s i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e : t h e s u b l i m e i s n o t h i n g b u t t h e
f i r s t d e g r e e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l . M o r e o v e r , h e d o e s s o , e v e n i f i n d i r e c t l y , w h e n , i n
t h e c o u r s e o n N i e t z s c h e , h e p l a c e s i n t o r e l a t i o n t o N i e t z s c h e ' s a e s t h e t i c s - t h e
a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e r e v e r s a l o f a e s t h e t i c s , a e s t h e t i c s a s a n t i - a e s t h e t i c s - t h e
f a m o u s s e n t e n c e f r o m R i l k e ' s f i r s t " E l e g y " : " F o r t h e b e a u t i f u l i s n o t h i n g I
B u t t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e t e r r i b l e , " w h e r e i n o n e c a n d e c i p h e r w i t h o u t
t o o m u c h t r o u b l e t h e R i l k e a n d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e .
1 7
O n e c o u l d n o t f o r -
m u l a t e m o r e a p t l y t h e d e p e n d e n c e o r s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e b e a u t i f u l . B u t t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n p r o b a b l y a l r e a d y c o m m i t s o n e t o
s u b s c r i b i n g s t i l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y t o t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e " m o s t c o m p r e h e n -
s i v e m e d i t a t i o n . . . t h a t t h e O c c i d e n t p o s s e s s e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e e s s e n c e o f a r t . "
H e g e l , t h e n , s e e m s t o p o s s e s s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h o f t h e s u b l i m e .
Sublime Truth 85
The reason for this is quite simple: from the moment when the Idea of
the beautiful is defined in terms of the figural adequation of (spiritual) content
to (sensible) form-the Ideal of art-and from the moment when adequation
("reconciliation," as the Aesthetics puts it) is posited as the very need of philo-
sophical Spirit, the sublime, that is, the inadequation of form to spiritual con-
tent, is inevitably conceived as a moment which precedes the moment of the
beautiful or art properly speaking. This is why the sublime, which Hegel situ-
ates in symbolic art, is not yet art (it is even, at the limit, in the Jewish
moment, the prohibition of art). But it goes without saying that such a defini-
tion, in terms of adequation (the ollotwaLS) of sensible and super-sensible and
of the spiritual conformity of the Gestalt, presupposes the eidetic determina-
tion of the being. It is indeed explicitly the truth
18
of such a determination.
And Hegel in fact conceives of the relation between the beautiful and the sub-
lime only on the basis of this determination. I take this example from the Lec-
tures on the Philosophy of Religion:
Sublimity is the form which expresses the relation between God
and the things of nature. One cannot call the infinite subject sub-
lime: it is the absolute in and for itself, it is holy. Sublimity is the
phenomenon, the relation between this infinite subject and the
world; it is the Idea that manifests itself in exteriority. The world is
conceived as the manifestation of this subject, but as a nonaffir-
mative manifestation, or as a manifestation which, although affir-
mative, has as its principal characteristic the negation of what
belongs to nature and to the world as lacking in conformity; and
thus this phenomenal manifestation reveals itself to be superior
[erhaben] to the phenomenon, to the reality, and the latter is
posited at the same time as negated. The phenomenalized Idea
shows itself to be superior to that which manifests it, or if one
wishes, the phenomenon lacks conformity to the I d e a . ~
In the religion of beauty [Greek art], the signification recon-
ciles itself with the material, sensible element...; the spiritual
reveals itself completely in this exteriority; the latter signifies the
interior which one knows entirely in its exterior form. Sublimity,
on the contrary, makes the matter disappear in which the sub-
lime appears. Matter is expressly conceived as not being in con-
formity.19
Clearly, this is a "dialectical" comprehension of the sublime. But it is by
no means merely the "dialectical version" or the "dialectization" of the sub-
lime: it is not the "Hegelian" truth of the sublime but rather the truth as such
of the sublime-once the sublime is thought, as it always has been, in terms of
the beautiful, itself in turn interpreted in terms of the eidetic comprehension
o f t h e b e i n g . H e g e l c o n t e n t s h i m s e l f b a s i c a l l y w i t h v e r i f y i n g t h i s , a n d q u i t e
c o n s i s t e n t l y : i f t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o r p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i t s f o r m -
d e l i m i t e d a n d f i n i t e - a n d i f t h e s u b l i m e i s a n d h a s a l w a y s b e e n t h o u g h t a s t h e
m a n i f e s t a t i o n o r p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i n f i n i t e , u n d e r w h a t e v e r n a m e i t m i g h t
b e , t h e n i n i t s v e r y s t r u c t u r e t h e s u b l i m e i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y . T h e s u b l i m e i s
i n d e e d , f r o m t h e s p e c u l a t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n p a r e x c e l l e n c e ,
w h i c h a r t , r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n , a n d p h i l o s o p h y ( S c i e n c e ) s u c c e s s i v e l y a t t e m p t t o
" r e c o n c i l e . " T h i s i s w h y t h e f o r m u l a o f t h e A e s t h e t i c s - - t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f
t h e i n f i n i t e a n n i h i l a t e s t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n i t s e l f - s t a t e s n o t m e r e l y t h e m e t a -
p h y s i c a l t r u t h o f t h e s u b l i m e , b u t t h e s u b l i m e t r u t h o f m e t a p h y s i c s . I t i s t h e
o r i g i n a l o x y m o r o n , e v e r s i n c e L o n g i n u s t h e f i g u r e p a r e x c e l l e n c e o f t h e s u b -
l i m e , w h i c h o n e s e e s a s s e r t i n g i t s e l f e v e r y w h e r e i n t h e H e g e l i a n t r e a t m e n t o f
t h e s u b l i m e .
2 0
T h e t r u t h o f t h e s u b l i m e i s t h u s d i a l e c t i c a l , i s d i a l e c t i c s i t s e l f . I t f o l l o w s
t h a t i f t h e s u b l i m e i s i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e t h e e x c e s s o f t h e b e a u t i f u l , i t i s o n l y s o
b y d e f a u l t , s u c h t h a t i t i s e f f e c t i v e l y t h e b e a u t i f u l t h a t i s t h e s u b l a t i o n a n d t r u t h
o f t h e s u b l i m e . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e i n c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l , w h i c h i s , t h e
b e a u t i f u l s e e k i n g t o c o m p l e t e i t s e l f . A n d i n t h i s r e v e r s a l o f t h e e n t i r e d i s c o u r s e
o f a e s t h e t i c s o n t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e
s u b l i m e c o m e s t o c o m p l e t e i t s e l f i n i t s t u r n . W h e n H e g e l s a y s o f M o s e s t h a t h e
o n l y h a s , " d o w n t h e r e . . . t h e v a l u e o f a n o r g a n " ( 6 5 ; 1 3 7 ) , h e s p e a k s t h e t r u t h
o f w h a t K a n t a t t e m p t e d t o e i a b o r a t e i n t h e n a m e o f " n e g a t i v e " o r " r e s t r i c t i v e "
p r e s e n t a t i o n : h e s p e a k s t h e t r u t h o f t h e K a n t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r o h i b i -
t i o n o f ( r e ) p r e s e n t a t i o n . F r o m u n d e r n e a t h t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l p a t h o s o f e x c e s s
a n d o v e r f l o w i n g , H e g e l w i l l h a v e s i m p l y f l u s h e d o u t t h i s n a ' i v e t e : t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e d o e s n o t r e m a i n a n y t h e l e s s a n e g a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n . F o r t h i s
r e a s o n , t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e b e a u t i f u l .
O n e c o u l d v e r i f y t h i s i n p r a c t i c a l l y a l l t h e " c l a s s i c a l " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f
t h e s u b l i m e , B u r k e ' s i n c l u d e d . B u t o n e c o u l d v e r i f y i t a b o v e a l l i n a n e m b l e m -
a t i c m a n n e r , i n w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h e f i g u r e o f M o s e s a s s o o n a s i t e n t e r s i n t o
a r t a s a m a n i f e s t s t a k e o f " g r e a t a r t " u n d e r t h e i n e v i t a b l e s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e
a e s t h e t i c d i s c o u r s e .
W h e n f o r e x a m p l e - b u t i t i s a m a j o r e x a m p l e - F r e u d u n d e r t a k e s t o
e l u c i d a t e t h e " e n i g m a " o f M i c h e l a n g e l o ' s M o s e s , h e i s f o r c e d , d e s p i t e h i m s e l f ,
t o s u b m i t h i m s e l f t o a d i a l e c t i c s o f t h e s u b l i m e , u p t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e h e m u s t
a c q u i e s c e b e f o r e t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n h e c o n f r o n t s , a n d f i n d s h i m s e l f o b l i g e d t o
r e s t o r e M o s e s t o i t s e n i g m a . T h i s t e x t h a s o f t e n b e e n c o n s i d e r e d w e a k a n d d i s -
a p p o i n t i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e a n a l y t i c p r o b l e m a t i c . I t h a s o f t e n a n d j u s t l y
b e e n s e e n a s c o n t a i n i n g t h e t r a c e o f a n u n t h o u g h t o r o r i g i n a l o b s t a c l e o f p s y -
c h o a n a l y s i s .
2 1
W h a t h a s b e e n l e s s e x p l i c i t l y r e m a r k e d , h o w e v e r , i s t h e p r e c i -
s i o n a n d r i g o u r w i t h w h i c h F r e u d ' s e s s a y i n s c r i b e s i t s e l f i n t o t h e t r a d i t i o n o f
t h e a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e s u b l i m e . I t i s a n a b s o l u t e l y S c h i l l e r i a n t e x t , a n d t h e s o l u -
t i o n o f t h e e n i g m a , i f t h e r e i s a s o l u t i o n , b e l o n g s t o t a l l y t o t h e c o n c e p t o f d i g -
Sublime Truth 87
nity which is, according to Schiller, the "expression in the phenomenon" of
the "mastery of the drives by moral force," that is, of "spiritual freedom."22
Freud translates this notion into the following terms, in which one can readily
recognize the lexical and thematic elements characteristic of the sublime code:
Michelangelo placed on the tomb of the Pope another Moses,
superior to the Moses of history or tradition. He transformed the
theme of the broken tables of the law, not permitting the anger of
Moses to break them, but the danger that they could be broken
appeases this anger or at least restrains it in the moment of the act.
In this way, he introduced into the figure of Moses something
new, something superhuman, and the strong mass as well as the
exuberant musculature of this powerful character are just a con-
crete expression of the highest psychic exploit of which a man
could be capable: to defeat his own passion in the name of an end
for which he knows himself to be destined.23
This solution, evidently, is none. In order to overcome the obstacle of "nega-
tive presentation," Schiller had already proposed the notion of "sensible
signs" of the super-sensible, a notion that moreover does not cease to guide
Freud in his inquiry. He was nonetheless not quite capable of avoiding a cer-
tain dialectization:
In all rigor, the moral force of man is not susceptible of presenta-
tion, since the super-sensible can never be rendered sensible. But
mediately it can be represented to the understanding by sensible
signs, as is evidently the case in the dignity of the human form.
(413; 217)
This does not prevent Schiller from finding, if only by means ofWinck-
elmann, the example of a work of art where the struggle between the sensible
and the super-sensible can be deciphered in the very form of the work. As ifby
chance, the example is a work of monumental statuary, the famous Laocoon:
24
Suppose that we see the signs of particularly painful affect in a
man, in the category of those first completely involuntary move-
ments [which Schiller has discussed above]. However, even as his
veins swell, his muscles flex convulsively, his voice falters, his
breast heaves, and his stomach contracts, still his voluntary move-
ments remain gentle, the expression on his face remains free, his
eye and forehead remain serene. If the man were merely a sensible
being, all of these traits, having a common source, would remain
in mutual accord. and would therefore in the present case all have
. . t o e x p r e s s i n d i f f e r e n t l y h i s p a i n f u l c o n d i t i o n . B u t s i n c e h e m i x e s
c a l m t r a i t s w i t h t h o s e o f s u f f e r i n g , a n d s i n c e a s i n g l e c a u s e c o u l d
n o t h a v e o p p o s e d e f f e c t s , t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f t r a i t s p r o v e s t h e
e x i s t e n c e a n d i n f l u e n c e o f a f o r c e w h i c h i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e
p a i n a n d s u p e r i o r t o t h e i m p r e s s i o n s t o w h i c h w e s e e t h e s e n s i b l e
e l e m e n t s u c c o m b . A n d i n t h i s m a n n e r , c a l m i n s u f f e r i n g - i n
w h i c h d i g n i t y p r o p e r l y c o n s i s t s - b e c o m e s , a l t h o u g h o n l y b y t h e
m e d i a t i o n o f i n f e r e n t i a l r e a s o n , t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i n t e l l i -
g e n c e i n m a n a n d t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f h i s m o r a l f r e e d o m . ( 4 1 4 ; 2 1 8 )
B u t o n e c a n r e a d i l y s e e w h e r e t h e d i f f i c u l t y l i e s . S u b l i m i t y i s l e g i b l e i n
t h e " c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f t r a i t s " w h i c h s i g n i f i e s i n a m e d i a t e d f o r m - b u t
n o n e t h e l e s s p r e s e n t s - " c a l m i n s u f f e r i n g " o r d i g n i t y . B u t t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i n
t h i s c a s e , i s p e r f e c t l y a d e q u a t e t o t h a t w h i c h i t i s s u p p o s e d t o p r e s e n t , t h a t i s ,
p r e c i s e l y , a c o n f l i c t : b e t w e e n s e n s i b l e a n d s u p e r - s e n s i b l e , b e t w e e n a " s t r o n g
i n t e r e s t " o f " t h e f a c u l t y o f d e s i r e " ( o f w h i c h s u f f e r i n g i s n o t h i n g b u t o n e e f f e c t
a m o n g o t h e r s ) a n d l i b e r t y . T h u s , S c h i l l e r p r o v i d e s h e r e a p u r e a n d s i m p l e
i n s t a n c e o f t h e b e a u t i f u l .
T h i s i s j u s t w h a t b o t h e r s F r e u d w h e n , i n t h e c a s e o f t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f
a n g e r b y s u f f e r i n g , h e a d a p t s t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n t o h i s p u r p o s e s . T o b e s u r e , t h e r e
r e m a i n s t h i s a g g r a v a t i n g d e t a i l : t h e f i g u r e h e t r e a t s i s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e
p r o h i b i t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : M o s e s i s t h e " g r a v e n i m a g e " t h a t f i g u r e s t h e
m a s t e r y o f a n a n g e r a r o u s e d b y t h e s p e c t a c l e o f i d o l a t r y , i . e . , b y t h e c u l t i c w o r -
s h i p o f t h e g r a v e n i m a g e . T h a t F r e u d p r e s e r v e s h i s s i l e n c e o n t h i s p a r a d o x ( a
k e y w o r d s i n c e L o n g i n u s , a n d p e r h a p s t h e m a j o r c o n c e p t o f t h e t h e o r y o f t h e
s u b l i m e
2 5
) , t h a t h e p r e t e n d s n o t t o p a y a n y a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s s t r a n g e f o l d t h a t a t
o n c e j o i n s a n d d i v i d e s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t e d b y v i r t u e o f t h e v e r y
f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h e r e , i s t h e s i g n , n o t o f a b l i n d n e s s o r a " f o r -
g e t f u l n e s s , " b u t o f a p r e s e n t i m e n t : t h a t h e r e w h a t i s a t s t a k e i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o r i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r t f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a e s t h e t i c s .
O n t h e o n e h a n d , M o s e s c a n b e c o m e a n g r y , t h e r e b y o b e y i n g h i s d e s t i n y
o r s p i r i t u a l m i s s i o n , i n a m o v e m e n t o n e c o u l d b e t e m p t e d t o c o n s i d e r p r o p -
e r l y s u b l i m e . B u t t h i s a n g e r , a s a n i m p u l s e , i s p r e c i s e l y n o t s u b l i m e . A n d a b o v e
a l l - t h i s i s t h e t r u e d i f f i c u l t y F r e u d c o n f r o n t s - i t w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n -
c e i v e t h e p r o j e c t o f M i c h e l a n g e l o , w h a t F r e u d c a l l s h i s " i n t e n t i o n , " a s a n
a t t e m p t t o f i g u r e t h e ( s u b l i m e ) h a t r e d o f f i g u r a t i o n . B u t F r e u d d o e s n o t
c h o o s e t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , M o s e s c a n m a s t e r h i s a n g e r , i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e
S c h i l l e r i a n d e f i n i t i o n o f s u b l i m i t y . B u t i n t h i s c a s e , a g a i n , t h e r e i s q u i t e s i m p l y
a d e q u a t i o n : t h a t w h i c h t h e f i g u r e f i g u r e s i s t h e ( s u b l i m e ) r e n u n c i a t i o n o f a l l
h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d f i g u r a t i o n . M o s e s , i n c l e a r o p p o s i t i o n t o J u d a i c ( M o s a i c ) s u b -
l i m i t y , i s a h o m m a g e , g r a n d i o s e b u t b e a u t i f u l , p a i d t o a r t i n i t s e i d e t i c d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n . O r , i f y o u p r e f e r , t h e t a b l e s o f t h e l a w w h i c h M o s e s r e t a i n s i n
Sublime Truth 89
extremis under his arm signify in a Hegelian manner that the essence of the
sublime is the beautiful.
This is why, before the force of such a contradiction, Freud acquiesces
and leaves the matter undecided. But this acquiescence is itself subjected to
the (aesthetic) logic of adequation, which in this case takes the form of the cri-
terion of success. With Michelangelo, Freud confesses, we are at the limits of
art-at least of a certain idea of art:
Is it fitting to attribute to Michelangelo-the artist in whose
works such a plethora of ideas struggles for expression-such
naive indecisiveness concerning these striking and strange traits of
the statue of Moses? Finally, one can add in all humility that the
artist shares with the critic the responsibility for causing this
uncertainty. Michelangelo often approached in his creations the
extreme limit of the expressible: perhaps he did not succeed
entirely with the Moses, if his intention was to have the beholder
divine the storm aroused by violent emotion through the signs
that remain behind when, the storm having subsided, calm is
restored. (220; 106)
The difficulty at work here (but one can find it elsewhere: it constitutes
the essential, necessary incompleteness of Schonberg's Moses and Aaron
26
) has
to do perhaps finally with this: the prohibition of representation-the icono-
clastic prescription, as Goux says-is a meta-sublime statement: it states in a
sublime manner-in the absolute simplicity of a negative prescription -sub-
limity itself, the incommensurability of the sensible to the metaphysical (to the
Idea, to God). In thereby ceasing to be the pure "organ" of this utterance, in
becoming a figure and thus contradicting the message he carries, Moses
emblematizes the aporia of the eidetic apprehension of the sublime and also of
art, in the sense of "great art." If you like, and even if it is an oversimplification:
in the contradiction of which it is the site, the figure of Moses reveals two things:
1. Either Hegel is right: the Mosaic law is, in its very negativity, effec-
tively sublime in that it states the essence of sublimity, namely, that negative
presentation signifies the negation of the presentation. No art, in a Platonico-
Hegelian sense, can escape this situation. A priori and a posteriori, Hegel pos-
sesses the truth of the sublime, and from Michelangelo to Schonberg the fig-
ure of Moses symbolically marks the impossibility of a great "modern" art
(that is, in Hegel's terminology, of a great "romantic" art). And this is more-
over probably what condemns art, in its aspiration toward great art, to
exhausting itself in the presentation of its proper impossibility and, conse-
quently, to combatting figurality in 'all its forms.
2. Or else art is not essentially a matter of eidetic presentation, and this
is perhaps what Schiller attempts with some difficulty to say when he speaks of
" s e n s i b l e s i g n s " o r o f " m e d i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " B u t i f a r t i s n o n e t h e l e s s p r e s e n -
t a t i o n ( a n d h o w c o u l d o n e d e f i n e i t o t h e r w i s e ? ) , w h a t d o e s i t e s s e n t i a l l y p r e -
s e n t o t h e r t h a n f o r m o r f i g u r e ? O r i n a m o r e g e n e r a l m a n n e r , w h a t c o u l d a
n o n e i d e t i c p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e b e i n g b e ? W h a t c o u l d b e a t p l a y i n p r e s e n t a t i o n
t h a t w o u l d n o t b e o f t h e o r d e r o f t h e e l B o s , t h e a s p e c t o r t h e v i e w ?
T h i s q u e s t i o n , w h i c h c o n c e r n s p r e s e n t a t i o n ( a n d n o l o n g e r r e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n , a t l e a s t i n t h e s e n s e i n v o k e d b y t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f a r t ) , i s d o u b t l e s s t h e
q u e s t i o n w h i c h , s e c r e t l y a n d i n n e a r s i l e n c e , ( r e ) e m e r g e s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e
s i n c e t h e i n c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h K a n t ' s t h o u g h t . I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s q u e s -
t i o n t h a t i s r u m b l i n g b e n e a t h t h e T r a n s c e ! 1 d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c a n d t h e d i s r u p t i v e
e f f e c t o f w h i c h o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e i n g e n e r a l m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t a l s o i n
t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f a r t . I w o u l d l i k e t o t h i n k h e r e t h a t i t i s e m b l e m a t i z e d b y
K a n t ' s s e c o n d e x a m p l e o f a b s o l u t e s u b l i m i t y , t h e m y s t e r i o u s f o r m u l a
i n s c r i b e d o n t h e t e m p l e o f I s i s : " I a m a l l t h a t i s , t h a t w a s , a n d t h a t w i l l b e , a n d
n o m o r t a l h a s l i f t e d m y v e i l . "
4 .
I n d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e u t t e r a n c e o f M o s e s , t h e u t t e r a n c e o f I s i s i s n o t a p r e s c r i p -
t i v e b u t a c o n s t a t i v e . I t s a y s m y s t e r y i t s e l f , a n d f o r t h i s r e a s o n , a s i s w e l l k n o w n ,
i t h a s a l w a y s b e e n t a k e n t o b e t h e m o d e l o f t h e e s o t e r i c u t t e r a n c e a s s u c h . I n
p a r t i c u l a r , t h e u t t e r a n c e o f I s i s c i r c u l a t e d w i d e l y t o w a r d t h e e n d o f t h e E n l i g h t -
e n m e n t , m a r k e d a s t h a t p e r i o d w a s b y M a s o n i c m y s t i c i s m , f r o m H a m a n n t o
H e g e l a n d f r o m S c h l e g e l t o t h e N o v a l i s o f t h e D i s c i p l e s o f S a i s . I f o n e a b s t r a c t s
f r o m t h e m e t a p h o r t h a t c a r r i e s i t , i t i s , q u a c o n s t a t i v e , a n u t t e r a n c e o f t r u t h : i t
s a y s t h e t r u t h o r t h e e s s e n c e o f d i v i n i t y , n a m e l y , t h a t d i v i n i t y c a n n o t b e
u n v e i l e d . A n d t h a t K a n t s h o u l d g i v e i t a " r a t i o n a l i s t " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t h e
s h o u l d t r a n s l a t e i t ( I s i s m e a n s M o t h e r N a t u r e ) a n d t r e a t i t t h u s a s a s o r t o f
p r o s o p o p o e i a o f n a t u r e , d o e s n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y a l t e r t h e t r u t h u t t e r e d a n d
d o e s n o t a f f e c t i t s m y s t i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . I n s c r i b e d a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f t h e b o o k b y
S e g n e r , i t i s s u p p o s e d t o f i l l t h e r e a d e r w i t h a " s a c r e d s h u d d e r , w h i c h s h o u l d
d i s p o s e t h e m i n d t o a s o l e m n a t t e n t i v e n e s s " ; a n d o n e d i v i n e s r a t h e r e a s i l y t h a t
t h i s i s w h a t p e r m i t s i t s h y p e r b o l i c a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e b i b l i c a l l a w : t h e s e n t e n c e
o f I s i s c o n c e r n s a l s o t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b i l i t y o f t h e m e t a - p h y s i c a l u n d e r s t o o d a s
t r u t h o r e s s e n c e o f < P O O L S . I t e c h o e s a l s o t h e < P O O L S K p U r r T E u 9 a L < p L M ' L o f H e r a -
c l i t u s . I t p r e s e n t s t h e " f a c t " t h a t t h e r e i s t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e .
H o w e v e r - a n d I r e t u r n t h u s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e m e t a p h o r , i f i t i s a
m e t a p h o r - t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e i s c o n c e i v e d h e r e a s n o n - u n v e i l a b l e , a n d t h i s
m a k e s a b i g d i f f e r e n c e b e c a u s e t h e p r o s o p o p o e i a o f n a t u r e i n i t s t o t a l i t y , o r o f
t h e t o t a l i t y o f b e i n g s ( i t i s t h e t o t a l i t y i t s e l f w h i c h i s n o n u n v e i l a b l e , t h a t i s , t h e
u n i t y o f a l l t h a t i s : i t s B e i n g ) , i s a l s o a p r o s o p o p o e i a o f t r u t h . T h e s e n t e n c e o f
I s i s i s n o t s i m p l y a n u t t e r a n c e o f t r u t h b u t a n u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t r u t h o f t h e
Sublime Truth 91
truth,27 that is, of the play of veiling and unveiling, of presentation and of the
non-unveilable. It takes the (well-known) form of: "I, the truth, speak." That
is to say, in this case-but isn't it always thus when truth speaks?- "I, the
truth, tell the truth of (or about) the truth." And this is no doubt why the sen-
tence is absolutely sublime. For it is a stricdy contradictory sentence. The syn-
tactical equivalent, if you will, of an oxymoron.
What does it mean, in effect, "to tell the truth"? By an immemorial con-
straint-at least as far back as philosophical memory can reach-which does
not arise out of any metaphorical decision, telling the truth is unveiling the
truth. Truth-telling, in this sense, as we know since Aristode, and as paragraph
7B of Being and Time reminds us, is apophantic: it lets us see (or lets appear:
4>atvEOem) on the basis of (cl1ro) that of which it speaks. It renders manifest
or patent, it unveils. Truth-telling is the Myos aATlS!ls. But what is produced
in Isis's sentence-and this is probably the reason why it has been so fascinat-
ing-is that telling the truth about itself, telling the truth of the truth and
unveiling itself as the truth, truth (unveiling) unveils itself as the impossibility
of unveiling or the necessity, for finite (mortal) Being, of its veiling. Speaking
of itself. unveiling itself, truth says that the essence of truth is nontruth-or
that the essence of unveiling is veiling. The truth (the unveiling) unveils itself
as veiling itself.
One may recall Hegel's jubilation. This jubilation surfaces in his descrip-
tion of the (symbolic) passage from the symbolic, sublime world (the Orient,
Egypt) to the world of the first emergence of Spirit as such, that is, of self-con-
sciousness: Greece. This passage is double. It occurs first of all by means of the
response of Oedipus (the one who knows) to the enigma of the Sphynx. 28 But
it occurs also, heliotropically, by means of the inscription of the sanctuary of
the deity Neith at Sai's. The sun rises in the Orient. It makes the stone sing (the
statues in the temple of Memnon). But the sun or Spirit itself remains, in
Egypt, enclosed in the stone, despite the ephemeral apparition of a solar cult
which will give Freud much to dream about. Greece. in turn, is the country of
the "great midday," the sun at its zenith. Spirit has come out of stone: out of
enigmatic inscriptions and tombs. The philosophical Occident begins with
this departure from Egypt. this breaking away from the somber. stony empire
of the dead. Hegel cites the inscription: "I am all that is, that was, and that will
be, etc." But the sentence adds. he says: "The fruit that I bore is Helios (the
solar deity)." And he comments:
This (solar) clarity is the spirit, the son of Nei'th, the mysterious
nocturnal divinity. In the Egyptian Nei'th. truth veils itself still.
The solution is the Greek Apollo. This is his proposition: "Man,
know yourself. "29
The truth of truth is pure and simple unveiling. the simple departure
from the night, the pure brilliance of the sun. It is the apparition of Spirit in its
l i g h t a s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d s u b j e c t . T h i s i s w h y , d e c i p h e r i n g t h e e n i g m a ,
H e g e l c a n r e j o i c e .
I n v e r s e l y , i n I s i s ' s s e n t e n c e , a s K a n t d e c l a r e s i t s s u b l i m i t y , i t i s n o t a
q u e s t i o n o f H e l i o s , a n d s t i l l l e s s o f A p o l l o - t h e " s o l u t i o n . " N o s u n d i s s i p a t e s
t h e v e i l i n g o f t h e d e i t y , n o s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s d i s s o l v e s t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f
t h e d i s c o u r s e o f t r u t h o n i t s e l f . T h e s e n t e n c e i s l e f t t o i t s p a r a d o x i c a l e n i g m a ,
t h e e n i g m a w h i c h e n g e n d e r s n o t r e j o i c i n g b u t a " s a c r e d s h u d d e r . " T h e t r u t h ,
i n i t s e s s e n c e , i s n o n t r u t h .
T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e t r u t h , i n i t s e s s e n c e , i s n o n t r u t h f i g u r e s , a s y o u
m a y r e c a l l , i n t h e s e c o n d o f t h e l e c t u r e s o f H e i d e g g e r o n " T h e O r i g i n o f t h e
W o r k o f A r t " ( 4 0 ; 5 4 ) . I t c o m e s u p s h o r t l y b e f o r e H e i d e g g e r d e f i n e s b e a u t y a s
" t h i s s h i n i n g [ S c h e i n e n J j o i n e d i n t h e w o r k " a n d a s " a w a y i n w h i c h t r u t h o c c u r s
a s u n c o n c e a l e d n e s s " ( 4 2 ; 5 6 ) . I n t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i s s u m m a r i z e d H e i d e g g e r ' s
a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t r u c t u r e o f c i - A T j 9 l Q , a n a n a l y s i s w h i c h i s d e s t i n e d
t o s h o w t h a t " i t b e l o n g s t o t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e t r u t h a s u n c o n c e a l e d n e s s [ U n v e r -
b o r g e n h e i t J n o t t o g i v e i t s e l f i n t h e m o d e o f a d o u b l e c o n c e a l m e n t [ V e r b e r g e n J . "
B y " c o n c e a l m e n t , " o r r e s e r v e , H e i d e g g e r m e a n s t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e L i c h t u n g , o f
t h e b r i g h t n e s s o r t h e c l e a r i n g , o f t h e " e m p t y p l a c e " o r t h e O p e n , " w h e r e t h e
b e i n g c o m e s t o h o l d i t s e l f . " " T h e c l e a r i n g . . . i s i n i t s e l f a t o n c e c o n c e a l m e n t "
( 3 9 ; 5 3 ) , t h a t i s , t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e c i A T j 9 L a i s t h e A T j 9 r } ( t h e e s s e n c e o f u n v e i l i n g
i s v e i l i n g ) ; t h e c l e a r i n g i t s e l f , t h e u n v e i l i n g o f t h e b e i n g , d o e s n o t g i v e i t s e l f . O r i f
y o u p r e f e r : t h e u n c o v e r i n g [ o u v e r t u r e J w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e b e i n g c a n n o t a p p e a r
a n d p r e s e n t i t s e l f a s s u c h , t h i s c o v e r i n g [ c o u v e r t u r e J i t s e l f - w h i c h , " t h o u g h t o n
t h e b a s i s o f t h e b e i n g , " s a y s H e i d e g g e r , i s " m o r e b e i n g " t h a n t h e b e i n g - d o e s
n o t p r e s e n t i t s e l f ; t h a t i s , i s n o t i n t h e m o d e o f w h a t i s . T h e o p e n i n g - u n c o v e r -
i n g , t h e c l e a r i n g , i s n o b e i n g : " T h i s o p e n c e n t e r i s t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r r o u n d e d b y
w h a t i s ; r a t h e r , t h e l i g h t i n g c e n t e r i t s e l f e n c i r c l e s a l l t h a t i s , l i k e t h e N o t h i n g
w h i c h w e s c a r c e l y k n o w " ( 3 9 ; 5 3 ) .
T h i s v e i l i n g o f t h e u n v e i l i n g , t h i s r e s e r v e o f t h e c l e a r i n g , s a y s H e i d e g g e r ,
i s d o u b l e . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t i s a d i s s i m u l a t i n g " i n s t a b i l i t y " ( V e r s t e l l e n ) : a
b e i n g " s l i d e s i n f r o n t o f t h e b e i n g , " v e i l s i t , g i v e s i t o u t f o r w h a t i t i s n o t ; a n d
h e r e i s t h e o r i g i n o f a p p e a r a n c e a n d o f e r r o r . T h i s f i r s t r e s e r v e a f f e c t s t h e b e i n g
i n " w h a t i t i s " ( W a s h e i t , o r q u i d d i t a s ) . B u t i t i s o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a n d a b o v e
a l l - t h a t i s , e s s e n t i a l l y - " r e f u s a l " ( V e r s a g e n ) , a n d i t a f f e c t s t h u s t h e b e i n g i n
i t s v e r y B e i n g , i n i t s " t h a t i t i s " [ D a f i h e i t , o r q u o d d i t a s ] : " T h e b e i n g r e f u s e s
i t s e l f t o u s d o w n t o t h a t o n e a n d s e e m i n g l y m o s t m i n i m a l f e a t u r e [ G e r i n g s t e ]
t h a t w e e n c o u n t e r n o w h e r e b e t t e r t h a n w h e n , o f a b e i n g , w e c a n o n l y s a y : t h a t
i t i s " ( 3 9 ; 5 3 ) .
T h i s r e f u s a l i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t I s i s s a y s : " N o m o r t a l h a s l i f t e d m y v e i l . " I f
y o u w i l l , i t i s f i n i t u d e i t s e l f , b u t o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t o n e u n d e r s t a n d f i n i t u d e a s
" s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n s i m p l y t h e l i m i t o f k n o w l e d g e . " F o r i t i s , H e i d e g g e r
a d d s , " t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c l e a r i n g o f w h a t i s c l e a r e d [ d e r A n f a n g d e r L i c h t u n g
d e s G e l i c h t e t e n J " ( 3 9 ; 5 3 - 5 4 ) . T h a t i s , t h e c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y i t s e l f o f
Sublime Truth 93
unveiling. This is why Heidegger can write-and the "metaphor" of the cur-
tain before a stage does not appear here by mere chance:
Concealment can be a refusal, or be nothing but dissimulation.
We are never fully certain whether it is the one or the other. Con-
cealment conceals and dissimulates itself. This means: the place
opened in the middle of that which is, the clearing, is never a rigid
stage with its curtain always raised and on which would play itself
out the play of that which is. Rather, the clearing never occurs
except as this double concealment. (39-40; 54)
If time were not lacking, it would be necessary to show how Heidegger's
thought here completely revises the Transcendental Aesthetics from the per-
spective of the thought of aAiJ9Ela. For having argued that the clearing is
nothing other than the open, this pure space without ontic localization (this
void, he will say later), Heidegger adds immediately: "The disclosed Being of
the being is never a state which would already be there, but always an occur-
rence [Geschehnis]" (40; 54).30 That is, pure temporality and, as will appear,
pure historicity.
The question on which one must insist, however, is this: what "occurs"
here? Answer, which goes, so to speak, without saying: the clearing itself (ak
iJ9Ela) as concealment, unveiling itself in its essence. So how does this occur-
rence signal itself, since it cannot do so by way of any sort of appearing or pre-
sentation, and since it exceeds all modes of Being of the being, although it
nonetheless happens or, as we say, takes place? It order for this occurrence to
signal itself, the being, in its very familiarity, must suddenly become
"estranged." The occurrence is the estrangement or becoming-uncanny of the
being: the Un-geheure, its de-familiarization:
We believe we are at home in the immediate circle of beings. That
which is, is familiar, reliable, ordinary. Nevertheless, the clearing
is pervaded by a constant concealment in the double form of
refusal and dissembling. At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary;
it is extra-ordinary, uncanny. (40; 54)31
One will say that this is still "negative presentation." Not at all. Heidegger,
moreover, prevents any misunderstanding: after, several lines further down,
having said that "the truth, in its essence, is nontruth," he specifies: this sen-
tence "does not mean that truth is basically falsity. It also does not mean, in a
dialectical representation, that truth is never itself but always also its contrary"
(40; 55). The estrangement or defamiliarization of the being is not any sort of
"negative presentation" -one must not precipitately latch onto either the Un
of Ungeheure or the Un of Un- Wahrheit for the simple reason that the
e s t r a n g e m e n t a f f e c t s t h e p r e s e n t e d . S t a r t i n g w i t h t h a t w h i c h i s p r e s e n t e d , p r e -
s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f ( o r t h e " f a c t " t h a t t h e r e i s p r e s e n c e ) c o m e s , i n a n a b s o l u t e l y
p a r a d o x i c a l f a s h i o n , t o " p r e s e n t " i t s e l f . O r r a t h e r , b e c a u s e t h e w o r d p r e s e n t a - '
t i o n i s n o l o n g e r f i t t i n g : h a p p e n s , o c c u r s . A n d t h i s i s t h e E r e i g n i s .
. N o w , i t i s t h e w o r k o f a r t , e s s e n t i a l l y , t h a t p r o d u c e s t h i s h a p p e n i n g o f
t h e c l e a r i n g a s r e s e r v e , t h e h a p p e n i n g o f t h e c i - } . . T j 9 E l a a s t h e d e f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n
o f t h e B e i n g - f a m i l i a r ( u n c o n c e a l e d ) o f t h e b e i n g . S u c h i s t h e " s t r o k e " o r
" s h o c k " ( S t o f i ) t h a t t h e w o r k p r o v o k e s . M y s t e r i o u s l y a d d e d t o t h e g i v e n b e i n g ,
a s a s u p p l e m e n t o r s u r f e i t , i t h a s t h e s i n g u l a r p o w e r t o s h o w i t s e l f a s c r e a t e d
a n d t o i n d i c a t e t h e r e b y , a s t h e b e i n g t h a t i t i s , t h a t t h e r e i s s u c h a t h i n g a s t h e
b e i n g :
I n a w o r k . . . t h i s f a c t , t h a t i t i s a s a w o r k , i s j u s t w h a t i s u n u s u a l [ d a s
U n g e w o h n l i c h e ] . T h e e v e n t [ E r e i g n i s ] o f i t s b e i n g c r e a t e d d o e s n o t
s i m p l y r e v e r b e r a t e t h r o u g h t h e w o r k ; r a t h e r , t h e w o r k c a s t s b e f o r e
i t s e l f t h e e v e n t f u l f a c t t h a t t h e w o r k i s a s t h i s w o r k , a n d i t h a s c o n -
s t a n t l y t h i s f a c t a b o u t i t s e l f . T h e m o r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e w o r k o p e n s
i t s e l f , t h e m o r e l u m i n o u s [ l e u c h t e n d ] b e c o m e s t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f
t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s r a t h e r t h a n i s n o t . T h e m o r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h i s t h r u s t
c o m e s i n t o t h e O p e n , t h e s t r a n g e r [ b e f r e m d l i c h e r ] a n d m o r e s o l i -
t a r y t h e w o r k b e c o m e s . I n t h e b r i n g i n g f o r t h [ H e r v o r b r i n g e n ] o f
t h e w o r k t h e r e l i e s t h i s o f f e r i n g [ D a r b r i n g e n ] " t h a t i t b e . " . . .
T h e m o r e s o l i t a r i l y t h e w o r k , f i x e d i n t h e f i g u r e [ f e s t g e s t e l l t i n
d i e G e s t a l t ] , s t a n d s o n i t s o w n a n d t h e m o r e c l e a n l y i t s e e m s t o c u t
a l l t i e s t o h u m a n b e i n g s , t h e m o r e s i m p l y d o e s t h e s h o c k c o m e
i n t o t h e O p e n t h a t s u c h a w o r k i s , a n d t h e m o r e e s s e n t i a l l y i s t h e
u n c a n n y [ d a s U n g e h e u r e ] t h r u s t t o t h e s u r f a c e a n d t h e l o n g - f a m i l -
i a r t h r u s t d o w n . ( 5 2 ; 6 5 - 6 6 )
H e i d e g g e r a d d s i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t t h i s s h o c k i s w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e :
f o r t h e m o r e p u r e l y t h e w o r k i s i t s e l f t r a n s p o r t e d [ e n t r u c k t , w h i c h
i s o n e p o s s i b l e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e G r e e k A a V 9 U V E l V ] i n t o t h e o p e n -
n e s s o f t h e b e i n g - a n o p e n n e s s o p e n e d b y i t s e l f - t h e m o r e s i m -
p l y d o e s i t t r a n s p o r t u s [ e i n r u c k e n ] i n t o t h i s o p e n n e s s a n d , a t t h e
s a m e t i m e , b e y o n d t h e o r d i n a r y . T o s u b m i t t o t h i s d e r a n g e m e n t
[ V e r r u c k u n g ] m e a n s : t o t r a n s f o r m o u r o r d i n a r y r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e
w o r l d a n d t h e e a r t h , t o r e s t r a i n [ a n s i c h h a l t e n ] o u r u s u a l d o i n g
a n d e v a l u a t i n g , k n o w i n g a n d o b s e r v i n g i n o r d e r t o s o j o u r n w i t h i n
t h e t r u t h a s i t h a p p e n s i n t h e w o r k . ( 5 2 - 5 3 ; 6 6 )
D e - f a m i l i a r i t y , a l i e n a t i o n a n d d e r a n g e m e n t , s h o c k , s i m p l i c i t y , t r a n s -
p o r t , r e t r e a t , a n d r e s e r v a t i o n : a l l o f t h i s , a s . y o u w i l l h a v e . r e c o g n i z e d , i s t h e
Sublime Truth 95
vocabulary of the sublime (as it is patently evident with das Ungeheure) or at
least its transcription in the Heideggerian idiom. But it is obviously not merely
a matter of vocabulary, just as one cannot say that Heidegger is innocent in
matters of traditional vocabulary. What this text describes, in its own way and
at a depth doubtless unknown before it, is the experience of the sublime itself.
That is, it describes precisely what Heidegger elsewhere-notably concerning
anxiety or Being-unto-death-ascribes to the ek-static comportment of
Dasein and ek-sistence. The shock produced by the work, the estrangement of
the being, is such an ecstasy or ravishment. It is the "precipitation beyond
oneself," as Burke3
2
says, which, from Longinus to Boileau and from Fenelon
to Kant, has been described as the properly sublime emotion or affect-on
condition, Heidegger would say, that one understand this mi80s in its strictest
sense.
But what happens in this experience or trial [epreuve]? On the borders
of a being that "estranges" the entirety of what is, and in accordance with the
proper glow or radiance of this being, it happens to become present (or to
appear): that there is (such a thing as) the being and not nothing. The work is
that absolutely paradoxical being (the "Being-being," as Heidegger writes in
the Introduction to Metaphysics
33
) which nihilates [ne-antise] the being in
order to make Being itself appear and come to light, glow, and scintillate. The
work opens the clearing, the luminous opening in which, as a being, it holds
itself, and on the (empty) ground-the groundless ground-of which the
being comes to manifest itself. The work presents u-ATj8Ela, the no-thing,
luminous with an "obscure illumination," which "is" the Being of what is.
And this is sublimity.
In a certain way, and by a further paradox, Heidegger verifies the
Hegelian determination of the sublime: the manifestation of the infinite anni-
hilates the manifestation itself. It is exactly this movement that traverses these
pages. Or rather, it would be, if Being could be likened to the infinite (which is
strictly impossible), but above all, Heidegger thought manifestation as the
eidetic presentation of the being, that is, in accordance with an account that
was only attentive to the Washeit or to the quiddity of the being. What the
work de-familiarizes, or what the presentation of presentation nihilates (but
precisely does not annihilate), is the presented being, the being such as it is,
such as it presents itself ontically, such as it ceaselessly cuts a figure against the
background of that which is in general. The presented being, the being in its
Washeit, is perhaps never thinkable except as e'lBos. The presented being
always figures itself, installs itself in its stature, makes a Gestalt. And it is, more-
over, thus that Heidegger in turn thinks the being-ness of the work. But the
work-and it shares this singular privilege with Dasein--is not merely of the
order of the being. It is the opening of this: that there are beings. In other
words, once the DaJ3heit of the being is in play, presentation as figuration
becomes secondary. Anterior to the cutting of the figure of this or that being,
o r e v e n t o w h a t o n e c o u l d s t i l l i m a g i n e t o b e t h e c u t t i n g o f t h e f i g u r e o f t h e
b e i n g i n g e n e r a l a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e v o i d ( b u t t h e v o i d d o e s n o t
c o n s t i t u t e a f o u n d a t i o n , a b a c k g r o u n d , a n d t h e b e i n g i n g e n e r a l d o e s n o t c u t
a n y f i g u r e w h a t s o e v e r ) , t h e r e i s t h e : " t h a t t h e r e a r e b e i n g s . " T h i s i s w h a t t h e
w o r k , i n f a c t , o f f e r s , b u t t h i s o f f e r i n g , t h i s D a r b r i n g e n , a s H e i d e g g e r s a y s , i s
t h a t o f a p u r e a p p e a r i n g , S c h e i n e n o r q , a t v w e m , t h e p u r e e p i p h a n y o f t h e
b e i n g a s s u c h . T h a t w h i c h i s , i n s o f a r a s i t i s , d o e s n o t c u t ( a n y f i g u r e ) b u t
g l o w s a n d s c i n t i l l a t e s i n t h e n i g h t w i t h o u t n i g h t , i n t h e b e y o n d - n i g h t o f t h e
v o i d , w h i c h i s t h e c l e a r i n g i t s e l f .
T h i s i s w h y t h e r e i s n o n e g a t i v i t y i n t h e m o t i f o f r e s e r v e , r e s e r v a t i o n ,
a n d r e t r e a t , o r i n t h e a c c e n t p l a c e d u p o n ) . . i } f h , . A n d i t i s w h y t h e " p h a n t i c "
a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e c a n n o t ( i m m e d i a t e l y o r e v e r ) g i v e r i s e t o a n y
d i a l e c t i z a t i o n . T h i s a p p r e h e n s i o n d o e s n o t p o s i t t h a t t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s : t h a t t h e r e i s t h e n o n p r e s e n t a b l e ( t h a t i s , i f ! a m t r a n s l a t i n g
c o r r e c t l y : t h a t t h e r e i s s o m e n e g a t i v e b e i n g ) . F o r t h i s a p p r e h e n s i o n d o e s n o t
p o s t u l a t e a n y " n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ; i t p o s i t s s i m p l y t h a t t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s : t h a t t h e r e i s p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t i s a m a t t e r - i f y o u l i k e , a n d
a l t h o u g h I r e g a r d t h e t e r m w i t h a c e r t a i n m i s t r u s t - - o f a n " a f f i r m a t i v e " c o m -
p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e , t h a t i s , o f " g r e a t a r t . "
5 .
O f c o u r s e , H e i d e g g e r t r a n s f e r s a l l o f t h i s i n t o t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l : t h e
p a t h f r o m w a s i s t t o d a f t . . . i s t , f r o m " w h a t t h e b e i n g i s " t o " t h a t t h e b e i n g i s , "
m e a n s f o r h i m t h e p a t h f r o m t h e b e a u t i f u l i n i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l , e i d e t i c o - a e s -
t h e t i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o a m o r e o r i g i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l . O n c e
a g a i n , t h i s ( p r o p e r l y s u b l i m e ) t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e
3 4
d o e s n ' t w a n t t o k n o w
a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e s u b l i m e .
. A n d y e t , i t i s i n t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e - a c e r t a i n t h o u g h t o f t h e
s u b l i m e - t h a t t h e m e m o r y h a s b e e n m a i n t a i n e d , h o w e v e r v a g u e o r h a l f - f o r -
g e t f u l , o f a c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e b e a u t i f u l w h i c h i s m o r e o r i g i n a l t h a n i t s P l a -
t o n i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t e r m s o f t h e E l 8 0 s - L B E a . O n e o u g h t t o a s k o n e s e l f i f t h e
t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e - a c e r t a i n t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , w h i c h m i g h t w e l l
b e , i n t u r n , t h e o r i g i n a l t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e - - i s n o t b o r n ( i n a r e b i r t h o r
r e n a i s s a n c e ) o f t h e c o n c e r n t o ( r e ) d i s c o v e r t h a t w h i c h , i n t h e b e a u t i f u l , i s
m a n i f e s t l y i r r e d u c i b l e t o i t s e i d e t i c a p p r e h e n s i o n . I a m r e f e r r i n g t o t h a t j e - n e -
s a i s - q u o i w i t h o u t w h i c h , a s e v e r y o n e k n o w s , t h e b e a u t i f u l w o u l d b e m e r e l y
b e a u t i f u l , a n d w h i c h i s p e r h a p s - a t l e a s t i t s e e m s s o t o m e - - a r e f u l g e n c e , a n
e x t r e m e o f l i g h t , t h e v e r y b r i l l i a n c e o f a p p e a r i n g : t h e E K q , a V E C J T a T o v .
T h i s i s , I b e l i e v e , w h a t h a p p e n s i n w h a t r e m a i n s t h e i n i t i a l t h o u g h t o f
t h e s u b l i m e , t h a t i s , i n P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s ' t r e a t i s e , a t l e a s t o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t
o n e r e a d i t n o t a s a w o r k o f r h e t o r i c o r o f p o e t i c s , t h a t i s , a s I s a i d , o f " c r i t i -
Sublime Truth 97
cism" (which it a l s o ~ of course, incontestably is), but rather as a philosophical
work, or at least as illegible without the presupposition of a precise philosoph-
ical intent beneath each of its fundamental statements, an intent which more-
over has nothing to do with the occasional recall of this or that ancient banal-
ity from stoicism or anywhere else.
35
What is this philosophical intent? It is to think the essence of art anew in
terms of the sublime, the great, and consequently to ask oneself under what
conditions the great is possible in art. One knows moreover that Longinus
places himself in a properly modern posture and that he conducts this interro-
gation with respect to examples of the Greeks' "great art" (the tragedians, Pin-
dar and Sappho, Thucydides, and Plato) considered as forever in the past,
"finished" or "finite."
Longinus's initial question-quite classically for a treatise of this type,
and in perfect conformity with the inherited T61T0l of Socratism-is, in fact, a
restricted question. It asks whether or not the sublime comes from a particular
TEXVll; whether or not there are" technical precepts" (II, 1) of the sublime. In
this first question, TEXVll is taken in the narrow, weak sense of "practical
know-how" [savoir-faire]. And one expects from the very beginning the tradi-
tional collection of examples and recipes, which this treatise in part certainly
provides, for Longinus immediately announces his thesis: yes, the sublime
comes from a TXVll: I am not of those who say that the sublime is innate and
therefore resistant to all didacticism, and I will prove it. However, in this
departure, and quite simply because Longinus bases himself at the outset on
the opposition between the innate and the acquired, an entirely other sense of
TEXVll resonates. The innate is in fact what is q,UOl: it is the gift of nature and
the work of nature (Ta q,OOlKa epya); it is consequently all that comes in art
(in TEXVll) from q,UOlS itself. And one is familiar with this problem: it is the
problem of genius, of the ingenium, such as, through Kant and Nietzsche, it
will dominate the thematics of the sublime.
Kant, one may recall, defines genius, that is, the artist of the sublime, as
follows:
Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art.
Since talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs
itself to nature, we may express the matter thus: Genius is the
innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which nature gives
the rule to art. (46, 138; 150)
In his own way, Longinus says nothing other than this. Not merely is his
definition of the genius the same: he speaks of "great nature" (J.1EyclAT) q,UOlS,
IX, 11; or J.1E'YaAoq,uLa, XXXIII, 4), of extraordinary gifts or presents (SEwa
Swpf]J.1aTa), of gifts of heaven (eE61TEJ.11TTa, XXXIV, 4), and so on. But above
all, the relation he establishes between q,OOlS and TEXVll is of the same sort.
/
W h a t d o e s L o n g i n u s a c t u a l l y s a y ? O r r a t h e r , w h a t i s . t h e s e n s e o f h i s
d e m o n s t r a t i o n ? T h a t i s , h o w c a n h e a s s e r t o f t h e s u b l i m e a t o n c e t h a t i t a r i s e s
o u t o f < p u a L S ( o u t o f g e n i u s ) a n d t h a t i t a r i s e s o u t o f a T E X V T J . i f n o t f r o m
T E X V T J a s s u c h o r i n g e n e r a l ? H o w c a n h e , i n s h o r t . e x p o s e h i m s e l f t o t h e o x y -
m o r o n i n s c r i b e d i n t h e v e r y t i t l e o f t h e p a r a g r a p h o f t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e d e v o t e d
t o t h e n o t i o n o f g e n i u s : " B e a u t i f u l A r t i s t h e A r t o f G e n i u s " ?
L o n g i n u s p r o c e e d s i n t w o s t e p s :
I f a n y o n e w o u l d l o o k t o s e e f o r h i m s e l f t h a t i n p a s s a g e s t h a t a r e
e m o t i o n a l a n d l o f t y n a t u r e o f t e n l o v e s t o b e a r u l e u n t o i t s e l f [ ( 1 1 , .
T 6 v o j . L o v ] a n d d o e s n o t l o v e t o b e r a n d o m a n d w i t h o u t a n o r d e r l y
w a y [ a j . L E 9 0 8 0 v ] o f p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g s ; a n d t h a t i t i s n a t u r e w h i c h
u n d e r l i e s a l l t h i n g s a s a k i n d o f f i r s t e l e m e n t a n d a r c h e t y p e o f c r e a t -
i n g , t h o u g h t e c h n i q u e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o k n o w " h o w m u c h " t o s a y a n d
t h e r i g h t m o m e n t i n e a c h c a s e a n d a l s o t o p r o v i d e a f i x e d d i s c i p l i n e
a n d u s a g e ; a n d t h a t g r e a t t h i n g s a r e s u b j e c t t o d a n g e r w h e n l e f t a l o n e
b y t h e m s e l v e s , a p a r t f r o m k n o w l e d g e , u n s t e a d y l i k e s h i p s w i t h o u t
b a l l a s t . l e f t t o i m p u l s e a n d u n l e a r n e d a u d a c i t y ; a s t h e y o u g h t t o h a v e
t h e s p u r . s o o u g h t t h e y t o h a v e t h e b r i d l e . ( 1 1 , 2 ; 1 2 - 1 3 )
T h u s , t h e a r g u m e n t i s a t f i r s t t h a t < p u a L S , i n t h e c a s e o f t h e s u b l i m e . i s
" a u t o n o m o u s . " T h i s m e a n s t h a t < p u a L S i s " a r u l e u n t o i t s e l f " a n d t h a t , a s K a n t
w i l l u n d e r s t a n d a n d " t r a n s l a t e " i t , n a t u r e g i v e s - o f i t s e l f a n d t h r o u g h i t s e l f -
t h e l a w ( o r r u l e s ) t o a r t , s i n c e n a t u r e i s n o t , a s L o n g i n u s t e l l s u s , " r a n d o m a n d
w i t h o u t a n o r d e r l y w a y " o r m e t h o d . T h e n a t u r a l g i f t i s t h u s r u l e - g o v e r n e d o r
m e t h o d i c a l , a n d g e n i u s - a s s u c h - r e c e i v e s i t s r u l e s o n l y f r o m " n a t u r e . " T h i s
i s w h y L o n g i n u s c a n s a y t h a t < p u a L S ( a n d I a m t r a n s c r i b i n g l i t e r a l l y ) " h a s c o n -
s t i t u t e d i t s e l f i n a l l t h i n g s a s t h e p r i n c i p l e a n d t h e a r c h e t y p a l e l e m e n t o f a l l
b i r t h [ a v 1 T J . . . n p 6 h 6 v T L K a t a P X E T U 1 T o V ' Y E V E a E W S a T O L X E l o v E n t m i v -
T W V i J < p E a 1 T J K E v ] . " A n d i t i s a l s o w h y h e a t t r i b u t e s t o " m e t h o d , " a s a m o d e o f
T E X V T J , a l l t h a t w h i c h h a s t o d o w i t h t h e s u c c e s s f u l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e n a t -
u r a l g i f t : m e a s u r e , a s e n s e o f t h e o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t , a n d p r a c t i c a l s u r e - f o o t -
e d n e s s . A l I o f t h i s c a n b e c a l c u l a t e d a n d c a n b e l e a r n e d , a s H 5 l d e r l i n w o u l d
s a y . A n d o n e m u s t k n o w h o w t o c a l c u l a t e , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s a d a n g e r t h a t
t h r e a t e n s g e n i u s a b a n d o n e d t o i t s e l f : t h e d a n g e r o f g o i n g t o o f a r . B u t o n e c a n
s e e t h a t b y t h e s a m e t o k e n T E X V T ] i s t h o u g h t h e r e m e r e l y a s t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f a
n a t u r a l f o r c e , a p o w e r o f c o n t r o l . A n d i t i s o n l y w i t h i n t h i s l i m i t t h a t t h e a r t o f
t h e s u b l i m e a r i s e s o u t o f T E X V T J .
3 6
B u t w h a t d o e s t h i s m e a n , m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y ? P r e c i s e l y t h i s , w h i c h i s
t h e s e c o n d s t e p o f t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n :
J u s t w h a t D e m o s t h e n e s . u s e d t o s a y a b o u t t h e c o m m o n l i f e o f
m a n k i n d - t h a t g o o d l u c k i s t h e g r e a t e s t o f g o o d s , b u t s e c o n d . n o
Sublime Truth
less important, is making good plans (and if the second is not pre-
sent, it will entirely remove the value of good luck)-I would say
about speeches and writings: [nature has charge of good luck,
technique of good planning. But what is most important is that
we can learn from no other source than technique what in
speeches and writings depends wholly on nature. If, as I declare,
he who looks down on those engaged in useful learning would
make for himself a peroration of these things, he would no longer
consider theorizing on the subject "too much" and useless 1. (II, 3,
13-15)
99
The editor of the French edition, Lebegue, takes this passage to be ques-
tionable: it only appears in one of the manuscripts (of the twelve or so which
have been preserved more or less intact). In this manuscript, moreover-a fif-
teenth-century copy edited for the first time in 1964-Longinus's text is
mixed with the text of Problems of Physics, attributed to Aristotle. However,
not only is the thought developed in this passage absolutely coherent, but it
provides what is certainly one of the most precise interpretations ever of the
Aristotelian theory of \1(\1110W such as this theory appears, in its essentials, in
book B of the Physics (I94a).
Demosthenes' adage, one of the "great banalities" of ancient wisdom,
which serves as an analogical support of Longinus's argument here, is this:
there are two goods: the first, and highest, is happiness (TO El.rrUXElV) which,
as its name indicates, does not depend on us; the second, which however is not
less exalted, is wise planning, appropriate judgment of existence: if this latter is
lacking, the former is lost. The structure of this relationship is that of a neces-
sary supplementarity: all gifts of nature or of the gods, all favorable fates, are as
nothing if one does not in addition make good decisions. Now, this same
structure, Longinus says, regulates the relation between <pueJlS and TEXVTl. In
conformity to Aristotle, Longinus literally conceives TEXVTl as the over-growth
of <pUOlS, that is, of appearing (<pa(VElv), as growth, blossoming, or opening
(<pUElV) in the light. Within the limits imposed upon him by the genre with
which he is involved, a kind of "theory ofliterature," Longinus says this in the
following manner-here again I am transcribing -: "the fact itself that there
should be one among the things which one finds in discourses which depends
only on <POOLS, from no other place than from TEXVTl we have to learn it." In
other words, only art (TEXVTl) is in a position to reveal nature (<pUotS). Or
again: without TEXVTl, <pUOts escapes us, because in its essence <puots KpU-
'lTTEo6al <plMl, it loves to dissimulate itself.
This is not only what Physics book B gives us to understand when it says
that TEXVTl completes <POOLS. It is further quite precisely what one must
understand when, in chapter 4 of the Poetics, concerning poetry or poetic art
(1TotllTtKll), Aristotle defines TEXVTl as \1(\1110tS: it is representation, if one
1 0 0 P H I L I P P E L A C O U E - L A B A R T H E
u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s t e r m p r o p e r l y a s p r e s e n t i f i c a t i o n , r e n d e r i n g - p r e s e n t . I d r a w
h e r e o n t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f R o s e l y n e D u p o n t - R o c a n d J e a n L a l l o t :
3 7
P o e t i c a r t i n i t s t o t a l i t y s e e m s t o o w e i t s b i r t h t o t w o c a u s e s , b o t h
o f t h e m n a t u r a l [ q , o o l K a t j . F r o m t h e i r i n f a n c y , m e n h a v e ,
i n s c r i b e d i n t h e i r n a t u r e [ O ' V j . l q , v r o v J ) a t o n c e j . l l j . l E L O ' e a l - a n d
m a n d i f f e r e n t i a t e s h i m s e l f f r o m o t h e r l i v i n g b e i n g s i n t h a t h e i s
t h e m o s t m i m e t i c [ j . l l j . l T ] T l K W T a T o v J a n d i n t h a t h e p r o d u c e s
[ 1 T O L E L T a t J h i s f i r s t k n o w l e d g e [ j . l a I h l O ' E l s J t h r o u g h m i m e s i s [ B l a .
j . l l j . l T j O ' E W S ' J - a n d t h e p l e a s u r e o f w o r k s o f i m i t a t i o n .
T E X V T J ) o f w h i c h p o e t r y i s o n l y o n e m o d e b u t p e r h a p s t h e h i g h e s t m o d e
i f o n e a t t e n d s w e l l t o w h a t A r i s t o t l e s a y s h e r e ) i s t h e p r o d u c t i o n ( 1 T o t T ] O ' l S ) o f
k n o w l e d g e ( j . l a 9 T ] O ' l S ) . A n d p e r h a p s o n e w i l l u n d e r s t a n d h e r e t h a t H e i d e g g e r
d o e s n o t b y c h a n c e i n s i s t o n t r a n s l a t i n g T E X V T J a s W i s s e n . T h i s k n o w l e d g e
a p p e a r s t h r o u g h j . l t j . l T ] O ' l S i n s o f a r a s j . l t j . l T ] O ' l S i s t h e f a c u l t y o f r e n d e r i n g p r e -
s e n t i n g e n e r a l ) t h e f a c u l t y o f r e p r e s e n t i n g ) w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n r e p r o d u c i n g
i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s e n s e o f r e d u p l i c a t i n g ) a n d s t i l l l e s s c o p y i n g o r a p i n g ) f o r i f
t h i s w e r e t h e c a s e ) i t w o u l d b e h a r d t o s e e w h a t k n o w l e d g e i s d o i n g h e r e .
R a t h e r ) i t m e a n s r e n d e r i n g p r e s e n t t h a t w h i c h n e e d s t o b e r e n d e r e d p r e s e n t )
t h a t w h i c h w i t h o u t t h i s r e n d e r i n g - p r e s e n t w o u l d n o t b e p r e s e n t a s s u c h a n d
w o u l d r e m a i n d i s s i m u l a t e d ) " e n c r y p t e d . " M t j . l T ] O ' l S ( " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ) i n
o t h e r w o r d s ) i s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e r e i s
s o m e t h i n g ( a n d n o t n o t h i n g ) a k n o w l e d g e w h i c h i s ) i n t u r n ) t h e c o n d i t i o n o f
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e m u l t i p l e k n o w l e d g e s o f t h e b e i n g s t h a t a r e . F o r t h i s r e a -
s o n - a n d b e c a u s e j . l t j . l T ] O ' l S d e f i n e s t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h i s s i n g u l a r k n o w l e d g e
w i t h q , V O ' l S - i J . t j . l T ] O ' l S r e n d e r s a p p a r e n t o r d i s c l o s e s q , V O ' l S a s s u c h . M t j . l T ] O ' l S
r e v e a l s q , V O ' l S , a n d i t i s d u e t o t h i s p r o p e r p o w e r o f j . l t j . l T ] O ' l S t h a t o n e c a n
d e f i n e s o m e t h i n g l i k e w h a t M a r t i n e a u i s r i g h t i n c a l l i n g t h e " a p o p h a n t i c "
e s s e n c e o f T E X V T J . 3 8 A n d i t i s t h i s ) I b e l i e v e , t h a t L o n g i n u s e c h o e s w h e n ) c o n -
c e r n i n g w h a t a r i s e s f r o m q , V O ' l S , h e s a y s ) " f r o m n o o t h e r p l a c e t h a n f r o m
T E X V T J w e h a v e t o l e a r n i t [ E K j . l a e E L V J . " A n a n c i e n t k n o w l e d g e o f j . l t j . l T ] O ' l s a n d
o f T E X V T J ) o f t h e e s s e n c e o f a r t ) r e s i s t s i n L o n g i n u s a s i t p r o b a b l y r e s i s t e d
a l r e a d y i n A r i s t o t l e . " R e s i s t s " o u g h t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d h e r e a s : r e s i s t s t h e P l a -
t o n i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f j . l t j . l T ] O ' l S .
. I t i s o n t h e b a s i s o f s u c h a m i m e t o l o g y t h a t L o n g i n u s u n d e r t a k e s t o t r e a t
o f t h e s u b l i m e . B u t f o r t h i s v e r y r e a s o n h i s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e s u b l i m e h a s a n
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i c a n c e : i t i s n o t s i m p l y t h e q u e s t i o n o f g r e a t a r t t h a t i s
p o s e d b u t ) w i t h i n t h e q u e s t i o n o f g r e a t a r t ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y a n d
e s s e n c e o f a r t .
T h i s i s w h a t e x p l a i n s a t f i r s t t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l e n i g m a o f a r t i s f o r
L o n g i n u s - a s i t w i l l b e a l s o f o r K a n t - t h e e n i g m a o f t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f
g e n i u s . t h a t i s . i f y o u l i k e . t h e e n i g m a o f t h e h i s t o r y o f a r t . I f ) o n t h e o n e h a n d .
Sublime Truth 101
that which in the sublime arises from TXVTl (in the restricted sense) and from
didactics is finally relatively little and certainly not the essential, and if, on the
other hand, great art and the innate gift of the sublime are nonetheless T)(VT]
(in the strong sense), TXVTl in the sense of a gift granted by cPUcrLS to humans
in order itself to be enabled to appear, then the question arises as to how
genius comes about or awakens itself, as to what path (oMs) leads to the sub-
lime and how the destination of the great is formed.
The response, here as in Kant, is itself enigmatic: Longinus suggests that
this origin of genius is (in)explicable. That is-and one will not be sur-
prised-he explains it in terms of (but this time in the agonistic
sense) and ,,,NuC1LS, the emulation of the great, "inspired" poets of the past
(like the Pythian on her tripod). The genius of these poets exhales as from the
fault in Delphi, the effluvia that penetrate the souls of their successors (XIII,
2-4). The transmission and the repetition of genius takes place by means of a
sort of (mysterious) mimetic contagion that is not, however, an imitation. As
Kant attempts to explain it, one must not use great works of art as models of
an "imitation" (Nachmachung) but as pieces or elements of a "succession" or
"heritage" (Nachfolge). But "it is difficult," he adds, "to explain how that is
possible. The ideas of the artist arouse in his disciple similar ideas when nature
has endowed the latter with a similar proportion of the faculties of the soul"
(47, 140; 152).
This notion seems, of course, to be worth about just as much as the figure
of the fault at Delphi. But in fact, Kant explicitates what Longinus means: the
rule that the genius gives to art is not (didactically) transmissible by normal
paths, for (1) it is not a concept (by definition, concerning the beautiful), and
(2) the genius does not know what he or she is doing or, in any case, as distinct
from the "head" such as Newton, he is incapable of showing how it is done: "no
Homer and no Wieland can show how his ideas rich in poetry and nonetheless
at the same time pregnant with thoughts arise and gather themselves in his
brain." The rule oUght therefore to be "abstracted" from the great works,
through contact with which genius can be awakened. And such contact means
simply "to draw on the same sources from which an exemplary creator drew
and to borrow from one's predecessor simply the manner of proceeding" (47,
139-40; 152). Which does not exclude, for Kant as for Longinus, an extremely
rigorous agonistic, with its historical scenes and instances: what would Homer
have said, what would he say, and what will posterity think? (XIV, 1-3; 85).
But this mimetic rivalry involves neither "pillage" nor the least envy or
jealousy-no serious artist can seek the enjoyment of this petty game. If there
is it is, in a manner quite expected since Plato, in the mode of the
"imprint" or "impression" (CilTOTImWC1LS) made by a beautifulliSos, a beauti-
ful work of plastic or other art (XIII, 4; 83-84). The enigmatic transmission of
genius arises out of a typology: he whom great art impresses can be a genius ..
F r o m t h e r e , m o r e o v e r , a n d i n c o m p l e t e c o n f o r m i t y w i t h L o n g i n u s ,
K a n t d e r i v e s t h e i d e a o f t h e c l a s s i c a l i n a r t :
T h a t o n e c a n r i g h t l y p r a i s e t h e w o r k s o f t h e a n c i e n t s a s m o d e l s
a n d t h a t o n e c a l l s t h e i r a u t h o r s c l a s s i c s , a s i f t h e y f o r m e d a c e r t a i n
n o b i l i t y a m o n g w r i t e r s , w h i c h b y i t s e x a m p l e g i v e s l a w s t o t h e
p e o p l e - t h i s s e e m s t o i n d i c a t e a p o s t e r i o r i s o u r c e s o f t a s t e a n d t o
r e f u t e t h e a u t o n o m y o f t a s t e i n e a c h s u b j e c t . ( 3 2 , 1 1 8 ; 1 2 4 )
T h i s p a s s a g e s a y s c l e a r l y t h a t t h e a n c i e n t s a r e i n f a c t a p r i o r i m o d e l s o f a r t :
t h e r e i s a s o r t o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i t y o f t h e a n c i e n t s . C e r t a i n w o r k s a p r i o r i h a v e
b e e n i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e j u d g m e n t o f t a s t e . I t h a p p e n e d
o n c e . A n d t h i s i s d o u b t l e s s w h y a r t h a s o n c e a r r i v e d a t i t s l i m i t . I f o n e c a n
h o p e f o r a n i n f i n i t e p r o g r e s s f r o m s c i e n c e ( i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h e " b r a i n " ) , o n e
c a n n o t h o p e f o r a n y s u c h t h i n g f r o m a r t :
B u t f o r g e n i u s a r t s t o p s s o m e w h e r e , f o r a l i m i t i s i m p o s e d u p o n i t
b e y o n d w h i c h i t c a n n o t g o , a l i m i t w h i c h p r e s u m a b l y h a s b e e n
r e a c h e d l o n g a g o a n d c a n n o t b e e x t e n d e d f u r t h e r . A g a i n , a r t i s t i c
s k i l l c a n n o t b e c o m m u n i c a t e d ; i t i s i m p a r t e d t o e v e r y a r t i s t i m m e -
d i a t e l y b y t h e h a n d o f n a t u r e ; a n d s o i t d i e s w i t h h i m , u n t i l n a t u r e
e n d o w s a n o t h e r i n t h e s a m e w a y , s o t h a t h e o n l y n e e d s a n e x a m -
p l e i n o r d e r t o p u t i n o p e r a t i o n i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n t h e t a l e n t o f
w h i c h h e i s c o n s c i o u s . ( 4 7 , 1 4 0 ; 1 5 2 )
B u t i n a d d i t i o n , t h i s l i m i t i s b y n o m e a n s a n e n d o f a r t , a s d i s t i n c t f r o m w h a t
h a p p e n s i n t h e P l a t o n i c o - H e g e l i a n v e r s i o n o f a r t . G e n i u s c a n - a l w a y s - p r o -
d u c e i t s e l f a n e w . I t w i l l n o t s u r p a s s t h e a n c i e n t s b u t i t c a n - a l w a y s - b e a s g r e a t
a s t h e y : W i e l a n d , s a y s K a n t ; H o l d e r l i n , s a y s H e i d e g g e r . O r T r a k l , o r G e o r g e .
B u t t h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h i s . F r o m t h e
m o m e n t w h e n J l l J l T l U L S , f u n d a m e n t a l l y , i s c o n c e i v e d a s " a p o p h a n t i c , " t h e r e
f o l l o w t w o a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n s e q u e n c e s :
F i r s t , i n s o f a r a s t h e s u b l i m e - g r e a t a r t - a r i s e s f r o m T E X V T ) i n t h e
r e s t r i c t e d s e n s e , i t i s i n d e e d n e c e s s a r y , L o n g i n u s s a y s , t h a t T E X V T J c o m e t o t h e
( c o r r e c t i v e ) a i d o f < p U U L S :
T h o u g h o f c o u r s e i n r e p l y t o t h e o n e w h o w r o t e t h a t t h e C o l o s s u s ,
w i t h i t s m i s t a k e s , i s n o t b e t t e r t h a n t h e " S p e a r - b e a r e r " b y P o l y -
c l e i t u s , i t m a y b e s a i d ( i n a d d i t i o n t o m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s ) t h a t
t h o u g h w h a t i s w o n d e r e d a t i n t e c h n i q u e i s t h e g r e a t e s t p r e c i s i o n
[ T O a K p t [ 3 E U T Q T O V 1 , i n t h e w o r k i n g s o f n a t u r e i t i s g r e a t n e s s , a n d
b y n a t u r e t h e h u m a n b e i n g i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y e l o q u e n c e ; a n d
w h i l e i n s t a t u e s l i k e n e s s [ T O B I l O L O V 1 t o a h u m a n b e i n g i s s o u g h t ,
Sublime Truth
in speeches and writings, as I said, what transcends the human [TO
irrrpa'LpoV TO. d.v6pW1Tlva] is sought .... Still ... though correctness
without any slip is more a matter of technique or art, the sub-
lime ... is the work of genius, so that technique must everywhere
provide support for nature. (XXXVI, 3-4; 182-84)
103
It is necessary, then, to moderate the excess of the sublime. But this
means evidently also that art, TE)(V1l in the restricted sense, is capable only of
assiduousness, the exactitude of perfectionism. In this sense 1!(I!T)O'lS is inter-
preted as OI!O(WOlS, resemblance. In statues, what is sought is resemblance (TO
Bj.1OLOV) to the human. And this defines and sums up the beautiful as aspect
(tSos) in the mode of the resemblance. Inversely, as a consequence, in the
sublime (great art), an entirely other j.1(j.1T)O'lS is at stake. Doubtless this is
because great art is first of all, for Longinus, the art of the Myos and because
by nature a person is essentially AOYlK6v, a speaking-being. What is sought is
the superhuman, that which surpasses things human: nothing which, by defi-
nition, could be reproduced. Great art has nothing to do with the tSos
because it has nothing to do, essentially, with the deja vu, the already-present.
Second, in the sublime as such (in great art), art ought to efface itself.
Longinus asserts this with respect to hyperbaton, that figure which "consists
in an order which dissociates words or thoughts from their customary
sequence and constitutes, so to speak, the most true character of a violent pas-
sion" (XXII, 1; 119-20):
In the superior writers, imitation, thanks to hyperbaton,
approaches the workings of nature; for art is thus fulfilled, when it
is the general opinion that it is nature at work, and ... nature
comes out luckily whenever she has in her a technique that
escapes notice.
If I transcribe: TE)(V1l accomplishes its purpose when it seems to be
<pUO'lS, and <POOLS succeeds when it encloses TEXVT) in hiding it from the view
(Xaveclvoooav). This proposition closes a lengthy development in which
Longinus shows that hyperbaton, syntactical dissociation, is appropriate to the
expression of a violent mJ.eos, such as anger, fear, indignation, or jealousy.
Disrupted Myos reveals the affect and makes it appear. In conformity with its
apophantic function, j.1tl!T)O'lS makes <pUO'lS itself-natural 1T<i90s-emerge.
But in this very revelation or this presentification, in the apparition of <pUO'lS,
TEXVT) effaces itself: it is the same thing as the <POOLS it reveals.
In deciphering <POOLS, in other words, TXVT) ciphers itself: as Longinus
indicates in a word, it is the very play of d.},:fJ9la; and this is why, moreover,
the sublime Myos is for Longinus the true MyoS, that is, the unveiling. The
p a r a d o x o f t h e e f f a c e m e n t o f T E ) ( V T l i s e v i d e n t l y i n s c r i b e d i n t h e o x y m o r o n
c o n s t i t u t i v e o f g e n i u s : n a t u r a l a r t . A n d i t e n t a i l s t h i s h y p e r b o l i c l o g i c t h a t I
h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o a r t i c u l a t e e l s e w h e r e :
3 9
t h e m o r e T E X V I l a c c o m p l i s h e s i t s e l f ,
t h e m o r e i t e f f a c e s i t s e l f . T h e h e i g h t o f i s i n i t s v e i l i n g a n d i t s d i s s i m u -
l a t i o n . T h i s i s i n d e e d i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y w h a t p r o m p t s K a n t t o s a y t h a t t h e s u b -
l i m e i s t o b e f o u n d i n s i m p l i c i t y . A n d i t i s a l s o p e r h a p s w h a t H o l d e r l i n u n d e r -
s t o o d b y s o b r i e t y .
B u t h o w i s T E X V I l s u p p o s e d t o e f f a c e i t s e l f ? A s i s w e l l k n o w n , L o n g i n u s
a d d r e s s e s t h i s p r o b l e m u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g o f t h e e f f a c e m e n t o f t h e f i g u r e
w h i c h , h e s a y s , a l w a y s f i g h t s o n t h e s i d e o f t h e s u b l i m e a n d c o m e s t o
i t s a i d . B u t t h e u s e o f f i g u r e s , h e a d d s , i s a d e l i c a t e m a t t e r b e c a u s e " t h e a r t i f i c e
o f f i g u r e s i s p r o p e r l y s u s p e c t a n d a w a k e n s t h e s u s p i c i o n o f e n t r a p m e n t " ( X V I I ,
1 ; 1 0 4 ) . T h i s i s w h y " t h e b e s t f i g u r e s e e m s . . . t h a t f i g u r e w h i c h h i d e s [ B l U A U V -
6 c i V 1 J ] a n d w h i c h c a s t s i n t o o b l i v i o n i t s o w n e x i s t e n c e . " T h e e x a m p l e L o n g i n u s
s e e k s i n D e m o s t h e n e s i s o f l i t t l e i m p o r t a n c e h e r e . W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h e
q u e s t i o n h e p o s e s : " W h a t h i d e s [ C I . 1 T E K p u t j I ] t h e f i g u r e i n t h i s c a s e ? " A n d a b o v e
a l l , w h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h e r e s p o n s e h e p r o v i d e s : " E v i d e n t l y , i t s v e r y r e f u l -
g e n c e [ B f j A o v O T t T 4 l < / > W T L U l J T 4 l ] . " F o r h e a d d s i m m e d i a t e l y , r e v e a l i n g
t h e r e b y t h a t t h i s l i g h t o r r e f u l g e n c e i s n o t t h e r e b y c h a n c e :
J u s t a s a f a i n t g l e a m i s a l m o s t m a d e t o d i s a p p e a r w h e n t h e s u n
r a d i a t e s a l l a r o u n d i t , s o r h e t o r i c a l c o n t r i v a n c e s g r o w f a i n t w h e n
g r e a t n e s s i s p o u r e d o v e r t h e m f r o m a l l s i d e s . A n d s o m e t h i n g n o t
d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h i s o c c u r s i n p a i n t i n g : a l t h o u g h l i g h t a n d s h a d o w
a r e p o r t r a y e d i n c o l o r s o n t h e s a m e s u r f a c e s i d e b y s i d e , t h e l i g h t
m e e t s o u r e y e s f i r s t , a n d n o t o n l y i s i t m o r e c o n s p i c u o u s , b u t i t
a l s o a p p e a r s [ < / > u l v w 6 m ] t o b e m u c h n e a r e r . N o w i n s p e e c h e s a n d
w r i t i n g s , s i n c e e m o t i o n a n d s u b l i m i t y l i e n e a r e r t o o u r s o u l s -
b e c a u s e o f a k i n d o f n a t u r a l k i n s h i p a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e i r d a z z l i n g
e f f e c t [ 8 l a a n d o v e r a g a i n t h e y a p p e a r t o u s
b e f o r e t h e f i g u r e s , a n d t h e y c a s t t e c h n i q u e i n t o t h e s h a d e a n d k e e p
i t h i d d e n ( X V I I , 2 - 3 ; 1 0 5 - 6 )
T h i s l i g h t i s b y n o m e a n s d u e t o t h e g e n i u s o f c o m p a r i s o n . O n e m u s t
t a k e i t l i t e r a l l y : i t i s t h e s u b l i m e l i g h t , i . e . , t h e l i g h t t h e s u b l i m e i s w h e n t h e
s u b l i m e i s t h o u g h t i n i t s t r u t h a s t h e u n c o n c e a l i n g , t h e < i k l 1 6 E t a o f w h a t i s
( < / > i l a l S ) . T E X V I l - j . 1 L J l l l a l S - i s t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n o f < / > i l a l S : t h i s i s , l i t e r a l l y a n d
i n a l l s e n s e s , t h e t r u t h o f g r e a t a r t . A n d t h i s i s o f c o u r s e w h y g r e a t a r t c a n n o t
b e s e e n - t h e l i g h t i t t h r o w s c a s t s i t i n t o s h a d o w . I t m a k e s e s s e n t i a l l y n o
" f o r m , " " f i g u r e , " o r " s c h e m a " c o m e i n t o p r e s e n c e . I t p r e s e n t s , w h i l e i m - p r e -
s e n t i n g i t s e l f [ s ' i r n p r e s e n t a n t ] , t h a t t h e r e i s t h e e x i s t e n t - p r e s e n t [ d e l ' U a n t -
p r e s e n t ] . A n d i t i s a b e d a z z l e m e n t .
Sublime Truth 105
This same light-the brilliance itself of the EKq,aVE:OTaTov-does not
cease gleaming and fulgurating in Longinus's text. Sublimity, "brought out at
just the right moment, makes everything different, like lightning" (I, 4; 9).
And concerning Demosthenes: "he outthunders, as it were, and outshines
orators of all times: one might actually be more capable of opening his eyes
toward a thunderbolt bearing in on him than to set his eyes on the emotions
of this man as they come one on top of another" (XXXIV, 4; 172).40 "Pretty
expressions are in reality the proper light of thought [q,6ls tSLOV TOU" vou 1."
Or again, Longinus says that the aging Homer, the Homer of the Odyssey (the
genius par excellence), is comparable to a setting sun (IX, 13; 60).
One could multiply these examples. The sublime says itself through
light and glittering. And it says itself so well in this way that, in two notable
passages (the tradition has noted them), it finds itself exemplified by light
itself.
