Stephen Marrin 1 July 2008 Remarks for State/INR conference on Learning the Lessons of All-Source Intelligence Analysis Topic:

Historical Overview of All-source Analysis: What are the lessons of the past that we have failed to incorporate into our current practice of intelligence analysis? How effectively has the literature of intelligence analysis been at building knowledge about the craft and profession? What efforts are afoot to help scholars and practitioners alike to learn more about intelligence analysis? XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Hi; my name is Steve Marrin, and I am a professor of intelligence studies at Mercyhurst College in Erie, PA. I started teaching fulltime about 2 years ago, which makes me sort of a newbie academic, but Ive been studying intelligencemostly intelligence analysis for over 15 years. As an undergraduate, I studied the causes of intelligence failure, and read the writings of people like Robert Jervis, Richard Betts, Michael Handel, Art Hulnick, and Loch Johnson. And then I went to work at CIA as an analyst, and quickly discovered that theory did not match practice. For example, as a junior analyst, I once started a paper with the sentence We do not know and then provided three explanations for the particular situation, with no evidence indicating that any one was any more plausible than another. I was subsequently told by my manager that the first line had to go, because CIA analysts never admit when they dont know something. Interesting. How does that square with the Powell framework: Tell em what you know; tell em what you dont know; and tell them what you think? Apparently, that framework did not have widespread acceptance at CIA in the mid-1990s, even though the literature on intelligence clearly established the interest that decisionmakers had in knowing not only what analysts knew, but also what they didnt know. Anyway, going back to that analytic report I had drafted, because the CIA office that I was in at that time put forth a single analytic line rather than multiple interpretations, this manager chose one of the three explanations I had put together essentially at random, and said that was going to be the CIA analysis on the subject. We believe. And off it went. Hmm. So much for alternative analysis. And there was no room for dissenting opinions in that office either. During the time I was there, I witnessed a dispute over an analytic judgment that led to a winners analysis

being put forth as the only analysis, and the loser being described as not a team player for fighting for his interpretation, even though he was a subject matter expert and knew more about the country than the winner in the bureaucratic struggle. And then I saw the losers forecast actually occursurprising decisionmakers in the process, and being subsequently described in the newspapers as a high-profile intelligence failure. Because of these incidentsand a series of others, related to apparent disregard for analytic expertise, disinterest in trying to identify ground truth rather than just report what was in the raw intelligence, and so on--I became a disillusioned analyst in relatively short order. Not because I didnt see value in the enterprise, but rather because I thought that the function of intelligence analysis was too important to allow these kinds of flawed practices to be embedded within analytic processes. The literature I had read clearly indicated that the value to decisionmakers came in providing them not just with alternative interpretations for a situation, but also an explanation for why those interpretations differed. Yet here I was, in the world of the practitioner, witnessing an intelligence failure because best practices identified in the literature were not implemented, and in-depth subject matter expertise was ignored. This wasnt the dark ages of intelligence analysis, but we werent yet at enlightenment. During the 4 years I was at CIA, not once was I taught a structured analytic method or technique. Heuers Psychology of Intelligence Analysis book was not yet released, and nobody knew what ACH was. As Randy Pherson has said, the model for doing intelligence analysis at that time was to read as much as you have time to read that day, think about it and suck an answer out of your thumb, and write it down in as crisp a manner as possible. And thats a pretty good description of what intelligence analysis involved when I was at CIA. But a lot was going on behind the scenes that built the foundation for the kind of conference we have here today. The T-2000 course and the development of analytic tradecraft; the promotion of alternative analysis and other structured analytic techniques, the creation of CIAs Kent School and its Career Analyst Program, and so on. This was very much a time of growth and change; of discovery and re-discovery, with my own personal emphasis more on the organization, management, training, and processes of intelligence analysis rather than its practice. But all of these lessons helped shape practice, by establishing training course content, human resource and development policies, standard operating procedures in terms of analytic production, and the development of new best practices in the field. What I was interested in was everything that shaped what an analyst did when he or she was on the job doing analysis. So I left the Agency to go study intelligence analysis in academia. Along the way, I have written almost 20 articles or book chapters addressing various aspects of intelligence analysis, each involving research into a different segment of the intelligence literature. So

