SANGAMON COUNTY, Illinois vs. CATHOLIC Charities of the DIOCESE of SPRINGFIELD, INC., an Illinois non-profit corporation. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the DIOCESE of Springfieid-in-lilinois, an lIllllee, peoria, and Cmholic charities of the DIOCESE of joliet, ) Inc., a non-profit
Original Description:
Original Title
Emergency injunction/temporary restraining to allow Illinois Catholic Charities to Continue Foster and Adoption Services
SANGAMON COUNTY, Illinois vs. CATHOLIC Charities of the DIOCESE of SPRINGFIELD, INC., an Illinois non-profit corporation. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the DIOCESE of Springfieid-in-lilinois, an lIllllee, peoria, and Cmholic charities of the DIOCESE of joliet, ) Inc., a non-profit
SANGAMON COUNTY, Illinois vs. CATHOLIC Charities of the DIOCESE of SPRINGFIELD, INC., an Illinois non-profit corporation. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the DIOCESE of Springfieid-in-lilinois, an lIllllee, peoria, and Cmholic charities of the DIOCESE of joliet, ) Inc., a non-profit
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
vs. Plaintiffs, Hon. John Schmidt Presiding Judge Case No. 20ll MR 254 Defendants. CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE ) OF SPRINGFIELD.IN-ILLINOIS, an Illinois ) non-profit corporation, CATHOLIC CHARI ) TIES OF THE DIOCESE OF PEORIA, an ) Illinois non profit corporation, and CATHOLIC) CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OF JOLIET, ) INC., an Illinois non.profit corporation, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) STATE OF ILLINOIS, LISA MADIGAN, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of lIIinois, ERWIN McEWEN, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services, State of lIIinois, the DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, State of Illinois, ROCCO J. CLAPPS in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Rights, State of Illinois, and the DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, State of lIIinois, AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS, WRITS OF PROHIBITION, AND OTHER RELIEF Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfieid-in-lilinois, an Illinois non- the Utllee,;e Peoria, an lIl1l1U" nm'-mm and Cmholic ('hill-iiiI" of of which are hercinaft(11 or undersigned attomeys, herehy complain of the defendants, the State of !Binois, Lisa Madigan, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of !Binois, Erwin McEwen, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of !Binois, the Department of Children & Family Services, State of lllinois, Rocco J. Clapps, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Rights, State of lllinois, and the Department of Human Rights, State of Illinois, as follows: Nature of the Case I. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities social service agencies for three Roman Catholic Dioceses in the State of Illinois which have provided extensive adoption and foster family services in lllinois for decades, bring this lawsuit in a pro-active effort to avert an imminent risk of irreparable harm to plaintiffs as well as many thousands of vulnerable and needy children, families, and adults across the State of lllinois, and to avoid the collapse of a critical network of social service agencies at a time when a budgetary crisis already has stretched vital social services resources to the breaking point. In order to stave off this crisis and avert harmful and potentially cruel disruption, discontinuity, and destabilization in the lives of so many of Illinois' needy young people, families, and others, plaintiffs are asking this Court to resolve a pair of actual controversies that have arisen between them and the State of Illinois, the Attorney General of the State of lIlinois, the Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of lIlinois ("DeFS"), DCFS itself, the Director of the lIlinois Department of Human Rights COfISClenllOllS fultlllment the his'lone. atlosto! an mUlvoldable instant COlltf(WCTSles tum on two questions of law. The initial between, on the one hand, wi e of the l{omlfi is whether in Or0Vlrl",O cmup:asS10!1:ate 2 of 40 Case 20i! :viR specifically, adoption and foster care - by means and methods that are faithful to the integral and essential tenets of the Roman Catholic religious faith, and on the other hand, (ii) the defendant Attorney General's enforcement duties and responsibilities, as well as the enforcement duties and responsibilities of the Director of IDHR and lDHR with respect to the provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act (e.g., 775 ILCS 5/101(A)(I2)), which proscribe discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation and/or marital status by "placelsl of public accommodation" within the State of llIinois. Plaintiffs are asking for entry of a declaratory judgment in this lawsuit to the effect that the "place of public accommodation" provisions of the Human Rights Act do not apply to them because they are "sectarian" and religious and, therefore, they are excluded from the scope of the llIinois Human Rights Act, which covers only those "adoption agencies" which are "non-sectarian." Plaintiffs provide vital social services, including adoption and foster care, as part of their religious ministry, rooted in the Holy Scriptures, and carried on in relationship to the Roman Catholic Church and under the spiritual governance and practical oversight of each Diocesan Bishop. As a result, plaintiffs plainly do not and cannot qualify as "non-sectarian adoption agencIies\," within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Nor are the plaintiffs otherwise covered by, or subject to, the "public accommodation" provisions of the Human Rights Act or the duties incumbent on Illinois places of public accommodation or any related duties incumbent on state contractors with DCFS. of the "m, hL" acCt}mmrldation' 2. Even assuming, arguendo. that these explicit provisions restricting the coverage of the lIIinoi, Hnman Rights Act somehow might he as to cover and another H"IlV:O statute. nmnel:y the Reli gions Freedom Kesroratlon Act 7751LCS let to authorize an apIJIl(,atiofl of these 2011 MR provisions of the Human Rights Act to plaintiffs. Pursuant to IRFRA, defendants' reading of the Human Rights Act to require the plaintiffs to process applications for adoption or foster care by unmarried couples, regardless of whether they are same sex or opposite sex, would "substantially burden Iplaintiffs'l exercise of religion." It would infringe plaintiffs' rights protected by Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which guarantees that "Itlhe free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed and no person shall he denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his lor herl religious opinions ...." Therefore, pursuant to IRFRA, in order to prevail, the defendants would bear a heavy burden they could not even remotely satisfy, namely, (a) proving that coercing plaintiffs to process such applications, contrary to the tenets of their religious faith, would serve a compelling govemmental interest, and (b) proving that such mandatory processing of applications by unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, would he "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Even assuming that forcing Roman Catholics to process such applications or place children in unmarried couples' households, contrary to the essential tenets of their religious faith, could be said to serve a "compelling governmental interest," defendants could adequately serve that interest by a far less "restrictive alternative" than by forcing plaintiffs to flout the tenets of their faith, Defendants enjoy a medley of options apart from requiring plaintiffs to process such applications, etc, in contravention of their professed religious faith, as indeed an entire host of ao()ption or foster care ,w,'nC'H'S do not share Roman Catholic religious beiiefs and refer apf,l!catl(J!1s such no care serV1Ci'S were 4 40 II plaintiffs guaranteed the right to free exercise of their religious faith. Therefore, defendants' insistence that plaintiffs themselves process all such applications for foster care or adoption is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means by which defendants could adequately serve the interest of providing adoption or foster care services to unmarried couples who are either of same-sex or opposite sex orientation. This is because other agencies already process their applications for adoption or foster care, and such applications may be referred to such agencies in the future. 3. A second and similar controversy has arisen between plaintiffs, on one hand, and the defendant Director of the Department of Children & Family Services ("DCFS") and the defendant DCFS itself, on the other hand, over another new Illinois statute, entitled the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, codified at 750 ILCS 75/l et seq., whose effective date was June 1,2011. Said Act provides, inter alia, for the registration and recognition of "civil unions" in Illinois between persons of the same sex or between persons of the opposite sex. It further provides that "Ial party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, prott..'Ctions, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." !d., Par. 20. In view of the claim by the defendant, Illinois Attorney General, that her office has had "notice" that plaintiffs are engaged in unlawful discrimination in their "provision of adoption and foster care services" (Exhibit A attacbed dcl:endarlt, DCFS. and both said defendants' the flOW that one or more the deti'endams lllll Y thn,m,m to take are In the effective Protection 40 11 MR 254 Union Act. Given that plaintiffs' estahlished religious practice is not to process applications for adoption or foster care by unmarried heterosexual or same sex couples, whose applications may be referred for processing by other social service agencies, plaintiffs fear that defendants DCFS and its Director, McEwen, may declare plaintiffs in default on their contractual obligations to DCFS to comply with "applicable law." 4. Thus, these threatened actions trigger another "case or controversy" that also turns on a question of law, which plaintiffs ask this Court to resolve and adjudicate by means of a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs believe here, too, that they are exempt from coverage under this new statute, the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, equally as they are exempted from the restrictive provisions of the place of public accommodations provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act. Plaintiffs cite Section 15 of the new Act, which provides, true to the Act's title, that: Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or regulate the religious practice of any religious body. Any religious body, Indian Nation or Tribe or Native Group is free to choose whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union. As plaintiffs' adoption and foster care services are essential parts of their religious mission and religious practice, the new Act is clearly inapplicable to them. Any question concerning the scope of this express exemption on the face of the new law was put to rest on the noor of the llIinois Senate on December 1,20\0, when Senator Koehler, sponsor of the bill which was adopted later that day, answered specific, explicit questions put to him by Senator Haine, to the effect that the two sentences in Se\:ticm 15. supra, are to be read separately so as to refer to the WC'''lCm "\\ihether or not to or orac!r.:es on of faith to Ii 40 j I VIR 254 agencies providing social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption agencies, hospitals, a wide gamut of things, So, that's covered under the first sentence" of Section 15, he queried, to which Senator Koehler answered: "Yes. The - certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede the rights that religious organizations have to carry out their" what their duties and - and religious activities are" (136'0 Legislative Day, 96'h Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript, p. 81, emphasis added). 