First, there is the example (celebrated up through Hegel) of the Fiat lux
of Genesis, the example of that sort of absolute performative whose sole aim
is: that it should be. Here God reveals himself to be the principle (apX1l), in
that he is precisely the Myos a1Toq,aVTLK6s: the speech of the pure appearing
or epiphany, for it is light itself which appears as that on the basis of which all
visible things present themselves.
The second example occurs when Longinus, in a long apparent digres-
sion opened by the praise of Demosthenes as thunder, as cited above, gathers
together his theses on the sublime: the superiority of the sublime over the
beautiful consists in the fact that it responds to our destiny. <PUOLS, Longinus
says, does not consider us as a base and vile creature but as a creature des-
tined to greatness: it has introduced us into life and the totality of the world
as into some great panegyric to contemplate (6e:aolJ.at) all that takes place
within it (XXXV, 2). Humans are there. in other words. in order that the
totality of what is should be taken in view. And this is why. Longinus adds.
q,UOLS has given birth (EVE:q,UOe:v) in our souls to an invincible for all
that is eternally great and for all that is more divine (SaLIJ.0vLwTe:pOV) than
ourselves.
What does Longinus mean to say here? What does this invincible
bespeak? That the totality of what is suffices neither for the ee:wpta nor for
the Slavola of humanity: "Even in its totality. the world [0 aUlJ.1Tas
K6oIJ.osl does not suffice for the elan of human theory and
thought" (XXXV, 3; 177). A person is a meta-physical being, or more pre-
cisely-because Longinus has such a high idea of q,UOlS (he conceives of it. in
effect. as Being)-a meta-cosmic, that is a meta-ontic Being. And lpws, here,
which moreover is mixed up with aywv (with violence. and not merely with
emulation), is strictly what Heidegger defines as the transcendence of Dasein.
As Longinus says, the E1TtvOLat of humanity, the thoughts we project before
a n d b e y o n d o u r s e l v e s , f r e q u e n t l y s u r p a s s t h e l i m i t s o f w h a t s u r r o u n d s u s .
A n d i t i s i n t h i s t h a t w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t f o r w h i c h w e a r e b o r n .
I t i s h e r e t h a t a s e c o n d l i g h t e r u p t s , a f i r e r a t h e r , w h i c h i s n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n t h e f i r e o f < P O O L S .
T h e r e f o r e w e a r e ( h e a v e n k n O W S ) s o m e h o w d r i v e n b y n a t u r e t o
w o n d e r n o t a t s m a l l s t r e a m s , e v e n i f t h e y a r e c l e a r a n d u s e f u l , b u t a t
t h e N i l e a n d t h e D a n u b e a n d t h e R h i n e , a n d s t i l l m o r e a t t h e
O c e a n ; n o r , o f c o u r s e , a r e w e m o r e a s t o u n d e d b y t h a t l i t t l e f l a m e
w h i c h w e k i n d l e , w h e n i t p r e s e r v e s a p u r e g l e a m , t h a n b y t h e g l e a m
o f t h e h e a v e n l y b o d i e s , t h o u g h t h e y a r e o f t e n g l o o m e d o v e r , n o r d o
w e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r i t m o r e w o r t h y o f w o n d e r t h a n t h e c r a t e r s o f
A e t n a , w h o s e e r u p t i o n s c a r r y u p r o c k s a n d w h o l e m o u n d s f r o m i t s
a b y s s a n d s o m e t i m e s p o u r f o r t h r i v e r s o f t h a t f i r e b o r n o f t h e e a r t h
a n d w h i c h o b e y s n o l a w b u t i t s o w n . ( X X X V , 4 ; 1 7 8 - 8 0 )
I t i s t h i s , t h e : K < p a v E C 1 T a T o v . O f w h i c h o n e c a n s e e - I i m a g i n e t h a t i t i s u s e l e s s
t o i n s i s t o n t h i s - t h a t H o l d e r l i n h a s r e t a i n e d i t s m e m o r y .
L o n g i n u s c o n c l u d e s , " I f w h a t i s u s e f u l o r e v e n n e c e s s a r y t o m a n i s
w i t h i n h i s r a n g e , i n t u r n t h e a s t o n i s h i n g , f o r h i m , i s a l w a y s t h e p a r a d o x . " T o
l T a p c i 8 0 e o v : n o r m a l l y , t h i s p h r a s e g o e s u n t r a n s l a t e d ; h o w e v e r , I ' l l t r a n s l a t e i t
d a s U n h e i m l i c h e , t h i n k i n g o b v i o u s l y o f t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n u s e o f t h e w o r d b u t
a l s o o f t h i s f a m o u s d e f i n i t i o n b y S c h e l l i n g : " O n e c a l l s u n h e i m l i c h a l l t h a t
w h i c h w a s s u p p o s e d t o r e m a i n s e c r e t , v e i l e d , a n d w h i c h m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f . "
6 .
T h u s , t h e E K < p a v E C 1 T a T o v , a t l e a s t , a c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e E K < p a v E C 1 T a -
T O V , w i l l h a v e b e e n a t s t a k e i n t h e s u b l i m e . A n d t h e w i l l h a v e
b e e n a b l e t o c o n s t i t u t e s u c h a s t a k e b e c a u s e o n e w i l l h a v e n o n e t h e l e s s k n o w n ,
h e r e o r " t h e r e , p e r h a p s b y t h e e f f e c t o f a s o r t o f b e y o n d - m e m o r y o f w h a t h a d
n e v e r b e e n p r o p e r l y s a i d o r t h o u g h t , t h a t t h i s b e y o n d - l i g h t ( a t r a n s l a t i o n f o r
E K . p a v E C 1 T a T o v ) i s t h e s t r a n g e c l a r i t y o f B e i n g i t s e l f , " a l t h o u g h o b s c u r i t y o f t e n
a t t a i n s i t , " i t s b e d a z z l i n g n i g h t w i t h o u t n i g h t - l i k e t h e l i g h t n i n g w h i c h i s i t s
s i g n i n H o l d e r l i n ( b u t a l s o w h a t h e c a l l s t h e " s o b e r c l a r i t y " ) . B e c a u s e t h u s o n e
w i l l h a v e t h o u g h t , h e r e o r t h e r e , t h a t " g r e a t a r t " h a s r e g a r d p r e c i s e l y f o r t h a t ,
w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e s o f c o u r s e t h a t , i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r , o n e e n d u r e s i t s v i e w ,
e v e n i f i t i s n e v e r p e r h a p s a m a t t e r o f m e r e v i s i o n . T h e L i c h t u n g , t h e c l e a r i n g
o r t h e o p e n i n g o f a p p e a r i n g , i s b e y o n d a l l l i g h t .
A c o n t e m p o r a r y o f H e i d e g g e r - a p p a r e n t l y a t h e o l o g i c o - m e t a p h y s i c a l
t h i n k e r , i n h i s w a y - e x p r e s s e d t h i s w i t h r a r e v i g o u r i n a t e x t w h i c h , f o r v a r i -
o u s r e a s o n s , H e i d e g g e r c o u l d n o t h a v e f a i l e d t o r e a d a n d w i t h w h i c h i n a n y
Sublime Truth 107
case "The Origin of the Work of Art" is joined by relationships which I would
consider rather troubling. I am referring to Walter Benjamin and his essay on
The Elective Affinites of Goethe." I tear from their context several sentences in
which all is said. I give them simply to be read or understood. To conclude:
All that is essentially beautiful is indebted constantly and in its
essence, but in infinitely varying degrees, to appearance [Schein].
This bond of debt attains its highest intensity in that which is
manifestly alive, and precisely here [in Goethe's novel] in a clear
polarity of triumphant and extinguishing appearance. For all that
lives is lifted out beyond [enthoben] the realm of the essentially
beautiful, and the higher the life-form the more this is so; accord-
ingly, the essentially beautiful manifests itself in the form
[Gestalt] of the living most of all as appearance. Beautiful life, the
essentially beautiful, and apparent beauty, these three are identi-
cal .... The beautiful, even if it is itself not appearance, ceases to be
essentially beautiful when its appearance disappears. For this
appearance belongs to it as its veil, and the law of the essence of
beauty thus shows itself to be this: that beauty can only appear as
such in the veiled .... Beauty is not an appearance [Schein], a veil
covering something other than itself. Beauty itself is not appear-
ance [Erscheinung] , but essence, an essence however which
remains the same as itself only when veiled. Therefore, even if
everywhere else appearance is deception, the appearance of the
beautiful is the veil thrown over what is necessarily the most
veiled. For neither the veil nor the veiled object is the beautiful,
but the object in its veil. Unveiled, it would prove to be infinitely
insignificant [unscheinbar] .... Thus, in the face of the beautiful,
the idea of unveiling becomes the idea of the impossibility of
unveiling .... Because only the beautiful and nothing besides can
be essentially veiling and veiled, the divine ground of the Being of
beauty lies in the secret. And thus the appearance in beauty is
this: not the superfluous veiling of things in themselves, but the
necessary veiling of things for us .... For the sake of the unity
which the veil and that which is veiled comprise in it, the Idea
can be essentially valid only where the duality of nakedness and
veiling does not yet obtain: in art and in the appearances of mere
nature. On the other hand, the more distinctly this duality
expresses itself, in order finally in man to reach its greatest force,
the more this becomes clear: in veil-less nakedness the essentially
beautiful has withdrawn and in the naked body of the human
being a Being beyond all beauty is attained-the sublime, and a
work beyond all images [Gebilden]-the work of the creator .....
1 0 8 P H I L I P P B L A C O U B - L A B A R T H B
O n l y n a t u r e i s i m p o s s i b l e t o u n v e i l ; i t r e t a i n s a s e c r e t f o r a s l o n g
a s G o d a l l o w s i t t o s u b s i s t . T r u t h i s d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e e s s e n c e o f
l a n g u a g e . T h e h u m a n b o d y s t r i p s i t s e l f , a s i g n t h a t t h e h u m a n
b e i n g i t s e l f s t e p s b e f o r e G o d . 4 1
ChapterS
@
THE INTEREST OF THE SUBLIME
Jean-Franfois Lyotard
Use, interest, benefit (profit), and sacrifice: the text of the Critiques treats its
themes-the true, the good, and the beautiful-with these concepts (but there
are also others, for example, the incentive and the motive) borrowed from the
domain of economy. For the faculties, too, have their economy. This economy
always intervenes on two occasions: wherever Kant elaborates the cooperation
of the faculties with one another; and wherever he attempts to comprehend
how the faculty in general, which is nothing but a capacity or potential power,
can actualize itself in empirical reality, how the capital of the potential powers
of thought can invest or "realize" itself in acts.
By focusing on the interest of the feeling of the sublime, one touches a
raw nerve of the "organism" of the faculties. The analysis of the beautiful still
allows one to hope that the subject will ground itself as the unity of the facul-
ties and that the accord between real objects and the authentic destiny of this
subject-the Idea of nature-will be legitimated. But even if it is nothing but a
"simple appendix" (CI, 23, 86; 85), the "Analytic of the Sublime"-like a
meteor careening into the work devoted to this double edification-appears
to put an end to these hopes. And it is the interest of the feeling of the sublime
that detonates, as it were, this disappointment.
I have left to these notes on the third Critique (Le., the Critique of ludg-
ment) the tone and rhythm of the lectures for which they were destined, as I
did also for "Sensus Communis."1 And like the latter, the present text is part
of a course on the sublime begun five years ago.
1.
The feeling of the beautiful is a reflexive judgment, singular (although it
claimes universality), immediate, and disinterested. It arises only from one
109
1 1 0 ] E A N - F R A N < ; : O I S L Y O T A R D
f a c u l t y o f t h e s o u l , t h a t o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n , a n d i t t a k e s p l a c e o n t h e o c c a s i o n
o f a f o r m . I t s f a t e a s d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s u r e , i n d e e d , d e p e n d s o n t h i s r a d i c a l
f o r m a l i t y o f i t s o c c a s i o n . I f i t a r o s e o u t o f t h e l e a s t a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e m a t t e r o f
t h e g i v e n , f o r e x a m p l e , t o c o l o r o r t o t o n e , i t w o u l d r e g r e s s i n t o t h e s o r t o f
" p l e a s u r e " [ a g r e m e n t ] t h a t r e s u l t s f r o m a f u l f i l l e d " i n c l i n a t i o n . " B y v i r t u e o f
i t s e x i s t e n c e h e r e a n d n o w , t h e o b j e c t w o u l d t h e n h a v e e x e r c i s e d a n " a t t r a c -
t i o n " o n t h e m i n d .
A t t r a c t i o n i s o n e c a s e o f i n t e r e s t , t h e e m p i r i c a l , " p a t h o l o g i c a l " c a s e . T h e
w i l l ' s m a x i m , o r t h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f i t s d e s i r e , i s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e e n j o y -
m e n t [ j o u i s s a n c e ] o f t h e o b j e c t . T h e m i n d t a k e s a s e r v i l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e e x i s -
t e n c e o f t h i s e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t : i t s p l e a s u r e i s t h a t o f d e p e n d e n c e , o f " h a v i n g a
t a s t e f o r . . . "
O n e m i g h t e x p e c t t h a t i t w o u l d s u f f i c e t o d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n p u r e
a n d i m p u r e t a s t e i n o r d e r t o e m a n c i p a t e a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e f r o m t h e e n j o y -
m e n t o f t h e o b j e c t . T h a t i s , o n e m i g h t e x p e c t t h a t i t w o u l d s u f f i c e t o d i s t i n -
g u i s h f r o m S i n n e n g e s c h m a c k ( s e n s u o u s t a s t e ) a R e f l e x i o n s g e s c h m a c k ( a r e f l e x -
i v e t a s t e ) ( C l , 8 , 5 8 ; 4 8 ) . R e f l e x i o n i n g e n e r a l , a b o v e a l l i n t h i s e x e m p l a r y
m o d e o f t h e i m m e d i a t e j u d g m e n t o f t h e b e a u t i f u l ( o r s i m p l y f e e l i n g ) , w o u l d
s e e m t o . e x c l u d e a l l i n t e r e s t d e f i n e d b y a s u b m i s s i o n o f t h e w i l l t o a d e t e r m i -
n a t e o b j e c t . T h i s i s b e c a u s e r e f l e x i o n c o n s i s t s i n j u d g i n g w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n a t e
c r i t e r i q n , w i t h o u t r u l e o f j u d g m e n t , a n d t h u s h e r e w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o a n t i c -
i p a t e t h e s o r t o f o b j e c t o r t h e u n i q u e o b j e c t t h a t c o u l d p r o c u r e p l e a s u r e .
H o w e v e r , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n t e r m s o f t h e f a c u l t i e s o f k n o w l e d g e ( d e t e r -
m i n a n t v e r s u s r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t ) h i d e s a n o t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n i n t e r m s o f t h e
f a c u l t i e s o f t h e s o u l ( C l , I X , 4 2 ; 3 4 ) , a n d m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r m s o f w h e t h e r
t h e y a r e p u r e o r e m p i r i c a l l y a p p l i e d . K a n t o p p o s e s t h r e e s o r t s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n
( i n t h e b r o a d s e n s e ) , t h r e e s o r t s o f r e l a t i o n t o t h e f e e l i n g s o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n .
A n o b j e c t c a n " s a t i s f y " ( v e r g n u g e n ) p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , i t c a n " p l e a s e "
( g e f a l l e n ) , o r i t c a n b e " a p p r e c i a t e d , e s t e e m e d " ( g e s c h i i t z t , g e b i l l i g t w e r d e n ) ( 5 ,
5 4 ; 4 4 ) . T h i s o b j e c t i s t h u s c a l l e d , r e s p e c t i v e l y , a g r e e a b l e , b e a u t i f u l , o r g o o d .
O n t h e p a r t o f t h e s u b j e c t , t h e m o t i v e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s o b j e c t i s c a l l e d ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y , i n c l i n a t i o n , f a v o r , o r r e s p e c t . O n l y f a v o r , g r a n t e d t h u s t o t h e
b e a u t i f u l , i s " a d i s i n t e r e s t e d a n d f r e e s a t i s f a c t i o n , " K a n t w r i t e s , " a u n i q u e , f r e e
s a t i s f a c t i o n . " S e n s u o u s t a s t e p r e s u p p o s e s i n c l i n a t i o n ; i t w a n t s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , a n d i t i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e a g r e e a b l e . R e f l e x i v e t a s t e p r e s u p -
p o s e s f a v o r . " P l e a s u r e " ( G e f a l l e n ) b e f a l l s i t . A n d t h e b e a u t i f u l i s t h e " o b j e c t "
t h a t ( b e } f a l l s . T h e G e r m a n w o r d G e f a l l e n i n d i c a t e s w i t h s u f f i c i e n t c l a r i t y t h e
e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e b e a u t i f u l b e f a l l s i t , f a l l s f r o m t h e c l o u d s , c o m e s u t t e r l y
u n e x p e c t e d . O n e c a n n o t d r e s s f o r t h e o c c a s i o n [ o n n ' y e s t p a s p a r e n i p r e p a r e ] .
T h e F r e n c h l a n g u a g e h a s t h e e x p r e s s i o n u n b o n h e u r , w h i c h i s n o t a t a l l t h e
s a m e a s I e b o n h e u r , f o r t h i s i n g e n u o u s n e s s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n . D i s i n t e r e s t i s a c o n -
d i t i o n f o r a v o i r d e s b o n h e u r s . B u t i t i s n o t a g u a r a n t e e .
_ . T w o r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g t h i s f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n . F i r s t , i n a g i v e n c a s e o f
The Interest of the Sublime HI
the empirical application of aesthetic judgment, it can happen that "what has
already pleased by itself without the consideration of any interest whatever"
arouses subsequently an interest in its existence, in the existence of this thing
(41, 129; 139). Thus, for example the inclination to live in society can come
to take over where pure aesthetic pleasure leaves off: sociability turns out to
realize itself through taste, in that the latter involves the demand that all par-
ticipate in it (41, 129-30; 139). It is necessary, however, to separate this lat-
ter demand, inscribed a priori in the transcendental analysis of aesthetic feel-
ing, from all empirical inclinations to communicate this feeling. It is
necessary, in short, to admit that the promise of a universal participation in
taste, which is analytically attached to taste itself, is not due to any interest in
a determinable community (41, 130-31; 140). Pure "favor" cannot become
inclination without the beautiful becoming the agreeable, in which case aes-
thetic pleasure is lost.
This argument arises from the distinction between the transcendental
and the empirical. But it also appeals-and this is my second observation-to
the difference between the faculties of the soul. Satisfaction in the narrow
sense fulfills an inclination. It functions in terms of an economy of desire
which presupposes a lack and the expectation of its suppression, satiation, the
"enough"-the genug that can be heard in Vergnugung. But taste takes place
only on condition of the absence of expectation. If it obeys any purposiveness,
no one knows-I mean, even transcendental analysis cannot know-how to
produce the concept of its purpose, the object that would come to satiate it. It
is not determined. This does not mean that it is infinite but rather that the sat-
isfaction in which it consists is independent of any inclination. That there is
no desire of beauty. One has either the one or the other, either desire or
beauty. That is: either the faculty of desire or the faculty of pleasure and pain.
And this is not easy for us to think today, perhaps for us in particular as Occi-
dentals, haunted as we are by the passion of willing, this grantedness or this
grace (Gunst) which comes unsought. A pleasure takes place "first" as such,
which comes to fulfill nothing and can disappoint nothing. Irrelative. A moti-
vation, "favor," which moreover nothing motivates: (a) motivation. .
I return to the three satisfactions. There is the third, "appreciation,"
"esteem" motivated by respect and taking the good as its object. The relations
between aesthetics and ethics play themselves out in the situation that Kant
attributes to the pleasure of esteem. And with this localization the point is
determined at which the sublime will be inserted into Kant's transcendental
characterization of affect, his transcendental sentimentality. This object, the
good, is placed on a par with the object of any empirical need, at least with
regard to the constraint each imposes. Only favor procures a "free satisfac-
tion." Respect, as we have seen, is in itself a free affection. But the law-after
the fact, so to speak, and insofar as it prescribes, even if it prescribes nothing
but a form for actions to be accomplished-imposes upon the will an interest
1 1 2 J E A N - F R A N 9 0 I S L Y O T A R D
i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c o b j e c t s . S i n c e w e a r e n o w i n t h e p r a c t i c a l f i e l d , u n d e r t h e
l a w o f " a c t i o n , " t h e s e o b j e c t s a r e a c t i o n s , o r r a t h e r , b e c a u s e t h e l a w i s f o r m a l ,
m a x i m s o f a c t i o n s . A n d t h e y b e c o m e p o w e r f u l l y i n t e r e s t i n g t h r o u g h t h e v e r y
f a c t o f t h e i r b e i n g p r e s c r i b e d . " W h e n t h e m o r a l l a w s p e a k s , t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r
o b j e c t i v e l y a n y f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e c o n c e r n i n g w h a t s h o u l d b e d o n e " ( C I , 5 ,
5 5 ; 4 5 ) . T h u s , w e s e e h e r e t h e r e t u r n o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t o f t h e o b j e c t , e v e n i f ,
s u b j e c t i v e l y a n d e m p i r i c a l l y , t h e " g o o d m a x i m s " - t h e g o o d o b j e c t s - r e m a i n
t o b e d e t e r m i n e d i n e a c h c a s e .
C o n s t r a i n t r e t u r n s h e r e b e c a u s e t h e f a c u l t y o f d e s i r e r e t u r n s . " E s t e e m , "
i n t h i s r e g a r d , s h a r e s w i t h s a t i a t i o n , V e r g n u g u n g , t h e s a m e c o n c e r n , w h i c h i s
t h e p r o p e r c o n c e r n o f t h e f a c u l t y o f d e s i r e : t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f " t h a t w h i c h i s
g o o d " ( 4 , 5 2 ; 4 1 - 4 2 ) . T o b e s u r e , w i t h i n w h a t o n e c a n r e a s o n a b l y j u d g e t o b e
g o o d , o n e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e w o z u g u t ( " t h e g o o d - f o r " ) f r o m t h e a n s i c h g u t
( " t h e g o o d t o u t c o u r f ' ) , b u t b o t h p r e s u p p o s e " t h e c o n c e p t o f a p u r p o s e . " A n d
o n e o u g h t f u r t h e r t o s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e u t i l i t a r i a n ( t h e g o o d - f o r . . . ) t h e a g r e e -
a b l e , i n w h i c h r e a s o n p l a y s n o p a r t w h a t s o e v e r ( C P r R , 7 l - 7 6 ; 5 9 - 6 5 ) . B u t i t
r e m a i n s n o n e t h e l e s s t h e c a s e t h a t i n t h e s e t w o e x t r e m e s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n , t h e
a g r e e a b l e a n d t h e g o o d p u r e a n d s i m p l e , b e t w e e n w h i c h t h e u s e f u l m e d i a t e s ,
d e s p i t e t h e i r d i v e r s i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e a s o n , a c o m m o n t r a i t c a n b e r e c o g -
n i z e d t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s b o t h f r o m a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e : i n t e r e s t , " a c e r t a i n i n t e r -
e s t r e l a t i v e t o t h e i r o b j e c t " ( C l , 4 , 5 3 ; 4 3 ) . E v e n t h e p u r e m o r a l g o o d d i f f e r s
f r o m t h e o t h e r s o n l y i n t h e d e g r e e o f i n t e r e s t i t a r o u s e s : i t e v o k e s " t h e h i g h e s t
i n t e r e s t , " a n d t h e r e a s o n t h e r e i s o n l y t h i s q u a n t i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t i n
e a c h c a s e t h e w i l l i s i n v o l v e d , a s o p p o s e d t o w h a t h a p p e n s i n a e s t h e t i c p l e a -
s u r e . W h e r e t h e r e i s w i l l , t h e r e i s i n t e r e s t : " t o w i l l s o m e t h i n g a n d t o t a k e s a t i s -
f a c t i o n i n i t s e x i s t e n c e , t h a t i s , t o t a k e s o m e i n t e r e s t i n i t - t h e s e t h i n g s a r e
i d e n t i c a l " ( 4 , 5 4 ; 4 3 ) .
2 .
T h e d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n a e s t h e t i c s a n d e t h i c s i s h e r e a p p a r e n t l y b e y o n d
a p p e a l . I t o b e y s t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y b e t w e e n t h e t w o f a c u l t i e s o f t h e s o u l a t p l a y ,
t h e f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a n d t h e f a c u l t y o f d e s i r e , r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n t h e
t h i r d C r i t i q u e , h o w e v e r , i t w a s a m a t t e r o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a b r i d g e b e t w e e n t h e
c a p a c i t y o f k n o w i n g a n d t h e c a p a c i t y o f w i l l i n g , a n d t h e f e e l i n g i n q u e s t i o n ,
a e s t h e t i c f e e l i n g , w a s s u p p o s e d t o s e r v e a s t h e c e n t r a l p i l l a r o f a b r i d g e w i t h
t w o a r c h e s b e t w e e n t h e s e c a p a c i t i e s . A n d y e t i t s e e m s t h a t t h e f i r s t a r c h i s
m i s s i n g , t h e o n e w h i c h w a s s u p p o s e d t o o p e n t h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e w i l l t o f e e l -
i n g . I n d e e d , i n t e r e s t f o r b i d s u s t o b u i l d i t . T h e h o p e o f a u n i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t ,
o f u n i t y b e t w e e n i t s d i v e r s e c a p a c i t i e s , s e e m s t h e r e b y t o h a v e b e e n d e f i n i t i v e l y
s h a t t e r e d . I t s e e m s t h a t t h e r e w i l l a l w a y s b e a d i s p u t e [ u n d i f f e r e n d ] b e t w e e n
" t a s t i n g " a n d w i l l i n g o r w a n t i n g , a n d t h u s n o t o n e b u t t w o h e t e r o n o m o u s
The Interest of the Sublime 113
subjects: the subject that does not cease to be born to itself-without even tak-
ing any interest in its birth, without willing it-in the pure pleasure of the
beautiful, and the subject that does not cease to be induced to act in the inter-
est of the realization of the law.
This divorce does not go uncontested. The critical judge proposes a pro-
fusion of conciliatory procedures, notably in paragraphs 42 and 59, which
have generally been read as if they exposed the Kantian "thesis" on this prob-
lem. According to this reading, the feeling of the beautiful in fact contains an
interest, an "intellectual interest" (42, 131; 140-41), to be understood here as
nonempirical. This is an interest precisely in realizing what the moral law pre-
scribes, an "intellectual" interest because it is attached to the "object" whose
willed realization practical reason prescribes: the good (42, 131-33; 140-43).
And in the other paragraph, this "thesis" is supposedly reaffirmed and ren-
dered more precise. The missing arch of the bridge can again be built, thanks
to a certain scaffolding-a scaffolding which is indispensable to the critical
strategy insofar as it permits one to cross over the "abysses" opened up by the
heteronomy of the faculties-called "hypotyposis," subjectio sub aspectum
("submission to the view"), the operation of placing in view-despite every-
thing-something that corresponds (analogically) to an invisible object (59,
174ff; 197ft). This is the case for the object of an Idea of reason, which is not
presentable by itself in intuition but of which one can present an intuitive ana-
logue: a "symbol." Beauty could in this manner be the "symbol of morality"
(59, 173; 196).
Many thinkers-harried by the haste to conclude, whether their motives
be good or bad-plunge down the path thus broken and manage in fact to get
to the other side, despite all Kant's multiple warnings, in order to reimplant
the old head of the bridge, in order to reaffirm the archaic argument-archaic
for Western thought at least-that one can infer the good from the beautiful,
that if one feels well and makes the other feel well, one realizes the good and
makes the other realize the good. Or as Lacoue-Labarthe
2
would say, if one fic-
tions or figures the given tastefully, in accordance with beauty, one moralizes
individual ethos or communal politikon. Thus one reopens the road, which had
for a moment seemed lost, toward an "aesthetic education." But one does so
only by failing to take into account Kant's incessantly and explicitly articulated
reservations with respect to any conclusive, inferential use of analogy. He
writes, for example: "Two things being heterogeneous, one can assuredly think
one of them by analogy with the other, even from the point of view of their het-
erogeneity; but one cannot, departing from what renders these things hetero-
geneous, conclude or infer the one from the other by analogy" (90, 268; 315).
Thus, one can maintain: "like the beautiful, so the good," but not: "if beautiful,
then good" (nor the converse). An aestheticization of ethics or politics is de-
authorized in advance by this reservation. Such an aestheticization is exactly
what Kant calls a transcendental "illusion" or "appearance."
1 1 4 J E A N - F R A N y o r s L Y O T A R D
I w o u l d a d d t h a t , i n v e r s e l y , o n e o u g h t n o t t o c o n f u s e t h e a s p i r a t i o n , t h e
c a l l t h a t a f f e c t s t h e m i n d a n d t h e d e b t i t c o n s e n t s t o i n c u r w h e n i t u n d e r t a k e s
t o r e a l i z e a b e a u t i f u l w o r k o f w r i t i n g i n t h e l i t e r a r y , a r t i s t i c s e n s e , i n o b e d i e n c e
t o t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e b e a u t i f u l - o n e o u g h t n o t t o c o n f u s e t h i s o b e d i e n c e
w i t h t h e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m o r a l l a w , w i t h t h e f e l t o b l i g a t i o n t o a c t i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n w h i c h t h e l a w e n t a i l s a s p r e s c r i p -
t i v e r e a s o n o r a s s o l e r a t i o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n . I f o n e m a d e t h e w o r k a d i r e c t t e s t a -
m e n t o f t h e l a w , o n e w o u l d o c c u l t t h e a e s t h e t i c d i f f e r e n c e , o n e w o u l d o b s c u r e
a t e r r i t o r y - t h a t o f b e a u t i f u l f o r m s - a n d a c o n d i t i o n a t s t a k e t h e r e , t h e p u r e
p l e a s u r e t h e s e f o r m s p r o c u r e , b o t h o f w h i c h o u g h t t o b e p r o t e c t e d f r o m a l l
i n t e r f e r e n c e . " T o w r i t e , " i n t h i s s e n s e , i s n o t a m e a n s o f a t t e m p t i n g - e v e n i f i n
v a i n - t o p a y o f f o n e ' s d e b t s t o t h e l a w . ( O r i f i t i s , t h e n t h e s e n s e o f " t o w r i t e "
w o u l d h a v e t o b e d i s p l a c e d - d i s p l a c e d e v i d e n t l y i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e s u b -
l i m e . ) I n o t h e r w o r d s , " t h e a n t i n o m y o f r e a s o n f o r t h e f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e a n d
p a i n " s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h " t h e a n t i n o m y o f r e a s o n f o r t h e f a c u l t y o f
d e s i r e " ( S 7 , 1 6 8 ; 1 9 0 ) .
T h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f t h e f a c u l t i e s s u f f i c e s t o f o r b i d b o t h
t h i s c o n f u s i o n a n d t h a t o t h e r i l l u s i o n w h i c h s u b o r d i n a t e s t h e f e e l i n g o f p l e a -
s u r e a n d p a i n t o t h e f a c u l t y o f k n o w i n g a n d w h i c h m a i n t a i n s " t h a t t h e j u d g -
m e n t o f t a s t e d i s s i m u l a t e s a j u d g m e n t o f r e a s o n o n t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f a t h i n g , "
t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o j u d g m e n t s b e i n g t h u s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a
m a t t e r o f " d i s t i n c t i o n " ( I S , 7 0 ; 6 4 ) . T a s t e w o u l d , o n t h i s v i e w , b e t h e " c o n -
f u s e d " a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h p u r p o s e p r e s e n t i n t h e o b j e c t
w h i c h w o u l d b e i n p r i n c i p l e a c c e s s i b l e t o c l e a r c o g n i t i o n . B u t o f c o u r s e t h i s i s
t h e L e i b n i z i a n t h e s i s a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e e n t i r e t h i r d C r i t i q u e m i l i t a t e s , a c c o r d -
i n g t o t h e g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y o f a n a u t o n o m i z a t i o n o f s p a c e - t i m e w i t h r e s p e c t t o
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a s t r a t e g y a l r e a d y o p e r a t i v e i n t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e ( i . e . , t h e
C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n ) b u t m o r e t i m i d l y t h e r e t h a n i n t h e t h i r d .
A n d t o s a y j u s t o n e w o r d m o r e c o n c e r n i n g t h e f i r s t o f t h e s e c o n f u s i o n s ,
t h e c o n f u s i o n o f t h e g o o d w i t h t h e b e a u t i f u l : i t s d i s s i p a t i o n b y c r i t i q u e o u g h t
t o d i s c o u r a g e i n a d d i t i o n a l l " p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e w i l l , " b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e " w i l l
t o p o w e r . " F o r t h e l a t t e r r e d u c e s e t h i c s a n d p o l i t i c s t o " v a l u e s " a n d t h e r e b y
g r a n t s i t s e l f t h e a u t h o r i t y t o t r e a t t h e m a s m e r e " f o r m s . " " A f f i r m a t i o n " i n
N i e t z s c h e i s c o n c e i v e d a s f o r m a t i o n , a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n . T h e g o o d a n d , s e c o n -
d a r i l y , t h e t r u e m a i n t a i n t h e m s e l v e s o n l y b y m e a n s o f t h e i r " b e a u t y . " T h i s
p o s i t i o n i s i n d e e d a n e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e o b s e s s i o n w i t h f a s h i o n i n g ,
w h i c h a f t e r t h e C r i t i q u e i s n o m o r e a u t h o r i z e d t h a n t h e o b s e s s i o n w i t h p r e -
e s t a b l i s h e d h a r m o n y . B o t h v i o l e n t l y i m p o s e a u n i t y o n B e i n g .
L e t u s r e t u r n t o o u r b r i d g e . T h e a n a l o g i c a l s c a f f o l d i n g i s f a r f r o m h a v i n g
t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f a t r u e b r i d g e . I h a v e j u s t e v o k e d t h e r i s k s , o r a t l e a s t s o m e o f
t h e r i s k s r u n b y a n y t h o u g h t t h a t p r e c i p i t o u s l y a t t e m p t s t h i s f r a g i l e p a s s a g e .
B u t K a n t d o e s a t t e m p t t o c o n s o l i d a t e i t b e c a u s e i t i s r e q u i s i t e t o t h e u n i f i c a -
t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t h e e n v i s a g e s . I s h a l l n o w e x a m i n e t h e s t r a t e g y o f t h i s c o n -
The Interest of the Sublime
115
solidation. Its significance will become clear when we then attempt to situate
sublime feeling in relation to ethics.
Two series of arguments of two different sorts. The one draws on the
transcendental properties common to aesthetic and moral judgment, the traits
shared by aesthetic and moral judgment that authorize their analogy. I will call
these arguments because they limit themselves to comparing the two
judgments according to what mere transcendental logic permits. The others
draw, to the contrary, on the regulative Idea of a nature finalized in terms of
the model of art. J1:tey use the "guiding thread" that critical teleology draws
out of the concrete texture of existences which comprise the world. Let us call
them with all the circumspection that the use of this term in Kant's
work, especially in the third Critique, makes necessary. They follow or at least
accompany the elaboration of the Idea of nature in this book, whereas the logi-
cal arguments are foreign-and so to speak anterior-to this elaboration.
Logically, the beautiful and the good share a family resemblance. They
please immediately; without or before all interest; in accordance with a free
relation of the faculties of which they are respectively the "objects": they are
considered to be necessary, to require universal assent or participation (59,
175-76: 199-200). These somewhat forced resemblances require corrections
even in Kant's view. These corrections are such that the difference between
the good and the beautiful opens anew. It is a concept, the concept of the law,
that inspires without mediation moral feeling: it is an (inconceivable) imagi-
native form that occasions taste. (Of course, one is "obliged" before knowing
why, but the law which obliges is conceivable.) In morality, it is the will that
is free, in the sense that it is dependent only on a prescription of rational
form (the "type" of legality) (CPrR, 85ff: 75ft): whereas in taste, it is the
imagination that is free. It produces new forms-quite "beyond" the
ment with the concept" which limits the schema (CJ, 49, 146: 160)-to the
point of "creating another nature so to speak on the basis of the matter with
which real nature provides it" (49, 144; 157). This freedom incites or excites
the understanding to vie with imaginative creativity for the greatest compre-
hension or comprehensiveness. Thus arises a "play"-itself "free"-between
the two faculties, an "enlivening" (Beforderung) (35, 122: 129). The claim of
singular taste for universal assent is not supported by the authority of any
concept, whereas the universalization of the maxim is required analytically by
the very definition of the concept of the law. And to conclude this term by
term comparison, as for interest, the beautiful concedes nothing to it: "it
pleases beyond all interest," whereas "the morally good is necessarily linked
with our interest" (59, 175; 199).
Nonetheless, the opposition is not so sharp as I am making it seem here,
not even in Kant's logical argumentations. The good is indeed linked with an
interest. However, as Kant repeatedly clarifies, this interest "does not precede"
moral judgment but rather "results" (59, 175: 199) from it. Practical judg-
1 1 6 J E A N - F R A N 9 0 I S L Y O T A R D
m e n t i s n o t " f o u n d e d " o n a n y i n t e r e s t " b u t i t p r o d u c e s o n e " ( 4 2 , 1 3 2 ;
1 4 2 - 4 3 ) . T h i s r e v e r s a l o f t h e p o s i t i o n o f i n t e r e s t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e c r i t i q u e o f
m o r a l i t y . T h e l a w d o e s n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e w i l l ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e g o o d , i t c o m -
m a n d s t h i s i n t e r e s t . S u c h i s " t h e p a r a d o x o f t h e m e t h o d " : " T h e c o n c e p t s o f
g o o d a n d e v i l s h o u l d n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d b e f o r e t h e m o r a l l a w ( t o w h i c h i t a p p a r -
e n t l y s h o u l d s e r v e a s f o u n d a t i o n ) , b u t o n l y ( a s h a p p e n s h e r e ) a f t e r t h i s l a w a n d
t h r o u g h i t " ( C P r R , 7 6 ; 6 5 ) . I f i n m o r a l i t y t h e w i l l e n v i s a g e d t h e g o o d a s i t s
o b j e c t " b e f o r e " t h e o b j e c t w a s p r e s c r i b e d f o r i t , i t w o u l d d e p e n d o n t h e g o o d
o b j e c t , j u s t a s i t d e p e n d s o n a n e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t , d e s i r a b l e , a g r e e a b l e , o r u s e f u l .
T h e r e w o u l d b e i n t h i s c a s e n o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n p u r e p a t h o s
a n d p u r e e t h o s b u t m e r e l y a d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t . I n b o t h c a s e s , t h e r e w o u l d b e a
c o n d i t i o n e d i m p e r a t i v e , a n i m p e r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n e d b y a n o b j e c t , " i n t e r e s t e d , "
h y p o t h e t i c a l . I f y o u w a n t t h i s ( t h e g o o d , o r s o m e c h o c o l a t e ) , d o t h a t .
I n o r d e r t o e s c a p e f r o m t h i s r u i n o u s c o n s e q u e n c e , " h e t e r o n o m y "
( C P r R , 7 8 ; 6 6 ) , w h i c h w o u l d d e s t r o y a l l e t h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e a n d i n d u c e s c e p t i -
c i s m o r c y n i c i s m ( t h e r e a r e s o m e w h o l o v e t h e g o o d , o t h e r s w h o l o v e c h o c o -
l a t e ) , o n e m u s t f o r K a n t r e v e r s e t h e o r d e r o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e l a w s e i z e s t h e
w i l l - " i m m e d i a t e l y " - t h r o u g h a n o b l i g a t i o n " w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r a n y o b j e c t "
( C P r R , 7 7 ; 6 5 - 6 6 ) . I t c a n p r e s c r i b e t o t h e w i l l o n l y p r e s c r i p t i o n i t s e l f . I t s d i c -
t u m ( i t s c o n t e n t ) i s r e d u c e d t o c o m m a n d m e n t w i t h o u t o b j e c t . A n d b y i t s
m o d u s ( t h e m o d a l i t y o f t h i s p r e s c r i p t i o n ) , i t o u g h t t o p r e s c r i b e p r e s c r i p t i o n
n e c e s s a r i l y . I t i s p o s i t e d a s n o t b e i n g a b l e n o t t o b e p o s i t e d . A s i n t h e d e m a n d
f o r a s s e n t i m p l i e d b y t a s t e ( o n e m u s t c o n c e d e t h i s r e s e m b l a n c e m e d i a t e d b y a
c o m m o n s o l l e n t h a t w o u l d m e r i t a s e p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t ) , s o h e r e w e a r e c o n -
c e r n e d w i t h a n e c e s s i t y w h i c h t r a n s l a t e s i t s e l f p r a c t i c a l l y i n t o t h e d e m a n d t h a t
t h i s l a w s h o u l d b e a b l e t o b e t h e l a w o f e a c h m o r a l " s u b j e c t , " o f a l l t h e " y o u ' s . "
I t i s u n i v e r s a l l y i m p o s e d .
T h i s p u r l o i n i n g [ d e r o b a d e l o f t h e o b j e c t i s w e l l k n o w n - t h i s r e d i s c o v -
e r y o f t h e c o n d i t i o n o f e t h i c s , w h i c h i s t h e p u r e o u g h t " b e f o r e " a n y o b j e c t . ( I
s a y r e d i s c o v e r y b e c a u s e t h i s a b s e n c e o f o b j e c t i s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n t h e " H e a r ,
o I s r a e l . " ) T h u s , a " d i s i n t e r e s t e d " c o n d i t i o n . T h e f e e l i n g o f o b l i g a t i o n , r e s p e c t
f o r t h e l a w , i s n o t a t t a c h e d t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y o b j e c t . T h e l a w i t s e l f i s n o t
a n o b j e c t , . o n e d o e s n o t l o v e t h e l a w . H o w e v e r , i t p r e s c r i b e s a c t i o n . I t p r e -
s c r i b e s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f w h a t i s " g o o d , p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y " ( C P r R , 7 7 ; 6 6 ) . I t
i n d u c e s i n t e r e s t f o r t h e " o b j e c t s " j u d g e d c a p a b l e o f m a k i n g t h i s g o o d e x i s t .
O b v i o u s l y , t h e s e o b j e c t s d o n o t e x i s t b e f o r e h a n d , s i n c e t h e g o a l i s t o m a k e
t h e m e x i s t i n p r a c t i c e a n d n o t t o k n o w t h e m i n t h e o r y . O n e m u s t d o t h e g o o d ,
n o t d i s c o v e r i t . T h e s e " o b j e c t s " a r e a c t i o n s t o b e p e r f o r m e d , j u d g m e n t s t o b e
c a r r i e d o u t . T h e l a w i n d u c e s a n i n t e r e s t y e t t o b e d e t e r m i n e d , a n i n t e r e s t i n
" m a x i m s " w h i c h c a n p u t t h e w i l l i n a p o s i t i o n t o d o t h e g o o d .
I t i s h e r e - p r e c i s e l y , p o w e r f u l l y , a n d o n l y h e r e - t h a t i n t e r e s t p l a y s a r o l e
i n t h e m o r a l d o m a i n . I t r e s u l t s f r o m o r i s " p r o d u c e d " b y t h e l a w . I f t h e g o o d i s
i n t e r e s t i n g , t h i s i s b e c a u s e f i r s t o f a l l t h e l a w o u g h t t o b e r e a l i z e d . T h e l a w s a y s :
actualize me and it says only that, without saying whatthe "self" of the law is. It
adds merely what could be a "good" [bonne) actualization: universalizable,
extensible to all particular wills. This condition, or rather this supposition (so
daft, als ob), determines the interest in certain modes of actualization.
Compared to aesthetic judgment in terms of this aspect of interest,
moral judgment does not seem, in Kant's eyes, so distant from it that one
could decide between them by a simple yes or no. Moral judgment is "analo-
gous" to aesthetic judgment in that the former "accords an immediate interest
to its object" (42, 133; 143), and this interest is "equal" to that which can be
associated with taste. The sole difference is that the interest of taste is a "free
interest, while [ethical interest) is founded on an objective law" (42, 133;
143). This conciliation is to be taken, as one can see, cum qrano salis. On the
aesthetic side, "free" interest can only be a disinterested interest ("favor")
where "no interest, neither of sense nor of reason, compels assent" (5, 55;
44). And on the ethical side, how could an interest for "its" object immediately
seize the will, if it is "founded on an objective law," that is, necessarily medi-
ated by the empty categorical imperative from which it has then to derive,
with the assistance of the mere clause of universalization, maxims which will
finally cause it to be interested in certain actions?
If the two judgments are members of one family, then it is clear that
they are presently in family counseling. Their relationship is structured by an
improbable analogy. It is necessary that there be some passage from the beau-
tiful to the good. But if one holds strictly to the transcendental logic, this pas-
sage begins to pass one by. For there is no interest at all in the felt immediacy
of taste, whereas in ethics, there is indeed an interest, secondary to be sure, but
secondary precisely because it is deduced from the conception of the law, an
interest which could not be more mediated, an implication ofinterest. Interest
is the result, in ethics; in aesthetics, disinterest initiates.
3.
Is the affinity between the beautiful and the good more conclusively demon-
strated by the argumentation I have called teleological? The reasoning is as follows:
1. The mind has no interest in the law. But the law commands it to do good,
and interests it in "acts" capable of actualizing the good. (This demand for
actualization is exercised on all the faculties which, by themselves, are
nothing but "facultative," that is, possibilities.)
2. The mind has no interest in the beautiful. But that the beautiful takes place
provides pure (disinterested) reflexive judgment with an opportunity to
exercise itself and to realize itself in the present. What furnishes this oppor-
1 1 8 J E A N - F R A N y O I S L Y O T A R D
t u n i t y i s a p p a r e n t l y a r t . w h i c h p r o d u c e s t h e b e a u t i f u l . B u t o n l y o n c o n d i -
t i o n t h a t a r t i t s e l f s o l i c i t n o i n t e r e s t a n d h e n c e . a l s o o b e y n o n e .
3 . B e a u t y ' s m o d e l o f d i s i n t e r e s t e d a c t u a l i z a t i o n . h o w e v e r . i s f u r n i s h e d b y
" n a t u r e . " A s f a r a s w e c a n k n o w , n a t u r e e x p e c t s n o g a i n f r o m t h e l a n d -
s c a p e s a n d h a r m o n i e s i t o f f e r s t o t h e m i n d . I t d o e s n o t p r o d u c e t h e b e a u t i -
f u l w i t h a n y ( c o n c e p t o f a ) p u r p o s e i n m i n d . A r t i s o n l y p u r e i f i t p r o d u c e s
l i k e " n a t u r e , " w h i c h i s i t s e l f , h e n c e , t h e p a r a d i g m o f p u r e a r t .
4 . T h u s ; i n p r o c u r i n g o c c a s i o n s o f p u r e a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e f o r t h e m i n d ,
" n a t u r e " - a s a r t i s t a n d / o r w o r k o f a r t - - d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t a d i s i n t e r e s t e d
a c t i v i t y o f j u d g m e n t w h i c h i s m e r e l y p o s s i b l e c a n a c t u a l i z e i t s e l f a s s u c h . I n
t h i s w a y , i t s h o w s i t s e l f f a v o r a b l e t o t h e d e m a n d f o r t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e
p o s s i b l e - o f t h e f a c u l t a t i v e - i n g e n e r a l , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e d e m a n d
f o r t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h a t f a c u l t y o f d i s i n t e r e s t e d a c t i o n w h i c h i s t h e
r a t i o n a l w i l l .
5 . P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h u s f i n d s i t s e l f i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s u r e t h a t
" n a t u r a l " b e a u t i e s a r o u s e ( C / , 4 2 , 1 3 1 - 3 3 ; 1 4 0 - 4 4 ; C P r R , 1 3 4 - 3 6 ; 1 2 4 - 2 6 ) .
. T h i s t h e n i s t h e b a c k b o n e o f t h e " t e l e o l o g i c a l " a r g u m e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s
o f w h i c h c r i t i c a l t h o u g h t p r o p o s e s t h e a f f i n i t y o f t h e b e a u t i f u l w i t h t h e g o o d .
O n e m i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o g i v e i t t h e t w i s t o f a d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c : a n ( e t h i c a l )
i n t e r e s t i n ( a e s t h e t i c ) d i s i n t e r e s t . B u t t h i s d i a l e c t i c w o u l d n o t b e c r i t i c a l . C r i -
t i q u e h a s t h e t a s k o f e x p o s i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h i s p r e t e n d e d d i a l e c t i c , a n d
t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s n o t t h e c o n c e p t i n t h e H e g e l i a n s e n s e b u t t h e m e r e l y r e g u l a -
t i v e I d e a o f a n a t u r e o r i e n t e d p u r p o s i v e l y ( s u c h a s a n a r t c a n b e ) t o w a r d t h e
a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e p o w e r s o f t h e m i n d . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f c r i -
t i q u e , f a r f r o m a u t h o r i z i n g a l o g i c o f n e g a t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d h o m o g e n i z e b y a
m o v e m e n t o f " s u b l a t i o n " ( A u f h e b u n g ) t h e y e s ( o f i n t e r e s t ) a n d t h e n o ( o f d i s -
i n t e r e s t ) , t h i s I d e a o u g h t r a t h e r t o g r o u n d i t s o w n l e g i t i m a c y ( t o " d e d u c e "
i t s e l f i n t h e K a n t i a n s e n s e ) . T h e d e d u c t i o n r e v e a l s t h e e x e r c i s e o f a t h i r d f a c -
u l t y , t h a t o f r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t w h i c h , a l t h o u g h i t i s a l s o i n p l a y i n b o t h c o g -
n i t i o n a n d m o r a l s n o n e t h e l e s s d o e s n o t l a c k i t s o w n " t e r r i t o r y , " t h a t o f a r t a n d
n a t u r e , w h e r e i t e x e r c i s e s i t s e l f " p u r e l y , " " i n a c c o r d w i t h i t s e l f . " T h i s e v i d e n t l y
c o m p l i c a t e s m a t t e r s o f u n i f i c a t i o n , s u s p e n d e d h e n c e f o r t h i n t h e " n o n d e m o n -
s t r a b l e " I d e a o f a n a t u r a l l y a r t i s t i c t e l e o l o g y , a n d r e q u i r e s t h a t o n e i n c l u d e a
s u p p l e m e n t a r y f a c u l t y i n t h e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e f i r s t t w o f a c u l t i e s . I t i s t h u s a s a
c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t o n e m u s t e x a m i n e t h e p l a y o f i n t e r e s t a n d d i s i n t e r e s t
w h i c h i n p r i n c i p l e p e r m i t s o n e t o e s t a b l i s h a n a l l i a n c e ( t o " b r i d g e " t h e g a p )
b e t w e e n . a e s t h e t i c f a v o r a n d e t h i c a l r e s p e c t . S u c h a n e x a m i n a t i o n i s a l l t h e
m o r e " u s e f u l " a s i t r e v e a l s t h e e x a c t p o i n t a t w h i c h t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e
w i l l c o m e t o d i s o r g a n i z e t h i s p l a y , i n b r e a k i n g t h e f r a g i l e a l l i a n c e b e t w e e n t h e
t w o " s a t i s f a c t i o n s . " T h e p o s s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e l o c a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s f r a c -
ture-both for the Idea of "nature" and for the general project of constituting
the mind as a subjective unity-draw themselves. so to speak. of themselves.
Only the former consequences will be treated here: the latter, concerning uni-
fied subjectivity, are only sketchily indicated.
But first, it is necessary to reconsider the demand for the actualization of
the faculty. This demand extends to all the powers or faculties of the mind.
They are nothing but possibilities. How then do they become acts of the
mind? How does it happen that on such and such an occasion (at the "right
moment"?), phenomenally given or not, the understanding or taste or the will
is exercised? How is the distance crossed between posse and esse? Precisely-
through "interest."
In the second Critique. Kant seeks to establish the primacy of pure prac-
tical reason over pure speculative reason (CPrR, 134: 124). This primacy. he
explains. cannot be intrinsic. One cannot maintain that the practical use of
reason provides "a more penetrating view" (CPrR. 135: 126) than its theoreti-
cal use. One can say neither that it is more penetrating "in itself." nor that it
has a "better" ontological grasp.
Formulated critically. this primacy is finally not transcendental. The
conditions in accordance with which a capacity of the mind is capable are sim-
ply what they are. It would be absurd to claim that some are more "radical"
than others. In turn. when it is a matter of actualizing anyone of these capaci-
ties. it is permissible. even inevitable. to ask under what condition this perfor-
mance takes place and which of these capacities-or still another. which one
would have forgotten about-is in charge of this "use." This term use, strange
at first sight. returns along with interest and motive throughout the Critiques to
circumscribe a sort of political economy of the faculties. The use of a faculty is
like the transformation ofits transcendental "value" into acts of the mind. like
its production and consumption. This transformation or realization. similar
to the transformation of money into commodities. is governed by an interest.
Interest is "the principle that contains the condition under which this power
only [each of the "powers of the mind"] is put into action" (CPrR. 134; 124).
It does not consist in "the simple harmony [of reason) with itself" in accor-
dance with each of its faculties (which fixes the status of its "a priori condi-
tions") but "only [in] its extension" (CPrR. 134: 124). The interest of the use
of a faculty is an interest of the faculty itself: in making use of it. the mind
effects its potential, "realizes" its credit as much as possible. And thus it
"extends" the range of the faculty by manifesting its power in actu. The faculty
is like a bank of possible judgments. An entrepreneur draws on its interest in
order to make use of the given faculty.
But the entrepreneur needs a "motive" (Triebfeder). which is the double.
within experience, of the faculty's own interest, a sort of incentive to invest the
facultative power. To the bank's interest in realization must correspond an
entrepreneurial interest on the part of reality-the empirical mind-in
i m p r i n t i n g o n e x p e r i e n c e t h e m a r k o f a g i v e n f a c u l t a t i v e p o w e r . T h i s i n t e r e s t
i s n o t a p r i o r i , b u t m u s t b e c a l c u l a t e d b e c a u s e t h e e m p i r i c a l m i n d r u n s t h e r i s k
o f l o s s w h e n e v e r i t a c t u a l i z e s o n e o f i t s p o w e r s . A n i n t e r e s t " c a n n e v e r b e
a t t r i b u t e d t o a b e i n g o t h e r t h a n o n e e n d o w e d w i t h r e a s o n a n d s i g n i f i e s a
m o t i v e f o r t h e w i l l , i n s o f a r a s t h i s m o t i v e i s r e p r e s e n t e d b y r e a s o n " ( C P r R , 9 2 ;
7 8 ) . T h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e c a l c u l a t i o n t o b e m a d e b e c a u s e t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a
p o w e r o f t h e m i n d d o e s n o t o c c u r w i t h o u t r i s k - - o f b a n k r u p t c y , o r a t l e a s t o f a
m a j o r l o s s o r d e f i c i t - f o r t h e e m p i r i c a l m i n d . A n d i f a c l o s e o u t s a l e c a n t h u s
e n d a n g e r t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l , i t i s b e c a u s e c e r t a i n o b s t a -
c l e s o p p o s e t h e m s e l v e s t o t h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n .
T h e s e t h r e e c o n c e p t s o f a m o t i v e , a n i n t e r e s t , a n d a m a x i m
[ w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e c o n o m i c m e t a p h o r , w o u l d b e t h e e n t r e -
p r e n e u r ' s s t r a t e g y ] c a n o n l y b e a p p l i e d t o f i n i t e b e i n g s . F o r t h e y
a l l p r e - s u p p o s e a l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f a b e i n g . . . , a n e e d t o
b e e x c i t e d i n t o a c t i v i t y [ h e r e i s t h e i n c e n t i v e t o i n v e s t ] , b e c a u s e a n
i n t e r i o r o b s t a c l e o p p o s e s i t s e l f t o t h i s a c t i v i t y . ( C P r R , 9 2 ; 8 0 )
W h e n t h e m i n d i s i n t e r e s t e d b y t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f o n e o f i t s f a c u l t i e s , i t i s
i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s f a c u l t y . T h i s i s t h e m i n d ' s r a t i o n a l m o t i v e , a n d t h e m i n d h a s
t o s a c r i f i c e s o m e o t h e r i n t e r e s t t h a t i s i t s e l f n o t r e a s o n a b l e o r i s r a t i o n a l l y
i m p u r e . T h i s i s w h y r a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t h a s t o b e n e g o t i a t e d . T h e e n t r e p r e n e u r i s
n o t a s a i n t .
I n t h e p a s s a g e o n w h i c h I a m c o m m e n t i n g , K a n t a n a l y z e s t h e m o t i v e a n d
t h e i n t e r e s t o f , f o r , a n d i n r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y , t h e m o t i v e t h a t i n c i t e s o n e t o d o t h e
g o o d a n d t h e i n t e r e s t t h i s i n c i t a t i o n o r i n c e n t i v e ( t h e m a x i m ) c a n h a v e f o r t h e
s p i r i t . T h e o b s t a c l e i s e a s y t o d e s i g n a t e : w h a t w i l l h a v e t o b e p l a c e d a t a d i s t a n c e
i n a n d b y t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , i n a n d b y t h e " u s e " o f t h e m o r a l
l a w , i s t h e s e l f - e n j o y m e n t o f t h e e m p i r i c a l e g o [ l a j o u i s s a n c e - d e - s o i d u r n o i
e r n p i r i q u e J , i t s p r e f e r e n c e f o r i t s e l f , i t s a r r o g a n c e . " T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e l a w
s u s p e n d s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f s e l f - l o v e a n d t h e i l l u s i o n o f p r e s u m p t i o n " ( C P r R , 8 9 :
7 8 ) . K a n t s e e m s n o t t o h a v e e n o u g h w o r d s t o e x p r e s s a l l t h a t t h e s p i r i t w i l l h a v e
t o " s a c r i f i c e " i n o r d e r t o r e a l i z e t h e m o r a l l a w . S t i l l , o n e w o u l d b e w r o n g t o p l a c e
t h e a c c e n t o n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e s a c r i f i c e s t o b e m a d e i n v i e w o f a c t u a l i z i n g
t h e g o o d p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e l a w . O n e w o u l d t h e r e b y c o n f u s e r e s p e c t w i t h e n t h u -
s i a s m , e t h i c s w i t h s u b l i m e a e s t h e t i c . A n d t h i s i s t h e w h o l e q u e s t i o n .
P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i s i n t e r e s t e d i n i t s a c t u a l i z a t i o n i n a w a y w h i c h d i f f e r s
f r o m t h a t o f t h e o t h e r f a c u l t i e s s u c h a s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A s s p e c i f i c a l l y p r a c -
t i c a l r e a s o n , i t c o n t a i n s i n i t s i n t r i n s i c c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y - i n t h e i m p e r a -
t i v e f o r m o f i t s l a w - t h e n e c e s s i t y o f i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . I t p r e s c r i b e s t o t h e p r a c t i -
c a l m i n d ( t o t h e e m p i r i c a l w i l l ) : " A c t ! " a n d t h i s s i g n i f i e s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n :
" A c t u a l i z e m e ! " B u t i n o r d e r f o r t h i s e f f e c t t o b e o b t a i n e d , t h i s w i l l m u s t p o s -
s e s s o r b e s u b j e c t t o a m o t i v e c a p a b l e o f s u r m o u n t i n g t h e i n t e r n a l o b s t a c l e s
represented by preestablished motives, that is, by the will's attachment to the
empirical ego.
Practical reason's interests cannot gain a hearing unless it creates in the
ego an "interest" which is disentangled from its favorite object, the ego itself.
But "disentangling" implies here not merely changing the object of interest or
reorienting toward the law an interest formerly fascinated by the ego but rather
transforming the nature of interest itself. For what rational law demands is its
own interest and not that of the ego. But this interest induces, on the empirical
side, the paradoxical motive of a "disinterest." The law does not offer the ego a
new object in which to invest, and in the appropriation of which it might find
some gain. The law itself cannot be such an object. It does not propose to the
ego any "content" which would permit the ego to overdetermine (and not even
by means of a "sublimation" in the Freudian sense) the interest of the law by the
ego's own interest. The law must not authorize the least equivocation in the
obedience it requires. The ego as such may not hope for any advantage, for
example happiness or pride, from its having listened to the law. Rather, it must
give itself to the law without any subjective (empirical) interest. The law must
produce in the ego a disinterested motive, without either "pathos" or calcula-
tion. The interest of the practical rational faculty is such that it must actualize
itself without arousing any empirical interest in this faculty.
The motive and interest of theoretical reason are less clearly circum-
scribed in the first Critique, and I leave them aside here (CPR, 358-65:
422-30). What is certain, in any case, is that they are different from the motive
and interest which "put into practice" practical reason. Indeed, this is why
their Verbindung ("connection") (CPrR, 134: 124) presents a problem.
According to Kant, the problem is not dramatic, in the sense that the one
would have to "cede" its place to the other. This would be the case if theoreti-
cal and practical interests were initially "contradictory," which is not necessar-
ily the case. The question is only one of hierarchy or "primacy": which is "the
higher" of the two, the interest in extending knowledge or the interest in
extending morality?
The answer is well known: without impinging upon the internal func-
tioning and interests of knowledge or cognition, practical reason possesses the
primacy of interest. But the argument that establishes this priority merits
attention. The motif of the hegemony of the practical is not merely due, as one
usually maintains, to this: that only the ethical grants the mind necessary
access, by way of obligation-Le., by way of the intimation of the moral law-
to the supersensible instance of freedom (the absolute of causality), whereas
knowledge can only lead to the supersensible (the absolute of the world) by
way of a "maximization" of its concepts (CPR, 381-85: 449-54) which,
although it is inevitable, is of no cognitive use, since this extension (CPR, 260:
307) transforms them into Ideas that are not determinable by intuition,
"indemonstrable" (CPR, 166; 199). Instead, Kant's argument for the hege-
m o n y o f t h e p r a c t i c a l t a k e s f i r s t o f a l l t h e f o r m o f a t a u t o l o g y . " O n e c a n i n n o
w a y d e m a n d t h a t p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s o n , t h u s
r e v e r s i n g t h e i r o r d e r , f o r a l l i n t e r e s t i s d e f i n i t i v e l y p r a c t i c a l " ( C P r R , 1 3 6 ; 1 2 6 ) .
A l l i n t e r e s t i s p r a c t i c a l . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t e r e s t a t t e s t s
t o a s o r t o f " n e e d " t o a c t u a l i z e t h e f a c u l t y , a p r e s s u r e o n t h e p a r t o f t h e p o s s i -
b l e t o w a r d i t s o w n r e a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h i s p u r e p r a t t e i n , a s o r t o f f a c u l t a t i v e " w i l l
t o b e " ( w h i c h w o u l d m e r i t l e n g t h y e x a m i n a t i o n ) . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n t h e
e m p i r i c a l s i d e , t h i s f a c u l t a t i v e " w i l l " c a n o n l y p u t i t s e l f i n t o e f f e c t i f i t m a n a g e s
t o g a i n a h e a r i n g b y t h a t a s p e c t o f t h e m i n d w h i c h i s i m m e r s e d i n t h e w o r l d o f
e m p i r i c a l i n t e r e s t s , c o n d i t i o n s , a n d a t t r a c t i o n s . T h i s a s p e c t o f t h e m i n d h a s t o
" p a y a t t e n t i o n " t o ( a c h t e n , " r e s p e c t " ) o r t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e " p r e s s u r e " o f
t h e f a c u l t i e s ; i t h a s t o b e s u s c e p t i b l e o f b e i n g " m o t i v a t e d , " m o b i l i z e d , o r
m o v e d b y t h i s p r e s s u r e . T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f
t h e f a c u l t a t i v e p o w e r c o n s i d e r e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a r e a s o n a b l e , p r a c -
t i c a l , a n d f i n i t e b e i n g : t h a t h e o r s h e s h o u l d b e a b l e t o b e m o v e d ( i n b o t h t h e
p h y s i c a l a n d t h e a f f e c t i v e s e n s e s o f t h e t e r m ) b y t h i s p o w e r .
T h u s , " e v e n t h e i n t e r e s t o f s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s o n i s c o n d i t i o n a l " ( C P r R ,
1 3 6 ; 1 2 6 ) . S c i e n c e d o e s n o t t h e r e b y b e c o m e t h e s e r v a n t o f m o r a l i t y . R a t h e r ,
w h a t a c t u a l i z e s k n o w l e d g e , w h a t e x t e n d s t h e d o m a i n o f k n o w l e d g e , w h a t
i m p e l s t h e e x e r t i o n s o f s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h ( o b v i o u s l y , a c c o r d i n g t o i t s o w n
r u l e s a n d n o t a c c o r d i n g t o m o r a l l a w ) , i s i t s e l f c o n d i t i o n e d b y a t r a n s c e n d e n -
t a l i n t e r e s t : b y a " w i l l t o e f f e c t " t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s p o t e n t i a l , b y a w i l l " t o
m a k e u s e , " b y a n i m p a t i e n c e , a s w e w o u l d s a y t o d a y , t o p e r f o r m c o g n i t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e , t o m a k e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e w o r l d e x i s t i n t h e w o r l d . A n d i n t h e
e m p i r i c a l r e a l m , t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s t h a t o t h e r " i n t e r e s t , "
c o r r e s p o n d i n g o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e s p e c u l a t i v e i n t e r e s t o f r e a s o n , a " m o t i v e , "
" t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e w i l l o f a b e i n g " ( C P r R ,
8 5 ; 7 4 ) . T h i s b e i n g i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o m n i s c i e n t ( o r b e n e v o l e n t , w h e r e i t i s a
q u e s t i o n o f a c t u a l i z i n g t h e g o o d ) ; i t s r e a s o n a b l e t h e o r e t i c a l ( a n d p r a c t i c a l )
s p o n t a n e i t y i s f e t t e r e d a n d t h e r e f o r e n e e d s t o b e " e x c i t e d . " I n d e e d , h u m a n i t y
i s c o n s t i t u t i v e l y r e l a t e d t o i g n o r a n c e , e v i l a n d p e r h a p s e v e n , c o n c e r n i n g t h e
i n t e r e s t o f t h e r e f l e x i v e f a c u l t y , u g l i n e s s .
W h e n i t i s a m a t t e r o f m o r a l i t y , t h e c h a i n s t h a t m u s t b e s h e d a r e t h e
c h a i n s b y w h i c h i n c l i n a t i o n s r e s t r a i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f g o o d w i l l . E m p i r i c a l w i l l -
i n g i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y i n v e s t e d i n a n d f i x a t e d o n t h e s e " c h a r m s " o r " a t t r a c -
t i o n s . " P r e o c c u p i e d . T h e p u r e l y r e a s o n a b l e p r a c t i c a l m o t i v e c a n n o t a s s e r t
i t s e l f e x c e p t i n t h e c o m p a n y o f a " p a i n " ( C P r R , 8 6 ; 7 5 ) , a m o u r n i n g f o r a t t r a c -
t i v e o b j e c t s , a w i t h d r a w a l o f p r e v i o u s i n v e s t m e n t s a n d f i x a t i o n s . T h i s m o u r n -
i n g t h u s h a s t o a f f e c t t h e " o b j e c t " p a r e x c e l l e n c e w h i c h p o s e s a n o b s t a c l e t o
r e s p e c t a n d t h e g o o d m o t i v e : t h e e g o ( C P r R , 8 9 - 9 0 ; 7 9 ) w h i c h , h o w e v e r ,
a c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d r e m a i n s a f t e r t h e l o s s o f a t t r a c t i v e o b j e c t s a n d , i n d e e d ,
l i v e s o f f t h i s l o s s . T h i s d a r k a s p e c t o f r e s p e c t i s t h e " h u m i l i a t i o n " o f t h e " p r e -
s u m p t i o n " a n d " a r r o g a n c e " o f t h e e m p i r i c a l e g o , o f i t s " o v e r e s t i m a t i o n " o f
itself (CPrR. 86-87; 76). Narcissism must be thrown down Uete a basl. van-
quished. The ego feels itself seized by obligation. affected by respect for the
law. and turned toward its realization only to the extent that it feels itself dis-
seized and abandoned. its "pathological" dependency broken-disoccupied.
It never quite gets there. This mourning remains a melancholia. This is the
dark side. finitude. But it is only the obverse of respect. not its condition.
On its bright side. respect is a "motive" (CPrR. 91; 81). It is the empiri-
cal attention to pure practical reason. It is "the law itself' as listened to. a law
which is "interesting" because "from the concept of a motive flows that of an
interest' (CPrR. 92; 82). This interest is independent of empirical interests.
"the mere interest one takes in observing the law" (CPrR. 92; 82). It is an
interest itself without interest. in the sense that it does not result from a calcu-
lation of enjoyment. "Respect for the law is not a motive for morality. but
morality itself. considered subjectively as motive" (CPrR. 89; 78). Just like the
listening to the order to listen: it is the ethical itself. Realized or not. this order
is listened to before being heard and understood. Which is what the German
word Achtung says. Thus. the law makes itself a motive. on its bright side. As a
regard regard].
Achtung is above all a regard. a regard one has for something which is
not there. is not an object. and does not lead to passionate intrigues either in
the sense of the passion to know or in the sense of the passion to desire and
love. It is indeed hardly a feeling at all. which would necessarily be "patholog-
ical." but instead a "singular feeling." of a "so particular nature" (CPrR. 89;
79). The law opens its clearing. its facies. in the closed texture of the condi-
tioned. That it is unconditional. "categorical." is what gives it its simplicity. its
lightness. The clearing it opens consists in nothing. it exists in this: that regard
is due to duty. under all circumstances. including those "inferior and com-
monly bourgeois" (CPrR. 90; 79). The regard is a motive of repose. a state of
feeling which is a nearly a-pathetic pathos. And it is perhaps appropriate here
to recall that "apathy" (apatheia or Affektlosigkeit) is to be counted among the
sublime feelings. with this advantage over enthusiasm: that it "has for
itself ... the satisfaction of pure reason" (CI. 29. 109; 113). which enthusiasm.
with its excessive pathos. lacks. There is an entire range of nuances in disinter-
ested feelings. a scale that runs from pure aesthetic favor to pure ethical
regard. And the intermediary "tones" are all sublime.
What then finally is the character. structure. position. or sense of inter-
est in the sublime?
4.
There are many sublime feelings-not just one. but an entire family. or rather
an entire generation. Let me weave for a moment the novel of this genos. On
1 2 4 J E A N - F R A N C ; : O I S L Y O T A R D
t h e g e n e a l o g i c a l t r e e o f t h e " f a c u l t i e s o f t h e s o u l , " t h e g e n e t r i x , l i k e t h e b e g e t -
t e r , i s a " s e n s a t i o n , " a s t a t e o f f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n . B u t t h e f a t h e r i s
h a p p y , t h e m o t h e r u n h a p p y . T h e s u b l i m e c h i l d w i l l b e c o n t r a d i c t o r i l y c o m ~
p r i s e d o f s u f f e r i n g a n d s a t i s f a c t i o n . T h i s i s b e c a u s e , i n t h e g e n e a l o g y o f t h e
f a c u l t i e s o f " k n o w l e d g e " ( i n t h e b r o a d s e n s e , i n s o f a r a s t h e p o w e r s o f t h e m i n d
r e l a t e t o o b j e c t s ) , t h e p a r e n t s c o m e f r o m w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t f a m i l i e s . S h e i s " f a c -
u l t y o f j u d g m e n t , " h e " r e a s o n . " S h e i s a n a r t i s t , h e a m o r a l i s t . S h e " r e f l e c t s , " h e
" d e t e r m i n e s . " T h e ( p a t e r n a l ) m o r a l l a w d e t e r m i n e s i t s e l f a n d d e t e r m i n e s t h e
m i n d t o a c t i o n . R e a s o n w a n t s g o o d l i t t l e c h i l d r e n , r e q u i r e s t h e e n g e n d e r m e n t
o f j u s t , m o r a l m a x i m s . B u t t h e m o t h e r , t h e r e f l e x i v e , f r e e i m a g i n a t i o n , k n o w s
o n l y h o w t o u n f o l d h e r f o r m s w i t h o u t p r e d e t e r m i n e d r u l e s a n d w i t h o u t
k n o w n o r k n o w a b l e g o a l s .
I n h e r l o v e a f f a i r w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " b e f o r e " h e r e n c o u n t e r w i t h r e a -
s o n , i t m a y b e t h a t t h i s f r e e d o m o f " f o r m s " f o u n d i t s e l f i n u n i s o n w i t h t h e
p o w e r o f r e g u l a t i o n a n d t h a t a n e x e m p l a r y h a p p i n e s s [ u n b o n h e u r J w a s b o r n
o f t h i s e n c o u n t e r . B u t i n a n y c a s e , n o c h i l d r e n . B e a u t y i s n o t t h e f r u i t o f a c o n -
t r a c t b u t t h e f l o w e r o f a l o v e a n d , l i k e w h a t h a s n o t b e e n c o n c e i v e d b y i n t e r e s t ,
i t p a s s e s .
T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e c h i l d o f a n u n h a p p y e n c o u n t e r , t h e e n c o u n t e r o f t h e
I d e a w i t h f o r m . T h i s e n c o u n t e r i s u n h a p p y b e c a u s e t h e I d e a r e v e a l s i t s e l f t o b e
s o u n w i l l i n g t o m a k e c o n c e s s i o n s , t h e l a w ( t h e f a t h e r ) s o a u t h o r i t a r i a n a n d s o
u n c o n d i t i o n a l , t h e r e s p e c t t h a t i t c o m m a n d s s o e x c l u s i v e , t h a t t h i s f a t h e r w i l l
u n d e r t a k e n o t h i n g t o a r o u s e t h e c o n s e n t o f i m a g i n a t i o n , n o t e v e n a d e l i c i o u s
r i v a l r y . H e s c a t t e r s a l l f o r m s , o r f o r m s s c a t t e r t h e m s e l v e s , t e a r t h e m s e l v e s
a s u n d e r , a n d b e c o m e u n m e a s u r e d i n h i s p r e s e n c e . H e f e r t i l i z e s t h e v i r g i n a l
d e v o t e e o f f o r m s w i t h n o r e g a r d f o r h e r f a v o r . H e d e m a n d s t h a t a l l h a v e
r e g a r d o n l y f o r h i m s e l f , t h e l a w , a n d i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . H e h a s n o n e e d w h a t s o -
e v e r o f a b e a u t i f u l n a t u r e . H e n e e d s i m p e r a t i v e l y a v i o l a t e d , e x c e e d e d ,
e x h a u s t e d i m a g i n a t i o n . S h e w i l l d i e i n g i v i n g b i r t h t o t h e s u b l i m e , o r a t l e a s t
s h e w i l l t h i n k s h e i s d y i n g .
3
T h e s u b l i m e t h u s i n d e e d p o s s e s s e s s o m e t h i n g o f t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f
r e s p e c t , w h i c h i t h a s f r o m i t s f a t h e r , r e a s o n . B u t t h e E r h a b e n e , t h e s u b l i m e , i s
n o t E r h e b u n g ( C P r R , 9 3 ; 8 3 ) , t h e p u r e e l a t i o n w h i c h t h e l a w i n s p i r e s ( C P r R ,
9 9 ; 8 9 ) . V i o l e n c e , " v i g o r , " i s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e s u b l i m e ; i t b r e a k s a w a y , g e t s c a r -
r i e d a w a y . R e s p e c t , h o w e v e r , s i m p l y r a i s e s i t s e l f t o a t t e n t i o n . I n t h e s u b l i m e ,
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d t o v i o l e n c e , b e c a u s e i t i s b y w a y o f i t s s u f -
f e r i n g , t h e m e d i a t i o n o f i t s v i o l a t i o n , t h a t t h e j o y o f s e e i n g - o r a l m o s t s e e -
i n g - t h e l a w c a n b e o b t a i n e d . T h e s u b l i m e " r e n d e r s s o t o s p e a k i n t u i t a b l e t h e
s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e r a t i o n a l d e s t i n y o f o u r f a c u l t y o f k n o w l e d g e o v e r t h e g r e a t e s t
p o w e r o f s e n s i b i l i t y " ( C l , 2 7 , 9 6 ; 9 6 ) . A n d t h i s " j o y . . . i s o n l y p o s s i b l e b y t h e
m e d i a t i o n o f p a i n " ( C l , 2 7 , 9 8 ; 9 9 ) .
T h e m o u r n i n g e n t a i l e d b y r e s p e c t o f t h e l a w i s b u t t h e d a r k s i d e o f
r e s p e c t , n o t i t s m e a n s . T h e e g o c r i e s o u t b e c a u s e i t s w i l l i s n o t s a i n t l y . B u t t h a t
the ego should cry out is not a necessary condition of respect, but merely a fact
of finitude. Respect does not measure itself in sacrifices. The law means you no
harm; it "means" you, as it were, nothing at all. The sublime, on the other
hand, requires suffering. It is supposed to hurt. It is "counterpurposive"
(zweckwidrig), "inappropriate" (unangemessen), and it is sublime "for this rea-
son" (Cf, 23, 85; 83). It needs "presentation," which is the function ofimagi-
nation, its mother (C], 17, 73: 69 and 23, 84: 82) and "presumption," this
native illness of the servile will, in order to manifest their nullity before the law.
One may smile at this infantile scenario. But in aesthetic matters, it is a
permissible "mode" of exposition (Cf, 49, 148: 162). Let us take up again the
modus logicus. Kant is not unaware that the good is more closely related to the
sublime than to the beautiful. "Considered aesthetically, the intellectual,
moral good, which is purposive in itself, should be represented not so much as
beautiful but as sublime" (Cf, 29, 108; 112). That's the thesis. What is the
effect of this proximity between the good and the sublime on the status of
nature from the standpoint of the aesthetics of sublimity? "The concept of the
sublime of nature," Kant writes, "is much less important and rich in conse-
quences than the concept of the beautiful in nature," and the sublime "indi-
cates in general nothing purposive in nature itself, but merely in that possible
use of our intuitions of it by which there is produced in us a feeling of a pur-
posiveness quite independent of nature" (Cf, 23, 86; 84).
The word use is underlined in the text. To comprehend its import, one
has to return to the teleological argument and to the parallel and paradoxical
relation exposed there between the interests of aesthetic favor and ethical
respect. I have said that practical reason is interested in procuring for itself a
disinterested listening: this is respect for the law. Reflexive jUdgment is also
interested in offering the mind occasions for disinterested judging, freed of
any pathological inclinations, cognitive motives, or even good intentions: this
is the favor of the beautiful. The use of these two faculties, which are heteroge-
neous in the a priori conditions of their respective functioning, requires the
same sort of paradoxical motive in both instances: disinterested interest. As
favor is the less suspect the more natural the beauty of which it is the occasion,
so the law is interested in nature as in what spontaneously provides disinter-
ested satisfaction.
The teleological argument adds a different gesture to the logical, strictly
analogical argument for the affinity of the beautiful with the good. The mind
traces a gesture while it experiences the aesthetic pleasure of a landscape. Let
us call natural beauties--deprived, as Kant requires, of all material attrac-
tion-landscapes. They "speak," or through them nature "speaks" to us "figu-
ratively" (figurlich) in "ciphered inscriptions" (eine Chiffreschrift) (Cf, 42,
133; 143). The cipher remains unknown. Landscapes are indecipherable,
insusceptible of conceptual "exposition" (Cf, 57, 167; 189). They are accessi-
ble "only" through taste, i.e., feeling. But this only casts a kind of sidelong
g l a n c e i n t o t h e " i n t e r i o r . " T h e m i n d s e n s e s a q u a s i p u r p o s i v e n e s s i n t h e s i l e n t
m e s s a g e s l a n d s c a p e s c o m p r i s e , a q u a s i i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o r q u a s i r e g u l a r i t y . B u t
" a s w e d o n o t e n c o u n t e r t h i s p u r p o s e a n y w h e r e o u t t h e r e , w e s e e k i t n a t u r a l l y
w i t h i n o u r s e l v e s a n d , i n t r u t h , i n w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f i n a l p u r p o s e o f o u r
e x i s t e n c e , t h a t i s , o u r m o r a l d e s t i n y " ( C / , 4 2 , 1 3 3 ; 1 4 4 ) .
T h i s g e s t u r e o f t u r n i n g o r r e t u r n i n g i s s u r r e p t i t i o u s . C o n c e r n i n g t h e
s u b l i m e , K a n t s p e a k s o f a " s u b r e p t i o n " w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e " c o n v e r s i o n o f
r e s p e c t [ A c h t u n g J f o r t h e I d e a o f h u m a n i t y i n o u r o w n s u b j e c t i n t o r e s p e c t f o r
t h e o b j e c t " ( C / , 2 7 , 9 6 ; 9 6 ) . I t i s t h i s p r o j e c t i o n , t h i s o b j e c t i v a t i o n t h a t t h e
A n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e c r i t i c i z e s : t h e r e a r e n o s u b l i m e o b j e c t s , o n l y s u b l i m e
f e e l i n g s ( C / , 2 6 , 9 5 ; 9 5 ) . H o w e v e r , a s u b r e p t i o n i s a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n t a s t e ,
b u t o n e t h a t g o e s t h e o t h e r w a y , f r o m t h e o b j e c t t o w a r d t h e s u b j e c t . T h e l a n d -
s c a p e a l l u d e s , t h r o u g h i t s e s c a p e f r o m d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t o t h e d e s t i n y o f m i n d .
T h e f a v o r w i t h w h i c h o n e r e c e i v e s i t i n d u c e s t h e t i m i d l y s u s p e n d e d " t u r n " o r
t w i s t o f r e s p e c t . T h e a l l u s i o n t o t h e l a w g o e s n o f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s o b l i q u e g a z e .
I t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o e r e c t t h e e n t i r e " o b j e c t i v e " t e l e o l o g y i n o r d e r t o l e g i t i -
m a t e t h i s t u r n ( C / , 4 2 , 1 3 3 ; 1 4 3 ) . T h i s t e l e o l o g y i t s e l f w i l l b e c o m p r i s e d o f
n o t h i n g b u t a t e x t u r e o f " g u i d i n g t h r e a d s . " B u t o n e o f t h e s e t h r e a d s i s s p u n
o u t b y t h e l i g h t g e s t u r e o f a e s t h e t i c s u b r e p t i o n .