I have read a good bit of the literature on intelligence analysis, and am generally aware of what is knownand what is not knownin the field. And its the analytic portion of the intelligence literature that Ill be talking about today. the unclassified summary and evaluation of what has been learned about intelligence analysis so far For those of you who rolled your eyes at the word literature as the touchstone of the irrelevant academic, let me just point out that while some literatures are truly ivorytower-ish, others have direct applicability to practitioners. Optimally, an intelligence analysis literature will contain the conceptual and contextual understandings of all the various aspects that relate to intelligence analysis. Even though some aspects of intelligence analysis.particularly substanceshould remain classified, other aspectsparticularly those related to the processes involved in doing analysiscan and should be unclassified. Think of the literature as your knowledge repository; it is where you can go to find out what people have learned about intelligence analysis so far. Many of the contributors to this body of knowledge are either current or former practitioners; their goal was not to create abstractions for the purposes of navel-gazing, but rather to conceptualize the function of intelligence in such a way as to make its practice easier to manage and improve. For that reason alone, the literature on intelligence analysis is crucial.absolutely crucial.for knowledge aggregation and accumulation to occur. FAILING TO BE CUMULATIVE But there are problems with the literature that addresses intelligence analysis. The most important problem has been its failure to be cumulative. Intelligence studies as a field of knowledge has books and journals to document lessons identified. But it does NOT have a structured process for compiling and evaluating the existing literature so that it is aggregated and made cumulative. There are a couple of key characteristics that enable any field of knowledge to become cumulative. For example, there needs to be competing schools of thought, with individuals representing those schools. There needs to be a tradition of critiquing previous interpretations, and building secondary and tertiary arguments off of the arguments of the main proponents of each school. And to support this, there also needs to be a heavy emphasis on citation and footnotes, in order to link current ideas back into the ongoing scholarly debates. Very little of this kind of infrastructure exists in the literature that addresses intelligence analysis. Personally, Ive tried to ensure that my own papers appropriately reference work done by previous writers.

For example, when I wrote a paper comparing and contrasting intelligence analysis to medical diagnosis, I referenced the 1983 article by Walter Laqueur on Intelligence and Medicine, providing an overview of his article and going on to explain why mine added to it. In this way, the intent was to try to layer new knowledge on top of old; not pretend that I was the first to write on a subject, but to use what had been written previously as the foundation to my paper; to try to ensure that knowledge was cumulative. I also tried to do the same thing with a paper on intelligence analysis professionalization, by using George Allens 1985 CIA Studies in Intelligence article on the Professionalization of Intelligence as its conceptual starting point. But this kind of practice is the exception rather than the rule in intelligence studies, and as a result the literature has a Groundhog Day-like flavor to it if you go back over the decades to review the concepts. For example, in the literature review for my PhD dissertation, I evaluated what Im calling the proximity hypothesis, or the effect that proximity between analysts and decisionmakers may have on the accuracy or utility of the finished product. In doing so, I went through the literature back to the 1940s, and discovered that many people had invented the same concept time after time after time. And they even ended up giving it different names. Two scholars writing at about the same time in the 1980s gave the relevant schools of thought two different namesboth of which have since been forgottenand later writers have identified up to 7 or 8 primary representatives of those schools. But almost none of the writers reference each other or those who wrote about it previously. So the same school of thought can be identified with up to 5 different names, depending on who was doing the writing at the time. If you read each contribution in isolation, it says something interesting about the issue. But when you read the different contributions in succession, the repetition and conceptual overlaps become obvious. Knowledge on this particular subject has not been cumulative. In some ways, the writers in the 1940s and 1950s had a better grasp of the key issues at play than those who write about it today. Why does this matter for practitioners? Is this as academic as it sounds? The answer is no; while it may be academic, it does have direct relevance for practitioners The chair of my dissertation committee is Philip Zelikow, who was Counselor of the State Department, and before that was executive director of the 9/11 Commission. Zelikow has a particular interest in the intersection of intelligence and policy, with a particular approach that he and Ernest May developed for Harvards Intelligence and Policy Program. May was also a consultant on the 9/11 Commission as well.