5. Nevertheless, on or about May 5, 2011, plaintiffs are informed and believe that the Deputy Director of the defendant, DCFS, wrote to another religious social services agency, Evangelieal Child & Family Serviees of Wheaton, Illinois (which is not a party to this lawsuit, nor represented by plaintiffs' counsel), to the effect that DCFS "will be revising policies and procedures to include recognition of Civil Unions (which) may impact potential service delivery issues for faith-based agencies." The Deputy Director also reportedly wrote that the "Director will be sending out a letter to all agencies sharing the Department's intention to be inclusive of Civil Union relationships relative to adoption and foster children." Furthermore, DCFS' Deputy Director reportedly described the impact of its decision "to be inclusive of Civil Union relationships" a, one that could well end its contractual relationship with Evangelical Child & Family Services, saying: "The decision to proceed with providing foster care will be yours to make, not DCFS' ," and that, "If the policy changes conflict with your agencies (sicl religious work '"to ensure an: nfilerllV lransilkm event DCFS service nrncVI,lie." " which ''''''''''] the defendant, receive a cases to out your foster care contracts," in your Board can to you take lV!(;l"AVeIL Director "1"SlllH' lhat all ",nllee nmivi"lers No, i MR 254 with the new law on ci vii unions as part of their contractor's certification of compliance with "applicable law," Moreover, on June 20, 2011, plaintiffs met with representatives of both of the defendants, the Attorney General (who also represents defendant IDHR) and DCFS, and during that meeting said defendants made it crystal clear that they expected plaintiffs forthwith to opt out of any ongoing contractual relationship with DCFS and that, should plaintiffs abide by their religious commitments, and that, should plaintiffs proceed to enter into new contracts with DCFS (as they now propose to do), their aforesaid religious practices necessarily would render them in violation of their undertaking to comply with all applicable Illinois laws, including, iflter alia, the Human Rights Act non-discrimination mandates incumbent on all places of public accommodation as well as the new Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act. Thus plaintiffs, exercising their right to continue to provide adoption and foster care services as part of their religious and charitable mission, are also imminently threatened with an array of immediate and irreparable harms insofar as defendants, including the Attorney General and her clients, DCFS and lDHR, have so far failed or refused to recognize and acknowledge: (a) that plaintiffs are not covered by the new Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act but are excluded and exempt from it as the new law explicitly recites that its provisions do not "interfere with or regulate religious practice"; (b) that any ambiguity arising from the text of the new law was eclipsed by Senator Koehler's explicit assurances on the floor of the Illinois State Senate; and that the !Ilioo!, Freedom Restoration Act, ILCS 351 I et seq" would rer"m'p that such sulJst:al1tml hn::denirlg them "I;'U"" CUl:(",,, a:ppiica'llO!lS for care 8 Case ~ 5 4 justitled by a "compelling governmental interest," and that such a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious practice be further justified by showing that it is the "least restrictive alternative" narrowly tailored to satisfy such an allegedly compelling governmental interest. Furthermore, anyone of defendants' many options for referral of civil union couples to other agencies willing to entertain and process their applications would manifestly constitute such a "least restrictive alternative" fully adequate to satisfy any needs posed by recognition of civil unions, while also fully protecting plaintiffs' religious freedom as the Act's very title would require, Jurisdiction and Venue 6, This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 235 ILCS 5/2-701(a), as there are now two actual controversies over the construction of a pair of Illinois statutes, namely, the lIlinois Human Rights Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, both of which must be construed and enforced in light of the provisions of a third Illinois statute, namely, the lIlinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("IRFRA"), 775 ILCS 35/ I et seq. More specifically, the dispute between plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other hand, is whether 775 ILCS 5/5-10l(A)( 12) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which defines the phrase, "place of public accommodation," to include only any "non-sectarian adoption agency," may be interpreted to encompass the plaintiffs, even though plaintiffs do not qualify as "non- :;ectarian are ""Q"",1n:m adoption agencies whose mission and character are malspmamy to Se,:ticm 20 of IRFRA ()liIUc"'''J in stOlat,lon this Aot . assert that violation as a or has been in aJUUllU!:dl 9 ( ~ a $ e No. 20t MR of the At1:onlcv {1"",,,raL Statc proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government." 7. Moreover, there is a second actual controversy hetween plaintiffs and defendants over the construction of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, namely, whether the provision in Paragraph 15 of that Act renders it inapplicable to plaintiffs, to the extent that defendants purport to regulate or interfere with plaintiffs' "religious practice," namely, its declining as a matter of conscience to process foster care and adoption applications from unmarried cohabiting couples, whatever their sexual orientation. That controversy, too, implicates the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 lLCS 3511 et seq., as defendants' threatened action against plaintiffs would constitute a significant burden on the free exercise of their religious faith, triggering in turn the imposition of a burden on defendants that they cannot meet, namely, having to prove that Illinois has a compelling governmental interest in forcing plaintiffs to go against their fundamental religious beliefs and that said compelling interest could not be adequately served by a less restrictive alternative than forcing plaintiffs either to suppress their religious faith or to cease furnishing the vital adoption and foster care they have been providing for years to Illinois citizens in furtherance of plaintiffs' religious mission and character. Indeed, the defendants' referral of unmarried couples to other agencies that do not share plaintiffs' conscientious objections would adequately serve the defendants' stated interests. The Controversies At Bar Are Real, Aetnal, Ripe, And Jnsticiable 8. These controversies hetween plaintiffs and defendants are real, actual, and far remote, and none is hypothetical or speculative in the slightest. On or about ngfleld in as \veH as to the (ither that the AHonlev Gener;al to 40 Case No. Ii MR Charities "discriminates against Illinois citizens" in violation of the lIIinois Human Rights Act (Exhibit A, attached hereto), Specitically, the defendant Attorney General's office stated its "understanding" that Catholic Charities "has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not required by Illinois law - for example, requirements about religious beliefs - or refuses to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Winois law - for example, refuses to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent:' The defendants' letter went on to request that Catholic Charities respond to a detailed request for "information and documentation," relative to plaintiffs' "Foster Care and Adoption Practices," including: All contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"); All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant to contracts wi th DCFS; All policies and requirements for (a) foster parents; and (b) adoptive parents; All services provided by the Organization and location(s) where each service is provided; The Organization's tinancial statements, including, but not limited to (a) IRS Form 990; (b) Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports filed with the Illinois Office of the Attorney General: Annual Reports; and (d) all other tinancial statements whether or not are HlKHlUJ, Orgarlizilticm s nV-ia\\iS or articleiS Tbe Org:miziHion nW:Slcm statement or other dOCUl11cnts fPgiWIi 40 254 the Organization; All documents regarding the relationship of the Organization to the lCatholic Church or other religious bodyl;
All employee handbooks;
All documents concerning complaints of discrimination against the Organization that were filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or in any state or federal court, induding but not limited to complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status or sexual orientation; and State whether any court, commission, department, induding but not limited to those listed in Request Number 10, has found that the Organization was or was not liable for discrimination and, if so, produce a copy of the judicial or administrative order or decision. 9. Plaintiffs were given until Friday, March 25, 2011, to submit the responsive data and documentation. Plaintiffs sought and obtained a long (37-day) delay of that deadline, after which meetings were sought with one or more of the defendants. But there was no response up to and induding June 1,2011, when the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act became et1ective. Nor was any meeting or offer to meet received before June. Plaintiffs, therefore, feared and continue to fear an imminent effort by the defendants to enforce the foregoing requests, pursuant to Section 10-104(A) of the Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/10- which inler reEisonalJie cause to belie"e (l i W/leneY',:! the Genemi perSOl,S is engaged in a pattern or pmctic,e milnation prohibited this the !!linois ttromp'v General may in the name of the VpP.n'p as parens patriae the State to enl'oH:e this Act in any 2 I MR 254 as to nn1l10r!v bring issues adjudication, and npe asking that it 11""I,', appropriate circuit court. 10. Plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois *** (6) If any person fails or refuses to file any statement or report, or obey any subpoena, issued pursuant to subdivision (A)(2) of this Section, the Attorney General will be deemed to have met the requirement of conducting a preliminary investigation and may proceed to initiate a civil action pursuant to subdivision (A)(l) of this Section. (2) Prior to initiating a civil action, the Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination declared unlawful by this Act and whether the dispute can be resolved without litigation. In conducting this investigation, the Attorney General may: (a) require the individual or entity to file a statement or report in writing under oath or otherwise, as to all information the Attorney General may consider necessary; (b) examine under oath any person alleged to have participated in or with knowledge of the alleged pattern and practice violation; or (c) issue subpoenas or conduct hearings in aid of any investigation. Human Rights Act and, therefore, they need not comply with defendants' request for such Rights Act, as contended by the defendant Attorney GeneraL and her clients, defendants DCFS voluminous data and documentation, to the extent that it is predicated on those provisions related to public accommodations. Nor do plaintiffs believe in the slightest that they are illegally discriminating, within the meaning of the public accommodations proscriptions of the Human and its Director, and the State of Illinois, by virtue of their faithful religious practice in UH1mlvelSV that is connection with adoptions and foster care, The parties are, therefore, caught up in an actual which empov/cre,d to a 3 of 201 i MR 254 Defendants Insist On Phasing Ont Of Plaintiffs' Adoption & Foster Care Contracts II, Upon filing this action, plaintiffs again sought and !1nally obtained a meeting with representatives of the defendants, At that meeting on June 20, 2011, defendants' representatives insisted that plaintiffs either opt out of any ongoing contractual relationship with the defendants, or give up their religious practices in handling foster care and adoptions, Defendants would not agree to any less restrictive alternative than plaintiffs' phasing out completely from any contract with the state for adoptions and foster care, Defendants stated that they believed that plaintiffs would be out of compliance with lllinois law if plaintiffs signed contracts for fiscal year 2012 foster care and adoption services, Nor would defendants back off from the Attorney General's demands to pursue an investigation of plaintiffs' alleged violation of the public accommodation provisions of the lllinois Human Rights Act. Nor would the Attorney General agree to the entry of any "standstill order" or agreement, as plaintiffs requested, staying any adverse legal action against plaintiffs on the part of the defendants, maintaining the status quo ante until this Court eould adequately consider and rule on the merits of plaintiffs' claims, The parties are, therefore, caught up in real and actual controversics, presenting clear,cut legal issues, which are fully justiciable and ripe for adjudication by this Court, Plaintiffs Have Legal Standing To Sue 12, Plaintiffs are also fully clothed with legal standing to bring tbis suit. Plaintiffs have VHf"YV" a longstanding, on,golng, and continued contractual partnership with the State of services neluding, inter these services for the in mi,;sicm and In 14 of 40 254 carrying out their apostolic ministry, with benefits flowing directly to needy and vulnerable Illinois children and families. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs have a legally protectable interest in continuing contractual relations with DCFS, and they are fully entitled to apply to this Court to invoke the benefit and protection of Illinois law against legally baseless threats to interfere with their provision of these vital services or to sunder plaintiffs' ongoing contractual relations with the State of Illinois. Nor might DCFS's refusal to continue plaintiffs' social service provider contracts or to declare a default in any of said contracts on account of defendants' baseless claims of discrimination be assailed, adjudicated, or restrained in any available administrative forum. This ease deserves an adjudication before this Court. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies Is Neither Feasible Nor Required 13. There is no requirement that plaintiffs exhaust any administrative remedy before DCFS or the Illinois Human Rights Commission, because there is no such remedy. The Illinois Human Rights Act provides that defendants' claims of pattern or practice discrimination must be adjudicated before the Illinois circuit courts, "whether or not a charge has been filed" before the Commission. 775 ILCS 5110-I04(A). Nor does IDHR have any jurisdiction to entertain or investigate any other charge of discrimination against thc plaintiffs which might be predicated on the baseless claim that they are places of public accommodation and thus bound by the proscriptions of the Illinois Human Rights Act in their adoption or foster care programs. Plaintiffs Reasonably Fear An Imminent Threat Of Adverse Legal Action munic:ation5 to them about the 14. Plaintiffs also are informed and based on defendants' prior based on Services 15 , et seq", and also I MR based upon the defendants' unequivocal and adamant assertions during their recent June 20 face to face meeting, that as plaintiffs will abide by their religious faith and practice in declining to process applications of. and make adoption and foster care placements with, unmarried same sex or heterosexual couples, DCFS, its Director, and the Attorney General all threaten to take adverse action against them, which may include plaintiffs' having to relinquish and cease their contractual relations with DCFS and the State of lIIinois, pursuant to which they have been providing these as well as other vital social services for many years, or to submit to a lawless investigation and prosecution on the part of the Attorney General premised on the false assertion that they are public accommodations. This again poses a dilemma, in light of which plaintiffs are forced to choose between abiding by their religious beliefs and commitments, on the one hand, and complying with defendants' invalid and overbroad interpretations of the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, by which plaintiffs do not believe in good faith that they are bound, on the other hand. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek entry of another declaratory judgment herein to the effect that they are excluded and exempt from that law, too, in continuing their "religious practice" in performing adoption and foster care social services. This controversy, too, is actual, imminent, and fully justiciable. Venue Is Properly Laid Here 15. Venue is properly laid as both plaintiff, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield in lllinois, a non-protlt corporation, and all of the defendants maintain offices within gnolon '.vuu, y, which encompasses the of Springfield, the capital city of Illinois. The Parties i6. 'liUlUI" of Ditxese IS an 16 4H 201 lllinois. \7. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria is an Illinois non-prallt corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois. 18. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet is an Illinois non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Joliet, Will County, lllinois. 19. Defendant, State of lllinois, is a political entity amenable to suit in this Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, lllinois, the seat of lllinois' State Government. 20. Defendant, Lisa Madigan, sued herein only in her official capacity, as the Attorney General of the State of lllinois, has a principal oftice within the city of Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. 21. Defendant, Erwin McEwen, sued herein only in his official capacity, is the Director of the Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS), State of Illinois, and defendant, DCFS, have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. 22. Defendant, Rocco J. Clapps, sued herein only in his official capacity, as the Director of the Department of Human Rights (lDHRJ, State of lllinois, and defendant, lDHR, have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I (Declaratory ,Judgment - Sectarian Adoption Agencies Exempt from Unman Rights Act) 1-22 each and aliegatl.on ccmta'med 10 22 Jr'lell""'" h."."Awith the same and as if set fOlth 1i /viR 254 23. The Attorney General, acting in her official capacity on behalf of the defendant State of Illinois, has asserted that plaintiffs are bound by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act, as set forth supra and as evidenced by Exhibit A, attached hereto. Said defendants also have alleged that they have "received notice" that plaintiffs are discriminating against !!linois citizens based inter alia on marital status and sexual orientation in their provision of adoption and foster care services. More specitically, said defendants have focused on plaintiffs' "requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not required by Illinois law.,. or refuslall to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Illinois law - for example, refuselal I to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent." !d. 24. Furthermore, said defendants appear to have invoked 775 ILCS 5/10-104(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which empowers the Attorney General of Illinois to conduct investigations "to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination declared unlawful by this Act," to make sweeping requests for the production of information and documents from the plaintiffs, indicating that the defendants believe that the "diserimination" on the part of plaintitTs of which they purport to have "notice" is indeed widespread and systematic. The public policy embodied in the Illinois Human Rights Act bans various types of discrimination - including discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation, etc. - but only "in connection employment, real estate access to tinancial Ine.,nrmn of an , as carried on as their social senilces nts none of the nrst three estate traos2tctions, or access \lR The public accommodations provisions are pertinent, however, and the question is squarely posed here whether those provisions apply to the plaintiffs, who operate sectarian adoption agencies. 26. Before the 2007 amendment of the Illinois Human Rights Act, that Act det1ned a place of public accommodation as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, and advantages of accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." 775 lLCS 5/5-101(A)(I). The Act provided, by way of examples, a lengthy laundry list of "placel sl of public accommodation," including "facilities of the following types," as follows: Illnns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, publie golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, buses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and amusement. 775 lLCS 5/5-101 (A)(2). In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Board of Trustees of Southem Illinois Univ. v. Dcp't ofHwnan Rights, 159111.2d 206, 211 (1994), that the Illinois Department of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction under the Illinois Human Rights Act to entertain complaints alleging racial discrimination in the academic program of public universities. The high Court stated that the definition "place of public accommodation" set forth at 775 ILCS 5/5-10I (A)( 1) had to be read in the at WI 01 Tniw,e,. supra. 159 III at 21 I), :1m,!",nq the maxim knovvn as "when a statute se';cra! classes but mc,vi,le, that the 9 40 II IvlR 254 riot be Human the the rne':ln,'n it is clear that an ot\{Jptl,on agency """",."" 142 (I" Dis!. i 999)). Nor did it include it Hunum to be met by prospective students (Gilberr v. Dep'r of Human Righrs, 343 1Il.App.3d 904 (I" Dis!. 2003)). Nor did it encompass a company offering health insurance (Cur 'n Dried Salon v. e;(haustive, the class of unartieulated persons or things will be interpreted as those' others such nor include a business offering scuba diving classes which required physical and other standards like' the named persons or things," lei, (internal citations omitted), The Court noted that the 27. The reasoning of the high Court in Board otTrusrees ( ~ l S I U was followed in of Human Rights did not fall within its jurisdiction. ld. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the conduct allcged by the Illinois Department pub, or a bookstore," but not "an academic program of a higher education institution." ld. terms "institution of higher education," "education program," and "classroom" were not specifically requires that the 'services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations [b[e contained anywhere in the list provided in the Act (again, this was before it was amended in 2007), ld, Further, the Court observed, "the examples listed in the Act are fundamentally overnight accommodation, entertainment, recreation or transportation." ld. "The definition 212. Instead, the Court e;(plained, "[t1he cited establishments are examples of facilities for different from institutions of higher education, which administer educational programs," ld. at Dep't several Appellate Court decisions, which held that the term "place of public accommodation" did omitted). As a consequence, "what was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, a extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the general public.'" ld. (citation contend that, under 20 i i Act. 28. In 2007, the Illinois Human Rights Act was amended, and by that amendment, the definition of "place of public accommodation" was deleted. Replacing the definition was a detailed list of specific examples, some of which had been held not to be "places of public accommodation" under the pre-amended wording of the statute and the cases decided under that prior wording of the Act (e.g., insurance offices, the professional offices of health care providers and certain educational institutions), See, 7751LCS 5/5-IOI(A)(1)-(l3). But with respect to the issue posed in this litigation, the list of examples of "public places of accommodation" now includes "a senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, non-sectarian adoption agency, or other social service center establishment ...." 775ILCS 5/5-101(A)(l2)(emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs contend that the obvious and unavoidable implication of this amended language is that a sectarian (i.e., religiously-based) adoption agency is not a "place of public accommodation," and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor within the jurisdiction of either the defendant, Illinois Department of Human Rights, or the Illinois Human Rights Commission. By the same token, sectarian nurseries, day care centers, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, postgraduate or other places of education are also implicitly excluded. See, 775 ILCS 515-10 I(A)( 11). 29. Again, any suggestion that this text is ambiguous and may somehow be read so that sectarian adoption agencies may be eovered, equally as non-sectarian adoption agencies, as aCC;OIlllnDd,ltiC1I! is absolutely n e ~ : a t e d the The the amendment doubt that exempts as places 20: MR the llf1,>!r'!'!vino biB amendment in terms the statute: 'h,sntl"s is not covered Cllilerton. ex(,latl:led Nor is there any legal basis for the contention that an entity might somehow of public accommodation '" sectarian adoption agencies" (State of illinois, 95'h General Assembly, Regnlar Session, Senate Transcript, 38'h Legislative Day, 5/10/2007, p. 38)(Emphasis added). 30 qualify as a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act because it receives governmental funding. Such a contention was roundly rejected by the Fourth District of the illinois Appellate Court in Duffy v. Department ofHuman Rights, 354 1l1.App.3d 236, 239 (4 th Dist. 2004)(claim that receipt of federal funds through Medicaid and Medicare brought clinic within the definition of "place of public accommodation" as the Human Rights Act does not "create such an inference from the mere receipt of federal funds"). 31, By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs pray that the Court declare and adjudge that as plaintiffs are sectarian agencies engaged in the rendition of charitable social services in connection with adoption and foster care, they cannot as a matter of law be subjected by the defendants, or any of them, to restrictions imposed by a statute whose coverage is explicitly confined to "non-sectarian adoption agencies," and so explicitly intended to exempt "sectarian adoption agencies" such as plaintiffs. Nor are plaintiffs bound by any provisions restricting their religious practice with reference to adoption and foster care in plaintiffs' contracts with the defendants, DCFS or the State of lllinois, including not only their past contracts but also the contracts for the upcoming fiscal year, July I through June 30, 2012, which they propose to enter into in kee'pirlg with de(;ades-old partnership with DCFS. is no legal basis for would he in for viol5ltllon of contracts. EREF10R.E m'otmnt to 1. 2011 intention also is reponed to have written that the defendant '\VI l! be Sendlrlg out a letter to the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Department Deputy Director reportedly advised that the Department "will be revising policies and procedures of Human Rights or the Human Rights Commission with respect to those provisions, nor are they bound to comply with any "pattern or practice" investigation on the part of the Illinois Attorney 1-31, Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in lawsuit, nor represented by counsel for plaintiffs herein), citing the new Illinois statute entitled, COUNT II (Declaratory Judgment - Claim That Plaintiffs Are Also Exempt From The New Illinois Religious Freedom Protectiou & Civil Union Act) May 5, 2011, the Deputy Director of the defendant, DCFS, wrote to another religious social 32. As is hereinabove alleged, plaintiffs are informed and believe that, on or aheut the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which they may be entitled upon Count I hereof. paragraphs 1through 31 inclusive hereof of Count I with the same force and effect as if fully set General, pursuant to the public accommodations provisions of the Human Rights Act; and that to iuclude recognition of Civil Unions [whichl may impact potential service delivery issues (or forth herein, "Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act," Public Act 096-1513, due to become services agency, Evangelical Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois (not a party to this judgmcnt to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodation provisions of effective on June 1,2011. In his letter to Evangelical Child & Family Services, the DCFS' ro rei ati ve to ad()ption and " It was 2;tated in said leHer that 201 MR in connection with adoption and foster care might well have a dispositive and terminal impact on that sectarian adoption agency's future relationship with DCFS. Specifically and pointedly, the Deputy Director observed that, "IUf the policy changes conflict with your agencies [sicl religious beliefs, you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts," and in that event, DCFS would work "to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers," usually taking "up to sixty days." 33. More recently, all of the plaintiffs received such a letter from DCFS, dated May 10,20II, and addressed to "All Department Service Providers and Contractors," in whicb DCFS' Director, defendant Erwin McEwen, bannered a string of boldface admonitions ("RE.\UNDER REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER"), beneath which he advised the DCFS service providers and contractors, including plaintiffs, that the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 751l et seq, had been signed into law in January 2011, and that it "amends and supplements existing state and federal laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." Mr. McEwen then proclaimed, also in boldface, an additional admonition, as follows: All federal and state anti-discrimination laws, including the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, are incorporated by reference into IDCFS contracts and subcontracts, And later (Exh. B hereto, p. 2), also in boldface print, McEwen noted specifically that DCFS' standard Contract provides: lDCFS Contractors and their subcontmctors are required to comply with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection aud Civil Union Act and all other state and federal equal laws, :Y!c:Evven's bullt,tm also pV'l!t"U 's standard contracts to ,'nt,rv their cOITIplimlCe with Case 1I f'vlR 254 law. This bulletin, on top of the reported letter to the Evangelical Child & Family Services, reinforces that defendants are imminently threatening to enforce the Religious Freedom Protectiou and Civil Union Act against plaintiffs, as if it negated rather than protected plaintiffs' rights to continue their "religious practice" in providing foster care and adoption services. This threat had heen foreshadowed by a March 2, 2011, story in the Chicago Tribune to the effect that "Attorney General Lisa Madigan, Gov. Pat Quinn's legal team and the Department of Children and Family Services are carefully researching the Hlinois Human Rights Act, the Civil Union Act and the lllinois Constitution to determine whether they prohibit agencies from considering sexual orientation as a factor in foster care and adoption in Illinois," etc. Furthermore, the same newspaper story quoted Kendall Marlowe, identified as "a spokesman for DCFS, to the effect that, "Social intervention such as adoption laws and practices inevitably reflect their communities (andllllinois as a state has grown on this (gay rights) issue as evidenced by (civil union legislation). Adoption law and practice should reflect the values of the people of Illinois." 34. Plaintiffs believe, therefore, that there is also an actual controversy between them and the defendants as to whether the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act applies to them at all, let alone whether it requires that they betray their religious commitments by processing foster care or adoption applications from unmarried couples. Examination of the text of the new law plainly shows that it does not purport to, and expressly disclaims any intent to. "interfere with or regulate the religious practice of any religious body" (supra. p. 6). 35. rhe iegir,latlve the new pas:sai;e hack on December 10. of SPCiIlS(l( on the floor the Senate - this ent,e,,1 ia ~ e ( ; t l ( i I l i5 rhe text of the Aet stands alone and should he tead scllarate and ens.uirlg sentence to the freed,xn 254 body to abstain from solemnizing or oftleiating at a eivil union ceremony (id.). Rather, the reference to the law's not regulating or interfering with the religious practice of any religious body should be read to refer to "a wide gamut of things," encompassing religious practices such as "social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoption agencies, hospitals," and so forth (emphasis added). In response to Senator Haine's listing these types of religious praetices and inquiring whether they were all covered by the disclaimer of any intent to regulate or interfere with them in Section 15, Senator Koehler answered unequivocally, "Yes. The - certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impede the rights that religious organizations have to carry out their - what their duties and - and religious activities are" (136 th Legislative Day, 96'h Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript, p. 81 - emphasis added; supra, pp. 6-7). 