T h e s u b l i m e , h o w e v e r , c u t s t h e t h r e a d , i n t e r r u p t s t h e a l l u s i o n . " I t i n d i -
c a t e s n o t h i n g p u r p o s i v e i n n a t u r e i t s e l f , b u t o n l y i n t h e p o s s i b l e u s e o f i t s i n t u -
i t i o n s " ( C / , 2 3 , 8 6 ; 8 4 ) . I t d o e s n o t k n o w n a t u r e , w h i c h i s u n e r k l i i r l i c h , i n e x -
p l i c a b l e a n d u n d i s c l o s a b l e f o r t h e A u f k l i i r e r w h o w o u l d d e t e r m i n e i t s p r o p e r
s t a t u s a p a r t f r o m a l l m e t a p h y s i c a l d e l i r i u m ( a s i n L e i b n i z o r H e g e l ) ( C / , 7 4 ,
2 1 0 ; 2 4 3 ) . T h e s u b l i m e d o e s n o t e v e n h e e d t h i s s i d e l o n g g e s t u r e t o w a r d t h e
e t h i c a l w h i c h i s p e r m i t t e d b y t h e a e s t h e t i c s o f n a t u r e , a n d w h i c h l a w s e e m s t o
r e q u i r e f o r i t s r e a l i z a t i o n .
N a t u r e s e n d s n o s i g n a l s t o t h e m i n d , h o w e v e r i n d i r e c t , w h i c h w o u l d
i n d i c a t e i t s p r o p e r d e s t i n y . R a t h e r , t h e m i n d m a k e s " u s e " o f n a t u r e . T h e
o b j e c t , " a s f o r m l e s s o r w i t h o u t f i g u r e , " " f o r m l e s s a n d w i t h o u t p u r p o s i v e n e s s , "
i s " u t i l i z e d i n a s u b j e c t i v e l y p u r p o s i v e m a n n e r , n o t j u d g e d f o r i t s e l f a n d b y r e a -
s o n o f i t s f o r m ( s o t o s p e a k s p e c i e s f i n a l i s a c c e p t a , n o n d a t a ) " ( C / , 3 0 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 ;
1 2 1 ) . T o b e s u r e , t h i s i m p l i e s a n i n v e r s i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t , b u t
a b o v e a l l i t i m p l i e s a n i n v e r s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s , a n d t h u s a r e - p l a c i n g i n q u e s t i o n
o f i n t e r e s t i n g d i s i n t e r e s t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t o m a k e u s e o f n a t u r a l a n t i p u r p o s i v e -
n e s s o r - a s w e c a n s a y f o r t h e s a k e o f s i m p l i c i t y - o f a n t i - n a t u r e . I w i l l r e t u r n
b e l o w t o w h a t " a n t i - n a t u r e " - n o t a K a n t i a n t e r m - m i g h t m e a n i n t h e e c o n -
o m y o f t h e s u b j e c t o r o f t h e m i n d a s s u b j e c t i v e n a t u r e . I t s u f f i c e s f o r t h e
m o m e n t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e w o r d h e r e d e s i g n a t e s n a t u r e i n s o f a r a s i t
i n d u c e s t h e m i n d t o n e g l e c t i t s b e a u t i f u l f o r m s . " I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e o b j e c t ,
o n c e p e r c e i v e d , c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f , f o r r e f l e x i o n , n o t t h e l e a s t p u r p o s i v e n e s s
c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f i t s f o r m " ( C J I , X I I , 8 3 ; 4 3 9 ) . I t i s n o t a t a l l a
m a t t e r o f m o n s t r o s i t y , n o t e v e n o f s i z e . R a t h e r , f o r m s i m p l y c e a s e s t o b e o f a n y
pertinence to matters of aesthetic perception. The sublime does not receive the
object according to its form, according to its subjective, internal purposive-
ness. Form does not make the soul resonate with the tone of un bonheur.
To what "use" does the mind put nature or anti-nature in the experi-
ence of the sublime? The "First Introduction" to the third Critique answers: "a
contingent usi' (C/I, XII, 82; 439). "The purposiveness of nature from the sub-
ject's point of vieW' ceases to induce "in" the subject his or her own "natural"
purposiveness, experienced as a harmony of diverse capacities. Instead, it is a
"purposiveness residing a priori in the subject," "an a priori principle
(granted, a merely subjective principle)," which "makes possible a purposive
use of certain sensible intuitions." The contingency of this use resides in the
fact that it "presupposes no particular technique of nature" (ClI. XII, 83; 439).
Natural art, of which taste was so to speak the reverberation within the sub-
ject, the internal "harmonics," is silent.
It is, on the contrary, the mind which, from afar and on high, imposes a
purposiveness all its own on what remains of nature when natural form is no
longer "given" (data) as a work of art, but merely "received," "taken"
(accepta), and redirected. It is not the work of nature or the "landscape" that
points to the (ethical) destiny of which the sublime is the excessively vigorous
feeling-not even obliquely as in taste. Rather, it is the mind that actualizes
this destiny, arbitrarily, autonomously, in connection with a "contingent"
object, by seizing the occasion furnished not by the landscape but by its a-
morphosis, its formal neutralization.
Consequently, the part played in sublime presentation by the imagina-
tion (or sensibility) as by the stabilization of forms ought to be quite minimal.
Which is why in Kant's vocabulary, the sublime is called a "feeling of the
spirit," (Geistesgefuhl) (C/I, XII, 84; 440), in opposition to taste. Its actual
province is that of a purposiveness proper to the spirit which is indifferent to
the purposiveness of forms. What sets sublime feeling in motion and supports
it is no longer the "purposiveness of objects in relation to the faculty of reflex-
ive judgment," but "inversely .. .following the concept of freedom, a purpo-
siveness of the subject in relation to objects concerning their form or even
their absence of form" (CI, VII, 38; 28-29). A reversal, if not a conflict, of
modes of purposiveness. By the beautiful, the subject is induced to listen to
nature, including his or her own. By the sublime, nature is spiritually defor-
ested by that other subject required by the law. For ultimately, Geistesgefuhl is
nothing other than "respect for moral Ideas" (C/, 54, 161; 180). And the sat-
isfaction that can affect it is not a "pleasure" (Gefallen) but a "satisfaction of
esteem" (Schatzung) (CI, 5, 54; 44; 54, 161; 180).
If one pursues the consequences of this reversal of purposiveness, one
may finally find it unsettling that a completely "spiritual" feeling, which
apparently expects and learns nothing from its object (nature) nor even from
the forms of intuition, still deserves to be called "aesthetic." It should
1 2 8 J E A N - F R A N < ; : O I S L Y O T A R D
" n o n e t h e l e s s " s t i l l b e c a l l e d " a e s t h e t i c , " K a n t w r i t e s , " b e c a u s e i t , t o o , e x p r e s s e s
a s u b j e c t i v e p u r p o s i v e n e s s w h i c h d o e s n o t r e s t o n t h e c o n c e p t o f a n o b j e c t "
( C ] I , V I I , 8 3 ; 4 4 0 ) . T h e s u b l i m e i s , l i k e t a s t e , a r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t " w i t h o u t t h e
c o n c e p t o f a n o b j e c t , s i m p l y w i t h r e g a r d t o a s u b j e c t i v e p u r p o s i v e n e s s " ( C ] I ,
V I I , 8 3 ; 4 3 9 ) . T h a t s u f f i c e s t o c l a s s i f y i t a s a e s t h e t i c , b e c a u s e a i s t h e s i s - s e n s a -
t i o n - s i g n i f i e s h e r e n o t " t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a t h i n g ( i n s e n s e , q u a r e c e p t i v -
i t y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e f a c u l t y o f k n o w l e d g e ) , " b u t " a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e f e e l -
i n g o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n , " a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h " i s r e l a t e d o n l y t o t h e
s u b j e c t a n d s e r v e s n o k n o w l e d g e , n o t e v e n t h a t b y w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t w o u l d
k n o w i t s e l f ( C I , 3 , 5 1 ; 4 0 ) . T h a t w h i c h j u d g e s ( i t s e l f ) b y t h e s t a t e o f t h e s u b -
j e c t - b y i t s i n t e r n a l " s e n s a t i o n " - i s a e s t h e t i c . S u c h s e n s a t i o n i s b y n o m e a n s
a n y s o r t o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e o b j e c t , b e i t i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l . I n c o n t r a s t ,
t h e s e n s a t i o n t h a t t h e s e n s e s p r o v i d e i s i n f o r m a t i v e a n d a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o m -
p o n e n t o f j u d g m e n t s o f k n o w l e d g e . I t a r i s e s f r o m l o g i c ( C I , 1 5 , 7 0 ; 6 4 ; C P R ,
5 4 ; 6 6 - 6 7 ) . B u t a s f o r t h e " s p i r i t u a l f e e l i n g , " i t b e l o n g s t o a e s t h e t i c s d e s p i t e i t s
i n d i f f e r e n c e t o s e n s i b l e f o r m s , i n t h a t i t i s , l i k e t a s t e , a n o n c o g n i t i v e j u d g m e n t
t h a t t h e s u b j e c t p a s s e s n o t o n a n o b j e c t b u t o c c a s i o n e d b y a n o b j e c t a n d i n
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m e r e s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e o f t h e s p i r i t .
B u t t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h i s j u d g i n g s e n s a t i o n h a s a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t s t a -
t u s i n t a s t e f r o m t h e s t a t u s i t h a s i n t h e s u b l i m e . A n d t h i s d i f f e r e n c e o f o c c a -
s i o n o u g h t t o a f f e c t t h e s y s t e m o f i n t e r e s t s a t p l a y i n e a c h c a s e . T h e s u b l i m e
o b j e c t i s n o l o n g e r t h e o c c a s i o n g i v e n t o a f o r m t o t r a n s f o r m i t s e l f o r g a n i c a l l y ,
i f I c a n p u t i t t h i s w a y , i n t o u n b o n h e u r o f t h e s o u l , b y a s o r t o f t r a n s i t i v i s m o f
n a t u r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l m o d e s o f p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n s t e a d , i t i s t h r o u g h i t s a b s e n c e
o f f o r m , o r r a t h e r c o n s i d e r e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f i t s f o r m s e v e n i f i s n o t t o t a l l y
f o r m l e s s , t h a t t h e o b j e c t , s o t o s p e a k , d e s p i t e i t s e l f , f u r n i s h e s a n o c c a s i o n f o r
p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t o r e i n f o r c e i t s i n f l u e n c e o n t h e s u b j e c t , t o e x t e n d i t s p o w e r ,
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s f a c u l t a t i v e i n t e r e s t . A n d t o b e s u r e , t h e s u b j e c t t h u s
c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e l a w t u r n s t o w a r d i t , e x p o s e s i t s e l f t o t h a t l a w , w i t h o u t b e i n g
i m p e l l e d b y a n y i n t e r e s t , h e n c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s o l e e t h i c a l m o t i v e ,
" r e s p e c t " ( A c h t u n g ) . B u t c a n o n e s a y a s m u c h o f t h e d a r k s i d e o f t h e s u b l i m e ,
d a r k e r t h a n t h a t o f r e s p e c t , s i n c e i t i s h e r e t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e f e e l i n g i n q u e s -
t i o n , a n d n o t m e r e l y i t s o b v e r s e ? A n d w i l l o n e s t i l l w a n t t o s a y t h a t t h e s u b l i m e
i n d i f f e r e n c e t o f o r m i s t h e s i g n o f a " d i s i n t e r e s t " ?
I n t h e s e n s e o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t e r e s t t h a t i m p e l s t h e f a c u l t i e s t o
a c t u a l i z e t h e m s e l v e s , t h e d i s a s t e r o f f o r m s w h i c h t h e s u b l i m e r e q u i r e s i m p l i e s
a n a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r f a c u l t a t i v e h i e r a r c h i e s . T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( o r r e a s o n
i n i t s c o g n i t i v e u s e ) m u s t r e n o u n c e i t s a c t u a l i z a t i o n , w h e r e a s i n t a s t e , a s o n e
m a y r e c a l l , f o r m s e v o k e i t s a c t u a l i z a t i o n b y d e f y i n g a n d e x c i t i n g i t . T h e
p r o s p e c t o f k n o w l e d g e , t o w h i c h b e a u t y s t i l l a l l o w s a c c e s s , e v e n i f a p o r e t i c a l l y
( C I , 5 5 - 5 7 , 1 6 2 - 6 5 ; 1 8 2 - 8 7 ) , i s a t o n e s t r o k e e f f a c e d b y t h e s u b l i m e . I n
t u r n , r e a s o n - t h e f a c u l t y o f p u r e I d e a s - s e e m s t o h a v e a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n t h e
d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e g i v e n a n d i n t h e d e f e a t o f b o t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
the imagination. In the lacuna thereby opened, reason can in fact render
nearly "intuitable" (C/, 27, 96; 96) to the subject the Idea of his or her true
moral destiny.
If it is now a matter of the interest or disinterest felt by the empirical
subject affected by sublime emotion, and if one sets aside the "disinterested
interest" that it experiences as a result of the moral law within, this subject's
indifference to the forms of objects might seem to arise not from any disinter-
est or interest but rather from a noninterest [ininteret] pure and simple. Imag-
inative forms have no pertinence whatsoever for the awakening of a "spiritual
feeling."
However, if one takes a closer look, one sees that the absence of imagi-
native forms is itself not without interest for the subject in its discovery of its
true destiny. If their nonpertinence is a means, if the suffering their impossi-
bility induces in the mind is a "mediation" which authorizes the "joy" of dis-
covering the true (ethical) destiny of the mind, and thus authorizes respect,
this is because the disaster of forms, however "counterpurposive" it may
appear for taste and for the purposiveness of nature, is-or at least can
become-itself nonetheless purposively oriented toward the Idea of this true
destiny (C/, 27, 98; 99). There is in this something of a "logic of the worst"
[logique du pire] or at least an aesthetics of the worst, which would not put
into "play" the ugly, but the amorphic. The more the antilandscape exceeds
the realm of forms, the more the power of pure (practical) reason finds itself
"extended" and actualized, the more its greatness is confirmed. Pure practical
reason wagers on the misery of favor in order to effect the elevation of its law.
As I have said, quite differently from what takes place in respect-which has
simultaneously two faces, the light and the dark-the sublime mediates (per-
haps dialectically) the light through the dark. The clearing opens itself up
through deforestation.
This indirect-not to say, perverse-interest, this secondary benefit,
drawn on the quasi "disappearance of nature in the face of the Ideas of rea-
son" (C/, 27, 96; 96), is what motivates or accompanies the "use," the "conti-
gent" use the mind makes of nature (as anti-nature) in the sublime. Let us
reread: "The concept of the sublime in general indicates nothing purposive in
nature itself, but only in the possible use of its intentions, in order to render
sensible (fiihlbar] in us a purposiveness which is utterly independent of
nature" (C/, 23, 86; 84). On the part of the empirical subject, as is confessed
in this "in order to render sensible," there is the motive of a powerful interest.
The disaster of forms is interesting. And thus, the movement is interested by
means of which the imagination is subjugated to a purposiveness which, how-
ever, is incompatible with its own, the free production offorms. "Imagination
deprives itself of freedom, since it is determined toward a purpose in accor-
dance with a law other than that of empirical use" (Cl, 29, 106; 109). What
benefit or profit is paid for in advance here? The profit one expects of a sacri-
f i c e . A n d w h o p r o f i t s ? N a t u r e i s s a c r i f i c e d o n t h e a l t a r o f t h e l a w . " I n d o i n g
t h i s , i m a g i n a t i o n a c q u i r e s a n e x t e n s i o n [ E r w e i t e r u n g ] a n d a f o r c e g r e a t e r t h a n
t h o s e i t h a s s a c r i f i c e d b u t o f w h i c h t h e f o u n d a t i o n i s h i d d e n a n d , i n s t e a d o f
t h i s f o u n d a t i o n , w h a t i t f e e l s i s s a c r i f i c e a n d d e s t r u c t i o n , a t t h e s a m e t i m e a s
t h e c a u s e t o w h i c h i t i s s u b m i t t e d " ( G l , 2 9 , 1 0 6 ; 1 0 9 ) .
T h e " c o n t i n g e n t u s e " o f n a t u r e t h u s a r i s e s f r o m a s a c r i f i c i a l e c o n o m y o f
t h e f a c u l t i e s . T h e r e g a r d o r r e s p e c t t h e s u b l i m e h a s f o r t h e l a w i s o b t a i n e d a n d
s i g n a l e d b y a u s e o f f o r m s t h a t i s n o t t h e u s e t o w h i c h t h e y a r e d e s t i n e d . W e a r e
c o n f r o n t e d h e r e w i t h a c o n v e r s i o n ( o r p e r v e r s i o n ) o f d e s t i n y , w h i c h p e r h a p s
a l w a y s c o n n o t e s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e s a c r e d . T h e s a c r e d r e q u i r e s p o t l a t c h , t h e
d e s t r u c t i o n o r c o n s u m p t i o n o f t h e g i v e n , o f p r e s e n t " w e a l t h " ( p r e s e n c e , g i f t )
( G l , 4 9 , 1 4 6 ; 1 6 0 ) o r n a t u i : a l f o r m , i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n i n r e t u r n t h e c o u n t e r g i f t
o f t h e n o n p r e s e n t e d ( o f m a n n a ? ) . " T h i s p o w e r ( o f t h e m o r a l l a w ) m a k e s i t s e l f
p r o p e r l y k n o w n i n t h e a e s t h e t i c s p h e r e o n l y t h r o u g h s a c r i f i c e s " ( G l , 2 9 , 1 0 8 ;
I l l ) . I n t h e a e s t h e t i c s p h e r e . S e t f i r e t o t h . e b e a u t i f u l s o t h a t t h e g o o d w i l l c o m e
b a c k [ t e r e v i e n n e ] a s a g h o s t o u t o f i t s a s h e s . A l l s a c r i f i c e e n t a i l s t h i s s a c r i l e g e .
P a r d o n c a n b e o b t a i n e d o n l y b y t h e a b a n d o n m e n t , t h e b a n i s h m e n t , o f a p r i o r
g i f t , w h i c h m u s t i t s e l f b e i n f i n i t e l y p r e c i o u s . S a c r i f i c e d n a t u r e i s s a c r e d . T h e
s u b l i m e i n t e r e s t e v o k e s s u c h a s a c r i l e g e . O n e i s t e m p t e d t o s a y : a n o n t o l o g i c a l
s a c r i l e g e . I n a n y c a s e , h e r e , a f a c u l t a t i v e s a c r i l e g e . T h e l a w o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ,
t h e l a w o f t h e l a w , b e a r s d o w n w i t h a l l i t s w e i g h t o n t h e l a w o f p r o d u c t i v e
i m a g i n a t i o n . I t m a k e s u s e o f i t . I t s u b j u g a t e s t h e p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n r i g h t
d o w n t o i t s a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y , i t s p r o p e r a u t o n o m y , i t s h e t e r o -
g e n e i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y . B u t t h i s s e r v i t u d e o f t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n i s " v o l u n t a r y , " v i o l e n t l y i n t e r e s t e d . T h e f a c u l t y o f f r e e f o r m s
" d e p r i v e s i t s e l f o f f r e e d o m , " a n d t h i s , " i n o r d e r t o r e n d e r s e n s i b l e " a l a w w h i c h
i s n o t i t s o w n ( G l , 2 9 , 1 0 6 ; 1 0 9 ) . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n , i n s a c r i f i c i n g i t s e l f , s a c r i -
f i c e s n a t u r e , a e s t h e t i c a l l y s a c r e d , w i t h a v i e w t o e x a l t i n g t h e s a i n t l y l a w .
A s i n a n y s a c r i f i c i a l m e c h a n i s m [ d i s p o s i t i j ] , a c a l c u l a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s i s
i n v o l v e d h e r e , a d i s c o u n t o n f e e l i n g s . A n n u l f a v o r , a n d y o u w i l l h a v e r e s p e c t .
I t a p p e a r s e a s y t o m a k e t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f a
d i a l e c t i c ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e m a s t e r - s l a v e d i a l e c t i c : r e n o u n c e e n j o y m e n t a n d
y o u w i l l h a v e r e c o g n i t i o n ) . T h i s w o u l d i n d e e d b e t h e c a s e i f K a n t l e t h i m s e l f
g o t o t h e p o i n t o f b e c o m i n g H e g e l , i f h e e n v i s a g e d a l a w w h i c h w o u l d b e n e g o -
t i a b l e a t t h e c o s t o f r e n o u n c i n g b e a u t y i n t h e g i f t - f o r - g i f t t h a t o r g a n i z e s d i a l e c -
t i c a l l o g i c a n d g u a r a n t e e s i t s p r o f i t s , i t s - h o w e v e r e t e r n a l l y d e f e r r e d - f i n a l
R e s u l t a t .
B u t q u i t e t o t h e c o n t r a r y , K a n t d e n o u n c e s t h e " b l i n d n e s s " o f t h e
" c h o i c e " o f g o a l a n d h o p e s o f " r e a l i z a t i o n " ( G J , 2 9 , 1 0 8 ; 1 1 2 ) i n v o l v e d i n t h i s
s o r t o f e c o n o m y o f t h e w o r s t [ e c o n o m i e d u p i r e ] o r o f t h e m o r e t h r o u g h l e s s ,
t h i s t r a n s p o r t i n t e r e s t e d i n d e - n a t u r a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h h e c a l l s " e n t h u s i a s m "
( a l t h o u g h i t a l s o h a s v a r i o u s b r o t h e r s ) . B e i n g a " v i g o r o u s a f f e c t , " a v i o l e n c e o f
f e e l i n g , t h e s u b l i m e " c a n n o t i n a n y w a y s e r v e t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f r e a s o n " ( G I ,
29, 109; 113). This "use" thus remains useless, without ethical use. The law
does not allow itself to be bent by the consumption of forms. For the law
unequivocally demands mere respect, a pure disinterested obedience. It has
no need of heroic demonstrations. Respect is not something to be obtained,
not even by mortification of the flesh. It is an immediate reverence. It is one
thing that this veneration should produce as one of its effects, as I have said,
humiliation of amour-propre. But it would be quite another if this sacrifice of
the ego or of imaginative forms were the condition of respect. Respect takes
place without condition; it is "morality itself, considered ... as motive" in the
empirical subject (CPrR, 89; 78). It cannot be acquired, even at the cost of all
nature. No more than the law, respect cannot be the object of trade, even expi-
atory trade.
And especially transcendental trade. I mean: above all, if the trade
implies that one power of the mind "yields" to another, for example, the fac-
ulty of formal presentation to the faculty of being obligated by the law. And
"yields" not merely domination over a given field of extension but its very
conditions of possibility, its autonomy-in this case, the freedom of its pre-
sentational activity and its disinterestedness. This surrender, this rendering of
accounts to reason, doesn't merely overthrow the specific functioning of
imagination. It disorganizes also the very principle of practical reason, which
is precisely the unconditional character of the law and of the respect due it.
The general economy of all the faculties is thereby dislocated.
The second Critique uses the word Frevel (CPrR, 135; 126) to designate
this radical concession, this subjugation of one faculty to another, which
entails also the disorganization of the other-in this case, the always threaten-
ing subordination of practical to speculative reason, "the reversal of order."
Frevel signifies a crime of impiety, a sacrilege. There is something frevelhaft
about the sublime. Or to put it differently, respect, according to its pure ideal,
which is the bright side of the law, cannot in any way enter into the calculation
of profits and discount sales of an economy of sacrifice. It arises from a
noneconomy which would be the regime of saintliness. Its dark side, the loss it
entails, is due to the fact that the empirical subject is not saintly but finite. But
it remains the case that the sacrifice of this finitude cannot buy saintliness.
Practical reason could never be "satisfied" at the cost of this transcendental
madness.
In short, enthusiasm is not pious. It is the profane (if not profaning)
way-and thus the aporetic way-of gaining access to piety. The internal con-
flict by which it is shaken pits the motif of the sacred against the motif of the
saint. But I said that it has brothers-an entire generation of other sublime
individuals. I cannot detail here the whole collection, even those Kant enumer-
ates: "anger," "rebellious despair," self-involvement, "sadness," "chagrin" (Cf,
29, 109; 113 and 29, 112; 116-17), "inaccessability [of the soul] to danger"
(28, 100-1; 102), "humility," the upright and free "admiration" of God {28,
1 0 1 - 2 ; 1 0 3 ) , w i t h o u t f o r g e t t i n g " d u t y , s u b l i m e a n d g r e a t n a m e " ( C P r R , 9 8 : 8 9 ) .
I t w o u l d n o t b e i m p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h a s o r t o f p e r i o d i c c h a r t o f t h e s e s u b l i m e
i n d i v i d u a l s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e g r e e o f " s a c r i f i c e " e a c h o f f e r s . I t i s n e a r l y z e r o i n
r e s p e c t , o b v i o u s l y , w h e r e t h e h u m i l i a t i o n o f t h e e g o i s a m e r e s h a d o w c a s t o n a
f i n i t e w i l l b y t h e l i g h t o f t h e l a w . I t w o u l d b r i n g t h e m i n d t o t h e l i m i t s o f " m a d -
n e s s " ( C I , 2 9 , I l l : 1 1 6 ) , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n r a d i c a l l y n e g a t i v e a f f e c t s s u c h a s
" r e b e l l i o u s d e s p a i r " o r t h a t n e a r l y " m i s a n t h r o p i c c h a g r i n " i n s p i r e d b y t h e e v i l s
o f l i f e w h i c h h u m a n s i m p o s e u p o n e a c h o t h e r t h r o u g h t h e i r " p u e r i l i t y " ( 2 9 ,
1 1 2 : 1 1 6 - 1 7 ) . I n t h e f a c e o f s u c h v a r i e t y , t h e d e m o n o f a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l t a x o n -
o m y n e a r l y r e g a i n s p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e c r i t i c a l s p i r i t , a n d i n d e e d , t h i s d e m o n h a d
o p e n e d t h e w a y t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e , i f s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t l y , i n t h e
O b s e r v a t i o n s o f 1 7 6 4 - 6 6 . N o n e t h e l e s s , i n t h e c a t a l o g u e o f s u b l i m e c h i l d r e n , t h e
s p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e t h a t u n i t e s t h e m c a n b e d e m a n d e d o f e a c h : t h a t i t s h o u l d b e
a " v i g o r o u s a f f e c t " ( 2 9 , 1 0 9 : 1 1 3 ) . R e a d : s a c r i f i c i a l , s o m e m o r e , s o m e l e s s .
N o n e ( e x c e p t r e s p e c t f o r t h e l a w ) i s e t h i c a l l y v a l i d . A n d a s " a e s t h e t i c , " t h e y a r e
a l l s u s p e c t o f b e i n g i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e ( n e g a t i v e ) u s e t h e y m a k e o f n a t u r a l f o r m s .
" T h e t h e o r y o f t h e s u b l i m e , " o f a l l s u b l i m i t i e s , r e m a i n s t h u s " a m e r e a p p e n d i x
t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t o f n a t u r a l p u r p o s i v e n e s s " ( 2 3 , 8 6 :
8 4 - 8 5 ) . O n e x - r a y s t h e r e t h e b a s t a r d s b o r n o f a s u d d e n i n f a t u a t i o n [ c o u p d e
f o u d r e ] o f n a t u r e w i t h o r b y t h e l a w .
I t r e m a i n s t o e x a m i n e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s d i s a s t e r f o r t h e u n i t y o f
t h e s u b j e c t a n d f o r t h e c o m m u n i t y o f ( a e s t h e t i c ) f e e l i n g .
Chapter 6
~
THE GIFT OF THE WORLD
Jacob Rogozinski
Passage
Under what conditions is a thought of the sublime possible? How does the
thought of the sublime in Kant's Critique of Judgment relate to these conditions?l
This question cannot be reduced to its "aesthetic" dimension. The third Critique
is not a philosophy of art arbitrarily attached to a philosophy oflife. In seeking to
locate a transcendental principle of the faculty of judgment, Kant is in quest of a
passage. He is in quest of that "bridge over the abyss" which "renders possible
the passage (Obergang) from pure theoretical reason to pure practical reason,"
from the domain of nature to the domain of freedom (11,25; 12). This quest pre-
supposes that nature is itself sufficiently organized, sufficiently purposive to
allow the regulation of the supersensible to be inscribed within it. Guided by the
principle of a natural purposiveness, the faculty of reflexive judgment orients
itself toward the passage in question by discovering the traces of order in the dis-
order of the world, a quasi legality in the contingency of phenomena. This fac-
ulty permits us to think what Kant calls, enigmatically, "the unity of the super-
sensible substratum" (11,25; 12). The concept of this unity is a liminal concept,
theoretically indeterminate, which designates "the point of union [den Vereini-
gungspunkt] of all of our a priori faculties" (57, 165; 187), the unknown root of
our modes of openness to Being. It resides "within us as well as without" (IX, 42;
33), doubtless because it is situated this side of all demarcation of an inside and
an outside, of a "subject" and an "object." And this unitary accord of our "facul-
ties"-of the different capacities or powers of opening-ties the radical knots at
once of the world and of the living community which accords in the under-
standing of this world.
2
In this sense, the third Critique is interested in beauty-
or more precisely, in the beautiful and the sublime of art and nature-only to
the extent that aesthetic judgment holds the promise of passage.
133
1 3 4 J A C O B R O G O Z I N S K I
O n f i r s t v i e w , n o t h i n g c o u l d a p p e a r m o r e c l a s s i c a l t h a n t h i s p r o c e d u r e ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e - - i n t h e s t r i c t s e n s e , m e t a - p h y s i c a l - p r i v i l e g e i t c o n f e r s u p o n
b e a u t y . F o r i s n o t b e a u t y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e P h a e d r u s t h e o n l y I d e a t h a t s t i l l
g l o w s w i t h i t s o r i g i n a l b r i g h t n e s s i n t h e o t h e r w i s e d a r k r e a l m o f a p p e a r a n c e s ,
t h e o n l y I d e a t h a t c a n a m o r o u s l y t r a n s p o r t u s b e y o n d t h e r e a l m o f t h e s e n s i -
b l e ? O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t i s n o t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t m a i n -
t a i n s t h e b e a u t i f u l i n i t s a n c i e n t p r i o r i t y . I n d e e d , n o t t h e b e a u t i f u l , b u t t h e
s u b l i m e w i l l l e a d t o t h e p o i n t o f p a s s a g e . W h e r e a s t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e b e a u t i f u l
a r i s e s m e r e l y o u t o f t h e p l a y o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d
c o n c e r n s o n l y t h e f i n i t e f o r m s o f p h e n o m e n a , i n t h e s u b l i m e t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
s t r u g g l e s w i t h r e a s o n i t s e l f , t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d , w h i c h " e x t e n d s "
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d o p e n s i t u p t o t h e i n f i n i t u d e o f t h e I d e a s . I t s e f f o r t
" o b l i g e s u s t o t h i n k n a t u r e i t s e l f i n i t s t o t a l i t y a s t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g
s u p e r s e n s i b l e " ( 2 9 , 1 0 5 : 1 0 8 ) . W e h a v e t o d o h e r e w i t h a p r e s e n t a t i o n " w h i c h
r e n d e r s s o t o s p e a k i n t u i t a b l e [ a n s c h a u l i c h l t h e s u p r e m a c y o f o u r r a t i o n a l d e s -
t i n y " ( 2 7 , 9 6 : 9 6 ) . H o w i s o n e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s q u a s i i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s u p e r -
s e n s i b l e ? A s i s w e l l k n o w n , t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t w o m o d e s
o f D a r s t e l l u n g ( " p r e s e n t a t i o n " ) , t h e s c h e m a , w h i c h d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t s a c o n c e p t
i n i n t u i t i o n , a n d t h e s y m b o l , w h i c h o p e r a t e s i n d i r e c t l y " b y t h e m e d i a t i o n o f a n
a n a l o g y " ( 5 9 , 1 7 4 : 1 9 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o K a n t i a n d o c t r i n e , n o s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n
c a n b e a d e q u a t e t o t h e I d e a s o f r e a s o n , w h i c h c a n o n l y b e e v o k e d b y m e a n s o f
s y m b o l s . B e a u t y i n a r t a n d n a t u r e - - t h e " c i p h e r e d l a n g u a g e " o f b e a u t i f u l
f o r m s - h a s b y v i r t u e o f i t s s y m b o l i c s i g n i f i c a n c e t h e v a l u e p r e c i s e l y o f a n
a n a l o g y o f m o r a l i t y . T h e f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f a n a l o g y i s s u c h t h a t i t a l w a y s
m a i n t a i n s a n i r r e d u c i b l e g a p b e t w e e n t h e t e r m s b e t w e e n w h i c h i t e s t a b l i s h e s a
r e l a t i o n . I f b e a u t y i s u n d e r s t o o d - i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n - a s a l l e -
g o r y o r s y m b o l , i f i t r e f l e c t s i n t h e s e n s i b l e t h e d i s t a n t g l o w o f t h e G o o d , i t g l i t -
t e r s o n l y w i t h a b o r r o w e d b r i l l i a n c e , a n d t h e w o r k i s b e a u t i f u l i n s o f a r a s i t s i g -
n i f i e s a t a d i s t a n c e w h a t i t i s n o t a n d c a n n o t a t t a i n . B y e r e c t i n g t h e b e a u t i f u l
i n t o a s y m b o l o f t h e G o o d , o n e r e - o p e n s t h e a b y s s i n t h e v e r y g e s t u r e t h r o u g h
w h i c h o n e c l a i m s t o s u r m o u n t i t . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e " C r i t i q u e o f t h e F a c u l t y o f
A e s t h e t i c J u d g m e n t " c u l m i n a t e s i n p r i v i l e g i n g t h e s y m b o l i s m o f t h e b e a u t i f u l
a s a " p a s s a g e f r o m s e n s i b l e a t t r a c t i o n t o m o r a l i n t e r e s t " ( 5 9 , 1 7 6 ; 2 0 0 ) t e n d s
t o p r o v e t h e f a i l u r e o f i t s p r o j e c t .
H o w c o u l d t h e s u b l i m e m a n i f e s t t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e d i r e c t l y , w i t h o u t
r e c o u r s e t o t h e m e d i a t i o n o f t h e s y m b o l ? T h e s c h e m a t i s m i s t h e " d i r e c t p r e -
s e n t a t i o n " o f a c o n c e p t o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t s t r a n s p o s i t i o n i n t o s e n s i b l e
i n t u i t i o n w i t h t h e a i d o f a n i n t e r m e d i a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n .
H o w e v e r , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e c o m -
m o n r o o t o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s e n s i b i l i t y : t h e o n l y r e a s o n w h y i t c a n s u c -
c e e d i n p a s s i n g f r o m t h e o n e t o t h e o t h e r , i n u n i f y i n g t h e m i n t h e s c h e m a , i s
b e c a u s e i t a l r e a d y c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e i r h i d d e n u n i t y . T h e t r u t h o f t h e
p a s s a g e w o u l d b e t h i s : t h a t i t d o e s n o t " p a s s " b e t w e e n t w o h e t e r o g e n e o u s
The Gift of the World 135
orders while maintaining their separation but rather reduces them to their
prior unity, where they join one another like two sides of the same coin, or like
the slopes of a single relief. If the sublime provides the site of a passage, it
ought to provide this site as schema and not as symbol. And Kant does some-
times describe the sublime in terms of schematism. Thus, poetry is that art,
most sublime of all, which in "aesthetically elevating itself to the level of the
Ideas," makes us consider nature "so to speak as the schema of the super-sen-
sible" (53, 154; 171). Such formulations remain, however, both rare and allu-
sive. If the schematization of the sublime is the road that leads to the passage,
one can say that Kant took a different road.
Doubtless he did so because the sublime is opposed to the fundamental
traits of the transcendental schematism. As the work of imagination, the
schema is a Bilden. a placing in view and an imposition of form. It is a pure
power of figuration, which presents to the view the horizon whereon the visi-
ble appears. For the sensible is chaos, a dynamic melee of sensations where no
figure traces itself out, no figure demarcates its outline against other possible
figures. The schematism, as Nietzsche will remember, is called upon to give
form to this chaos. to impose upon it a stable order. The imprint of the
schema marks off a field within the profusion of the possible, determining
there a unique mode of appearance, and it is only thus that a finite figure can
appear and fix itself as it emerges from the infinity of possibilities. What allows
the imagination to schematize, to delimit a field and to bind together what is
diverse. are the forms it sketches. Form, says Kant, is not merely Gestalt; it does
not designate the arrested contour of a figure but the movement of its figura-
tion, the tracing of its limit, the unification of its diversity. This in-formation
of what is formless in finitude is what is most beautiful: it is beauty itself,
where the imagination exults in the organization of chaos. The aesthetic
schematization of beauty would be then the originary schematism of the
imagination: functioning before all conceptualization and all representation
of objects. its figurative power here figures itself in the self-affection of a sub-
ject, a tiny all-too-human god, whom it pleases to give form to the world.
Complacencies of the play of pretty forms: these comprise our cheap thrills
[notre bon plaisirj, the ultimate ideal of a time abandoned by Ideas and gods.
This sovereign exultation of the subject interrupts itself only at the
moment of the sublime. Whereas beauty "concerns the form of the object,
that is. its limitation." the feeling of the sublime seizes us in the presence of "a
formless object to the extent that the unlimited here represents itself' (23, 84;
82). This is the feeling of unlimitation. or rather of de-limitation, born of the
subversion, the sub-limation of a limit. as phenomenal forms disfigure them-
selves and the organization of the sensible undoes itself and it returns to its
primal indistinction. And it is "in its chaos or in its disorder [Unordnungj, in
its most wild and unruly devastation [Verwustungj that nature best arouses
the Ideas of the sublime" (23, 86; 84). In liberating the powers of chaos, it de-
s c h e m a t i z e s t h e s e n s i b l e , d e s t r o y s t h e w o r k o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . I f t h e h a r m o -
n i o u s o r d e r o f b e a u t y a n d l i f e b e a r w i t n e s s t o a q u a s i p u r p o s i v e n e s s , i t i s c o m -
p r e h e n s i b l e t h a t t h e s u b l i m e w i l l i n t u r n " a p p e a r t o v i o l a t e p u r p o s e [ t o b e
z w e c k w i d r i g ] i n r e s p e c t o f t h e f a c u l t y o f j u d g m e n t " ( 2 3 , 8 5 ; 8 3 ) . I n t h e p r o b -
l e m a t i c o f t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e p a s s a g e t o t h e s u p e r -
s e n s i b l e i s g r o u n d e d p r e c i s e l y i n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f n a t u r e .
T h e c o u n t e r - p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f t h e s u b l i m e a p p e a r s t o f o r b i d a n y a c c o r d
b e t w e e n n a t u r e . a n d t h e f a c u l t y o f j u d g m e n t ; i t s u p p o r t s t h e d i s q u i e t i n g
h y p o t h e s i s o f a " c h a o t i c a g g r e g a t e " o f p h e n o m e n a , o f a " s t e p - m o t h e r n a t u r e "
[ s t i e f m u t t e r l i c h 1 w h o w o u l d n o l o n g e r a l l o w h e r s e l f t o b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e
L a w o f f r e e d o m . ' I t t h u s t e n d s t o r u i n t h e c h a n c e s o f p a s s a g e , t h e p r o m i s e o f a
r e c o n c i l e d c o m m u n i t y .
A t t h e m o m e n t w h e n i t i s t a k i n g u s c l o s e s t t o t h e p a s s a g e , t h e s u b l i m e
v i o l e n t l y t e a r s u s a w a y . W h a t w a s s u p p o s e d t o b e t h e c e n t e r o f t h e t h i r d C r i -
t i q u e w i l l h a v e b e e n n o t h i n g b u t a n i n s i g n i f i c a n t a p p e n d i x . B u t p e r h a p s t h i s i s
o n l y a n a p p e a r a n c e . I f t h e s u b l i m e w e r e n o t h i n g b u t d i s o r d e r a n d i n s a n e d e v -
a s t a t i o n , i t w o u l d p r o v o k e o n l y f e a r o r h o r r o r a n d t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p a i n
w h i c h i s i n d u c e d b y t h e a b s e n c e o f p u r p o s i v e n e s s . B u t " t h e s u b l i m e p l e a s e s " :
t h e a f f l i c t e d j o y t h a t i t a w a k e n s i s s u p p o s e d t o b e t h e i n d e x o f a h i d d e n p u r p o -
s i v e n e s s . T h e t a s k o f t h e a n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e w i l l b e t o e x p o s e t h i s p u r p o -
s i v e n e s s o f c o u n t e r - p u r p o s i v e n e s s , t o d e l i v e r i t s l a t e n t f o r m a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e
f o r m l e s s . M o r e o v e r , i n o r d e r t o b e j u d g e d s u b l i m e , a p h e n o m e n o n m u s t n o t
b e a b s o l u t e l y d e p r i v e d o f f o r m : t o t h e n o n l i m i t a t i o n t h a t d i s f i g u r e s i t m u s t b e
" a d d e d b y t h o u g h t t h e n o t i o n o f i t s t o t a l i t y " ( 2 3 , 8 4 ; 8 2 ) . T h e c a t e g o r y o f
t o t a l i t y d e s i g n a t e s f o r K a n t " p l u r a l i t y c o n s i d e r e d a s u n i t y " ( C P R , 9 7 ; 1 1 6 ) .
W h a t c o u l d t h i s f u n c t i o n o f u n i t y b e i n t h e c a s e o f t h e s u b l i m e ? W h a t b o n d s
w o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t l y p o w e r f u l t o c o n t a i n c h a o s , t o r e d u c e i t t o t h e o n e i n t h e
v e r y m o v e m e n t o f i t s u n b i n d i n g ? T h e r e m u s t b e s o m e s u c h b o n d s , f o r i f t h e r e
w e r e n o t , i f t h e o b j e c t c o u l d n o t b e " c o m p r e h e n d e d a s a w h o l e , " t h e l e a s t t r a c e
o f p u r p o s i v e n e s s w o u l d d i s a p p e a r . T h e p h e n o m e n o n w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e s u b -
l i m e , b u t " m o n s t r o u s " ( u n g e h e u e r ) ( 2 6 , 9 2 ; 9 1 ) . A p r e c a r i o u s d e m a r c a t i o n
i n d e e d , f o r s u b l i m i t y r a i s e s i t s e l f " t o t h e l i m i t o f t h e m o n s t r o u s , " j u s t t h i s s i d e
o f h o r r o r , a n d i s a l w a y s o n t h e p o i n t o f d i s a p p e a r i n g i n t o i t . 4 T h e s a m e m o v e -
m e n t o f d i s f i g u r a t i o n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s u b l i m e f r o m b e a u t i f u l f o r m s
a l w a y s c a r r i e s t h e s u b l i m e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e f o r m e d o r f o r m l e s s . I t
m u s t , h o w e v e r , e s t a b l i s h a b o r d e r b e t w e e n i t s e l f a n d m o n s t r o s i t y : w h a t i s a t
s t a k e h e r e i s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t - t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f j u d g -
m e n t i t s e l f - t h a t t h e s u b l i m e s h o u l d h a v e a b o u t i t " n o t h i n g o f t h e m o n -
s t r o u s . . . o r o f t h e h i d e o u s " ( 2 6 , 9 2 ; 9 1 ) , t h a t i t s h o u l d p r e s e r v e t h e o u t l i n e o f
a f o r m o n t h e v e r g e o f c h a o s . A s t r a n g e f o r m . w i t h o u t f i g u r e . w h i c h g i v e s i t s e l f
o n l y i n d e f o r m i n g i t s e l f a n d w h i c h i s p e r h a p s t h e p u r e s t o f f o r m s . t h e s e c r e t
a r m a t u r e o f t h e s e n s i b l e . T h e a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e s u b l i m e w i l l t h u s p e r m i t t h e
d i s c o v e r y o f a n o r d e r h i d d e n b e n e a t h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f c h a o s . T h e s a v a g e
anarchy of phenomena will be paradoxically the surest index of a super-sensi-
ble order. It will have been necessary for the texture of appearances to tear, for
the world to be delivered up to devastation, in order that an aesthetics of the
sublime should signal the opening of the passage.
But do we know at all what is aesthetically sublime? In positing that "the,
authentic sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form" (23, 85; 83-84),
Kant forbids us at the outset to search for examples of it in nature or art. It is
only by means of a "subreption," a paralogism of aesthetic judgment, that we
call works of art and landscapes "sublime," that we consider a mere disposi-
tion of our faculty of judgment to be a real quality of the object. Nothing is
sublime in this world. It does, however, happen that this feeling overtakes us:
doubtless because the sublime is precisely what happens, the pure occurrence
of the event. Despite everything, Kant will not have hesitated, at least once, to
perform what he forbids, namely, to designate a "work" as sublime, that is, as
the most sublime. Even if it is in the detour of a furtive footnote, supplemen-
tarily: "One has perhaps never said anything more sublime or expressed a
thought in more sublime fashion than in the inscription on the temple of Isis
(mother Nature): 'I am all that is, that was, and that will be, and no mortal has
lifted my veil'" (49, 146n; 160n). What is so sublime about this veiled figure?
Is it the veil which covers it and its impossible unveiling-the metaphor of a
truth which reveals itself only in the concealing movement of a primary opac-
ity, which no mortal would know how to render transparent? An entire epoch,
before Kant and after him, allowed itself to be captivated by the enigma of the
veiled goddess, desiring to pierce the mystery, to pass beyond the veil, to dis-
cover there, according to the different versions, horror (this would be
Rousseau's version), death, or the mirror, the pure act of mirroring itself and
speculating on itself (this would be, after Novalis, Hegel's version).
As careful as he was to avoid_all the mystic "revelation," to respect the
reserve of the secret, it seems that Kant will not have been able to prevent him-
self from lifting the veil in his manner, from exposing what "Isis" means. In
the Critique, she symbolizes Nature, the totality of phenomena in space and
time. She presents herself as the unity of the infinite All in the three dimen-
sions of time-"all that is, that was and that will be"-which escapes the
clutches of a "mortal" or finite spirit. The impossible figuration of this All, or
its figuration as nonfigurable, gives birth to sublime feeling. What could be the
relation of the sublime to the infinity of nature? The veiled idol reappears
some years later, in the text, Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton
in der Philosophie, a polemical text in which Kant takes to task enthusiasts who
dream of denuding Isis, or rather, thanks to a "mystical tact," of "intimating"
her presence behind the veil. This Schwiirmerei is the delirium of metaphysics,
insofar as, since Plato, it has attempted to know the super-sensible, to embrace
the absolute totality in an intuition. However, at the end of this text of 1796,
the signification of the sublime figure seems to have changed: "The veiled god-
d e s s b e f o r e w h i c h . . . w e g o d o w n o n o u r k n e e s i s t h e m o r a l l a w w i t h i n u s . " s
T h a t w h i c h , i n t h e C r i t i q u e , r e p r e s e n t e d M o t h e r N a t u r e , h a s s u d d e n l y b e c o m e
a n a e s t h e t i c f i g u r a t i o n o f t h e L a w " i n i t s s u b l i m i t y a n d i t s i m p e n e t r a b l e m y s "
t e r y . " H o w h a v e w e p a s s e d f r o m s e n s i b l e n a t u r e t o a l a w o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e ,
f r o m a n I d e a o f s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s o n t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ? I s
i h i s a m e r e i n c o n s i s t e n c y , t h e e q u i v o c a l s e n s e o f a n a l l e g o r y , o r r a t h e r t h e s i g n
t h a t t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e s i t e o f t h e p a s s a g e ? A n d t h a t i t h a s t o d o , i n i t s e s s e n t i a l
s t r u c t u r e , w i t h t h e v e i l i n g o f t r u t h a n d w i t h t h e t r u t h o f t h e v e i l ? T h e a e s t h e t i c
I d e a o f t h e v e i l e d I s i s w o u l d t h e n d e s i g n a t e t h e j u n c t i o n o f t w o w o r l d s , a n d
t h i s b r i d g e a c r o s s t h e a b y s s w o u l d b e t h e m o s t s u b l i m e t h i n g o f a l l . I n w h a t
s e n s e d o e s s u b l i m i t y a s s u r e t h i s p a s s a g e ? H o w c a n i t g i v e u s , o n t h e e d g e o f t h e
s e n s i b l e r e a l m i t s e l f , a s c h e m a o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e ?
V i o l e n c e s
T h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e c o m e s f r o m a n " e f f o r t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n t o t r e a t
n a t u r e a s a s c h e m a " f o r t h e I d e a s . H e r e i n r e s i d e s " t h a t w h i c h i s t e r r i b l e t o s e n -
s i b i l i t y a n d y e t i s a t t r a c t i v e . [ I t i s a t t r a c t i v e ] b e c a u s e r e a s o n v i o l e n t l y e x e r c i s e s
[ e i n e G e w a l t . . . a u s u b t ] i t s p o w e r o v e r t h e s e n s i b i l i t y , t o t h e s o l e e n d o f e x t e n d -
i n g t h i s s e n s i b i l i t y i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h i t s p r o p e r r e a l m ( w h i c h i s p r a c t i c a l ) a n d
o f m a k i n g i t l o o k o u t i n t o t h e i n f i n i t e w h i c h i s f o r i t a n a b y s s " ( 2 9 , 1 0 2 ;
1 0 4 - 5 ) . T h e s c h e m a t i s m o f t h e s u b l i m e p r e s u p p o s e s a n " e x t r e m e t e n s i o n " o f
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , w h i c h a w a k e n s i n u s a c o n t r a d i c t o r y e m o t i o n w h e r e a t t r a c -
t i o n m i x e s w i t h f r i g h t . T h i s d o u b l e a f f e c t r e v e a l s t h e " v i o l e n c e " o f r e a s o n i n i t s
e f f o r t s t o " e x t e n d " s e n s i b i l i t y t o i n f i n i t y , t o o p e n i t o n t o t h e a b y s s o f t h e I d e a s .
H o w d o e s t h i s v i o l e n t o p e n i n g p u t u s i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e i n f i n i t e a n d w h a t
d o e s t h i s " p r a c t i c a l " i n f i n i t y s i g n i f y ? W h y d o e s t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e
i m p l y a s o r t o f o s c i l l a t i o n , a " r a p i d s u c c e s s i o n o f r e p u l s i o n a n d a t t r a c t i o n b y
t h e s a m e o b j e c t ? " ( 2 7 , 9 7 ; 9 7 ) .
I t i s a m a t t e r o f a d o u b l e m o v e m e n t o f w h i c h t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n r e s o n a t e s
a l o n g t h e f l e s h , o f a d y n a m i c a l t e r n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n h i b i t i o n o f t h e " v i t a l
f o r c e s " a n d t h e i r s u d d e n e x p a n s i o n - a " n e g a t i v e p l e a s u r e " m i x e d o f j o y a n d
p a i n . K a n t m a k e s i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e s e t w o a f f e c t s a r e q u a s i s i m u l t a n e o u s :
w h a t i s f r i g h t e n i n g i s " a t t h e s a m e t i m e " ( z u g l e i c h ) a t t r a c t i v e , a s i f t h e a t t r a c -
t i o n o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e c o n t a i n e d i t s f r i g h t e n i n g a s p e c t , a s i f i t s f r i g h t e n i n g
a b y s s d i d n o t c e a s e n o n e t h e l e s s t o f a s c i n a t e . S u b l i m i t y a r i s e s t h e r e t o o a t t h e
l i m i t , b e t w e e n t h e p l e a s u r e t h a t b e a u t y i n s p i r e s a n d t h e r e p u l s i o n o f t h e m o n -
s t r o u s , i n a n a m b i g u o u s p e r s p e c t i v e w h e r e t h e u n f o l d i n g o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i s c o m p l i c a t e d b y a r e f l u x o r a f o l d i n g b a c k o n t o i t s e l f , i n
s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h i s r e t r a c i n g o f i t s s t e p s i n s c r i b e s i t s e l f a l r e a d y i n t h e i n i -
t i a l i m p u l s e , a s t h e t r a c e o f a f l e x i o n t h a t a r r e s t s i t , c u r v e s i t b a c k , a n d r e t u r n s
i t a g a i n s t i t s e l f . D o u b t l e s s t h i s g e s t u r e d o e s n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e o n l y t h e t r a j e c t o r y
of the imagination in the sublime event: one might even say that it defines the
transcendental imagination in its essential structure.
In fact. Heidegger describes the transcendental synthesis of the imagina-
tion-the very movement of transcendence-as an ec-static self-affection. a
looking-away which looks back toward itself.6 It is the opening to the world.
the initial orientation that forms the horizon within which the being [l'etant]
comes to appear. within which it appears to us as object. As a finite-receptive
and sensible-transcendence. it requires a sensible transposition of the hori-
zon. the transcendental schematism of the imagination. in order to make
objective knowledge possible. But the character of objectivity. this consistent
ob-jection which opposes itself. does not come from the being as such: it must
be pre-formed within the horizon of transcendence. must offer itself to this
transcendence like a resistance this transcendence imposes upon itself. It is
this trait of ob-jection that Kant calls the transcendental object = X: that
which is found or finds itself posed over-there or "over-against" (Dawider)
(cf. CPR. 117; 134)-the across-from. the unknown from beyond. which is
nothing but permits the constitution of the being in its Being. As the offering
of a limit. of a pure form where transcendence inflects itself and links itself
freely. Dawider is one of the first names of Being. That is to say. it is one of the
first names of time. for the objectivating opposition is a self-objectivation.
where "the subjective ob-jects itself to the subject as the objective."7 It is an
encounter of its limits with its limits. and time. the form of the inner sense. is
"the manner in which the spirit is affected by its own activity' (CPR. 72; 87)-
the chiasmus of auto-affection. One will thus. it seems. be obliged to conclude
with Heidegger that "the transcendental imagination is originary time" and
constitutes the essence of finite subjectivity.
As is well known. the Heideggerian interpretation treats only the first
Critique. This interpretation appears to be confirmed. however. in the Critique
of Judgment, by the eminent role that the "Analytic of the Beautiful" confers
on the productive imagination and also by the structure of reversed intention-
ality that the "Analytic of the Sublime" attributes to it. But perhaps we are
allowing ourselves to be misled by a superficial resemblance. Perhaps the dou-
ble movement of the aesthetic imagination does not correspond to the auto-
affection of transcendental imagination. Or perhaps. if that double movement
is rooted in ecstatic transcendence. it raises this transcendence to the highest
power. up to the point where this transcendence comes undone.
In the emotion of the sublime. one experiences "the feeling of the impo-
tence of the imagination for representing the Idea of a whole; in this the imag-
ination attains its maximum and. in the effort to exceed it. collapses into the
abyss of itself' (26. 91; 91). In its objectivating intention. the imagination.
respecting its limits. folds itself back on itself in the halt that it haltingly
imposes on itself. In its sublime excess. it trangresses its maximum. passes to
the limit. unlimits itself infinitely. Is what it encounters at infinity. where it
b r e a k s a n d c o m e s u n d o n e , s t i l l t h e s a m e D a w i d e r , t h e f i n i t e B e i n g o r t h e
B e i n g - f i n i t e o f f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y ? M u s t n o t a t h o u g h t o f o r i g i n a r y f i n i -
t u d e i n p r i n c i p l e r e v o k e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n o p e n i n g o n t o t h e i n f i n i t e ?
I n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l s y n t h e s i s d e s c r i b e d b y H e i d e g g e r , t h e p r o j e c t o f t r a n -
s c e n d e n c e o b - j e c t s t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e w o r l d t o i t s e l f o n l y i n o r d e r t o r e t u r n t o
i t s e l f a s s u b j e c t . I n f a c t , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n h a r d l y d e p a r t s f r o m t h e c i r c l e o f i t s
a u t o - a f f e c t i o n , r e c e i v e s n o t h i n g t h a t i t h a s n o t a l r e a d y p r e - f o r m e d : i t n e v e r
t r u l y e x p o s e s i t s e l f . I n c o n t r a s t , s u b l i m i t y s c a t t e r s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o r s e t s i t t o
f l i g h t ; b r o k e n a n d p o w e r l e s s , i t r e c e d e s i n t o i t s e l f a n d t h i s e b b i s a f a i l u r e a n d a
c o l l a p s e . T h u s , t h e s u b l i m e a w a k e n s i n u s t h e " f e e l i n g o f a d e s t i n y t h a t e x c e e d s
c o m p l e t e l y t h e d o m a i n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . " H o w i s o n e t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s
d e c l i n e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ? D o e s t h e " A n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e " r e m a i n c a u g h t
i n t h e r e c o i l o f K a n t ' s t h o u g h t , t h e p a n i c k e d r e t r e a t b e f o r e t h e a b y s s o f t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r t h o u g h t h e c o u l d r e a d i n t h e l a t e K a n t , b e g i n -
n i n g w i t h t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f t h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n ? O r c o u l d i t b e t h a t
t h e " A n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e " d i s c o v e r s t o u s a n o t h e r a b y s s , u n e x p l o r e d b y t h e
f i r s t C r i t i q u e , a m o r e r a d i c a l d i m e n s i o n - t h a t o f t h e u n - i m a g i n a b l e ?
I n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A n a l y t i c , " a f a i l u r e o f t h e i m a g i -
n a t i o n w o u l d b e i n c o n c e i v a b l e . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e f a c u l t y o f s y n t h e s i s ,
w h i c h c o l l e c t s t h e m a n i f o l d a n d u n i f i e s i t ; t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h a t " i n d i s p e n s -
a b l e f u n c t i o n " o f t h e m i n d " w i t h o u t w h i c h w e c o u l d n e v e r a n d n o w h e r e h a v e
a n y k n o w l e d g e " ( C P R , 9 3 ; 1 1 2 ) . A c t u a l l y , i t i s n o t m e r e l y k n o w l e d g e , b u t
a l r e a d y s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n , t h e a p p e a r i n g o f p h e n o m e n a , t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s a
" p r e l i m i n a r y s y n t h e s i s , " a u n i f y i n g c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e m a n i f o l d . T h e e l e m e n t
o f t h i s s y n t h e s i s c o u l d o n l y b e t h e p u r e f o r m o f t i m e , w h e r e i n e v e r y s e n s i b l e f i g -
u r e t a k e s o n f o r m . I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r c a n g o s o f a r a s t o i d e n t i f y t h e t h r e e
e c s t a s e s o f t e m p o r a l i t y w i t h t h e t r i p l e s y n t h e s i s o f i m a g i n a t i o n . I f t h e l a t t e r
c e a s e d t o p u t . i t s e l f i n t o e f f e c t , t h e u n i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d b e d i s l o c a t e d , t h e
w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a w o u l d b e c o m e " a b l i n d p l a y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h a t i s , l e s s
t h a n a d r e a m " ( C P R , 1 2 6 ; 1 3 9 ) . I t w o u l d b e c o m e a c h a o t i c , u n s t a b l e u n i v e r s e ,
t h e p u r e p l a y o f s i m u l a c r a , t h e p l a y o f t h e l a s t h y p o t h e s e s o f t h e P a r m e n i d e s o r
o f t h e C a r t e s i a n e v i l g e n i u s w h i c h t h e f a m o u s t e x t o n t h e c i n n a b a r e v o k e s o n l y
t o d i s m i s s i t i m m e d i a t e l y . I t i s t h i s d a n g e r t h a t t h e t r i a l o f t h e s u b l i m e a w a k e n s ,
t h i s h a u n t i n g o f c h a o s , o f w h a t i s d i s g u s t i n g l y o u t o f t h i s w o r l d [ d e l ' i m - m o n d e J ,
r e v i v e d b y t h e s p e c t a c l e o f t h e o c e a n u n l e a s h e d , o f t h e " w i l d d i s o r d e r s " o f
n a t u r e . T h e a w a k e n i n g o f t h i s d a n g e r a t t e s t s t o a f a i l u r e - - a t l e a s t a p r o v i s i o n a l
f a i l u r e - o f s y n t h e s i s . A n d a n a e s t h e t i c s o f t h e s u b l i m e w o u l d i n d e e d b e i m p o s -
s i b l e i f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n d i d n o t b r e a k d o w n . W e k n o w , h o w e v e r , t h a t o n p a i n o f
d i s a p p e a r i n g i n t o m o n s t r o s i t y s u b l i m e d e f o r m a t i o n i s n e v e r a b s o l u t e l y f o r m -
l e s s ; i t p r e s e r v e s t h e p l a n o f a f o r m a t t h e l i m i t o f c h a o s . T h e t r a c e o f a f o r m
m a i n t a i n s i t s e l f , t h e n , d e s p i t e t h e f o u n d e r i n g o f i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e o n t o l o g i c a l
s y n t h e s i s i s n o t t h e u l t i m a t e s y n t h e s i s , t h e i n i t i a l b o n d o f t h e w o r l d , a n d t h e
" D e d u c t i o n " o f t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e m u s t a c c o r d i n g l y b e r e c t i f i e d .
What could this radical binding be? If it is more primitive than the tem-
poralizing imagination and survives the ruin of this imagination, what is its
relation to time? Is it not called upon to play in the schematism of the sublime
the same role as the imagination in the schematism of the categories, which
would make of it the faculty of the passage, the bridge over the abyss of the
super-sensible? How should one characterize more precisely the schematiza-
tion of the sublime? Perhaps one has not been sufficiently attentive to a term
that returns several times in Kant's text: violence. Mediated by the imagina-
tion's effort to schematize the Ideas, reason "exercises its violence" on sensi-
bility (29, 102: lOS, and cf. also 29, 108: 112). Kant specifies that "in the aes-
thetic judgment on the sublime this violence [Gewalt] is represented as
exercised by the imagination itself as an instrument of reason ... according to
the principles of the schematism of the faculty of judgment" (29, 106:
109-110). In this extremely elliptical formulation, the entire enigma of the
schematism of the sublime is condensed. It seems that, once defeated and sub-
mitted to reason, the imagination puts its own violence at the service of the
Ideas. In order that it should be able to exercise "by itself' the violence of rea-
son, it must itself already be violent. This is exactly what Kant has affirmed
several pages earlier: the imagination "does violence to the inner sense," and
"makes the subject feel its violence" (27, 97; 98). What does he mean by this?
In what way can it exercise a violence on the inner sense, that is, on time, if it
is identical to time? Kant had never before described in these terms the opera-
tion of imagination, and he would never do so again. These brief notations are
nevertheless the barely sketched beginnings of a new thought of imagination
and temporality. They indicate the point where Kant came closest to formu-
lating the passage of which he was in search.
When one considers this text more closely, a new difficulty presents
itself. Apparently, the violence of the imagination does not suffice to incite the
feeling of the sublime. In effect, the sublime appears "to do violence to the
imagination" (23, 85; 83), as if another violence were required, as if the vio-
lent tension of the imagination provoked or evoked in turn a counterviolence
of reason, which is "the authentic form of the ethical," (29, 106; 109) the
imperative vocation of its Law. Is one to understand by this that the sublime
emotion arises in the confluence of two opposed violences? Or instead, that
there is always only one violence, that of the imagination, which can be turned
against itself?
It would then be necessary to say that, at the call of the Law, the imagina-
tion does itself violence: that in imposing its violence on time, the imagination
violates itself and only ever has to do with itself. The schematization of the sub-
lime would still obey the logic of auto-affection, and the ethical Law itself
would be nothing but a connective modality of the imagination. But is it quite
certain that the imagination encounters nothing beyond itself? According to
Kant, "a force [Macht] is called violence [Gewaltl if it is superior to the resis-
t a n c e o f t h a t w h i c h i t s e l f p o s s e s s e s f o r c e " ( 2 8 , 9 8 ; 9 9 ) . T h e d y n a m i c s u b l i m e i s
t h i s m o d a l i t y o f t h e s u b l i m e t h a t " m a k e s [ u s 1 d i s c o v e r i n o u r s e l v e s a p o w e r o f
r e s i s t a n c e o f a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d , " c a p a b l e o f " m e a s u r i n g i t s e l f a g a i n s t
t h e a p p a r e n t o m n i p o t e n c e o f n a t u r e , " t h a t i s , o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a -
t i o n w h o s e s y n t h e s i s f o r m a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s n a t u r e . W h a t i s t h i s s u p e r - s e n s u o u s
f o r c e t h e r e s i s t a n c e o f w h i c h b r e a k s t h e p o w e r o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ? I s i t t h e
m o r a l L a w ? A n d h o w c a n i t c o u n t e r t h e v i o l e n t p r e s s u r e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ?
D o u b t l e s s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n c o u l d n o t f r a c t u r e a n d c o l l a p s e i n t o r u i n i f i t
w e r e n o t a l r e a d y d i v i d e d , a t o d d s o r i n c o n f l i c t w i t h i t s e l f . A s t h e q u a s i p r e s e n -
t a t i o n o f a n u n l i m i t e d g r e a t n e s s , t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l s u b l i m e r e q u i r e s a " f u n d a -
m e n t a l m e a s u r e , " a n a e s t h e t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f g r e a t n e s s . T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s t w o
s y n t h e t i c o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , a p p r e h e n s i o n ( A u f f a s s u n g ) a n d c o m -
p r e h e n s i o n ( Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g ) . " A p p r e h e n s i o n c a u s e s n o d i f f i c u l t y , f o r i t c a n
b e p u r s u e d t o i n f i n i t y ; b u t c o m p r e h e n s i o n b e c o m e s e v e r m o r e d i f f i c u l t t h e
m o r e a p p r e h e n s i o n p r o g r e s s e s , a n d i t q u i c k l y a r r i v e s a t i t s m a x i m u m " ( 2 6 ,
9 1 ; 9 0 ) . I n t h e a e s t h e t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n s e e k s t o t a k e
i n t h e s e r i e s o f a p p r e h e n s i o n s a t a g l a n c e , t o c o l l e c t t h e m i n t h e u n i t y o f a s y n -
t h e t i c c o m p r e h e n s i o n . N o r m a l l y , i t m a n a g e s t o s u c c e e d i n t h i s , b u t w h e n i t i s
a m a t t e r o f a n i m m e n s e o b j e c t " t h e e y e n e e d s a c e r t a i n t i m e " t o c o m p l e t e t h e
o p e r a t i o n , a n d t h i s t i m e i s f o u n d t o b e l a c k i n g : " t h e f i r s t p e r c e p t i o n s d i s a p -
p e a r b e f o r e t h e i m a g i n a t i o n c a n s e i z e t h e l a s t o n e s " a n d i t s c o m p r e h e n s i v e
s e i z u r e t h u s e n c o u n t e r s i t s l i m i t . I t i s i n a t t e m p t i n g t o t r a n s g r e s s t h i s l i m i t - t o
s u b - l i m a t e i t s e l f - t h a t i t b e c o m e s d i s m e m b e r e d , t o r n b e t w e e n t h e p r o g r e s -
s i o n t o i n f i n i t y o f i t s a p p r e h e n s i o n s a n d t h e l i m i t e d , f i n i t e c h a r a c t e r o f i t s
c o m p r e h e n s i o n . I f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n f a i l s t o p r e s e n t t h e i n f i n i t e , t o l i f t t h e v e i l
o f I s i s , t h i s i s b e c a u s e i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y f i n i t e , b e c a u s e i t i s f i n i t u d e i t s e l f , i n i t s
p o w e r l e s s v i o l e n c e . T h e e x c e s s i v e l y p o w e r f u l r e s i s t a n c e w h i c h s u r m o u n t s i t s
v i o l e n c e a n d r e v e a l s i t s f i n i t u d e i s i n v e s t e d i n t h e t r a c e o f a l i m i t , o f a D a w i d e r .
A n d t h i s l i m i t a t i o n i s i m p o s e d o n i t b y t h e g i g a n t i c p r o p o r t i o n s , t h e m e a s u r e -
l e s s n e s s o f a p h e n o m e n o n .
A t f i r s t s i g h t , i t i s t h e v a s t n e s s o f s p a c e - t h e c o l o s s a l m a s s i v e n e s s o f t h e
p y r a m i d , t h e l i m i t l e s s e x t e n s i o n o f t h e o c e a n o r t h e s t a r r y s k y - t h a t r e s t r i c t s
t h e r a n g e o f i m a g i n a t i o n . B u t s p a t i a l i m m e n s i t y i n t r o d u c e s u s t o a m o r e r a d i -
c a l m e a s u r e l e s s n e s s w h i c h i s t e m p o r a l . O n t h e p o i n t o f f o u n d e r i n g , t h e i m a g i -
n a t i o n d i s c o v e r s t h a t i t n e e d s t i m e , a n d t h a t t i m e i s l a c k i n g : i n i t s i m p o s s i b l e
c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f s p a c e , i t e x p e r i e n c e s i t s t e m p o r a l f i n i t u d e . B u t h o w c a n
t i m e e s c a p e f r o m t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , g i v e n t h a t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t e m p o r a l
t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h ? P e r h a p s t h e " A n a l y t i c o f t h e S u b l i m e " o b l i g e s u s t o
p l a c e i n q u e s t i o n a n e w t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
w o u l d n o t , t h e n , b e i d e n t i c a l w i t h o r i g i n a r y t e m p o r a l i t y ; t h e v i o l e n c e t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n i n f l i c t s o n t i m e a n d t h e t e m p o r a l f a i l u r e o f i t s s y n t h e s i s w o u l d b e
t h e . i n d i c e s o f a d i s p u t e o r " i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y " [ d i f f e r e n d ] b e t w e e n t i m e a n d t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n , o f a p r i m o r d i a l d i s c o r d t h e s u b l i m e e v e n t r e v e a l s .
To bring this incompatibility to light is a difficult task. It presupposes
that we have already elucidated another conflict, where the temporal limit of
the imagination discovers itself, its internal staggering, the discord between
apprehension and comprehension. This laceration itself has a temporal signif-
icance: it puts into question the essential determinations of time. In the sole
passage where Kant evokes the violence of the imagination, he signals that this
violence has its origin in comprehension. It comes from the radical finitude of
imagination. It is the violence of finitude that attempts, ardently and in vain,
to hold back time. In fact, the "comprehension of plurality in the unity of the
intuition" is a "comprehension in an instant [in einemAugenblick] of what has
been successively perceived" that "suppresses [aufhebt] the temporal condi-
tion in the progression of the imagination." It is also a "subjective movement
of the imagination that does violence to the inner sense"-a violence which
"will be all the more sensible the greater the quantum which the imagination
comprehends in an intuition."
The violence of imagination is at work in every effort at comprehension,
whatever the extension of the temporal series. When the object is small, the
intensity of synthetic violence remains barely perceptible and passes unno-
ticed. In the case of an immense magnitude, this violence becomes intense in
the extreme and becomes perceptible just before it founders. The experience
of the sublime thus reveals a latent violence inherent in the synthesis of the
imagination, and an aesthetics of the sublime would be impossible if the pure
imagination were not violent in its very essence.
The "comprehension" in question here should not be understood in a
psychological or conceptual sense. It is the unifying intention of imagination
that turns back toward the beginning of the temporal sequence, seizes anew
the plurality of the apprehensions which have already floated by, and repeating
the trajectory of the entire series, reduces them to the unity of the present
instant. It is in these terms that the "Transcendental Deduction" had described
the "synthesis of reproduction in imagination." Inseparably tied to the synthe-
sis of apprehension, to the reception of the "now" that forms the horizon of
the present, the synthesis of reproduction receives anew the past "nows" and
takes them up again, reproduces them. It opens the horizon of the past in the
unity that harmonizes this past with the present. This very synthesis, which the
first Critique designated as the origin of time, is determined in the Critique of
Judgment as a violence imposed upon time. First of all, because it is retention,
because it attempts, against time, to retain the temporal flux, to keep present
what passes, to connect to the present what does not cease to distance itself
from the present, and because it thus does violence to the passage, the passivity
of time. Secondly, because it is synthesis, "comprehension of plurality in
unity," because it intends to establish a linear continuity in the discontinuous
succession of apprehensions, to occult the essential discontinuity of the time.
Time can be said to be discontinuous in two very different senses. In this pas-
s a g e f r o m t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e , i t i s o n l y a m a t t e r o f t h e s e r i e s o f a p p r e h e n s i o n s ,
o f t h e i n s t a n t a n e o u s s e i z u r e s o f t h e p r e s e n t n o w w h i c h s u c c e e d e a c h o t h e r o n e
b y o n e . H o w e v e r , K a n t d o e s n o t a l w a y s h o l d t o t h i s n a i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f t i m e .
T h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " m a d e i t p o s s i b l e t o t h i n k t e m p o r a l d i s c o n t i -
n u i t y i n a m o r e r a d i c a l s e n s e a s t h e e c s t a t i c u n i t y o f t h e t r i p l e s y n t h e s i s , a s t h a t
u n i q u e p r e s s u r e t h a t d i v i d e s i t s e l f a n d f l o o d s t o w a r d t h e t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s o f
i t s p r e s e n t , i t s p a s t , a n d i t s f u t u r e . I n i t s e f f o r t t o r e t a i n t h e p a s s i v i t y o f t h e p a s t
w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e p r e s e n t , t o m a s k t e m p o r a l d i f f e r e n c e b e n e a t h t h e
a p p e a r a n c e o f a h o m o g e n e o u s f l u x , t h e v i o l e n t s y n t h e s i s o f i m a g i n a t i o n w o r k s
t o w a r d a l e v e l i n g o f t i m e . I n r e d u c i n g t i m e t o a c o n t i n u o u s a n d u n i f o r m s e r i e s
o f n o w ' s , t h i s s y n t h e s i s s u b m i t s t e m p o r a l i t y t o t h e r e i g n o f p r e s e n c e , t o t h e
m a i n t e n a n c e o f t i m e . P r e s e n c e a s s u c h i s v i o l e n c e .
8
T h e v i o l e n c e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s s u p p o s e d t o a r i s e f r o m t h e n o w . I t i s
s u p p o s e d t o h a v e i t s r o o t s t h i s s i d e o f a l l r e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e p u r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
o f t h e p r e s e n t , t h e s y n t h e s i s o f a p p r e h e n s i o n . T h i s f i r s t s y n t h e s i s i s a l r e a d y
" c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f p l u r a l i t y i n u n i t y " ; i t o p e r a t e s a s u c c e s s i v e u n f o l d i n g , a
" t r a v e r s a l " ( D u r c h l a u f e n ) o f d i v e r s i t y a n d t h e " c o m p r e h e n s i o n " ( Z u s a m m e n -
n e h m u n g ) o f t h i s d e p l o y m e n t ( c f . C P R , 1 1 2 ; 1 3 1 ) . I t i s a l r e a d y s y n - t h e t i c , c o m -
p r e h e n s i v e , t h a t i s , v i o l e n c e . E a c h i n s t a n t c o n t a i n s i t s c h a r g e o f v i o l e n c e , w h i c h
e x p l o d e s c e a s e l e s s l y t o w a r d i t s p a s t a n d i t s f u t u r e a n d p r o j e c t s i t s e l f i n t o t h e m
i n o r d e r t o g a t h e r t h e m i n t o p r e s e n c e . A c c o r d i n g t o K a n t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
e x p e r i e n c e r e s t s o n t h i s s y n t h e t i c c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e m a n i f o l d . I f a l l s y n t h e s i s i s
v i o l e n t , t h i s e l e m e n t a r y v i o l e n c e i s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a l l o b j e c -
t i v e k n o w l e d g e , o f a l l e x p e r i e n c e , o f t h e l e a s t p e r c e p t i o n . W i t h o u t t h i s t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l v i o l e n c e , w h i c h o p e n s t h e h o r i z o n o f p h e n o m e n a , n o p h e n o m e n o n
a t a l l c o u l d a p p e a r a n d l i n k i t s e l f t o o t h e r s i n t h e c o h e s i o n o f a w o r l d . I n k e e p -
i n g w i t h t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e , o n e c o u l d e v e n s a y t h a t t h i s t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l v i o l e n c e e n g e n d e r s t h e r a d i c a l l y o r i g i n a r y f o r m s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e .
I f t h e s y n t h e s i s o f r e p r o d u c t i o n c e a s e d t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s e l f , " i f I a l w a y s l e t t h e
p r e c e d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s e s c a p e f r o m m y t h o u g h t . . . a n d i f I d i d n o t r e p r o -
d u c e t h e m a s I a r r i v e a t t h e f o l l o w i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , n o c o m p l e t e r e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n . . . n o t e v e n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e m o s t p u r e a n d c o m -
p l e t e l y p r i m a r y o n e s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e c o u l d b e p r o d u c e d " ( C P R , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ;
1 3 3 ) , a n d t h e w o r l d w o u l d c o m e u n h i n g e d i n a f o r m l e s s c o n f u s i o n . T h i s i s
w h a t s e e m s t o h a p p e n i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e . N o n e t h e l e s s , w e k n o w
t h a t i n t h i s e x p e r i e n c e a t r a c e o f f o r m i s p r e s e r v e d b e n e a t h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f
c h a o s . T h e f o r m o f a l l f o r m s i s t i m e : s i n c e t h e u n i t y o f a c o n n e c t i v e f o r m m a i n -
t a i n s i t s e l f t h r o u g h o u t s u b l i m e d i s c o n n e c t i o n , o n e m u s t a d m i t t h a t t h e f a i l u r e
o f t h e t e m p o r a l i z i n g i m a g i n a t i o n d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e r u i n a t i o n o f t i m e , t h a t
t h i s f a i l u r e d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o t h e u l t i m a t e n e r v e o f t i m e .
O u r h y p o t h e s i s i s c o n f i r m e d : o r i g i n a r y t e m p o r a l i t y i s n o t i d e n t i c a l t o
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n ; i t i s n o t r e d u c i b l e t o t h e a u t o - a f f e c t i o n o f t h i s
i m a g i n a t i o n a n d c a n n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n
gives of it. The violence of presence is the condition of all re-presentation. But
time cannot properly be represented: as the "Transcendental Aesthetic"
emphasizes, its pure form is not susceptible of figuration, and this is why "we
seek to supplement this defect by recourse to analogies and we represent the
passage of time by a line which extends to infinity" (CPR, 63; 77). This supple-
mentary figuration already presupposes the violence of the imagination: for
one must do violence to time to keep it present, to represent the non pre-
sentable "instance" of originary temporality by means of an external intuition.
It is only at the cost of this violence that the synthesis of the imagination can
constitute "fundamental representations" of time, notably its spatial represen-
tation in the form of a continuous and infinite line of which the gramm dom-
inates the ordinary precomprehension of time. Without this spatial represen-
tation, time would remain a formless form, a pure nothing (cf. CPR, 249;
295), and no phenomenon would be able to find its place in time. The vio-
lence inflicted on time belongs to the very movement of temporalization: it
forms a spatialized and homogeneous time, the de-temporalized time of phe-
nomena, which can be schematized by the imagination in order to found
objective knowledge. The schema of a reality "is precisely this continual and
uniform production of reality in time" (CPR, 154; 184), and the set of
schemas exposed by the "Analytic" "are nothing other than the a priori deter-
minations of time according to rules." They are a "transcendental product of
the imagination," which captures time, submits it to the categories of the
understanding, and imposes on it their rule and measure. Kant remarks that
the schemas "restrain" the categories in limiting them to the conditions of
sensibility. They limit the forms of sensibility, space and time, as well, impos-
ing upon them the yoke of the categories. The schematism of the categories
thus operates a restriction, a contraction, which narrows the horizon of the
possible. "The singular has renounced the free disposition over the possible,
and thus it can become an example for the identical that rules as such the
diversity of what is possible."9 In schematizing, the imagination does violence
to the possible. It engenders that monotonous time, mutilated of its possibili-
ties, where past and future are the mere recidivism of the eternal present.
Where the past is never passed by, never delivered or pardoned, but relent-
lessly reproduced by the synthesis of reproduction which recalls this past to
the present as what haunts it. Where the advent of the future is without adven-
ture, already recognized by the synthesis of recognition which identifies it in
advance and has been expecting it forever.
If originary temporality were identical to imagination, nothing other
would be possible, nothing sublime could happen. In fact, this feeling seizes us
when the imagination fails to identify time, to comprehend it in the unity of
synthesis-when time is radically lacking. In the impossible view of the pyra-
mid, past perceptions disappear before the imagination has been able to grasp
the perceptions that follow. The violence of synthesis breaks down in connec-
t i o n w i t h t h i s e s c a p e o f t i m e , i t e x h a u s t s i t s e l f i n t h e a c t i v i t y o f h o l d i n g t i m e i n
p r e s e n c e , o f r e t a i n i n g t h e p a s s i v i t y o f t h e p a s t a n d p r e v e n t i n g t h e a d v e n t u r e o f
t h e f u t u r e ' s a d v e n t . I t i s t h u s t h a t i t c o l l a p s e s , t o r n a s u n d e r b e t w e e n t h e
a l r e a d y - n o - I o n g e r a n d t h e n o t - y e t . A n d i t s r u i n r e v e a l s a p r i m i t i v e t i m e
[ t e m p s s a u v a g e J - i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h M e r l e a u - P o n t y s p e a k s o f a b r u t e o r
p r i m i t i v e B e i n g - w h i c h r i p s a p a r t a n d f l e e s i n t o t h e d i s t a n c e s o f t h e f u t u r e
a n d t h e p a s t . I f t h e s u b l i m e i s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e b e a u t i f u l , t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e i s
f i r s t o f a l l o f a t e m p o r a l o r d e r . B e a u t i f u l f o r m p l a y s o f f b y i t s e l f i n t h e g r a c e o f
a p r e s e n t w i t h o u t p r e s e n c e ; i t g i v e s i t s e l f t o t h e i n s t a n t , i n a s i n g u l a r a p p r e h e n -
s i o n w h e r e i t m a k e s a p r e s e n t o f i t s b e a u t y . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e f o r m l e s s - l i m i t -
l e s s , w h i c h e x c e e d s a l l p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d a l l f i n i t e d u r a t i o n . T h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e
p a s t i s s u b l i m e , a n d e v e n m o r e t h e f a c e l e s s i n f i n i t y o f t h e f u t u r e .