I believebut do not know for surethat part of the structure of NCTC that was written into the 9/11 Commission Report was partly intended to bridge the gap between intelligence analysts and decisionmakers. This is an effort to try to take our understandings of organizational best practice, and implement them. And where does that understanding come from? From the accumulated wisdom in the literature. But as I just pointed out, our accumulated wisdom in terms of how to structure the interface between analysts and decisionmakers isnt very solid. And because our knowledge is not very solid, neither is the implementation of the recommendations. As I was researching the dissertation, I found an example of an interface between analysts and decisionmakers that it appears has been completely forgotten by both academia and government. It used to exist. It actually received a fair amount of praise for being an effective way to communicate. But it hasnt been referenced in the literature for almost 30 years. I asked a couple of longtime former senior intelligence officers if they had ever heard of it, and the answer is no. I also asked a member of the Principals committee during the Clinton administration if he had ever heard of it. Again, the answer was no. However, when I wrote it up for the dissertation and sent it to Zelikow, he said the ODNI was implementing something similar. Which is interesting. My guess is that what we have here is another re-invention of the wheel, that could have been prevented if the intelligence literature had been more cumulative. The point that Im trying to make is that literature is the embodiment of knowledge, and the state of knowledge in terms of our understanding of intelligence analysis is not nearly what it could or should be. And this can have a direct impact on practitioners. And this is only one concept, one research question. I believe the same kind of Groundhog Day-like effect exists along a number of dimensions in the intelligence literature Its really sort of sad; even though the purpose of academia is to develop and grow knowledge over time, we have failed to do so in the study of intelligence analysis. SHERMAN KENT The only real progress that has been made on this front over the past few years is the establishment of Sherman Kent as one of the giants in the field. But I dont think that was an accident. I think Jack Davis spent about 15 years trying to raise the profile of Kent, and succeeded. Im not saying that Kent was unknown prior to Jack Davis; only that he wasnt referenced to the extent that he is today. And this higher profile is a good thing, because it provides a touchstone in the literature that later scholars and practitioners can refer back to, and use as a jumping off point to make additional observations and contributions to the body of knowledge

But there were other people writing on intelligence at the time who were just as important.and perhaps more important.whose writings are worth studying by those who both write aboutand practiceintelligence. HILSMAN Another mostly forgotten writer on intelligence analysis was Roger Hilsman, a former director of State/INR. In 1953, only 4 years after Kents book was published, Hilsman made a strong case for a closer relationship between intelligence analysis and decisionmaking. Hilsman is actually as good or better than Kendall as a counter to some of Kents ideas. Hilsman argued that a more effective integration of knowledge and actionor intelligence analysis and decisionmakingwill require intelligence analysts to become more policy-oriented.1 Hilsman directly questioned the separation of intelligence from decisionmaking by asking whether this division of labor is a wise or even a valid one2 and he ended up concluding that it was both arbitrary and awkward. Hilsman goes on to say that in order for intelligence to be useful and significant it should be frankly and consciously concerned with policy and that its practitioners should have a frame of mind which is instrumental, action-conscious, policy-oriented. The major task before the researchers is one of recasting their thought to the context of action, and adapting their tools to the needs of policy.3 In other words, Hilsman believed that intelligence analysts should work much closer with decisionmakers than the Kent model that has become adopted as the traditional approach in the intelligence community. People know what Kent said about the intersection between intelligence analysis and decisionmaking, but they seem to have forgotten Hilsman, even though his ideas have as much relevance as anything else written about the subject over the past 50 years... In terms of practitioners, what would the value be of re-discovering Hilsman? The answer is: A much better, more substantive debate about the respective roles and functions of intelligence analysis vis a vis decisionmaker assessment. It might even lead to a redefining of the concept of politicization, which I am beginning to conclude is--in and of itself--badly conceptualized. PLATT and KNORR Another example of forgotten scholarship that would be helpful for those trying to understand intelligence analysis is Washington Platts 1957 book Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles. Just listen to the titles of his chapters and relate the content to the work that you are doing: Principles of Intelligence Production;
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Hilsman. Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs. 45. Hilsman. Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs. 25. 3 Hilsman. Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs. 44. 6

From Information to Intelligence; Intelligence Production: An Act of Creative Thinking; Help From the Social Sciences; Probability and Certainty; Forecasting; Characteristics of the Intelligence Profession