36. That the plaintilfs' involvement in foster care, adoption and other soeial services is a central, critical element of their "religious practice" is patent. Catholic Charities' mission is said to fulfill the Church's role in giving charitable aid to anyone in nced by providing compassionate, competent and professional services that strengthen and support individuals, families and communities based on the value and dignity of all human life. Catholic Charities' agencies around the entire United States form a network, which includes the plaintiffs herein, comprising more than 1,700 agencies and institutions. involving thousands of programs, over 62.000 staff members, and more than 24D,OOO volunteers. Essential features of Catholic aQ"ncies mark as indelibly Roman Catholic , are d0.0n:!v rooted in the very heart the bittEca! ClJl1Cept jus:tice was the care the stran.ger - the gauge wlwti"" one or 201 MR homeless, sick, imprisoned, and poor. St. Catherine of Siena, St. Peter ('1o"" St St Franci s of that poor widows and children received care. This ministry of care was continues to focus primarily on these same groups: women who are poor; children the poor. Later in the cities, religious orders established orphanages, homes for the religious communities cared for the widows and orphans, sick, elderly, wayfarers, and institutionalized and flourished in the great monasteries of the first millennium as the her relationship to God and to one another. Catholic Charities' contemporary work ministry was to make sure that justice was reflected in the life of the community and years. In the earliest days, the apostles appointed the seven deacons whose first who are poor; and individuals who are marginalized, including foreign workers, immigrants, refugees, racial minorities, disabled persons, those aftlicted with mV/AIDS, or other conditions that set them apart. All these needy and vulnemble Jesus tells his followers that the world will be judged by how they treat the hungry, among us. This was Jesus' teaching, as in the judgment scene in Matthew 25, where human beings are children of the one God who is passionately concerned for the least religious groups, such as those begun by St. Vincent de Paul, expanded and deepened sick and elderly, hospices, and other centers for health and social services. Lay and this work, and throngs of saints were known for ministries to the poor and vulnerable, Catholic Charities' ministry has been an integral part of the Catholic Church for 2,000 fv!artin and St izabeth SetorL Sisters of New \JII'"'''' pioneered the mstltl,tlc,naiilZltlCin vital \vork in New World, s12irtlnf' in New where aa orphanisge. women. care facility, By 19OD, there were more than 800 Catholic charitable institutions in the u.s" and now staff and volunteers serve almost 7 million persons a year with group homes, clderly residences, family counseling centers, hospices for HIVIAIDS patients, soup kitchens and homeless shelters, among a vast array of social services, Plaintiffs' Catholic Charities agencies alone setve thousands of children in foster care daily, helping children heal from abuse such as trauma and neglect, stabilizing their lives by avoiding multiple moves among different foster homes, resolving problems that led to placement, and finding stable, lasting relationships for traumatized children, Catholic Charities promote the sanctity of human life and the dignity of the human person, Although society may exclude some people because of sickness, disability, poverty, racial bias, disease, undocumented ot imprisoned status, Catholic Charities reaches out to them with respect for their human dignity, a sacred concept at the very root of Catholic social teaching, Jesus Christ rejected no one from his healing touch, and enjoyed fellowship meals with tax collectors and sinners, Among Catholic Charities' ethical standards and values that shape their work is the preferential option for the poor articulated by the late Pope, Blessed John Paul ll, Catholic Charities are authorized to exercise their ministry by the Diocesan Bishop, All three plaintiffs herein have a formal Catholic identity in relationship to the and their respec:tl tea!Cnl:rgs and canon law , h!n'l1lt:s respect the those whom it serves tf1r::mg/n its 254 various ministries. This respect for persons of other faiths or no faith stems from a determined position to serve the entire community, a custom going back as far as the fourth century and, again, in this country to the Ursuline Sisters in New Orleans in 1727. In the pattern of Christ Jesus, Catholic Charities feed the hungry, homeless, depressed, troubled, and frail - regardless of their religious beliefs. Thus Jesus cured the Canaanite woman in Matthew 15 and the Centurion's servant in Luke 7. On April 18, 1997, tbe Pope, John Paul II, directed that: "Actions of aid, relief, and assistance sbould be conducted in a spirit of service and free giving for the benefit of all persons without the ulterior motive of eventual tutelage or proselytism." Catholic Charities recognize that some services require attention to physical, mental, and spiritual needs. Addiction treatment programs that involve 12-step programs have a distinctive spiritual component, involving recognition of a higher power. In such programs as well as in marriage and family counseling, grief ministries, and other services it is appropriate and necessary to recognize and respond to the physical, mental, and spiritual needs of those whom Catholic Charities serve. Catholic Charities have a special relationship to the Catholic diocese and to Catholic parishes within the diocese. Catholic Charities agencies often have formal programs which support and encourage Roman Catholic parishes in their ministry to the community and its needs, assisting parishioners in the exercise of their baptismal commitment to poor , tbe Coune:il. as Catholics mandated as welt as of No" and other people of good will to serve the needs of the larger civic community. Catholic Charities support an active public-private partnership with government at all levels. The Church has a long and strong tradition of teaching about the responsibilities of government in promoting the common good and protecting the least among us. Catholics are also charged with a responsibility to support their roles as citizens and taxpayers and to actively participate in civic life. These teachings have impelled and authorized Catholics to seek out and accept partnerships with cities, counties, states, and the federal government to facilitate and insure the provision of needed services for the wider community that are judged to be consistent with the Church's own mission. These relationships are sometimes contractual relationShips, as between plaintiffs and DCFS, to deliver particular services such as adoption and foster care application processing, placements and related services. They also may involve voucher payments from the government, such as Medicaid, or government funding of construction, such as housing. The Church provides additional funding, volunteers, efficiency, values, community credibility, and dedication to service for the benefit of local communities and their needy families. Catholic Charities blend advocacy for those in need and public education about social justice with service to vulnerable and needy individuals, families, and communities. Consistent with its special concern for the poorest and most vulnerable human beings d""m e us, over the last the been increasingly outspoken about tbe need the of the the U.S. bishops, attlOlle Ch,uili"q have for a more ,OCiletyan service. 201 i rvlR 37. Nor could plaintiffs' observance of their conscientious religious obligations be held, in any event, to violate any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act. The core protection embodied in the new statute is set forth at Section 20 thereof, which provides: Section 20. Protections, obligations, and responsibilities. A party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law. Catholic Charities' religiously grounded practice of declining to entertain or process applications for foster care or adoption on the part of unmarried same sex or heterosexual cohabiting couples, together with defendants' options to refer such applicants to other agencies willing and able to accommodate them, does not even remotely deny any "legal ... benefit" to a civil union couple that would be available to a ntarried couple, let alone effect such a denial by "statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." Couples in civil unions - same sex or opposite sex - remain perfectly free to contact and obtain all relevant services from other adoption or foster care agencies or to make private adoption arrangements, all without the slightest interference of obstruction on the part of plaintiffs or any hindrance arising as a matter of law. Thus there is no underlying predicate for any application of the new Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act against plaintiffs, even if plaintiffs were not deemed exempt as provided on the face of the Act itself, and also as recited in the statllte's own text that the Court issue a ilel.:lar"li1rv ludgment to the that plamt"Us are not ,'n\J,'n'li the neVi' Freedom Pn)tectiol & Union its iCEI'SlatiVe , and that in any 40 viR event plaintiffs' assertion of their conscientious religious objections, together with defendants' capacity for referral of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples to other agencies which do not share plaintiffs' religious objections and may provide all requested social services in connection with adoption or foster care, does not deny any unmarried cohabiting same sex or heterosexual couple any legal benefit whatsoevcr; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which they may be entitled on the premises pursuant to Count II hereof. COUNTlII (Declaratory Judgment - Claim Under The Illinois Religions Freedom Restoration Act. 775 ILCS 35/I et seq) 1-37. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs I through 37 inclusive of Count II hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 38. The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. was enacted in reaction to the U.s. Supreme Court decisions in Employment Divisioll v. SmUh, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which articulated a narrow, compound test for evaluation of constitutional claims asserting infringements of the First Amendment freedom to exercise one's religious faith, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997), which struck down an attempt by Congress to overrule Smith by legislation. Both of these U.S. Supreme Court cases are referenced in the findings and purposes of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra, 775 lLCS IO(a)(4),(5). 39 Section 15 the RellgiOlls Freedom Restoration ILCS 35115, provides Government not sniGsta11l1Ully burden a pel'sola' exercise even if the results . unless it demonstrates apt:llc:CltH:,n of a conlpel 32 201 i MR governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. 40. "Exercise of religion" is defined in turn to mean "an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief." 775 ILCS 35/5. And "government" includes "a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision of the State, including a home rule unit." ld. 41. Pursuant to Section 20 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 lLCS 35/20: If a person's exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act, that person may assert that violation as a claim or defense in ajudicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government. A party who prevails in an action to enforce the Act against a government is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in maintaining the claim or defense. 