1 o
T h e s u b l i m e m a n a g e s t o s c h e m a t i z e n o n f i g u r a b l e , p r e p h e n o m e n a l t i m e
o n l y a t t h e c o s t o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s f i g u r a t i o n , o f a d e - s c h e m a t i z a t i o n o f t h e
w o r l d , o n l y b y b r e a k i n g t h e s c h e m a s p r e f o r m e d i n t h e v i o l e n t s y n t h e s i s o f
i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e s c h e m a o f s u b s t a n c e a s " p e r m a n e n c e o f t h e r e a l i n t i m e , " t h e
s c h e m a o f c a u s a l i t y a s s u c c e s s i o n o f t h e m a n i f o l d i n t i m e , e t c . W h a t t h e s e
s c h e m a s f o r b i d u s t o t h i n k , w h a t t h e y a b s o l u t e l y e x c l u d e , i s a r u p t u r e i n t h e
t e m p o r a l s e r i e s . " T h e f a c t o f c o m i n g t o b e [ E n t s t e h e n J d o e s n o t c o n c e r n s u b -
s t a n c e . . . . T h e r e i s s i m p l y c h a n g e a n d n o t o r i g i n a t i o n [ U r s p r u n g J o u t o f n o t h -
i n g " ( C P R , 1 9 2 ; 2 3 0 ) . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m , a s t h e p o w e r t o i n i t i a t e a s e r i e s
o f p h e n o m e n a , c a n n o t b e a d m i t t e d i n a u n i v e r s e s c h e m a t i z e d b y t h e s y n t h e s i s
o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . I t s m e r e p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d s u f f i c e t o d e s t r o y t h e n e c e s s a r y
u n i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . B u t t h e s u b l i m e d e - s c h e m a t i z a t i o n o f t h e s e s c h e m a s
r e v e a l s t h e r a d i c a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y o f t i m e . I n a u g u r a l f r e e d o m w a s i n c o m p a t i b l e
o n l y w i t h a m u t i l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t i m e : i n i t s f i r s t m a n i f e s t a t i o n , o r i g i -
n a r y t e m p o r a l i t y i s f r e e d o m .
W h a t t h e s u b l i m e r e v e l a t i o n d i s c o v e r s , a t t h e l i m i t o f t h e f o r m l e s s a n d
a t t h e r i s k o f c h a o s , i s t h e e v e n t o f o r i g i n a t i o n . E v e n m o r e t h a n B e i n g - u n t o -
d e a t h , B e i n g - i n - o r i g i n a t i o n i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e i m p o s s i b l e . T h e f e e l i n g o f
t h e s u b l i m e o v e r t a k e s u s t h e i n s t a n t t h e c h a i n o f p h e n o m e n a b r e a k s a p a r t ,
w h e n t i m e g i v e s i t s e l f a n o t h e r c h a n c e , d e l i v e r i n g a l l a t o n c e t h e h o r i z o n o f
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t i s t h u s t h a t t h e p a s s i o n o f L a w a n d o f I d e a s c a n s u d d e n l y s e i z e
a n a t i o n ; t h a t t h e w o r k o f t h e g e n i u s i n v e n t s i t s e l f w i t h o u t a m o d e l ; t h a t t h e
c a l l o f t h e L a w l i b e r a t e s u s f r o m a b a d r e p e t i t i o n , i n a c h a n g e o f d i r e c t i o n , a
B e k e h r u n g w h i c h i s , K a n t s a y s , " l i k e a n e w o r i g i n a t i o n . " T h e s u b l i m e s c h e m a -
t i z e s t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e w o r l d , t h e p o w e r t o c o m m e n c e a f r e s h . I t t h u s m a k e s
i t p o s s i b l e t o t h i n k a n a e s t h e t i c s o f i n n o v a t i o n , a n e t h i c s o f c o n v e r s i o n , a p o l -
i t i c s o f r e v o l u t i o n . W h a t i s m o s t s u b l i m e w o u l d b e t h e e v e n t i n w h i c h t h e
t o t a l i t y o f t h e p o s s i b l e i s d i s c o v e r e d , t h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e M a y b e , w h i c h m e t a -
p h y s i c s n a m e s G o d .
. H o w e v e r , a l l t h e w e i g h t o f e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e d e n o u n c e s t h e " i l l u s i o n
o f f r e e d o m . " I n t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e , w h o s e v o c a t i o n i s t o g r o u n d o b j e c t i v e
knowledge, transcendental freedom remains a problematic concept. The dis-
ruption of origination makes no sense in the world of phenomena: it would
ruin the coherency of their connections, "which is precisely what distinguishes
experience from the dream" (cf. CPR, 353; 413-14). In phenomenalizing
itself, time de-temporalizes itself; it covers over its division and renounces
infinite possibility. The schematizing violence of the imagination operates this
cover-up, this de-sublimation of time. No text by Kant authorizes us to char-
acterize. this phenomenal temporality as "vulgar" or "fallen." Although a
"product of the imagination," it is not "imaginary," in the sense of an illusory
or fictive representation. Indeed one must see in this temporality the condi-
tion of all objective truth. But it is nonetheless dissimulating, and the truth it
supports is initiated by means of a transcendental untruth. The time of phe-
nomena masks the phenomenalization of time, the violent de-temporalization
of time as form of phenomena. The violence of presence dissimulates itself in
that-and in what-it presents. Each phenomenon can appear only by occult-
ing this original violence, in re-covering the ecstatic fracture of time, the tem-
poral tearing of imagination. The totality of phenomena-Nature-is the veil
of Isis, the texture of which is woven of the thread of temporality. What
weaves the veil is the violence of the imagination, concealed in the apparition
of phenomena, in the luminous appearance of the world. The imagination is
the violence of the veil, which veils itself and dissimulates itself under an illu-
sory transparence. With respect to this beautiful appearance, the sublime
would be the test of truth. Stretched to the extreme, to the breaking point, the
hidden violence of the imagination becomes quasi perceptible, at the moment
when it comes apart. The violent truth of the world, latent in each phenome-
non, discovers itself in its laceration. The sublime reveals the veil.
Does this mean that it lifts or sublates [relevel the veil, that it un-veils?
The pretention to denuding the goddess, to letting her flesh be "divined"
through the thinness of the veil, is according to Kant the exalted revery of the
Schwiirmer, the dream of metaphysics. There is, in the sublime, a degree of
"madness" (Wahnsinn) which seems quite close to this visionary "insanity"
(Wahnwitz). Which is why Kant makes an effort to differentiate between them:
"It is insanity least of all which can accord with the sublime"; in fact, the latter
is a "pure, merely negative presentation which ... entails no danger of
Schwiirmerei ... precisely because the presentation is merely negative" (29,
Ill; 116). This is an essential distinction but a precarious one, as necessary and
fragile perhaps as the demarcation between the sublime and the monstrous.
What is at stake here is the truth of the sublime: the determination of
the truth implied by the thought of the sublime and, more profoundly, truth
as sublimity. Far from claiming to lift the veil of ISIS, or to sublate it in the
sense of a dialectical Aufhebung, the sublime revelation reveals nothing.
Unless it is the veil itself, nonfigurable weave of time. Is the sublime, as the dis-
play of the veil in its blind opacity, truth itself, the veiling unveiling of
a l e t h e i a ? l l M e t a p h y s i c a l i l l u s i o n w o u l d b e b o r n t h e n i n t h e f o r g e t t i n g o f t h i s
t r u t h : f o r i t i s n o t t h e v e i l a s s u c h b u t t h e d e s i r e f o r i t s i m p o s s i b l e s u b l a t i o n
t h a t s u s t a i n s t h e d e l i r i u m o f t h e S c h w a r m e r , t h e p h a n t a s m o f A b s o l u t e K n o w l -
e d g e . A s d i s s i m u l a t i n g a s i t m a y b e , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s n o t w h a t c r e a t e s t h i s
i l l u s i o n . I n K a n t i a n t e r m s , o n e c o u l d s a y t h a t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h
b e t w e e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l v i o l e n c e o f i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e v e i l i n g t h a t c o n s t i -
t u t e s t h e w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a , a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t - i . e . , m e t a p h y s i c a l -
i n t e n t i o n o f p u r e r e a s o n , t h e c l a i m t o r a i s e i t s e l f a b o v e p h e n o m e n a , t o g r a s p
t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s , a n d t o g i v e u s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e .
B u t t h i s c r i t i c a l d e m a r c a t i o n n e e d s t o b e n u a n c e d f u r t h e r : w i t h o u t b e i n g
i t s e l f i l l u s o r y , t h e v i o l e n c e o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s n o n e t h e l e s s t h e m a t r i x o f
m e t a p h y s i c a l i l l u s i o n . I f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n t h a t l e v e l s t i m e w o r k s i n t h e s e r v i c e
o f p r e s e n c e , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i v i l e g e o f t h e p r e s e n t c u l m i n a t e s i n t h e i n t e n -
t i o n t o a b o l i s h t i m e , t o s u b l a t e i t i n t h e e t e r n i t y o f t h e a l w a y s - p r e s e n t . T h e d e -
t e m p o r a l i z i n g t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n a c u l m i n a t e s i n t h e i l l u s i o n o f t h e
a t e m p o r a l . O n e c a n , i n f a c t , s h o w t h a t e a c h o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t I d e a s o f r e a -
s o n - t h e s u b j e c t , t h e W o r l d , a n d G o d - i s s u p p o r t e d b y a n a n n u l m e n t o r a
d e n i a l o f t h e t e m p o r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f i n t u i t i o n . T h u s , t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a s u b -
s t a n t i a l p e r m a n e n c e o f t h e E g o t e n d s t o o c c u l t i t s t e m p o r a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y , t h e
i n t e r m i t t e n c y o f t h e e g o I a m . O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e p e r m a n e n t p r e s e n c e o f t h e
s u b j e c t " a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s , " m e t a p h y s i c s i n f e r s i t s p e r s i s t e n c e " a t a l l t i m e s , "
t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l .
I Z
I n t h e v e r y g e s t u r e t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y d e n y i t ,
t h e I d e a s o f r e a s o n a l s o p r e s u p p o s e t h e l i n e a r t i m e o f p h e n o m e n a , a l r e a d y v i o -
l a t e d a n d s c h e m a t i z e d b y i m a g i n a t i o n . M e t a p h y s i c s w o u l d o n l y i n t e n s i f y t h i s
d e - t e m p o r a l i z i n g v i o l e n c e , a u g m e n t i t i n f i n i t e l y - u p t o t h e s u b l i m e p o i n t
w h e r e i t f o u n d e r s . K a n t d o e s n o t a n a l y z e t h i s p a s s a g e - t o - t h e - l i m i t , t h i s u n -
l i m i t a t i o n t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e s p e c u l a t i v e i l l u s i o n . H e n e v e r r e l a t e s i t t o t h e
s u b l i m e t e n s i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . H o w e v e r , i f m e t a p h y s i c s i s t h e p a s s i o n o f
u n - l i m i t a t i o n - T r i e b z u r E r w e i t e r u n g ( C P R , 3 6 ; 4 7 ) - i f i t i s t h e d e s i r e t o
u n v e i l , t h e f o r g e t f u l n e s s o f f i n i t u d e , t h i s i s p e r h a p s b e c a u s e i t h a s i t s r o o t s i n
t h e ( s e l f - ) e x c e e d i n g t r a n c e o r t r a n s p o r t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , t h a t s u d d e n m a d -
n e s s w h i c h b e a r s i t s r u i n a t i o n i n i t s t r a i n .
A s c e r t a i n p a s s a g e s i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t s u g g e s t , t h e p u r e i m a g i -
n a t i o n , w h i c h u n f o l d s t h e f i n i t e h o r i z o n o f p h e n o m e n a , r e f u s e s t o a l l o w i t s e l f
t o b e e n c l o s e d w i t h i n t h i s h o r i z o n . I n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c I d e a s , i t
" s t r i v e s t o r i v a l r e a s o n i n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a m a x i m u m , " a n d r a i s e s i t s e l f
" b e y o n d t h e l i m i t s o f e x p e r i e n c e " ( 4 9 , 1 4 4 ; 1 5 8 ) . T r a n s p o r t e d " b e y o n d t h e
s e n s i b l e " b y i t s i m p e t u s t o w a r d t h e I d e a s , i t " f e e l s i t s e l f u n l i m i t e d , " a n d i t s
s u b - l i m a t i o n i s a " n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i n f i n i t y " ( 2 9 , 1 1 0 ; 1 1 5 ) . T h e s e n -
t i m e n t o f t h e s u b l i m e a r i s e s t h e n a t t h e l i m i t o f m e t a p h y s i c s : o n t h e u n d e c i d -
a b l e m a r g i n w h e r e , h a v i n g a t t a i n e d i t s m a x i m u m , t h e i m a g i n a t i o n s t r i v e s t o
t r a n s g r e s s t h i s m a x i m u m - t o " e x t e n d " ( e r w e i t e r n ) i t - t o e m b r a c e t h e i n f i -
n i t e . B u t i t s c o m p r e h e n s i o n i s t e m p o r a l l y f i n i t e , a n d t h u s , o n t h e p o i n t o f p r e -
senting that which cannot be presented, it comes undone and collapses. All of
this will have taken place in a single instant: it is "at the same time" that the
imagination feels both its extreme tension toward and its powerlessness to
attain the infinite (26, 94; 94) in the instantaneous oscillation of intention
and retreat, of attraction and repulsion, of audacity and timorous fall. The
violent "rivalry" of imagination and reason then is nothing but a maddened
play of the imagination with itself and the source of transcendental illusion.
Not-as the tradition teaches from Plato to Malebranche--because the imag-
ination is a "deceptive power," the "enemy of reason," but because it is pure
reason itself, as the faculty of delirium. In the sublime failure of the imagina-
tion, metaphysical illusion deconstructs itself. The violence of finitude
acknowledges its powerlessness to comprehend the infinite.
To Infinity
The event of the sublime befalls us when the metaphysical violence of the
imagination encounters the infinite as its trait of ob-jection, as the rampart of
a Dawider. The sublime is the feeling of the infiniteY "Nature is thus sublime
in those of its phenomena the intuition of which arouses the Idea of its infin-
ity" (26, 94; 94). It is a question here of the infinite of nature, of its "total
infinity as phenomenon." But this is itself a "contradictory concept." For this
reason, Kant continues, the "greatness of an object of nature, to which the
imagination applies in vain all of its faculty of comprehension, ought to lead
[jUhrenl the concept of nature to a super-sensible substratum ... great beyond
all measure of the senses" and "to extend" the spirit in a practical perspective
(26, 94-95; 94). This Fiihrung, this movement which guides us from sensible
infinity to another infinity, is this not the passage we have been seeking, the
bridge over the abyss of the super-sensible? All the questions with which we
are confronted-the questions of the schematism of the sublime, of the con-
flict of time and imagination, of the passage between sensible and super-sensi-
ble-lead back in this crucial passage to a single question: what is the role of
the infinite here? At first view, the sense of the text is clear. The imagination
"demands totality," it "insists on a presentation for all the members of a con-
tinually growing series, without excluding even the infinite from this demand"
(26, 93; 93). However, this common notion of the infinite, as "absolute total-
ity of a progress without termination," is naively dogmatic. It is this notion
that underlies the first antinomy of rational cosmology, the insoluble conflict
between a thesis which negates and an antinomy which affirms the infinity of
the world in space and time (cf. CPR, 338-47; 396-409). From this point of
view, the total infinity of nature is a "contradictory concept," while practical
infinity is an empty idea, and only a vague analogy enables one to establish a
relation between the two. A "vast trench" continues to separate the super-sen-
s i b l e f r o m t h e w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a . K a n t w i l l n o t h a v e d e e p e n e d h i s r e f l e x i o n
o n t h e I d e a o f t h e i n f i n i t e , w h i c h s e e m e d t o b e a b l e t o p r o v i d e a h i n g e b e t w e e n
t h e t w o d o m a i n s . H e w i l l h a v e r e c o i l e d b e f o r e t h e a b y s s o f t h e i n f i n i t e .
I s t h i s h i s f i n a l w o r d ? D o e s h e s e e s e n s i b l e i n f i n i t y a s n o t h i n g b u t a c o n -
t r a d i c t o r y n o t i o n , a s i m p l e i l l u s i o n o f r e a s o n ? A s i s w e l l k n o w n , t h e " T r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c " d e f i n e s s p a c e a n d t i m e a s " g i v e n i n f i n i t e q u a n t i t i e s "
( C P R , 5 7 - B ; 6 9 ) . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n s e e m s t o c o n t r a d i c t t h a t g i v e n i n t h e " D i a l e c -
t i c , " w h i c h a f f i r m s t h a t " a g i v e n i n f i n i t e q u a n t i t y i s i m p o s s i b l e " ( C P R , 3 4 0 ;
4 0 0 ) . B u t t h e p o i n t i s t h a t w e a r e d e a l i n g h e r e w i t h t w o d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t s o f
t h e i n f i n i t e . T h e f i r s t a n t i n o m y r e s t s o n t h e c o n c e p t o f a q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f i n -
i t y - t h a t o f a q u a n t i t y w i t h o u t e n d , o f i n d e f i n i t e s e r i e s o f j u x t a p o s e d o r s u c -
c e s s i v e p h e n o m e n a . T h e i n f i n i t y o f s p a c e a n d t i m e , h o w e v e r , i s n o t a q u a n -
t u m , a r e l a t i v e q u a n t i t y , b u t t h e " a b s o l u t e l y l a r g e , " m a g n i t u d e . I t i s n o t
s i t u a t e d a t t h e e n d o f a s u m m a t i o n w i t h o u t e n d , b u t p r e - g i v e n a l l a t o n c e a s
t h e f o r m o f i n t u i t i o n . T h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e w o r l d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e " D i a l e c t i c " i s
t h a t o f a n " i n f i n i t e a g g r e g a t e o f r e a l t h i n g s , " o f " i n f i n i t e s e r i e s o f s u c c e s s i v e
s t a t e s " ( C P R , 3 3 8 ; 3 9 7 ) , t h e u n a c h i e v e d r e c o l l e c t i o n o f s e p a r a t e e l e m e n t s
w h i c h a r e a d d e d t o g e t h e r o r a r e c o m p o s e d e x t e r n a l l y . I n t h e " A e s t h e t i c , " t h e
i n f i n i t y o f s p a c e a n d t i m e d e s i g n a t e s , t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e u n c o m p o s e d u n i t y
o f a n o r i g i n a r y c o m m u n i t y . F i n a l l y , i f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n f i n i t y i s a n i n c o n s i s t e n t
n o t i o n , t h e i n f i n i t y o f s p a c e - t i m e h a s t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f a p u r e f o r m , w h i c h
d w e l l s i n a r e t r e a t f r o m p h e n o m e n a l f o r m s a n d p r e s e n t s i t s e l f i n t h e g u i s e o f
t h e f o r m l e s s . T h e s e t h r e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - m a g n i t u d e , c o m m u n i t y , a n d i n f o r -
m a l f o r m a l i t y - q u a l i f y b o t h t h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e s e n s i b l e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e " A e s -
t h e t i c " a n d t h e " a e s t h e t i c " i n f i n i t y o f t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e w h i c h a w a k e n s t h e
f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e . E v e n w h i l e i t r e j e c t s t h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e w o r l d a s a c o n -
t r a d i c t o r y n o t i o n , K a n t ' s o e u v r e r e m a i n s s i l e n t l y p e r v a d e d b y a n o t h e r t h o u g h t
o f t h e i n f i n i t e , w h i c h o r i e n t s i t t o w a r d t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e p a s s a g e .
" W e c a l l s u b l i m e t h a t w h i c h i s g r e a t a b s o l u t e l y " ( 2 5 ; 8 7 ; 8 6 ) . I f t h e
e v a l u a t i o n o f q u a n t i t y o r g r e a t n e s s w e r e m e r e l y m a t h e m a t i c a l , a n a e s t h e t i c s o f
t h e s u b l i m e w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e . I n t h e l o g i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f q u a n t i t y ,
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a l c u l a t e s t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e o b j e c t w i t h t h e a i d o f r e l a -
t i v e q u a n t i t i e s . T h i s a r i t h m e t i c m e a s u r e m e n t , h o w e v e r , r e m a i n s a b s t r a c t a n d
e m p t y o f s e n s e u n l e s s i t i s s u p p o r t e d b y a " f i r s t m e a s u r e " ( 2 6 , 9 0 ; 9 0 ) , a n a e s -
t h e t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f s i z e a n d d i s t a n c e , w h e r e w e t a k e t h e m e a s u r e o f t h e w o r l d
" i n a s i n g l e g l a n c e . " I t i s a t t h i s p r e - l o g i c a l , p r e - o b j e c t i v e l e v e l , i n i t s n a i v e
e m b r a c e o f t h e w o r l d , t h a t t h e f i n i t e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n c a n
e n c o u n t e r i t s m a x i m u m , t h e s u b l i m e l i m i t o n w h i c h i t b r e a k s . A e s t h e t i c e v a l -
u a t i o n " p r e s e n t s g r e a t n e s s a b s o l u t e l y " ( 2 6 , 9 1 ; 9 0 ) ; a t t h e f o o t o f t h e p y r a -
m i d s o r b e f o r e t h e o c e a n , i t p l a c e s u s i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e a b s o l u t e l y g r e a t ,
a n d o n l y t h e i n f i n i t e i s a b s o l u t e l y g r e a t ( 2 6 , 9 4 ; 9 3 ) . I n f i n i t e g r e a t n e s s : n o t a n
i n f i n i t e q u a n t i t y , n o t a q u a n t i t y a t a l l i n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l s e n s e . I n f a c t , " t o b e
g r e a t [ G r o f i - s e i n 1 a n d t o b e a q u a n t i t y [ e i n e G r o f i e s e i n 1 , a r e c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r -
ent concepts (magnitudo and quantitas)" (25, 87; 86). Magnitude is the
Being-great of all quantity or greatness, that which gives it its size, the gesture
of a tracing, of a first measure which no finite quantity could measure. If the
finite is the quantitative, the measured, the commensurable, magnitude is
infinite by its un-measure. It can present itself as an immense quantity, "in
comparison with which all the rest is small." But quantitative immensity is not
un-measure: magnitude is a "greatness which is equal only to itself," great
"beyond all comparison," infinitely other than all finite quantity. In this sense,
it is neither large nor small, and the colossal is as little sublime as the most
extreme smallness. It even happens that, in a time dominated by emphasis on
grandeur, the sublime finds refuge in the tiny or the laughable, the grain of a
voice, the brilliance of an instant.
No series of phenomena is truly infinite; no sensible figure, however
enormous it may be, can be ajudged sublime. And Kant can conclude that
"the sublime ought not be sought in the things of nature, but solely in our
Ideas" (23, 85; 83). A hasty conclusion, which precipitates the "Analytic of
the Sublime" into an impasse. At the moment when his analysis of infinite
magnitude was leading him to the threshold of the passage, Kant holds to the
dialectical concept of the infinite, to the illusory infinity in space and time,
without considering the infinity of space and time. Due to its failure to articu-
late itself with the "Transcendental Aesthetic," the thought of the sublime
stops short of its goal. It is this articulation that it is possible to envisage. All
the traits of magnitude are, in fact, also found in the pure forms of space and
time. Magnitude is the infinitely great that has no quantity but supports each
quantum of greatness and gives it its measure, always "equal to itself' in each
of its parts. Likewise, space is nowhere in space, although it gives rise and gives
place to each of its regions, and its least parcel is still space, just as "any part of
time is time."14 The infinity of space and time thus implies a singular relation
of the parts to the whole. According to Kant-and this is one of his essential
theses-composition is the mark of finitude. IS Within the horizon of finitude,
the parts precede the whole and are aggregated or juxtaposed to compose the
whole synthetically. In contrast, in the infinite form of space and time, "the
infinite contains the foundation of the part" (D1770, 73; 67). It makes its parts
arise in it, supports them and holds them in its web. Its "co-parts" (compartes)
are therefore not parts--separate portions of space or slices of duration-but
internal limits, which ceaselessly de-limit themselves, sub-limate themselves at
the heart of the unlimited whole. They are "unthinkable in themselves," co-
implicated by the whole and compromised in it, in solidarity at the heart of an
originary uncomposed unity, which is the world itself as universitas,
Inbegriff-community. The feeling of the sublime is awakened by the infinite
of the world: it is the feeling of community.
What of this community? The Dissertation of 1770 designates it as lex
and nexus. The infinite community of the world is form, that is, the connec-
t i o n o f a m u l t i p l i c i t y , a n d t h i s " c o n n e c t i o n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e s s e n t i a l
f o r m o f t h e w o r l d " h o l d s t h e m a n i f o l d t o g e t h e r , a s s u r e s i t s a f f i n i t y , o r a g a i n ,
a s K a n t s a y s , i t s c o a l e s c e n c e ( D 1 7 7 0 , 5 0 - 5 3 ; 5 8 ) . S p a c e a n d t i m e a r e t h e s e o r i g -
i n a r y f o r m s o f c o n n e c t i o n w h e r e t h e s e n s i b l e u n f o l d s i t s e l f i n i t s p u r e d i v e r -
s i t y , b e f o r e a l l a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d a l l c o m p r e h e n s i o n , b e f o r e t h e s y n t h e s i s o f
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . O n e w o u l d b e w r o n g t o r e p r e s e n t t h e m t o o n e s e l f a s a
m o n o t o n o u s a n d v o i d e x t e n s i o n , a u n i f o r m d u r a t i o n . A s a p r i o r i f o r m s o f
i n t u i t i o n , t h e y a l r e a d y c o n t a i n a " p u r e m a n i f o l d , " a " m a n i f o l d o f s e n s i b i l i t y a
p r i o r i , " u n l i k e t h e e m p i r i c a l v a r i e t y o f p h e n o m e n a i n s p a c e a n d t i m e , w h i c h i s
s u p p o s e d t o a r i s e o u t o f a p r i m i t i v e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f s p a c e a n d t i m e . I t i s p o s -
s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t i n t h i s s e n s e t h e n o t e o f t h e " A n a l y t i c " w h e r e K a n t r e m a r k s
t h a t " t h e f o r m o f i n t u i t i o n g i v e s m e r e l y t h e m a n i f o l d . " ( C P R , 1 3 8 ; 1 7 0 ) 1 6 T h e
a p r i o r i f o r m s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e a r e n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s g i v i n g : t h e y d o n ' t
c o m e . t o r e c o n n e c t r e t r o a c t i v e l y , s y n t h e t i c a l l y , a n a l r e a d y g i v e n e m p i r i c a l
d i v e r s i t y b u t m a k e t h e m a n i f o l d o f t h e s e n s i b l e a p p e a r o u t o f t h e u n i t y o f t h e
c o n n e c t i v e f o r m f r o m w h i c h t h i s m a n i f o l d a r i s e s a s m a n i f o l d a n d w h i c h k e e p s
i t i n c o m m u n i t y . P u r e f o r m i s g i f t , t h a t i s , p a r t i t i o n i n g [ p a r t a g e l : p o w e r o f d i f -
f e r e n t i a t i o n , o f d i s p e r s i o n t o i n f i n i t y . I f t h e e s s e n c e o f a l l f o r m i m p l i e s u n i f i c a -
t i o n o f a m u l t i p l i c i t y , t h e o u t l i n e o f a l i m i t a t i o n , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f o r m i s o n l y
f o r m i n s o f a r a s i t d e f o r m s i t s e l f o r . b e c o m e s d e f o r m e d . D i s s e m i n a t i n g i t s e l f , i t
d i s j o i n s o r d e - l i m i t s i t s e l f , a n d i t s s u b - l i m a t i o n d r a w s i t i n t o t h e w a t e r s o f t h e
f o r m l e s s . B u t i t s i n f i n i t e d i s j u n c t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t h a r m o n i z e s t h e m a n i -
f o l d : w h a t m a k e s a g i f t o f i t a n d a d j o i n s i t . A c r o s s t h e i r d i f f r a c t i o n , s p a c e a n d
t i m e r e m a i n " e s s e n t i a l l y o n e " a n d p r e s e r v e t h e e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f f o r m
t h r o u g h o u t t h e m o v e m e n t o f s u b l i m e d e f o r m a t i o n . W h a t t h u s p r e s e n t s i t s e l f
a s c h a o s i s t h e o r d e r i n g o f p u r e f o r m s , f r o m w h i c h p r o c e e d a l l e m p i r i c a l o r d e r
a n d d i s o r d e r . B y d e f i n i n g s p a c e a n d t i m e a s " g i v e n i n f i n i t e q u a n t i t i e s , " a s t h e
d o n a t i o n o f a n i n f i n i t e f o r m , t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c " b r e a k s w i t h a
l o n g t r a d i t i o n w h i c h i d e n t i f i e d F o r m a n d G e s t a l t , w h i c h a p p r e h e n d e d a l l f o r m
o n t h e b a s i s o f e i d o s , t h e f i n i t e f i g u r e o f p h e n o m e n a , a s t h e s t a b l e l i m i t o f a
c o n t o u r . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f f i n i t u d e , t h e i n f i n i t y o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
f o r m s n e c e s s a r i l y a p p e a r s m o n s t r o u s a n d f o r m l e s s . I n t r u t h , i t s a p p a r e n t c o n -
f u s i o n c o n t a i n s t h e i n f i n i t e p r o f u s i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t o p e n s i t s e l f o n t o t h e
e n t i r e t y o f t h e M a y b e , t h e i d e a l o f p u r e r e a s o n ( c f . C P R , 4 1 5 - 2 1 , 4 8 7 - 9 5 ) ,
w h i c h i d o l a t r o u s m e t a p h y s i c s p e r s o n i f i e s a n d n a m e s G o d . T h e C r i t i q u e i s
c a l l e d u p o n t o d e c o n s t r u c t t h i s h y p o s t a s i s , t o d i s c o v e r b e n e a t h t h e v e i l o f t h e
i d o l t h e s u b l i m e c h a o s o f t h e w o r l d .
T h e f o r m s o f t h e s e n s i b l e c a n b e c o n t a i n e d b y n o s e n s i b l e f o r m . T h e y
a r e n o t " f i g u r e s " i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e , b u t r a t h e r t h e o p a q u e g r o u n d ,
G r u n d , a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e e x p l o s i v e b r i g h t n e s s o f f i n i t e f i g u r e s s t a n d s o u t .
P l a t o c a l l e d t h e i n v i s i b l e a n d f o r m l e s s m a t r i x o f a l l f o r m t h e c h o r a , " b r o u g h t
i n t o m o v e m e n t a n d c u t u p i n t o f i g u r e s " b y t h e t y p e s w h o s e i m p r i n t i t r e c e i v e s
" w i t h o u t e v e r t a k i n g o n a f o r m s i m i l a r t o t h o s e t h a t p e n e t r a t e i t . " T h e c h o m i s
the form(lessness) of pure space, the transcendental site of the world. Up to
now, I have only considered the temporality of the sublime. However, this
feeling seizes us always on the ground of space, before a spatial un-measure.
The sublime discovers to us the pure form of space, which is irreducible to the
abstract spatiality of extension. This form is that of a primitive space prior to
phenomena but already differentiated, dissymetrical, heterogeneous, tra-
versed by fractures and rendered uneven by reliefs. According to Kant, the
internal ground of spatial diversity is situated in "the space proper to the
body," its primordial orientation, structured by the opposition of high and
low, front and back, left and right. The carnal matrix of space remains most
often hidden: "we cannot perceive what, in the form of a body, has to do solely
with its spatial relation except by its symmetrical opposition to other bod-
ies"17-such as when hands meet and when flesh touches flesh. The flesh is
sublime from the moment of this first contact, of this tactile chiasmus,
wherein the carnal spacing of the world is revealed. Clearly, Kant did not fol-
low this path much further. Nonetheless, the third Critique does not fail to sig-
nal that our feelings are "always corporeal" (29, 113; 119), that emotion is
born of an excitation and an arrest of "vital forces." Emotion is thus rooted in
the carnal materiality oflife. It participates in what the Anthropology calls "the
impression oflife," which never affects any determinate organ, any part of the
organism, but is diffracted across the entire body and overflows its limits.
"The frisson that pervades man in the representation of the sublime" is of this
type; it "flashes through the body everywhere there is life in it."18 The feeling
of the sublime is the living flesh of Being that feels itself live and incarnate
itself. "Chaos is the name of the life that incarnates itself':19 the veil of Isis is
the infinite of the flesh.
Carnal diffraction of space, ecstatic explosion of time: could their differ-
ences be the truth of the sublime? But the infinite form of the world is commu-
nity, that is, connection and unity of the manifold. Space, like time, is "essen-
tially one." Their infinitude is that of a continuous totality, of an intertwining
where all conspires and sympathizes. Radical unity on a measure with infinite
dispersion. This cannot be the abstract unity of a quantum, nor that of a syn-
thesis, but a transcendental unity. In the Analytic, Kant compares this qualita-
tive unity to "the unity of theme in a dream, in a discourse, in a fable" (CPR,
98; 118). What assures the cohesion of time is the persistence of one temporal
style, of one gait, a singular manner of precipitating myself at every instant
toward my future in order to let it flow away into the past. And each instant
gives me anew all of (the) time, like a continuous pressure that divides itself
from itself and remains one in and through this very division, held in unity by
the maintenance of a unique point-source. In the same way, the divergent
dimensions of space cross each other and emanate from a central Here, from
the singular pole of a unique, fleshly body. Thus, the originary community is at
once dispersion of the One and reception of the Many: gathering of the mani-
f o l d , w h i c h o n e m u s t n o t c o n c e i v e a s a g a t h e r i n g o f d i s j o i n t e d p a r t s , a s y n -
t h e t i c c o l l e c t i o n o f s e p a r a t e e l e m e n t s . S y n t h e t i c c o m p o s i t i o n i s t h e c o n c e r n o f
i m a g i n a t i o n : i t i s t h e v i o l e n c e o f t h e s y n t h e s i s t h a t c o l l e c t s a n d l i n k s t o g e t h e r a
p r e l i m i n a r y d i v e r s i t y . B u t t h e f i n i t e v i o l e n c e o f i m a g i n a t i o n f a i l s t o c o m p r e -
h e n d t h e i n f i n i t e , a n d t h e s u b l i m e i s t h e m a r k o f t h i s f a i l u r e , t h e s i g n t h a t t h e
u l t i m a t e l i n k o f t h e w o r l d i s n o t t h e w o r k o f i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e c o n n e c t i v e f o r m
o f s p a c e a n d t i m e c o n n e c t s i t s e l f o f i t s e l f b y a n i m m a n e n t a u t o - s y n t h e s i s ,
b e f o r e a l l i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t i s t h e r e f o r e
n o t a s y n t h e s i s , w h i c h a l w a y s p r e s u p p o s e s t h e t h e t i c o p e r a t i o n o f a c o n s c i o u s -
n e s s o r o f a c o n s t i t u t i n g s u b j e c t . I t c o r r e s p o n d s r a t h e r t o w h a t K a n t s o m e t i m e s
c h a r a c t e r i z e s a s " s y n o p s i s " o f t h e m a n i f o l d i n a p u r e i n t u i t i o n , a n d w h i c h H e i -
d e g g e r p r o p o s e s t o c a l l s y n d o s i s :
2 0
a u n i f y i n g c o - d o n a t i o n , s h a r e d o f f e r i n g ,
w h i c h i m p o s e s n o e x t e r n a l l i n k o n t h e d i v e r s e a n d i s t h e r e f o r e n o t , i n t h e s t r i c t
s e n s e , v i o l e n c e . N o t h i n g i s m o r e s u b l i m e t h a n t h i s s e c r e t c o m m u n i t y o f t h e
w o r l d : t h a t w h i c h K a n t w i l l d e s i g n a t e i n t h e O p u s P o s t h u m u m a s a " s e i z u r e o f
t h e O n e a n d t h e A l l i n O n e , w h e r e f o r m i s t h e g i f t o f B e i n g .
2 1
H e w i l l d e f i n e
t h e p a s s a g e t h e n , t h e " p h y s i c a l O b e r g a n g , " a s a " g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r a c -
t i o n " o f p h e n o m e n a , " l i n k e d t o a l l o f t h e u n i v e r s e b e c a u s e s p a c e a n d t i m e a r e
a b s o l u t e u n i t i e s . " 2 2 O n e c a n j u d g e s u b l i m e t h e a e s t h e t i c f i g u r a t i o n s o f t h i s p a s -
s a g e , s u c h a s t h a t o f t h e v e i l e d I s i s w h o s y m b o l i z e s t h e h i d d e n u n i t y o f " a l l t h a t
i s , w a s , a n d w i l l b e . " O r , c l o s e r t o u s , t h a t o f a B o o k t h a t c o n t a i n s a l l b o o k s , o r
o f t h e p o i n t A l e p h " w h e r e a l l t h e p l a c e s i n t h e u n i v e r s e v i e w e d f r o m a l l a n g l e s
m e e t w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g c o n f u s e d . "
W h a t i s a t s t a k e i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t i s b e c o m i n g m o r e c l e a r . T h e
t a s k w a s t o g r o u n d a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r i n c i p l e o f t h e f a c u l t y o f j u d g m e n t , t o
j u s t i f y t h e r e f l e x i v e c o n s t a t a t i o n o f a c o h e r e n t o r d e r i n t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f
n a t u r e . T h i s o r d e r e d c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e e m p i r i c a l l y m a n i f o l d t r a n s l a t e s o n t o
t h e l e v e l o f t h e p h e n o m e n a t h e i n i t i a l c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d . I t s c h e m a t i z e s
t h e s y n d o s i s , t h e u n i - d i v e r s i t y o f s p a c e a n d t i m e . K a n t c a l l s p u r p o s i v e n e s s t h e
" l a w f u l n e s s o f t h e c o n t i n g e n t , " i t s c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e f o r m o f a l a w . T h e t h i r d
C r i t i q u e i s i n q u e s t o f a p r i n c i p l e o f t h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f t h e f o r m s o f n a t u r e .
I t s e e k s t o d i s c o v e r p u r p o s i v e f o r m s , " s i n g u l a r t h i n g s i n t h e f o r m o f s y s t e m s , "
f r a g m e n t s o f o r d e r e m e r g i n g f r o m d i s o r d e r w h i c h b e a r w i t n e s s t o a s u p e r - s e n -
s i b l e o r d e r . I t i s p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t ,
w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o t h r e e t y p e s o f f o r m a l p u r p o s i v e n e s s : t h e b e a u t i f u l , t h e
s u b l i m e , a n d l i f e a r e t h e s c h e m a s o f t h e s y n d o s i s ; t h e y i n c a r n a t e f i n i t e l y t h e
i n f i n i t e f o r m o f c o m m u n i t y . A r e t h e y s i m p l y e q u i v a l e n t s , o r i s t h e r e h e r e
s o m e s o r t o f g r a d a t i o n ? I n w h a t s e n s i b l e f a c e d o t h e t r a i t s o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e
r e p r o d u c e t h e m s e l v e s m o s t f a i t h f u l l y ? O n a f i r s t l e v e l , w e e n c o u n t e r " o b j e c t i v e
p u r p o s i v e n e s s " : o r g a n i c s y s t e m s o f w h i c h t h e p a r t s a r e o n l y p o s s i b l e b y m e a n s
o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o t h e w h o l e a n d w h e r e t h e p a r t s m u t u a l l y e n g e n d e r e a c h
o t h e r i n r e c r e a t i n g t h e u n i t y o f t h i s w h o l e ( c f . 6 4 - 6 5 ) . E a c h l i v i n g b e i n g c a r -
r i e s w i t h i n i t s e l f i n t h i s m a n n e r t h e l i v i n g f o r m o f t h e w o r l d . I n t h e j u d g m e n t
of beauty-and first of all in this "free" or "vague" beauty which Kant distin-
guishes from "merely adherent" beauty-another dimension of syndosis
unveils itself, the dimension of the free appearance of the manifold in the One.
The accent is no longer placed on the internal connection of the parts but on
the free play of forms, legality without law and purposiveness without pur-
pose. Transcendental formality schematizes itself here in the "vision of chang-
ing figures" (22, 83; 81) where the manifold is unified without a rule-
arabesques and ornamental scrolls, flickering of a flame or waves of a stream,
which are as many floating and unstable schemas, the hesitant contours of
which reconstitute themselves every instant only in order to efface themselves
anew. In its unrule, beauty manifests better than life the structure of syndosis,
its immanent giving of the manifold gift, where form ceaselessly deforms
itself, partitions and apportions itself, alters itself in remaining one and the
same. Its scope remains nonetheless limited by the finitude of the imagina-
tion. The most free beauty still restrains the play of this syndosis, restricts
form still to the contour of a figure, imposes on form an appearance that fixes
it, an outline that freezes it. When beautiful form frees itself of figurative con-
straints, when it disfigures itself and unlimits itself, only then does it tend to
the sublime, to the point of appearing chaotic and formless. But chaos is the
supreme order: the finite figures of the phenomena mask the infinity of pure
forms and only a radical disfiguration of the world reveals the world's Law.
The limen of the sublime is the threshold of the passage.
Of a passage which, as we are beginning to understand, does not lead to
another world that would be distinct from the world of phenomena. In the
ordeal of the sublime, the ancient opposition between sensible and super-sen-
sible is unsettled: the third Critique implies another thought of the super-sen-
sible, which does not hide behind the veil of Isis, but weaves the texture of this
veil; which does not reside beyond the sensible, but lies this side ofit as its sub-
stratum or its reverse, as its form-in-retreat which makes a gift of sensible
diversity and retires in the movement through which it appears. The unity of
the super-sensible substratum is the connective form of the world, its nexus or
its Law. It is this form of law that presents its profile when the failure of syn-
thesis permits a glimpse-upstream of all phenomena-of the gift of syndosis,
its transcendental Ur[orm, which is Gesetz-positing of the sensible-and lex
or logos, obliging reception of its diversity. The truth of the sublime is that it
discloses, in its opacity, the faceless form of the Law. What appears within the
horizon of finitude as an additional violence, through which the violent ten-
sion of the imagination is broken, is in truth the power of the gift, the sover-
eign excess of infinitude over the finite. An infinitude which is no longer that
of the Cartesian God, and which is not superabundance of bounty and love,
but the imperative obligation of a Law.
This Law of the world is the Law of community, as universitas or Inbe-
griff, but also as Urgemeinschaft: carnal archi-community the agreement of
w h i c h s u p p o r t s t h i s w o r l d a n d a c c o r d s i t i n i t s B e i n g . T h e f i r s t v o c a t i o n o f
e t h i c s i s t o p r e s c r i b e t h i s a c c o r d . T h i s s i d e o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y -
- t h e d i v e r s e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f " K a n t i a n M o r a l s " - t h e L a w c o m m a n d s n o t h -
i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s c o m m u n i t y . I n K a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , a n d i n h i s l a n g u a g e s t i l l
m a r k e d b y t h e t r a d i t i o n , t h e c o m m u n i t y t h a t o r g a n i z e s i t s e l f i n t h e n a m e o f
t h e L a w i s t h e r e i g n o f p u r p o s e s . t h e h i g h e s t f o r m o f t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e :
i t i s t h e " f i n a l p u r p o s e [ E n d z w e c k ] o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a w o r l d , " a n d t h e h i g h e s t
g o o d p o s s i b l e i n t h i s w o r l d ( c f . 8 4 - 8 7 ) . T h e s u b l i m e i s t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t o f
t h i s e n d , t h e p r o m i s e o f c o m m u n i t y . 2 3 O n e m u s t n o t c o n s i d e r i t t h e n a s a n
a e s t h e t i c i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a p r e e s t a b l i s h e d m o r a l r u l e . A s t h e s c h e m a o f t h e
s u p e r - s e n s i b l e , t h e s u b l i m e c a n n o t b e e x t e r i o r t o w h a t i t s c h e m a t i z e s : i t i s t h e
L a w i t s e l f , a n d t h e s u b l i m e c o m m u n i t y d e s t i n e s i t s e l f a s a l w a y s s t i l l t o c o m e ,
s t i l l d e f e r r e d a n d p r o m i s e d . T h e i n f i n i t y o f t h e f u t u r e i s w h a t i s m o s t s u b l i m e
i n t i m e . T h e i n f i n i t u d e o f t h e s u b l i m e , h o w e v e r , c a n n o t b e t h e i l l u s o r y i n f i n i t y
o f t h e " D i a l e c t i c , " t h e i n a c c e s s i b l e e n d o f a n i n d e f i n i t e p r o g r e s s i o n . T h e i n f i -
n i t e f o r m o f c o m m u n i t y i s s u p p o s e d t o h a v e b e e n a l w a y s a l r e a d y g i v e n t o u s ,
a s i t i s s u p p o s e d t o b e o f f e r e d a n e w e v e r y i n s t a n t . F o r i t i s t h e g i f t o f t h e w o r l d ,
v e i l e d b y t h e a p p e a r i n g o f t h e p h e n o m e n a , a n d t r a n s p a r e n t l y t r a n s p i r i n g i n
t h e t e a r s i n t h e v e i l . T h e m o n o t o n o u s t i m e o f t h e s c h e m a t i s m c o v e r s o v e r t h e
b r i l l i a n t e x p l o s i o n o f i t s d o n a t i o n . I t m a y p l e a s e t h e s u b j e c t t o f i g u r e f o r t h f o r
i t s e l f a w o r l d i n t h e a s s u r a n c e o f i t s a u t o - a f f e c t i o n . I n t h e c e r t i t u d e t h a t n o t h -
i n g i s h a p p e n i n g , t h a t n o t h i n g s u b l i m e c o u l d e v e r b e f a l l i t . B u t w h a t e r u p t s
i n t o t h e d i s t r e s s o f t h i s t i m e , w h a t r e c a l l s t h e s u b j e c t t o i t s c h a n c e a n d c o n -
v o k e s i t i n i t s f r e e d o m - t h a t i s s u b l i m e . T h a t i s w h a t o u g h t t o c o m e , w h a t i s
a l w a y s a b o u t t o c o m e , w h a t i s d e f e r r e d t o i n f i n i t y a n d r e m a i n s i n w a i t . O n e
c a n j u d g e t o b e s u b l i m e t h e s t o r y o f t h i s i n d e f a t i g a b l e w a i t i n g o n t h e t h r e s h o l d
o f t h e L a w .
Chapter 7
@
TRAGEDY AND SUBLIMITY:
THE SPECULATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
OEDIPUS REX ON THE THRESHOLD
OF GERMAN IDEALISM
Jean-Franfois Courtine
In his elegant "Essay on the Tragic," Peter Szondi noted, with reference to
the interpretation of Greek tragedy sketched by Schelling in the last of his Let-
ters on Dogmatism and Critidsm
2
(an interpretation whose guiding thread is
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex): "This interpretation of Oedipus Rex and of Greek
tragedy in general marks the beginning of a period in the history of the theory
of tragedy in which the focus of interest is no longer on tragic effect (to tes
tragodias ergon), but on the phenomenon itself." And after having retraced in
broad strokes Schelling's analysis, Szondi notes again by way of conclusion:
In Schelling's interpretation, the tragic hero does not merely suc-
cumb to the 'superior power' of the objective, but he is punished
for having succumbed, and even for having engaged in the com-
bat, and thus the positive value of his attitude-that will to free-
dom which constitutes the 'essence of the Ego'-turns against
him. One can call this process, with Hegel, 'dialectical'. (13; 45)
I will not investigate here whether this last characterization is well
founded, nor whether it is possible to find evidence of any sort of phenome-
nology of the tragic in Schelling's work. I would like simply-after having
examined more closely what may seem like a mere "digression" in the Letters,
placing it in the context of its immediate problematic-to pose the question
of whether and to what extent Schelling's analysis can be considered as the
first speculative theory of the tragic phenomenon and, consequently, as some-
157
1 5 8 J E A N - F R A N y O I S C O U R T I N E
t h i n g d e c i d e d l y e p o c h - m a k i n g , m a r k i n g a t r u e r u p t u r e i n t h e " p o e t i c " e x e g e -
s i s o f t r a g e d y , t h a t i s , i n d e e d a s t h e f i r s t r e s o l u t e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
s i n c e A r i s t o t l e ' s P o e t i c s .
I w o u l d a l s o l i k e t o e x a m i n e w h e t h e r a n d t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e t h e o r y
s k e t c h e d i n t h e L e t t e r s a n t i c i p a t e s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o p o s e d i n t h e L e c t u r e s
o n t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f A r t ( 1 8 0 2 - 3 ) , a n d m o r e p r e c i s e l y s t i l l i n w h a t s e n s e t h i s
f l e e t i n g s k e t c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e t r u e g e r m , t h e c e n t r a l k e r n e l o f t h e a p r i o r i
d e d u c t i o n o f t h e p o e t i c g e n r e s e x p o s e d i n t h e J e n a L e c t u r e s .
F i n a l l y , I w i l l a s k w h e t h e r o n e c a n v i e w t r a g e d y , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e
t r i p l e f u n c t i o n S c h e l l i n g a s s i g n s t o a r t a t t h e e n d o f t h e S y s t e m o f T r a n s c e n d e n -
t a l I d e a l i s m , 3 a s t h e s u p r e m e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f a r t , a s t h e w o r k p a r e x c e l -
l e n c e , t h a t w o r k w h i c h m o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r i l l u m i n a t e s t h e e s s e n c e o f a r t a n d
i t s p r o p e r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r s p e c u l a t i v e i m p o r t .
F r o m t h e e n d o f t h e L e t t e r s o n D o g m a t i s m a n d C r i t i c i s m , p a s s i n g b y w a y
o f t h e S y s t e m o f 1 8 0 0 , a n d u p t o t h e L e c t u r e s o f J e n a , S c h e l l i n g c a r r i e s o u t ,
t h r o u g h h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f G r e e k t r a g e d y , a p r e l i m i n a r y e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e
e n t i r e p h i l o s o p h y o f I d e n t i t y f r o m h i s e a r l i e s t a t t e m p t s o n .
I f o n e w o u l d c o m p r e h e n d t h e s e n s e a n d i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e b r i e f a n a l y s i s
o f G r e e k t r a g e d y t h a t o p e n s t h e t e n t h L e t t e r , o n e m u s t f i r s t o f a l l s i t u a t e i t a s
p r e c i s e l y a s p o s s i b l e i n t h e ( h a r s h l y d i s c o n t i n u o u s , s i n u o u s ) g e n e r a l e c o n o m y
o f t h e L e t t e r s . I n t h e L e t t e r s - w h o s e m o d e o f e x p o s i t i o n , t h e e p i s t o l a r y g e n r e ,
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l a d a p t e d t o h i s d e s i g n - S c h e l l i n g p u r s u e s s e v e r a l o b j e c t i v e s :
f i r s t o f a l l , h e a t t e m p t s t o m a r k c l e a r l y t h e s h a r p s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n d o g m a t i -
c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m ( o r r a t h e r , t h o r o u g h g o i n g o r c o n s i s t e n t d o g m a t i s m -
r e a d : S p i n o z i s m ) , a n d t o s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e r i s k o f d o g m a t i z a t i o n t o w h i c h ,
i n h i s d a y , c r i t i c i s m i s e x p o s e d .
4
F u r t h e r , a n d a b o v e a l l , h e a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g t o
l i g h t t h e p r o b l e m w i t h w h i c h b o t h d o g m a t i s m a n d c r i t i c i s m a r e n e c e s s a r i l y
f a c e d : t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e " e n i g m a o f t h e w o r l d " ( d a s R i i t s e l d e r W e l t ) ( 1 , 3 , 7 8 ) ,
a s S c h e l l i n g s a y s , o r a g a i n t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e " d o m a i n o f
e x p e r i e n c e " ( 1 , 3 , 7 9 ) , t h a t i s , o f t h e f i n i t e a n d i t s r e l a t i v e a u t o n o m y . T h e q u e s -
t i o n c o n c e r n s t h u s , i f y o u w i l l , t h e d i f f i c u l t d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e f i n i t e E g o a n d
i t s f r a g i l e s t a t u s . I n a d d i t i o n , a n d f i n a l l y , S c h e l l i n g a t t e m p t s t o s h o w w h y t h e
p r o f o u n d a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e t w o t y p e s o f p o s s i b l e s y s t e m s i s i r r e d u c i b l e ,
t o d i s e n g a g e t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r a c t i c a l p o s t u l a t e s f r o m e a c h o f t h e g i v e n t h e s e s
a n d , h a v i n g t h u s " c h a n g e d t e r r a i n , " c h o s e n a n e w f i e l d o n w h i c h t o m a n e u -
v r e - t h a t o f p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n - t o p l a c e t h e i m a g i n a r y c o r r e s p o n d e n t , t h e
f i c t i v e a d d r e s s e e o f t h e L e t t e r s , b e f o r e t h e t r u e a n d u l t i m a t e a l t e r n a t i v e : t o
k n o w w h o h e i s o r w h o h e w a n t s t o b e , w h a . t o r w h o m h e g i v e s h i m s e l f t o b e
p r a c t i c a l l y - a n d t o d e c i d e c o n s e q u e n t l y s e i t h e r f o r u n l i m i t e d a c t i v i t y o r f o r
a b s o l u t e p a s s i v i t y - a b a n d o n , r e p o s e i n t h e a r m s o f t h e w o r l d .
O n e m i g h t a s k o n e s e l f , h o w e v e r , i f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e b e t w e e n d o g m a t i s m
a n d c r i t i c i s m , p o s e d i n t h e s e t e r m s , s t i l l a l l o w s o n e t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e p o w e r
o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; i f t h e e f f o r t t o r e a l i z e t h e a b s o l u t e w i t h i n o n e s e l f b y a n
Tragedy and Sublimity 159
unlimited activity does not lead one to rob the object of all consistency, to
make it lose its essential status of resistance; and if, inversely, the abandon-
ment of oneself to the world, the Empedoclean aspiration to throw oneself
"into the arms of the infinite" and to lose oneself in the "young world"6 does
not represent a merely illusory triumph for the power of the objective. For if
the objective dominates as a result of the measureless passivity of the subject;
it ends up owing its victory to the subject itself insofar the subject abandons
and renounces itself in dis appropriating itself.
One could show this in detail, it seems to me, by following the analyses
of the eighth Letter concerning the intellectual intuition and the (quasi neces-
sary) illusion ofSpinoza and of all authentic Schwarmer. This is why the fictive
addressee of the Letters legitimately can and even ought-it seems-to intro-
duce in fine a third possibility. This possibility necessarily imposes itself on
one's thought as soon as one's considerations are no longer limited to the sub-
ject-object couple, or the principal antagonism between freedom of the Ego
and power of the objective, and as soon as this latter power presents itself,
even if only by means of a historicization of these conflictual terms, as an
"excessive power" (Obermacht).
The alternative onto which the ninth Letter opens is, if not quite decep-
tive, at least incomplete. To be sure, it is important to decide, that is, to halt or
hold up the type of destiny that everyone is at every turn in a position to make
his or her own, in conformity with the fundamental opposition of dogmatism
and criticism:
In dogmatism, my destiny is to annihilate all free causality in
myself, not to act myself, but to let absolute causality act in me, to
restrain ever further the limits of my liberty, in order to enlarge to
this extent those of the objective world-in short, absolutely
unlimited passivity .... For criticism, my destiny is this: to struggle
to attain to unmovable selfhood, unconditioned liberty, activity
without limits. So be it! Such is the supreme requirement of criti-
cism. (I, 3, 104, 106)
But we have to take a third element equally into account; we still have in
effect something to learn: "that there exists an objective power which threatens
to annihilate our liberty and that, penetrated by this firm conviction, we have
to struggle against it and in so doing perish" (1,3, 106). This last possibility not
only ought not to be excluded in principle, but ought in a sense to remain
always in view, ever present to the spirit. Not as a "real" possibility, but at the
very least as an imaginary possibility, which as such ought to be entrusted to
art (to artistic representation)-and even to the highest art: tragedy.
Why has such a possibility disappeared as a "real possibility" if indeed it
ever had a reality other than that precisely of Darstellung, "representation and
1 6 0 ] E A N - F R A N 9 0 I S C O U R T I N E
s p e c t a c l e " ? S c h e l l i n g l i m i t s h i m s e l f t o s a y i n g l a c o n i c a l l y t h a t t h e e v e n t u a l i t y o f
t h e f r o n t a l c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e E g o i n i t s f r e e " s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n " ( S e l b s t m a c h t )
a n d s o m e s o r t o f p o w e r d e f i n e d p r i m a r i l y b y i t s e x c e s s o r i t s " u n m e a s u r e "
( O b e r m a s s ) v a n i s h e d l o n g a g o b e f o r e t h e l i g h t o f r e a s o n . S c h e l l i n g h a d a l r e a d y
e v o k e d i n t h e p r e f a c e t o V o m ! c h t h e n e c e s s i t y o f d e l i v e r i n g h u m a n i t y d e f i n i -
t i v e l y f r o m " t h e t e r r o r s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d " ( I , 3 , 1 0 7 ) . 7 T h e c o n c r e t e p o s -
s i b i l i t y o f e n v i s a g i n g a n y v i o l e n t s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e e x c e s s i v e p o w e r ( O b e r -
m a c h t ) d i s a p p e a r e d a t t h e s a m e t i m e a s t h e i d e a o f d e s t i n y a n d i t s s u p e r i o r
f o r c e e m p t i e d i t s e l f o f a l l t r u e c o n t e n t . S u c h a n i d e a b e l o n g s h e n c e f o r t h t o
a n o t h e r a g e , i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a b y g o n e p e r i o d o f h i s t o r y c o n c e i v e d i n i t s
t o t a l i t y a s " c o n t i n u o u s r e v e l a t i o n , p r o g r e s s i v e s e l f - u n v e i l i n g o f t h e a b s o l u t e " :
t h e t r a g i c p e r i o d , e v o k e d a s i f i n p a s s i n g a t t h e e n d o f t h e S y s t e m o f T r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l I d e a l i s m .
I t i s i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , t o m a i n t a i n i n t h e s p h e r e o f a r t t h e v i v i d r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , o r m o r e c o n c r e t e l y t h i s s t r u g g l e o f f r e e d o m a g a i n s t
o b j e c t i v e p o w e r . F o r w h a t r e a s o n ? W h a t i s i t t h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h i s
r e m i n d e r ? O n w h a t i s t h e p e r m a n e n t v a l u e o f s u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b a s e d ?
B e f o r e ( i n d i r e c t l y ) d o i n g j u s t i c e t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , a n d o n t h e t h r e s h -
o l d o f h i s f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e t r a g i c p r o c e s s , S c h e l l i n g b e g i n s b y r e j e c t i n g
t h e p r o b l e m a t i c t h a t u n d e r l i e s b o t h c l a s s i c a l a n d A u f k l a r u n t e x e g e s e s o f t h i s
p r o c e s s , a p r o b l e m a t i c o n e c a n p u t i n t h e s e t e r m s : " H o w w a s G r e e k r e a s o n
a b l e t o b e a r t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f i t s t r a g e d y ? " O r a g a i n : " W h a t r e n d e r e d c o n -
t r a d i c t i o n b e a r a b l e i n t h e e y e s o f t h e G r e e k s ? " O e d i p u s R e x i s n a t u r a l l y t h e
h e r o i c f i g u r e w h o i l l u s t r a t e s m o s t n e a t l y s u c h a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n i t s i n a d m i s s i -
b l e q u a l i t y . S c h e l l i n g p r e s e n t s h i m i n t h e s e t e r m s : " A m o r t a l , d e s t i n e d b y
f a t u m [ V e r h a n g n i s l t o b e c o m e a c r i m i n a l , s t r u g g l i n g h i m s e l f a g a i n s t t h i s
f a t u m , a n d n o n e t h e l e s s t e r r i b l y p u n i s h e d f o r a c r i m e w h i c h w a s t h e w o r k o f
d e s t i n y ! " ( 1 , 3 , 1 0 6 ) .
S c h e l l i n g ' s g e s t u r e , w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n p l a c i n g r a d i c a l l y i n q u e s t i o n a
r e c e i v e d p r o b l e m a t i c ( " H o w w a s G r e e k r e a s o n . . . ? " ) , i n t e r e s t s m e h e r e i n p a r -
t i c u l a r b e c a u s e i t r e p e a t s i n a s e n s e - a n d 1 w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s - h i s g e s t u r e i n
t h e e i g h t h L e t t e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o S p i n o z a . " I a s k m y s e l f , " t h e f i c t i v e a d d r e s s e e
o b j e c t e d , " h o w a s p i r i t a s l i m p i d a s h i s , a s p i r i t t h e s w e e t c l a r i t y o f w h i c h i l l u -
m i n a t e s h i s e n t i r e l i f e a n d w o r k , w a s a b l e t o b e a r s u c h a d e s t r u c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , .
a p r i n c i p l e i n d e e d o f a n n i h i l a t i o n ? " ( 1 , 3 , 8 6 ) . S c h e l l i n g i s r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f a l l S c h w a r m e r e i , w h i c h f o r m u l a t e s i t s i n t r a c t a b l e d e m a n d a s f o l -
l o w s : " R e t u r n t o t h e d i v i n e o r i g i n a l s o u r c e o f a l l e x i s t e n c e , u n i t e w i t h t h e
a b s o l u t e , a n n i h i l a t e t h e s e l f . "
B u t l e t u s r e t u r n t o t r a g e d y . S c h e l l i n g ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h e r e c e i v e d , q u a s i
o b l i g a t o r y q u e s t i o n o f t h e u n b e a r a b l e c o n t r a d i c t i o n c o n s i s t s i n s h o w i n g t h a t
t h e u l t i m a t e g r o u n d o r f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e a n t i n o m y c o n s i s t s - b e y o n d m e r e
" r e a s o n " - i n t h e r e s o l u t e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h a t w h i c h a t f i r s t s e e m s u t t e r l y s c a n -
d a l o u s , t h e s u p r e m e i n j u s t i c e . T h e t r a n s m u t a t i o n o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o a
superior reason and of conflict into reconciliation was mediated precisely by
the struggle to the death between human freedom and the power of the objec-'.L&., -t
tive world. To be sure, once this power had become an excessive power (a
fatum), freedom had to succumb, and since it did not succumb without a
struggle, freedom had to be punished for and through its very defeat. To pun-
ish the "criminal," although he or she succumbed only to the superior power
of destiny, was still a way-a paradoxical way, if you like
9
-of recognizing the
intangibility of human freedom and of paying it a supreme hommage. Thus,
Greek tragedy magnified the freedom of its heros, even if they were con-
demned in advance, precisely by revealing in all its bitterness the terrifying
and rigorous logic of the struggle between freedom and the implacably supe-
rior power of destiny. "It was an exalted idea," Schelling notes, "to allow man
to accept his torture voluntarily, even for an inevitable crime, and to manifest
in this way his freedom through the very loss of his freedom, to have him suc-
cumb while declaring the rights of his free will" (I, 3, 107).
To manifest one's freedom even through the loss of this freedom itself,
to sacrifice oneself to freedom by voluntarily accepting to be tortured for a
crime of which one remains innocent or which one had to commit against
one's will, in order to recognize it only retrospectively [apres coup]-in all
senses of the expression-this is in Schelling's eyes the grandiose conception
on which Greek tragedy rests at its highest point, a conception owing to which
freedom and necessity can be finally conjugated and reconciled-at least
within the limits of art.
What is in fact valid for the mimetic space of representation, for the
scenic space properly speaking-the inexpiable struggle of human freedom
affirming the irreducible autonomy of its "proper power" (its Selbstmacht) in
the face of the superior power of destiny--can neither be applied to the ethical
sphere (the very sphere which, let us recall, is at the heart of the Letters of
1794-95) nor a fortiori serve as a rule for a "system of action." Such a sys-
tem-the system of the struggle to the death, of the unconditional affirmation
of imprescribable rights of freedom in the face of the absolute which is fantas-
matically realized or objectivated outside of me-such a system would pre-
suppose nothing less than a "race of Titans."
Having retraced in broad strokes the general perspectives of Schelling's
interpretation, we can see clearly Schelling's break with the Aristotelian tradi-
tion: his analysis is truly no longer centered on "tragic effect," no longer cen-
tered on the cathartic function of representation and the identification with
the hero which this function necessarily presupposes on the part of the specta-
tors,lO The key concepts of Aristotle's definition of tragedy as a specific figure
of mimesis (eleos kai phobos. but also hamartia) apparently no longer play any
role whatsoever. To be sure, tragedy remains for Schelling a kind of present a-
tion or representation: it exposes or gives to be seen, it stages in the proper
sense (Darstellung) the tragic process, that is, the conflictual process at the
1 6 2 J E A N - F R A N y O I S C O U R T I N E
h e a r t o f w h i c h - a t t h e e n d o f w h i c h - f r e e d o m a n d n e c e s s i t y b e c o m e i d e n t i -
c a l w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , i n a s u d d e n f l a s h b e f o r e o u r e y e s , a s t h e y h a v e b e e n i d e n -
t i c a l f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g i n t h e a b s o l u t e i t s e l f . T h e n i n t h L e t t e r h a d , m o r e o v e r ,
r e a f f i r m e d t h i s i d e n t i t y i n p r i n c i p l e :
H e w h o h a s r e f l e c t e d u p o n f r e e d o m a n d n e c e s s i t y w i l l h a v e d i s -
c o v e r e d o n h i s o w n t h a t t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y b e
u n i t e d i n t h e a b s o l u t e : - f r e e d o m b e c a u s e t h e a b s o l u t e a c t s i n
f u n c t i o n o f i t s u n c o n d i t i o n a l s e l f - e m p o w e r m e n t ; - n e c e s s i t y
b e c a u s e t h e a b s o l u t e c a n a c t o n l y i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e l a w s o f
i t s e s s e n c e . I n t h e a b s o l u t e , t h e r e i s n o r o o m f o r a n y w i l l s u s c e p t i -
b l e o f s t r a y i n g f r o m a l a w , b u t n o r o o m e i t h e r f o r a n y l a w w h i c h i t
w o u l d n ' t f i r s t h a v e g i v e n t o i t s e l f t h r o u g h i t s a c t i o n s , f o r a n y l a w
w h i c h w o u l d r e t a i n a n y r e a l i t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s e a c t i o n s
t h e m s e l v e s . A b s o l u t e f r e e d o m a n d a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y a r e i d e n t i c a l .
( 1 , 3 , 1 0 7 )
B u t d e s p i t e t h i s i d e n t i t y i n p r i n c i p l e , w h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e p e r m a n e n c e o f
t r a g i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s s t i l l t h e " w o r k " ( e r g o n ) w h i c h t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
p r o p e r l y a c c o m p l i s h e s : t o m a k e m a n i f e s t , a t t h e v e r y h e a r t o f t h e m o s t
e x t r e m e i n n e r c o n f l i c t , a n d w h e n a l l s e e m s d e f i n i t i v e l y l o s t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a
s u p e r i o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . W h a t m a d e t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f w h i c h t h e i r t r a g e d i e s
w e r e w o v e n b e a r a b l e t o t h e G r e e k s w a s n o t p r i n c i p a l l y s o m e " e f f e c t " o f
r e s t o r e d h a r m o n y o r t h e p u r i f i c a t i o n o f c e r t a i n a f f e c t s w h i c h w o u l d p e r m i t
o n e t o s u b s t i t u t e p l e a s u r e f o r p a i n f u l e m o t i o n s , b u t , m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y , t h e
f a c t t h a t t h e s p e c t a t o r ' s c a t h a r s i s p o i n t s t o t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w h i c h i s a t w o r k
i n t r a g e d y i t s e l f , a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f w h i c h t r a g e d y c o n s t i t u t e s , a s i t w e r e , t h e
u n e q u a l l e d e v e n t . O n e c a n t h u s u n d e r s t a n d b e t t e r w h y s u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
c e n t e r e d f r o m t h e f i r s t o n t r a g i c a c t i o n ( t h e d r a m a ) , s h o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y a n d i n
t h e s a m e g e s t u r e u n d e r s c o r e t h e u n s u r p a s s a b l e l i m i t s o f a l l p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
t h i s t y p e : t h e y a r e t h e l i m i t s o f a r t . F o r t h e s p e c t a c l e o f t r a g e d y i s a l w a y s i l l u s o r y :
i t a n t i c i p a t e s i n e f f e c t t h e a b s o l u t e - a n d a s y m p t o t i c - ( r e ) u n i f i c a t i o n o f
a n t a g o n i s t i c t e r m s , w h a t e v e r o n e w i s h e s t o c a l l t h e m : f r e e d o m - n e c e s s i t y , f i n i -
t u d e - i n f i n i t u d e , E g o - a b s o l u t e o b j e c t .
T h i s i s w h y o n e c a n a s k o n e s e l f i f , i n t h e c o m p l e x e c o n o m y o f t h e L e t -
t e r s , t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f G r e e k t r a g e d y d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e a e s t h e t i c o - p o s -
i t i v e f l i p s i d e o f t h e S p i n o z i s t i l l u s i o n ; i f , i n o t h e r w o r d s - t h i s t i m e w o r d s
t a k e n f r o m H o l d e r l i n - t r a g e d y o u g h t n o t t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a s " t h e m e t a p h o r
o f a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n . " 1 1 B u t l e t ' s r e t u r n f o r a m o m e n t t o S p i n o z a , t h e
e p o n y m o u s h e r o o f t h o r o u g h g o i n g a n d f u l l y c o h e r e n t d o g m a t i s m . S p i n o z a
t o o k h i s d e p a r t u r e f r o m a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e i m m e d i a c y o r o r i g i n a r i t y o f w h i c h
c o u l d n o t b e p l a c e d i n q u e s t i o n , t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f " s e l f - i n t u i t i o n " ( S e l b s t a n -
s c h a u u n g ) . I t i s i n t h i s i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s e l f b y t h e s e l f - w h i c h b y d e f i n i t i o n c a n
only be an intellectual intuition
12
-that the Ego identifies itself, assures itself
of its proper selfhood. "This intellectual intuition produces itself," Schelling
writes, "when we cease to be an object for ourselves, whenever the intuitive
Self, going back into itself, becomes identical with what it intuits" (I, 3, 88).
This intellectual intuition, which can be produced only through freedom, per-
mits us to gain access to what is "in the proper sense of the term," and with
respect to which "all the rest is but appearance. n Spinoza's error consisted, as
we know, in objectifying this intuition of the absolute in himself. He did not
recognize that through this intuition, which is like the tangential point of the
finite Ego and the absolute Ego, the absolute became identical to him. He
believed, to the contrary, that it was he who was becoming identical to the
absolute, and he accepted, in accordance with this presupposition, the idea of
self-destruction. In doing so, he fell victim to a general illusion, in any case an
illusion held in common by all Schwarmer and nearly impossible to uproot:
the illusion that consists in surrepticiously putting one's Ego in the place of
the absolute in order to make acceptable to oneself precisely the idea of one's
own disappearance, one's own annihilation in the absolute object.
One might ask oneself, returning now to tragedy, whether the tragic
hero does not proceed to a substitution of the same order when he voluntarily
accepts to take onto himself without reserve crimes imposed by destiny and,
struggling nonetheless against the inexorable, to be frightfully punished for
what comes properly speaking from Fatum itself. By identifying thus with
what is fated, by refusing to allow certain of his actions to be dissociated from
himself, that is, by boldly laying claim to the ultimate and unforeseeable conse-
quences of these actions, the tragic hero, because he means to speak always on
his own behalf, loses and gains in one stroke the absoluteness of his freedom.
Just as a Schwiirmer would have had difficulty being satisfied with the
idea of his own disappearance into the abyss of the divine ifhe had not always
already put his own Ego in the place of God, the tragic hero has been able to
suffer his punishment only by condemning himself and by inflicting upon
himself, as Oedipus did, the most terrible of punishments (blindness, exile,
wandering in the midst of the unthinkable).
To be sure, as Schelling strongly underscores:
In this intellectual state which Spinoza described in accordance
with the testimony of his self-intuition, all conflict within us is
supposed to disappear, all struggle, even the most noble, the
struggle of morality, is supposed to end, and all the contradictions
that sense and reason inevitably create between morality and hap-
piness are supposed to be resolved. (1, 3, 91)
Of course, tragic drama does not involve exactly the same thing.
Indeed, the situation is, if you will, exactly the inverse: only in absolute d i s s o ~
1 6 4 J E A N - F R A N < ; : O I S C O U R T I N E
n a n c e , a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e m o s t u n b e a r a b l e d i s s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n h a p p i n e s s
a n d m e r i t , c a n t h e h e r o - p a i n f u l l y e x p o s e d t o t h e b l o w s o f f a t e , b u t r e f u s i n g
t h e m a l l t h e m o r e r e s o l u t e l y a n y p a s s i v e s t a n c e - r e d i s c o v e r , t h a t i s , r e c o n -
q u e r - e v e n i f m o s t o f t e n a t t h e p r i c e o f h i s l o s s o r c o m p l e t e s e l f - f o r f e i t u r e -
t h e h a r m o n i a a p h a n e s e v o k e d b y H e r a c l i t u s ' s F r a g m e n t 5 4 . I n n e a r l y t h e
s a m e e p o c h , i n t h e H o m b u r g e s s a y s , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r i n h i s s t u d y " O n t h e
D i f f e r e n c e o f P o e t i c M o d e s , " H o i d e r l i n s o u g h t t o c o n j u g a t e , u n d e r t h e t i t l e
o f t h e " h a r m o n i c a l l y o p p o s e d , " o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e F u h l b a r k e i t d e s G a n z e n
( " t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e w h o l e t o b e f e l t " o r " t h e f e e l a b i l i t y o f t h e w h o l e " ) a n d ,
o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e s e c e s s i o n o f o n e " p a r t " w h i c h , p r e y e d u p o n b y t h e
" e x c e s s o f i n - t e n s i t y " ( O b e r m a s s d e r I n n i g k e i t ) o r t h e " e x c e s s o f u n i - c i t y "
( O b e r m a s s d e r E i n i g k e i t ) , e x c e s s i v e l y i n d i v i d u a l i z e s i t s e l f . S u c h a s e p a r a t i o n
c a n n o t h o w e v e r d i s t u r b o r d i s l o c a t e t h e h a r m o n i c i n t e g r i t y o f t h e w h o l e , f o r
i t i s s o l e l y d u e t o a s e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s s o r t - t h e a b s o l u t e l a c e r a t i o n o f w h i c h
t h e h e r o i s t h e v i c t i m - t h a t t h e w h o l e c a n r e t u r n u p o n i t s e l f , a c c e d e t o i t s
h i g h e s t , m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e u n i - t o t a l i t y , a n d g i v e w a y t o t h e " i n f i n i t e c o h e -
s i o n o r c o n t e x t " ( u n e n d l i c h e r Z u s a m m e n h a n g ) , w h e r e p a r t s a n d w h o l e c a n b e
f e l t w i t h a n e q u a l v i v a c i t y . B u t a g a i n i n o r d e r f o r t h i s t o t a k e p l a c e , t h e p a r t
m u s t s u f f e r , e n d u r e u n i t y ( E i n i g k e i t ) ; p r o p e r l y t r a g i c p a t h o s i s a l w a y s t h a t o f
V e r e i n z e l u n g , i s o l a t i o n , s o l i t u d e , a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n u p o n o n e s e l f t o t h e p o i n t
o f t h e m o s t e x t r e m e d i s s i d e n c e , l 3
O n e c o u l d t h u s r i s k t h e t h e s i s t h a t f o r S c h e l l i n g t r a g i c i l l u s i o n - f o r i n
t r a g e d y t o o i t i s c e r t a i n l y a m a t t e r o f i l l u s i o n - w o u l d b e t h e i n v e r s e , t h e s y m -
m e t r i c a l n e g a t i o n o f t h e S p i n o z i s t i l l u s i o n : t r a g e d y a l s o w o u l d c o n s i s t i n t h e
o b j e c t i v a t i o n o f a n i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n .
T o b e s u r e , o n e w i l l h a v e t o w a i t f o r t h e S y s t e m o f T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l -
i s m t o s e e S c h e l l i n g d e f i n e i n t h e s e t e r m s - w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o
t r a g e d y - t h e w o r k o f a r t a n d t h e s p e c i f i c i n t u i t i o n t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s t o i t :
" T h i s u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i z e d a n d a b s o l u t e l y u n d e n i a b l e o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n i s a r t i t s e l f . T h e a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n , i n f a c t , i s p r e c i s e l y t h e
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n b e c o m e o b j e c t i v e . " 1 4 N o t h i n g h o w e v e r f o r b i d s u s t o
t h i n k t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e a n a l y s i s o f G r e e k t r a g e d y , i n t h e l a s t o f t h e L e t -
t e r s o f 1 7 9 5 , t h i s i d e a a l r e a d y c a m e t o l i g h t w h i c h c o u l d n o t b e r e t a i n e d i n t h e
c o n t e x t o f t h e L e t t e r s : t h e i d e a t h a t b e y o n d t h e a p p a r e n t l y u n s u r p a s s a b l e a l t e r -
n a t i v e o f d o g m a t i s m o r c r i t i c i s m , t r a g e d y w a s o r h a d b e e n a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t -
a n d p r e c i s e l y s o l e l y i n t h e s p a c e o f r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n - a n a t t e m p t e d a e s t h e t i c
c o n c i l i a t i o n o f t h e t w o d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d i m p e r a t i v e s - t h e i m p e r a t i v e o f
d o g m a t i s m : " A n n i h i l a t e y o u r s e l f ] B e h a v e i n a p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y p a s s i v e m a n -
n e r v i s " a - v i s a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y ! " a n d t h e i m p e r a t i v e o f c r i t i c i s m : " B e ! " l S
T h u s , t h i s f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e t r a g i c p h e n o m e n o n a l r e a d y
p o i n t s - p r e c i s e l y b y w a y o f t h e a e s t h e t i c s p h e r e , a n d t h a n k s t o a n a e s t h e t i c
v e r s i o n o f t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n - i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f
identity. A first landmark, a first stone will have been thereby placed to be
built upon later in a reconstructive or retrospective mode.
And in fact, some years later, in the Lectures on the Philosophy 0/ Art,
Schelling will reassert his earlier interpretation, and in nearly the same words.
But of course, it is to this "nearly" that we shall have to pay particularly close
attention .
. In the Lectures of Jena and Wiirzburg, Schelling sketches out his inter-
pretation of tragedy and the tragic in the frame of an analytic of the sublime.
The point ought to be emphasized, for Schelling here parts company with
Kant,16, who had illustrated his definition of the sublime (mathematical and
dynamic) only with examples taken from the natural sphere. In contrast,
Schiller-whom Schelling follows closely here-although he too seeks to dis-
cover the ultimate foundation of the natural sublime, seeks further to discover
the similarities and differences between the natural sublime and its historical
counterpart.
Schelling's analysis of the sublime presupposes the determination of at
least two concepts which I shall have to present very quickly here: the concept
of genius (already at the center of the study of art and its production in the
System o/Transcendental Idealism) and the concept of poetry.
Schelling instructs us in 63 that one can call genius "the eternal con-
cept of man in God," insofar as it is permissible to consider the genius as "the
immediate cause of his productions." To be sure, it is man who effectively
produces, but man apprehended as that which, within him, is more than him-
self, man apprehended in his concept such as he is present in God himself. In
other words, the genius can be seen as "the divine immanent in man"-the
divine which is inherent in man or inhabits
l7
man-and which constitutes a
kind of "fragment of the absoluteness of God."
The second concept we have to confront before proceeding to
Schelling's analytic of the sublime is more difficult and surprising in various
respects. Schelling opposes in fact "poetry," in the strict sense, to "art" (or bet-
ter: to what he calls die Kunst der Kunst, the essence of art, that which, in art, is
properly art or artistic). As for poetry, it represents "the real side of genius"; it
is at the basis of the "information" or "uniformation"-"esemplasis," if one
follows Coleridge'sl81ead-ofthe infinite in the finite. To this staging or imag-
ing of the infinite responds, on the ideal side, the uniformation of the finite in
the infinite, the principle of which is art.
One will note that in the definition of the two latter-complementary
rather than antagonistic-concepts, the schema of mimesis seems to have no
place. Schelling takes equal care to cut short all allegorical interpretation of the
relations between the finite and the infinite: insofar as the infinite has been
incorporated into the finite to the point of no longer being distinct from it
(Ineinsbildung), the finite becomes truly independent, "consistent" (etwas [iir
sich Bestehendes): it attains the status of Being/Essence (Wesen) in itself. And
1 6 6 J E A N - F R A N 9 0 I S C O U R T I N E
a s s u c h , i t i s w h a t " n o l o n g e r m e r e l y m e a n s s o m e t h i n g e l s e , " w h a t n o l o n g e r
p o i n t s o r r e f e r s t o a n y t h i n g e x t e r i o r t o i t s e l f . O n e m u s t r e c a l l t h a t i n t h e b a c k -
g r o u n d o f t h i s a b s o l u t i z a t i o n o f t h e w o r k , a p p r e h e n d e d i n i t s e s s e n t i a l i t y ,
t h e r e s t a n d s K . P . M o r i t z ' s t r u l y i n a u g u r a l e s s a y " O n t h e F o r m a t i v e I m i t a t i o n
o f t h e B e a u t i f u l . " 1 9 " I t i s t h e a b s o l u t e i t s e l f , " S c h e l l i n g c o n c l u d e s , " w h i c h g i v e s
a n i n d e p e n d e n t l i f e t o t h e i d e a s o f t h i n g s p r e s e n t w i t h i n i t , b y i n f o r m i n g t h e m
e t e r n a l l y i n t o f i n i t u d e [ E n d l i c h k e i t ] . "
I t i s i n t e r m s o f t h e s e t w o d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f p o s s i b l e u n i t y - t h e i n f i n i t e
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e f i n i t e , a n d t h e f i n i t e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e i n f i n i t e - t h a t
S c h e l l i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n s u b l i m i t y a n d b e a u t y : " T h e f i r s t u n i t y , t h a t
w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n t h e u n i f o r m a t i o n ( E i n b i l d u n g ) o f t h e i n f i n i t e i n t o t h e f i n i t e ,
f i n d s i t s p r i v i l e g e d e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e w o r k o f a r t a s s u b l i m i t y ; t h e s e c o n d , t h a t
w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n t h e u n i f o r m a t i o n o f t h e f i n i t e i n t o t h e i n f i n i t e , a s b e a u t y . " A n
o b j e c t o r a c t i o n w i l l t h u s b e q u a l i f i e d a s s u b l i m e w h e n t h e y a r e s u s c e p t i b l e ,
p r e c i s e l y a s f i n i t e b e i n g s , o f t a k i n g t h e i n f i n i t e i n t o t h e m s e l v e s ; w h e n t h e y a r e
p r o p e r l y , a n d i n s p i t e o f t h e i r f i n i t u d e , c a p a b l e o f i n f i n i t u d e , a n d t h i s i n s u c h a
m a n n e r t h a t t h e i n f i n i t e p r o c e e d s f r o m a n d i n t h e f i n i t e , t h a t t h e i n f i n i t e p r e -
s e n t s i t s e l f t h e r e i n i t s d i f f e r e n c e ( o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ) , i t s p u r e a l t e r i t y .
H a v i n g r e c a l l e d t h e s e p r i n c i p a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , w e c a n l e a v e a s i d e t h e
d e t a i l s o f S c h e l l i n g ' s a n a l y t i c o f t h e b e a u t i f u l , i n o r d e r t o f o l l o w h i m i n h i s
s t u d y o f t h e s u b l i m e , w h i c h b e g i n s i n t u r n w i t h a p r e l i m i n a r y d i s t i n c t i o n : t h e
s u b l i m e p r o c e e d s e i t h e r f r o m n a t u r e o r f r o m G e s i n n u n g - w h i c h w e c a n
t r a n s l a t e a s e t h o s ( " c h a r a c t e r " ) .