All of these chapters could make contributions to the ongoing discussions regarding analytic process, utility of the social sciences, increasing imagination, futures work and forecasting, and professionalization. But Platts work falls into the same category as Hilsman.its been forgotten over time, even though it contains some important ideas that current scholars and practitioners would find quite interesting. Finally, another forgotten piece of scholarship is Klaus Knorrs 1964 monograph Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences. I found this little bookwritten 45 years agoto be the best evaluation of how analysts use social science methodology in the entire intelligence literature including the recent literature. Yet all of this knowledge has been forgotten. Current academics are rebuilding the wheels that were built decades ago. And current practitioners do not have as solid a grasp of what it is that they do than these scholars did over a half century ago. And there has been just as much scholarship forgotten over the most recent few decades as well. Thomas Hughesperhaps not coincidentally, another former director of State/INR wrote a short monograph in 1976 on the relationship between intelligence and policy that noted British intelligence scholar (and former longtime GCHQ officer) Michael Herman thinks is the best writing thats ever been done on the subject. But I challenge you to find more than a handful of references to it in the literature. Bottom line: you have to know who the giants are to stand on their shoulders. Right now Im not sure that (with a few exceptions) there is agreement on the part of intelligence studies scholars or practitioners regarding who those giants are. FAILING TO BE COMPREHENSIVE Another problem with the intelligence literature is its failure to be comprehensive Intelligence Failure The most well-developed part of the analytic literature deals with intelligence failure, which grew out of the post-Pearl Harbor emphasis on the study of strategic surprise. But after Michael Handel and Richard Betts covered this ground in the 1970s and 1980s, there did not appear to be much else that could be said. Intelligence failures will be inevitable.

There are inherent pathologiesin Betts terminology, enemies of intelligencethat will ensure that perfection is unattainable. So the research agenda that had previously been established --identify causes of failure in the hopes that these causes could be addressed and failure prevented--came to a dead-end. Conceptually, there hasnt been much progress in the intelligence failure literature since the late 1970s. The only real potentially productive research agenda that scholars could point to was to study successes rather than failures. But the academic community decided that was a bridge too far because of classification issues. But now--with the creation of the CIA and ODNI lessons learned centers--this research agenda can finally be implemented. So the study of intelligence failures.which hasnt really gone anywhere for almost 30 years.can finally be replaced with the study of intelligence successes. But that doesnt mean that there is no more room at the inn for people who want to study intelligence failure. Just that their contributions will be marginal. Essentially, this is the Betts fallback position; intelligence failures may be inevitable, but you might be able to prevent failure on the margins. To use the baseball analogy that Robert Jervis and Dick Betts have periodically used, perfection is unattainable so a fielding percentage standard is inappropriate for intelligence analysis. However, a batting average standard might work better. So how might the batting average of the individual batter.or baseball team in the aggregatebe raised? There are a lot of different ways to answer that question; all of which relate to recommendations and suggestions for improving intelligence analysis. In my Preventing Intelligence Failure article, I suggested a two-prong approach; first using more rigorous tradecraft to minimize faulty or incomplete analysis, and then implementing a more seamless integration of that better product into decisionmaking processes. Structured Methods The first part of this approachproducing a better analytic productis also addressed in the part of the literature that talks about structured methods. For example, in 1978 Dick Heuer edited a book titled Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience. It is perhaps the best scholarly effort to rigorously document the value of quantitative methods to intelligence analysis. It did exactly what was necessary to create a literature; it captured in the form of a publication new thinking and research on topics of interest. But its been 30 years since that book was published, and there isnt anything else like it out there. There are a smattering of other voices in this discussion over the value of structured methodsfor example, Rob Folkers Masters thesis and JMIC Occasional paper; a couple of articles by Stan Feder; a couple of follow-on articles by Heuer and Pherson; a contribution or two by Steve Rieber; a short article I wrote last year on structured analytic techniques versus intuition; and a handful of others..but the literature is just not that large.