42. Plaintiffs contend that the State's coercion of plaintiffs' religiously based adoption agencies, under penalty of law, to act in a way that directly conflicts with their sincerely held, fundamental religious convictions with respect to the morality of sexual cohabitation outside of marriage, and the morality of placing children for adoption or foster care in the homes of unmarried cohabiting couples (regardless of their heterosexual or homosexual orientation) would, indeed "substantially burden" their eonstitutionally protected rights to free exercise of religion. According!y. pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, it would be nc::ml:e!1t on the to plalnt1:ffs was the ",v;cnnmenlallnterest." 7751LCS !5, 33 40 20t 43. Plaintiffs further contend that there is no "compelling government interest" in bmdening religiously based moral objections on the part of plaintiffs to processing foster care or adoption applications by unmarried couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual. Nor may the defendants rely on the anti-discrimination provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act as a predicate for deeming that alleged governmental interest "compelling," when that statute clearly exempts from its "public accommodation" proscriptions sectarian adoption agencies such as plaintiffs. The Illinois Human Rights Act also has been held repeatedly to represent an "exclusive remedy" for anyone in Illinois who claims to he a victim of "discrimination," and as shown supra (Count I) it affords no remedy at all to those allegedly aggrieved by acts or omissions of sectarian adoption agencies, such as plaintiffs. Indeed, the ringing declarations of Illinois' public policy bound up in the free exercise of religion clause of the Illinois Constitution, Article I, Section 3, must be taken into consideration and at very least deemed a powerful counterweight to any facile assertion that Illinois law somehow dictates it a "compelling interest" to coerce its citizens under penalty of law to disregard their own sincere, deeply held, conscientious religious objections to what they deem immoral. 44. Nor could the defendants argue that there is a "compelling interest" in suppressing plaintiffs' rights to pursue their religious practice by mging that serious harm would !low from plaintiffs' declining to process adoption or foster care applications, etc. when defendants command a host of options for referral of those applicants to other social service agencies which care or adoption services ~ \vhether those other social services Gf'r'Cli" afe which are un''''n, to and prrlCe,;s such aPIJlicalirms relm:,;ents the "least restrictive such a sullsttmtl.al hllrdE,n on free e x , ~ r c i s e of :"11< to other providers would assure the proper and adequate handling of everybody's applications, while not trampling on plaintiffs' conscientious objections and permitting plaintiffs to continue to practice their religious faith through social ministry within our religiously pluralistic democracy. 45. Still another factor should be weighed in arriving at an accurate and proper interpretation of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Statutes should be construed so as not to yield untoward or absurd results. Yet, Federal Executive Order No. 13559, dated November 17,2010, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit C, was promulgated by the Obama Administration as a modification of a predecessor Executive Order, dated December 16, 2002, promulgated during the Bush Administration. The 2010 Executive Order recites in Seetion 2 thereof (Exh, C, pp. 1-3) ten "Fundamental Principles" for the implementation of "policies that have implications for faith-based.,. agencies that administer social service programs or that support (through prime awards or sub-awards) social services programs with Federal financial assistance ...." These "Fundamental Principles" support use of faith-based social service agencies, such as plaintiffs (id., Also, they ban discrimination "on the basis of religion or religious belief in the administration or distribution of Federal lInaneial assistanee under social service programs" (id., Finally, the "Fundamental Principles" mandate that "telach agency responsible for administering or awarding Federal lInancial assistance for social service programs shall offer protections for beneficiaries of such programs" , inter for '/{pfnrol to an Aif,ernfltp Provider," 50 that whenever "a beneficiary a social serv!,:e prog:rarn oblects to the b"JU" mcw!,!"s services under that the the 40 beneficiary to an alternate provider." While plaintiffs do not purpart to invoke these principles as any cause of action herein, as the Executive Order explicitly disclaims that it creates any "right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party," plaintiffs do allege that their state funding, which defrays only part of their financial burden in providing foster care and adoption services, is largely derived from federal grants, Thus those federal funds should be administered in a manner that assures the availability of the very referral procedures which plaintiffs have been providing to "prospective beneficiaries" of their foster care or adoption services over their decades-long partnership with the defendant, DCFS. Plaintiffs further allege, therefore, that the Illinois General Assembly could hardly have intended to flout these Federal guidelines for the "administration and distribution of Federal financial assistance," by discriminating against plaintiffs - denying plaintitTs referral options to accommodate their conscientious objections while providing referral options to beneficiaries or prospective beneficiaries who object to plaintiffs' religious character. Such patent discrimination against plaintiffs, moreover, would constitute a gross affront to the religious liberty guarantees in the Illinois Constitution. The 'avoidance canon' of statutory interpretation, therefore, would also militate in favor of reading the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, together with the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to require that plaintitfs be guaranteed a legal right to 'opt out' of processing foster care or adoption applications against which plaintiffs have deep-scared religion-based conscientious objections, lest the newly effective Act be struck down as l!m;of1sti I:ution:al 'KltJmt:nt to the effect to Count in the event the lIIinois Human that the issue a de,claratory that to to to the Kell grm" Freedom 201 254 Protection & Civil Union Aet is held applicable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion under Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 would be substantially burdened by a reading of the Illinois Human Rights Act that would force them to process applications for foster care or adoption from unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, or a reading of the new Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act to apply to them and restlict their religious practice, for which there is no compelling governmental interest, and that defendants' many options for referral of such applicants to other adoption agencies willing to entertain and process their applications represent the least restrictive alternative to burdening plaintiffs' free exercise of their religious faith, pursuant to the Hlinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act; that the defendants' imminently threatened effort to coerce defendants into going against their conscientious religious scruples and commitments would constitute a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and that plaintiffs be granted all other relief, pursuant to Count \II hereof, to which they may be entitled on the premises, and pursuant to said Act. COUNT IV (Claim For Emergencv, Temporary & Permanent Injunctive Relief & Writ Of Prohihition) 1-45. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs I through 45 inclusive of Count III hereof with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 46. Plaintiffs have pled several causes of action herein lIpon which they have not chance but rather a substantia! any adl,qulate ,t","',t,y at law to redress the ,m'm,,,qihi,,, would to suffer if the defendants were nor Ii 254 plaintiffs pursuant to either the place of pUblic accommodation provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which do not apply to plaintiffs, or the newly effective Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, which also does not apply to plaintiffs, and in derogation of plaintiffs' rights pursuant to the Illinois Religions Freedom Restoration Act, all as alleged herein supra. Plaintiffs' irreparable injury would include inter alia an interruption of its legal rights to maintain the status quo ante, to continue its religious practice and ministry to those birth parents, prospective foster parents and adoptive parents, and those children whose vital interests plaintiffs are serving now in fulfillment of their religious mission, on which their Church has been embarked for millennia. 48. There would be no legally cognizable harm to defendants or to third parties were this Court to enter the injunctive relief, emergency, temporary and permanent relief, which plaintiffs seek herein to protect their vital legal rights and continue to carry out their religious mission on the safe side of the law. Unmarried cohabiting couples' applications for adoption or foster care could be adequately serviced and accommodated (as they are now) by defendants' referring them to other providers which do not share plaintiffs' conscientious religious objections. On the other hand, the harm to plaintiffs and to the poor, needy and vulnerable third parties whom they serve, should no injunetive relief issue, would be severe and, given the patent merits of plaintiffs' claims herein, even unconscionable. The balance of hardships weighs decisively in favor of plaintiffs and those who are beneficiaries of plaintitls' vital social services. /\ \vrtt should properly issue in favor of plaintiffs and d!;;,l"''' to the extellt that one or dthem be in a UUliCHll or qU:""JU\llUi2" authoJ'ity to their t h r e a t e n t ~ d actions agllmst the not e!1(!ovved with fHltho!cltV OJ ",hpYl.V; Case I MR 254 with statutory jurisdiction to enforce any public accommodation provision of the Illinois Human Rights Act or any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act against the plaintiffs, to the extent that plaintiffs are now imminently threatened. 50. Granting ofequitable relief andlor any writ of prohibition in favor of plaintiffs would be in furtherance of the public interest. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray pursuant to this Count IV that this Court enter emergency, temporary, and permanent injunctive relief, protecting the plaintiffs' rights and the vital interests of the persons whom they serve, by continuing and protecting the status quo ante, and barring defendants from regulating or interfering with plaintiffs' free exercise of their religious faith or otherwise violating plaintiffs' rights in the premises; that the Court also issue a writ of prohibition, precluding and prohibiting the defendants, and each of them, to the extent that they may be acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, from any new or continued effort to enforce the restrictive provisions of the illinois Human Rights Act that are incumbent on places of public accommodation against the plaintiffs and/or to so endeavor to enforce the restrictive or other provisions of the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act against them, as defendants lack any legal autbority or statutory jurisdiction to enforce either of said statutes against these plaintiffs; and that plaintiffs have all other relief to which they may be entitled on Dire:ctor & Peter 1I 254 Thomas More Society 29 South laSalle St. - Suite 440 Chicago, IL 60603 Tel. 312-7821680 Fax 312-782-1887 Bradley E. Huff Graham & Graham, Ltd. 1201 South Eighth Street Springfield, IL 62703 Tel. 217-523-4569 Fax 2174234656 Patricia Gibson Chancellor &; Diocesan Counsel Diocese of Peoria Spalding Pastoral Center 419 NE Madison Avenue Peoria, lL 61603 Tel. 309-671-1550 Fax 309-671-1576 Attorneyfor Catholic Charities for the Diocese ofPeoria James C. Byrne Spesia & Ayers 1415 Black Road Joliet, lL 60435 Tel. 815-726-4311 Fax 815-726-6828 Attorneyfor Catholic Charities for the Diocese ofJoliet, Inc. d ~ Paul Benj SRecial Cifuill,4f ~ ~ n ton, One of the Attorneys l:1iaintiffs, o Society 254 77S Ivlareh 8, 20 II OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF ILLlNOIS Lisa Madigan t;E'tlt\!" Dear Mr. Roach: Steven E, Roach Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springtleid-in-lllinois 1625 W. Washington Springfield, II. 62702 VIA CERTIFIED MAIL The Civil rights Bureau of the Omce for the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, is charged with the responsibility of investigating al! violations of laws relating to civil rights and undertaking the necessary enforcement measures when such violations are established. Re: Foster Care and Adoption Practices This office received notice that Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois (the "Organization") discriminates against Illinois citizens based on race, marital status and sexual orientation in its provision of adoption and foster care services. Sped tically, we understand that the Organization has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not tequired by lllinois law - for example, requirements ahout religious heliefs - or refuses to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of minois law - lor example, refuses to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation ofa potential foster or adoptive parent. Please be advised that the fliinois Human Rights Aet C'IHRA") makes it a civil rights violation any person to "deny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods. and services of any public place of accommodation" on the basis of unlawful discrimination. 775 ILeS 5"5-1 Unlawful discrimination includes discriminatiDn on the bd.-'}is of sex, national , age, order status. statL-IS, <ii menial Status, sexual or Please submit the information and documents responsive to our request by Friday, .\larch 25, 2011. If you have any questions or would like to discuss this matter, please contact me, Roach Letter March 8, 20II Page20f2 The Organization's by-laws or articles of incorporation. All services provided by the Organization and the location(s) wbere each service is provided, All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant to contracts with DCFS, All policies and requirements lor: (a) foster parents; and (h) adoptive parents, All employee handbooks, All documents concerning complaints of discrimination against the Organization tbat were tiled with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or in any state or federal court, including but not limited to complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status or sexual orientation, Ail documents regarding the relationship of the Organization to the [Catholic Church or other religious body), The Organization's financial statements, including, but not limited to: (a) IRS Fonn 990; (0) llJinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports tlled with the [llinois Office of the Attorney General; (c) Annual Reports; and (d) all other tinancial statements regardless of whether or not they are audited. The Organization's mission statement or other documents regarding the purpose of the Organization. State whether any court, commission or department, including but not limited to those listed in Request Number to, has found that the Organization was or was not liable for discrimination and, if so, produce a copy of the judicial or administrative order or decision. 2 10, II. 6. 5, 9, 8. Pat Quinn Governor 10)CC1F Ern1n. McEwen Director Illinois Department of Children & Family Services REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER Date: May 10, 2011 m Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 75/1 et All Department Service Contractors I Illinois Religious seq, Re: From: To: As the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS) initiates the FY2012 contract process, we wanted to remind you of the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq" which Governor Pat Quinn signed into law in January 2011, The Act amends and supplements eXisting state and federal laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, Essentially, the new law provides two people who have entered into a civil union the same obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits that are afforded to spouses as recognized by Illinois law, The Act also recognizes 'a marriage between persons of the same sex, a civil union, or a substantially similar legal relalionship other than common law marriage, legally entered into in another jurisdiction" as a civil union, 750 IlCS 75/10 defines a 'civil union" as "a legal relationship between 2 persons, of either the same or opposite sex, established pursuant to this Act: All federal and state antidiscrimination laws, inclUding the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, are incorporated by reference into IDCFS contracts and subcontracts. The Contract proVides, in relevant part: Paragraph 4,12 (Compliance With The Law): 'The Vendor, iis employees, agents, and subcontractors shall comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, rules, ordinances, regulations, orders, federal circulars and all license and permit requirements in Ihe performance of this Contract, , " 4,14 (Applicable law): 'This Contract shall be construed in accordance wilh and is to the laws sod n,l!as of the Stele of iUinois, The Department of the DIr'ecflOl' Monroe Street. Sp!ri!J!gfil,ld, llluwis 62101 Human Rights' Equal Opportunity requirements (44 Ill. Adm. Code 750) am incorporated by reference . .. In compliance with the illinois and federal Conslitutions, the Illinois Human Rights Act, the U. S. Civii Rights Act, and Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act and other applicable laws and rules, the Stete does not unlawfully discriminate in employment, contracts, or any other activity." Paragraph 5.2 (Standard Certifications): "Vendor certifies it and its employees and subcontractors will comply with applicable provisions of the U. S. Civil Rights Act, ... and applicable rules in performance under this Contract." Paragraph 5.22 (Standard Certifications): "Vendor certifies it complies with the Illinois Department of Human Rights Act and rules appilcable to public contracts, including equal employment opportunity, refraining from unlawful discrimination, and having written sexual harassment policles (J75 ILCS 5/2-105)." Additional anU-discrimination requirements are reflected in Paragraphs 2.2 (Supplies and/or Services Required) and 5 (Standard Certifications) of the Contract and IDCFS Rules 308 (Nondiscrimination Requirements of Department Service Providers), 357 (Purchase of Service), and 429 (Equal Employment Opportunity Through The Department of Children and Family Services). loeFS Contractors and their subcontractors are reqUired to comply with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act and all other state and federal equal opportunity laws. A Contractor's execution of the IDCFS Contract shall be its certification of compliance with the applicable laws, regUlations, and rules. IDCFS Rule 357.110 (Compliance During the Contract Period) specifies that "Purchase of Service providers under contract to the Department must comply with Federal and State laws and regulations and Department rules. When the prOVider signs the purchase of service contract. this signature shall be the provider's certification of compliance with the applicable laws, regulations and rules." A Contractor's or its subcontractor's failure to comply with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act and other non-discrimination requirements will adversely affect the contractual relationship. Paragraph 5.1 of the IOCFS Contract notifies Contractors that "As part of each certification. Vendor acknowtedges and agrees that should vendor or its subcontractors provide false information, or fail to be or remain in compliance with the Standard Certification requirements, one or more of the following sanctions will apply: the contract may be void by operation of law, the State may void the contract. and the Vendor and its subcontractors may be SUbject to one or more of the follcwing: suspension, debarment, denial of payment, civll fine, or criminal penalty." Please do not hesitate to contact the IDCFS Office of Contract Administration al406 E. MOioro'3, Station 455. Springfield, illinois 62701 shOUld you have any questions. 2 the followingl Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 224 Monday, November 22, 21}10 Title 3- The President 71319 Presidential Documents Executive Order 13559 of November 17, 2010 Fundamental Principles and Policymaking Criteria for Part- nerships With Faith-Based and Other Neighhorhood Organi- zations By the authority vested in me as President by tbe Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to guide Federal agancies in formulating and developing policies with implications fur faith-based and other neighborhood organizations. to promote compliance with constitu- tional and other applicable legal principles, and to strengthen the capacity of faith-based and other neighborhood organizations to deliver services effec- tively to those in need. it is hereby ordered: Section 1. Amendments to Executive Order 13279. Executive Order 13279 of December 12, 2002 (Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations), as amended, is hereby further amended: (a) in section 1, by striking subsection (e), and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(e) 'Specified agency heads' meens: (i) the Attorney General; (il) the Secretary of Agricqlture; (iii) the Secretary of Comierce; (iv) the Secretary of Labor; (v) the Secretary of Health and Human Services; (vi) the Secretary of Hou,ing and Urban Development; (Vii) the Secretary of Education; (viii) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; (ix) the Secretary of Homeland Security; (x) the Administrator of tbe Environmental Protection Agency; (xi) the Administrator of the Small Business Administration; (xU) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International apm.nt; and (xiii) the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and Community Service,"; (b) by striki.ng section 2, and inserting in Heu thereof "Sec. Z. Fundamental and that have for 0 administer social SEirvlcB p awards or sulb,aw,:rdsJ TITrr' Ll lp18 l " the "-, r {a) financial assistance for sodal service pr<)glarr;s should be tlibuted in the most effective and efficient manner pOlssiljlB. 