I n h i s a n a l y s i s o f t h e s u b l i m e - a s I h a v e p o i n t e d o u t - S c h e l l i n g o f t e n
d e p e n d s r a t h e r h e a v i l y o n S c h i l l e r , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r o n t h e e s s a y o f 1 7 9 3 ,
" O b e r d a s E r h a b e n e , " p u b l i s h e d f i r s t i n 1 8 0 1 . O n e c a n n o t i n s i s t t o o s t r o n g l y ,
h o w e v e r , o n t h e c a p i t a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n K a n t ,
p r i n c i p a l l y f o r a l l t h a t c o n c e r n s t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f
t h e s u b l i m e a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e d e s t i n y o f m a n .
T h e r e f o r e t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e i n n a t u r e i s r e s p e c t f o r o u r
o w n d e s t i n y , w h i c h , b y a c e r t a i n s u b r e p t i o n , w e a t t r i b u t e t o a n
o b j e c t o f n a t u r e ( c o n v e r s i o n o f r e s p e c t f o r t h e i d e a o f h u m a n i t y i n
o u r o w n s u b j e c t i n t o r e s p e c t f o r t h e o b j e c t ) . T h i s m a k e s i n t u i t i v e l y
e v i d e n t t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e r a t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f o u r c o g n i -
t i v e f a c u l t i e s t o t h e g r e a t e s t f a c u l t y o f s e n s i b i l i t y . ( 2 7 , 9 6 ; 9 6 )
F r o m S c h i l l e r , S c h e l l i n g b o r r o w s w h a t o n e c a n c a l l h i s p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f t h e s u b l i m e . F r e e l y p a r a p h r a s i n g S c h i l l e r , 2 0 S c h e l l i n g i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s u b -
l i m e o f n a t u r e a p p e a r s t o u s f i r s t o f a l l w h e r e v e r a s e n s i b l e o b j e c t i s " o f f e r e d " t o
u s ( d a r g e b o t e n ) w h i c h e x c e e d s o u r " p o w e r o f a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( F a s s u n g s k r a f t )
b e c a u s e i t i s i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h t h i s p o w e r . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w e e x p e r i e n c e
s u b l i m i t y w h e n " o u r f o r c e [ K r a f t ] , i n s o f a r a s w e a r e l i v i n g b e i n g s , i s o p p o s e d
Tragedy and Sublimity
167
to a natural power [Macht] in comparison with which [gegen welchel our force
disappears into its own nothingness." That which, in nature, appears as the
"incommensurable" (Schelling had said Obermacht in the Letters) not only
causes our capacity of apprehension to fail but also manifests the comparative
emptiness of our power insofar as we are merely and first of all living beings.
But this is only the first aspect-call it the negative aspect-ofthe feel-
ing of the sublime that natural.phenomena awaken in us. Schelling continues:
The intuition of the sublime truly appears only when sensible
intuition proves to be inadequate to the greatness of the sensible
object, and now [as in a second phase which we distinguish
abstractly] the true infinite stands forth [hervortritt], for which
the former merely sensible infinite becomes the symbol.. .. The
sublime .. .is a subjection which betrays [in other words, lets
appear, gives to be seen-if it were here a question of the view or
vision] the infinite by means of the true infinite.
" The sensible infinite-that which reveals itself to us at first as the
incommensurable-is thus in reality only the mask of the true infinite which,
as such, remains unseizable. Through the sublime, the infinite reveals itself in
its double visage. It is actually more a matter here 6f transfiguration or 'trans-
verberation' than of disguise or dissimulation. In fact, the sensible infinite
hides nothing but rather translates or betrays what one must always decipher
obliquely. For "there can be no more complete intuition of the infinite than
where the symbol in which it is intuited hypocritically lays a finite claim to
infinitude [in seiner Endlichkeit die Unendlichkeit heuchelt]" (1, 5, 462). Or
again, to formulate differently this central thesis: there is properly speaking no
absolute intuition or intuition of the absolute. Certainly, the absolute gives
itself, offers itself to us-its essence consists in this gift itself-but always in
the shadow or mirror of the sensible and, in reality, of the finite. The spectator
who contemplates "that which, beyond him, is always relatively great," discov-
ers therein, by means of the feeling of the sublime, "the mirror in which he
glimpses [erblickt] the absolutely great, the infinite in and for itself' (I, 5, 463).
Schelling is freely quoting Schiller here again, but modifying Schiller's text in
an extremely important way, as Dieter Hihnig has perspicaciously under-
scored.
21
Whereas Schiller indicated in effect that in the experience of the sub-
lime the relatively great becomes the mirror in which the spectator "glimpses
the absolutely great in itself' [in ihm selbst), Schelling erases this reference to
the subject which, since Kant, has been inscribed in the very definition of the
sublime: it is the infinite "in and for itself" (an und fUr sich selbst) that appears
in the contemplation of the sublime which Schiller had already called-but
without drawing all the consequences-absolute Contemplation. Such a con-
templation induces an "elevation of freedom" (Erhebung der Freiheit) which,
1 6 8 J E A N - F R A N ; : O I S C O U R T I N E
d e l i v e r e d o f a l l p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e i n t e r e s t i n t h e o b j e c t ( f e a r , a n x i e t y , d e s i r e ,
w i l l t o a p p r o p r i a t i o n ) , a t t a i n s t o t h e " s u p e r i o r i n t u i t i o n " o f t h e n o n o b j e c t i v e
a n d n o n o b j e c t i f i a b l e a n d t h u s a t t a i n s a t o n e s t r o k e a g l i m p s e o f t h e c o m i n g t o
p a s s o f t h e a b s o l u t e . T h i s " s u p e r i o r i n t u i t i o n " ( h o h e r e A n s c h a u u n g ) S c h e l l i n g
a l s o c a l l s a n " a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n " ( 1 , 5 , 4 6 3 ) .
O n e c a n t h u s , i t s e e m s t o m e , f o l l o w D . I a h n i g w h e n h e n o t e s t h a t w h a t
r a d i c a l l y s e p a r a t e s S c h e l l i n g ' s a n a l y s i s f r o m i t s K a n t i a n - S c h i l l e r i a n p o i n t o f
d e p a r t u r e i s t h a t f o r S c h e l l i n g t h e s u b l i m e i n t u i t i o n d o e s n o t r e l a t i v i z e m e r e l y
o b j e c t i v i t y ( t h e g r e a t n e s s t h a t r e v e a l s i t s e l f t o b e s i m p l y r e l a t i v e , e v e n i f i t a t
f i r s t g a v e i t s e l f t o b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e ) b u t a l s o t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e v e r y
i n t u i t i n g s u b j e c t , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t S c h e l l i n g i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e a b s o l u t e i n
a n d f o r i t s e l f . I t i s , i n a n y c a s e , a l w a y s f r e e d o m t h a t e m e r g e s v i c t o r i o u s f r o m
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e , b u t f r o m S c h e l l i n g ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , h u m a n f r e e -
d o m t h u s e x a l t e d o f f e r s s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e f i r s t f r u i t s o f a b s o l u t e f r e e d o m .
O n e c a n s e e f u r t h e r f r o m t h i s e x a m p l e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e f u n c t i o n o f
o b j e c t i v a t i o n o r , b e t t e r , t h e v e r i t a t i v e , " e p i p h a n i c " f u n c t i o n o f t h e w o r k o f a r t ,
o n c e t h e s u b l i m e h a s c e a s e d t o b e l o n g e s s e n t i a l l y a n d a b o v e a l l t o t h e d o m a i n
o f n a t u r e a n d o f g r e a t n a t u r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s : t h e s t a r r y s k y , t h e s t o r m , t h e
u n l e a s h e d o c e a n - t h e s e a r e t h e p r i v i l e g e d e x a m p l e s o n w h i c h K a n t ' s i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n r e s t e d . T h e s t u d y o f t h e s u b l i m e - - a s o p p o s e d t o t h e s t u d y o f b e a u t y -
m a r k s f o r S c h e l l i n g n o r e t u r n t o t h e s u b j e c t , t o t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t
w h o j u d g e s a e s t h e t i c a l l y , e v e n i n t h o s e p a s s a g e s w h e r e t h e a n a l y s i s i s e x p l i c i t l y
c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e e f f e c t p r o d u c e d o n t h e s p e c t a t o r .
2 2
I f i n f a c t , a s t h e S y s t e m
o f 1 8 0 0 i n s t r u c t s , b e a u t y a n d s u b l i m i t y b o t h r e s t o n t h e s a m e i n i t i a l c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n ( W i d e r s p r u c h ) , w h i c h i s s u d d e n l y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n " u n e x p e c t e d h a r -
m o n y , " w h a t p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e s u b l i m e i s u n i q u e l y t h e s i t e o r t h e
p l a c e w i t h i n w h i c h t h i s p r o c e s s o f t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , t h e h a r m o n i c r e s o l u t i o n
o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n - t h e " i n t u i t i n g s u b j e c t " i t s e l f - c o m e s t o p a s s . T h i s p o i n t i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n o n e t h i n k s o f t h e t r a g i c w o r k a s e x e m -
p l i f i c a t i o n o f s u b l i m i t y . T h e s p e c t a t o r - t h a t i s , t h e " i n t u i t i n g s u b j e c t " ( I , 3 ,
6 2 0 - 2 1 ) , w h i c h i s h e r e c o n c r e t e l y t h e " p u b l i c " - i n f a c t , i m m e d i a t e l y f i n d s
i t s e l f i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e w o r k i t s e l f a n d i t s a c h i e v e m e n t . T h e p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t e s
( i . e . , i t a c t u a l l y t a k e s p a r t ) i n t h e " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " o r t h e " e x e c u t i o n " o f t h e
w o r k , w h i c h f u l l y e x i s t s o n l y t h r o u g h a c o m p l e x p r o c e s s i n w h i c h s t a g i n g ,
e f f e c t u a t i o n , p l a y , a n d s o o n , a r e n e c e s s a r i l y a l s o i n v o l v e d .
T h e i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e r e m a i n s n e c e s s a r i l y a n " a e s t h e t i c " o r s e n s i b l e
" i n t u i t i o n " f o r a n o t h e r r e a s o n : a s w e h a v e j u s t s e e n , t h e a b s o l u t e l y i n f i n i t e - - i n
a n d f o r i t s e l f - d o e s n o t o f f e r i t s e l f d i r e c t l y b u t o n l y t h r o u g h t h e m e d i a t i o n o f
t h e s y m b o l o r t h e m i r r o r o f t h e s e n s i b l e ( t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t ) . S c h e l l i n g c l e a r l y
r e c o g n i z e s t h a t " T h i s i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e i s i n s p i t e o f i t s r e l a t i o n a n d i t s
a f f i n i t y w i t h t h e i d e a l a n d t h e e t h i c a l , a n a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n , t o u s e h e r e f o r o n c e
t h i s t e r m " ( I , 5 , 4 6 3 ) . D o u b t l e s s t h i s s t r a n g e l y c o n c e s s i v e f o r m u l a t i o n o u g h t t o
give one pause. It raises the question of whether this remark is the mere restate-
ment of the thesis from the System of Transcendental Idealism which posited that
"the aesthetic intuition is nothing but the transcendental [intellectual] intu-
ition." But let us leave the question open and pursue our examination of
Schelling's analysis as it unfolds within the horizon of identity. To be sure, the
infinite dominates unconditionally, reigns as sole lord, but nonetheless, it can
"unfold its reign as lord only to the extent that it is intuited in a sensible infini-
tude which, as sensible, is always also a finitude" (I, 5, 463). Schelling can thus
conclude, by invoking the concept of poetry he has already elaborated,23, and by
keeping in view the idea of human destiny: "To intuit the true infinite in the infi-
nite of nature-this is the poetry which man is in a position to practice univer-
sally; for it is the intuiting one himself for whom the relatively great in nature
becomes sublime as he takes it for a symbol of the absolutely great." We can omit
consideration here of Schelling'S analysis of the relation, and finally the identity,
between beauty and sublimity (66), since their opposition is simply quantita-
tive rather than qualitative, to the extent that the beautiful and the sublime both
constitute "a differentiated unification of the infinite with the finite." What it is
instead important to emphasize, however, is the continuity of this determina-
tion with the determination in the System of 1800, where beauty was already
defined as "finite presentation [Darstellung] of the infinite" (I, 3, 620). And it
,was precisely this deictic (expositional or demonstrative) function which, in the
System, justified the privileged role of art for any philosophical enterprise. If phi-
losophy has had to-and still has to-turn resolutely to the work of art and to
what this work contains, it is because in the work the consciousness of the
absolute comes to light, or better: because in the work the absolute comes to pass.
The work is in its ground an event, the absolute event.
In the Lectures on the philosophy of art, Schelling paradoxically does
not refer-as he did at the end of the System of 1800-to the "product of art"
(Kunstprodukt) as "product" in order to define the essence and character of art
but rather to the idea of chaos,24 which serves as the transition from the sub-
lime of nature to the sublime of art and to the sublime of the pinnacle of art:
tragedy. "Nature," Schelling in fact remarks, "is sublime not merely with
regard to its greatness, which is inaccessible to our faculty of apprehension, or
to its power, which is invincible to our physical force, but also in a general way
as chaos, or as Schiller also puts it, as the disorder [Vetwirrung] of its phe-
nomena in general." Schelling, who refers here explicitly to Schiller (I, 5, 463),
might just as well have referred to Kant, who in the third Critique himself
evoked chaotic nature as what eminently arouses in us the idea of the sublime:
"But in what we are accustomed to call sublime there is nothing at all that
leads to particular objective principles and forms of nature corresponding to
them; so far from it that, for the most part, nature excites the ideas of the sub-
lime in its chaos or in its wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation,
provided size and might are perceived" (23, 86; 84).
1 7 0 J E A N - F R A N < ; : O I S C O U R T I N E
S c h e l l i n g t h u s p l a c e s t h e i n t u i t i o n o f c h a o s i t s e l f - a s G r u n d a n -
s c h a u u n g - a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e i n t u i t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e : t h e a b s o l u t e
o f f e r s i t s e l f t o u s i n t u i t i v e l y - i n n a t u r e a s i n h i s t o r y - o n l y i n t h e d e f o r m e d
f o r m o f t h e c h a o t i c . I n f a c t , h e g o e s s o f a r a s t o s a y : " t h e i n t i m a t e e s s e n c e o f t h e
a b s o l u t e , i n w h i c h a l l r e p o s e s a s u n i t y a n d w h e r e t h e u n i t y i s a l l , i s o r i g i n a r y
c h a o s i t s e l f . " W h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f i n i t i a l l y a s p u r e d i s o r d e r o r i n e x t r i c a b l e c o n -
f u s i o n r e v e a l s i n r e a l i t y , w h e n i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h e a b s o l u t e i t s e l f i n i t s i r r e -
d u c i b l e n o n o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e i d e n t i t y o f f o r m a n d " f o r m l e s s n e s s " ( F o r m -
l o s i g k e i t ) .
B u t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e i d e a o f t h e s u b l i m e i n t e r m s o f t h e f u n d a -
m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n o f c h a o s i t s e l f h a s d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e p r i n c i p a l l y b e c a u s e
t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n r e n d e r s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t h e n a t u r e a n d s p e c i f i c i t y o f t h e s e c -
o n d - a n d d o u b t l e s s t h e m o s t e l e v a t e d - f i g u r e o f t h e s u b l i m e : t h e s u b l i m e o f
G e s i n n u n g . H e r e t o o , S c h e l l i n g d e p e n d s o n S c h i l l e r , w h o h a d r e m a r k e d i n h i s
e s s a y " O n t h e S u b l i m e " : t h e o n e w h o , i n t h e f a c e o f t h e w o r l d a s i t i s , w i s h e s
t h a t a l l w e r e o r g a n i z e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a w i s e e c o n o m y ( a d o m e s t i c e c o n -
o m y s o t o s p e a k ) , h a s n o h o p e o f s e e i n g h i s d e s i r e s a t i s f i e d e x c e p t i n a n o t h e r
e x i s t e n c e ; b u t i n v e r s e l y , " i f h e r e n o u n c e s w i l l i n g l y [ g u t w i l l i g J t h e c l a i m t o s u b -
m i t t h e c h a o s o f p h e n o m e n a , r e b e l l i o u s a g a i n s t a l l l a w , t o t h e u n i t y o f a
k n o w l e d g e , h e t h e r e b y g a i n s o n a n o t h e r s i d e m o r e t h a n a l l t h a t h e h a s l o s t "
( 6 1 4 - 1 5 ; 1 4 6 ) . T h e i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e a t t h e v e r y h e a r t o f t h e m o s t
c h a o t i c a r i s e s t h u s f r o m a n e c o n o m y m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h a t t o w h i c h t h e
v u l g a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d v u l g a r k n o w l e d g e h a v ~ a c c u s t o m e d u s . T h i s e c o n -
o m y i s a n e w e c o n o m y i n w h i c h g a i n d o e s n o t s i m p l y e q u a l l o s s b u t r e v e a l s
i t s e l f t o b e w i t h o u t a n y c o m m o n m e a s u r e w i t h t h e l a t t e r . I t i s t h i s e c o n o m i c
p e r s p e c t i v e - a n d i t a l o n e - w h i c h o p e n s a c c e s s t o u n i v e r s a l h i s t o r y i n i t s
e x t r e m e s u b l i m i t y . S c h i l l e r w r i t e s : " C o n s i d e r e d f r o m t h i s a n g l e , u n i v e r s a l h i s -
t o r y i s f o r m e a s u b l i m e o b j e c t " ( 6 1 5 ; 1 4 7 ) .
B u t w h a t n e w i n s i g h t d o e s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f " u n i v e r s a l h i s t o r y "
( W e l t g e s c h i c h t e ) p r o v i d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m a t i c o f t h e s u b -
l i m e ? N o t h i n g l e s s t h a n t h i s : t h e u p h e a v a l o r i n s u r r e c t i o n o f f r e e d o m i n i t s
s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t n a t u r a l f o r c e s . N a t u r e a n d H i s t o r y , r i g o r o u s l y a r t i c u l a t e d ,
c o m p r i s e t h e t h e a t e r i n w h i c h f r e e d o m c a n c o m e i n t o p l a y a n d i n a u g u r a t e i t s
u n f o l d i n g . S c h i l l e r c l a r i f i e s : " T h e w o r l d , a s h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t , i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e c o n f l i c t o f n a t u r a l f o r c e s [ N a t u r k r i i f t e J a m o n g t h e m -
s e l v e s a n d w i t h h u m a n f r e e d o m ; i t b e l o n g s t o h i s t o r y t o i n t r o d u c e u s t o t h e
i s s u e o f t h i s c o m b a t . " B u t o n c e f r e e d o m h a s d i r e c t l y c o m e o n s t a g e , t h e s p e c -
t a c l e o f f e r e d u s i s i n c o m p a r a b l y m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g - a n d o f c o u r s e i t i s t h e
i n t e r e s t o f r e a s o n t h a t i s h e r e e n g a g e d - t h a n a l l t h a t t h e n a t u r a l s u b l i m e h a d
t o o f f e r , e v e n a s s y m b o l o f t h e i n f i n i t e . I n a s e n s e , f r e e d o m , i n i t s r a d i c a l h i s -
t o r i c i t y , c o n s t i t u t e s a p e r m a n e n t f a c t o r o f d i s o r d e r a n d d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ; i t
e n g e n d e r s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , f o m e n t s c o n f l i c t s , a n d c a n e v e n l e a d t o s u f f e r i n g s
t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f w h i c h i s o n l y t o o r e a l , o n l y t o o p a i n f u l l y t a n g i b l e . H o w e v e r ,
"it procures usn-at least if we regard it with a "noble heart"-"a spectacle
infinitely more interesting than that of tranquility and order deprived of free-
dom" (615; 147).
Indeed, Schiller goes one step further, assigning to history or, if one
prefers, to the philosophical consideration of Weltgeschichte, an utterly spe-
cific mode of intelligibility which is supposed to put an end even to the illu-
sory pretentions of reason when reason wishes to make the world coincide
with its own practical imperatives:
If one approaches history only in the expectation of light and
knowledge, to what disappointment does one not expose oneself?
All the well-intentioned attempts of philosophy to harmonize
what the moral world requires with what the world effectively
produces in reality are refuted by the lessons of experience .... But
what a difference, when one renounces explanation of these
events, and when one regulates one's judgment in terms of this
incomprehensibility [UnbegreiflichkeitJ which properly belongs to
them!
From the perspective of a "philosophical" consideration of history, Schiller
formulates here as neatly as one could wish something like the matrix of the
new interpretation of tragedy Schelling will expose: concerning universal his-
tory, renouncing explanation or ethical instruction does not, of course, mean
renouncing reason itself. To the contrary, to adopt in one's judgments the
point of view of inconceivability is to make the identity emerge that obtains
between the phenomenal confusion, the disorder of the world as it is, and a
rationality of a different order. To the one who is capable of elevating himself
or herself to the hohere Anschauung evoked above, this rationality reveals the
secret identity of the absolute and chaos.
Schelling will consequently have no difficulty whatsoever in transposing
Schiller's lesson from the level of history to that of tragedy (mythos-"his-
tory," "narrative," or "intrigue"). He tells us that it is in fact "the intuition of
chaos which induces the passage to the knowledge of the absolute." The
understanding can decide to take the inconceivable as its principle, and that
means-in the very terms of Schiller-"to adopt in one's judgments the point
of view of inconceivability." This is, as Schelling clarifies further, "the first step
leading to philosophy, or at least to the aesthetic intuition of the world." And in
this latter formulation, one must understand by "world" both nature and
Weltgeschichte or, in general, the drama in which freedom comes on stage. In
order to attain this intellectual intuition of the world, in the most general
sense, . common sense or the understanding must radically overturn their
habitual perspectives: the method of the understanding, always in quest of a
new "condition," has as its ultimate goal the deduction of phenomena from
1 7 2 ] E A N - F R A N 9 0 I S C O U R T I N E
e a c h o t h e r . B u t h e r e e a c h p h e n o m e n o n o r " n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n " ( N a t u r -
e r s c h e i n u n g ) a f f i r m s i t s e l f a s t o t a l l y a u t o n o m o u s , i n d e p e n d e n t o f a l l o t h e r s .
T h e p h e n o m e n o n t o w h i c h t h e a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n o p e n s i t s e l f i s i n i t i a l l y f r e e
o f a l l f e t t e r s , a s t r a n g e r t o a l l l a w s , a n d c h a r a c t e r i z e d a b o v e a l l b y i t s a b s o l u t e -
n e s s . U n g e b u n d e n h e i t , G e s e t z l o s i g k e i t , U n a b h i i n g i g k e i t , A b s o l u t h e i t - t h e s e a r e
t h e t r a i t s t h a t k e e p t h e v u l g a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e f i n i t i v e l y a t b a y . T h i s u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g t h u s h a s n o w a y o u t o t h e r t h a n b y " r e c o g n i z i n g t h e w o r l d a s t h e t r u e
s y m b o l [ S i n n b i l d j o f r e a s o n - i n w h i c h a l l i s u n c o n d i t i o n e d - a n d o f t h e
a b s o l u t e - i n w h i c h a l l i s f r e e a n d w i t h o u t c o n s t r a i n t " ( I , 5 , 4 6 6 ) .
F r o m t h e s u b l i m e o f ( u n i v e r s a l ) h i s t o r y t o t h e s u b l i m e o f G e s i n n u n g ,
w h i c h w i l l t a k e u s b a c k t o t r a g e d y , i t i s e a s y t o p r o c e e d , f o r a s S c h e l l i n g
s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s : " t h e o n e i n w h o m t h e s u b l i m e o f G e s i n n u n g i s m a n i f e s t
c a n s e r v e a t t h e s a m e t i m e a s a s y m b o l f o r a l l o f h i s t o r y . " I f , c o n s i d e r e d a s a
w h o l e , a n d t h u s i n i t s a l r e a d y c h a o t i c f i g u r e , n a t u r e o b e y s r u l e s a n d l a w s
w h i c h a r e l o o s e e n o u g h t o p r e s e r v e i n t h e m s e l v e s a t l e a s t a n " a p p e a r a n c e "
( S c h e i n ) o f a n a r c h y o r i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o g e n e r a l l a w s , o p e n i n g
t h u s a f i r s t g l i m p s e o f t h e a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n , t h e w o r l d o f h i s t o r y a p p e a r s , i n
t u r n , d i s c o n n e c t e d o n c e a n d f o r a l l f r o m a n y " c o n f o r m i t y t o l a w " ( G e s e t z -
m i i f t i g k e i t ) .
H o w c a n t h e c h a o s t h u s r a i s e d t o i t s h i g h e s t p i t c h r e v e a l i t s e l f t o b e i n a
p r i m o r d i a l i d e n t i t y w i t h p u r e , s e r e n e , a b s o l u t e r a t i o n a l i t y ? W i t h t h a t r a t i o n a l -
i t y w h i c h , f a r f r o m d r o w n i n g a l l t h i n g s i n a l i f e l e s s n o n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , g r a n t s
t o a l l o f t h i s B e i n g - t h e r e i t s d i s c o n n e c t e d n e s s a n d i t s p r o p e r d i v i n i t y ? 2 5
T h r o u g h t r a g e d y , e x e m p l a r i l y , w h e r e i n t h e m o s t o p p o s e d a n d c o n f l i c t u a l
e x t r e m e s - f r e e d o m a n d n e c e s s i t y - a r e r e c o n c i l e d . I t f a l l s i n f a c t t o t r a g e d y t o
m a n i f e s t m a j e s t i c a l l y t h e " h i s t o r i c a l " s u b l i m e o f c h a r a c t e r , o f " e t h o s " ( G e s i n -
n u n g ) , b y s h o w i n g t h e d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y o f t h e m o r a l i s c h e G e s i n n u n g .
I n t h e a t t e m p t e d a p r i o r i d e d u c t i o n o f t h e p o e t i c g e n r e s t h a t t h e P h i l o s o -
p h y o f A r t e x p o s e s i n i t s " s p e c i f i c p a r t " ( B e s o n d e r e r T h e i l ) ; S c h e l l i n g r e a f f i r m s
t h e p r i v i l e g e o f t h e t r a g i c p o e m o v e r t h e o t h e r g e n r e s ( e p i c a n d l y r i c ) , a p r i v i -
l e g e e s s e n t i a l l y l i n k e d t o t h e s u b l i m i t y o f t h e t r a g i c p o e m . T h e t r a g i c p o e m , f o r
a l l t h a t i t i s a d r a m a ( D r a m a ) , d o e s n o t s i m p l y r e p r e s e n t t h e s y n t h e s i s o f e p i c
a n d l y r i c , b u t c o n s t i t u t e s " t h e h i g h e s t m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f a r t . " A s w e h a v e s e e n ,
d r a m a i s t h e e s s e n t i a l p h e n o m e n o n o f a r t ( I , 5 , 6 9 0 ) . W h y ? B e c a u s e o n l y t h e
d r a m a t i c s y n t h e s i s c a n s h e d l i g h t o n a n d e l e v a t e t o i t s h i g h e s t p o w e r t h e f u n -
d a m e n t a l c o n f l i c t o r a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e i n f i n i t e a n d t h e f i n i t e . T h i s
a n t a g o n i s m i s e x p r e s s e d o n t h e l e v e l o f a r t , a s w e ' v e s e e n , t h r o u g h t h e i r r e -
d u c i b l e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n n e c e s s i t y a n d f r e e d o m .
2 6
I n l y r i c p o e t r y , t h e c o n -
f l i c t a n d i t s r e s o l u t i o n t a k e p l a c e i n t h e s u b j e c t i t s e l f : h e n c e , i t i s a m a t t e r o f a
s u b j e c t i v e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f t h e a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o p r i n c i p l e s . I n
e p i c p o e t r y , t h e a c c o r d b e t w e e n n e c e s s i t y a n d f r e e d o m i s i n a s e n s e a n t e r i o r t o
a l l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n : i t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f t h r o u g h t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e u n d e r t a k i n g ,
e v e n i f t h u s a p l a c e i s l e f t f o r c h a n c e . N e c e s s i t y n e v e r s h o w s i t s e l f h e r e i n t h e
inexorable figure of destiny. Only in the tragic process can freedom and neces-
sity emerge as such. But in order to emerge as such, the one and the other must
appear at the end of the process in their equality and equilibrium. Thus, what
is staged and exposed in the tragic is a combat in which irreducible and equally
powerful adversaries confront one. another. The combat must precisely pre-
sent to the view the equlibrium between freedom and necessity. However, as
Schelling emphasizes, "there is not true combat, if the possibility of winning
does not exist on both sides." But is such a possibility conceivable when one
knows in advance that each of the protagonists is profoundly invincible?
On the one hand, there is no question of defeating necessity, for a neces-
sity one could beat would thereby cease to be necessary. On the other hand,
there is also no question of defeating freedom, for it belongs to its essence to
be invincible-at least if it wishes to remain free! In the face of this untenable
alternative, there is no way out other than by reaffirming the contradiction in
its pure state: both freedom and necessity must emerge from the combat as at
once vanquished and victorious, in other words, as equals. This is what
Schelling loudly declares:
Such is doubtless the highest manifestation [Erscheinung] of art:
that freedom should be elevated to equality with necessity, and
that necessity in turn, without losing any of its absoluteness,
should appear the equal of freedom; only through such a relation
[Verhaltnis] does this true and absolute indifference become
objective which is in the absolute and does not rest on its simul-
taneity [zugleichsein] but on its equality [gleichsein]. (I, 5, 690)
Proceeding deductively, Schelling poses the question of the possibility-
conditions of this Verhaltnis, this strange relation of "equalization" where
necessity wins without freedom succumbing and where, in turn, freedom can
win without necessity being simply defeated. The answer leaves no room for
doubt: only human nature-or better, the individuals who heroically repre-
sent human nature-can furnish the conditions of possibility of this singular
game of he-who-wins-loses.
It is only in human nature that the conditions can be found under
which it is possible that necessity should win without freedom
succumbing, and inversely that freedom should be victorious
without interrupting the course [Gang] of necessity. The same
person who succumbs to necessity can elevate himself anew above
the latter by virtue of his Gesinnung ["spiritual disposition,"
"force of character," or "generosity"] so that the one and the other
(necessity and freedom), at once vanquished and victorious, man-
ifest themselves in their supreme indifference.
1 7 4 ] E A N - F R A N < ; : O I S C O U R T I N E
I t i s h u m a n n a t u r e , t h e n , t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e u n i q u e " m e a n s " ( M i t t e l ) -
i n s t r u m e n t , m e d i u m - o f " p r e s e n t a t i o n " ( D a r s t e l l u n g ) o f t h i s c o m p l e x r e l a -
t i o n o f m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g .
T h u s , S c h e l l i n g t a k e s u p a g a i n , a n d n e a r l y w o r d f o r w o r d ( I , 5 , 6 9 6 - 9 7 ) ,
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f O e d i p u s R e x h e h a d s k e t c h e d s o m e y e a r s e a r l i e r i n t h e
L e t t e r s , b u t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n h a s n o n e t h e l e s s r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d i t s s e n s e , p r e -
c i s e l y a s a f u n c t i o n o f t h i s " f r a m i n g " o n w h i c h 1 h a v e i n s i s t e d a t s o m e l e n g t h :
t h e a n a l y t i c o f t h e s u b l i m e , t h e s p e c i f i c s u b l i m i t y o f G e s i n n u n g , a n d t h e f u n d a -
m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e a s c h a o s .
T h a t w h i c h , i n t h e L e t t e r s , w a s c l e a r l y s i t u a t e d w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f a r t a n d
c o u l d a p p e a r n e c e s s a r y t o t h e c o m p l e t e e l u c i d a t i o n o f h u m a n d e s t i n y , n o w
f u l f i l l s a d e c i s i v e f u n c t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e a b s o l u t e i t s e l f : t h e t r a g i c p o e m
h a s b e c o m e a p o e m o f i d e n t i t y o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : f r e e d o m a n d n e c e s s i t y , i n
f a c t , i d e n t i f y t h e m s e l v e s a n d e a c h o t h e r i n i t [ s ' y i d e n t i f i e n t e n e f f e t , e t c e l a d a n s
t a u s l e s s e n s d u t e r m e J . T h e y u n v e i l t h e i r t r u e i d e n t i t y a n d r e c o g n i z e t h e m -
s e l v e s e a c h f o r i t s e l f a n d t h e o n e t h r o u g h t h e o t h e r , t h e o n e i n a n d a c r o s s t h e
o t h e r , w h i l e t h e y r e n d e r a p p a r e n t o r t r a n s p a r e n t t h e s u p r e m e i d e n t i t y , t h e
i n d i f f e r e n c e i n w h i c h t h e y f i n a l l y c o m e t o g e t h e r a n d a r e r e c o n c i l e d .
D o u b t l e s s , a m o r e s p e c u l a t i v e - " s p e c u l a t i v e " i n t h e p r o p e r s e n s e -
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t r a g e d y h a s n e v e r b e e n p r o p o s e d . B u t s u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
m a n i f e s t s e q u a l l y a t w h a t p o i n t t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f s o - c a l l e d i d e n t i t y c a n f i n d
i t s u l t i m a t e c o m p l e t i o n i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f a r t i n w h i c h i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n
a n d a e s t h e t i c i n t u i t i o n a p p r o a c h e a c h o t h e r t o t h e p o i n t o f c o i n c i d i n g : a p h i -
l o s o p h y o f a r t t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f w h i c h r e m a i n s t h e c o n c e p t o f D a r s t e l l u n g ,
t h e f i n a l a v a t a r o f P l a t o n i c - A r i s t o t e l i a n m i m e s i s . T h i s e x p o s i t i o n , t h i s s t a g i n g
c u l m i n a t e s , i n t u r n , i n t h e ( n e c e s s a r i l y t r a g i c ) p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e n o n p r e -
s e n t a b l e , o f t h e a b s o l u t e " i t s e l f , " s u c h a s i t o f f e r s i t s e l f t o u s , t h r o u g h t h e e x p e -
r i e n c e o f t h e s u b l i m e , a s c h a o s a n d / o r a s d r a m a .
Chapter 8
~
ON A TOWER OF BABEL
IN A PAINTING BY POUSSIN
Louis Marin
Hence can be explained what Savary remarks, in his Lettres
sur l'Egypte, that we must keep from going very near the
Pyramids just as much as we keep from going too far from
them, in order to get the full emotional effect of their size.
For if we are too far away, the parts to be apprehended (the
stones lying one over the other) are only obscurely
represented, and the representation of them produces no
effect upon the aesthetic judgment of the subject. But if we
are very near, the eye requires some time to complete the
apprehension of the tiers from the bottom up to the apex,
and then the first tiers are always partly forgotten before
the imagination has taken in the last, and so the
comprehension of them is never complete. The same thing
may sufficiently explain the bewilderment or, as it were,
perplexity which it is said seizes the spectator.on his first
entrance into St. Peter's in Rome. For there is here a feeling
of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the
ideas of the whole, wherein the imagination reaches its
maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks back into
itself, but is thereby displaced into a moving satisfaction.
(Ch26,91;90-91)
In the background of a painting by Poussin, Landscape with Pyramus and
Thisbe, today at the Frankfurt Museum, one finds a strange edifice.
l
It is situ-
ated on a plain surrounded by a circle of mountains, which the gaze of the
spectator discovers between a hill surmounted by a castle on the left and
177
1 7 8 L O U I S M A R I N
b u i l d i n g s a n d m o n u m e n t s o f a l a r g e c i t y o n t h e r i g h t . T h i s e d i f i c e i s i l l u m i -
n a t e d b y t h e l i g h t o f a s u n a b s e n t f r o m t h e p a i n t i n g , b u t w h i c h o n e d i v i n e s t o
t h e w e s t , b r o n z i n g w i t h i t s r a y s t h e i n c i d e n t a l d e t a i l s o f t h e t e r r a i n i n t h e b a c k -
g r o u n d . I f o n e e x a m i n e s i t c l o s e l y , o n e n o t i c e s t h a t t h e e d i f i c e i s r a t h e r
s t r a n g e : c o m p a r e d t o t h e c a s t l e a n d t h e c i t y , i t s e e m s r u i n e d . O n e c a n d i s c e r n ,
o n t w o s t o r i e s , a n a r c a d e w i t h s e v e n a r c h e s a n d , a t t a c h e d t o t h i s a r c a d e , a
m u l t i - l e v e l e d s t r u c t u r e r i s i n g o b l i q u e l y u p t o s o m e r e m a i n s o f a w a l l : a h e s i t a -
t i o n b e t w e e n v e s t i g e o r r u i n , a n d i n c o m p l e t i o n o r i n t e r r u p t i o n . S c a n n i n g
P o u s s i n ' s r e u v r e , t h e s p e c t a t o r f i n d s w i t h o u t d i f f i c u l t y c a s t l e s , f a r m s , t o w e r s ,
d w e l l i n g s , t e m p l e s , a n d t o m b s , b u t n o o t h e r e x a m p l e o f t h e e d i f i c e a t t h e b a c k
o f t h i s p a i n t i n g : a t m o s t a d r a w i n g w h i c h t h e m a s t e r m a y h a v e e x e c u t e d , a
v i e w o f t h e R o m a n c o l i s e u m .
2
T h e L a n d s c a p e w i t h P y r a m u s a n d T h i s b e , p a i n t e d i n 1 6 5 1 f o r C a s s i a n o
d e l P o z z o , i s i t s e l f r e l a t i v e l y u n c o m m o n : i t r e p r e s e n t s a s t o r m . T h i s s e e m s a t
l e a s t t o b e t h e " s u b j e c t " o f t h e p a i n t i n g , j u d g i n g b y w h a t t h e g a z e c o n f r o n t s :
t w o f l a s h e s o f d i f f u s e l i g h t n i n g c u t a c r o s s a s k y o f i n k , a l i g h t n i n g - b o l t s t r i k e s a
t r e e i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d , a f u r i o u s w i n d , b l o w i n g f r o m l e f t t o r i g h t , s t i r s t r e e s
a n d b u s h e s . P o u s s i n h i m s e l f c o n f i r m s t h a t t h e " s u b j e c t " o f t h e p a i n t i n g i s
i n d e e d a s t o r m w h e n h e w r i t e s a b o u t i t t o J a c q u e s S t e l l a : " I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o
r e p r e s e n t a s t o r m o n e a r t h , i m i t a t i n g a s b e s t I c o u l d t h e e f f e c t o f a n i m p e t u o u s
w i n d . " P u r s u i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i s p i c t u r e , h e i n s c r i b e s i n t h i s a t t e m p t t o
r e p r e s e n t t h e t e m p e s t , i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d , a l i o n ' s a t t a c k o n s h e p h e r d s a n d
t h e i r f l o c k s i n f l i g h t , a n d f i n i s h e s h i s l e t t e r b y n a m i n g t h e t w o f i g u r e s o f t h e
f o r e g r o u n d . I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i t i s t h e i r n a m e s t h a t g i v e t h e w o r k i t s n a m e :
" A n d i n t h e f r o n t o f t h e p i c t u r e , o n e s e e s P y r a m u s s t r e t c h e d o u t d e a d u p o n
t h e g r o u n d a n d n e x t t o h i m T h i s b e a b a n d o n e d t o h e r s a d n e s s . " 3
T h u s , a t e m p e s t o n t h e e a r t h , t h i s d o u b l e d s t r o k e o f l i g h t n i n g , t h i s w i n d ,
a n d t h e s e s w i r l i n g c l o u d s o f d u s t , b u t a l s o t h e l i o n ' s a t t a c k , a n d T h i s b e ' s a b a n -
d o n m e n t t o h e r s a d n e s s a t d i s c o v e r i n g - d . e a d - t h e b o d y o f h e r b e l o v e d :
m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , a n i m a l , a n d h u m a n t e m p e s t s ; l e v e l b y l e v e l , t h e a t m o s p h e r i c
m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e i r e f f e c t s a r e c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h o s e o f i n s t i n c t a n d t h o s e o f
p a s s i o n : n a t u r e , a n i m a l , m a n . B u t w i t h t h e l a t t e r , ( h i ) s t o r y ( s t o r i a ) e n t e r s t h e
s c e n e - a t t h e f r o n t o f t h e p i c t u r e . I t i s f i g u r e d b y t h e s e t w o s e p a r a t e d l o v e r s
w h o m o n l y d e a t h c a n r e - u n i t e . A t t h e b a c k o f t h e p i c t u r e - - o u t s i d e o f t h e t e m -
p e s t b u t p e r h a p s a l s o a s t h e t e m p e s t ' s c u l t u r a l e m b l e m - a v a s t e d i f i c e , r u i n e d
o r i n t e r r u p t e d , i s a t o n c e t h e d o c u m e n t - t h e a r c h i v e - a n d t h e m o n u m e n t o f
t h i s ( h i ) s t o r y .
H o w e v e r , t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e t e m p e s t h a s i t s o w n h i s t o r y w i t h i n t h e h i s -
t o r y o f t h e a r t o f p a i n t i n g a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h m a r k s t h e m y t h o f i t s o r i -
g i n a n d , a s i t w e r e , i t s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l i m i t .
4
I n b o o k 3 5 o f h i s N a t u r a l H i s t o r y ,
P l i n y t e l l s u s t h a t A p e l l e s - w h o i s f o r m o d e m a r t i s t s , a s i s w e l l k n o w n , t h e
o r i g i n a r y h e r o o f m i m e s i s ( a l o n g w i t h Z e u x i s a n d P a r r h a s i o s ) , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e w o r k s o f t h e s e o r i g i n a r y h e r o e s c a n o n l y b e " s e e n " i n t h e f o r m o f w r i t -
On a Tower of Babel 179
ten descriptions--that Apelles succeeded in representing what cannot be rep-
resented: flashes and bolts of lightning, thunder, in a word, the-nonrepre-
sentable5-tempest. This renders comprehensible the master's humility when
he states to Stella both his intention to paint a tempest and the distance mime-
sis takes from itself when it reaches its limit: "I have attempted to
represent ... imitating as best I could."
In "the front of the picture, one sees Pyramus ... dead ... and Thisbe
abandoned to her sadness"-in the front of the picture, but in the last sen-
tence of its description,6 i.e., at once as its fullest measure and as its supple-
ment/ comes the literary reference, the names of the actors of a story in its
denouement, the name of the picture: Pyramus and Thisbe. A story told by
Ovid in his Metamorphoses:
8
two lovers, whom the mutual hatred of their
families separates to the point where they can communicate only through the
chink of a wall, which prevents them from seeing each other, decide to flee
from the town in order to meet, at night, near the tomb and the spring indi-
cated by a mulberry tree with fruits the color of snow. Thisbe arrives first, but
she sees a lion, its jaws bloody from the carnage that it has just made of a flock
of sheep. She runs to hide in a nearby grotto, but while fleeing, she drops her
veil, which the beast tears to pieces and covers with blood. Pyramus arrives,
discovers the bloody veil: Thisbe is dead, he thinks. He kills himself. Thisbe,
the danger having passed, leaves her hideout to find the body of her beloved at
the base of the mulberry tree where they were to have met. She kills herself.
The blood of the two young people mingles finally in death and stains red the
roots of the tree: its white berries turn black.
Rereading Ovid in terms of Poussin's letter, or rather rereading
Poussin's painting in terms of this rereading, one realizes that the tomb
9
is the
tomb of Ninus and that the town from which the lovers flee is the town of
Semiramis, Babylon. In an instant, passing from the foreground to the
extreme background, one discovers that the colosseo, the colossal edifice which
had been so intriguing, is the ruin of the long-since interrupted construction
of the tower of Babe1.
1o
Thus, in the-nonrepresentable-representation of a
tempest on earth, several stories-the story of an original fulfillment of repre-
semation in painting and the story of an original fulfillment oflanguages, but
also a story of love and death and a story of a metamorphosis-intermingle
and intersect.
A word on the metamorphosis: it concerns the unhappy lovers only
indirectly, commemorates only their disastrous destiny, and their mingled
blood is merely an instrument. By means of them, the white fruit of the mul-
berry tree has become black. This metamorphosis does however directly con-
cern the painter; it is the allegory of a genesis of colors between two contraries,
white-the universal color of light, the absolute medium of visibility, the syn-
thesis of the totality of mixed colors-and black-the noncolor of night and
nonvisibility. But the passage from light to the night, from white to black can
o n l y t a k e p l a c e a s m e d i a t e d b y t h e c o l o r o f b l o o d , t h e u n i t e d b l o o d o f P y r a m u s
a n d T h i s b e , r e d o f d e a t h ' s v i o l e n c e , o n e o f t h e t h r e e c a r d i n a l c o l o r s . T h e
p a i n t i n g t h u s t e l l s a l s o t h i s s t o r y o f c o l o r i n g e n e r a l b y t e l l i n g t h e s t o r y o f P y r a -
m u s a n d T h i s b e , b u t a s a n i n v e r t e d g e n e s i s , a p a l i n g e n e s i s , I I t h a t o f t h e
a b s o r p t i o n o f l i g h t i n t o t h e n i g h t b y m e a n s o f b l o o d , t h e s t o r y , i f y o u w i l l , o f
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f p a i n t i n g a n d i t s v i s i o n l 2 b y t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t e m -
p e s t a s t h e n o n r e p r e s e n t a b l e p a r e x c e l l e n c e . I t i s t h i s s t o r y t h a t w i l l b e t o l d i n
i t s w a y b y t h e s t o r y o f P y r a m u s a n d T h i s b e , o n t h e e d g e s o f B a b y l o n , a n d i n
t h e f o r e g r o u n d o f a p a i n t i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f w h i c h p r e s e n t s t o t h e v i e w t h e
e n i g m a o f a r u i n e d , i n t e r r u p t e d t o w e r , a t o w e r t h e n a m e o f w h i c h - B a b e l -
w i l l b e s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n t h e i m a g e o f t h e R o m a n C o l i s e u m .
T h u s , t h e t h r e a d s o f m u l t i p l e s t o r i e s a r e i n t e r w o v e n h e r e : t h e p i c t o r i a l
m i m e s i s o f t h e t e m p e s t , t h e O v i d i a n m e t a m o r p h o s i s o f w h i t e i n t o b l a c k , o r i -
e n t a l B a b y l o n a n d a n c i e n t R o m e , t h e d r a m a t i c p a s t o r a l o f t h e s h e p h e r d s
a t t a c k e d b y t h e l i o n , a n d t h e p a s s i o n a t e t r a g e d y o f t h e l o v e r s . T h e s e s t o r i e s
h a v e i n c o m m o n t h a t t h e y a l l t e l l a t o n c e t h e o r i g i n a n d t h e e n d , t h e c o m -
m e n c e m e n t a n d t h e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e f o u n d a t i o n a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , u n i t e d
a n d s e p a r a t e d a t t h e i r l i m i t s : t h e o r i g i n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d i t s e n d i n t h e
n o n r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n s t a n c e o f t h e n a t u r a l s t o r m ; t h e o r i g i n a n d t h e e n d o f a l l
c o l o r , w h i t e a n d i t s n e g a t i o n i n b l a c k : t h e b e g i n n i n g o f l o v e s a n d t h e i r e n d i n
d e a t h ; t h e f o u n d a t i o n a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e p r o j e c t o f a l l a r c h i t e c t u r e
w h e r e t h e r u i n i s a d e s i g n a n d t h e t r a c e a m o n u m e n t , O r i e n t a n d O c c i d e n t
m i x e d a n d s e p a r a t e d f o r e v e r . O f a l l t h e s e s t o r i e s , a l l o f w h i c h f o r P o u s s i n b a s i -
c a l l y t e l l t h e s a m e s t o r y , t h e s p e c t a t o r , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s o r h e r v i s i o n o r
m e d i t a t i v e c o n t e m p l a t i o n , c a n c h o o s e - i n t h e d i v e r s e p a r t s o f t h e p a i n t i n g o r
o n i t s d i v e r s e l e v e l s - t h e e m b l e m s , a l l e g o r i e s , a n d s y m b o l s t h a t r e c i p r o c a l l y
r e s p o n d t o , e m b l e m a t i z e , a l l e g o r i z e , a n d s y m b o l i z e o n e a n o t h e r Y
T h u s , t h e t h r e e s t o r m s - t h e m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , a n i m a l , a n d h u m a n -
e x p r e s s o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l l y , o r b e t t e r , t h e y r e p r e s e n t e a c h o t h e r s o c o m -
p l e t e l y i n t h e i r d i r e c t o r i n v e r t e d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s t h a t t h e r e o c c u r s i n t h e
w o r k a p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e n o n r e p r e s e n t a b l e . T h u s , t h e b l a s t e d t r e e p e r p e n d i c -
u l a r t o t h e b o d y o f t h e d e a d P y r a m u s ; t h u s , t h e g l o w f r o m t h e l i g h t n i n g - b o l t
w h i c h f i g u r a t i v e l y s t r i k e s T h i s b e w i t h i t s a r r o w a n d i l l u m i n a t e s h e r w i t h i t s
i n s t a n t a n e o u s b r i l l i a n c e ; t h u s t h e b l a c k o f t h e g r o t t o a n d t h e s p r i n g , t h e o b s c u -
r i t i e s o f t h e s t o r m y s k y , t h e b l i n d i n g w h i t e s o f t h e s h e e t s o f l i g h t n i n g o v e r t h e
t o w n a n d o v e r t h e p r o t a g o n i s t s o f t h e d r a m a , a n d t h e r e d s o f t h e s h e p h e r d s '
c o a t s , o f t h e c a v a l i e r g a l l o p i n g o n h i s h o r s e , o r o f t h e b l o o d y r e f l e x i o n s t h e
m a s t e r p l a c e s h e r e a n d t h e r e a s e f f e c t s o f t h e l i g h t n i n g ; t h u s t h e t r a g e d y i n t h e
f i f t h a c t o f i t s d e n o u e m e n t i n t h e f o r e g r o u n d , t h e d r a m a t i c p a s t o r a l i n t h e
m i d d l e g r o u n d , a n d t h e L u c r e t i a n c o s m i c p o e m a t t h e b a s e o f t h e s k y .
T h e p a i n t i n g e n c l o s e s w i t h i n i t s e l f , t h e n , a g r a n d e m b l e m a t i z a t i o n o f
p i c t o r i a l m i m e s i s - t h e t h e o r y o f l i g h t a n d c o l o r , g e n r e s o f p a i n t i n g ( l a n d -
s c a p e , p a s t o r a l , a n d h i s t o r y ) , c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y ( a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n , o r i e n t a l
and occidental), and the history of human passions the signs of which recount
in painting the history of humanity (love, violence, and death). The entirety of
this grand symbolic "system" turns, however, around another symbol: the
central, immobile, unaltered lake, the calm surface of which reflects imper-
turbably the appearances of the things and living beings preyed upon by all
these tempests, symbolizing the divine eye of the painter--or spectator-who
regards apathically from his place of contemplation, una tota simul, like a god,
"the prodigious efforts of nature," as Felibien says of another of the Master's
storm-paintings--the animal power of instincts, the pitiful emotional errors
of humanity.14 Thus, in the background, the castle and its high tower in the
midst of the storm, which the setting sun illuminates, and the town with its
monuments from which the tomb of Ninus detaches itself, and between the
two, in the painting, but further away still in the space it represents as also in
the history it evokes, the tower of Babel from the Old Testament joined to the
image of the Coliseum of ancient Rome. The meditative, immobile specta-
tor-in the place of the painter, in the place of the Stoics' God, in his own
place of contemplation--can thus situate now on the level of "enunciation"
[enonciation] , now on the level of "utterance" [enonce], the self-representation
of the structure of the painting in its "represented" terms: suave terrae
magna .... [sic-J.1.1 Where does one stop within such representations, where is
one to situate the law of the whole of what the painting presents to the gaze?IS
Babel, a tower, a strange edifice in the background of this painting by Poussin.
We shall have to abandon for a moment Poussin's miniscule and colos-
sal tower of Babel in order to (re)construct it in accordance with a textual
architecture that combines various components-Genesis, a treatise by
Dante, and Hegel'S Aesthetics--in order to extend across time an arch or an
ark of theology, philosophy, theory, and history. This arch or ark has
remained unbroken throughout the tradition from the Church Fathers,
Augustin or Ambrose, from Philo of Alexandria or Flavius Josephus to
medieval thought and to Dante, from the Renaissance and classical age theo-
reticians of art and architecture to the philosophers of the Enlightenment and
the Romantic thinkers.
And in the beginning, as is only fitting, we should consult Genesis:
Now the whole earth had one language and few words. And as
men migrated from the east, they found a plain in the land of Shi-
nar and settled there. And they said to one another, "Come, let us
make bricks, and burn them thoroughly." And they had brick for
stone, and bitumen for mortar. They they said, "Come, let us
build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the heavens, and
let us make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered abroad upon
the face of the whole earth." And the Lord came down to see the
c i t y a n d t h e t o w e r , w h i c h t h e s o n s o f m e n h a d b u i l t . A n d t h e L o r d
s a i d , " B e h o l d , t h e y a r e o n e p e o p l e , a n d t h e y h a v e a l l o n e l a n g u a g e ;
a n d t h i s i s o n l y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f w h a t t h e y w i l l d o ; a n d n o t h i n g
t h a t t h e y p r o p o s e t o d o w i l l n o w b e i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m . C o m e ,
l e t u s g o d o w n , a n d t h e r e c o n f u s e t h e i r l a n g u a g e , t h a t t h e y m a y
n o t u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r ' s s p e e c h . " S o t h e L o r d s c a t t e r e d t h e m
a b r o a d f r o m t h e r e o v e r t h e f a c e o f a l l t h e e a r t h , a n d t h e y l e f t o f f
b u i l d i n g t h e c i t y . T h e r e f o r e i t s n a m e w a s c a l l e d B a b e l , b e c a u s e
t h e r e t h e L o r d c o n f u s e d t h e l a n g u a g e o f a l l t h e e a r t h ; a n d f r o m
t h e r e t h e L o r d s c a t t e r e d t h e m a b r o a d o v e r t h e f a c e o f a l l t h e e a r t h .
( 1 1 : 1 - 9 ; 7 ) 1 6
T h e s t o r y t h a t i n v o l v e s t h e t o w e r o f B a b e l i s t h u s t h e s t o r y o f a n e n d a n d
a b e g i n n i n g o r o f a n o r i g i n w h i c h e n d s i n o r d e r t h a t a b e g i n n i n g s h o u l d b e
a l s o a n o r i g i n : " N o w t h e w h o l e e a r t h h a d o n e l a n g u a g e a n d f e w w o r d s . . . t h e r e
t h e L o r d c o n f u s e d t h e l a n g u a g e o f a l l t h e e a r t h . " A t t h e o r i g i n , o n e l a n g u a g e
a n d o n e s p e e c h , a n d w i t h t h e e n d o f t h i s u n i t y , w i t h i n i t , t h e c o n f u s i o n o f l a n -
g u a g e s a n d s p e e c h , t h e i r m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d d i s p e r s i o n : " S o t h e L o r d s c a t t e r e d
t h e m a b r o a d f r o m t h e r e o v e r t h e f a c e o f a l l t h e e a r t h . " T h i s s t o r y i s t h e s t o r y o f
a l i m i t ; i t i s i t s e l f a t t h e l i m i t o f a d o u b l e l i m i t : a t t h e o r i g i n , t h e r e i s a u n i q u e
a n d u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e , b u t t h e r e a r e a l s o u n i q u e a c t s o f s p e e c h : t h e s p e a k e r s
r e p e a t t h e s a m e . T h i s u n i t y a n d i d e n t i t y a n n u l a l l s t o r y i n t h e v e r y s t o r y w h i c h
i s t o l d o f t h e m , o r r a t h e r t h e y i n s t a l l s t o r y o n l y a t t h e v e r y m o m e n t w h e n t h i s
u n i t y a n d i d e n t i t y a r e l o s t . A t t h e o r i g i n t h e e a r t h i s n o t m e r e l y l a n g u a g e a n d
m o n o l o g u e , b u t t a u t o l o g y : a s i n g l e l a n g u a g e .
B y t h e s a m e t o k e n , t h e s p e e c h - a c t s [ p a r o l e s ] o f t h i s l a n g u a g e r e s o l v e
t h e m s e l v e s i n t o o r e x h a u s t t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f o n e s i n g l e N a m e ,
t h a t w h i c h A d a m u t t e r e d a n d n e v e r s t o p p e d u t t e r i n g - i f o n e i s t o . b e l i e v e
D a n t e - - a t h i s c r e a t i o n : " Q u i d a u t e m p r i u s v o x p r i m i l o q u e n t i s s o n a v e r i t ? W h a t
d i d t h e v o i c e o f t h e f i r s t o n e t o s p e a k i n t o n e ? I d o n o t h e s i t a t e t o a s s e r t t h a t i t i s
m a n i f e s t f o r e v e r y m a n o f h e a l t h y m i n d t h a t i t w a s p r e c i s e l y t h e w o r d , G o d ,
t h a t i s , E l w h e t h e r i n t h e w a y o f a q u e s t i o n o r i n t h e w a y o f a n a n s w e r . " 1 7 A d a m
c o m m u n i c a t e s n o t h i n g , a n d t a k e s p l e a s u r e i n m a k i n g h i s v o i c e r e s o u n d i n t h e
p r o n u n c i a t i o n o f a n a m e t h a t c o n t a i n s a l l n a m e s , a l l c r e a t u r e s , i n t h e j o y o u s
e f f u s i o n o f t h e m o n o s y l l a b l e E l : a c r y o f e c s t a s y , t h e p u r e s o n o r i t y o f s p e e c h
a n d i t s t o n a l i t y f o r m e d a s v o i c e . I n t h e c r y o f A d a m i c e c s t a s y w h e r e , i n a
u n i q u e N a m e , a l l n a m e s a n d a l l a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e a r e v i r t u a l l y p r e s e n t ,
D a n t e h e a r s t h e s t o r m o f N a t u r e r u m b l i n g i n t h e a l t e r a t i o n s o f t h e m o v i n g a i r :
T h e r e f o r e s i n c e t h e a i r i s m a d e t o u n d e r g o s u c h g r e a t d i s t u r -
b a n c e s b y t h e o r d i n a n c e o f t h a t l o w e r n a t u r e w h i c h i s t h e m i n i s -
. t e r a n d w o r k m a n s h i p o f G o d , t h a t i t c a u s e s t h e t h u n d e r t o p e a l ,
t h e l i g h t n i n g t o f l a s h , t h e w a t e r t o d r o p , a n d s c a t t e r s t h e s n o w
On a Tower of Babel
and hurls down the hail, shall it not be moved to utter certain
words rendered distinct by him who has distinguished greater
things? (I, IV, 13)
183
The entire language of humanity is one vocal storm articulating the one
sound; the entire convulsion of nature is a language of air, sounding and
intoning through alterations of the one substance: the double resonance of a
single voice, that of God in creative speech: "Let there be light and there was
light,"18 wherein Longinus, the Augustan rhetor, and Boileau, at the apogee of
the classical century, hear the sublime. To be sure, Adam speaks, but the
words and sentences he articulates will be forever formed of the unique sound,
anterior to all names, the voice thatdoes not speak but gives to be spoken as it
withdraws into the universal cry. The one language is the storm which pre-
sents the nonrepresentable cry, the end of all language as its origin in the
unnamable name. The universal deluge is the language of created nature
which presents the nonrepresentable origin as its end. "So the Lord said, 'I will
blot out man whom I have created from the face of the ground, man and beast
and creeping things and birds of the air, for I am sorry that I have made
them'" (Genesis 6:7; 4).
And this death sentence applies to all humans, animals, beasts, and birds
except for one couple of each species who will go-as we know-with Noah
and his family into the ark to keep life alive under the protection of humanity.
The architecture of this ark is God, and Noah, its attentive worker:
Make yourself an ark of gopher wood; make rooms in the ark, and
cover it inside and out with pitch. This is how you are to make it:
the length of the ark three hundred cubits, its breadth fifty cubits,
and its height thirty cubits. Make a roof for the ark, and finish it to
a cubit above; and set the door of the ark in its side; make it with
lower, second, and third decks. (Genesis 6:14-16; 5).
Divine speech is the arche of all architecture: the plan of the edifice is
revealed, coming from on high, in an epiphany of transcendence that finds a
material, takes on a form, encloses itself within an exact limit.
19
The sublimity
of the ark takes place along this limit which appears in the form of a construc-
tion only insofar as it obeys Yahweh's commandment, responds through its
architectural end to the end of Nature, the destruction of all creatures. Adam's
cry of ecstasy, the universal storm of the deluge, the architecture of the ark; the
sound at the border of the articulation of language, the air stirred for the
effacement of all created flesh, the arche of architecture: a tri-unitary sublim-
ity, tri-unitary presentation of the nonrepresentable origin-end, the first and
last name that the first man-the most ancient ancestor, without father or
mother-uttered, the sound he made resound, EI.
O n e r e a d s i n t h e f i r s t p a g e s o f H e g e l ' s T h e S p i r i t o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d I t s
F a t e a r e f l e x i o n o n " t h e i m p r e s s i o n m a d e o n m e n ' s h e a r t s b y t h e f l o o d " : " a
d e e p d i s t r a c t i o n a n d i t m u s t h a v e c a u s e d t h e m o s t p r o d i g i o u s d i s b e l i e f i n
n a t u r e . F o r m e r l y f r i e n d l y o r t r a n q u i l , n a t u r e n o w a b a n d o n e d t h e e q u i p o i s e o f
h e r e l e m e n t s , n o w r e q u i t e d t h e f a i t h t h e h u m a n r a c e h a d i n h e r w i t h t h e m o s t
d e s t r u c t i v e , i n v i n c i b l e , i r r e s i s t i b l e h o s t i l i t y ; i n h e r f u r y s h e s p a r e d n o t h i n g ; s h e
m a d e n o n e o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s w h i c h l o v e m i g h t h a v e m a d e b u t p o u r e d s a v a g e
d e s t r u c t i o n o v e r e v e r y t h i n g . " 2 0 T w o g r e a t f i g u r e s t a k e o n t h i s e f f e c t o f t h e
s t o r m , t w o g r e a t f i g u r e s o f t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f N a t u r e : N o a h , w h o s e c u r e d h i s
s a f e t y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e h o s t i l e p o w e r b y s u b m i t t i n g i t , a s w e l l a s h i m s e l f , t o a
m o r e p o w e r f u l i n s t a n c e , G o d , w h o p r o m i s e d h i m t o p u t t h e e l e m e n t s i n h i s
s e r v i c e a n d t o k e e p t h e m w i t h i n t h e i r b o u n d s , a n d N i m r o d , w h o s e c u r e d h i s
s a f e t y b y d o m i n a t i n g N a t u r e o n h i s o w n , a s a " r a s h m a n a n d o n e b o a s t i n g i n
t h e s t r e n g t h o f h i s a r m . " A n d H e g e l , f o l l o w i n g t h e t e x t h e r e o f F l a v i u s J o s e -
p h u s ' s A n t i q u i t i e s o f t h e J e w s , a d d s :
I n t h e e v e n t o f G o d ' s h a v i n g a m i n d t o o v e r w h e l m t h e w o r l d w i t h
a f l o o d a g a i n , h e t h r e a t e n e d t o n e g l e c t n o m e a n s a n d n o p o w e r t o
m a k e a n a d e q u a t e r e s i s t a n c e t o H i m . F o r h e h a d r e s o l v e d t o b u i l d
a t o w e r w h i c h w a s t o b e f a r h i g h e r t h a n t h e w a v e s a n d s t r e a m s
c o u l d e v e r r i s e a n d i n t h i s w a y t o a v e n g e t h e d o w n f a l l o f h i s f o r e -
f a t h e r s . H e p e r s u a d e d m e n t h a t t h e y h a d a c q u i r e d a l l g o o d t h i n g s
f o r t h e m s e l v e s b y t h e i r o w n c o u r a g e a n d s t r e n g t h ; a n d i n t h i s w a y
h e a l t e r e d e v e r y t h i n g a n d i n a s h o r t t i m e f o u n d e d a d e s p o t i c
t y r a n n y . ( 3 7 4 - 7 5 ; 1 8 4 )
I n h i s c o m m e n t a r y , t h e y o u n g H e g e l n o t e s : " H e u n i t e d m e n a f t e r t h e y h a d
b e c o m e m i s t r u s t f u l , e s t r a n g e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , a n d n o w r e a d y t o s c a t t e r .
B u t t h e u n i t y h e g a v e t h e m w a s n o t a r e v e r s i o n t o a c h e e r f u l s o c i a l l i f e i n
w h i c h t h e y t r u s t e d n a t u r e a n d o n e a n o t h e r ; h e k e p t t h e m t o g e t h e r , i n d e e d ,
b u t b y f o r c e " ( 3 7 5 ; 1 8 4 ) . N o a h ' s a r k v e r s u s N i m r o d ' s t o w e r ; d i v i n e a r c h i t e c -
t u r e v e r s u s h u m a n a r c h i t e c t u r e ; t h e n a m e o f Y a h w e h a t t h e o r i g i n o f A d a m ' s
l a n g u a g e v e r s u s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n b y m e n o f t h e i r p r o p e r n a m e : " L e t u s m a k e a
n a m e f o r o u r s e l v e s , l e s t w e b e s c a t t e r e d a b r o a d u p o n t h e f a c e o f t h e w h o l e
e a r t h . " A n i n d e p e n d e n t t o w e r , a p r o p e r n a m e , w o r k s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h
r e a l i z e s i t s e l f t h r o u g h t h e m .
I n h i s o l d a g e , H e g e l t a k e s u p a g a i n i n t h e A e s t h e t i c s t h i s i d e a f r o m h i s
y o u t h :
W h a t i s t h e s a c r e d ? G o e t h e a s k s . A n d h e a n s w e r s i m m e d i a t e l y : i t i s
w h a t u n i t e s s o u l s . O n e c a n s a y , l e t t i n g t h i s d e f i n i t i o n s e r v e a s
o n e ' s p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e , t h a t t h e s a c r e d , a s t h e g o a l o f t h i s u n i o n
a n d t h i s u n i o n i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f i r s t c o n t e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n t
On a Tower of Babel
architecture. We have the most familiar example of this in the leg-
end of the tower of Babel .... All men work here in common and it
is this community that constitutes at once the goal and the con-
tent of the work. This union which they wanted to create ... was
supposed to mark the dissolution of a purely patriarchal associa-
tion [that of Noah and his sons after the flood, bowed forever
beneath the Law of the transcendent Name] and the construction
which was supposed to rise up to the clouds was to have meant
precisely the objectification of this dissolution and the realization
of a greater union.
21
An immense collective task, the rapprochement of all peoples:
In order to realize this incommensurable work ... to make all lands
submit to a kind of architectonic transformation. If they dis-
pensed with tasks which are required in our times by ethics, cus-
toms, and the legal organization of the State, it was solely in order
to create among themselves a tie which was to have been indissol-
uble .... But the same tradition adds that after having come
together in a single center in order to realize this work of union,
the peoples separated again, to follow each its own path. (14,276;
2,638)
185
Thus, the tower expresses the sacred, the bond uniting humanity, but
the construction of this bond is at the same time its destruction; an inter-
rupted edifice, a community that comes together only at the moment of its
dispersion: both sublime precisely in this. "The sublime in general is an effort
to express the infinite, an effort which in the world of phenomena finds no
object which would lend itself to representation ... inaccessible, inexpressible
by all finite expression ... the substantial unity which opposes itself to the total-
ity of the phenomenal world," without any possible form in the external
world, a-symbolic. "But if this inherent unity is to be brought before our
vision, this is only possible if, as substance, it is also grasped as the creative
power of all things, in which it therefore has its revelation and appearance and
to which it thus has a positive relation" (13,467-68; 1,363). Thus, the univer-
sal tempest; thus, the plan of the architectural ark come from on high.
But at the same time this essentially expresses the fact of sub-
stance's elevation above individual phenomena as such ... with the
logical result that ... the substance is purified from everything
apparent and particular and therefore from what fades away in it
and is inadequate to it. This outward shaping which is itself anni-
hilated in turn by what it reveals [auslegt], so that the revelation of
1 8 6 l o U I S M A R I N
t h e c o n t e n t i s a t t h e s a m e t i m e a s u p e r s e s s i o n o f t h e r e v e l a t i o n , i s
t h e s u b l i m e . ( 1 3 , 4 6 8 ; 1 , 3 6 3 )
A t t h i s p o i n t i n h i s A e s t h e t i c s , H e g e l f i n d s a p r e c i s e e x a m p l e o f t h i s n e g a t i v e o r
a n n i h i l a t i n g c e l e b r a t i o n o f t h e P o w e r a n d G l o r y o f t h e o n e G o d i n H e b r e w
p o e t r y : " I t c a n c e l s t h e p o s i t i v e i m m a n e n c e o f t h e A b s o l u t e i n i t s c r e a t e d p h e -
n o m e n a a n d p u t s t h e o n e s u b s t a n c e e x p l i c i t l y a p a r t a s t h e L o r d o f t h e w o r l d i n
c o n t r a s t t o w h o m t h e r e s t a n d s t h e e n t i r e t y o f h i s c r e a t u r e s , a n d t h e s e , i n c o m -
p a r i s o n w i t h G o d , a r e p o s i t e d a s t h e i n h e r e n t l y p o w e r l e s s a n d p e r i s h a b l e " ( 1 3 ,
4 6 9 ; 1 , 3 6 4 ) .
T o H e b r e w s a c r e d p o e t r y , o n e m u s t a d d t h e t o w e r N i m r o d h a d b u i l t ,
a l t h o u g h H e g e l s i t u a t e s t h e m i n t w o d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s i n h i s A e s t h e t i c s : o n e c a n
d o s o b e c a u s e t h e e r e c t i o n o f t h e t o w e r i s i n t i m a t e l y b o u n d u p w i t h l a n g u a g e ,
t h e e p i d e i x i s o f d i s c o u r s e : i t i s a c e l e b r a t i o n o f G o d , r e p e a t i n g w i t h o u t e n d
e v e n i f i n a s i n g u l a r f a s h i o n t h e N a m e o f G o d , a l l t h e N a m e s o f G o d , t h a t i s ,
h i s i n f i n i t e p e r f e c t i o n s . O r t o f o l l o w i n t h i s p o i n t t h e R a b b i n i c t r a d i t i o n , t h e
t o w e r c e l e b r a t e s t h e N a m e o f G o d b y c o n s t r u c t i n g a n i d o l o f i t , t h a t i s , t h e
p r o p e r N a m e o f t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h e d i - f i e s t h e N a m e i n i t s u n i v e r s a l
i m m a n e n c e : t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h - i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p r o c e s s t h a t a l w a y s
a n i m a t e s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n - t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f , s u b s t i t u t e s i t s e l f f o r , r e p r e s e n t s
t h e N i u n e o f t h e O t h e r i n i t s u n i q u e t r a n s c e n d e n c e .
E a c h m e m b e r o f t h e c o m m u n i t y , a c c o r d i n g t o F l a v i u s J o s e p h u s ( a n d
t h i s m o t i f w a s t a k e n u p a g a i n i n t h e R e n a i s s a n c e ) , w r o t e i t s n a m e o n e a c h o f
t h e s t ~ n e s o f t h e T o w e r . O n c e b a k e d , t h e s t o n e s b e c a m e t h e h o m o g e n e o u s
m a t e d a l o f c o n s t r u c t i o n . L a n g u a g e a n d a r c h i t e c t u r e a r e i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r -
t w i n e d b y t w o i n e x o r a b l y c o u p l e d a n d i n v e r t e d m o v e m e n t s .
I n h i s m e d i t a t i o n o n B a b e l , D a n t e e v o k e s t h e " m e m o r a b l e " s t o r m , t h e
r e m a r k a b l e c a t a s t r o p h e o f l a n g u a g e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e a s t o n i s h i n g e n t e r -
p r i s e o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e T o w e r , a d i v i s i o n o f s p e e c h i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
t h e d i v i s i o n o f a r c h i t e c t u r a l w o r k : .
F o r a l m o s t t h e w h o l e h u m a n r a c e h a d c o m e t o g e t h e r t o t h e w o r k
o f w i c k e d n e s s . S o m e w e r e g i v i n g o r d e r s , s o m e w e r e a c t i n g a s
a r c h i t e c t s , s o m e w e r e b u i l d i n g t h e w a l l s , s o m e w e r e a d j u s t i n g t h e
m a s o n r y w i t h r u l e s , s o m e w e r e l a y i r i g o n t h e m o r t a r w i t h t r o w e l s ,
s o m e w e r e q u a r r y i n g s t o n e , s o m e w e r e e n g a g e d i n b r i n g i n g i t b y
s e a , s o m e b y l a n d , a n d d i f f e r e n t c o m p a n i e s w e r e e n g a g e d i n v a r i -
o u s o t h e r o c c u p a t i o n s . w h e n t h e y w e r e s t r u c k b y s u c h c o n f u s i o n
f r o m h e a v e n , t h a t a l l t h o s e w h o w e r e a t t e n d i n g t o t h e w o r k . u s i n g
o n e a n d t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e . l e f t o f f t h e w o r k o n b e i n g e s t r a n g e d
b y m a n y d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s a n d n e v e r a g a i n c a m e t o g e t h e r i n t h e
s a m e i n t e r c o u r s e . ( I . V I I . 1 9 )
On a Tower of Babel
And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the
sons of men had built. And the Lord said, "Behold, they are one
people, and they have all one language; and this is only the begin-
ning of what they will do; and nothing that they propose to do will
now be impossible for them. Come, let us go down, and there
confuse their language, that they may not understand one
another's speech. (Genesis 11:5-7; 7)
And Dante continues:
For the same language remained to those alone who were engaged
in the same kind of work; for instance, one language remained to
all the architects, another to those rolling down blocks of stone,
another to those preparing the stone; and so it happened to each
group of workers. And the human race was accordingly then
divided into as many different languages as there were different
branches of work; and the higher the branch of work the men
were engaged in, the ruder and more barbarous was the language
they afterwards spoke. (I, VII, 19-20)
187
The catastrophe of language is measured exactly by the ana-strophe of the
tower. The wall of sense separating the society of speakers is built of the cut
and piled stones of the wall of the tower that unites the community of work-
ers. The architectural articulation of the tower, which is supposed to make of
it a great organized body, can be put into effect only through the articulations
of particular, specialized languages, the languages of technologies and arts,
which by their very articulation disarticulate the originary unnamable Name,
the name cried out in Edenic ecstasy with all the names of creation, because
humanity wanted to make of this Name their proper name, because they
wanted to appropriate it for themselves, to appropriate it to their immanence,
to construct its representation. The community of this representation would
have been its autonomous and independent subject: the noncommunication
of languages on the site of the tower and the town is nothing other than the
presentation of the noncommunicable instance of the other Name, and if the
mutual translation oflanguages will attempt to surmount their mutual radical
estrangement, will attempt to break down the forever disjointed wall of sense,
trans-Iation will remain an infinite, interminable task, forever opaque, as the
interrupted edi-fication of the tower on the plain of Shin ear testifies, the head,
summit, or archi-tectum of which was supposed to have occupied the infinite
and formless--sublime-place of the clouds.
Dante will make the storm of languages resound in the hollows of hell:
"strange tongues, horrible language, words of pain, tones of anger, voices loud
and hoarse, and with these the sound of hands, made a tumult which is
w h i r l i n g a l w a y s t h r o u g h t h a t a i r f o r e v e r d a r k , a s s a n d e d d i e s i n a w h i r l w i n d . " 2 2
I n t h i s s t o r m w e e n c o u n t e r a s e c o n d f l o o d o f w h i c h a n i n t e r r u p t e d a n d c o l o s -
s a l t o w e r w i l l b e t h e t r a c e o n t h e p l a i n , t h e s u b l i m e T o w e r o f N i m r o d . D a n t e
a n d V i r g i l d i s c o v e r h i m , b e t w e e n t h e t w o l a s t c i r c l e s o f h e l l , a m o n g t h e g i a n t s
r a n g e d a b o u t L u c i f e r ' s p i t : N i m r o d , t h e f i r s t e a r t h l y p o t e n t a t e a n d t y r a n t , t h e
f i g u r e o f t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n a b s o l u t e o f t h e p o l i t i c i a n , p l a n t e d l i k e h i s t o w e r u p t o
t h e w a i s t i n t h e s o i l . " ' R a p h e l m a y a m e c h z a b i a l m i , ' b e g a n t h e s a v a g e m o u t h
t o c r y , f o r w h i c h n o s w e e t e r p s a l m s w e r e f i t . " T h e s p e e c h o f t h e u n i q u e t y r a n t ,
u n t r a n s l a t a b l e a n d i n c o m m u n i c a b l e , a c r y w h i c h , i n h e l l , i s l i k e t h e n o c t u r n a l
e c h o o f t h e A d a m i c c r y i n t h e l i g h t o f E d e n , t h e " n e g a t i v e " p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
u n n a m a b l e N a m e h e w a n t e d t o a p p r o p r i a t e f o r h i m s e l f i n h a v i n g i t s r e p r e s e n -
t a t i o n c o n s t r u c t e d . 2 3
M y L e a d e r t o w a r d s h i m : " S t u p i d s o u l , k e e p t o t h y h o r n a n d v e n t
t h y s e l f w i t h t h a t w h e n r a g e o r o t h e r p a s s i o n t a k e s t h e e . " . . . T h e n
h e s a i d t o m e : " H e i s h i s o w n a c c u s e r . T h i s i s N i m r o d , t h r o u g h
w h o s e w i c k e d d e v i c e t h e w o r l d i s n o t o f o n e s o l e s p e e c h . L e t u s
l e a v e h i m t h e r e a n d n o t t a l k i n v a i n , f o r e v e r y l a n g u a g e i s t o h i m
a s h i s t o o t h e r s , w h i c h i s k n o w n t o n o n e . " ( X X X I , 6 7 - 8 1 , 3 8 5 - 8 7 )
T h r o u g h t h e c o n f u s i o n o f t h e u n i q u e l a n g u a g e , " t h e p e o p l e u n i q u e u n t o
t h e m s e l v e s ' ; b e c o m e s t h e p e o p l e s e a c h u n i q u e f o r t h e o t h e r s . B u t t o a c c o m p a n y
D a n t e j u s t o n e m o r e m o m e n t i n h i s a c c o u n t o f B a b e l , n o t t h e e n t i r e h u m a n
r a c e w a s g a t h e r e d a r o u n d t h e i n i q u i t o u s w o r k : a l m o s t a l l p a r t i c i p a t e d . T h e
t o t a l i t y , f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , i n v o l v e s a r e m a i n d e r . O n t h e s i t e o f B a b e l t h e r e
w e r e t h o s e w h o p r e s e r v e d t h e v a g u e m e m o r y o f t h e s o u n d t h a t c o n t a i n e d a l l
o t h e r s , t h e g u a r d i a n s o f t h e h e n c e f o r t h i n a r t i c u l a b l e N a m e :
B u t t h o s e t o w h o m t h e h a l l o w e d l a n g u a g e r e m a i n e d w e r e n e i t h e r
p r e s e n t , n o r c o u n t e n a n c e d t h e w o r k ; b u t u t t e r l y h a t i n g i t , t h e y
m o c k e d t h e f o l l y o f t h o s e e n g a g e d i n i t . B u t t h e s e , a s m a l l m i n o r -
i t y , w e r e o f t h e s e e d o f S h e m ( a s I c o n j e c t u r e ) , w h o w a s t h e t h i r d
. s o n o f N o a h ; a n d f r o m t h e m s p r a n g t h e p e o p l e o f I s r a e l , w h o
m a d e u s e o f t h e m o s t a n c i e n t l a n g u a g e u n t i l t h e i r d i s p e r s i o n . ( I ,
V I I , 2 0 )
S u b l i m e b y v i r t u e o f i t s v e r y w i t h d r a w a l o r r e t r e a t , t h i s l a n g u a g e i s a " f o r m o f
l a n g u a g e . ; . c r e a t e d b y G o d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f i r s t s o u l ( I , V I , 1 6 ) . I t i s t h e
u n i q u e a n d s i n g u l a r a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e N a m e . " W i t h [ t h e H e b r e w s ] a l o n e d i d
i t r e m a i n a f t e r t h e c o n f u s i o n , i n o r d e r t h a t o u r R e d e e m e r ( w h o w a s , a s t o h i s
h u m a n i t y , t o s p r i n g f r o m t h e m ) m i g h t u s e , n o t t h e l a n g u a g e o f c o n f u s i o n , b u t
o f g r a c e " ( I , V I , 1 7 ) .
T h u s , f r o m t h e o r i g i n , t h e r e h a s b e e n a n i n f i n i t e s i m a l d i v i s i o n , a s e c r e t
l i m i t , j u s t a s N o a h w a s t h e s o l e j u s t o n e o n t h e e v e o f t h e u n i v e r s a l f l o o d , a t t h e
moment when the natural elements were entering into the discord of the
flood: a marginal distance on the border of the whole. through which the
undeniable intervention of Transcendence manifests itself. the blank of the
nonrepresentable, which is the incommensurable memory. It is this unattain-
able measure that Dante seeks in De Vulgari Eloquentia through all the cities of
Italy, in order to found the sublimity of the illustrious vernacular the odor of
which he senses everywhere without ever being able to see the panther itself.