The literatures regarding the value of structured methods outside the intelligence analysis domain is much larger, but the research agenda necessary to reach out to other domains and literatures and exploit them for the value they have for understanding and improving intelligence analysis is still in its infancy. Analogies and Other Fields As I have argued elsewhere, the exploitation of other domains and literatures is best accomplished through the rigorous evaluation of analogous fields such as medicine. The paper that was published in 2006 under the title Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession had its beginnings in 2000, while I was working at CIA. At the time, I was also involved in a difficult medical situation where someone I knew was having health problems that the doctors were having difficulty diagnosing. The process that the doctors were going through to diagnose the problem appeared to me to be very similar to the processes that an analyst goes through when tackling a difficult question. At the time, I was a participant on Jack Davis internal CIA discussion group on Alternative Analysis, and in that forum raised some of the issues regarding the analogy between medicine and intelligence. Some of the other participants explained to me that the similarities I was seeing in the practice of both fields were related more to the application of the scientific method than anything else. I was too busy at the time to study this aspect further, but had more time in 2003 and 2004 when I wrote the draft of the medical analogy paper that was eventually published. I dont have time to lay out the content of that paper here, but the general idea was to look at medical practice and see what we can learn from it; both similarities and differences. But I also didnt think that the utility of studying analogies stopped at medicine. The conclusion of that paper included a suggestion that intelligence professionals look to analogous professions for ideas that can be adapted to an intelligence context. I went on to say that Many of the challenges intelligence analysts face are not as unique as its practitioners believe, but the insularity of the field prevents them from being able to identify the lessons from other professions that could be useful as models to follow. As a result, the first task is to identify analogous professions, and examine them for the lessons they might provide. Any profession that encounters similar problemssuch as medicine, journalism, law, or law enforcement may provide fertile ground for deriving ideas to improve existing practices. And let me add to that list, academia and its emphasis on knowledge creation and aggregation, which is more or less what Im outlining in my talk here today. Others have also explored different aspects of other fields for their utility in understanding intelligence analysis:

Heuer has looked at the psychology literature Zegart has looked at the organizational and institutional literatures R. Scott Rodgers has compared clinical psychology to intelligence analysis

And so on and so forth, with additional authors like Steve Rieber, Rob Johnston, Charles Weiss and others exploring different domains of knowledge for their relevance to intelligence analysis. So there is the beginning of an effort to increase the breadth of our understandings of intelligence analysis, although other fields of knowledge have yet to be fully explored. Other concepts or methods of similar value can come from sociology, anthropology, organizational theory, and so on. More writings need to be encouraged--and different angles need to be explored --so that we can maximize our learning opportunities along the way. At this point, our understandings of intelligence analysis are growing in leaps and bounds due to these kinds of evaluations, although in the aggregate the literature in its entirety is not anywhere close to comprehensive. This may happen in time, but it wont be any time soon RECOMMENDATIONS/SOLUTIONS In this last part of my talk today, I want to lay out a series of suggestions or recommendations thatif implementedmight bolster the intelligence analysis literature and make it both more cumulative and more comprehensive. For those of you who have read my professionalization paper, what we are talking about here is the segment of the professionalization process related to knowledge advancement Document the literature: The first step would be to document what you know. This has to be a dynamic rather than static process; perhaps an annualized bibliographic book series. The last comprehensive intelligence bibliography that I am aware of was Neal Petersens bibliography published in 1990. That bookwhich is a great resource for students of intelligencehas not been updated since. The closest approximation that I am aware of is the online Muskingum College intelligence bibliography compiled by J. Ransom Clark, with the appendix to the 2006 University of Marylands Project on the Future of Intelligence Analysis coming in a distant second. If the goal is to be able to learn from the past, then documenting the knowledge that has been developed thus far is important. Will scholars or academics do this on their own? Probably not. Maybe the best way to go would be to partner up with J. Ransom Clark and see if hed be willing to use his online bibliography as the starting point for a much more comprehensive bibliography. And that may require governmental funding. But if you