71320 Federal Register / VoL 75, No. 224/ Monday, November ZZ, 2010/ Presidential Documents orr Federal Hnancial p for benendaries sball (cJ No organization should be discriminated against on the basis of religion or religious belief in the administration or distribution of Federal financial assistance under social service programs. (dJ All organizations that receive Federai financial assistance under social service programs should b. prohibited from discriminating against bene- ficiaries or prospective beneficiaries of the social service programs on the basis of religion or religious belief. Accordingly! organizationsl in providing services supported in whole or in part with Federal financial assistance, and in their outreach activities related to such services, should not be allowed to discriminate against current or prospective program beneficiaries on the basis of religion, a religious belief, a refusal to hold a religious belief, or a refusal to attend or participate in a religious practice. (eJ The Federal Government must implement Federal programs in accord- ance with the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as other applica- ble law, and must monitor and enforce standards regarding the relationship between religion and government in ways that avoid excessive entanglement between religious bodies and governmental entities. (f) Organizations that engage in explicitly religious activities (including activities that involve overt religious content such as worship. religious instruction, or proselytizationJ must perform such activities and offer such services outside of programs that are supported with direct Federal financial assistance (including through prime awards or sub-awards), separately in time or location from any such programs or services supported with direct Federal financial assistance, and participation in any such explicitly religious activities must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social service program supported with such Federal financial assistance. (gJ Faith-based organizations should be eligibie to compete for Federal financial assistance used to support social service programs and to participate fully in the social service programs supported with Federal financial assist w Ufice without impairing their independence, autonomy, expression outside the programs in question, or religious character. Accordingly, a faithbased organization that applies for, or participates in, a social service program supported with Federal finandal assistance may retain its independence and may continue to carry out its mission, including the definition, develop- ment, practice. and expression of its religions beliefs, provided that it does not use direct Federal financial assistance that it receives (including through a prime award or sub-award) to support or engage in any explicitly religious activities (including activities that involve overt religious content such as worship, religious instruction, o.r proselytizationl, or in any other manner prohibited by law. Among other things, faith-based organizations that receive Federal financial assistance may use their facilities to provide social services supported with Federal financial assistance, without removing or altering religions art, icons, scriptures, or other symbols from these facilities. In addition, a faith-based organization that applies for, or participates in, a social service program supported with Federal financial assistance may retain terms in its name, select its board members on a religious basis, include religious references in its organization's mission statements and other chartering or documents. Each fDr assistance service of such progtl!1lls pmsuftnt t6 to an Alternative Provider. of a social service program 3ss1stance to the: character that pr,nv,ct". services the \vithin a reasonable time after the date CJ oeoe,hclary to an alternative Federal RegismrlVoL 75, No. 2241 Monday, November 22, 2010lPresidential Documents 71321 Federal financial assistance shan establish policies and procedures de- signed to ensure that (1) appropriate and timely referrals ar<l made to an alternative provider; (2) all referrals are made in a manner consistent with all applicable privacy laws and regulations; (3) the organization subject to subsection (h)(i) notifies the agency of any referral; (4) sucb organization has established a process for determining whether the bene- ficiary has contacted the alternative provider; and (5) each beneficiary of a social service program receives written notice of the protections set forth in this subsection prior to enrolling in or receiving services from such program. h) To promote transparency and accountahility, agencies that provide Federal financial assistance for social service programs shall post online, in an easily accessible maDner l regulations, guidance documents. and policies that reflect or elahorate upon the fundamental principles described in this section. Agencies shall also post online a list of entities that receive Federal financial assistance for provision of social service programs, consistent with law and pursuant to guidance set forth in paragraph (c) of section 3 of this order. (j) Decisions abont awards of Federal financial assistance must be free from political interference or even the appearance of such interference and must he made on the basis of merit; not on the basis of the religious affiliation of a recipient organization or lack thereof."; (c) by striking section 3, and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Sec. 3. Ensuring Uniform Implementation Across the Federal Government. In order to promote uniformity in agencies' policies that have implications for faith-based and other neighborhood organizations and in related guidance, and to ensure that those policies and guidance are consistent with the fundamental principles set forth in section 2 of this order, there is established an Interagency Working Group on Faith-Based and Other Neigbborhood Partnerships (Working Group). (a) Mission and Function af the Working Group. The Working Group shall meet periodically to review and evaluate existing agency regulations, guidanco documents, and policies that have implications for faithbased and other neighborbood organizations. Where appropriate, specified agency heads shall, to the extent permitted by law, amend all such existing policies of their respective agencies to ensure that they are consistent with the fundamental principles set forth in section 2 of this order. (b) Uniform Agency Implementation. Within 120 days of the date of this order, the 'Working Group shall submit a report to the President on amend roents, changes, or additions that are necessary to ensure that regulations and guidance documents associated with the distribution of Federal financial assistance for social service programs are consistent with the fundamental principles set forth in section 2 of this order, The Working Group's report should include, but not be limited to, a model set of regulations and guidance documents for agencies to adopt in the following BIeas: (1) prohibited uses of direct Federal financial assistance and separation requirements; (in for identity; [iii) the distinction be- tween 1;direct" '.lindire-cf l financial for beneficiaries of social service transparency consistent with and in furt.henmce open ;feen,"c,'C'V:C," '"w'tell,llslGa'lllial d thoiSe HH.i:i111t peBr traL'1ing on these matters State, and local and Fsderal assistance under social servite this and in agency' c with section 2 of this the V report and BafH?tl th10 f)ffiCfJ Order l(C}, "community" and 71322 Federal Register I VoL 75, No. 224 I Monday, November 22, 2010lPresidentiaJ Documents (c) Guidance. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), following receipt of a copy of the report of the Working Group, and in coordination with the Department of Justice, shall issue guidance to agencies on the implementation of this order, including in particular subsections 2(hHiJ (d) Membership of the Working Group. The Director of the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and a senior official from the OMB designated by the Director of the OMS shall serve as the Co-Cbairs of the Working Group. The Co-Chairs shall convene regnlar meetings of the Working Group, determine its agenda, and direct its work. In addition to the Co-Chairs. the Working Group shall consist of a senior official with knowledge of policies that have implications for faith-based and other neigh- borhood organizations from the following agencies and offices: (i) the Department of State; (ii) the Department of Justice; (iii) the Department of the Interior; (iv) the Department of Agriculture; (v) the Department of Commerce; (vi) the Department of Labor; (vii) the Department of Health and Human Services; (viii) the Department of Housing and Urban Development; fix) the Department of Education; (x) the Department of Veterans Affairs; (xi) the Department of Homeland Security; (xii) the Environmental Protection Agency; {xiii} the Small Business Administration; (xiv) the United States Agency for International Development; (xv) the Corporation for National and Community Service; and (xvi) other agencies and offices as the President, from time to time, may designate. (e) Administration of the Initiative. The Department of Health and Human Services shall provide funding and administrative support for the Working Group to the extent permitted by law and within existing appropriations."; and (d) by striking in the title, preamble. and section inserting in lieu thereof '"'other Sec:. 2. General Provisions. This order amends the contained in Executive 13279, Thia order supplern811ts, does not rSf!uirerueots contained in Executive Orders 13118 and 13199 of 29, and Executive Order 13498 of 5, Wa9. this order shaH be CODSUUBd to law to an executive or 0 affect: agency, or the functions Df thB Director of the OMB relJ,tirig to bwdg"jd!y Federal Register/Vol. 75, No. 224/Monday, November 22, 2010/Presidential Documents 71323 (d) This order is not intended to, and doos not. create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States t its departments. agencies. or entities. its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. THE WHITE HOUSE, November 17, 2010. ~ ; : R Doc. 2010-29579 fJled 11-19-10; 11:15 Bml nillir.g CQile 3195-Wl-P VERIFICAnON Steve Roach, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese of Springfieid-in-Illinois, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to Section I-I 09 of the Code ofCivil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/1-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs' Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, Writs of Prohibitions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations offact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 5th day ofJuly, 2011. VERIFICATION Trish Fox, upon her oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Chief Executive Officer of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 511-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs' Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, Writs of Prohibitions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. VERlFICATlON Glenn Van Cura, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet, Inc., an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State oflllinois, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs' Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, Writs of Prohibitions, and Other Relief, that said allegations offact are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet, Inc. and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact may pertain 10 other plaintiffs herein, I am infonmed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid. Further this Declarant sayeth not, this S- day of July, 2011.
TRO by Life Legal Defense Foundation connected to law suit challenging a Huntsville Zoning Board action to allow an abortion facility to open across from a middle school in violation of state and local law.