"we say that in every kind of things, there must be one thing by which all the
things of that kind may be compared and weighed, and which we may take as
the measure of all the others" (I. XVI. 54). Thus. for example. one uses the
concept of unity in order to compare numbers. So "also in colours all are mea-
sured by white. for they are said to be more or less visible according as they
approach or recede from it" (I. XVI, 54). How is one to discern this vernacular
whose fragrance is in every town. but whose lair is in none. It may.
however, be more perceptible in one than in another. just as the
simplest of substances, which is God, is more perceptible in a man
than in a brute ... in fire than in earth. And the simplest quantity.
which is unity. is more perceptible in an odd than in an even
number; and the simplest colour, which is white. is more percep-
tible in orange than in green. Having therefore found what we are
searching for. we declare the illustrious. cardinal, courtly, and
curial vernacular language in Italy to be that which belongs to all
the towns in Italy but does not appear to belong to anyone of
them. and by which all the municipal dialects of the Italians are
measured. weighed, and compared. (I, XVI. 55-56)
The language of the poem, its voice. is thus to be found on the limit. the bor-
der, that is, the sublime of a Babel which is at once pre- and post-Babelian.
transcendent and immanent, belonging to all of us and to no one-a voice
white like the white of the mulberry's fruits of old, before the lovers' death, an
incommensurable unit of measurement, the white of the nonrepresentable
outline of beautiful form, which Poussin will seek in tum for painting in terms
of the-at once contradictory and complementary-definitions of the musi-
cal mode and the sound of speech. 24
The totalitarian city. the colossal tower will remain forever the ruin of
lost unity and the project of the immanent totalization of this unity. As in the
background of Poussin's painting. the Babel-Coliseum will rise almost indis-
cernibly in the distance upon a plain between the tower of a castle on a hill and
the monuments and buildings of a town on the flanks of a mountain.
But perhaps by means of the emblem of this monument one can com-
prehend the inexplicable eruption of the storm in Ovid's story. which Poussin
1 9 0 L o U I s M A R I N
p r e s e n t s t o t h e s p e c t a t o r ' s g a z e a s t o h i s o w n : t h e s t o r m , f i g u r e o f t h e n o n r e p -
r e s e n t a b l e i n t h e h i s t o r y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n p a i n t i n g , f i g u r e s a n e x c e s s w h i c h
d o e s n o t t r a n s g r e s s t h e l i m i t s o f s u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b u t d o e s i n d e e d t r a n s ~
g r e s s t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f i t s m i m e t i c m e a s u r e : t h e s t o r m f i g u r a l l y p r e s e n t s t h e
l i m i t s o f t h i s m e a s u r e . " I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o r e p r e s e n t a t e m p e s t o n e a r t h , i m i -
t a t i n g a s b e s t I c o u l d t h e e f f e c t o f a n i m p e t u o u s w i n d . " P o u s s i n ' s t e m p e s t f i g -
u r e s i n t h e p a i n t i n g o f h i s t o r y w h a t B a b e l f i g u r e s i n t h e p a i n t i n g o f a r c h i t e c t u r e
a n d l a n g u a g e : t h e e q u i v a l e n c e o f r u i n a n d p r o j e c t , c o n f u s i o n a n d d i s p e r s i o n .
T h e n o n r e p r e s e n t a b i l i t y o f t h i s e q u i v a l e n c e i s c l e a r : i t d i s p e r s e s a l l i n a n
i n s t a n t a n e o u s f r a g m e n t a t i o n ; i t m i x e s a l l i n c o n f u s i o n a n d c o n t i n u i t y , w i t h o u t
a r t i c u l a t o r y d i s t a n c e ; i t i s t h e s t r o k e o f t h e a b s o l u t e f o r c e o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
w h i c h , i n a w o r d , n e u t r a l i z e s a l l d i f f e r e n c e s :
2 5
a s i n t h e b r i l l i a n c e o f t h e l i g h t -
n i n g - f l a s h i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s o l a r m i l i e u o f l i g h t ; a s i n t h e c l a p o f t h u n d e r i n
r e l a t i o n t o n o i s e , s o u n d , a n d v o i c e : l i g h t t h a t b l i n d s i n s t e a d o f r e n d e r i n g v i s i -
b l e , n o i s e t h a t d e a f e n s i n s t e a d o f r e n d e r i n g a u d i b l e . T h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
t e m p e s t i n t h e p a i n t e d t a b l e a u i s t h e p e r m a n e n t r i s k o f i t s d e s t r u c t i o n w h i c h ,
i n i t s o w n w a y , O v i d ' s m e t a m o r p h o s i s o f w h i t e i n t o b l a c k a l s o a l l e g o r i z e s .
S t i l l , i n t h e d r a m a t i z a t i o n o f p a i n t i n g i n t o w h i c h h e f a s h i o n s t h e s t o r y o f
P y r a m u s a n d T h i s b e , P o u s s i n p u t s i n t o p l a y , o r r e p r e s e n t s , t h e t e m p e s t u o u s
f i g u r e ' s e f f e c t s o f d i s s e m i n a t i o n a n d c o n f u s i o n , d i s p e r s i o n a n d c o n d e n s a t i o n ,
e f f e c t s w h i c h t h e T o w e r - C o l i s e u m i n t h e e x t r e m e b a c k g r o u n d o f h i s p a i n t i n g
r e c a l l . H e p u t s t h e m i n t o p l a y t w i c e , i n t h e s p a c e a n d i n t h e t i m e o f r e p r e s e n -
t a t i o n . O n e w i l l r e c a l l t h a t O v i d h a d s i t u a t e d t h e l o v e r s ' a s s i g n a t i o n o u t s i d e o f
t h e t o w n o f B a b e l , B a b y l o n , b y t h e t o m b o f N i n u s , a t t h e f o o t o f t h e m u l b e r r y
t r e e w i t h w h i t e b e r r i e s , n e a r t h e s p r i n g a n d t h e g r o t t o . T h e m a s t e r , h o w e v e r ,
d i s j o i n s a n d p l a c e s a t t h e t w o e x t r e m e s o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s c e n e t h e m a r k s
o f t h e s i n g l e m e e t i n g p l a c e o f t h e y o u n g l o v e r s : t h e t o m b o f N i n u s r i s e s o n t h e
e d g e o f t h e t o w n i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d o n t h e r i g h t , w h e r e a s t h e m u l b e r r y , t h e
s p r i n g , a n d t h e g r o t t o a r e p l a c e d i n t h e f o r e g r o u n d t o t h e l e f t . D i s s e m i n a t i o n
o f s p a t i a l s i g n s , B a b e l i a n e f f e c t s o f t h e ( n o n r e p r e s e n t a b l e ) t e m p e s t . O n e w i l l
r e c a l l a l s o t h a t P y r a m u s k i l l s h i m s e l f b e c a u s e h e d i s c o v e r s T h i s b e ' s v e i l
s m e a r e d b y t h e l i o n w i t h t h e b l o o d o f t h e s h e p h e r d s ' f l o c k s . P o u s s i n , h o w e v e r ,
c h o o s e s t o r e p r e s e n t T h i s b e i n t h e f o r e g r o u n d a b a n d o n i n g h e r s e l f t o h e r s o r -
r o w s a s s h e d i s c o v e r s P y r a m u s d e a d , w h i l e a t t h e s a m e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
m o m e n t , i n t h e m i d d l e d i s t a n c e , t h e l i o n i s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f a t t a c k i n g a w h i t e
h o r s e t h e r i d e r o f w h i c h h a s b e e n t h r o w n t o e a r t h . I n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e
c a u s e i s c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h i t s m o s t d i s t a n t e f f e c t - a c o n j u n c t i o n o r r a t h e r a
c o n d e n s a t i o n , o f a l l t h e f o r c e s a t w o r k i n t h e n a r r a t i v e - i n a s i n g l e r e p r e -
s e n t e d m o m e n t , t h e v e r y m o m e n t t h a t s u m m a r i z e s t h e m i n t h e i r d r a m a t i c
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e i r t r a g i c d e n o u e m e n t .
I s e e i n P o u s s i n ' s a t t e m p t t o r e p r e s e n t t h e n o n r e p r e s e n t a b l e t e m p e s t -
b y m e a n s o f t h e s t o r y o f a n O v i d i a n m e t a m o r p h o s i s a n d t o t h e r h y t h m o f t h e
c o n f u s i o n a n d d i s p e r s i o n o f c a u s e s a n d e f f e c t s , p l a c e s a n d m o m e n t s , t o t h e
rhythm of the dissemination and condensation of significations and sym-
bols-the archaic memory in classical modernity of an origin and end of all
language [du langage et des langues], of architecture and its monuments, of
society and culture, of history and narratives. The lake, that immobile mirror
at the center of the picture, is the symbol of the presence of this memory in the
painter's divine gaze; the Coliseum or tower of Babel in the background is its
. iconic monogram.
Afterword
@
POSITING THE SUBLIME:
READING HEIDEGGER READING KANT
Jeffrey S. Librett
-for the Nonce
l
Au of the essays above respond, directly or indirectly, to the reading of the
history of metaphysics broached by Heidegger around 1927 and elaborated in
various directions by a broad number of thinkers up to our own "moment."
Yet what does Heigegger's text say about or have to do with the sublime? Why
Heidegger here, if it is a question of the sublime? Or why the sublime here. if it
is a question of Heidegger? My way of focusing this question below depends
on the following pragmatic considerations.
Five of the essays above concern the sublime in Kant. Two of the others
(by Courtine and Marin) concern at least in part the sublime in the idealist
aftermath of Kant. But none of them, except those by Escoubas. Lacoue-
Labarthe, and Rogozinski, address in much explicit detail Heidegger's Kant-
reading, and where even these do so, moreover, it is-except for the essay by
Lacoue-Labarthe-most frequently to the early Kant und das Problem der
Metaphysik that they refer. None, in any case, make reference to Heidegger's
essay, "Kant's Thesis on Being" (1961).2 I have therefore decided to provide in
this Afterword a detailed examination of the latter essay. (The places where
my own trajectory intersects those of the essays translated above will be indi-
cated in footnotes.) This examination is intended: (1) to provide the reader
with an explicit introduction to the relation between the Heideggerian
thought of Being and the thought of the sublime (in the case of Kant), an
introduction which is presupposed in a general way by all of the essays above,
and (2) beyond this introductory function, to make some "positive" contribu-
tion to our understanding of the later Heidegger's Kant-reading, in particular
to the way in which that reading alludes to, interacts with, at once inscribes
itself within and outside of the Kantian sublime.
193
1 9 4 J E F F R E Y S . L I B R E T T
A p p r o a c h i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t
o f B e i n g a n d K a n t ' s t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e , a s t w o f o r m s o f t h e t h o u g h t o f
w h a t e x c e e d s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o n e f i n d s o n e ' s p a t h a t o n c e b l o c k e d a n d b r o k e n
b y a t e x t u a l - c o n c e p t u a l c u r i o s i t y : o n t h e o n e h a n d , d e s p i t e t h r e e p u b l i s h e d
b o o k - l e n g t h s t u d i e s o n - a n d n u m e r o u s e s s a y s a n d l e c t u r e s w h i c h a l l u d e t o -
K a n t , 3 H e i d e g g e r d o e s n o t d e v o t e a n y m a j o r d i s c u s s i o n t o t h e K a n t i a n s u b -
l i m e , o r e v e n m o r e b r o a d l y t o K a n t i a n " a e s t h e t i c s , " a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
H e i d e g g e r f r e q u e n t l y - a n d w i t h a d i s c r e t i o n b o r d e r i n g o n t h e i n s i d i o u s -
i n v o k e s k e y t e r m s f r o m t h e d i s c o u r s e o f t h e s u b l i m e .
4
I n p a r t i c u l a r , w h e n h e i s
a r g u i n g i n " K a n t ' s T h e s i s o n B e i n g " a g a i n s t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f K a n t ' s o n t o l o g y ,
H e i d e g g e r s h i f t s m o r e o r l e s s s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y i n t o t h e r e g i s t e r o f t h e s u b l i m e a t
t h e p r e c i s e m o m e n t w h e n h e b e g i n s t o d i v e r g e f r o m K a n t a n d t o p o i n t t o w a r d
t h e n e c e s s i t y o f h i s o w n w a y o f t h i n k i n g o f B e i n g . I n w h a t s e n s e a n d f o r w h a t
r e a s o n s d o e s H e i d e g g e r t h u s t u r n t h e K a n t i a n s u b l i m e a g a i n s t t h e K a n t i a n
o n t o l o g y w i t h i n w h i c h t h i s s u b l i m e o p e r a t e s ?
T h e c o u r s e o f t h e a r g u m e n t i n " K a n t ' s t h e s i s " d i c t a t e s t h a t , i n o r d e r t o
a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n , w e b e g i n w i t h o n t o l o g y , w h i c h b e c o m e s h e r e t h e t h e m e
o f p o s i t i o n o r p o s i t i n g . F o r H e i d e g g e r p o s i t s t h a t K a n t p o s i t s B e i n g a s p o s i t i o n .
T h e q u e s t i o n - a t o n c e r h e t o r i c a l a n d n o n r h e t o r i c a l - w h i c h w e s h a l l c o n t i n u -
o u s l y p o s e w i t h H e i d e g g e r i s s i m p l y t h i s : w h a t i s t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h a t w h i c h i s
" b e y o n d " p o s i t i o n ? M y s u p p o s i t i o n - p e r h a p s n o t q u i t e a t h e s i s - i s t h a t t h i s
p o s i t i o n " b e y o n d " p o s i t i o n i s t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e : t h e n a m e o f t h e s u b -
l i m e c o m p r i s e s a n d c a l l s f o r t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f p o s i t i o n a s o f i t s ( a l w a y s s e n t e n -
t i o u s ) s y n t a x , t h e s y n t a x o f t h e s y n t h e s i s o f s e n s e a s i n t e l l i g i b l e m e a n i n g w i t h
s e n s e a s m e a n i n g l e s s s e n s u a l i t y . T h e s e n s e o f t h e s u b l i m e h a s , t h e n , t h e s e n s e o f
n e i t h e r n o n s e n s i c a l s e n s u a l i t y n o r s u p e r - s e n s u o u s s e n s e , n e i t h e r t h e p u r e
m o m e n t n o r t h e ( p u r p o s i v e ) c o n c e p t , n e i t h e r t h e t i m e o f t h o u g h t n o r t h e
t h o u g h t o f t i m e , b u t w h a t o n e c o u l d c a l l , f o r t h e n o n c e , a k i n d o f n o n c e - s e n s e :
t h e n o n c e - s e n s e o f t h e n o n c e a n n o u n c e d a n o n . . I n o r d e r t o e x p o s e t h i s s u p p o -
s i t i o n , I s h a l l : ( I ) r e t r a c e i n s o m e t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f
K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f p o s i t i o n , ( I I ) e x a m i n e h o w H e i d e g g e r p o s i t i o n s h i m s e l f w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h i s t h e o r y , ( I I I ) s k e t c h h o w H e i d e g g e r i n s c r i b e s h i s o w n " p o s i t i o n "
i n t e r m s o f t h e s u b l i m e , a n d ( I V ) a t t e m p t t o m e a s u r e t h i s i n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e
s u b l i m e a g a i n s t s o m e o f t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e K a n t i a n s u b l i m e " i t s e l f . "
1 .
H e i d e g g e r o n t h e L i m i t o f P u r e K a n t
H e i d e g g e r ' s e s s a y , " K a n t s T h e s e t i b e r d a s S e i n , " a r g u e s t h e n t h a t f o r K a n t
B e i n g i s p o s i t i o n , i n t h e s e n s e o f p o s i t i n g , S e t z u n g , t h e s e i n . K a n t p o s i t s B e i n g
a s p o s i t i n g . I n K a n t ' s p o s i t i o n o f o r o n B e i n g , f u r t h e r , r e f l e x i o n i s a l w a y s
Afterword 195
implicated: Kant's position is the position of position, the reflexion of posi-
tion back upon itself and hence also the (double) position of reflexion.
5
For
Heidegger, however, both the notion of position and the notion of reflexion
by means or in terms of which Kant contextualizes position belong to the
metaphysical tradition of the forgetfulness of Being, i.e., they are incapable of
allowing for a thought of Being which would not make of Being the mere cri-
terion of beings. The question we shall ask, again, is how does Heidegger posi-
tion himself with respect to position and its reflexions, or how can he place
himself in some sense outside of position or placing, how can he reflect upon
reflexion in some nonreflexive mode? But let me summarize in some detail the
course of Heidegger's account of Kant here, before pursuing some kind of
answer to these questions by going into the complexities of how Heidegger
frames his account of Kant's ontology with the determination of the relation
between its "object" and itself as a discourse "on" this "object."
The passage on which Heidegger centers his argument comes from
Kant's famous demonstration of the impossibility of the ontological proof of
the existence of God in the first Critique:
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept
of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is
merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as
existing in themselves [oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst].
(A 598/B 626)
Kant's view of Being as nonpredicable is for Heidegger legible only against the
background of the question that inaugurates Western metaphysics: what is the
being? This question is ambiguous, or has a double interpretation, for it asks
on the one hand: what is that which exists in general? and on the other hand:
what is that which exists most of all, what is the highest existent thing? Within
scholastic metaphysics, this double question is answered under the headings
of, on the one hand, metaphysica generalis, as general ontology, and, on the
other hand, theology, which along with cosmology and psychology makes up
the tripartite structure of the metaphysica specialis. Heidegger argues, here as
repeatedly elsewhere,6 that these two interpretations of the question of the
existent/being share a common point of departure in the determination of the
Being of the being as grounding, ground, foundation. Thus, the Being of that
which is in general grounds the Being of that which is in specific, insofar as
Being in general constitutes the starting point for any consideration of its spe-
cific determinations; yet the highest being also fulfills the function of a
ground, albeit in a different sense, namely, as that which allows everything else
to come into Being, in other words, as creator. When Kant denies Being the
status of a real predicate, then, in the context of the negation of any ontologi-
cal proof of the existence of God, he is displacing onto-theological meta-
p h y s i c s o n t h e s i t e o f i t s s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o l o g i c a l m o m e n t . D e f i n i n g B e i n g a s
p o s i t i o n , h e r e f u s e s t h e n o t i o n o f B e i n g a s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a t h i n g , a n d t h u s
r e f u s e s t h e r e d u c t i o n o f i t t o a n o n t i c s t a t u s , b u t h e c o n t i n u e s t o a d h e r e t o t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f B e i n g a s g r o u n d i n g . P o s i t i n g i n K a n t i s s t i l l t h e p o s i t i n g o f a
g r o u n d , p o s i t i n g a s g r o u n d i n g . A s f o r H e i d e g g e r , h i s e n t i r e i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f
K a n t ' s o n t o l o g y w i l l a t t e m p t t o a s k h o w a n d i n w h a t s e n s e o n e c a n t h i n k t h e
" g r o u n d " o f t h i s g r o u n d i n g , h o w o n e c o u l d o c c u p y a p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t f r o m
K a n t ' s , w h i c h w o u l d p l a c e i t s e l f o u t s i d e o f t h e p o s i t i o n o f p o s i t i n g , o r w h i c h
w o u l d p l a c e i t s e l f o n t h e g r o u n d o f s o m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f B e i n g o t h e r t h a n
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f B e i n g a s g r o u n d i n g . I n t h e o p e n i n g r e m a r k s o f " K a n t ' s
T h e s i s , " h e " p o s e s t h i s q u e s t i o n a s f o l l o w s :
o b u n d i n w i e w e i t d a s h e u t i g e D e n k e n s c h o n b e f u g t i s t , e i n e
A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g m i t d e r T h e s e K a n t s z u w a g e n , d . h . z u f r a -
g e n , w o r i n K a n t s T h e s e i i b e r d a s S e i n g r i i n d e , i n w e l c h e m S i n n e
s i e e i n e B e g r i i n d u n g z u l a s s e , a u f w e l c h e W e i s e s i e e r o r t e r t w e r d e n
k o n n e . ( 4 4 2 )
w h e t h e r a n d t o w h a t e x t e n t t o d a y ' s t h o u g h t i s c o m p e t e n t t o r i s k
a n e n c o u n t e r w i t h K a n t ' s t h e s i s , i . e . , t o a s k w h e r e i n K a n t ' s t h e s i s
o n B e i n g i s g r o u n d e d , i n w h a t s e n s e i t a l l o w s o f a g r o u n d i n g , a n d
i n w h a t m a n n e r i t c a n b e s i t u a t e d .
W e s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s o f H e i d e g g e r ' s E r o r t e r u n g ( " s i t u a -
t i o n " ) o f K a n t ' s t h e s i s b e l o w , a f t e r h a v i n g t r a c e d t h e p a t h H e i d e g g e r t a k e s t o
t h e O r t o f t h i s t h e s i s . H a v i n g a t t e m p t e d t o " p o s i t i o n " K a n t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t
o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c s K a n t i s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f d i s p l a c i n g , H e i d e g g e r b e g i n s h i s
c o m m e n t a r y o n K a n t ' s T h e s e .
T h e f i r s t p h a s e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t a r y f o c u s s e s - a n d h e i s t h u s s t i l l
i n 1 9 6 1 m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i z i n g n e o - K a n t i a n r e a d i n g w h i c h
w o u l d s e e i n K a n t ' s c r i t i c a l t r i l o g y t h e d e f i n i t i v e b u r i ~ l o f a l l o n t o l o g y - o n t h e
t w o " p o s i t i v e " s e n s e s B e i n g t a k e s b e y o n d t h e n e g a t i o n o f i t s s e n s e a s a r e a l
p r e d i c a t e , i . e . , a s w h a t w o u l d c o m p r i s e a n a d d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e
t h i n g . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e r e i s t h e l o g i c a l u s e o f t h e c o p u l a , f o r t h e u n i f i c a -
t i o n o f g i v e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e i s w h a t H e i d e g g e r
c a l l s t h e o n t i c u s e o f t h e " i s " t o a d d t h e o b j e c t t o i t s c o n c e p t , t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
o b j e c t a s e x i s t i n g . ( W e s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n o f t h e " u s e " o f t h e c o p u l a
b e l o w ( I I I ) . ) T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o f u n c t i o n s o f t h e c o p u l a i s t h e
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h a t s o m e t h i n g w o u l d b e - i t s p o s s i -
b l e e s s e n c e - i f i t w e r e i n a d d i t i o n p o s i t e d a s e x i s t i n g , a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t h a t i t i s , t h e p o s i t i n g o f i t s a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e . T h e s e t w o f u n c t i o n s o f t h e c o p u l a
m e d i a t e b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d p r e d i c a t e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d s u b j e c t a n d
o b j e c t , o n t h e o t h e r . K a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o t y p e s o f p o s i t i o n a s
Afterword 197
relative and absolute position, respectively. They comprise the two fundamen-
tal dimensions of the traditional determination of Being, applicable in turn to
both the being as the being-in-general and the being as the highest being.
According to Heidegger, the full import and ramifications of the dis-
tinction between these two modes of position only become clear when one
takes into account the difference between its precritical and critical versions.
Whereas in the precritical phase, the distinction between relative and absolute
position is conceived in terms merely of the operation of the understanding,
in the critical phase it is conceived in terms of the operation of the faculties of
knowledge in general, including the receptive faculties addressed to the sensu-
ous manifold by which the understanding must be affected in order to have
knowledge of objects at all. That is, in Kant's critical phase, ontic position has
become the "position of an affection" (451), the position that supplements the
givenness of what is susceptible of being posited. (Again, we shall return below
(III) to the question of how one adds to the given its givenness, or of how to
take giving.) With this move, Kant has begun to think more clearly the finitude
of the understanding, to distance himself from the rationalist metaphysics he
had inherited from the Leibniz-Wolff school. The ground of the link between
subject and predicate is no longer merely the logical copula. Rather, in order
to be able to function as the ground of the (relative) proposition, the subject
of the proposition must become an object of possible knowledge for the a pri-
ori syn-thesizing activity of a subject-ego. The ultimate ground of the proposi-
tion is now no longer in the proposition itself but in the synthetic unity of
apperception, as the "highest point" of all use of the understanding, or as the
essence of the understanding itself. This "highest point" is what Heidegger
characterizes, in his Erorterung of Kant's thesis, as the Ort from which Kant
thinks that he can determine the Being of beings. In the critical phase, logical
and ontic theses have been reduced to the syn-thesis
7
of the understanding, as
that which provides the ground of their possibility.
Kant's critical interpretation of the positing activity of the understand-
ing exceeds his precritical interpretation not only insofar as the critical i n t e r ~
pretation takes into account the dependence of knowledge of experience on
the sensuously given, but further insofar as it consequently includes a specifi-
cally reflexive dimension. This dimension becomes most clearly manifest in
connection with Kant's differentiation of his ontology of positing into the
principles-or fundamental posits [Grundsatzel-of the pure understanding,
which comprise the rules for the application of concepts to intuitions. Dis-
cussing only the fourth set of principles, the postulates of empirical thought,
in which Kant submits the concepts of possibility, reality, and necessity to a
transcendental analysis, Heidegger asserts that these principles comprise an
explication of the determinations of Being, a set of ontological predicates that
determine not the what nor the that but the how of Being in the sense of the
how of the relation between subject and object. The modalities are ontologi-
c a l - a s o p p o s e d t o l o g i c a l o r o n t i c - p r e d i c a t e s , b e c a u s e t h e y d o n o t m e r e l y
p o s i t l o g i c a l l y o r e x i s t e n t i a l l y , r e l a t i v e l y o r a b s o l u t e l y , b u t t h e y i n t e r p r e t a n d
d e t e r m i n e s u c h a c t s o f p o s i t i o n , t h a t i s , t h e y c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e r e l a t i o n s
b e t w e e n t h e p o s i t e d a n d t h e f a c u l t i e s o f k n o w l e d g e i n v o l v e d i n s u c h p o s i t i n g .
T h u s , K a n t d e f i n e s t h e p o s s i b l e a s " t h a t w h i c h a g r e e s [ u b e r e i n k o m m t ] w i t h t h e
f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i s , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f i n t u i t i o n a n d o f
c o n c e p t s " ; t h e " a c t u a l " [ w i r k l i c h ] a s " t h a t w h i c h i s b o u n d u p w i t h [ z u s a m -
m e n h i i n g t ] t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i s , w i t h s e n s a t i o n " ; a n d
t h e n e c e s s a r y a s " t h a t w h i c h i n i t s c o n n e c t i o n [ Z u s a m m e n h a n g ] w i t h t h e
a c t u a l i s d e t e r m i n e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i -
e n c e " ( 2 4 8 ; 2 3 9 ) . 8 B y d e t e r m i n i n g o n t i c p o s i t i o n a s t h e s y n - t h e s i s o r c o m -
p o s i t i o n o f a n a f f e c t i o n , K a n t h a s m a d e i t p o s s i b l e t o e n v i s a g e t h e n e c e s s a r y
p a r t p l a y e d b y r e f l e x i o n t h e r e i n . F o r o n t i c p o s i t i o n a l w a y s i n v o l v e s t h e d i f f e r -
e n t i a t i o n o f m o d a l i t i e s . I n t u r n , o n e m u s t d e t e r m i n e i n w h a t r e l a t i o n r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n s s t a n d t o t h e f a c u l t i e s o f k n o w l e d g e - s e n s u a l i t y o r i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y -
i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f t h e i r m o d a l i t i e s . A n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f s u c h r e l a t i o n s i s t h e b u s i n e s s o f r e f l e x i o n .
W h e n f i n a l l y K a n t a p p e n d s t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e " A m p h i b o l y o f t h e C o n c e p t s o f R e f l e x i o n , "
h e i s t a k i n g w h a t i s f o r H e i d e g g e r h i s l a s t s t e p i n t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e s e n s e
o f B e i n g . V e r y b r i e f l y , t h i s s t e p - w h i c h H e i d e g g e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s a s t h e s k e t c h -
i n g - i n o f t h e l i n e s i n t h e O r t s n e t z o f t h e O r t o f t h e r e c e p t i v e - p o s i t i o n a l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g , t o w h i c h w e w i l l r e t u r n b e l o w - i n v o l v e s r e f l e c t i n g o n t h e r e f l e x i o n
o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n a c t s o f p o s i t i o n a l j u d g m e n t , i . e . , . i n t h e a p p l i c a -
t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
A l l j u d g m e n t s , . . . a n d i n d e e d a l l c o m p a r i s o n s , r e q u i r e r e f l e x i o n ,
i . e . , d i s t i n c t i o n o f t h e c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t y t o w h i c h t h e g i v e n c o n c e p t s
b e l o n g . T h e a c t b y w h i c h I h o l d t o g e t h e r t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n s w i t h t h e c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t y t o w h i c h i t b e l o n g s , a n d b y
m e a n s o f w h i c h I d i s t i n g u i s h w h e t h e r i t i s a s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e p u r e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r t o s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e y a r e t o b e c o m -
p a r e d w i t h e a c h o t h e r , I c a l l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e f l e x i o n . ( 2 8 6 ; 2 7 6 - 7 7 )
F o r K a n t , t h e c o n c e p t s w h i c h g u i d e t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f ( c o n c e p t u a l ) r e p r e s e n -
t a t i o n s - i d e n t i t y a n d d i f f e r e n c e , a g r e e m e n t a n d o p p o s i t i o n , i n n e r a n d o u t e r ,
a n d d e t e r m i n a b l e a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n ( m a t t e r a n d f o r s u c h
c o m p a r i s o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a f o r m a l l o g i c . B u t t h e s e c o n c e p t s c a n b e
a p p l i e d w i t h i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c o n l y a f t e r i t h a s b e e n d e c i d e d w h a t s t a t u s
t h e g i v e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h a v e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a c u l t i e s o f k n o w l e d g e . " T h e
r i g h t d e t e r m i n i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n , i n
w h i c h f a c u l t y o f k n o w l e d g e t h e i b e l o n g t o g e t h e r s u b j e c t i v e l y - i n t h e s e n s i b i l -
i t y o r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ( 2 8 6 ; 2 7 7 ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d - J . L . ) T h e w o r d a m p h i -
Afterword 199
boly, or "ambiguity," in Kant's section-title refers, then, to the confusion of
pure objects of the understanding with appearances, noumena with phenom-
ena, which occurs when transcendental reflexion is elided or insufficiently
carried out.
II.
Heidegger within the Limits of Pure Kant
Now-to return tothe question we announced at the outset--once he has
thus sketched out Kant's position on Being, what position does Heidegger
take with respect to the former position? How does he delimit it, and how
does he characterize his own act of delimitation? As Heidegger had argued in
the earlier Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that Kant shied away from
the privilege he intially granted to the transcendental imagination as ontolog-
ical faculty9 in the first deduction, so he argues in the later essay that Kant fails
to think through the consequences of transcendental reflexion.
10
Having
marked the reflexion of reflexion in the" Amphiboly" as the limit-the Orts-
netz of the Ort--of Kant's thought on Being, Heidegger remarks that Kant's
solution to the ambiguity of representations-are they phenomena or
noumena?-by means of transcendental reflexion itself involves an ambiguity
which Kant fails to glimpse. In order to characterize this ambiguity, and draw-
ing on his previous analyses of the motif of the unity of Being and thinking
since Parmenides,lI Heidegger first suggests that Kant translates this unity into
the unity of position and reflexion. Being reduces to the positive act of an
understanding in the process of reflecting upon itself. Since one cannot posit,
or attribute existence (as determined by modality), except on condition of
reflecting on the relations between representations and one's own faculties of
knowledge, reflexion is always already included within the activity of positing,
but this activity also always requires a controlling movement of reflexion
upon that reflexion. For Heidegger, Kant has failed to distinguish adequately
between these two movements, or aspects of reflexion, or rather he has failed
to realize the way in which they are at once distinct and intertwined. This inter-
twinement entails that neither reflexion nor the reflexion of reflexion ever
quite punctually arrives as such, each being incessantly de-Iayed by the other,
with the consequence that position is always only in the process of taking (and
therefore taking away its) place.
In order to clarify the misunderstanding to which the notion of a simple
opposition between position and reflexion in Kant's thought would lead, Hei-
degger characterizes the difference between the reflexion of position, the
reflexion which "is" or gives or carries out position. and the reflexion of
reflexion, as follows: reflexion on the first level proposes the horizon-the
l i m i t - w i t h i n w h i c h p o s i t e d n e s s , t h a t i s , o b j e c t i v i t y , c a n b e g l i m p s e d . R e f l e x -
i o n o n t h e s e c o n d l e v e l f u n c t i o n s , h e a s s e r t s , a s t h e " p r o c e d u r e " ( V e r f a h r e n ) ,
i n s t r u m e n t , a n d " o r g a n o n " ( O r g a n o n ) t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e B e i n g w h i c h i s
g l i m p s e d w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f p o s i t e d n e s s i s " i n t e r p r e t e d " ( a u s g e l e g t ) . T h u s
w e h a v e t h e p o s i t i n g - t h e o p e n i n g u p - - o f a h o r i z o n , a n d t h e n a n i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n o f t h e m o d a l i t y o f w h a t a p p e a r s w i t h i n ( a n d a s ) t h a t h o r i z o n . B u t t h e
h o r i z o n , t h e l i m i t , i s h e r e ( s t i l l t o b e ) p o s i t e d a n e w i n e a c h " m o m e n t " o f i t s
r e f l e x i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
P o s i t i o n i s t h e p o s i t i o n o f r e f l e x i o n , a n d r e f l e x i o n i s a l w a y s t h e r e f l e x i o n
o f p o s i t i o n . T h e p o s i t e d " o b j e c t " o f a n i n t e r p r e t i v e r e f l e x i o n , t h e h o r i z o n t a l
g r o u n d o r d e l i m i t e d f i g u r e w i t h r e s p e c t t o w h i c h i n t e r p r e t i v e r e f l e x i o n w o u l d
o r i e n t i t s e l f , i s a l w a y s d i s p l a c e d a n d r e p l a c e d a n e w i n t h e r e f l e x i o n w h i c h h a s
a l w a y s n o t y e t e s t a b l i s h e d i t s p o s i t i o n . F r o m t h e a t t e m p t i n K a n t t o o v e r c o m e
t h e c o n f u s i o n o f o b j e c t s o f t h e p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a p p e a r a n c e s g i v e n
i n t u i t i v e l y , w e h a v e m o v e d t o t h e a t t e m p t i n H e i d e g g e r t o a r g u e f o r t h e
i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n f u s i o n o f r e f l e x i o n a s p o s i t i n g w i t h r e f l e x i o n a s i n t e r -
p r e t i v e d e - p o s i t i n g o r " e x - p o s i t i o n " ( a u s - l e g e n ) . H o w i s i t t h e n t h a t H e i d e g g e r
w i l l p r o p o s e h i s o w n p o s i t i o n ? W h a t l i m i t w i l l H e i d e g g e r h a v e t h u s d r a w n
a r o u n d t h e K a n t i a n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d h o w w i l l t h i s l i m i t b e i n t e r p r e t e d s o a s t o
c o m p r i s e t h e f r a m e o f a m e d i a t i o n b e t w e e n K a n t a n d H e i d e g g e r , o b j e c t a n d
s u b j e c t r e s p e c t i v e l y h e r e ?
H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s h i s a n s w e r t o K a n t t o w a r d t h e e n d o f h i s e s s a y a s
f o l l o w s :
W i e a b e r n u n , w e n n w i r S e i n i m S i n n e d e s a n f a n g l i c h e n g r i e c h i s -
c h e n D e n k e n s v e r n e h m e n a l s s i c h l i c h t e n d - w a h r e n d e A n w e s e n -
h e i t d e s J e - W e i l i g e n , n i c h t n u r u n d n i c h t e r s t a l s G e s e t z t h e i t i n
d e r S e t z u n g d u r c h d e n V e r s t a n d ? K a n n f U r d i e s e s a n f a n g l i c h
g e p d i g t e S e i n d a s v o r s t e l l e n d e D e n k e n d e n H o r i z o n t b i l d e n ?
O f f e n b a r n i c h t . w e n n a n d e r s d i e s i c h l i c h t e n d - w a h r e n d e A n w e -
s e n h e i t v e r s c h i e d e n i s t v o n d e r G e s e t z t h e i t . m a g a u c h d i e s e G e s e t -
z t h e i t m i t j e n e r A n w e s e n h e i t v e r w a n d t b l e i b e n , w e i l G e s e t z t h e i t
i h r e W e s e n s h e r k u n f t d e r A n w e s e n h e i t v e r d a n k t . ( 4 7 2 )
B u t n o w w h a t i f w e t h i n k / h e a r [ v e r n e h m e n l B e i n g i n t h e s e n s e o f
o r i g i n a l G r e e k t h i n k i n g a s s i c h l i c h t e n d - w a h r e n d e A n w e s e n h e i t d e s
J e - W e i l i g e n . n o t o n l y a n d n o t f i r s t o f a l l a s p o s i t e d n e s s i n t h e
p o s i t i n g o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ? C a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g
c o n s t i t u t e t h e h o r i z o n f o r t h i s o r i g i n a l l y i m p r i n t e d B e i n g ? E v i -
d e n t l y n o t . i n s o f a r a s t h e s i c h l i c h t e n d - w a h r e n d e A n w e s e n h e i t i s
d i f f e r e n t f r o m . p o s i t e d n e s s . e v e n i f t h i s p o s i t e d n e s s r e m a i n s
r e l a t e d t o t h a t A n w e s e n h e i t , b e c a u s e p o s i t e d n e s s o w e s i t s e s s e n t i a l
o r i g i n t o t h a t A n w e s e n h e i t .
Afterword 201
In this extremely dense passage, in which almost every word would call for
commentary, Heidegger suggests that das vorstellende Denken ("representa-
tional" or "pro-positional thinking") cannot constitute or image-forth or
"inform" (bilden) the horizon or limit within which the thought of Sein as sich
lichtend-wiihrende Anwesenheit des !e-Weiligen would occur. Heidegger
thereby apparently begins to position himself "outside" the space of position.
But he does so only insofar as he also insists that the thinking of position and
of the outside would only misconstrue that which is "outside" of it by thinking
of it precisely as outside, by spatially representing it. Hence, to the degree that
we do not simply do away with representational thinking, it will be necessary
to think of Heidegger as being every bit as much inside Kant as outside Kant,
every bit as much precisely where Kant is as elsewhere. In this sense, Heideg-
ger simply repeats Kant's thesis on Being, proposes himself no other thesis, says
nothing else or other. When Heidegger suggests here that "positedness" owes
its Wesensherkunft to Anwesenheit, then, he is not suggesting that positedness
simply derives from a temporally prior or epistemologically more original
ground. Rather, if the "essence" of "positedness" comes from-has its
Herkunftin-"presence" (Anwesenheit), it comes from a "presence" which has
never yet arrived as such, from a "presence" still up ahead, coming on-an-
wesend-in the interpretive de-positing of its position.
But what, then, would be the meaning of Heidegger's own "position":
sich lichtend-wahrende Anwesenheit des /e- Weiligen? One can translate it-
with relative precision and in its proper near-unread ability-as the "self-
clearing-enduring-(un)veiling presence of whatever whiles along and away
without reason or ground as of the while itself."12 The language of grounding
conflated or confused with the language of the passage of time-the word wei!
as "because" and as "while"-appears here as a quasi name for the being (des
/e-Weiligen) , alluding to the necessary impossibility of the incessant efface-
ment of the ontological difference. The being thereby appears as the self-
(un)grounding Being of its own arbitrariness (jeweilig = "for the time being,"
"momentary," "for the nonce"). In sich lichtend-wahrende Anwesenheit, the
"truth" (Wahrheit, wahrend) of Being as aletheia "appears" as the (un)veiling
of a moment without moment, or a momentousness without moment, the
(un)veiling of the nonce which is always still the not-yet of the nonce,
['annonce of the (translative) nonce, the anon.
If Heidegger knows, then, that he can place himself neither simply out-
side nor simply inside of Kant's discourse, and if he here gestures in part
toward being outside of it despite the claims that the outside/inside polarity
would be properly of no relevance, how does he elsewhere inscribe himself
inside Kant's discourse? More generally, how does he elsewhere negotiate the
double line of the border between his determination of Kant's text and the text
of this determination, such that one can no longer quite say who is who and
therefore also against whom Heidegger is polemicizing-himself or Kant?-
when he marks the limitations of the discourse of transcendental philosophy?
1 . . L e t U S r e t u r n t o c e r t a i n i n d i c a t i o n s t h u s f a r e l i d e d . T o b e g i n w i t h ,
a n d a s o n l y b e c o m e s r e a d a b l e t o w a r d t h e e n d o f " K a n t s T h e s e , " H e i d e g g e r h a s
w r i t t e n a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t w h a t h e w i s h e s t o p u r s u e i s e i n e e i n f a c h e O b e r -
l e g u n g ( 2 7 3 ) , a s i m p l e r e f l e x i o n , " c o n c e r n i n g B e i n g i n K a n t . B A n d h e h a s g o n e
o n , a g a i n t o w a r d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e e s s a y , t o r e f e r t o h i s " e n c o u n t e r " w i t h
K a n t t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f a t e r m w h i c h h e f r e q u e n t l y u s e s o r m e n t i o n s b u t
w h i c h i n t h i s " c o n t e x t " t a k e s o n w i t h p a r t i c u l a r c l a r i t y i t s d o u b l e s e n s e o f
p o s i t i o n a n d r e f l e x i v e e x - p o s i t i o n : A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g ( 4 4 2 ) . 1 4 T r a n s l a t e d l i t -
e r a l l y , t h e t e r m m e a n s , " p o s i t i n g o u t o f o n e a n o t h e r " o r " p o s i t i n g o u t o f i t s e l f '
a n d s u g g e s t s a n i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e e n c o u n t e r
w h i c h w o u l d n o t b e a f u s i o n b u t r a t h e r a k i n d o f m u t u a l d i s a r t i c u l a t i o n o r d i s -
m e m b e r m e n t . T h u s , H e i d e g g e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e d i s c o u r s e h e w o u l d e n a b l e
a s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a v a r i a n t o f S e t z u n g a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , a S e t z u n g t h a t i s n o
l o n g e r p e r h a p s s i m p l y d e t e r m i n a n t o r f o r m a t i v e b u t o n e t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t i n a
k i n d o f d e f o r m a t i o n , f o r m l e s s n e s s , o r m a t e r i a l i t y . T h a t i s , i t w o u l d r e s u l t i n a
" r e t u r n " t o t h a t B e i n g w h i c h , a s h e w r i t e s a t t h e e n d o f t h e e s s a y , h a s " a l l o w e d
i t s e l f t o b e d e t e r m i n e d " a s S e t z u n g a n d t h u s w o u l d b e n o m i n a l l y o n t h e s i d e o f
t h e m a t e r i a l i n t h e K a n t i a n s e n s e o f d a s B e s t i m m b a r e .
1 5
F u r t h e r , H e i d e g g e r a s s e r t s a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h i s e s s a y t h a t h e m e a n s t o
e n a b l e t h i s A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g - t h i s S e t z u n g w h i c h i s a t o n c e ( o r f o r t h e
n o n c e ) n o l o n g e r a S e t z u n g b u t a k i n d o f A u s s e t z e n d e r S e t z u n g , a c e s s a t i o n a n d
e x - p o s u r e o f p o s i t i n g - b y j u x t a p o s i n g c e r t a i n t e x t s f r o m K a n t w h i c h " r e c i p -
r o c a l l y i l l u m i n a t e o n e a n o t h e r " a n d t h u s a l l o w " w h a t c a n n o t b e i m m e d i a t e l y
s a i d t o s h i n e f o r t h " ( d i e g e e i g n e t e n T e x t e s o e i n a n d e r g e g e n u b e r z u s t e I l e n , d a B
s i e s i c h w e c h s e l w e i s e e r h e l l e n u n d d a d u r c h j e n e s , w a s n i c h t u n m i t t e l b a r a u s -
g e s a g t w e r d e n k a n n , d o c h z u m V o r s c h e i n k o m m t [ 4 4 1 - 2 ] ) . T h i s p a s s a g e c a l l s
f o r a t l e a s t t w o r e m a r k s .
F i r s t o f a l l , w h a t i s t o a p p e a r n o n i m m e d i a t e l y h e r e i s n o t s o m u c h t h e
i m m e d i a t e a s r a t h e r m e d i a t i o n , 1 6 f o r a p p e a r i n g i s m e d i a t i o n a n d m e d i a c y ,
a p p e a r a n c e i s a l w a y s s t i l l c o m i n g i n t o t h e a p p e a r a n c e t o c o m e - A n w e s e n h e i t
d e s l e - W e i l i g e n . F o r e x a m p l e , w h a t " s h i n e s f o r t h " f r o m H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t
o f K a n t ' s t h e s i s i s t h a t t h i s t h e s i s p r e s e n t s i t s e l f o n l y " e p i s o d i c a l l y " ( 4 6 5 ) ,
a l w a y s m e d i a t e d a n d i n p i e c e s . W h i l e c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d b y t h e f o r m o f t h e
a r g u m e n t a s t h e a p p a r e n t l y l i n e a r n a r r a t i v e o f t h e f a t e o f o n e t h o u g h t i n K a n t ,
t h e d i s m e m b e r m e n t o f K a n t ' s c o r p u s a s o f h i s o w n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r o p e r a t e s ,
a l l o w s , o r o c c a s i o n s i n t h i s e s s a y n o n e t h e l e s s s h o w s t h i s o n e t h o u g h t , t h i s o n e
p o s i t i o n , t o b e d e p o s i t e d i n s e v e r a l s u b p o s i t i o n s . I t t h u s s h o w s t h i s t h o u g h t t o
b e t e m p o r a l i z e d a s a l w a y s a g a i n d e - p o s i t e d , r e f l e c t e d u p o n a s t h e r e f l e x i o n
t h a t r e t u r n s t o i t s p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e o n l y i n t h e m o d e o f n o n r e t u r n , i . e . , a s t h e
s e l f - p o s i t i n g t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y n o t i n t h e p o s i t i o n t o r e a c h b a c k t o t h e s e l f i t
h e n c e f o r t h w i l l h a v e b e e n .
B u t t h e r e i s m o r e m a t t e r f o r r e f l e x i o n i n H e i d e g g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f
h i s m e t h o d h e r e . F o r H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w h e m e a n s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e
Afterword
203
possibility of this Auseinandersetzung with Kant is secondly also a (displaced)
example of its realization. It adds itself as partial performance to that of which
it speaks. That is, when Heidegger speaks of letting the fragments of Kant's
corpus reciprocally illuminate (wechselweise erhellen) each other, the recipro-
cality of this illumination itself alludes to or inscribes itself within Kant's con-
cept of reflexion, in particular as unfolded in the Critique of Judgment, where
Wechselwirkung ("reciprocal effectuation") is the principle that governs the
relation between understanding and imagination, or reason and imagination,
in the judgments of beauty and sublimity, respectively. Through the recipro-
cal illumination or effectuation of these reciprocalities, Heidegger implies: (1)
that his montage of Kant-quotations is perhaps more "aesthetic" object than
philosophical essay and (2) that what is going on in "aesthetic" experience as
Kant characterizes it is perhaps more a matter of an experience of the "his-
tory" of Being than something like the disinterested contemplation of art for
art's sake. By making the fragments of Kant's text-the different versions and
formulations of his ontology-stand in for the imagination and understand-
ing/reason, Heidegger implies that the Erkenntnisvermogen have been dis-
placed by or re-interpreted as fragments of text, which would always be com-
posed of the elements of sensuality and the super-sensuous, or rather which
would always consist essentially of some other and third (dis)figural-
schematic possibility. In the place of Erkenntnisvermogen Heidegger inserts
textual fragments, con-texts "lighting" each other up, where the erhellen
alludes to the play of the Lichtung of Being. But do we know for certain that
the Erkenntnisvermogen in Kant were not already fragments of text?
2. Having seen how Heidegger both takes his distance from Kantian
reflexive position and places that taking-of-distance within the frame of such
position, we are perhaps in a position to return to a call put on hold above:
Heidegger's characterization of the reflexion of reflexion as the Ortsnetz of the
art of the synthetically propositional understanding. Although Heidegger is
apparently literalizing it to mean, "the net of the place" or "the network
around the place," otherwise Ortsnetz merely means a telephone network
l7
which connects either several towns or places, Orter, or the different tele-
phones within a given town or place. The Ortsnetz is thus either the context
around the place or the text within the place; it is undecidably-depending on
the context of its use-the outside context or the inner space, extra-topical or
intra-topical. Accordingly, when Heidegger speaks of the reflexion on the
reflexion introduced in the "Amphiboly" as the Ortsnetz, he varies his formu-
lations among those which suggest that the Ortsnetz is outside of the art and
those which suggest that it is within the "art":
das Ortsnetz ist noch nicht sichtbar, d.h. dasjenige, von woher
Sein als Position, d.h. diese selbst ihrerseits eigens bestimmt wird
(465). Wir mussen uns auch hier mit einem Hinweis begnugen.
d e r n u r z e i g e n s o l I , i n w i e f e r n K a n t i n d i e s e m " A n h a n g " d i e L i n i e n
i m O r t s n e t z d e s O r t e s z e i c h n e t , a n d e n d a s S e i n a l s P o s i t i o n
g e h O r t . . . . A c h t e t n u n d i e R e f l e x i o n a u f d i e j e n i g e n Z u s t a n d e u n d
V e r h a l t n i s s e d e s V o r s t e l I e n s , d a d u r c h i i b e r h a u p t d i e U m g r e n z u n g
d e s S e i n s d e s S e i e n d e n m o g I i c h w i r d . d a n n i s t d i e R e f l e x i o n a u f
d a s O r t s n e t z i m O r t d e s S e i n s e i n e t r a n s z e n d e n t a l e R e f l e x i o n .
( 4 6 5 - 6 6 ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d - J . L . )
t h e t e l e p h o n e n e t w o r k i s n o t y e t v i s i b l e . i . e t h a t f r o m w h i c h B e i n g
a s p o s i t i o n , i . e . , p o s i t i o n i t s e l f i n t u r n i s p r o p e r l y d e t e r -
m i n e d . . . . W e m u s t c o n t e n t o u r s e l v e s h e r e t o o w i t h a n i n d i c a t i o n
w h i c h i s o n l y m e a n t t o s h o w t o w h a t e x t e n t i n t h i s " A p p e n d i x "
K a n t h a s t r a c e d o u t t h e l i n e s i n t h e t e l e p h o n e n e t w o r k o f t h e p l a c e
a t w h i c h B e i n g a s p o s i t i o n b e l o n g s . . . . I f n o w r e f l e x i o n a t t e n d s t o
t h o s e s t a t e s a n d r e l a t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h i n g e n -
e r a l t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e B e i n g o f t h e b e i n g b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e ,
t h e n t h e r e f l e x i o n o n t h e t e l e p h o n e n e t w o r k i n t h e p l a c e o f B e i n g i s
a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e f l e x i o n .
W h a t i s t h e s t a t u s o f t h i s a p o s i t i o n a l O r t s n e t z o f p o s i t i o n ? I n h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a -
t i o n o f t h e O r t s n e t z , H e i d e g g e r u n d e r l i n e s K a n t ' s r e m a r k t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d f o r m . a s t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e a n d t h e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . h a s a c e r t a i n p r i v i l e g e w i t h i n t h e s e t o f f o u r o p p o s i t i o n s w h i c h
c o m p r i s e t h e c o n c e p t s o f r e f l e x i o n , c o m i n g p r i o r e v e n t o a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e . I f t h e s p a c e o f r e f l e x i o n a s O r t s n e t z
" c o n t a i n s " t h e c o n c e p t s o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d d e t e r m i n a b i l i t y - t h e " U n t e r -
s c h i e d v o n M a t e r i e u n d F o r m . . . g e h o r t i n d a s O r t s n e t z r u r d e n a r t d e s S e i n s
a l s P o s i t i o n " ( 4 6 7 ) - b u t t h e s e c o n c e p t s a r e p r i o r t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a n y
s p a c e o f c o n t a i n m e n t , t h e n r e f l e x i o n i s c o n t a i n e d b y w h a t i t c o n t a i n s . I n s o f a r
a s i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y t h e p l a y o f t h i s - i t s e l f n o t y e t c o n s t i t u t e d - d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n f o r m a n d m a t t e r . t h e n . t h e m o d a l i t y o f t h e O r t s n e t z - r e f l e x i v e p o s i -
t i o n i n o r a s i t s i n e v i t a b l e p o s t p o n e m e n t - w o u l d b e s i t u a t e d b e t w e e n f o r m
a n d m a t t e r . d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e . p o s s i b i l i t y a n d r e a l i t y .
e s s e n c e a n d e x i s t e n c e . T h e m o d a l s t a t u s o f t h e r e f l e x i o n o n r e f l e x i o n , t h e
q u e s t i o n o f t h e h o w - a s o p p o s e d t o t h e t h a t o r w h a t o f B e i n g - i s i t s e l f i n a c -
c e s s i b l e t o t h e d i s c o u r s e s o f t h e t h a t a n d w h a t . T h e m o v e m e n t o f r e f l e x i o n a s
t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a f o r m m u s t a l w a y s i n v o l v e t h e s e l f - e x t e r n a l i z a t i o n a n d
m a t e r i a l i z i n g ( b u t n e v e r y e t m a t e r i a l i z e d ) d e f o r m a t i o n o f t h a t f o r m . R e f l e x i o n
a s t h e r e f l e x i o n o f r e f l e x i o n i n v o l v e s c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e s e l f - e x t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f
s e l f - e x t e r n a l i z a t i o n , t h e d e f o r m a t i o n o f d e f o r m a t i o n " i t s e l f . " T h e O r t s n e t z -
t h e p o s i t i o n a l n e t w o r k o r t e x t u a l p l a c e - o f p o s i t i v e r e f l e x i o n i s p o s i t i v e l y
u n s i t u a b l e . p o s i t i v e l y e x - p o s e d .
W h i c h h e l p s e x p l a i n w h y t h e t e l e p h o n i c " m e t a p h o r " i s a p p o s i t e : t h e
Afterword 205
distance of the voice-the place of self-affection-on the telephone is the dis-
tance from a voice heard within by means of a prosthesis of the liminal ear.
This voice approaches that ear, at the distance of an inside (or a materiality),
from (a formal-delimiting) outside. The telephonic voice, no matter how
mundane its tone and message, is always liminally ecstatic. The voice is always
telephonic; the apparently absolute nearness of its self-affective proximity is
always only proximitative.
To place a call, or to receive a call, on this telephonic network is as Hei-
degger knows a somewhat risky business. For Heidegger characterizes Kant's
tracing of the lines of the textual-telephonic network of reflexive position fur-
ther as the Sicherung of a Sicherung, the securing of a securing (466). But
Sicherung also means a "fuse" or "circuit breaker" in the sense of what shuts
down an electrical apparatus before its circuits get blown out by an overload
of current. The reflexion on reflexion is hence figured here as the fuse of a
fuse. Heidegger's apparent refusal of the fuse, however, acknowledges its own
confusion with the fusion of the circuits from which it would escape, and by
acknowledging this confusion attempts in a sense to escape from them, to shut
metaphysical thinking down. The circuits of reflexion, then, are enacted and
con stated in Heidegger's text as blown out insofar as shut down. The circuit
breaker is here itself what overloads, blows out, and confuses the circuits, the
net result being a nonmeasurable overload of circuitous ramifications. Indeed,
for example, the Sicherung is also the safety-catch on a rifle, to prevent it from
shooting off inadvertently, to prevent the shot from coming too soon, i.e.,
here to prevent the noumenal phantasm of a signifier from becoming the p h e ~
nomenal experience of a signified, or to prevent the extraneous connotation
from entering the context in a counter-purposive manner. If the shot-Le.,
the safety-catch--comes both too soon and too late in Kant-for the shot is
reflexive position in its self-anticipatory postponement-then it does the
same in Heidegger. It comes too soon, for example, to prevent Heidegger
from shooting off his mouth about the limitations of Kantian reflexion, but
also too late to prevent him from thereby precisely shooting off his own mouth
along with Kant's own. Heidegger's text is indeed loaded (and overloaded)
with mixed "metaphors" for its own lack of synthetic composure.
III.
The Calling of the Sublime
Thus, as a telephonic network of reflexive Auseinandersetzung, Heidegger's
discourse inscribes itself into the border of what can no longer quite be char-
acterized as Kant's position on Being, even if it also cannot be characterized as
any other position. On the basis of the "comprehension" of this inscription,
2 0 6 J E P P R E Y S . L I B R E T T
o n e c a n s e e p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t m o r e c l e a r l y t h a n w o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e p o s s i b l e
w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g a t t h e e n d o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e s s a y . H e r e , H e i d e g g e r m u l t i p l y
i n v o k e s c e r t a i n k e y t e r m s o f t h e ( K a n t i a n ) d i s c o u r s e o f t h e s u b l i m e , b u t w i t h . : .
o u t a t t r i b u t i n g t h e m t o K a n t a n d w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o t h e s u b l i m e a s s u c h .
A n d h e i n v o k e s t h e s u b l i m e h e r e i n o r d e r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e w h a t , i n t h e a b s e n c e
o f t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o v e , o n e w o u l d h a v e b e e n t e m p t e d t o m i s c o n s t r u e a s
w h a t H e i d e g g e r w o u l d c o n c e i v e t o b e h i s o w n p u r e n o n p o s i t i o n o n B e i n g d i s -
t i n c t f r o m a n d s i m p l y " b e y o n d " t h e p o s i t i o n o f K a n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r
i n v o k e s h e r e t h e m o t i f s o f W u r d e a n d o f t h e m e a s u r e l e s s s o u r c e o f a l l m e a s u r e .
1 . T o s t a r t w i t h W u r d e : E x t e n d i n g t h e t h o u g h t o f s i c h l i c h t e n d -
w a h r e n d e A n w e s e n h e i t d e s J e - W e i l i g e n w h i c h w e h a v e b e g u n t o d i s c u s s a b o v e ,
H e i d e g g e r a r g u e s t h a t , i f t h o u g h t ( i n r e l a t i o n t o B e i n g ) o r r e f l e x i o n ( i n r e l a -
t i o n t o p o s i t i o n ) i s a m b i g u o u s , n a m e l y a s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a h o r i z o n o n
w h i c h t h e o b j e c t c a n a p p e a r a n d a s t h e t o o l o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s h o r i -
z o n , t h e n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f " l o g i c " a n d " L o g o s " e s s e n t i a l l y r e d u c e t o t h i s a m b i -
g u i t y . H e i d e g g e r g o e s o n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e r e f o r e l o g i c m u s t b e r e t h o u g h t a s
t h i s a m b i g u i t y i n i t s q u e s t i o n a b l e c h a r a c t e r o r i n i t s w o r t h i n e s s o f q u e s t i o n a n d
t h o u g h t .
W e n n n u n a b e r d a s D e n k e n i n s e i n e m B e z u g z u m S e i n z w e i d e u t i g
i s t : a l s H o r i z o n t v o r g a b e u n d a l s O r g a n o n , b l e i b t d a n n n i e h t a u c h ,
w a s " L o g i k " h e l l i t , n a c h d e r g e n a n n t e n H i n s i c h t z w e i d e u t i g ? W i r d
d a n n " d i e L o g i k " a l s O r g a n o n u n d a l s H o r i z o n t d e r S e i n s a u s l e g u n g
n i c h t d u r c h a u s f r a g w u r d i g ? E i n e B e s i n n u n g , d i e n a c h d i e s e r R i c h -
t u n g d r a n g t , w e n d e t s i c h n i e h t g e g e n d i e L o g i k , s o n d e r n v e r w e n d e t
s i c h f U r e i n e z u r e i c h e n d e B e s t i m m u n g d e s L O G O S , d . h . d e s j e n i g e n
S a g e n s , d a r i n d a s S e i n s i c h z u r S p r a c h e b r i n g t a l s d a s D e n k w u r d i g e
d e s D e n k e n s . 1 m u n s c h e i n b a r e n " i s t " v e r b i r g t s i c h a l l e s D e n k -
w u r d i g e d e s S e i n s . ( 4 7 2 , e m p h a s i s a d d e d , e x c e p t f o r d a s - J . L . )
B u t n o w i f t h i n k i n g i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o B e i n g i s a m b i g u o u s : a s t h e
p r e - s e n t a t i o n o f t h e h o r i z o n a n d a s o r g a n o n , d o e s n o t w h a t " l o g i c "
m e a n s a l s o r e m a i n i n t h i s r e s p e c t a m b i g u o u s ? D o e s n o t " l o g i c " - a s
o r g a n o n a n d a s h o r i z o n o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f B e i n g - b e c o m e
t h o r o u g b l y q u e s t i o n a b l e / w o r t h y o f q u e s t i o n ? A t h i n k i n g w h i c h
p u s h e s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n d o e s n o t t u r n a g a i n s t l o g i c , b u t u s e s i t s e l f
f o r a s u f f i c i e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e L O G O S , i . e . , o f t h a t s p e e c h i n
w h i c h B e i n g b r i n g s i t s e l f t o l a n g u a g e a s t h a t w h i c h , i n t h o u g h t , i s
w o r t h y o f t h o u g h t . I n t h i s i n c o n s p i c u o u s / n o n a p p e a r i n g " i s " a l l o f
B e i n g t h a t i s w o r t h y o f t h o u g h t c o n c e a l s i t s e l f .
W h a t . ! w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e h e r e i s f i r s t o f a l l t h e w a y H e i d e g g e r c a l l s u p o n t h e
e x p r e s s i o n s f r a g w u r d i g a n d d e n k w i i r d i g - w o r t h y o f q u e s t i o n a n d w o r t h y o f
Afterword 207
thought-expressions that recur obsessively throughout Heidegger's text.
IS
Why all this emphasis on the linkage of thought and interrogation with "wor-
thiness" or "dignity" (Warde) and the converse?
The question is particularly worth asking in our present context, since
Heidegger makes use of the term "dignity" or "worth" in his brief discussion
of Kant's "doctrine of the beautiful" in his Nietzsche lectures. There he
defends Kant against what he sees as Schopenhauer's and, subsequently, Niet-
zsche's misreadings of Kant's aesthetics of disinterest. This defense takes the
form of the argument that Kant's aesthetics of disinterest is an aesthetics not
of mere indifference but, to the contrary, of an engagement beyond all empir-
ical or purely conceptual interestedness.
19
When we find something beautiful,
for Heidegger's Kant, we let it "come before us purely as itself, in its own rank
and dignity [Warde]" (129); "the beautiful is what we dignify [wiirdigen] and
honor as the pre-image/model [Vor-bild] of our essence" (132); and "the
beautiful is "what provides the measure [Maftgebende]" (134). Readers of
Schiller will recognize here that the Wiirde echoing in the late Kant-essay and
throughout Heidegger's works echoes also back from them into the title and
theme of Schiller's essay, "Ober Anmut und Wilrde" (On Grace and Dig-
nity"). There, Wiirde refers precisely to the sublime sensibility. "The domina-
tion of the drives through moral force is spiritual freedom, and dignity is the
name of its expression in appearance" (413). But without going into Schiller's
determination of sublime dignity in any detail, suffice it to say that it is a
derivative of Kant's,20 and to say that it would be perhaps precipitous to think
of Heidegger as simply adhering to a Schillerian reading of Kant. The point
here is merely to note that Heidegger broaches the discourse of the sublime
when he speaks of "logic" as wiir.dig of question and thought, and conse-
quently wherever he speaks of das Fragwiirdige or das Denkwiirdige.
2. As in the passages from the Nietzsche-lectures just quoted, at the
conclusion of the Kant-essay Heidegger links the thought of Warde with the
thought of the gift of a measureless measure in a way that cuts to the heart of the
Kantian discourse of the sublime and which is therefore worth looking at here
in some detail. That which is, Heidegger says, "most worthy of thought" (das
Denkwiirdigste) is a consequence or an aspect of the interpretation of the
ontological difference: that Being "is" not, but that there is-"it gives" (Bs
gibt)-Being. Heidegger characterizes this gift, as the giving of what gives the
measure, by means of a condensed commentary on Parmenides' speech of
Being. Since Being is no being, when Parmenides writes esti gar einai, we can-
not translate this as "Being is," but at best as "there is Being" (es gibt Sein), or
as Anwest niimlich Anwesen, which one might in turn translate as "coming
(nominally) comes," or "coming is coming." In an emphatic tone, then, Hei-
degger reduces logic to tautologic, the speaking of Being toward Being, or as
he says in the "Letter on Humanism," l'engagement par l'etre pour l'etre. But
what good is a speech that goes nowhere, that stutters in the endless repetition
o f a n a p p a r e n t l y c o n t e n t l e s s c i r c u l a r i t y ? H e i d e g g e r ' s a n s w e r i n t h e K a n t e s s a y
i s t h a t P a r m e n i d e s ' t a u t o l o g y i s " d i e T a u t o l o g i e i m h o c h s t e n S i n n e , d i e n i c h t
n i c h t s , s o n d e r n a l l e s s a g t : d a s a n f a n g l i c h u n d k i i n f t i g h i n f U r d a s D e n k e n
M a B g e b e n d e " ( " t a u t o l o g y i n t h e h i g h e s t s e n s e , w h i c h s a y s n o t n o t h i n g b u t
e v e r y t h i n g : w h a t g i v e s t h e m e a s u r e f o r t h o u g h t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g a n d i n t o t h e
f u t u r e " [ 4 7 2 - 7 3 ] ) . A n d t h i s t h o u g h t , H e i d e g g e r a d d s , a s i f b y w a y o f a f t e r -
t h o u g h t , h a s t o b e t h o u g h t a s t i m e . .
T h u s , a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e s s a y , t h e s p e e c h o f B e i n g , a s t h e
s p e e c h o f a t i m e " b e y o n d " t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l h o r i z o n o f o b j e c t i v e p o s i t i o n i n g ,
c o m e s t o s p e a k i n t e r m s o f t h e s u b l i m e . T h i s s p e e c h w o u l d b e f i r s t o f a l l a
s p e e c h t h a t s a y s n o t h i n g a s e v e r y t h i n g , a s t h e t o t a l i t y o f w h a t i s o r r a t h e r a s t h e
n o t h i n g o f t h a t t o t a l i t y i n t h e s e n s e o f i t s B e i n g . S e c o n d l y , i t w o u l d b e a s p e e c h
t h a t p r o v i d e s t h e m e a s u r e f o r t h o u g h t . A n d t h e s e t w o n o t i o n s i m p l y o n e
a n o t h e r : w h a t p r o v i d e s t h e m e a s u r e f o r e v e r y t h i n g e l s e i s i t s e l f b e y o n d m e a s u r e ,
a n d t h e t o t a l i t y o f e v e r y t h i n g i n o r a s i t s B e i n g i s t h e m e a s u r e l e s s , t h e i n f i n i t e .
B u t - b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o m e a s u r e t h i s p a s s a g e a g a i n s t t h e K a n t i a n a n a -
l y t i c o f t h e s u b l i m e i t s e l f - h o w i s o n e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h e " I t "
g i v e s a m e a s u r e h e r e ? 2 1 I n o t h e r w o r d s , h o w i s o n e t o t a k e t h e m e a s u r e o f w h a t
g i v e s t h e m e a s u r e , t h e u n m e a s u r a b l e m e a s u r e i t s e l f , t h e m e a s u r e a s t h e g i v i n g
o f t h e m e a s u r e ?
W h a t g i v e s t h e m e a s u r e h e r e m u s t a l s o b e w h a t t a k e s t h e m e a s u r e , t a k -
i n g t h e m e a s u r e a w a y e v e n a s i t g i v e s t h e m e a s u r e . F o r t o r e c e i v e i s a l s o a l w a y s
t o m e a s u r e , t o p l a c e , t o r e - c o g n i z e , t o f i n d a p o s i t i o n f o r w h a t i s m e a s u r e d .
B u t t h e r e c e p t i o n o f t h e m e a s u r e a s a m e a s u r a b l e m e a s u r e w o u l d b e a f a i l u r e
t o r e c e i v e i t a s t h e m e a s u r e o f a l l o t h e r m e a s u r e s . T h e r e c e p t i o n o f t h e m e a -
s u r e a s i m m e a s u r a b l e w i l l t h e r e f o r e a m o u n t t o a c e r t a i n n o n r e c e p t i o n . I t s g i v -
i n g w i l l a m o u n t t o i t s w i t h h o l d i n g , t o i t s t a k i n g a s i t s b e i n g t a k e n a w a y .
T h u s , t h e m e a s u r e s t h a t o n e w o u l d h a v e t o t a k e t o t a k e t h e m e a s u r e ( o f
w h a t g i v e s t h e m e a s u r e ) w h i l e p r e v e n t i n g i t s b e i n g - m e a s u r e d w o u l d b e m e a -
s u r e s f o r w h i c h " m e a s u r e " i s n o l o n g e r q u i t e t h e w o r d . T h e y w o u l d i n v o l v e a
" u s e " t h a t i s n o l o n g e r s i m p l y a n a p p l i c a t i o n t o s o m e g o a l o r t o s o m e e n d , n o
l o n g e r m e a n t t o s e c u r e o r s h o r e u p s o m e p o s i t i o n , b u t a r a d i c a l l y d e t e r -
m i n a b l e u s e o f t h e r a d i c a l l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e . H o w w o u l d o n e d e t e r m i n e t h i s
d e t e r m i n a b l e u s e ?
H e i d e g g e r ' s a l l u s i o n , i n t h e p a s s a g e q u o t e d a b o v e o n w h a t i s " w o r t h y -
o f - t h o u g h t , " t o t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h o u g h t s i c h v e r w e n d e t i s p e r h a p s " u s e f u l "
h e r e , a s i t t u r n s u s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h i s " u s e " w h i c h w o u l d n o t b e a " u s e " ;
A t h i n k i n g w h i c h p u s h e s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n d o e s n o t t u r n a g a i n s t
[ w e n d e t s i c h n i c h t g e g e n ] l o g i c , b u t u s e s i t s e l f [ v e r w e n d e t s i c h ] f o r a
s u f f i c i e n t [ z u r e i c h e n d e ] d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f l o g o s , i . e . , o f t h a t s p e e c h
i n w h i c h B e i n g b r i n g s i t s e l f t o l a n g u a g e a s w h a t , i n t h o u g h t , i s
w o r t h y o f t h o u g h t .
Afterword 209
To "use" (up) one's thought or oneself in this way would be to "turn oneself'
(sich wenden) and yet also in a certain sense always to "mis-turn oneself' (sich
ver-wenden) in a "turn" (Wendung) oflanguage, which would be a detour, a
de-turning or mis-turning, a dis-torsion, a mistranslation. The thinking of
Being, then, would distort itself as its language. To distort language would be
to turn it away from its measuring instrumental-representational function.
But at the same time, it would be to turn language back toward that function,
and this for two reasons. First, because to operate against the purposive-eval-
uative-positional is still to operate, to work for the work against the work. But
secondly, because to submit to the language of the work and its position is to
use up, to give away, the position of opposition to positional measurement.
This rather strange structure of the (non)receptive "use" of the gift of
Being can be illustrated once more in the case of Heidegger's determination
here of the "end" of this "use," of what it serves. Namely, Heidegger proposes
the "use" of thought "for" a "sufficient" determination of the logos, of the
speech of Being. But how is one to read this reference to a "sufficient" deter-
mination of logos as the speech of Being? The term sufficient alludes obviously
to "sufficient" reason, to the "sufficient" ground of a discourse on Being as
grounding. Yet how could a discourse which would still provide a sufficiency
of ground exceed the space of the power of the principle of sufficient reason
on the ungrounded character of which Heidegger has elsewhere insisted at
some length? Is Heidegger simply being unrigorous here? It would seem more
probable that the use, the expenditure of the subject on a "sufficient" determi-
nation here performs itself in the disappearance-into the discourse of ground ..
ing-of a discourse which would exceed or escape grounding. Giving itself up
to the discourse of self-grounding is the only way in which the discourse of
non-self-grounding can attempt to renounce grounding itself.
Before taking up Kant's "own" discourse on the sublime (un)measure,
let me illustrate this structure once more, with respect to the closing lines of
"Kant's Thesis." Heidegger's closing apparent condemnation of the limits of
the Parmenidean motif, as a version of which he has been reading a Kantian
position, is deeply and elusively ambiguous: "The title of the metaphysical
determination of the Being of the being, 'Being and Thinking,' does not suf-
fice [reicht nicht zul even to pose [stellenl the question of Being, never mind
[geschweige dennl to find an answer" (473). While it would seem that Heideg-
ger is saying here that the discourse of 'Being and Thinking' cannot reach into
the space of his "own" question, it is at least also the case that to suffice to pose
a question is to provide by anticipation for a sufficient grounding of its
answer. That is, it is not at all clear that the question of Being can be posed
even if and precisely when and where it is posed and positioned. This suggests
in turn that the failure to pose the question amounts to a certain kind of suc-
cess in allowing the question to be somehow other than posed. In this respect
too, then, the (external) immanence of Heidegger's discourse to its object
w o u l d p e r h a p s a l l o w f o r t h e s u b l i m e l y i m m e a s u r a b l e s u c c e s s o f i t s f a i l u r e t o
o p p o s e t h a t d i s c o u r s e w i t h a n y t h i n g o f i t s o w n . I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h e n t h a t
H e i d e g g e r c l o s e s b y c a l l i n g K a n t ' s t h e s i s a " p i n n a c l e " ( G i p f e l ) f r o m w h i c h t h e
" v i e w " ( B l i c k ) , t h e d o m a i n o f t h e v i e w , r e a c h e s b a c k t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
B e i n g a s h y p o k e i m e n o n a n d f o r w a r d t o t h e s p e c u l a t i v e - d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n o f B e i n g a s a b s o l u t e c o n c e p t ( i n H e g e l ) . T h e p i n n a c l e - t h e s u b l i m e
c l i c h e p a r e x c e l l e n c e - h a s t h e l a s t w o r d o n K a n t , w h i c h i s t o s a y t h a t t h e d i s -
a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e a t t e m p t t o f i n d a n e w p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e c l i c h e o f p o s i t i o n a l
s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n i s t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h a t a t t e m p t s u c c e e d s i n g i v i n g i t s e l f u p t o
t h e w a s t i n g o f i t s e l f a n d t h e r e f u s a l o f s u c h p r o t e c t i o n .
I V ,
T h e C a l l i n g B a c k o f t h e G i f t o f t h e M e a s u r e : K a n t ' s S u b l i m e
T h e q u e s t i o n w e n o w h a v e t o p o s e i s : h o w d o e s H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t o f t h e
( s u b l i m e ) t a k i n g o f t h e m e a s u r e m e a s u r e u p t o K a n t ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e s u b l i m e ?
S i n c e t h e s u b l i m e o c c u r s w i t h i n t h e s p a c e o f " r e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t , " i t
m a y b e u s e f u l t o d e l a y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f ( u n ) m e a s u r e i n K a n t ' s s u b l i m e f o r t h e
t i m e o f a b r i e f c o m p a r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f r e f l e x i o n i n t h e t h i r d a n d f i r s t
C r i t i q u e s . R e f l e x i o n i n t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e i s n e i t h e r l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n , i . e . , l o g -
i c a l p o s i t i o n , n o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a c o n c e p t b y a n i n t u i t i o n , i . e . , o n t i c
p o s i t i o n a s t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e t h i n g t o t h e c o n c e p t . R a t h e r , r e f l e x i o n h e r e
c o n s i s t s i n m e r e l y d e p a r t i n g f r o m t h e i n t u i t i o n i n s e a r c h o f i t s c o n c e p t . T h i s
~ e a r c h m u s t r e m a i n w i t h o u t e n d , b e c a u s e w h e n i t e n d s , t h e g i v e n - o r r a t h e r
t h e a l w a y s n o t y e t g i v e n - i n t u i t i o n w i l l h a v e b e e n d e t e r m i n e d :
T h e f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t i n g e n e r a l i s t h e c a p a c i t y t o t h i n k t h e p a r -
t i c u l a r a s c o n t a i n e d b e n e a t h t h e g e n e r a l . I f t h e g e n e r a l ( t h e r u l e ,
t h e p r i n c i p l e , t h e l a w ) i s g i v e n , t h e f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t i s d e t e r m i -
n a t e , w h i c h s u b s u m e s t h e p a r t i c u l a r b e n e a t h i t ( e v e n w h e n , a s
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t , i t p r o v i d e s [ i n t h e f o r m o f t h e
p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ] t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h w h i c h a l o n e o n e c a n s u b s u m e a n y t h i n g u n d e r t h a t g e n e r a l -
i t y ) . B u t i f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s g i v e n , f o r w h i c h t h e f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t
s h o u l d f i n d t h e g e n e r a l , t h e f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t i s r e f l e x i v e . ( 8 7 ; 1 5 )
R e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t , t h e n , i s i n a r e l a t i o n o f s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y t o d e t e r m i n a t e
j u d g m e n t , t h e o n e c o m p l e t i n g t h e o t h e r i n o r d e r t o r e p l a c e i t . R e f l e x i o n i s a
k i n d o f s y n c o p a t i o n
2 2
i n t h e r h y t h m o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n i n c e s s a n t i n t e r r u p -
t i o n o f t h e f i g u r a t i o n s o f t h e s c h e m a t i c i m a g i n a t i o n . I t i s i t s e l f n e i t h e r d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n n o r s i m p l y ( d e ) t e r m i n a b l e : n e i t h e r i n t u i t i v e ( a n s c h a u l i c h ) n o r c o n -
Afterword 211
ceptual per se, neither quite its object nor quite something other than its
object, it is no Seiendes at all, and cannot be known theoretically nor brought
to the standstill of a unidimensional essence. It can therefore be "experienced"
in Kant's text only in terms of either "the feeling of life" (115;38) or "life
itself," that is, either the aesthetic or the teleological, the subjective or objec-
tive modes of its play, which account for the main division of the Critique of
Judgment, and the second of which I ignore here.
On the one hand, then, the interpretation of reflexion in the third Cri-
tique makes retrospectively clear that if reflexion in the first Critique operated
in the service of the determination of whether or not given representations
belong to sensibility or conceptuality, there too reflexion nonetheless preceded
this determination. Reflexion takes place in the space of the uncertainty of not
yet having determined the relations of given representations to the faculties of
knowledge. Indeed, in "aesthetic judgment," the harmonious agreement of
understanding/reason and imagination is also the uncertainty as to whether
the representation that occasions this agreement belongs to the one faculty or
the other.
But on the other hand, as is suggested by the supplementary relation
between reflexion and determination I've just outlined, reflexion is in the third
Critique too-despite its "disinterested character"-not without some involve-
ment with position, with the positing of the existence of the object. This
involvement of reflexion with position is made manifest (unless it is consti-
tuted) in a way that at least English readers of Kant would have little occasion to
remark: by the German word for "reflexion." As we shall see in a moment, this
constitutive manifestation has implications for the Kantian "sublime. JJ
One can perhaps best introduce the proximity to "position" of the Ger-
man signifier for "reflexion" by reference to the way in which Kant expresses,
at the outset of the third Critique, the structure of "disinterest," as the essential
quality of aesthetic reflexion. "Disinterest"-as the indifference to the exis-
tence of the object, the tum away from a discourse regulated by the determi-
nations of the Being of beings-is determined here as a kind of interruption of
Legen ("laying"), which is one version of positioning:
The pleasure [Wohlgefallen] which we combine with the represen-
tation of the existence of an object is called 'interest' .... Now when
the question is if a thing is beautiful [and the same goes for the
sublime] we do not want to know whether anything depends or
can depend on the existence of the thing [ob uns oder irgend
jemand, an der Existenz der Sache irgend etwas gelegen sei, oder
auch nur gelegen sein kannel, either for myself or for anyone else,
but how we judge it by mere observation [Betrachtung] (intuition
or reflexion) .... We cannot better elucidate this proposition,
which is of an extreme importance [almost "sublimity": von
v o r z u g l i c h e r E r h e b l i c h k e i t l , t h a n b y o p p o s i n g t h e p u r e d i s i n t e r -
e s t e d p l e a s u r e i n t h e j u d g m e n t o f t a s t e t o t h a t w h i c h i s b o u n d u p
w i t h i n t e r e s t . ( 1 1 6 - 7 ; 3 8 - 9 )
W h a t J . H . B e r n a r d t r a n s l a t e s h e r e a s " w h e t h e r a n y t h i n g d e p e n d s o r c a n
d e p e n d o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a t h i n g " i s p u t i n t e r m s o f a n i d i o m i n G e r m a n t h a t
o p e r a t e s w i t h t h e v e r b l e g e n , o n e o f t h e v a r i a n t s o f t h e t h o u g h t o f p o n e r e
( " p o s i t i o n " ) . T o b e s u r e , o b u n s . . . e t w a s a n d e r E x i s t e n z g e l e g e n s e i m e a n s
" w h e t h e r f o r u s a n y t h i n g d e p e n d s o n t h e e x i s t e n c e , " b u t o n e w o u l d t r a n s l a t e
i t l i t e r a l l y a s " w h e t h e r f o r u s s o m e t h i n g w e r e l a y e d o n t h e e x i s t e n c e , " i n t h e
s e n s e o f " w h e t h e r a n y t h i n g l a y i n t h e e x i s t e n c e w h i c h c o u l d b e a n o p p o r t u n i t y
o f w h i c h w e m i g h t m a k e p r o f i t a b l e u s e , " f o r i f s o m e t h i n g k o m m t m i r g e l e g e n ,
t h e n i t i s f o r m e a n " o p p o r t u n i t y " ( e i n e G e l e g e n h e i t ) . T h e v e r b l e g e n i s a t p l a y
t h e n a s t h a t f r o m w h i c h r e f l e x i o n w o u l d a l w a y s o p e r a t e a k i n d o f d e p a r t u r e
a n d o f w h i c h i t w o u l d a l w a y s o p e r a t e a k i n d o f p a r t i t i o n .
" R e f l e x i o n " d e p a r t s f r o m a n d p a r t i t i o n s l e g e n f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t
i t i s : O b e r - I e g u n g , o v e r - l a y i n g , s o m e m o r e a n d o t h e r t h a n p o s i t i o n w i t h i n
p o s i t i o n , w h o s e p o s i t i o n " b e y o n d " p o s i t i o n b e s p e a k s i t s e l f s i l e n t l y , i . e . , d o e s
n o t p o s e i t s e l f i n t h e m a t i c e x p l i c i t n e s s , i n t h e n a m e t h e G e r m a n l a n g u a g e
" g i v e s " i t a n d i n t h e p l a y o f v a r i a n t s o n t h i s t h e r e b y d i s a r t i c u l a t e d n a m e i n
K a n t ' s t e x t . T h a t i s t o s a y , i n H e i d e g g e r ' s ( t e l e p h o n i c ) c o n t e x t w i t h i n t h e c o n -
t e x t o f K a n t , o r i n t h e t e x t o f H e i d e g g e r o v e r l a y i n g i t s e l f o n t h e t e x t o f K a n t .