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dont fund this kind of project, you will never have any idea of what knowledge has already been created, and will continue to reinvent wheels ad infinitum. Review and evaluate the Literature: The second step would be to evaluate what you know; the literature that has already been developed. This would involve a variety of literature reviews oriented towards identifying a variety of research questions that have been explored sufficiently, others that still require some work, and yet still others that have not yet been answered. The Intelligence Studies Section at ISA is participating in a project that is heading in this direction, called the Compendium project. The section broke the intelligence studies literature down into 20 different topics, and lined up authors to write literature reviews on each of those topics. When published by Blackwell next year, this project should provide current and future scholars with a starting point for understanding the current state of that segment of the literature. Not all the topics address analysis, but enough do to make the project worth highlighting for purposes of todays conference. The authors of the essays on intelligence analysis, intelligence failure, and the intersection of intelligence and decisionmaking spoke on a panel at the ISA conference earlier this year, and all acknowledged that their segments of the literature failed to be cumulative. So the Compendium Project will begin the process of evaluating what we know, by reviewing, evaluating and critiquing the current parameters of intelligence scholarship, and highlighting what we dont know. Add to the literature The next step in the process, after evaluating what we know and highlighting what we dont know, is to begin the process of filling in the gaps in the literature. There are a variety of ways to do this, including by developing a dedicated (and funded) research agenda akin to the Army War Colleges Key Strategic Issues List to back-fill gaps in knowledge. Another way to fill in gaps in knowledge is through themed conferences and symposiaperhaps made annual events.like the Godson events at Georgetown that led to the Intelligence Requirements book series, or the recent joint ODNI/RAND symposium on intelligence theory. But both of those kinds of events are by their nature invitation only. There should also be a mechanism for getting new ideas into the literature, and that means opening up the venue to public participation. A model for this kind of activity could be the 2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis that Mitre coordinated on behalf of the then-ADCI for analysis and production (Lowenthal). This conference was modeled on an academic conference, with a paper requirement and proposals open to the public. Rather than do this kind of work unilaterally, maybe you should partner up with existing associations that have the infrastructure, contacts, and knowledge necessary to pull it off. ODNI partnered up with INSA for the ODNI conference on analytic transformation last year, but other associations exist such as ISAs Intelligence Studies Section--which would be a good partner for those wanting to engage academia--as would the 400+

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membership of the International Association for Intelligence Education. In both cases, the associations could provide a focal point for acquiring and coordinating the kinds of knowledge that would be helpful in terms of outreach to the academic community. Institutionalize these efforts The next step would be to institutionalize these efforts, through Centers for Intelligence Analysis Research and Scholarship. Not Centers of Academic Excellence; thats a different program with a different purpose. Instead, the goal should be to rely on academia for its strengths, including knowledge of scholarship and the ability to aggregate knowledge so that the end product is more than the sum of its parts. Frankly, this is the kind of project that Id be interested in getting involved in, but I also think its establishment would pay dividends back to the Community in terms of providing it with a one-stop shop for knowledge and expertise about intelligence analysis. Create a Learning Feedback Loop Finally, an absolutely mandatory aspect of building knowledge is to then exploit that knowledge by disseminating it to those who can use it. That could involve synching up those who research and write about intelligence and those who teach it, so that you have a feedback loop established to maximize learning. The students could be those in academia in intelligence studies or intelligence school programs; or those in governmental training courses. The Harvard Intelligence and Policy Program also provides a potential model for those who want to establish a form of continuing education in the field devoted not to practitioner proficiency per se, but rather broader understandings of purpose and how best to manage the enterprise. So when you summarize each of these suggestions, the steps involve: Document what you know Evaluate it for gaps or holes Work to fill those gaps in knowledge Distribute this knowledge to those who need it (create a dynamic feedback loop) Now heres my takeaway for those of you in government who are trying to figure out how to establish a dynamic learning process regarding intelligence analysis: All you have to do is follow those same 4 steps. Let me leave you with a few questions geared to get you thinking along the lines of an academic who builds knowledge for a living: Heres my first question for you: do you have any idea what the intelligence community knows about how to do intelligence analysis, and how to do it better? If the answer is noand I assume the answer is nothen what kind of documentation or repository would be of greatest value? Which entity should be the one doing the documenting? Or should it be a collaborative enterprise, with a focal point per analytic agency or organization?

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In terms evaluating existing knowledge, do you have any idea what you know, and more importantly, what you dont knowabout the practice of intelligence analysis? If not, then what kind of evaluative process are you going to establish to meet this requirement? As for filling gaps in knowledge, what projects are currently underway? What gap or need to they fill? Are they prioritized in any way, or just ad hoc research efforts? Being able to establish a strategic approach to filling gaps in the literature will be an important part of this kind of knowledge accumulation effort And finally, how are you planning on synchronizing each of these functions with the dissemination of this knowledge? Are you planning to incorporate the content into training courses? Or maybe you want to use this knowledge to shape professional development programs. However you use the knowledge, somehow there must be some kind of interface between those who acquire, store, develop, and disseminate knowledge about intelligence analysis. What kind of architecture will you build to meet these purposes? Thanks for your time and attention.

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