R e f l e x i o n d o e s n o t l a y d o w n o r p o s i t t h e l a w f o r a n i n t u i t i o n o r a c t i o n , n o r
d o e s i t c o n n e c t a p o s i t e d l a w , a c o n c e p t w i t h a n i n t u i t i o n . R a t h e r , a s s i c h s e l b s t ,
s u b j e k t i v , G e g e n s t a n d , s o w o h l a l s G e s e t z ( " f o r i t s e l f , s u b j e c t i v e l y , o b j e c t a s w e l l
a s l a w " ) ( 2 1 9 ; 1 3 0 ) , i t i n c e s s a n t l y i m p o s e s a n d d e p o s e s i t s e l f , " i s " a l w a y s
a l r e a d y t h e n o t y e t o f t h e l a w t o b e l a y e d o v e r t h e l a w .
F o r t h i s r e a s o n K a n t c a n w r i t e , i n t h e p r e f a c e t o t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e , t h a t
t h e a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t i s i n t h e " e m b a r r a s s m e n t o f n o t h a v i n g a n y p r i n c i p l e "
( V e r l e g e n h e i t w e g e n e i n e s P r i n z i p s ) ( 7 6 ; 5 ) o r a s B e r n a r d r e n d e r s i t , " p e r p l e x i t y
a b o u t a p r i n c i p l e . " I t i s i n d e e d t h e t a s k o f t h e C r i t i q u e t o a n a l y z e a n d e s t a b l i s h
t h e l e g i t i m a t e l i m i t s o f t h e s e l f - a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s " p e r p l e x i t y " ( V e r l e g e n h e i t ) ,
w h i c h e v o k e s t h e p a r t i c i p i a l v e r l e g t , m e a n i n g " l o s t , " " m i s p l a c e d , " o r " d i s -
p l a c e d , " a n d s o h a s t h e s e n s e o f t h e V e r l e g u n g d e s L e g e n s ( " l o s s o r m i s p l a c e -
m e n t o f p l a c e m e n t " ) . B u t s i n c e " c r i t i q u e " i s i n K a n t a l w a y s " s e l f - c r i t i q u e , " t h e
t u r n o f t h e f a c u l t y u p o n i t s e l f t o d e l i m i t i t s l e g i t i m a t e s c o p e , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e
t h i r d C r i t i q u e i s p r e c i s e l y t h e " p e r p l e x i t y o f p e r p l e x i t y " ( d i e V e r l e g e n h e i t d e r
V e r l e g e n h e i t ) .
T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n a c e r t a i n d i s p e r s a l o f t h e s i g n i f i e r f o r " r e f l e x -
i o n " i n K a n t p u t u s p e r h a p s i n a " p o s i t i o n " t o g l i m p s e a s e n s e - o f t e n o v e r -
r e a d o r o v e r l o o k e d - i n w h i c h s u b l i m i t y h a s a p r i v i l e g e d r e l a t i o n t o r e f l e x -
i o n . 2 3 S u c h a p r i v i l e g e d r e l a t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d e x p l i c i t l y , e v e n i f i n d i r e c t l y , b y
K a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e ( n o n ) p o s i t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t o f s u b l i m i t y :
Afterword 213
namely, Oberlegenheit-which is almost but not quite Oberlegtheit, or reflect-
edness, deliberation, circumspectness. Translated correctly as "superiority" by
Bernard, but literally something like "overlayedness," Oberlegenheit consti-
tutes in Kant-Heidegger's text a variant of Oberlegung, overlays itself upon
Oberlegung and lays it out-legt die Oberlegung aus-even while laying over
and playing dead, as it were, in the discreetness of its general failure to be
remarked. As respect for our "calling" (Bestimmung), the sublime makes "as it
were [gleichsam, omitted by Bernard] intuitable the superiority [die Ober-
legenheitJ of the rational calling of our cognitive capacities [Erkenntnisvermo-
genJ to the greatest capacity of our sensibility" (180; 96). And:
Power [MachtJ is that which is superior to great hindrances
[grofien Hindernissen uberlegenJ. It is called dominion/violence
[GewaltJ when it is superior to [uberlegenJ the resistance of that
which itself possesses power. Nature, considered in an aesthetical
judgment as power that has no dominion over us, is dynamically
sublime [dynamisch-erhabenJ.!If nature is to be judged by us as
dynamically sublime, it must be represented as exciting fear .... For
in aesthetical jUdgments (without the aid of concepts) superiority
to [die Oberlegenheit uberJ hindrances can only be judged accord-
ing to the greatness of the resistance. (184; 99-100)
Finally, for example:
In our mind we find a superiority over nature even in its immea-
surability [eine Oberlegenheit uber die Natur selbst in ihrer Uner-
messlichkeitJ. And so also the irresistibility of its power ... discloses
to us a faculty of judging independently of and a superiority over
[Oberlegenheit uber] nature. (185-6, 101-2)
The surprise ... is not real fear, but only the attempt, to be supe-
rior to nature within and without [der Natur in uns selbst, mithin
auch der aufier uns ... uberlegen zu seinJ. (195; 109)
Superiority, then, is the ec-static superiority of reflexion-as superimposition,
superposition, or translation-over the position it both exceeds and occupies.
Sublimity is the superiority to itself of what is de-posited because super-posed
beyond or over the Being of both positedness and positing, objectivity and
subjectivity in the sense of the first two Critiques. Sublimity overlays itself and
lays itself over as Being "beyond" the Being of position.
But how exactly does the overlaying relate to the immeasurability of that
which is its occasion, the subreption of its essential calling? How does Kant
take the call of the measureless measure? I shall briefly try to sketch this with
respect to the mathematical sublime.
T h e s u b l i m e i s f o r K a n t t h e a b s o l u t e l y g r e a t , t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y
g r e a t , h e n c e t h a t w h i c h c a n b e m e a s u r e d o n l y b y t h e s t a n d a r d o f i t s e l f . S i n c e
a l l e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s - a l l b e i n g s - - a r e m e a s u r a b l e i n t e r m s o f o r a r e c o m p a r a -
b l e t o s o m e s p a t i a l u n i t s , t h e s u b l i m e o b j e c t c a n n o t b e a n o b j e c t o u t s i d e o f u s .
T h e s u b l i m e " p r o p e r " m u s t , c o n c l u d e s K a n t , b e s o m e t h i n g - s o m e n o t h i n g -
w i t h i n u s , w h i c h h e c a l l s t h e " u s e " 2 4 w h i c h t h e j u d g m e n t m a k e s o f c e r t a i n r e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n s . D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s " u s e " i s d e t e r m i n e d a s a r e f l e x i v e u s e , i t
m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s b e s i t u a t e d , l i k e r e f l e x i o n " i t s e l f , " i n a s e n s e " b e y o n d " r e f l e x -
i o n , s i n c e i t i s a " u s e " o f t h e i n c o m p a r a b l e , w h e r e a s a l l r e f l e x i o n i s s u p p o s e d t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . O b e r l e g u n g g o e s o u t " b e y o n d "
i t s e l f , o r r e c e d e s i n t o i t s e l f ( a s i n t o t h e t e l e p h o n i c n e t w o r k o f i t s c a l l i n g ) . H o w
d o e s t h i s r e f l e x i v e " u s e " o f " u s e " o c c u r , o r w h a t m e a s u r e s a r e t a k e n w i t h t h e
t a k i n g o f m e a s u r e s h e r e ?
N o w , a l l m e a s u r e m e n t i s f o r K a n t u l t i m a t e l y " a e s t h e t i c , " i . e . , i t u l t i -
m a t e l y d e p e n d s o n t h e m e a s u r e m e n t " b y m e r e i n t u i t i o n ( b y t h e m e a s u r e m e n t
o f t h e e y e ) " o f a " f u n d a m e n t a l m e a s u r e " ( G r u n d m a f i , " m e a s u r e o f t h e
g r o u n d , " " g r o u n d o f m e a s u r e , " o r " m e a s u r e a s g r o u n d " ) ( 1 7 3 ; 8 9 ) i n t e r m s o f
w h i c h a l l o t h e r q u a n t i t i e s w o u l d b e m e a s u r e d . H e n c e , t h e e s t i m a t i o n o f s u b -
l i m e m a g n i t u d e w i l l b e a m a t t e r o f a e s t h e t i c m e a s u r e m e n t , n o t l o g i c a l m e a -
s u r e m e n t , w h i c h p r o c e e d s t h r o u g h t h e c o n c e p t s o f n u m b e r a s m a n i p u l a t e d b y
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B e c a u s e i t m u s t i n v o l v e t h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h a n e x c e s s i v e ,
i m m e a s u r a b l e m e a s u r e , t h e e s t i m a t i o n o f s u b l i m e m a g n i t u d e w i l l i n v o l v e t h e
f a i l u r e t o s e i z e t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f a n o b j e c t w i t h i n o n e p e r c e p t u a l a c t o f t h e
r e c e p t i v e - p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i m a g i n a t i o n a s f a c u l t y o f D a r s t e l l u n g . T h i s f a i l u r e
c o m p r i s e s t h e s u b j e c t i v e c o u n t e r - p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f t h e s u b l i m e a n d c o m e s t o
p a s s a s f o l l o w s .
T h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f i m a g e s , o r i m p r o p e r
f u n d a m e n t a l m e a s u r e s ( f o r t h e " p r o p e r [ e i g e n t l i c h e ] u n c h a n g e a b l e f u n d a m e n -
t a l m e a s u r e o f n a t u r e i s i t s a b s o l u t e w h o l e " [ 1 7 8 ; 9 4 ] ) , c o n s i s t s i n b o t h a p p r e -
h e n s i o n a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n . T h e t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e s e t w o f u n c t i o n s
a r e , a s K a n t s p e c i f i e s , l i n e a r s u c c e s s i v i t y i n t i m e , a n d m o m e n t a r y s i m u l t a n e i t y
i n t i m e . W h a t K a n t c a l l s t h e " m a x i m u m " o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i s r e a c h e d w h e n ,
i n t h e a t t e m p t e d p e r c e p t i o n o f e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y l a r g e o b j e c t s o f " r a w n a t u r e , "
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n - w h i c h i s t o r e c e i v e s p o n t a n e o u s l y t h e i m p r e s s i o n o f t h e s e n -
s u o u s l y g i v e n a s a " m o m e n t " i n t i m e - - c a n n o l o n g e r c o m p r e h e n d , s y n - t h e -
s i z e , o r c o m - p o s e , w h a t i t a p p r e h e n d s , w h a t i t t a k e s i n b i t b y b i t i n e a c h p r e v i -
o u s s u b - m o m e n t . W h e n i m a g i n a r y c o m p r e h e n s i o n f a i l s t o t o t a l i z e
a p p r e h e n s i o n , d i a c h r o n i c i t y c a n n o l o n g e r b e s y n c h r o n i z e d , m e t o n y m y c a n
n o l o n g e r b e m e t a p h o r i z e d : t h e p r e s e n t i s s h a t t e r e d , o r i s r e c o g n i z e d a s a l w a y s
a l r e a d y s h a t t e r e d : t h e p u n c t u a l f r a m e o f p r o - p o s i t i o n a l i t y p o i n t s t o i t s p r o p e r
d i s p e r s a l . . K a n t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h i s " m o m e n t " o f t h e f a i l u r e o f i m a g i n a t i o n t o
a t t a i n t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e i m a g e - i . e . , t h i s " m o m e n t " o f t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h a t f a c -
u l t y w h i c h , f o r t h e H e i d e g g e r o f t h e K a n t - b o o k , w a s t h e o n t o l o g i c a l f a c u l t y p a r
Afterword 215
excellence-as the displacement or "dis-position" (Versetzung), the position
on the edge of position of the mood of the subject: "where the imagination
reaches its maximum, and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but
is thereby displaced [versetzt] into a moving pleasure" (174; 91).25
But how does this "moving pleasure" (ruhrendes WohlgefalIen) or sub-
jective purposiveness emerge out of the counter-purposive collapse of sensu-
ous sense? Through the failure of the subject to synthesize the object in one
image, the object-which otherwise would constitute a fundamental measure,
or a unity in terms of which the imagination could, in combination with the
understanding, measure other things--comes to have the sense of an infinite
fundamental measure, and therefore of the infinite as fundamental measure of
all things.
But now the mind listens to the voice of reason which, for every
given magnitude-even for those that can never be entirely
apprehended, although (in sensible representation) they are
judged as entirely given-requires [Jordert] totality, hence com-
prehension in one intuition, and [imaginal] presentation
[Darstellung] for all of these members of a progressively increas-
ing numerical series. It does not even exempt the infinite (space
and past time) from this requirement [Forderung] but rather it
renders it unavoidable to think the infinite (in the judgment of
common reason) as entirely given (in accordance with its total-
ity). (176-77; 93)
The desire of imagination to present in a momentary image this measure which
is immeasurable and counter-purposive for our sensuous imagination is thus
already, in the "moment" of its paradoxical emergence out of its impossibility,
the desire of reason to present the infinite itself, or that which evades presenta-
tion as such. But how is this" already' to be understood? Kant describes this
paradoxical emergence of the sublime emergency in terms of a metaphorical
passage from the sensible to the super-sensible versions of the immeasurable.
What the imagination cannot grasp is (aesthetically-subjectively) incomparable
by virtue of its noncomprehension: one can indeed only with difficulty com-
pare what one cannot comprehend. But what is (conceptually-objectively or
"properly") incomparable is the infinite conceived as given in intuition (Le., the
pyramids or St. Peter's Cathedral are not actually, objectively infinite).
that magnitude of a natural object on which the imagination fruit-
lessly spends its whole faculty of comprehension must carry our
concept of nature to a super-sensible substrate (which lies at its
basis and also at the basis of our faculty of thought) [mufi ... den
Begriffder Naturauf ein ubersinnliches Substrat ... }Uhren]. (94; 178)
T h r o u g h t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l c o n f u s i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e l y i n c o m p a r a b l e w i t h
t h e o b j e c t i v e l y i n c o m p a r a b l e , t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e s u b l i m e d i s c o v e r s i t s e l f s u d -
d e n l y d e m a n d i n g t h e t o t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e m o m e n t a s t h e t o t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i n f i -
n i t e . B u t t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l p a s s a g e - f U h r e n . . . a u f - i s p a r t i c u l a r l y p e r s u a s i v e
h e r e o n l y b e c a u s e r e a s o n i s i n s c r i b e d f r o m t h e s t a r t i n i m a g i n a t i o n : t h e f u n c -
t i o n o f Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g ( " c o m p r e h e n s i o n " ) i s a l r e a d y t h e d e m a n d f o r t o t a l -
i t y : " t h e m i n d l i s t e n s t o t h e v o i c e o f r e a s o n w h i c h , f o r e v e r y g i v e n m a g n i -
t u d e . . . r e q u i r e s t o t a l i t y " ( 1 7 6 - 7 7 ; 9 3 ) . T h e q u a s i p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e o f
t h e s u b l i m e i s o n l y d e p e n d e n t , e v e n i n t h e c a s e o f o b j e c t s a s i m p r e s s i v e a s t h e
p y r a m i d s , o n b e i n g c l o s e e n o u g h t o s e e t h e p a r t s a n d f a r e n o u g h a w a y t o b e
a b l e t o ( b e g i n t o f a i l t o ) t a k e i n t h e w h o l e . T h i s e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e
w i t h r e s p e c t t o e v e r y p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d a t e v e r y m i n u t e , a s t h e d i s c o v -
e r y o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e t o t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e m i n u t e i t s e l f , h o w e v e r m i n u t e .
T h e m o m e n t i s a l w a y s a b o v e a l l t h e d u t y o f t h e m o m e n t , t h e " o u g h t " o f t h e
" t h e r e o u g h t t o b e " a m o m e n t . T h e s u b j e c t i v e p u r p o s i v e n e s s o f t h e f a i l u r e o f
i m a g i n a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n t h i s d i s c o v e r y t h a t " w e " a r e n o t m e r e l y b e i n g s o f s e n s e ,
i n t h e o p e n i n g u p o f a p o s i t i o n w h i c h , i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s e n s u o u s
" c o m p r e h e n s i o n " a s i t s d e m a n d , f i n d s i t s e l f n o n e t h e l e s s o u t s i d e o f t h e s p a c e o f
w h a t s i m p l y i s , o n t h e b o r d e r o f S e i e n d e s a s i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e i n t e r r u p t i o n .
I f t h e d e m a n d o f t h i s " o u g h t , " t h e n , i s f i n a l l y w h a t K a n t c a l l s t h e p r o p -
e r l y s u b l i m e , i n w h a t s e n s e c a n w e u n d e r s t a n d t h i s d e m a n d t o b e t h e d e m a n d
o f t h e s u p e r - s e n s i b l e ? A s a F o r d e r u n g o r A n s p r u c h ( I 7 2 ; 8 8 ) , i t p o s i t s a l a w ,
c a l l s f o r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e " m o m e n t " a s w h a t o u g h t t o b e b r o u g h t a b o u t .
T h i s ( p r a c t i c a l ) p o s i t i o n i s n o t a k n o w l e d g e , b u t a " d e s i r e " o f r e a s o n - r e a s o n
i s f o r K a n t t h e f a c u l t y o f d e s i r e - a d e s i r e o f t h e s e n s u o u s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
s u p e r - s e n s u o u s . B u t i f r e a s o n i s a " s u p e r - s e n s u o u s " f a c u l t y , t h i s o n l y m e a n s
h e r e t h a t i t i s o n t h e b o r d e r - o r r a t h e r i s t h e b o r d e r , p o s i t s t h e b o r d e r , p o s i t s
a s . t h e b o r d e r - b e t w e e n s e n s u o u s g i v e n n e s s , o r r e c e p t i v i t y , a n d w h a t e v e r
w o u l d b e n o t s e n s u o u s b u t t h e ( s p o n t a n e o u s l y p o s i t e d o r " d i s c u r s i v e " ) s e n s e
o r m e a n i n g a b o v e t h e ( " i n t u i t i v e " ) s e n s e s . W e " a r e " t h i s " s u p e r - s e n s u o u s "
b o r d e r o n l y i n s o f a r a s w e d i v i d e o u r s e l v e s f r o m o u r s e l v e s t h e r e , a r e " a b o v e "
a n d " b e l o w " a t o n c e o r b y t u r n s . T h a t i s , " w e " w h o " h a v e " s u c h a " f a c u l t y " o f
s u p e r - s e n s u o u s o r a b s o l u t e l y s p o n t a n e o u s p o s i t i o n a r e n o t s i m p l y i d e n t i f i a b l e
w i t h t h i s p o s i t i o n , a r e n o t s i m p l y i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h i s p o s i t i o n .
T h e d e s i r e o f r e a s o n i s i n d e e d f o r K a n t o u r c a l l i n g , t h e c a l l w e r e c e i v e
a n d t h e o n e w e t r y t o p u t t h r o u g h , t h e o n e w e t a k e a n d t h e o n e w e g i v e . B u t
t h i s c a l l i n g i s o n l y o u r c a l l i n g t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e a r e p r e c i s e l y n o t a d e q u a t e
t o i t , t h a t w e c a n n o t i d e n t i f y o u r s e l v e s w i t h i t , t h a t i t i s i n a n i m p o r t a n t -
i n d e e d a " m o m e n t o u s l y " i m p o r t a n t - s e n s e n o t o u r o w n . W e h a v e t h i s c a l l i n g
o n l y i n s o f a r a s i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e - a n o n c e - s e n s e - w e d o n o t h a v e i t . O r a g a i n ,
i n t h e i d i o m o f B e i n g a n d T i m e , w e a r e o u r B e i n g o n l y i n s o f a r a s w e s t i l l h a v e
t o b e i t . K a n t e m p h a s i z e s t h i s n o n a d e q u a t i o n w h e n h e s t a t e s t h a t t h e " r e s p e c t "
w e f e e l f o r t h e s u b l i m e i s " t h e f e e l i n g o f o u r i n c a p a c i t y t o a t t a i n t o a n i d e a
Afterword 217
which is a law [Gesetzl for u? (180; 96). Insofar as we are incapable of attain-
ing our own law (Gesetzor Setzung) we are exiled from (the theoretical knowl-
edge of) our own positional calling. The only proof for Kant that we belong at
all to the law, to the meaning of the law as to the law of meaning, is that we
know ourselves to be excluded from its experience. Strictly speaking, we listen
more for it than to it, as may well be marginally indicated by Kant's use of the
phrase hart ... auf die Stimme der Vernunft instead of simply hart ... die Stimme
der Vernunft. The "aesthetic" experience of the position of positing as our own
unknowable (non)position is an experience that takes the (formless) form of
respect as a mode of objectless desire. The sublime-almost nothing at all-
would take place somewhere (Le., nowhere) between sensuality and its sense,
which does not mean as the figure of super-sensuous sense in the sensuaP6 but
rather its nonce-sensical disfiguration. The sublime is not; there is no such
"thing" as the sublime. But still, the giving and taking of the sublime occurs-
always only for the nonce-as its nonce-sense.
Accordingly, Kant determines the "moment" or the "nonce" of this
nonce-sense once as a sequence of two feelings, the one negative, the other pos-
itive, so to speak, and once as a quasi simultaneous alternation between nega-
tive and positive feelings. The indirect pleasure of the sublime is the "momen-
tary inhibition [augenblicklichen Hemmung] of the life forces, and immediately
thereafter an all the stronger outpouring of them" (165; 83). This mininarra-
tive of the moment of the sublime not only divides it into two, but also speaks
of the first moment in terms of an inhibition oflife, that is, again, of an inhibi-
tion of the moment, assuming that life is the continuing presentation of the
moment. Some moments later in his text, Kant "compares" the quality of
(properly incomparable) sublime pleasure to "a convulsion [Erschatterung],
Le ... a quickly alternating [schnellwechselnden] repulsion from, and attraction
toward, the same object" (181; 97), a dying and a vivification almost at once, a
dialectics at a standstill. From the description of a linear sequence, then, we
move to the description of a circularity or simultaneous repetition of opposed
tendencies. Between the two descriptions and within each, the moment, the
nonce, is broken or multiplied to several nonces at (n)once. The nonce-sense
of the sublime is a nonnonce, always the anon of the nonce.
How, then, finally, would one take the measure of the distance between
the giving/taking of the measureless measure in Heidegger and the giving/tak-
ing of the measureless measure in Kant? What gives the measure in Heidegger
is, as we have seen above, indissociable from the textual network-the Orts-
netz-of reflexive position. The corresponding "context" in Kant would be
perhaps most "fittingly" situated in the determination of taste as a network of
dispositional displacements between-and not within-any given subject. For
if what provides the measureless measure in the Kantian sublime is finally the
reflexive activity of judgment, then judgment is in turn always the judgment of
the other as delayed and as overlayed upon the judgment of the one who would
t a k e t h a t m e a s u r e . T h a t i s , t h e " d i s p l a c e m e n t " ( V e r s e t z u n g ) i n t o u a e s t h e t i c "
p l e a s u r e i s a d i s p l a c e m e n t i n t o d i s p l a c e m e n t " i t s e l f ' w i t h s o c i o p o l i t i c a l i m p l i -
c a t i o n s w e c a n o n l y b r i e f l y p o i n t t o i n c o n c l u s i o n h e r e . A s K a n t w r i t e s i n t h e
s e c t i o n o n s e n s u s c o m m u n i s - a n d i t i s i n t h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e M i t t e l g l i e d , a n d n o t
i n t h e s y n t h e t i c u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n p e r s e , t h a t t h e g r o u n d o f t h e g r o u n d i n
K a n t i s p e r h a p s " u l t i m a t e l y " t o b e l o c a t e d
2 7
- t h e m a x i m o f t h e r e f l e x i v e j u d g -
m e n t a s o f t h e e x t e n d e d " m o d e o f t h o u g h t " ( D e n k u n g s a r t ) i s a n d e r S t e l l e j e d e s
a n d e r n d e n k e n ( " t o t h i n k i n t h e p l a c e o f e v e r y o t h e r " [ 2 2 6 ; 1 3 6 ] ) . O n e c a n d o
t h i s w h e n h e " p o s i t s h i m s e l f b e y o n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r i v a t e c o n d i t i o n s o f j u d g -
m e n t [ s i c h a b e r d i e s u b j e k t i v e n P r i v a t b e d i n g u n g e n d e s U r t e i l s , . . . w e g s e t z t ] , b y
w h i c h s o m a n y o t h e r s a r e c o n f i n e d , a n d r e f l e c t s u p o n h i s o w n j u d g m e n t f r o m
a u n i v e r s a l s t a n d p o i n t ( w h i c h h e c a n o n l y d e t e r m i n e b y p l a c i n g h i m s e l f a t t h e
s t a n d p o i n t o f o t h e r s [ d a f t e r s i c h i n d e n S t a n d p u n k t a n d e r e r v e r s e t z t ] ) " ( 2 2 7 ;
1 3 7 ) . T h e u n i v e r s a l s t a n d p o i n t w h i c h i s t o b e a d o p t e d i n r e f l e x i o n t a k e s i t s
s t a n d , d e s p i t e a p p e a r a n c e s , p r e c i s e l y n o w h e r e a t a l l , o r a t l e a s t i t t a k e s n o p o s i -
t i o n i n t h e s e n s e o f a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h p o s i t i n g o f e x i s t e n c e c o u l d b e c a r r i e d
o u t b y a s u b j e c t i v i t y r e f l e x i v e l y e n c l o s e d u p o n i t s e l f . N o t o n l y i s r e f l e x i o n d i s -
i n t e r e s t e d a n d h e n c e n o n , d i s - , o r o v e r - p o s i t i v e , b u t i n s o f a r a s i t m e a n s t h i n k -
i n g i n t h e p l a c e o f e v e r y o t h e r i t m e a n s t h i n k i n g i n t h e p l a c e o f e v e r y o t h e r
t h i n k i n g i n t h e p l a c e o f e v e r y o t h e r . . . . I t f o l l o w s t h a t t o b e i n t h e p l a c e o f t h e
o t h e r i s t o b e w h e r e h e o r s h e i s n o t , f o r h e o r s h e i s e l s e w h e r e , i n t h e p l a c e o f
e v e r y o t h e r . T o t h i n k i n t h e p l a c e o f t h e o t h e r i s e a c h t i m e t h e n t o t h i n k i n t h e
p l a c e o f a s i n g u l a r n o t h i n g n e s s o r a b s e n t p l a c e w h i c h i s f i l l e d b y a h e t e r o g e -
n e o u s p l u r a l i t y . . . . , - a d i s p o s i t i o n a l n e t w o r k - o f t h e o t h e r s i n t u r n . A g a i n , s u c h
t h o u g h t , w h i c h c a l l s u p o n K a n t t o c a l l i t r e f l e x i o n , d o e s n o t i n v o l v e m e r e l y t h e
p o s i t i o n a l a c t i v i t y o f a s e l f - a f f e c t i n g s u b j e c t , b u t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l a n d d i s -
p l a c e d a c t i v e - p a s s i v i t y o f a n e i t h e r s u b j e c t i v e n o r o b j e c t i v e o v e r l a y i n g , m o n -
t a g e , o r c o l l a g e o f p o s i t i o n s . I t c h a r a c t e r i z e s K a n t i a n M i t s e i n o r c o m m u n i t y a s
t h e K a n t i a n e q u i v a l e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n . N o t " e v e r y t h i n g
m u s t h a v e a r e a s o n , " b u t " t h i n k i n t h e p l a c e o f e v e r y o t h e r " - w h i c h a l s o
m e a n s , " n o t h i n g y e t h a s i t s r e a s o n , " o r " r e a s o n i s t h e r e a s o n o f t h e o t h e r " - i s
t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u a s i i m p e r a t i v e , t h e u l t r a - e t h i c s o f t h e K a n t i a n c r i t i c a l t r i l -
o g y , i t s p r i n c i p l e o f h o p e .
2 8
I t m a r g i n a l l y e x c e e d s t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e B e i n g o f
b e i n g s t o w h i c h t h e L e i b n i z i a n p r i n c i p l e o f s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n s t i l l m o r e
u n e q u i v o c a l l y a d h e r e s , f o r i t d o e s n o t e n u n c i a t e a c r i t e r i o n f o r w h a t c o u n t s a s
a n e x i s t e n t , b u t r a t h e r t h e s y n c o p a t e d r h y t h m o f a n i n t e r r u p t i o n o f c r i t e r i a
a n d o f t h e p o s i t i o n s o v e r w h i c h c r i t e r i a c l a i m t o d i s p o s e .
I t i s w i t h i n t h e a n o n y m o u s n e t w o r k o f t h i s t e l e p h o n i c c o m m o n
( n o n c e ) s e n s e , t h e n , t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g o f s u b l i m e p o s i t i o n w o u l d m e a -
s u r e i t s e l f a g a i n s t a n d c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h K a n t ' s r e a d i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e a s t h e
c o l l a p s e o f i m a g i n a t i o n i n t o t h e d e m a n d o f r e a s o n f o r t o t a l i t y . K a n t r e t u r n s
H e i d e g g e r ' s c a l l t h e r e , o r o v e r l a y s t h e t e x t o f t h a t c a l l u p o n h i s o w n , r e a d s i t
b a c k , a n d r e c a l l s i t f o r r e a d i n g .
Afterword 219
In his essay, "LOGOS," Heidegger reads legein as Legen ("laying") and
writes that Legen ist Lesen ("laying is reading") (201).29 In these terms, Heideg-
ger's and Kant's positions on (sublime) Being can be said to overlay, to read
over, and in all possible senses to overread each other.30 Such overreading
constitutes the obligation to which the essays above, it seems to me, each in its
singular manner, attempt to respond.
CONTRIBUTORS
Courtine is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris
(X) and the Director of the HusserI Archives in Paris. He has translated
Schelling's works into French and has written widely on German ideal-
ism and phenomenology, including two recent books on Schelling and
Heidegger.
Michel Deguy is a poet and essayist. He is the Editor in Chief of Po&sie, and
has been serving as President of the College internationale de philoso-
phie since 1989. His numerous books include Poemes de la presque'ile
(1962), Figurations (1969), and Poemes 1960-1970 (1973). .
Eliane Escoubas is a former President of the College internationale de
philosophie and teaches at the University of Toulouse. She is the author
of, among other texts, Imago Mundi: Topologie de l'art(I986).
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe teaches at the University of Human Sciences in
Strasbourg and at the University of California, Berkeley. His many
books and essays include Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics
(1989), and Heidegger, Art and Politics: the fiction of the political (1990).
Jeffrey S. Librett is assistant professor of German in the Department of Mod-
ern Languages and Literatures at Loyola University Chicago. He has
translated numerous critical texts from German and French into Eng-
lish and has published articles on Paul de Man, Kant, Schiller, Schlegel,
and Heidegger.
Lyotard taught for many years at the University of Paris (VIII)
and is a visiting professor at the University of California at Irvine. His-
many books include The Postmodern Condition (1984), The Differend
(1988), Just Gaming (with Jean-Loup Thebaud), and Heidegger and "the
jews" (1990).
Louis Marin taught at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. He
wrote numerous books and articles, including La critique du discours:
sur la 'Logique de Port-Royal' et les 'Pensees' de Pascal (1975), and Le por-
trait du roi (1981).
221
2 2 2 C O N T R I B U T O R S
J e a n - L u c N a n c y t e a c h e s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f H u m a n S c i e n c e s o f S t r a s b o u r g ,
F r a n c e , a n d a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , B e r k e l e y . H i s n u m e r o u s
b o o k s a n d a r t i c l e s i n c l u d e T h e L i t e r a r y A b s o l u t e ( w i t h P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - '
L a b a r t h e , 1 9 8 8 ) , T h e I n o p e r a t i v e C o m m u n i t y ( 1 9 9 1 ) , a n d L ' e x p e r i e n c e d e
l a l i b e r t e ( 1 9 8 8 ) .
J a c o b R o g o z i n s k i t e a c h e s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s ( V I I I ) a n d h a s b e e n s i n c e
1 9 8 6 D i r e c t o r o f P r o g r a m s a t t h e C o l l e g e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e d e p h i l o s o p h i e .
H e h a s p u b l i s h e d a r t i c l e s o n H e i d e g g e r ( i n R e s e a r c h i n P h e n o m e n o l o g y ) ,
L y o t a r d ( i n L ' e s p r i t c n a t e u r ) , M a r x , D e l e u z e , S a r t r e , a n d o t h e r s , a n d i s
p r e s e n t l y c o m p l e t i n g a b o o k o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e l a w i n K a n t .
NOTES
Notes for Chapter 1
1. Arthur Rimbaud, Complete Works, Selected Letters, ed. and trans. Wallace
Fowlie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 215.
2. Ernst Robert Curti us, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans.
Willard R. Trask (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953).
3. One could, playing a bit, propose "On Height" [sur la hauteur).
4. For example: "Because of this all the ages and all of human life, which is not
seized by the mindlessness of grudging envy, brings and awards the victory prize to
them [Homer, Demosthenes, and Plato), and even now protects it from being
removed, and is likely to keep them thus," Longinus, On the Sublime, trans. and with
commentary by James A. Arieti and John M. Crossett (New York: Mellen Press, 1985),
XXXVI, 2; 182. What remains for the moderns-we are at the beginning of the Christ-
ian era-is to struggle, despite the necessity of defeat, for a "defeat without dishonor"
(XIII,S; 84) in this age of imitation (Iltlll1ots T Kat C"Aw01S, XIII, 2; 79) measured
by its distance from the Pythian origin, from the divine exhalation and from the Home-
ric beginning, which was followed by the age of the greatness of the Ancients (TWV ap'
Xa(wv 1lE'Ya).o4>u(as) ("Stesichorus, Archilocus, and Plato, more than all the others,
have drawn on the Homeric source," XIII, 3; 82), down to "ourselves" and our "infe-
rior times" (TO TtTTaOeal). Chapter, section, and page references (the latter from the
English language edition) are given hereafter parenthetically in text. The edition used
by Deguy is: Du sublime, trans. Henri Lebegue (Paris: :t:ditions des Belles Lettres, 1965).
5. Homer is the one who knew how to measure "the leap of the [divine J steeds
by a cosmic distance" (IX,S; 55).
6. Deguy notes here that where the translation is by Lebegue, he will mark it
"H.L." and that, elsewhere, the translations are his own. I have attempted, where
Deguy makes a point of retranslating Longinus, to follow the sense of De guy's versions,
while still referring to the page in the English edition where the corresponding passage
is to be found. The (polemical) play between his versions and those of Lebegue is
nonetheless necessarily largely effaced in my own translation. Let the following general
comment suffice, which Deguy inserts at this point:
Is not the Traitt! du sublime-relayed by Boileau across innumerable citations,
223
2 2 4 N O T E S F O R C H A P T E R 1
a c r o s s t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y b y B u r k e , K a n t , a n d
m a n y o t h e r a e s t h e t i c i a n s - a c c e s s i b l e t o u s p r e c i s e l y i n t h e b i l i n g u a l e d i t i o n p u b l i s h e d
b y B e l l e s L e t t r e s w i t h a t r a n s l a t i o n b y M . L e b e g u e ? T h e q u e s t i o n o f t r a n s l a t i o n p o s e s
i t s e l f h e r e : w h a t i s a s t o n i s h i n g i s t h a t t h e t o n e o f L e b e g u e ' s t r a n s l a t i o n i s m u c h c l o s e r t o
B o i l e a u t h a n t o u s , i . e . , t o o u r a r c h e o l o g i c a l n e e d .
T h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e s u b l i m e i s r e d o u b l e d f o r u s i n t h i s r e s p e c t : t h e e n t i r e u s e
o f F r e n c h h e r e - - I e x i c o n , l o c u t i o n s , t u r n s o f p h r a s e , g e n e r a l t o n e , a n d s t e r e o p h o n i c s o f
t r a n s l a t i o n , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e t i t l e i t s e l f , I l p t " y , p o \ J S , t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f w h i c h a s s u b -
l i m e l o s e s s i g h t o f t h e h i g h , w h i c h i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t i s a t s t a k e i n t h e s u b l i m e a v a t a r s o f
s u b l i m i t y - i s o b s o l e t e . I t c a s t s t h e t e x t n o t b a c k i n t o i t s o w n d i s t a n c e f r o m u s t o d a y
b u t b a c k i n t o o u r o w n s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e s u b l i m e a n d t h e a c a d e m i c h a v e
b e c o m e c o n f u s e d , i n a B o i l e a u e s q u e m a n n e r , a n d h a v e t h e r e b y b e c o m e m a r g i n a l i z e d
i n m e r e " a e s t h e t i c t h e o r i e s . " W h a t w e r e a d i n H . L e b e g u e ' s t e x t i s d i s t a n t f r o m t h e s u b -
l i m e ; i t d i s p l a c e s t h e s u b l i m e i n t o t h e c a t a s t r o p h e o f i t s c o l l u s i o n w i t h " t h e o l d s t y l e , " a s
o n e o f B e c k e t t ' s f i g u r e s s a y s , l i k e a s t e r e o t y p i c a l p a i n t i n g w i t h i t s i t s o b l i g -
a t o r y m o t i f s , i t s m o r e a n d m o r e r e c o g n i z a b l e b e c a u s e e x p e c t e d " f i g u r e s " . .
D o u b t l e s s i t w o u l d b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e s t o r e , b y r e t r a n s l a t i o n , L o n g i n u s ' s b o o k
t o t h e s t a t u r e o f i t s o b j e c t , t h e T ) w c r o o , " t h e h i g h , " t o w h i c h i t o u g h t t o r e l a t e i t s e l f
o t h e r t h a n i n a n a w k w a r d p o s e , w e a r i n g s t i f f c o l l a r s , o r w e a r i n g t h e v a r n i s h o f h a u t e -
e p o q u e f u r n i t u r e , " t h e s u b l i m e . " A n d i f n o n t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y i s a c l i c h e d m a r k o f t h e s u b -
l i m e ( t h e B i b l e , D a n t e ) , i t w o u l d b e f i t t i n g t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e t e x t
a n d i t s t r a n s l a t i o n .
7 . T o p r o v i d e t h e i r c o m p l e t e i n v e n t o r y w o u l d b e e a s y e n o u g h , i n a t e d i o u s
s o r t o f w a y f o r , o f c o u r s e , t h e L e t t e r c o n s i s t s i n l a r g e p a r t o f q u o t a t i o n s : a l o n g s e r i e s o f
c o m b a t s , r a p e s , d a n g e r s , t o r t u r e s , c a r n a g e s , i n c e s t s , d e a t h s , s h i p w r e c k s , d i s a s t e r s , m u r -
d e r s , a n d o t h e r t o r m e n t s .
8 . T h e M a r c e l P r o u s t o f t h e t e m p s r e t r o u v e w o u l d o f f e r L o n g i n u s p a g e s o f
e x a m p l e s o f t h e m o d e r n s u b l i m e , M a r c e l P r o u s t , A l a r e c h e r c h e d u t e m p s p e r d u , v o l . 1 4
a n d 1 5 , L e t e m p s r e t r o u v e ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 2 7 ) ; E n g l i s h : R e m b r a n c e o f T h i n g s P a s t ,
v o l . 3 : T i m e R e g a i n e d , t r a n s . C . K . S c o t t M o n c r i e f f , T e r r e n c e K i l m a r t i n , a n d A n d r e a s
M a y o r ( N e w Y o r k : R a n d o m H o u s e , 1 9 8 1 ) .
9 . W h e r e b y w e c a n g l i m p s e o n e a s p e c t o f t h e " c o m i c a l , " w h i c h i s t o m i s s t h e
e x i t ?
1 0 . B e e t h o v e n ' s f a m o u s a d a g i o o f o p u s 1 0 6 ( c f . P o & s i e 9 ) .
1 1 . W h e n c e t h e e x a m p l e s o f t h e s u b l i m e : i n u n d a t i o n , t h e d e l u g e , c o r r e s p o n d i n g
t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a n d t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t i e s t h a t p r e c e d e d a n d r e m a i n r e m a r k a b l e f o r o n e
m o r e m o m e n t i n t h e o v e r w h e l m e d m e m o r y t h a t a t t e n d s t h e f l o o d a n d i n t h e d i s p e r s e d
v e s t i g e s ( f l o a t i n g d e b r i s ) o f t h e d r o w n i n g , b e f o r e a l l i s s w e p t u n d e r b y a h o m o g e n e i t y
w i t h o u t r e m a i n d e r w h i c h t h e n c e f o r t h c o n t a i n s n o t h i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e . A n d t h e s a m e
l o g i c w o u l d a p p l y t o t h e i m a g e o f v o l c a n i c f i r e .
1 2 . I n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f G o r g i a s , E n c o m i u m o f H e l e n , e d . a n d t r a n s . D . M .
M c D o w e l l ( B r i s t o l , U . K . : B r i s t o l C l a s s i c a l P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 3 - 2 7 : " S p e e c h e x e r c i s e s g r e a t
p o w e r : t h a t w h i c h i s i t s e l f a l m o s t n o t h i n g a t a l l a n d w h i c h i s u t t e r l y i n v i s i b l e a t t a i n s t o
Notes for Chapter 2 225
divine works .. the power of discourse has the same relation to the disposition of souls
as the disposition of drugs to the nature of bodies."
13. The essence of metonymy: pars pro toto.
14. Which is not a reason for the analyst (critic, rhetorician, or aesthetician) not
to study them to reveal their subtle play! But Pseudo-Longinus's lesson, the question of
figures and rhetoric, seems still so little understood that every minute one can read
things like the following, from Le Monde (18 February 1983); V. Alexakis writes with
respect to Georges Simenon: "He has banished from his work all literary artifice"!
15. "In this one figure the oath (which I term apostrophe) he made divinities of
his ancestors, and stirred us to swear as if they were divinities" (XVI, 2; 100-102).
16. The Greek words here are emKOlJpta and navolJpye'tv.
17. Reminder oOean Cohen: "There are no figures in the Discours de la methode."
18. The sublime in morals? Isn't-this in general the gesture ofrenunciation, the
figure of "privation" (simplification, ascesis, etc.)?
19. "The silence of Ajax in the Nekuia is great and more sublime than any
speech" (IX, 2; 53).
Notes for Chapter 2
1. It is in fashion in Paris and among the theoreticians, who often refer to it in
recent years (Marin, Derrida. Lyotard. Deleuze. Deguy). as well as in Los Angeles and
among the artists. as for example one of the them entitled a recent exposition and per-
formance. "The Sublime" (Michael Kelley. April 1984). One finds further evidence of
this fashion in Berlin (Hamacher). Rome. and Tokyo. (Not to speak of the use of the
word sublime in the most current everyday speech) As for the texts. they are numerous
and dispersed. Let it suffice to indicate their authors here, my indebtedness to whose
works it would be impossible to convey adequately. But I do not intend to add to theirs
one more interpretation of the sublime. I attempt rather to come to terms with what it
is that they share and that the epoch shares in this fashion: that offers us all up to a
thought of the sublime.
2. This perhaps excessively concise formula adopts the general perspective of
Samuel Monk's classical study The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in Eighteenth-
Century England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1960) which has been
reconsidered with respect to France by T. Litman in Le sublime en France (1971) from
both a historical and an aesthetical-conceptual perspective. My contribution is neither
historical nor aesthetical.
3. I must not omit to mention at least once the name of Nietzsche. who
thought. in one sense or several. something of the sublime. even if he hardly thema-
tized it as such.
4 . W a l t e r B e n j a m i n , G e s a m m e l t e S c h r i f t e n , v o l . I : 1 , ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :
S u h r k a m p , 1 9 8 0 ) , 1 9 6 .
5 . M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , " D e r U r s p r u n g d e s K u n s t w e r k e s , " H o l z w e g e ( F r a n k f u r t '
a m M a i n : V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 4 2 : " T h e O r i g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " P o e t r y ,
L a n g u a g e , T h o u g h t , t r a n s . A l b e r t H o f s t a d t e r ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 7 1 ) , 5 6 .
6 . T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , A s t h e t i s c h e T h e o r i e ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : S u h r k a m p ,
1 9 7 3 ) , 2 9 2 ; A e s t h e t i c T h e o r y , t r a n s . C . L e n h a r t , e d . G r e t e l A d o r n o a n d R o l f T i e d m a n n
( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e a n d K e g a n P a u l , 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 8 0 .
7 . G e o r g e s B a t a i l l e , C E u v r e s , v o l 7 ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 7 0 ) .
8 . M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , " L a l i t t e r a t u r e e t I e d r o i t a l a m o r t , " L a p a r t d u f e u ( P a r i s :
G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 4 9 ) , 2 9 4 : " L i t e r a t u r e a n d t h e R i g h t t o D e a t h , " i n T h e G a z e o f O r p h e u s ,
t r a n s . L y d i a D a v i s , e d . P . A d a m s S i t n e y , w i t h a p r e f a c e b y G e o f f r e y H a r t m a n ( B a r r y -
t o w n , N . Y . : S t a t i o n H i l l , 1 9 8 1 ) , 2 2 .
9 . T h i s m e a n s a t o n c e t h a t t h e s e t w o m o d e s o f t h o u g h t a r e o p p o s e d t o e a c h
o t h e r a n d t h a t t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e s u b l i m e d o u b t l e s s i n f i l t r a t e s a n d s e c r e t l y d i s q u i e t s
t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e e n d o f a r t . B u t I w i l l n o t a t t e m p t t o s h o w t h i s h e r e . I n t u m , w h e r e
H e g e l e x p l i c i t l y s p e a k s o f t h e s u b l i m e , h e d o e s n o t b r i n g a n y t h i n g o f t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e
s u b l i m e t o b e a r ( c f . P a u l d e M a n , " H e g e l o n t h e S u b l i m e " i n D i s p l a c e m e n t : D e r r i d a a n d
A f t e r , e d . M a r k K r u p n i c k [ B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 3 ] , 1 3 9 - 5 3 ) .
1 0 . S e e C r i t i q u e d e l a f a c u l t e d e j u g e r , t r a n s . A . P h i l o n e n k o ( P a r i s : V r i n , 1 9 8 6 ) ,
2 3 - 2 9 , 8 4 - 1 1 4 ; C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , t r a n s . J . H . B e r n a r d ( N e w Y o r k : H a f u e r , 1 9 5 1 ) ,
8 2 - 1 2 0 , f o r m o s t o f t h e a l l u s i o n s t o K a n t ' s t e x t w h i c h f o l l o w .
1 1 . T h e w o r d c a n b e f o u n d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t , 2 2 , 8 0 ; 7 8 .
1 2 . " I n t h e a e s t h e t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f g r a n d e u r , t h e c o n c e p t o f n u m b e r o u g h t t o b e
k e p t a t a d i s t a n c e o r t r a n s f o r m e d . "
1 3 . I n t h i s s e n s e a l l o f t h a t w h i c h i n K a n t s t i l l d e r i v e s f r o m a c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y o f
a n a l o g y a n d t h e s y m b o l d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o t h e d e e p l o g i c o f w h i c h I a m s p e a k i n g h e r e .
1 4 . T h e l a t t e r f o r m u l a i s L y o t a r d ' s , c f . L e d i f f e r e n d ( P a r i s : M i n u i t , 1 9 8 3 ) ,
1 1 8 - 1 9 : T h e D i f f e r e n d : P h r a s e s i n D i s p u t e , t r a n s . G e o r g e s V a n D e n A b b e e l e ( M i n -
n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s , 1 9 8 8 ) , 7 7 - 7 8 . T h e f o r m e r f o r m u l a i s D e r -
r i d a ' s , u L e p a r e r g o n , " i n L a v e r i t e e n p e i n t u r e ( P a r i s : F l a m m a r i o n , 1 9 7 8 ) ; T h e T r u t h i n
P a i n t i n g , t r a n s . G e o f f B e n n i n g t o n a n d I a n M c L e o d ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o
P r e s s , 1 9 8 7 ) , 1 3 1 - 3 2 . T h e y a r e c e r t a i n l y n o t w r o n g . a n d t h e y c o m m e n t r i g o r o u s l y ,
t o g e t h e r o r t h e o n e a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r , u p o n t h e t e x t o f K a n t . I d o n o t a t t e m p t t o d i s c u s s
t h e m h e r e , p r e f e r r i n g t o t a k e a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e - a l o n g t h e e d g e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t a t
a d i s t a n c e , a n d b e c a u s e p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f d i s t a n c e s i t s e l f f r o m i t s e l f . T h e p o l i t i c a l
f u n c t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e i n L y o t a r d w o u l d c a l l f o r a d i f f e r e n t d i s c u s s i o n . w h i c h I s h a l l
u n d e r t a k e e l s e w h e r e .
1 5 . K a n t d o e s n o t f a i l t o i n d i c a t e a n a e s t h e t i c d i r e c t i o n c o m b i n i n g t h e t w o
m o t i f s : a s u b l i m e g e n r e d i s t i n c t f r o m a l l o t h e r s , a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i s g e n r e a s
a kind of total work of art. He in fact evokes the possibility of a "presentation of the
sublime" in the fine arts in terms of the "combination of the fine arts in one single
product" and he indicates then three forms: verse tragedy, the didactic poem, and the
oratorio. There would, of course, be much to say about this. I shall content myself here
with noting that it is not quite the same thing as Wagner's Gesamtkunstwerk. More par-
ticularly, Kant's three forms seem to turn around poetry as the mode of presentation of
destiny, thought, and prayer, respectively, and it does not seem to be above all a matter
of a "total" presentation.
16. One ought to analyze the relations between Kant's Bestrebung and Freud's
Vorlust, that is, this "preliminary pleasure," the paradox of which consists in its tension
and which occupies an important place in Freud's theory of the beautiful and of art.
17. I prefer on this point the first edition.
18. Hegel provides a kind of figure of this feeling by way of the other in his dis-
cussion of the infant in the womb ofits mother. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Identite et trem-
blement," in Hypnoses (Paris: Galilee, 1984), 13-47.
19. I am choosing to ignore here the economy of sacrifice, which is quite visible
in Kant's text where the imagination acquires "an extension and power greater than
that which it has lost." I do not pretend that the offering is simply "pure loss." But at
the heart of the economy (of presence, art, thought), it [fill offers itself also, there is also
offering, neither lost nor gained.
20. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema, vol. I, L'image-mouvement (Paris: ditions de
Minuit, 1983), 69, Cinema, vol. I, The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and
Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 46.
21. I suspend here an analysis I pursue in L'experience de la liberte (Paris:
Galilee, 1988).
22. Darbieten or Darbietung ("offering") would be the word to substitute on the
register of the sublime for Darstellung ("presentation"). But it is in each case a matter
of the dar, of a sensible "here" or "here it is."
23. Cf. note 15 above.
24. It is remarkable that another Biblical commandment-the Fiat lux of Gene-
sis-had been already a privileged example of the sublime for Longinus and for his
classical commentators. From the one example to the other as from the one command-
ment to the other, one can appreciate the continuity and the rupture.
25. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, Le discours de la syncope: 1. Logodaedalus (Paris: Flam-
marion, 1976).
Notes for Chapter 3
1. This text figures in a study of Kant in Imago Mundi-Topologie de l'Art
(Paris: Galilee, 1986).
2 2 8 N O T E S P O R C H A P T E R 4
2 . I w i l l u s e h e r e t h e a b b r e v a t i o n s C H o r t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t a n d C P R f o r
t h e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n .
3 . C f . J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , " L e p a r e r g o n " i n L a v ~ r i t e e n p e i n t u r e ( P a r i s : A u b i e r - '
F l a m m a r i o n , 1 9 7 8 ) ; T h e T r u t h i n P a i n t i n g , t r a n s . G e o f f B e n n i n g t o n a n d I a n M c l e o d
( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 9 8 7 ) , a n d " E c o n o m i i n e s i s , " i n M i m e s i s d e s
a r t i c u l a t i o n s ( P a r i s : A u b i e r - F l a m m a r i o n , 1 9 7 5 ) ; " E c o n o m i m e s i s , " t r a n s . R . K l e i n , D i a -
c r i t i c s 1 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) : 3 ' ; " 2 5 .
4 . I n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e C J ( 2 3 ; 1 0 ) , K a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n f o u r s i t e s
o f t h e i n s c r i p t i o n o f c o n c e p t s : F e l d ( " f i e l d " ) , B o d e n ( " t e r r i t o r y " ) , G e b i e t ( " d o m a i n " ) ,
a n d A u f e n t h a l t ( " d o m i c i l e , " i n P h i l o n e n k o ' s t r a n s l a t i o n ) .
5 . I n t h e s e n s e o f t h e a e i o f w h i c h H e i d e g g e r s p e a k s i n " C e q u ' e s t e t c o m m e n t s e
d e t e r m i n e l a p h y s i s , " t r a n s . F r a n ' r o i s F e d i e r , i n Q u e s t i o n s , v o l . 2 ( P a r i s : E d i t i o n s G a I l i -
m a r d , 1 9 6 8 ) , 2 2 2 , " O n t h e B e i n g a n d C o n c e p t i o n o f < l > T I : L E i n A r i s t o t l e ' s P h y s i c s B , l , "
t r a n s . T h o m a s J . S h e e h a n , M a n a n d W o r l d 9 ( 1 9 7 6 ) : 2 4 4 - 4 5 : " T h a t w h i c h e a c h t i m e
a w a i t s i t s e l f i n i t s p r o p e r p l a c e . . . . I n t h e a e i t h a t w h i c h i n v i e w i s t h e a r r e s t i n g o n e s e l f ,
r e m a i n i n g , b e i n g b e l a t e d - a n d i n t h e t r u t h i n t h e s e n s e o f t h e e n t r y i n t o p r e s e n c e . "
6 . T h e p r o c e s s o f s t a t i n g i s a n a p o p h a n t i c s .
7 . T h e a s p e c t i s n o t t h e s u b j e c t i v e f a c e o f t h i n g s b u t t h e e n t r y i n t o p r e s e n c e .
8 . D o u b t l e s s a l s o i n t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e p r o x i m i t y t o C e z a n n e w h e n h e s p e a k s
o f t h e " i m p o s i n g s i m p l i c i t y o f n a t u r e . "
9 . W h i c h i n s c r i b e s i t s e l f i n t h e t e r m i t s e l f i n t h e E r - o f E r h a b e n e s , w h e r e b y t h e
p a s s a g e t o t h e l i m i t i s i n d i c a t e d .
N o t e s f o r C h a p t e r 4
1 . S e e i n p a r t i c u l a r J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , " E c o n o m i m e s i s , " i n M i m e s i s d e s a r t i c u l a -
t i o n s ( P a r i s : A u b i e r - F l a m m a r i o n , 1 9 7 5 ) .
2 . M a r g e s d e l a p h i l o s o p h i e ( P a r i s : M i n u i t , 1 9 7 2 ) ; M a r g i n s o f P h i l o s o p h y , t r a n s .
A l a n B a s s ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) .
3 . S e e ' ' T h e S u b l i m e O f f e r i n g " b y J e a n - L u c N a n c y i n t h i s v o l u m e .
4 . M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , N i e t z s c h e , v o l . 1 , ( P f u I l i n g e n , G e r m a n y : N e s k e , 1 9 6 1 ) ,
9 3 - 9 4 ; N i e t z s c h e , v o l . 1 , T h e W i l l t o P o w e r a s A r t , t r a n s . D a v i d F a r r e l l K r e l l ( S a n F r a n -
c i s c o : H a r p e r & R o w , 1 9 7 9 ) , 7 9 . P a g e n u m b e r s c i t e d b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y i n t h e t e x t ,
f i r s t t h e G e r m a n , t h e n t h e E n g l i s h e d i t i o n .
5 . C f . " D e r U r s p r u n g d e s K u n s t w e r k e s , " i n H o l z w e g e ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t -
t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 9 5 0 ) ; " T h e O r i g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " i n P o e t r y , L a n g u a g e ,
T h o u g h t , t r a n s . A l b e r t H o f s t a d t e r ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r & R o w , 1 9 7 5 ) . P a g e n u m b e r s f o r
q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h i s t e x t c i t e d b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y i n t h e t e x t , f i r s t t h e G e r m a n , t h e n
t h e E n g l i s h e d i t i o n .
6. Elsewhere, Heidegger's own proposal or project goes in this direction. For
example: "Actually it cannot be denied that the interpretation of being as idea results
from the basic experience of being as cf!OOLS. It is, as we say, a necessary consequence of
the essence of being as emerging Scheinen ("seeming," "appearing," "radiance"). And
herein there is no departure, not to mention a falling-off, from the beginning. No, that
is true. But if the essential consequence is exalted to the level of the essence itself and
takes the place of the essence, what then? Then we have a falling-off, which must in
tum produce strange consequences. And that is what happened. The crux of the matter
is not that physis should have been characterized as idea but that the idea should have
become the sole and decisive interpretation of being," Introduction to Metaphysics.
trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press. 1959), 182. The
German edition is Gesamtausgabe, vol 40: EinJahrung in die Metaphysik (Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1935), 191. Page numbers given below parenthetically.
first of the German. then of the English edition.
7. Cf. Jean-Marie Pontevia, Tout a p e u t - ~ t r e commence par la beaute (Bor-
deaUx: William Blake, 1985), 14-19.
8. In "The Origin of the Work of Art," this concerns essentially both "the
imagination as faculty of the soul" (to derive the essence of the Lichtung from it does
not by any means allow one to think the Lichtungwith "a sufficient import" [58-59;
72-73]) and the beautiful defined simply as an object of pleasure (see "Epilogue," 67;
81). Jacques Derrida remarks in "Parergon" (La. verite en peinture [Paris: Flammarion,
1978J. 42, 54; The Truth in Painting. trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian Mcleod
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987J, 35, 46), the proximity of this Heidegger-
ian reservation to the Hegelian reserVation: for Hegel as for Heidegger the third Cri-
tique remains a "theory of subjectivity and judgment."
9. The two succeeding moments, Wagner and Nietzsche, are evidently com-
prehended within this closure.
10. The same text, in its first version. considers as most essential the fourth
moment of the six Heidegger re-counts in the course on Nietzsche as the fundamental
moments of the history of aesthetics.
11. Heidegger himself accepts the cathedral at Bamberg and in all probability
also DUrer ("The Origin of the Work of Art," 26; 41 and 63; 77).
12. Heidegger's treatment of Wagner is overwhelming. In 1936, the sense of
such a condemnation could escape no one. Despite everything, Wagner's enterprise is
recognized in its principle, that is, in its "desire to safeguard the essentiality of art in
existence": beyond its merely summary aspect, the total work of art has the merit of
attempting to be "a celebration of the community of the people; religion itself." What
saves Wagner, in other words, is his artistico-political project. What condemns him is
that this project is merely aesthetico-political (by which trait it justly presides over the
NationalSocialist project itself). Between Hegel (religion) and postromanticism (the
"community" [GemeinschaftJ of the people), the path is as narrow as possible.
13. Cf. 56-57; 69. I allude here to the elaboration upon the opening-clearing
trait (Rift) by means of which the work can be defined in a sense as the archi-inscription
o f s t r u g g l e ( d i s c o r d o r d i f f e r e n d ) b e t w e e n e a r t h a n d w o r l d ( t / l O O L S a n d T X V T ) , c r y p -
t o p h i l i a a n d u n v e i l i n g , r e s e r v e a n d c l e a r i n g ) , w h i c h i s t h e s t r u g g l e t r u t h i s , a n e l a b o r a -
t i o n i n w h i c h t h e ( A r i s t o t e l i a n ) c o n c e p t o f I l t l l l J O " L S i s r e - e l a b o r a t e d f r o m t o p t o b o t - ,
t o m a n d i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o a t t a i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f " f i g u r e " o r " s t a t u r e "
( G e s t a l t ) a n t e r i o r t o t h e e i d e t i c g r a s p o f t h e b e i n g a s s u c h . T h a t t h e w o r d G e s t a l t c a n n o t
b e a v o i d e d a n d t h a t t h e w o r k i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t e x p r e s s l y c o n c e i v e d i n t e r m s o f G e - S t e l l
( w h i c h t w e n t y y e a r s l a t e r w i l l b e t h e w o r d f o r t h e e s s e n c e o f t e c h n o l o g y ) i n d i c a t e w i t h
s u f f i c i e n t p r e c i s i o n t h e p r e c a r i o u s n e s s o f t h i s e l a b o r a t i o n ( w h i c h s a y s n o t h i n g w h a t s o -
e v e r a b o u t a p o s s i b l e e i d e t i c o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e t h e m a t i c s o f t r a i t a n d t r a c e ) .
1 4 . A n d n o l o n g e r c o m p r e h e n d e d , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s i n i t i a l g r e a t n e s s , a s
k n o w i n g . A f t e r h a v i n g o n c e a g a i n r e c i t e d t h e d e c l i n e o f t h i s i n i t i a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n ,
H e i d e g g e r n o t e s i n p a s s i n g , " i t s u f f i c e s t o k n o w t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m a t t e r
a n d f o r m e m a n a t e s f r o m t h e d o m a i n o f t h e f a b r i c a t i o n o f t h e t o o l , t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n
d i d n o t o r i g i n a l l y b e l o n g t o t h e d o m a i n o f a r t i n t h e s t r i c t s e n s e . . b u t w a s a p p l i e d t o i t
r e t r o a c t i v e l y . " T h e e i d e t i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e b e i n g i s c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f T X V T ) a s l a b o r .
T h i s p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s e n t i r e e f f o r t a f t e r t h e R e k t o r a t s r e d e ( t h a t
i s , a f t e r t h e N i e t z s c h e a n e n g a g e m e n t o f f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y i n t h e a e s t h e t i c o - p o l i t i -
c a l p r o j e c t o f N a z i s m ) i s a p p l i e d t o r e m o v i n g T X V T ) f r o m t h e d o m a i n o f E i n b i l d e n ,
f r o m t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d t h e i m a g i n a t i o n b y w h i c h H e i d e g g e r t h i n k s , f r o m S e i n u n d
Z e i t o n , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f D a s e i n a s W e l t b i l d u n g : f o r m a t i o n ( i m a g i n a t i o n ) o f t h e
w o r l d . I n t h i s s e n s e , t o p a r a p h r a s e o n e o f h i s f o r m u l a e , t h e R i f t ( t h e a r c h i - t r a i t ) o f " T h e
O r i g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t " i s t h e n e g a t i v e , i n t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c s e n s e , o f t h e B i l d o f
" V o m W e s e n d e s G r u n d e s . " W h a t i s s o l i c i t e d t h e r e , i n a d i f f i c u l t w a y , i s t h e K a n t i a n
s c h e m a t i s m , t h a t i s , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n c o n c e i v e d a s T X V I l . H e n c e , t h e
a t t e m p t i n " T h e O r i g i n o f t h e W o r k o f A r t " t o r e l a t e t h e e s s e n c e o f T X V T ) t o " l a n g u a g e ,
m Y t h , a n d p o e t r y " ( S p r a c h e , S a g e , D i c h t u n g ) . T h e e s s e n c e o f a r t i s D i c h t u n g b e c a u s e
D i c h t u n g a t t e s t s t h a t a r t i s n o t s i m p l y t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o f t h e b e i n g b u t r a t h e r i t s r e v e l a -
t i o n , w h i c h i s s o m e t h i n g e l s e a l t o g e t h e r .
1 5 . T h i s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d p e r f e c t l y b y E l i a n e E s c o u b a s i n " K a n t o r t h e S i m p l i c -
i t Y o f t h e S u b l i m e " i n t h i s v o l u m e .
1 6 . A b o v e a l l , t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e r e i s n o K a n t i a n a e s t h e t i c s . I a m
f o r c e d h e r e - b y w a y o f e x c e p t i o n - t o o p p o s e N a n c y ' s a r g u m e n t , w h o w r i t e s , i n " T h e
S u b l i m e O f f e r i n g " i n t h i s v o l u m e : " I t i s a e s t h e t i c s , a s a r e g i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c i -
p l i n e , t h a t i s r e f u s e d i n t h e t h o u g h t o f a r t s e i z e d b y t h e s u b l i m e . K a n t i s t h e f i r s t t o d o
j i I s t i c e t o t h e a e s t h e t i c a t t h e h e a r t o f w h a t o n e c a n c a l l a ' f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y , ' b u t h e i s
a l s o , a n d f o r t h i s v e r y r e a s o n , t h e f i r s t t o s u p p r e s s a e s t h e t i c s a s a p a r t o r d o m a i n o f p h i -
l o s o p h y . A s i s w e l l k n o w n , t h e r e i s n o K a n t i a n a e s t h e t i c s . A n d t h e r e i s n o t , a f t e r K a n t ,
a n y t h o u g h t o f a r t ( o r o f t h e b e a u t i f u l ) w h i c h d o e s n o t r e f u s e a e s t h e t i c s a n d w h i c h d o e s
n o t i n t e r r o g a t e i n a r t s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a r t . " I a m n o t s u r e , f i r s t o f a l l , t h a t a f t e r
K a n t t h e r e i s n o t h o u g h t o f a r t " w h i c h d o e s n o t r e f u s e t h e a e s t h e t i c a n d w h i c h d o e s n o t
i n t e r r o g a t e i n a r t s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a r t . " S c h i l l e r a n d H e g e l , f o r e x a m p l e , d o n ' t
e v e n f o r a n i n s t a n t r e f u s e t h e a e s t h e t i c , a n d e v e n t h e c o u n t e r - a e s t h e t i c s o f N i e t z s c h e
t h a t i s , v i r i l e a e s t h e t i c s ( a e s t h e t i c s f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e c r e a t o r ) r e m a i n s b y d e f i n -
ition an aesthetics. This means that to "interrogate in art something other than art" is
not perhaps a sufficient criterion: the more Hegel grants art the function of the presen-
tation of truth (the Idea, the Spirit, the Absolute, and so on), the more he affirms the
autotelic character of art, and the more he consecrates aesthetics to the grasping of art
in its essence. The movement is doubtless equivocal if, through the very logic of the
essence, art is thus explicitly apprehended only in its end (telos and completion). But
this is also for Hegel the condition of the possibility of all aesthetics. I do not thereby
contest that "it is aesthetics, as a regional philosophical discipline, which is refused in
the thought of art seized by the sublime." I contest this indeed all the less as, concern-
ing Hegel, one can only with difficulty speak of a "thought of art seized by the sub-
lime." But I do think that these matters are not quite so simple. For Kant, in any case,
such a refusal, if it takes place, is internal to aesthetics itself. Certainly, Kant's gesture,
invoking Baumgarten's word for a first philosophy, is not at all indifferent-if only
through its contrast with Hegel's weak gesture of resigning himself, in the absence of a
better term and in view of its dominant usage, to call the science or philosophy of art
an "Aesthetics." But if Kant's gesture is not indifferent, it is not indifferent precisely
with regard to the earthquake it provokes in first philosophy: in ontology. With regard
to the object of the first part of the Critique of Judgment, however, it is indifferent: a
theory of the judgment of taste is just what one calls in the eighteenth century an aes-
thetics. The title (the name) does not change at all the matter at hand (the concept). In
addition, the Analytic of the Beautiful, like that of the sublime, unfolds in the name of
the "Analytic of the faculty of aesthetic judgment," and thus in the name of the "Cri-
tique of the faculty of aesthetic judgment," and they are not for no reason a theory of
pleasure taken in the beautiful object or in the affect (emotion) of the sublime. There is
indeed a Kantian aesthetics, systematic and complete. In sum, I would not speak of a
"refusal" of aesthetics but of a collapse of aesthetics: the sublime disrupts the aesthetic,
breaks up its very ground. And I would add: the fact that the aesthetic collapses at the
touch of the sublime in this sense does not apply to the sublime in general: an entire
thought of the sublime, of the excess of the beautiful, accommodates itself easily to the
aesthetic (exemplarily, Burke).
17. In the tradition, for example, of Burke, "the terrible" (das Schreckliche) is a
word for the sublime. This is perhaps because Vasari, not knowing how to characterize
Michelangelo's great statuary, the Moses in particular, uses this word (aesthetically) as
one says for the first time.
18. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, vol. 13: Vorlesungen
aber die Asthetik, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1970), 82; Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. 1
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),55.
19. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, vol. 17: Vorlesungen
aber die Philosophie der Religion, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970),63-64; Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion;
vol. 2, Determinate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson,
and J. M. Strauss, with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987), 134-37.
2 0 . F o r e x a m p l e w h e n H e g e l c o n d e n s e s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e ( s u b l i m e ) r e l a -
t i o n t h a t G e n e s i s i n s t a l l s b e t w e e n G o d a n d H i s c r e a t i o n i n t o t h i s f o r m u l a : " G o d s t r o n g
i n t h e w e a k " ( 6 4 ; 1 3 6 ) .
2 1 . J e a n - J o s e p h G o u x , " M o Y s e , F r e u d , l a p r e s c r i p t i o n i c o n o c I a s t e , " i n L e s l c o n o -
c l a s t e s ( P a r i s : S e u i l , 1 9 7 3 ) ; S y m b o l i c E c o n o m i e s : A f t e r M a r x a n d F r e u d , t r a n s . J e n n i f e r
C u r t i s s G a g e ( I t h a c a , N . Y . : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 0 ) , 1 3 4 - 5 0 .
2 2 . F r i e d r i c h S c h i l l e r , " U b e r A n m u t u n d W u r d e , " W e r k e , v o L 2 ( M u n i c h : K a r l
H a n s e n , 1 9 6 6 ) , 3 9 1 - 9 2 ; " O n G r a c e a n d D i g n i t y , " C o m p l e t e W o r k s , v o l . 8 ( N e w Y o r k :
C o l l i e r , 1 9 0 2 ) , 1 8 7 - 8 8 .
2 3 . S i g m u n d F r e u d , " D e r M o s e s d e s M i c h e l a n g e l o , " S t u d i e n a u s g a b e , v o l . 1 0 , e d .
A l e x a n d e r M i t s c h e r l i c h , A n g e l a R i c h a r d s , a n d J a m e s S t r a c h e y ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :
F i s c h e r , 1 9 6 9 ) , 2 1 7 . E n g l i s h i n C h a r a c t e r a n d C u l t u r e , e d . P h i l i p R i e f f ( N e w Y o r k :
M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 0 3 . P a g e n u m b e r s a r e g i v e n b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , f i r s t i n G e r m a n
t h e n E n g l i s h .
2 4 . T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s i n s p i r e d b y W i n c k e l m a n n ' s a n a l y s i s o f L a o c o o n , w h i c h
S c h i l l e r h a d q u o t e d i n " O b e r d a s P a t h e t i s c h e " ( 4 3 2 ; 1 5 9 ) . F o r r e a s o n s t h a t h a v e t o d o
w i t h t h e p r o b l e m a t i c a n d i n t e r n a l e c o n o m y o f " O b e r A n m u t u n d W i i r d e , " S c h i l l e r
d o e s n o t p r e s e n t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n a s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a w o r k o f a r t . H o w e v e r , S c h i l l e r
d o e s a l l u d e i n a n o t e t o t h e e s s a y s , " O b e r d a s P a t h e t i s c h e " a n d " V o m E r h a b e n e n . "
2 5 . L o n g i n u s , O n t h e S u b l i m e , t r a n s . w i t h c o m m e n t a r y b y J a m e s A . A r i e t i a n d
J o h n M . C r o s s e t t ( N e w Y o r k : M e l l e n , 1 9 8 5 ) . T h e F r e n c h e d i t i o n u s e d b y L a c o u e -
L a b a r t h e i s : D u s u b l i m e , e d . a n d t r a n s . H e n r i L e b e g u e ( P a r i s : L e s B e l l e s L e t t r e s , 1 9 6 5 )
O n t h e S u b l i m e , X X X V : " a s t o n i s h i n g [ f o r m a n l i s a l w a y s t h e p a r a d o x [ T O l T a p -
C h a p t e r , s e c t i o n , a n d p a g e r e f e r e n c e s ( t h e l a t t e r f r o m t h e E n g l i s h e d i t i o n )
g i v e n h e r e a f t e r p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y i n t e x t ) .
2 6 . I t s e e m s t o m e t h a t t h i s i s t h e s e c o n d e x e m p l a r y c a s e o f w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h e
f i g u r e o f M o s e s w h e n i t e n t e r s t h e r e a l m o f a r t u n d e r t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e o f t h e a e s t h e t i c
d i s c o u r s e . M a n i f e s t l y , a f a i l u r e o c c u r s . B u t p e r h a p s S c h O n b e r g ' s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e
" f o r m o f o p e r a " i s s u b l i m e i n i t s t u r n . T h e f i l m v e r s i o n b y S t r a u b i n d e e d s u g g e s t s a s
m u c h , i n s o f a r a s i t i n t e g r a t e s t h e l i b r e t t o f o r t h e t h i r d a c t - w h i c h , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e
f i r s t t w o a c t s , h a d b e e n w r i t t e n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e m u s i c - i n t h e f o r m o f a m e r e l y
s p o k e n d i a l o g u e . T h i s i m m e n s e b r e a k d o w n , w h i c h o c c u r s i n o n e o f t h e r a r e s c e n e s , i f
n o t t h e u n i q u e s c e n e , o f a m o d e r n t r a g e d y , r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y c a s t s a n e w l i g h t o n t h e r e s t
o f t h e w o r k . T h e w o r k b e g i n s t o o s c i l l a t e b e t y . r e e n ( s a c r e d ) o r a t o r i o a n d t r a g e d y , t h a t i s ,
t h e ( p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) d i d a c t i c p o e m , w h i c h a r e K a n t ' s t h r e e m o d e s ( C r i t i q u e o f J u d g -
m e n t , 5 2 ) o f " s u b l i m e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " " i n s o f a r a s " s u c h a p r e s e n t a t i o n " b e l o n g s t o t h e
f i n e a r t s . " I w i l l a t t e m p t t o s p e a k o f t h i s a g a i n e l s e w h e r e .
2 7 . A n d i n f a c t t h e e n t i r e s p e c u l a t i v e e p o c h u n d e r s t a n d s i t a s s u c h .
2 8 . I p e r m i t m y s e l f t o r e f e r t h e r e a d e r t o m y e s s a y , " L e d e r n i e r p h i l o s o p h e ; " i n
L ' i m i t a t i o n d e s m o d e r n e s ( P a r i s : G a l i l e e , 1 9 8 6 ) .
2 9 . T h e o r i e W e r k a u s g a b e , v o l . 1 2 : , v o r l e s u n g e n a b e r d i e P h i l o s o p h i e d e r
G e s c h i c h t e , e d . E v a M o l d e n h a u e r a n d K a r l M a r k u s M i c h e l ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :
Suhrkamp, 1970),272; The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover,
1956),220.
30. We know that in the following editions of this text, Heidegger explicitly
remarked this Geschehnis as Ereignis.
31. "Das Geheure ist im Grunde nicht geheuer."
32. Edmund Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful (New York: Collier, 1909),
114.
33. "Das seiende Sein," Einfohrung in Die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1966),27; Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959),35,
34. This is the proper effect of contamination which the thought of the sublime
entails, as has been revealed by Neil Hertz, "A Reading of Longinus," The End of the
Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University Press,
1985), 1-20; originally published as "Lecture de Longin." Poetique 15 (1978); and
Michel Deguy, "The Discourse of Exaltation (Megalogoreuein): Contribution to a
Rereading of Pseudo-Longinus," in this volume. Sublime poetry, says Michel Deguy,
"does what it says."
35. Only Michel Deguy, to my knowledge, has done justice to the thought of
Longinus by listening attentively to the Greek. It is he, in fact, who opened up the path
I am following here.
36. A bit further on (VIII, 1), concerning the five sources of the sublime, Long-
inus uses the same logic: the five sources, he explains, "presuppose as their common
foundation orational talent, without which there is nothing at alJ." More precisely,
there is a 1TpolirroKlllVOV, which is the BwallLS in speaking, the "faculty" (Kraft, in
Kant's sense) or the power of speaking. And that is the gift. This is the reason why,
thereafter, it is necessary to distinguish among the various sources between those that
come from tPU<1LS (the disposition to elevated thought and the disposition to vehement
and enthusiastic pathos) and those that come from T ~ X V l l (the "fashioning of figures"
[crxTlllaTa] "noble diction" [cf>p<icrLS] and "arrangement" [cr6v9crLS] "with a view to
the dignity and elevation of the style"). Longinus's thought is moreover so unwavering
on this point that, much later (XXXIX, 1 and 3), the principal element of crW8C7LS
("harmony") conceived in accordance with the model of musical harmony as a har-
mony of language, or of the arrangement of words, is said to be innate to humans
(which explains, in turn, the powerofits effects: it moves the soul).
37. Aristotle, ia poetique, trans. Roselyne Dupont-Roc and Jean Lallot (Paris:
Seuil, 1980),43; Poetics, trans. James Hutton (New York: Norton, 1982),47.
38. I share here without reservation Emmanuel Martineau's conclusion in his
essay "Mimesis dans la 'Poetique': pour une solution phenomenologique," La revue de
metaphysique et de morale (1975). See also the essays concerning art in La Provenance des
especes (Paris: P.U.F., 1982). I ought to indicate, moreover, that-apart from the reading
of "The Origin of the Work of Art" and Jean Beaufret's "Phusis et techne' (in Aletheia,
n o . 1 - 2 ) - m y p o i n t o f a c c e s s t o t h e t e x t o f t h e P o e t i c s w a s t h e s a m e s e n t e n c e f r o m t h e
I n t r o d u c t i o n t o M e t a p h y s i c s w h i c h M a r t i n e a u c i t e s i n f i n e : " T h u s T X T l V p r o v i d e s t h e
b a s i c t r a i t o f & L V O V , t h e v i o l e n t ; f o r v i o l e n c e [ G e w a l t - t a t i g k e i t ) i s t h e u s e o f p o w e r
[ G e w a l t - b r a u c h e n ) a g a i n s t t h e o v e r p o w e r i n g [ O b e n v a l t i g e n d e ) : t h r o u g h k n o w l e d g e i t
w r e s t s b e i n g f r o m c o n c e a l m e n t i n t o t h e m a n i f e s t a s t h e e s s e n t " ( 1 6 9 ; 1 6 0 ) .
3 9 . I p e r m i t m y s e l f a g a i n t o r e f e r t h e r e a d e r t o L ' i m i t a t i o n d e s m o d e r n e s ( P a r i s :
G a l i l e e , 1 9 8 6 ) .
4 0 . D e m o s t h e n e s i s m o r e o v e r p l a c e d u n d e r t h e s i g n o f P h o e b u s A p o l l o : " B u t a l l
o f a s u d d e n , a s i f a n i m a t e d b y a d i v i n e b r e a t h , a n d s o t o s p e a k p o s s e s s e d b y t h e s p i r i t o f
P h o e b u s , h e o f f e r s h i s s e r m o n i n t h e n a m e o f t h e h e r o e s o f G r e e c e " ( X V I , 2 ) .
4 1 . W a l t e r B e n j a m i n , " G o e t h e s W a h l v e r w a n d s c h a f t e n , " G e s a m m e l t e S c h r i f t e n , v o l .
I , I , e d . R o l f T i e d e m a n n a n d H e r m a n n S c h w e p p e n h a u s e r , w i t h T h e o d o r A d o r n o a n d G e r -
s h o r n S c h o l e m ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : S u h r k a m p , 1 9 8 0 ) , 1 9 4 - 9 7 ( t r a n s l a t i o n m i n e , J . 1 . ) .
1 . L y o t a r d , " S e n s u s C o m m u n i s , " P a r a g r a p h : T h e J o u r n a l o f t h e
M o d e r n C r i t i c a l T h e o r y G r o u p 1 1 ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 1 - 2 3 .
2 . P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , L a f i c t i o n d u p o l i t i q u e : H e i d e g g e r , l ' a r t e t l a p o l i -
t i q u e ( P a r i s : C h r i s t i a n B o u r g e o i s , 1 9 8 7 ) ; H e i d e g g e r , A r t a n d P o l i t i c s : T h e F i c t i o n o f t h e
t r a n s . C h r i s T u r n e r ( O x f o r d , U . K . : B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 9 0 ) .
3 . S e e J a c o b R o g o z i n s k i , " T h e G i f t o f t h e W o r l d , " i n t h i s v o l u m e .
1 . T h i s t e x t c a m e d i r e c t l y o u t o f t h e w o r k d o n e d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f J e a n -
L y o t a r d ' s s e m i n a r o n T h e Q u e s t i o n o f t h e S u b l i m e i n 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 a t t h e C o l l e g e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l d e P h i l o s o p h i e . I t i s e q u a l l y i n d e b t e d t o J e a n - L u c N a n c y ' s " T h e S u b l i m e
O f f e r i n g " a n d t o t h e o t h e r s t u d i e s p u b l i s h e d i n t h e " p e r m a n e n t t r i b u n e c o n s e c r a t e d t o
t h e s u b l i m e " o f t h e r e v i e w , P o & s i e . ( A t t h e m o m e n t o f f i n i s h i n g t h i s t e x t , I h a v e j u s t
b e c o m e a w a r e o f t h e l a s t p i e c e i n t h i s d o s s i e r , P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e ' s " T h e S u b -
l i m e T r u t h , " P o & s i e 3 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) : 8 3 - 1 1 6 , w h i c h e l u c i d a t e s i n g r e a t d e p t h , i f i n a s o m e -
w h a t d i f f e r e n t " l i g h t , " s e v e r a l o f t h e m o t i f s I h a v e a d d r e s s e d h e r e . )
2 . C f . t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b o o k b y O . C h e d i n , S u r l ' e s t h e t i q u e d e K a n t ( P a r i s :
V r i n , 1 9 8 2 ) , 1 7 2 - 7 5 , a s w e l l a s L y o t a r d , " S e n s u s C o m m u n i s , " i n P a r a g r a p h : T h e J o u r -
n a l o f t h e M o d e r n C r i t i c a l T h e o r y G r o u p 1 1 ( M a r c h 1 9 8 8 ) : 1 - 2 3 .
3 . T h e h y p o t h e s i s o f t h e " c h a o t i c a g g r e g a t e " i s e v o k e d a n d h e l d a t a d i s t a n c e
t h r o u g h o u t t h e " F i r s t I n t r o d u c t i o n , " P r e m i e r e i n t r o d u c t i o n e l l a c r i t i q u e d e l a f a c u l t e d e
j u g e r , t r a n s . L . G i l l e r m i t ( P a r i s : V r i n , 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 8 - 2 9 , 3 9 - 4 0 , 8 0 , e t c . ; C r i t i q u e o f J u d g -
ment: Including the First Introduction, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, with a foreword by
Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 397-98, 405, 437, passim. On the
hypothesis of a "step-mother nature," cf. Critique o/Practical Reason (159; 152). As in
the passage of the first Critique on "cinnabar," it is a matter of limit hypotheses, where
Kant places the entirety of his thought in question, designating a point of the impossi-
ble which he immediately revokes or pushes away. Cf. also in the Essay on Radical Evil
the insupportable eventuality of an absolute or "diabolical" evil. The sub-limited has to
do with the impossibility of this limit.
4. Monstrous horror is, in the strict sense, unpresentable. In tum, sublimity is
for Kant "nearly too big for all presentation." But, as Derrida remarked, it thus
becomes impossible-or nearly impossible?-to fix the limit, to "delimit the trait of the
almost too." Cf. "Parergon" in La verit.!en peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978). 143-44;
The Truth in Painting. trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian Mcleod (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. 1987), 125-26. This effect of the limit or of the threshold is doubtless
what demarcates Kant's thought of the sublime from the Heideggerian motif of the
Ungeheuer: the Kantian sublime is not monstrous "e-normity"-it holds itself on its
border. is appointed as its guard.
5. Immanuel Kant. "D'un ton grand seigneur adopte naguere en philosophie."
in Premiere introduction a la critique de la faculte de juger. trans. L. Gillermit (Parts:
Vrin, 1982). 108. This text has been analyzed by Derrida in D'un ton apocalyptigue
adopte naguere en philosophie (Paris: Galilee, 1983); "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently
Adopted in Philosophy." Oxford Literary Review 6 (2): 3-37. On the "proliferation" of
veiled Isis at the end of the eighteenth century. one can profitably read La quete d'Isis
by J. Baltrusaitis (Paris: Perrin, 1967).
6. Cf. Heidegger, Kant et Ie probleme de la metaphysique, trans. Alphonse de
Waelhens and Walter Biemel (Paris: Gallimard, 1954),247. passim; Kant and the Prob-
lem of Metaphysics. 4th ed . trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990). 131-32. passim.
7. Martin Heidegger. Interpretation pMnomenologique de la Critique de la rai-
son pure (Paris: Gallimard. 1982). 157.324.
8. The concept of a "transcendental violence" appears in an already old text by
Derrida. "Violence et metaphysique." L'ecriture et la differance (Paris: Seuil. 1967);
"Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 1978), which affirmed that "the present. the presence of the
present. and the present of presence. are all originally and forever violent" (195; 133).
One will find no reelaboration of this concept in the subsequent works of Derrida.
9. Martin Heidegger, Kant et Ie probleme de la metaphysique, trans. Alphonse
de Waelhens and Walter Biemel (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 156; Kant and the Problem 0/
Metaphysics. 4th ed . trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990),67.
10. Cf. the still insufficiently elaborated "pre-critical" notation, of the Observa-
tions on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldhwait (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960), 49-50: "A long duration is sublime. lfit belongs to
t h e p a s t , i t i s n o b l e . I f o n e s i t u a t e d i t i n a n i n f i n i t e f u t u r e , i t i s . f r i g h t e n i n g . . . . H a l l e r
i n s p i r e s a s w e e t f e a r w h e n h e r e p r e s e n t s f u t u r e e t e r n i t y , a s o l i d a d m i r a t i o n w h e n h e
d e s c r i b e s p a s t e t e r n i t y . " T h i r t y y e a r s l a t e r , i n t h e l i t t l e t e x t " O n t h e E n d o f A l l T h i n g s , " ,
K a n t r e t u r n s t o t h i s a b y s s o f t h e f u t u r e e t e r n i t y ; " T h i s t h o u g h t m a k e s o n e s h u d d e r . . . i t
e x e r c i s e s h o w e v e r a k i n d o f f a s c i n a t i o n . . . . l t i s o f f o r m i d a b l e s u b l i m i t y . " T h i s t e m p o r a l
d i m e n s i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e i s s t r a n g e l y a b s e n t f r o m t h e C r i t i q u e o f J u d g m e n t .
1 1 . I p r e s e r v e h e r e t h e i n t e r r o g a t i v e m o d e . I f t h e K a n t i a n a n a l y t i c o f t h e s u b l i m e
s e e m s t o p l a c e i n q u e s t i o n a n e w , a n d i n p a r t , H e i d e g g e r ' s K a n t - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - t h a t o f
t h e " f i r s t " H e i d e g g e r , e s s e n t i a l l y o f t h e K a n t - b o o k o f 1 9 2 9 - c i n o n e c o n c l u d e t h a t i t
e x c e d e s a l s o t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e " s e c o n d " H e i d e g g e r , a n d n o t a b l y i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f
t h e t r u t h a s a l e t h e i a ? F o r t h e m o m e n t , I p r e f e r t o r e s e r v e m y r e s p o n s e . ( O n t h i s p o i n t , i t
i s d i f f i c u l t f o r m e t o s h a r e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t l e a d s L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e t o p r i v i l e g e t h e
s u b l i m e v e i l i n g o f I s i s t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f t h e " n e g a t i v e " s u b l i m e o f M o s e s a n d t h e J e w -
i s h l a w . B u t t h i s d e c i s i o n - s t i l l t o o H e g e l i a n ? - w o u l d c a l l f o r l o n g a n a l y s e s . )
1 2 . C f . i n t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D i a l e c t i c , " t h e c r i t i q u e o f t h e p a r a l o g i s m s o f
r a t i o n a l p s y c h o l o g y , n o t a b l y t h e " p a r a l o g i s m o f p e r s o n a l i t y " ( C P R , 2 9 3 - 9 7 ; 3 4 1 - 4 4 ) .
O n t h i s q u e s t i o n , I p e r m i t m y s e l f t o p o i n t t o m y o w n " A l ' a p p e l d e l ' e t r a n g e r : s u r K a n t
e t l a q u e s t i o n d u s u j e t " f o r t h c o m i n g i n C r i t i q u e .
1 3 . I h a v e t o t a k e m y d i s t a n c e h e r e f r o m t h e o r i e n t a t i o n f o l l o w e d b y J e a n - L u c
N a n c y i n " T h e S u b l i m e O f f e r i n g , " i n t h i s v o l u m e . A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , " I t i s n o t e x a c t l y
a m a t t e r o f t h e i n f i n i t e i n t h e u n l i r n i t a t i o n o n w h i c h t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e s u b l i m e
t o u c h e s , " a n d " t h e i n f i n i t e d o e s n o t e x h a u s t t h e B e i n g o f t h e u n l i m i t e d , i t d o e s n o t
o f f e r , a s i t w e r e , i t s t r u e m o m e n t . "
1 4 . I m m a n u e l K a n t , L a D i s s e r t a t i o n d e 1 7 7 0 , t r a n s . P a u l M o n y ( P a r i s : V r i n ,
1 9 7 6 ) , 5 7 , K a n t ' s I n a u g u r a l D i s s e r t a t i o n o f 1 7 7 0 , t r a n s . W i l l i a m J . E c k o f f ( N e w Y o r k :
n . p . , 1 8 9 4 ) , r e p r i n t e d ( N e w Y o r k : A M S , 1 9 7 0 ) , 6 0 . R e f e r e n c e s g i v e n p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y
b e l o w f o r D 1 7 7 0 , f o r s t F r e n c h , t h e n E n g l i s h e d i t i o n s .
1 5 . C f . G . G r a n e l , L ' e q u i v o q u e o n t o l o g i q u e d e l a p e n s e e k a n t i e n n e ( P a r i s : G a I I i -
m a r d , 1 9 7 0 ) , 8 7 - 9 4 . C f . a l s o G . L e b r u n , K a n t e t f a f i n d e l a m e t a p h y s i q u e ( P a r i s : P I o n ,
1 9 7 0 ) , w h i c h r e f e r s t o t h e o c c u r r e n c e s o f t h i s o t h e r t h o u g h t o f t h e i n f i n i t e i n t h e
e n t i r e t y o f K a n t ' s w o r k s ; s e e n o t a b l y h i s a n a l y s i s o f t h e s u b l i m e , 4 2 0 - 2 6 .
1 6 . O n t h i s q u e s t i o n , o n e c a n c o n s u l t , d e s p i t e i t s i n s u f f i c i e n c i e s , M . C l a v e l , L a
C r i t i q u e d e K a n t ( P a r i s : F l a m m a r i o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 2 0 3 , 2 4 5 , p a s s i m .
1 7 . I m m a n u e l K a n t , " D u p r e m i e r f o n d e m e n t d e l a d i f f e r e n c e d e s r e g i o n s d a n s
l ' e s p a c e ( 1 7 6 8 ) , " i n Q u e l q u e s o p u s c u l e s p r e c r i t i q u e s , t r a n s . S . Z a c ( P a r i s : V r i n , 1 9 7 0 ) , 9 8 ;
" C o n c e r n i n g t h e U l t i m a t e F o u n d a t i o n o f t h e D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f R e g i o n s i n S p a c e
( 1 7 6 8 ) , " i n S e l e c t e d P r e - C r i t i c a l W r i t i n g s a n d C o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h B e c k , t r a n s . G . B .
K e r f e r d a n d D . E . W a l f o r d ( M a n c h e s t e r : M a n c h e s t e r U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ; N e w Y o r k :
B a r n e s a n d N o b l e , 1 9 6 8 ) , 4 3 . W e w i l l h a v e t o r e t u r n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n o f t h e b o d y a n d
t h e f l e s h i n K a n t .
1 8 . I m m a n u e l K a n t , A n t h r o p o l o g i e d ' u n p o i n t d e v u e p r a g m a t i q u e , t r a n s . M i c h e l
Foucault (Paris: Vrin. 1979). 16. 37; Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.
trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1974). 33.
19. Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche, vol. 3. La volant/! de puissance en tant que con-
naisance, trans. Pierre Klossowski (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).439; Nietzsche, vol. 3. The
Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics, trans. Joan Stambaugh. David Farrell
Krell. and Frank A. Capuzzi. ed. David Farrell Krell (S.an Francisco: Harper and Row.
1987).80.
20. Martin Heidegger. Interpr/!tation pMnomt!nologique de la Critique de la rai-
son pure (Paris: Gallimard. 1982). 137.
21. "To grasp the One. and All in One. in an ideal act ... Form for itself consti-
tutes in this case the Being of the thing. Form makes up here all of the object. Forma
dat esse rei." Immanuel Kant. Gesammelte Schriften. vol. 21 (Berlin: de Gruyter. 1936).
91-92; Opus Postumum. trans. J. Gibelin (Paris: Vrin. 1950).36-37. .
22. Immanuel Kant. Opus Postumum. trans. J. Gibelin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), 163.
The conception of the "passage" that dominates these last writings of Kant prolongs, in
a certain sense. the project of the Critique of Judgment. but in a profoundly modified
problematic. -
23. But just what sort of community is this? Is it not forcing things a bit to pass
from "logical" community (InbegrijJ) to ontological community. or rather "transcen-
dental" community (Urgemeinschaft)--conceived as the "chorus of monads" or the
carnal agreement of the world? Have we sufficiently taken into account the Kantian
concept of common sense. as the "indeterminate accord of our faculties a priori."
which would permit a better articulation of these two acceptations or modes of com-
munity? In the hopes of returning to this question. let us point here again to Lyotard's
study of "Sensus communis." as well as to the recent work of Jean-Luc Nancy on La
communautt! dt!sreuvr/!e (Paris: Galilee. 1986).
Notes for Chapter 7
1. Peter Szondi. Versuch tiber das Tragische (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1964). 13. Reprinted in Schriften 1. ed. J. Bollack. et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1978); On Textual Understanding and Other Essays, trans. Harvey Mendelsohn (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1986). 44. Page numbers cited below paren-
thetically in the text. first the German, then the English edition.
2. F. W. J. Schelling. SiJmmtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta,
1856-61). I. 3. 96ff. The French edition cited by Courtine is Premiers ecrits (1794-95),
trans. Courtine (Paris: P.U.F . 1987). Page references to German edition
given parenthetically in text below.
3. "Art is the sole true and eternal organon and at the same time document of
philosophy. which testifies ever and ceaselessly to that which philosophy cannot pre-
sent externally .... Art is for the philosopher the highest thing, because it as it were
o p e n s t o h i m t h e h o l y o f h o l i e s " ( I , 3 , 6 2 7 - 2 8 ) . F u r t h e r : i s t h e s o l e a n d e t e r n a l r e v -
e l a t i o n a n d t h e m i r a c l e w h i c h , e v e n i f i t h a d o n l y e x i s t e d o n c e , w o u l d h a v e t o c o n v i n c e
u s o f t h e a b s o l u t e r e a l i t y o f t h a t h i g h e s t t h i n g " ( 1 , 3 , 6 1 8 ) .
4 . S c h e l l i n g h a s d i r e c t l y i n m i n d P r o f e s s o r s J . F . F l a t t , F . G . S U s k i n d , G . C .
S t o r r , a n d G . C . R a p p , o f t h e T i i b i n g e r S t i f t . S e e a l s o S c h e l l i n g ' s l e t t e r t o H e g e l i n
S c h e l l i n g , B r i e f e u n d D o k u m e n t e , e d . H . F u h r m a n s , 1 : 5 6 . O n t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s i t u a t i o n
i n T i i b i n g e n , s e e a l s o F u h r m a n s 1 : 9 - 5 4 .
. 5 . C f . a l s o t h e p r e f a c e t o Y o m I c h ( I , 2 , 7 7 - 7 8 ) : " G i v e m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
w h a t h e i s a n d h e w i l l s o o n l e a r n t o b e c o m e w h a t h e o u g h t t o b e . G i v e h i m t h e o r e t i c a l
s e l f - r e s p e c t a n d p r a c t i c a l s e l f - r e s p e c t w i l l s o o n f o l l o w . "
6 . C f . H o l d e r l i n ' s l e t t e r t o h i s b r o t h e r f r o m 2 J u n e 1 7 9 6 , F r i e d r i c h H o l d e r l i n ,
S a m t l i c h e W e r k e ( S t u t t g a r t e r H o l d e r l i n - A u s g a b e ) , e d . F r i e d r i c h B e i s s n e r , v o l . V I , 2
( S t u t t g a r t : C o t t a , 1 9 5 8 ) , l e t t e r n o . 1 2 1 ; E s s a y s a n d L e t t e r s o f T h e o r y , e d . a n d t r a n s .
T h o m a s P f a u ( A l b a n y : S U N Y P r e s s , 1 9 8 8 ) , 1 3 5 : " T o b e s u r e , w e a l s o f r e q u e n t l y l o n g t o
t r a n s c e n d f r o m t h i s i n t e r m e d i a r y s t a t e o f l i f e a n d d e a t h i n t o t h e i n f i n i t e b e i n g o f t h e
b e a u t i f u l w o r l d , i n t o t h e a r m s o f e t e r n a l l y y o u t h f u l n a t u r e f r o m w h e r e w e e m e r g e d . "
C f . t h e p o e m " A n d i e N a t u r " i n S i i m t l i c h e G e d i c h t e , e d . D e t l e v L i i d e r s , v o l . 1 ( B a d
H o m b u r g : A t h e n a u m , 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
7 . C f . a l s o t h e P r e f a c e t o Y o m I c h ( 1 , 2 , 7 7 ) . F o r i t s p a r t , t h e n i n t h l e t t e r a l r e a d y
e v o k e d t h e S c h r e c k n i s s e d e r S c h w a r m e r e i .
8 . C f . i n p a r t i c u l a r G . E . L e s s i n g , " H a m b u r g i s c h e D r a m a t u r g i e , " W e r k e , v o l . 6
( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : D e u t s c h e r K l a s s i k e r , 1 9 8 5 ; H a m b u r g D r a m a t u r g y , t r a n s . H e l e n
Z i m m e r n ( [ 1 8 9 0 ) ; r e p r i n t e d N e w Y o r k : D o v e r , 1 9 6 2 , a n d a l s o t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l e w o r k
b y M a x K o m m e r e l l , L e s s i n g u n d A r i s t o t e l e s . U n t e r s u c h u n g a b e r d i e T h e o r i e d e r T r a g o d i e ,
4 t h e d . ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 9 7 0 ) . C f . a l s o W . S c h a d e w a l d t ,
" F u r c h t u n d M i t l e i d ? " i n H e l / a s u n d H e s p e r i e n ( Z i i r i c h a n d S t u t t g a r t : n . p . , 1 9 6 0 ) ,
3 4 6 - 8 8 .
9 . C f . F r i e d r i c h H o l d e r l i n , " D i e B e d e u t u n g d e r T r a g o d i e n , " S a m t l i c h e W e r k e ,
I V , 1 , 2 7 4 ; E s s a y s a n d L e t t e r s o n T h e o r y , 8 9 : " D i e B e d e u t u n g d e r T r a g o d i e n i s t a m
l e i c h t e s t e n a u s d e m P a r a d o x o n z u b e g r e i f e n . "
1 0 . A r i s t o t l e , P o e t i q u e , t r a n s . R . D u p o n t - R o c a n d J . L a l l o t ( P a r i s : S e u i l , 1 9 8 0 ) ,
c h a p . 1 3 a n d n o t e 2 , 2 3 8 f f ; P o e t i c s , t r a n s . J a m e s H u t t o n ( N e w Y o r k : N o r t o n , 1 9 8 2 ) ,
5 7 - 5 8 .
1 1 . F r i e d r i c h H o l d e r l i n , " O b e r d e n U n t e r s c h i e d d e r D i c h t a r t e n , " i n S a m t l i c h e
W e r k e , I V , 1 , 2 6 6 - 6 7 ; E s s a y s a n d L e t t e r s o n T h e o r y , 8 3 . C f . a l s o C o u r t i n e ,
" D e l a m e t a p h o r e t r a g i q u e , " R e v u e p h i l o s o p h i q u e d e L o u v a i n 1 8 ( 1 9 8 3 ) : 3 7 - 6 2 .
1 2 . I t i s n o t a t a l l a m a t t e r h e r e o f t h e i n t u i t u s o r i g i n a r i u s r e j e c t e d b y K a n t b u t o f
t h a t w h i c h i s f o r S c h e l l i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n o f a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p u r e e g o .
S c h e l l i n g d e r i v e s t h i s n o t i o n f r o m a f l e e t i n g i n d i c a t i o n i n F i c h t e ' s R e c e n s i o n d e s A e n -
e s i d e m u s a n d e x p l i c i t a t e s i t i n h i s t e x t s f r o m Y o m I c h ( 1 , 2 , 1 0 6 - 7 ) .
Notes for Chapter 7
239
13. Friedrich Holderlin, "Ober den Unterschied der Dichtarten," Siimtliche
Werke, IV, 1,268-69; Essays and Letters on Theory, 83-89.
14. "This objectivity of the intellectual intuition, which is generally recognized
and indeed impossible to deny, is art itself. For the aesthetic intuition is precisely the
intellectual intuition become objective. Only the artwork reflects back to me what in
no other way can be reflected, that absolute Identity [jenes absolut Identischel which
even in the ego has already divided itself, therefore that which the philosopher allows
to divide itself in his first act of consciousness is streamed back toward him, through
the miracle of art, out of its products-and in no other way is it accessible" (I, 3, 625).
15. It is perhaps a hypothesis of this kind which would make it possible for one
to comprehend HolderIin's remark in his letter to Niethammer of 24 February 1796
(no. 117): "Schelling, whom 1 encountered before my departure, is content to collabo-
rate in your journal and to be introduced by you to the world of the learned. We did
not agree about everything, but we did agree that the new ideas can be most clearly
exposed in the form ofletters. You ought to know that his new convictions have made
him take a better path, before the worse had been pursued to its end." In the "New Let-
ters on the Aesthetic Education of Man," announced in the same post, Holderlin
intended to oppose himself to Schelling's emphasis on practice: "I would like to find
the principle which explains to me the divisions within which we think and exist, but
which possesses also the power to overcome the opposition between subject and
object, between our ego and the world, between reason and revelation-<m the theo-
reticallevel, by means of the intellectual intuition, without recourse to our practical
reason. We need the aesthetic sense in order to do that." Cf. also the letter to Schiller
from 4 September 1795 (no. 104): "I am attempting to prove that ... the unity of subject
and object in an absolute ego . .is possible without a doubt on the aesthetic level, in the
intellectual intuition, but is possible on the theoretical level only by way of an infinite
approximation."
16. Cf. also Holderlin's letter to Neuffer of 10 October 1794 (no. 93).
17. Cf. the theme of Gott in uns abundantly orchestrated by Holderlin.
18. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. George Watson (Lon-
don: Dent; New York: Detton, 1956; reprint ed., 1967), chap. 1O,91ff.
19. Karl Philip Moritz, Schriften zur Asthetik und Poetik, ed. H. J. Schrimpf
(Tiibingen: n.p., 1962). On Moritz. see Peter Szondi, Studienausgabe der Vorlesungen,
vol. 2: Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie I, ed. S. Metz and H. H. Hildebrandt (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 82ff., and T. Todorov, Theories du symbo[e (Paris: n.p.,
1977), 179ff.
20. Friedrich Schiller, <cOber das Erhabene," Werke, vol. 2 (Miinchen: Karl
Hansen, 1966),610; "On the Sublime," Complete Works, vol. 8 (New York: Collier,
1902),140-41.
21. D. Jl1hnig, "Schelling," Die Kunst in der Philosophic, vol. 2 (pfuIIingen: n.p.,
1969),239.
2 2 . C f . S y s t e m d e s t r a n s z e n d e n t a l e n I d e a l i s m u s ( I . 3 . 6 2 0 - 2 1 ) ; S y s t e m o f T r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l i s m ( 1 8 0 0 ) . t r a n s . P e t e r H e a t h ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e . V a . : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s o f
A I n e r i c a . 1 9 7 8 ) . 2 2 5 - 2 6 .
2 3 . C f . a l s o F r i e d r i c h S c h l e g e l . " E n t r e t i e n s u r l a p o e s i e . " i n L ' a b s o l u l i t t e r a i r e .
T h e o r i e d e l a l i t t e r a t u r e d u r o m a n t i s m e a l l e m a n d , e d . P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , ( P a r i s :
S e u i l . 1 9 7 8 ) , 2 8 9 f f ; D i a l o g u e o n P o e t r y a n d L i t e r a r y A p h o r i s m s , t r a n s . E r n s t B e h l e r a n d
R o m a n S t r u c ( U n i v e r s i t y P a r k : P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . 1 9 6 8 ) .
2 4 . O n t h e p r o t e u s - l i k e c o n c e p t o f c h a o s i n F r i e d r i c h S c h l e g e l . s e e X . T i l l i e t t e ' s
r i c h l y d o c u m e n t e d n o t e i n S c h e l l i n g . u n e p h i l o s o p h e e n d e v e n i r . v o l . 1 . 4 3 0 - 3 2 . n o t e 5 l .
C f . a l s o F r a n z N o r b e r t M e n n e m e i e r . F r i e d r i c h S c h l e g e l s P o e s i e b e g r i f f ( M u n i c h : n . p . ,
1 9 7 1 ) . 2 5 f f .
2 5 . C f . f o r e x a m p l e . t h i s m a g n i f i c e n t d e c l a r a t i o n i n t h e A p h o r i s m e n z u r E i n -
l e i t u n g i n d i e N a t u r p h i l o s o p h i e : " W h a t I c a n b o a s t o f ? T h e o n e t h i n g t h a t w a s g r a n t e d t o
m e : t h a t I h a v e p r o c l a i m e d t h e d i v i n i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . t h e p o s s i b l e i d e n t i t y o f a l l
k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t d i f f e r e n c e o f o b j e c t . a n d t h u s t h e i n f i n i t y o f p h i l o s o p h y " ( I . 7 .
1 4 3 - 4 4 ) .
2 6 . I . 5 . 6 8 7 - 8 8 . O n e d o e s w e l l t o r e c a l l h e r e w h a t H e g e l i n s t r u c t e d a t t h e
t h r e s h o l d o f h i s l e c t u r e s o n A e s t h e t i c s : " I t w a s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y [ a f t e r t h e K a n t i a n
a t t e m p t t o r e u n i f y f r e e d o m a n d n e c e s s i t y o n t h e l e v e l o f a e s t h e t i c s ] t o c o n c e i v e i n a
m o r e a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g f a s h i o n t h e u n i t y s u c h a s i t r e a l i z e s i t s e l f b e t w e e n f r e e d o m a n d
n e c e s s i t y , t h e u n i v e r s a l a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r . t h e r a t i o n a l a n d t h e s e n s i b l e " ( G . W . F .
H e g e l . V o r l e s u n g e n u b e r d i e A s t h e t i l c , i n T h e o r i e W e r k a u s g a b e , e d . E v a M o l d e n h a u e r
a n d K a r l M a r k u s M i c h e l . v o l . 1 3 ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : S u h r k a m p . 1 9 7 0 ) . 8 9 j A e s t h e t i c s .
t r a n s . T . M . K n o x ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s . 1 9 7 5 ) . 6 0 - 6 1 .
1 . C f . A n t h o n y B l u n t . N i c h o l a s P o u s s i n ( N e w Y o r k : B o l l i n g e n F o u n d a t i o n ,
1 9 6 7 ) , v o l . 2 , p l a t e n o . 1 8 7 .
2 . C f . W . F r i e d l a n d e r a n d A . B l u n t , T h e D r a w i n g s o f N i c o l a s P o u s s i n ( L o n d o n :
W a r b u r g I n s t i t u t e . 1 9 6 3 ) , v o l . 4 , n o . G 2 1 , p I . 2 3 5 . A n a t t e n t i v e s t u d y o f b o t h t h e p i c -
t u r e i n F r a n k f u r t a n d t h e s k e t c h t e n d s t o c o n v i n c e m e t h a t i t i s i n d e e d a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y
a v i e w o f t h e C o l i s e u m .
3 . C f . N i c o l a s P o u s s i n . C o r r e s p o n d a n c e , e d . C . J o u a n n y . A r c h i v e s , v o l . V , 4 2 4 .
C f . F e l i b i e n . E n t r e t i e n s , ( 1 9 8 5 ) : 4 0 8 , a n d m y s t u d y o f t h i s p a i n t i n g p u b l i s h e d i n V e r s u s
2 9 ( M a y - A u g u s t 1 9 8 1 ) : 5 9 - 7 5 .
4 . I u s e t h e t e r m t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t h e K a n t i a n s e n s e o f a c r i t i q u e o f k n o w l e d g e
w i t h a v i e w t o i t s f o u n d a t i o n , t h a t i s , t o t h e r i g o r o u s e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f
p o s s i b i l i t y o r l e g i t i m a c y o f i t s s t a t e m e n t s . T h e s t o r m i s i n a s e n s e t h e f i g u r e - p e r h a p s i t
w o u l d b e b e t t e r t o s a y t h e m e t a f i g u r e - o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y a n d l e g i t i m a c y
o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( i n p a i n t i n g ) .
5. Pliny, Natural History, trans. H. Rackham, vol. 9 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1938-63), xxx:v, paragraph 96, page 333. Cf. J. Bialostocki, "Une idee de
Leonard realisee par Poussin," Revue des arts 4 (1954): 131ff.
6. That the storm is indeed the "subject" of Po us sin's painting would be proven
e contrario by the magnificent description provided by Giovan Pietro Bellori in his life
ofPj:lUssin (Le VUe dei pittori, scultori e architetti modern;' 1672, (Turin: Einaudi, 1976)
472), which opens with the drama in the foreground: "Corre Tisbe con Ie braccia
aperte sopra il cadavero dell'amato Piramo e forsennata precipita a morte, mentre la
terra e'l delo e tutte Ie cose spirano funesto errore" ("With her arms open wide Thisbe
runs upon the corpse of her beloved Piramns and in a mad frenzy plunges to her death,
while the earth and the heavens and all things exude deathly error"), and which, after
the description of the storm, finishes with the lion's attack: "questo e illeone che ha
cagionato la morte agl'infelid amanti" ("This is the lion that caused the death of the
unfortunate lovers").
7. I use these two terms in the sense in which Derrida introduces them in De la
Grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967), 208; Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), 144-45, with respect to writing:
the proper names of the "narrative actors" of the storia are added to their painted rep-
resentation, they are "a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest
measure of presence," but they supplant, only 'add themselves to' in order to 'replace'
as if "somewhere [in the painted representation) something can be filled up of itself,
can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy". Con-
sider the two definitions of comble ("plenitude"): (1) (Latin cumulus, with the sense of
culmen, "ridge" or "pinnacle"). In architecture, a ridge, coping, or crown of an edifice.
Part of an edifice on which the roof immediately rests. Figuratively, a culminating
point, the highest degree. (2) (Latin cumulus, "heap") that which is above an already
full measure; figuratively, surfeit, abundance.
8. Ovid, Metamorphoses. trans. Mary M. Innes (Baltimore: Penguin, 1955), IV,
I. 58-169.
9. The tomb ofNinus is the monument that the painter highlights pictorially by
illuminating it among the edifices of the town which appear in the background and to
the right. As Blunt has written (Nicolas Poussin [New York: Phaidon, 1967), 204ff.), we
have here a strange building composed of a square base supporting a pyramid. "His
model is a number of tombs near Jerusalem known to Poussin through engravings
from II Devotissimo Viaggio di Gerusalemme, by Giovanni Zuallardo, Rome 1587" (205,
n. 76). One finds this tomb again in the Moses Exposed of Oxford's Ashmolean
Museum and in Chantelou's Order. In the latter picture one can recognize the same
architectural structure, but reversed, as that in Pyramus and Thisbe: the tomb is tied to
another construction (a monumental pilaster in the Order, a palace in Pyramus) by a
bridge. On the values of this articulation, see our study on the Order (forthcoming). It
is worth noting that this articulation is not effective in the represented space and its fig-
ures but visually operative on the level of the representation, not without having com-
plex symbolic and ideological effects and investments.
1 0 . O n e w i l l n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e n a m e s P y r a m u s a n d T h i s b e
( c f . n o t e 6 a b o v e ) , p e r m i t s t h e p r o j e c t i o n , o n t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l w h o l e , o f a n e t -
w o r k o f p r o p e r n a m e s , t h a t i s , o f t e r m s d e s i g n a t i n g s i n g u l a r i t i e s o r i n d i v i d u a l s : h e r e i n
t o o , w e s e e t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f f u l f i l l m e n t a n d s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .
1 1 . O n t h e " d i r e c t " g e n e s i s o f c o l o r s i n P o u s s i n , s e e t h e w o n d e r f u l s t u d y b y V .
B a t s c h m a n n , D i a l e k t i k d e r M a l e r e i v o n N i c o l a s P o u s s i n ( M u n i c h : P r e s t e l , 1 9 8 2 ) , 3 9 f f .
S e e i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n o f r e d ( r u b e u s ) b e t w e e n t h e t w o e x t r e m e s o f w h i t e
( a l b u s ) a n d b l a c k ( n i g e r ) i n t h e d i a g r a m s o f t h e c o l o r s b y F r a n c i s c u s A g u i l o n i u s ,
O p t i c u m L i b r i S e x ( A n t w e r p , 1 6 1 3 ) , P r o p . X X X I X , 4 0 , a n d o f A t h a n a s i u s K i r c h e r , A r s
m a g n a I u d s e t u m b r a e ( R o m e : 1 6 4 6 ) , b o o k 1 , p a r t 3 , f o l . 6 5 , q u o t e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d o n
p a g e 4 3 o f B a t s c h m a n n . A m o n g s t t h e a n a l o g i a r e r u m o f t h e c o l o r s K i r c h e r g i v e s , o n e
f i n d s , f o r w h i t e , l u x p u r a , i g n i s , i n t e l l e c t u s , D e u s ; f o r b l a c k , t e n e b r a e , t e r r a , i g n o r a n t i a ,
p l a n t a ; a n d f o r r e d , l u x c o l o r a t a , A u r o r a e m e d i u m , e r r o r , h o m o .
1 2 . I f o n e b e g i n s w i t h t h i s r e l a t i o n w h i t e - . . r e d - . b l a c k , o n e c a n p e r h a p s b e t -
t e r u n d e r s t a n d P o u s s i n ' s f a m o u s c o m m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o C a r a v a g g i o : " T h i s m a n h a s
c o m e i n t o t h e w o r l d t o d e s t r o y p a i n t i n g , " a l t h o u g h o n e s h o u l d n o t f o r g e t t h a t P o u s s i n
a d d s t h a t C a r a v a g g i o w a s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h e a r t o f p a i n t i n g . C f . m y
D e t r u i r e l a p e i n t u r e ( P a r i s : G a l i l e e , 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 7 f f . i n p a r t i c u l a r .
1 3 . T h i s r e c i p r o c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e a l l e g o r i e s a n d s y m b o l s i s o n e o f t h e m e a n -
i n g s o n e c a n g i v e t o t h e " d e l e c t a t i o n " w h i c h P o u s s i n c o n s i d e r e d a s t h e g o a l o f p i c t o r i a l
m i m e s i s . C f . A n t h o n y B l u n t , N i c h o l a s P o u s s i n ( N e w Y o r k : B o l l i n g e n F o u n d a t i o n ,
1 9 6 7 ) , 1 : 3 5 4 - 5 6 .
1 4 . I h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h i s p o i n t i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n m y a r t i c l e i n V e r s u s ( s e e n o t e
3 a b o v e ) w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s t o i c s ' t h e o r y o f t i m e a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n - p h a n t a s i a .
1 5 . T h i s p o i n t i s , i t s e e m s t o m e , e s s e n t i a l t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o n e k e y e l e -
m e n t i n P o u s s i n ' s a e s t h e t i c s , t h e n o t i o n o f v a r i a t i o n o f w h i c h t h e f a m o u s l e t t e r o n t h e
m u s i c a l m o d e s p r o v i d e s a n a n a l o g y i n t h e a r t s o t h e r t h a n p a i n t i n g , t h e m u s i c o f " o u r
w o r t h y , a n c i e n t G r e e k s " a n d t h e e p i c p o e t r y o f V i r g i l . E a c h o f t h e l e v e l s o f a p a i n t i n g i s
d e t e r m i n e d b y i t s " m o d a l " d i f f e r e n c e f r o m t h e o t h e r s : t o s p e a k o n l y o f g e n r e s , t h e f i r s t
l e v e l i s h i s t o r y p a i n t i n g ; t h e s e c o n d l e v e l , b u c o l i c o r p a s t o r a l p a i n t i n g ; t h e t h i r d , l a n d -
s c a p e p a i n t i n g . E a c h o f t h e l e v e l s w o u l d c o m p r i s e a n e m b l e m a t i c " f i g u r e , " s p e c i f i c t o
i t s o r d e r , o f t h e m o d a l v a r i a t i o n o f t h i s l e v e l w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o t h e r s o f w h i c h t h e s i n -
g u l a r c o n t e m p l a t i o n w i t h i n t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e t a b l e a u - i n a w o r d , t h e c o m p r e h e n -
s i o n - w o u l d h a v e f o r e f f e c t t h e d e l e c t a t i o n o f t h e s o u l i n t h e " i n t e l l e c t u a l b e a u t y o f t h e
a l l e g o r y , " t o a d o p t B l u n t ' s e x p r e s s i o n . T h e s e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e m u s i c a l m o d e s a n d t o
t h e " s o u n d s o f t h e s p e e c h " o f V i r g i l ' s p o e m a r e t o b e p l a c e d i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n w i t h w h a t
w e w r i t e b e l o w o n D a n t e a n d t h e B i b l e .
1 6 . M a r i n h a s u s e d h e r e t h e t r a n s l a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e H e b r e w ,
a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e t r a n s l a t i o n b y E . F l e g , p u b l i s h e d i n S e m i o t i q u e e t B i b l e 1 0
( J u n e 1 9 7 8 ) . C f . i n t h e s a m e n u m b e r " R u d i m e n t s d ' a n a l y s e . L a t o u r d e B a b e l , " 1 - 2 6 . I
[ t r a n s . ] a m c i t i n g t h e R e v i s e d S t a n d a r d V e r s i o n ( N e w Y o r k : N e l s o n , 1 9 5 2 ) . B o o k ,
c h a p t e r , v e r s e ; a n d p a g e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h i s e d i t i o n g i v e n i n t e x t . T h e F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n
u s e d b y M a r i n d i f f e r s f r o m t h e E n g l i s h h e r e i n t h a t i t b e g i n s w i t h s o m e t h i n g l i k e : " A n d
Notes for Chapter 8
243
all the earth was one tongue and one speech," thus emphasizing the unity of speech-
as opposed to the "one language and few words" of the Revised Standard Edition. This
nuance is important to Marin's commentary in the paragraph immediately following
this quotation.
17. Dante, "The De VUlgari Eloquentia," trans. A. G. Ferrers Howell, in The
Latin Works of Dante (London: Dent, 1940), I, N, 12. Page references given below par-
enthetically in text. Cf. Roger Dragonetti, "Dante face a Nemrod. Babel memoire et
miroir de l'Men?" in Critique, issue on "Le mythe de la langue universelle" 387-88
(August-September 1979): 690-706, to which the present essay owes much.
18. Boileau, preface in CEuvres completes, Ie Trait!! du sublime ou du merveilleux
dans Ie discours, traduit du grec de Longin (1674) (Paris: Pleiade, 1966), 338; Longinus,
On the Sublime, trans. with commentary by James A. Arieti and John M. Crossett (New
York: Mellen Press, 1985), VII, 353.
19. On the presence in the Renaissance, in conjunction with the reading ofVit-
ruvius, of "revealed forms comprising three exemplary models for architects: Noah's
ark, the tabernacle in the desert, and the Temple in Jerusalem," see J. Rykwert, La mai-
son d'Adam du paradis (Paris: Seuil, 1976), chap. 6, "Raison antique et grke chreti-
enne," particularly p. 142ff. Cf. also Felibien, book 1 of his Recueil historique de la vie et
des ouvrages des plus dlebres architectes (1687): "It is also true that this people held
architecture in particularly high esteem, doubtless because this art has something
divine about it and because in the Holy Scriptures God was not merely called 'sover-
eign Architect of the Universe' but he himself wanted to instruct Noah upon how he
should build the Ark. He prescribed also to Moses the manner in which he wanted his
tabernacle to be built, infusing the workers who served the legislator with the gift of the
knowledge and wisdom necessary to the execution of his orders. Finally, David and
Solomon followed, in the construction of the City and Temple of Jerusalem, nothing
other than the idea God gave them." The essential reference is Saint Augustine, Works,
vol. 2, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: Clark, 1872), book 15, chap.
26, p. 98, and "Contra Faustum," in Sanctit Aureli Augustini De utilitate credendi (Vin-
dobonae: Tempsky, 1891), XII, 30, where the Church Father shows how the Ark was
organized and ordered by God through Noah and how it signifies Christ and the
Church-in all details of its construction-as well as man-in its specific proportions.
Augustine is himself in turn picking up on an ancient tradition illustrated by
Philo, Qurestiones et Solutiones in Genesim, trans. Charles Mericier (Paris: Cerf, 1979)
2:2, and above all Ambrose, "De Noe," in Corpus Sciptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latino-
rum, vol. 32, part 1, Sancti Ambrosii Opera, ed. C. Shenk! (Vindobonae: Tempsky,
1897),411-97.
We could trace this "fundamental" tradition from Francesco Giorgio's Harmo-
nia I, 3, 3, 101, to the allusions to it in Le Dicerie Sacre, la seconda sopra la
Musica, parte prima, 243, by Giovanbattista Marino, the Cavalier Marin, a text with
which we know Poussin to have been familiar.
Finally, is it not the Ark that reappears with a typically classical sobriety in
Antonie Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou L'Art de penser, ed. Pierre Clair and
Girbal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), part 1, chap. 4, 52-54;
The Art of Thinking, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
2 4 4 N O T E S F O R A F T E R W O R D
M e r r i l l , 1 9 6 4 ) , 4 5 - 4 7 , t h e f a m o u s c h a p t e r o n t h e i d e a s o f t h i n g s a n d t h e i d e a s o f s i g n s ,
i n o r d e r t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t c a t e g o r y o f s i g n s w h e r e t h e s i g n i s j o i n e d t o t h e t h i n g i t s i g n i -
f i e s ?
2 0 . G . W . F . H e g e l , D e r G e i s t d e s C h r i s t e n t u m s : S c h r i f t e n 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 0 , e d . W e r n e r
H a m a c h e r ( F r a n k f u r t : U l l s t e i n , 1 9 7 8 ) , 3 7 3 ; " T h e S p i r i t o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d I t s F a t e , "
E a r l y T h e o l o g i c a l W r i t i n g s , t r a n s . T . M . K n o x ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a -
n i a , 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 8 2 . P a g e r e f e r e n c e s g i v e n b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y i n t e x t
2 1 . G . W . F . H e g e l , T h e o r i e W e r k a u s g a b e , v o l . 1 3 - 1 5 , V o r l e s u n g e n a b e r d i e
A s t h e t i l c . e d . E v a M o l d e n h a u e r a n d K a r l M a r k u s M i c h e l ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :
S u h r k a m p , 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 4 : 2 7 6 ; A e s t h e t i c s : L e c t u r e s o n F i n e A r t , t r a n s . T . M . K n o x ( O x f o r d :
C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) . 2 : 6 3 8 . V o l u m e a n d p a g e r e f e r e n c e s g i v e n b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i -
c a l l y i n t e x t . f i r s t i n G e r m a n . t h e n i n E n g l i s h .
2 2 . D a n t e . I n f e r n o . i n T h e D i v i n e C o m e d y , t r a n s . J o h n S i n c l a i r ( N e w Y o r k :
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1 9 7 7 ) , I I I . I , 2 5 - 3 0 . 4 7 - 4 7 . C a n t o , l i n e . a n d p a g e r e f e r e n c e s
g i v e n b e l o w p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y i n t e x t .
2 3 . T h i s p o i n t s e e m s t o m e t o b e e s s e n t i a l , i . e . t h e p a s s a g e f r o m a u n i v e r s a l
u n i t y f o u n d e d u p o n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t N a m e . t h e o t h e r N a m e . t o a t o t a l i t a r i a n a b s o l u t e
f o u n d e d u p o n a p r o p e r n a m e . T h i s i s o n e o f t h e w o r k i n g h y p o t h e s e s o f m y L e p o r t r a i t
d u r o i ( P a r i s : M i n u i t . 1 9 8 1 ) . w h i c h h a s t o d o w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d e t h i c a l s u b l i m e .
2 4 . C f . N i c o l a s P o u s s i n . C o r r e s p o n d a n c e , l e t t e r o f 2 4 N o v e m b e r 1 6 4 7 . 3 7 1 f f .
2 5 . C f . L o n g i n u s a n d h i s f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e : " s u b l i m i t y , b r o u g h t o u t
a t j u s t t h e r i g h t m o m e n t . d i s p e r s e s a l l i n i t s p a t h . l i k e l i g h t n i n g . a n d s h o w s f i r s t o f a l l
t h e p o w e r o f t h e o r a t o r i n a l l o f i t s d e n s i t y . " L o n g i n u s . O n t h e S u b l i m e , t r a n s . w i t h
c o m m e n t a r y b y J a m e s A . A r i e t i a n d J o h n M . C r o s s e t t ( N e w Y o r k : M e l l e n P r e s s . 1 9 8 5 ) .
I , 3 . 9 .
N o t e s f o r A f t e r w o r d
1 . " N o n c e : 1 . F o r t h e n o n c e : a . F o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e ; o n p u r p o s e ;
e x p r e s s l y . O f t e n w i t h i n f i n i t i v e o r c l a u s e e x p r e s s i n g t h e o b j e c t o r p u r p o s e . O b s . e x c .
d i a l . . . b . I n M i d d l e E n g l i s h p o e t r y ( a n d l a t e r . m o r e o r l e s s a r c h a i c a l l y ) u s e d a s a m e t r i -
c a l t a g o r s t o p - g a p . w i t h n o s p e c i a l m e a n i n g ; f r e q u e n t l y r i m i n g w i t h b o n e s a n d
s t o n e s . . . c . F o r t h e o c c a s i o n ; h e n c e ( i n m o d e r n u s e ) . f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . t e m p o r a r -
i l y . . . 3 . F o r t h e v e r y n o n c e : f o r t h e e x p r e s s p u r p o s e . A t t h e v e r y n o n c e : a t t h e v e r y
m o m e n t . . . 4 . a t t r i b . n o n c e - w o r d , t h e t e r m s u s e d i n t h i s D i c t i o n a r y t o d e s c r i b e a w o r d
w h i c h i s a p p a r e n t l y u s e d o n l y f o r t h e n o n c e ( s e e v o l . I . p . x x ) ; s i m i l a r l y n o n c e - u s e , e t c . . . .
O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 1 9 7 1 .
2 . " K a n t s T h e s e t i b e r d a s S e i n " i n W e g m a r k e n ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : K l o s t e r -
m a n n , 1 9 7 8 ) , 4 3 9 - 7 3 ; " K a n t ' s T h e s i s o n B e i n g . " t r a n s . T e d E . K l e i n . J r . a n d W i l l i a m E .
P o h l , i n T h e S o u t h w e s t e r n J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y , 4 . 3 ( 1 9 7 3 ) : 7 - 3 3 . P a g e r e f e r e n c e s o f
Notes for Afterword 245
German text hereafter given parenthetically in text. Translations my own unless other-
wise indicated.
3. Cf. Philnomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der rein en Vernunft
(1927-28) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977); Kant und das Problem der Meta-
physik (1929) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973); Kant and the Problem of Meta-
physics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Die Frage
nach dem Ding: zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsiltzen (1935-36)
(Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1962), in English: What is a Thing?, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr., and
Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967).
4. The essay by Lacoue-Labarthe exposes and pursues the implications of this
tension at some length.
5. For one of the crucial texts on position and reflexion in German romanticism
from Fichte on, see Walter Benjamin, "Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen
Romantik," in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppen-
hauser,l.1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), 18-40. On position in its relation to
the sublime, see the analyses of Paul de Man, which speak indeed incessantly of posi-
tion in connection with the performative function of language. Without going into
those analyses, I shall let the quotation of two relevant passages suffice here. On Baude-
laire's "Correspondences": "The problem is not so much centered on phorein as on
meta (trans ... ), for does "beyond" here mean a movement beyond some particular
place or does it mean a state that is beyond movement entirely? And how can
"beyond," which posits and names movement, ever take us away from what it posits?"
("Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1984),251; and on Hegel's sublime: "the spirit posits
itself as that which is unable to posit, and this declaration is either meaningless or
duplicitous ... by moving from knowledge to position, all is changed. Position is all of a
piece, and moreover, unlike thought, it actually occurs," "Hegel on the Sublime," in
Displacement: Derrida and After, ed. Mark Krupnick (Bloomington: Indian University
Press, 1983), 148. The present essay could be regarded as a kind of reconstruction of
the "philosophical" discourse on position in Kant and Heidegger, and therefore as a
kind of background or propaedeutic to the reading of de Man, especially to a reading
of his perhaps excessively derisive attitude toward Heidegger.
6. On the question of the principle of sufficient reason, see in particular: "V om
Wesen des Grundes"(1929), in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967),
and Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen, Germany: Neske, 1957).
7. The essay above by Michel Deguy on Longinus carries out an extraordinary
interpretation of the function of "synthesis" in Longinus's sublime, which would bear
comparison with the problem of synthesis and its failure (the failure of the schematiz-
ing imagination) in the Kantian sublime.
8. Page references to Kant given below parenthetically in text first for the Ger-
man, then English editions, as indicated in "Note on the Translation" above.
9. Escoubas stays very close to this analysis, and extends it into the analytic of
t h e s u b l i m e , i n " K a n t , o r t h e S i m p l i c i t y o f t h e S u b l i m e . " R o g o z i n s k i p r o v i d e s a
r e m a r k a b l e r e a d i n g o f t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f t i m e i n t h e K a n t i a n s u b l i m e , w h i c h c u t s t o
s o m e d e g r e e a g a i n s t t h e g r a i n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s K a n t - b o o k , i n " T h e G i f t o f t h e W o r l d . " ,
1 0 . I n o r d e r t o m e a s u r e t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e K a n t - r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r o f f e r s
h e r e a n d t h e K a n t - r e a d i n g h e o f f e r s i n K a n t u n d d a s P r o b l e m d e r M e t a p h y s i k . o n e h a s
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e f l e x i o n a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i -
n a t i o n . I f f O f t h e e a r l i e r K a n t - s t u d y t h e p o i n t w a s t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
i m a g i n a t i o n w a s t h e g r o u n d o f t h e i n n e r p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e , f o r t h e
l a t e r K a n t - s t u d y t h e p o i n t i s t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h e r e f l e x i o n o f r e f l e x i o n i s t h e f u r t h e s t
p o i n t o f K a n t ' s t h o u g h t o f B e i n g . M i n i m a l l y , w h a t t h e t w o a p p r o a c h e s h a v e i n c o m -
m o n i s t h a t e a c h i n s t a n c e o r p r o c e s s - t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
r e f l e x i o n - i n v o l v e s t h e s p a c e b e t w e e n t h e c o n c e p t a n d t h e i n t u i t i o n , b e t w e e n t h e
i n t e l l i g i b l e a n d t h e s e n s i b l e , a n d e a c h t h u s m a r k s t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h s o m e o t h e r
r e m a i n s t o b e t h o u g h t .
1 1 . C f . " M o i r a ( P a r m e n i d e s , F r a g m e n t V I I I , 3 4 - 4 1 ) , " V o r t r i l g e u n d A u f s i l t z e
( P f u l l i n g e n , G e r m a n y : N e s k e , 1 9 5 4 ) , 2 2 3 - 4 8 .
1 2 . K l e i n a n d P o h l r e n d e r t h i s a s " t h e s e i f - i l l u m i n a t i n g - e n d u r i n g p r e s e n c e o f
t h a t w h i c h i s f o r a w h i l e " ( 3 2 ) .
1 3 . I n t h e " A m p h i b o l y , " K a n t s p e a k s o f t h e r e f l e x i o n o f r e f l e x i o n a s a r e g a r d
c a s t u p o n t h e Z u s t a n d d e s G e m U t s ( 4 6 6 ) , " t h e s t a t e o f t h e s o u l . " O n e w a y i n w h i c h t h e
m o t i f o f t h e G e m U t i s r e t a i n e d a n d d i s p l a c e d t h r o u g h o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s t e x t s i s t h r o u g h
h i s r a t h e r s t r a n g e u s e o f t h e t e r m s v e r m u t e n , a n m u t e n , M u t , a n d v a r i a t i o n s o n t h e s e .
C f . i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e a n a l y s i s o f d a s A n m u t e n d e i n " A u s e i n e m G e s p r a c h v o n d e r
S p r a c h e , " U n t e r w e g s z u r S p r a c h e ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 8 9 5 ) , 1 3 3 .
1 4 . I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r u s e s t h i s t e r m t o r e f e r a l s o t o K a n t ' s r e l a t i o n t o t h e t r a d i -
t i o n h e i n h e r i t s ( 4 4 0 ) .
1 5 . I n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e K r i t i k d e r U r t e i l s k r a f t K a n t w r i t e s t h a t t h e u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g l e a v e s t h e n o t i o n o f t h e " s u p e r - s e n s u o u s s u b s t r a t u m " i n d e t e r m i n a t e , t h a t t h e
f o r c e o f j u d g m e n t g i v e s t h e n o t i o n d e t e r m i n a b i l i t y , a n d t h a t r e a s o n d e t e r m i n e s t h i s
n o t i o n t h r o u g h i t s p r a c t i c a l l a w ( 1 0 8 ; 3 3 ) . T h e d e t e r m i n a b l e i s d e t e r m i n e d a s m a t t e r ,
a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n a s f o r m , i n t h e s e c t i o n o n t h e " A m p h i h o l y " i n t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e .
1 6 . T h i s w o u l d c o n f i r m w h a t P a u l d e M a n a r g u e s a b o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s r e l a t i o n t o
p h i l o s o p h e r s , w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g o n e w a y o r t h e o t h e r h i s r e a d i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s r e l a -
t i o n t o H o l d e r l i n i n " H e i d e g g e r ' s E x e g e s e s o f H o l d e r l i n , " i n B l i n d n e s s a n d I n s i g h t
( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s , 1 9 8 3 ) , 2 4 6 - 6 6 .
1 7 . C f . H e i d e g g e r ' s t e l e p h o n i c c o n n e c t i o n s h a v e r e c e n t l y b e e n w o r k e d o u t i n
s o m e d e t a i l i n A v i t a l R o n e l l , T h e T e l e p h o n e B o o k ( L i n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y o f N e b r a s k a
P r e s s , 1 9 9 0 ) . I n t h e c o u r s e o f h e r b r i l l i a n t l y a t h e t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n t h e t e l e p h o n e a s
s y n e c d o c h e f o r t e c h n o l o g y , R o n e l l d o e s n o t c a l l u p o n H e i d e g g e r ' s u s e o f t h e w o r d O r t s -
n e t z i n " K a n t ' s T h e s i s . " T h i s u s e i m p l i c i t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t e l e p h o n y a s w h a t i s n e i t h e r
m e r e l y a t e c h n i c a l p r o d u c t n o r p u r e l y o f t h e e s s e n c e o f t e c h n o l o g y a s e n c o u n t e r e d i n
Notes for Afterword
247
thinking, but undecidably both. It "places" telephony, that is, on the border of G e - s t e l ~
at the (non)site of its greatest endangerment. I indicate the connections of the tele-
phonic Onsnetz to the voice of conscience below, if somewhat obliquely or fleetingly,
by discussing Heidegger's replacement of reflexion with the aporetic structure of the
assumption of the (sublime gift of) measure, both in Heidegger and in Kant. Although
I do not attempt here, as does Ronell, to address the psychoanalytic implications of the
telephonic network of position, one might cast the net further, in order to catch the
distant echo of the maternal super-ego (for Ronell, the Other summoned by the tele-
phone) in the word Netz in Ortsnetz: "netzen" means to moisten or sprinkle, as for
example with tears of mourning.
18. Within "Kant's Thesis," for example, it would be the Sache of the thinkers,
"immer wieder das Sein als das Denkwilrdige Zll zeigen, und zwar so, daB dieses
Denkwilrdige als ein solches im Gesichtskreis der Menschen verbliebe"(440), and cf.
441 passim.
19. Lyotard's essay in this volume pursues the sense in which the sublime is
allied with a certain kind of "interest," and explores the economic implications of the
metaphor of "interest." Lacoue-Labarthe argues against Heidegger's "thesis" in the
Nietzsche lectures regarding aesthetics, in order to propose that the eidetic determina-
tion of the being is not a necessary condition of its consideration in terms of
phainesthai, and that in Kant's exemplification of the sublime through the veil ofIsis
something of this non-eidetic mode of appearing gives itself to be read. Page references
to Nietzsche, vol. 1 (Pfullingen, Germany: Neske, 1961) are given in texti translations
are my own.
20. I discuss the relations between the Kantian and Schillerian versions of the
sublime in "Vom Spiegelbild zur Unterschrift: Paul de Mans Ideologiebegriff und
Schillers Dramen," in Asthetik und Rhetorik: Lekffiren zu Paul de Man, ed. Karl Heinz
Bohrer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), forthcoming.
21. The contributions to this volume by Nancy and Rogozinski pursue the
problematic of the "gift" in great detail. And in Heidegger, the most relevant text is
perhaps: " ... dichterisch wohnet der'Mensch ... " Vonriige und Aufsiitze (Pfullingen,
Germany: Neske, 1954), 181-98.
22. I am stealing this term from Jean-Luc Nancy, in particularly in Le discours
de fa syncope. 1. Logodaedafus (Paris: Flammarion, 1976).
23. In an extraordinary essay on the Kantian sublime, Spacings--of Reason and
Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987), John Sallis has read the Kantian "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" as in "a posi-
tion ever so close to the dissolution of every position" (85) and has tried to show-
thinking now more in terms of Heidegger's Kant-book than in terms of his late Kant-
essay-how in aesthetic judgment there is a "certain erosion of the structure of
reflective judgment in its initial, cognitively related sense" (97), such that judgment
tends, to become "assimilated to imagination"(98). My reading of the "signifier" for
reflexion here--Oberlegungas "over-laying"-would essentially corroborate this view,
i f f r o m a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t ( a n d s l i g h t l y l e s s v i s u a l o r t h e o r e t i c a l ) a n g l e , w h e r e i t i s l e s s a
m a t t e r o f t h e i m a g e t h a n o f t h e l e t t e r .
2 4 . C f . K a n t u n d d a s P r o b l e m d e r M e t a p h y s i k , w h e r e H e i d e g g e r a r g u e s t h a t
K a n t ' s u s e o f t h e t e r m G e b r a u c h ( " u s e " ) t o r e f e r t o t h e w a y i n w h i c h t h i n k i n g r e l a t e s t o
i n t u i t i o n c o m p r o m i s e s K a n t ' s i n s i g h t i n t o t h e p r i v i l e g e o f i n t u i t i o n o v e r t h o u g h t ,
w h i c h w o u l d b e t h e m e r e s e r v a n t o f i n t u i t i o n ( 6 4 ) .
2 5 . C f . P a u l d e M a n , " P h e n o m e n a l i t y a n d M a t e r i a l i t y i n K a n t , " i n T h e T e x t u a l
S u b l i m e : D e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d i t s D i f f e r e n c e s , e d . H u g h S i l v e r m a n a n d G a r y A y l e s w o r t h
( A l b a n y : S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k P r e s s , 1 9 9 0 ) , C f . t h e i n s c r i p t i o n o f t h i s
p a s s a g e i n t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e u n l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e l i m i t i n N a n c y ' s e s s a y i n t h i s v o l u m e .
2 6 . C o u r t i n e ' s e s s a y t r a c e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h i s n o n K a n t i a n ,
i d e a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s u b l i m e , a s a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f i n f i n i t e w i t h f i n i t e , t h r o u g h
S c h e l l i n g ' s c a r e e r a n d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h S c h e l l i n g ' s s p e c u l a t i v e t h e o r y o f t r a g e d y .
2 7 . C f . L y o t a r d , " S e n s u s C o m m u n i s , " i n P a r a g r a p h : T h e J o u r n a l
o f t h e M o d e r n C r i t i c a l T h e o r y G r o u p I L l ( M a r c h 1 9 8 8 ) : 1 - 2 3 , a s w e l l a s t h e r e c e n t
s t u d i e s o f t h e n o t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y b y M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , L a c o m m u n a u t e i n a v o u a b l e
( P a r i s : M i n u i t , 1 9 8 3 ) , a n d b y ] e a n - L u c N a n c y , L a c o m m u n a u t e d e s c : e u v r e e ( P a r i s : C h r i s -
t i a n B o u r g e o i s , 1 9 8 6 ) : T h e I n o p e r a t i v e C o m m u n i t y ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n -
n e s o t a P r e s s , 1 9 9 1 ) , e d . P e t e r C o n n o r , t r a n s . P e t e r C o n n o r , L i s a G a r b u s , M i c h a e l H o I
l a n d , a n d S i m o n a S a w h n e y . O n N a n c y ' s t h o u g h t o f c o m m u n i t y , s e e t h e e s s a y s
c o l l e c t e d i n M i a m i T h e o r y C o l l e c t i v e , e d s . , C o m m u n i t y a t L o o s e E n d s ( M i n n e a p o l i s :
U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s , 1 9 9 1 ) . I n t h i s c o l l e c t i o n , w h i c h a p p e a r e d s u b s e q u e n t t o
t h e ( d e ) c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t e s s a y , J e a n - L u c N a n c y ( " O f B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n "
[ 2 ] ) i m i t a t e s , a s h e p u t s i t , K a n t ' s t h e s i s o n B e i n g : " I n i m i t a t i o n o f a s t a t e m e n t o f
K a n t ' s t h e s i s o n b e i n g , o n e c o u l d s a y : C o m m u n i t y i s n o t a p r e d i c a t e o f b e i n g o r o f e x i s -
t e n c e . O n e c h a n g e s n o t h i n g i n t h e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e b y a d d i n g o r s u b t r a c t i n g c o m m u n i -
t a r y c h a r a c t e r . C o m m u n i t y i s s i m p l y t h e r e a l p o s i t i o n o f e x i s t e n c e . " J u s t a s B e i n g q u a
p o s i t i o n d o e s n o t a d d a n y t h i n g t o t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e t h i n g w h o s e B e i n g i s p o s i t e d , s o
c o m m u n i t y d o e s n o t a d d a n y t h i n g t o t h e c o n c e p t o f B e i n g . N a n c y ' s p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t
c o m m u n i t y d o e s n o t a d d a n y t h i n g t o B e i n g b e c a u s e B e i n g i s a l r e a d y c o m m u n i t a r y .
B e c a u s e e x i s t e n c e i s a l r e a d y p o s i t i o n , c o m m u n i t y b e c o m e s f o r N a n c y h e r e " t h e p o s i -
t i o n o f p o s i t i o n " ( 2 ) . T h i s m e a n s i n t u m f o r N a n c y h e r e t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f p o s i t i o n .
W h a t i s p o s i t e d i s n o t a u n i t a r y e s s e n c e b u t m e r e e x i s t e n c e . I n p o s i t i o n , e x i s t e n c e d i s -
p l a c e s e s s e n c e , s u c h t h a t e s s e n t i a l i t y i s d e p o s e d o r e x p o s e d : " E x i s t e n c e i s t h e e s s e n c e , i f
y o u l i k e , b u t i n s o f a r a s i t i s p o s i t e d . I n t h e p o s i t i n g , e s s e n c e i s o f f e r e d o r g i v e n . T h a t i s ,
e s s e n c e i s e x p o s e d t o b e i n g , o r t o e x i s t i n g , o u t s i d e o f b e i n g a s a s i m p l e s u b s i s t e n c e , o r
a s a n i m m a n e n c e " ( 3 ) . T h i s e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e i n - c o m m o n i s , I b e l i e v e , a l r e a d y c o m m u -
n i c a t e d b y K a n t h i m s e l f - i m i t a t i n g N a n c y i m i t a t i n g h i m s e l f , a s i t w e r e - i n t h e s e c t i o n
o f t h e t h i r d C r i t i q u e o n s e n s u s c o m m u n i s . T h e e s s a y b y M a r i n i n t h i s v o l u m e d i s c u s s e s
a B a b e l i a n s u b l i m i t y w h i c h w o u l d b e a r " c o m p a r i s o n " w i t h t h e f a c u l t y o f t a s t e a s s e n s u s
c o m m u n i s i n K a n t .
2 8 . I n K a n t u n d d a s P r o b l e m d e r M e t a p h y s i k , H e i d e g g e r i n s c r i b e s K a n t ' s t h r e e
q u e s t i o n s : w h a t c a n I k n o w ? w h a t s h o u l d I d o ? a n d w h a t m a y I h o p e f o r ? i n t o t h e m e t a -
Notes for Afterword 249
physica specialis of cosmology, psychology, and theology, respectively. This inscription
would call for a long analysis, which would have to consider, for example, whether or
not the second Critique simply articulates a psychology, and further whether the ques-
tion of hope is not itself "answered" by aesthetico-teleological reflexion, etc.
29. Vortrilge und Aufsiltze (Pfullingen, Germany: Neske, 1978).
30. Thanks to John Llewelyn, Ned Lukacher, and Herman Rapaport for reading
over and responding to the manuscript of this essay in its penultimate form.
INDEX
Abandon, 48. See also Gift
Achtung (Respect) in Kant, 123
Adequation, 85,88-89
Adorno, Theodor, 26,27
Aesthetic ideas, in Kant, 68, 72
Aestheticism, 2
Aestheticization, of ethics and politics,
113
Aesthetics: Kant's relinquishment of, 27,
83, 230; the sublime is not an, 1
Affirmation, 56, 96
Agreeable, the Kantian concept of, 31,
33,50,110
Amplificatio, 9
Apatheia, 46, 123
Apostrophe, 17, 225
Appendix, "Analytic of the Sublime" in
Kantas,33,34,109
Apprehension and Comprehension, in
Kantian imagination, 66, 79,142,
214. See also Imagination; Synthesis
Aristotle, Poetics of, 99-100. See also
Mimesis
Ark, of Noah, 11, 181, 183-184. See also
Genesis
Arnauld, Antoine, and Pierre Nicole, 243
Art. See Physis and Techne
"As if," in Kantian thought, 11,57,117
Augenschein (appearance to the eye), in
Kant's analysis of the sublime, 62, 69
Augustine, Saint, 243
Auseinandersetzung (mutual dialogical
, exposition), in Heidegger's works,
202. See also Heidegger; Positing
251
Babel, tower of, 177-191
Bataille, Georges, 27
Bauen (building), 55
Being: as Being-in-origination, vs. Being-
unto-Death, 146; as Being-in-the-
world, 2; faculties in Kant as modes of
openness to, 133; imagination in Kant
as another name for, 69; Kant as inau-
gurating a different epoch of thought
of, 67; living flesh of, 153; as nonpredi-
cable, 195; style as ordeal of, 64. See
also Difference, ontological; Heidegger
Benjamin, Walter, 26; "Elective Affinities
of Goethe," 107-108
Bestreben (Striving), 45-46
Bild (image), in Kant, 33
Bilden (forming), in Kant, 55, 135, 201.
See also Imagination; Figures; Schema
Blanchot, Maurice, 27
Boileau, 6, 11,25,34, 183
Bridge, between knowing and willing, in
Kantian judgment, 112, 133, 141, 149
Burke, Edmund, 86, 95
Chaos, as transition from sublime of
nature to sublime of art, 169, 174. See
also Babel
Ciphered inscriptions, as language of
nature in Kant, 125, 134
Coleridge, S.T., 165
Commandment, as presentational form,
51. See also Moses
Community, 66-67,133,150-156,185,
218,237,248
2 5 2 I N D E X
C o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , 1 9
C o p u l a , s t r a n g e s t a t u s o f i n " i t i s b e a u t i -
f u l , " 5 8 . S e e a l s o B e i n g ; D i f f e r e n c e ,
o n t o l o g i c a l
C u r t i u s , E r n s t R o b e r t , 5 , 7
D a n t e , 1 0 , 1 8 6 - 1 8 9
D e a t h , 9 - 1 0 ; a n d B e i n g - u n t o - D e a t h ,
1 4 6 ; a s i n t e r m i t t e n t s u s p e n s i o n o f
l i f e , 4 6 ; o f P y r a m u s , 1 7 9
D e g u y , M i c h e l , 2 3 3
D e l i r i u m , r e a s o n a s f a c u l t y o f , 1 4 9
d e M a n , P a u l , 2 4 5 ; " H e g e l o n t h e S u b -
l i m e , " 2 2 6
D e m o s t h e n e s , 1 0 5
D e n e g a t i o n , 2 3 , 2 4
D e r r i d a , J a c q u e s , 2 2 6 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 5 , 2 4 1
D e s i r e , 3 7 ; f a c u l t y o f , I I I
D e s t i n y , 2 5 , 4 3 , 4 8 , 5 0 , 1 2 7 , 1 3 0 , 1 3 4 , 1 6 6 ;
o f a r t i n t r u t h , 8 2 ; o f m e t a p h y s i c s , 7 6
D e t a i l s , 1 6
D i a l e c t i c a l t h o u g h t , 4 2 . S e e a l s o H e g e l
D i d e r o t , D e n i s , 7 2
D i f f e r e n c e , b e t w e e n i m m o r t a l a n d m o r -
t a l , 7 , 9
D i f f e r e n c e , o n t o l o g i c a l : a n d B e i n g a s g i f t ,
2 0 7 ; K a n t i a n i m a g i n a t i o n a s f a c u l t y
o f , 6 1 , 6 3 ; K a n t i a n s u b l i m e a s a
g l i m p s e o f , 7 0 ; n e c e s s a r y i m p o s s i b i l -
i t y o f t h e e f f a c e m e n t o f , 2 0 1 . S e e a l s o
B e i n g ; H e i d e g g e r
D i f f e r e n c e , a s t r a n s g r e s s e d b y t h e S a m e
i n t h e s u b l i m e , 1 1
D i s a s t e r , 1 2 9 , 1 3 2
D i s p u t e ( d i f f e r e n d ) , b e t w e e n t a s t i n g a n d
w i l l i n g , 1 1 2
D i v i n e , 8
D i v i n e u t t e r a n c e , s u b l i m e u t t e r a n c e a s ,
7 4
D i v o r c e , o f t h e K a n t i a n f a c u l t i e s , 1 1 3
E f f u s i o n ( E r g i e f i u n g ) , 3 7
E i d o s - i d e a , 7 6 ; c o n t e n t - f o r m d i s t i n c t i o n
a s f o l l o w i n g f r o m c o n c e p t o f e n t i t y
a s , 7 6
E k p h a n e s t a t o n , 7 6 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 8
E k s t a s i s , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 6 , 9 5 , 1 4 0
E m o t i o n , 4 4
E n d , 2 , 8 , 1 8 . S e e a l s o D e a t h ; T e l e o l o g y
E n d o f a r t . 2 6 , 3 2 . S e e a l s o H e g e l
E n j o y m e n t . 3 1 , 1 2 0 ; o f i m a g i n a t i v e r e a -
s o n , 3 2 ; a n d j o y , 3 3
E n t h u s i a s m , 1 3 1
E r e i g n i s ( e v e n t ) . 9 4 . S e e a l s o B e i n g ; D i f -
f e r e n c e . o n t o l o g i c a l ; a n d H e i d e g g e r
E r l e b n i s s e ( l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s ) , 8 2
E s s e n c e , t h e l i m i t o f , 2
E x c e s s , 8 , 6 7 , 8 4 , 1 3 9
E x c l a m a t i o n , s u b l i m e a s , 6 1
F a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e , o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d
t h e g o o d i n K a n t , 1 1 5
F a m i l y , o f s u b l i m e f e e l i n g s i n K a n t ,
1 2 3 - 1 2 5
F a s h i o n , 2 5 , 6 3
F e n e l o n , 3 4
F i c t i o n , 3 7 , 5 5
F i g u r e s , 3 , 1 2 , 1 7 , 1 9 - 2 1 ; c o m p l e m e n t a r -
i t y b e t w e e n t h e L o n g i n i a n s u b l i m e
a n d , 1 9 ; e f f a c e m e n t a n d f o r g e t t i n g o f
i n t h e L o n g i n i a n s u b l i m e , 2 2 - 2 4 , 1 0 4 ;
a n d f i g u r a l f o r c e , 1 2 ; a n d t h e p r o p e r ,
2 3 ; s c h e m a t i s m o f , 1 3 ; a s s e l f - f i g u r -
i n g , 2 9 ; o f t h o u g h t a n d o f s t y l e , 2 0 .
S e e a l s o s c h e m a ; r h e t o r i c
F o r m , 5 6 ; K a n t ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n o f a n
o n t o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f , 6 4
F r e e d o m : c o m m a n d m e n t o f i n K a n t , 5 1 ;
a n d f r e e f a v o r i n K a n t a n d H e i d e g g e r ,
7 8 - 7 9 ; a s i d e n t i c a l w i t h n e c e s s i t y ,
1 6 2 ; a s r e c o n c i l e d w i t h n e c e s s i t y i n
t r a g e d y , 1 7 2 ; a s p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e g i n -
n i n g i n K a n t , 4 8 - 4 9 , 1 4 6
F r e u d : o n M i c h e l a n g e l o ' s M o s e s , 8 6 - 8 9 ;
o n m o u r n i n g , 1 2 2 . S e e a l s o M o s e s ;
M o u r n i n g
G e n e s i s , 1 0 5 , 1 8 1 - 1 8 3 ; a n d F i a t L u x , 1 0 5 ,
1 8 3 , 2 2 7
G e n i u s : i n K a n t , 9 7 ; i n P s e u d o - L o n g i -
n u s , 9 7 ; i n S c h e l l i n g , 1 6 5
G e s t u r e , 3 6 , 5 1
Index 253
Gift, 16,48,68,133-156: of measureless
measure, 207-209: and sovereign
excess of infinitude over the finite,
ISS: as syndosis, 154
Good, the Kantian concept of32, 110
Gorgias, 24, 224
Goux, Jean-Joseph, 89
Grammatical structure as rhetorical fig-
ure, 17
Grandiloquence, 6
Heart, 45, 46, 50
Hegel: and the end of art, 27-28, 30, 32;
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, 85:
on Old Testament, 184-186
Heidegger, 26: the deconstruction of
aesthetics in, 75: on great art and the
historical destiny of a people, 80: on
Hegel's aesthetics, 79-83: on Kant's
aesthetics, 77-79: on Kantian imagi-
nation as originary temporality, 142:
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
139, 199; "Kant's Thesis on Being,"
193-210; Nietzsche, 75; "The Origin
of the Work of Art," 77,79, 92-96: on .
Schiller, 77, 79; on the truth of the
being, 82, 85. See also Being: Differ-
ence, ontological; Veiling and
Unveiling
Heliotropism of philosophy, 22, 73; and
metaphors of the sun, 91,105
Hemmung (inhibition), 45
Hertz, Neil, 233
Holderlin, 164,238,239
Homer, 6,7-8, 12, 18-19, 105
Hyperbaton, 103
Hyperbole, 9, 20
Identity, 174
Images, in Pseudo-Longinus, 17
Imagination in Kant: extension of, 69; as
image imaging itself, 29: as equivalent
to judgment, 56: limits of, 39: and
presentation (Darstellung), 60-63;
and reflexion, 56-60: and synthesis,
64-70; as doing violence to inner
sense in the sublime, 141; See also
Apprehension and Comprehension
Immemoriality, 60
Infinity, 63, 139, 149-156: of a begin-
ning, 35-53; and continuous totality,
153; as distinguished from Being, 95;
as "given infinite quantity," 150; as
incorporated into finite in Schelling,
166. See also Totality
Intellectual intuition, 164
Interest, 32, 109-132
Invention, turn or trope, 64
Joy, 50, 52, 124. See also Enjoyment
Judgment. See Reflexive Judgment in
Kant
Kant, Immanuel, 25-157,193-219. See
under specific concepts, such as:
Apprehension and Comprehension;
Bild; Community; Desire; Freedom;
Genius; Imagination; Infinity; Inter-
est; Positing: Schema; Synthesis;
Totality .
Kelly, Michael, 225
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 113
Laocoon, 87
Letter, 8
Life, 211: supplement of, 72
Litman, T., 225
Logos, 13, 17, 18,22,74,219
Lyotard, Le differend, 226
Magnitude in Kant, 38, 150-152
Maximum, of imagination in Kant, 39,
40,66,139,148,215
Measure, 7, 15,66, 142,207,213-219
Metaphor, 9, 90. See also Figures: Trans-
port
Mimesis, 12, 14, 16, 18,21-22,57-59,
67; Aristotelian theory of, 99-100,
161,230; art as, 21; and mimetic
struggle, 6; pictorial. 180: not repro-
ductive but productive, 60
Mondrian, Piet, 53
2 5 4 I N D E X
M o n k , S a m u e l , 2 2 5
M o n o g r a m , 6 0
M o n s t r o s i t y ( d a s U n g e h e u r e ) , 5 8 , 9 3 .
1 3 6 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 2 . 2 3 5
M o r i t z . K . P . , 1 6 6
M o s a i c L a w . 5 0 . 7 1 , 8 6 - 9 0
M o s e s : g a i n i n g g l i m p s e o f t h e p r o m i s e d
l a n d , 1 1 ; i n S c h o n b e r g ' s M o s e s a n d
A a r o n . 8 9
M o t i o n : a n d e m o t i o n . 4 8 ; o f t h e i n f i n i t e .
3 6
M o t i v e . 1 1 9 - 1 2 3
M o u r n i n g , 5 7 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 4
M o v e m e n t , 3 8
M u s i c , l O - 1 1
N a n c y , J e a n - L u c , 2 3 0 , 2 3 6
N a t u r e . S e e P h y s i s a n d T e c h n e
N e u t e r , 5 7
N i e t z s c h e , 7 8
N o n o b j e c t i v i t y , o f t h e a e s t h e t i c i n K a n t ,
5 6
N o n p r e s e n t a b l e , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 7 , 7 4 . 8 4 . 9 0 ,
9 6 , 1 7 4 . 1 8 0
N o s t a l g i a . 7
N o t h i n g , 5 6
O f f e r i n g , 4 7 - 5 3 , 9 6
O n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
G o d . 1 9 5
O p e n n e s s , 6 9
O r i e n t . 6
O v i d . 1 7 9 . 1 8 9
P a s c a l , 1 0
P a t h o s . 1 3 . 1 8 . 2 0 ; a n d e t h o s , 5 3
P e r f o r m a t i v e , 2 4
P e r s u a s i o n , 1 3
P h a e d r u s . 1 3 4
P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l , 7 . 1 5 7
P h e n o m e n o n . 6 4
P h y s i s ( N a t u r e ) a n d T e c h n e ( A r t ) , 8 .
1 1 - 2 2 . 5 3 , 6 7 , 6 9 . 7 7 - 1 0 6
P i n n a c l e . 9 , 2 1 0
P l a t o . S e e P h a e d r u s ; e i d o s / i d e a
P l i n y . 1 7 8
P o s i t i n g . 1 9 3 - 2 1 9 ; a s g r o u n d i n g , 1 9 6 ; a s
p o s i t i o n o f a n a f f e c t i o n i n K a n t ' s c r i t -
i c a l w r i t i n g s . 1 9 7 . S e e a l s o B e i n g ; S y n - '
t h e s i s ; T h e s i s
P o s s i b i l i t y , 4 8 . 1 5 2 ; a n d i n t e r e s t . 1 1 9 ;
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n a l y s i s o f r e a l i t y .
n e c e s s i t y . a n d . 1 9 7
P o u n d . E z r a , 1 7
P o u s s i n , N . 1 7 7 - 1 9 1
P r e s e n t a t i o n , 1 . 1 0 . 3 4 . 8 6 ; i n d i r e c t . 3 6 ;
n e g a t i v e , 3 6 , 6 3 , 8 6 ; v r i t h o u t p r e s e n -
t a t i o n . 3 6 ; v r i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t e d
o b j e c t . 2 8 . S e e a l s o I m a g i n a t i o n ; R e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n
P r o f i t . 1 2 9
P r o u s t . 1 0
P s e u d o - L o n g i n u s . 5 - 2 5 . 7 2 . 8 4 , 9 6 - 1 0 6 .
1 8 3 . 2 2 4
P s y c h e . 1 2 . 2 2
P u r p o s i v e n e s s . v r i t h o u t p u r p o s e , 5 1 ; a n d
c o u n t e r - p u r p o s i v e n e s s . 1 3 6
Q u a n t i t a s . 3 8 . 1 5 0 - 1 5 1
R e a s o n , a s t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f a r t , 3 0 .
S e e D e s i r e ; D e l i r i u m
R e f l e x i v e j u d g m e n t i n K a n t . 5 6 - 6 0 . 1 0 9 ;
a n d " A m p h i b o l y " i n C r i t i q u e o / P u r e
R e a s o n , 1 9 8 ; H e i d e g g e r o n . 2 0 2 ; a s
s u p p l e m e n t o f d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g -
m e n t . 2 1 0 ; a s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e f l e x -
i o n , 1 9 9 ; a s O b e r - l e g u n g , 2 1 2 - 2 1 9
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 1 ; a r t a n d . 2 8 . 3 7 . S e e
a l s o P r e s e n t a t i o n
R e p u l s i o n a n d a t t r a c t i o n i n K a n t i a n s u b -
l i m e , s i m u l t a n e i t y o f , 1 3 8 . 2 1 7
R h e t o r i c . 1 3 . 2 5 . 9 6 . S e e a l s o F i g u r e s ;
P e r s u a s i o n ; S c h e m a
R h y t h m , 1 8 - 1 9 . S e e a l s o S y n c o p a t i o n .
R i l k e . 8 4
R i m b a u d . 5
R o m a n E m p i r e , 6
R o m a n t i c i s m . 3 0
R o n e l l , A v i t a l , 2 4 6
S a c r e d , 7 . 1 3 0 , 1 3 1
Index 255
Sacrifice, 48; and sacrificial economy of .
the faculties, 130
Sacrilege, 130
Saintliness, 131
Sallis, John, 247
Salvation, 10
Schelling, F. W. I., 157-174; Lectures on
the Philosophy of Art, 165-174; Letters
on Dogmatism and Criticism, 157-164
Schema: in Kant, 29-31, 34, 40, 43, 60,
134-135,230; in music, 11; in
Pseudo- Longinus, 14-15
Schiller, F., 87,165-166; "On the Sub-
lime," 166, 170-171
Schumann, R., 10
Sentiments, 46; of exposure and appro-
priation, 47. See also Apatheia; Joy;
Pathos; Repulsion and Attraction
Simplicity, 51, 55-70
Simulacrum, 57-58, 67
Singularity, 47, 52
Sophocles, 157
Soul, in Kant, 72
Space, as carnal matrix in Kant, 153
Spinoza, 160, 162-164
Stimmung (attunement, harmony,
mood), 58-60
Style of nature in the sublime, 62-64
Subjectio sub aspectum, 61, 69, 113
Subreption, 126, 137,213
Supersensible, 134,216
Suspension, 69
Syncopation, 23, 47, 52, 210, 218
Synthesis, 12, 14-16,20-21; and synec-
doche, 15,65. See also Being; Imagi-
nation; Positing; Thesis
Szondi, Peter, 157
Technique. See Physis and Techne
Teleology, 117-119
Telephony, 204-205
Temporality, originary, as not identical
to transcendental imagination, 144
That (of existence) as opposed to what
(of essence), 39, 40,69,74,90,92,
94-96,196,204
Thesis, 9-10. See also Positing; Synthesis
Totality, 39, 134, 136. See also Infinity
Touch, 44, 46, 50
Tradition, 1, 6, 7
Tragedy, 157-174
Transport, 8, 9, 16, 45
Truth, 71-109; of metaphysics, 86; non-
truth as essence of, 92
Types, 152
Typology, 101
Unification, 13, 15,21
Union, as differentiated from unity,
39-43; Hegelian and Kantian, 40
Unity, 14, 18-19,31,38; in Kant, as
unity of theme in dream, discourse,
or fable, 153
Unlimitation, as concern of the sublime,
35-53, 139; as distinguished from the
infinite, 36
Use, 119, 125,127,208,214
Veiling and Unveiling, 26, 91; and veil of
Isis, 72, 90-92, 137-138, 147-148,
153-154. See also Being; Heidegger;
Truth
Verweilung (abiding), 59; in relation to
the motif of weil (because) in Heideg-
ger, 201
Violence, 124, 138-149; transcendental,
144,235
Wagner, Richard, 82, 229
Wild nature (rohe Natur) in Kant, 61,
214. See Physis and Techne
Witness, 10,21
Work,75,169
World, 8, 133-156
Warde (worth, or dignity), and the
denkwilrdig (worthy of thought) and
fragwardig (worthy of question),
206-207

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