The current situation in South Kordofan

Paper presented by Hafiz Mohamed Director Justice Africa Sudan hafiz@justiceafricasudan.org Introduction

South Kordofan is one of the most conflict-ridden areas of Sudan. The 20 years of civil war in the region led to a huge migration of people from rural areas to cities in North Sudan, particularly to Khartoum. The region has also been stricken by extreme poverty and recurrent famine. In 2005 a peace agreement was signed between the government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) to end the war, and South Kordofan was included in this agreement through an additional protocol (The Three Areas Protocol). The Three Areas Protocol allowed the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) to share in local governance of South Kordofan. It also gave the region 2% of the countrys oil income. This agreement called for an election in the fourth year of the CPA; however, due to disagreements concerning the 2008 census results and constituencies demarcation, the election was postponed. South Kordofan hosts 1300 kilometres of the 2010 kilometres of the North-South border, bordering four South Sudan states. Although South Kordofan contains many natural resources. Throughout the modern history of Sudan, it has made huge contributions to the national economy through its primary economic activity, agriculture, particularly producing seeds for oil and Arabic gum. Indeed, South Kordofan contains more than 6 million hectares of fertile land useful for rain-intensive agriculture. Mechanized farming has been seen in the region; however, it has not been developed due to the civil war and the ensuing insecurity which persisted even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. South Kordofan also plays a significant role in the cattle-raising sector of the economy. Indeed, at least one third of the animals raised for export are found in South Kordofan. In addition to agricultural activities, South Kordofan is likely to take on greater importance following the separation of South Sudan. After July, 2011, South Kordofan will represent the only source of oil revenue for North Sudan, as all remaining oil fields in the North are located there.

As the interim period comes to an end, the region still suffers from the same problems it suffered from before, and people in the region have not seen any benefits from the CPA and the Three Areas Protocol apart from a few roads and government buildings built using the 2% share of oil awarded to South Kordofan in the Wealth Sharing Protocol. The rivalry between the NCP and SPLM has led to insecurity in the region and to a greater proliferation of arms. The area used to be controlled by the SPLM before the agreement, and it is still not truly under the control of the regional government. Regional elections were postponed due to disagreements over the 2008 census results. This disagreement required that the census be repeated in 2010, with the regional elections finally taking place in May, 2011, with a supplementary election for the regional assembly and the states governor. NCP-SPLM Relations For the last two years, relations between the leadership of SPLM and the NCP were considered to be excellent due to the pragmatic approach of Abdele Asis Adam, Hilow, and Ahmed Haron. They decided to work together for the benefit of the region and its people rather than bring the differences between Khartoum and Juba to Kadugli, the regional capital. This approach managed to restored law and order as well as address very difficult security challenges. Relations began to deteriorate during the election campaign and totally collapsed after the Arab militia attack on the area of AlFayed Umabdella Rashad locality in April 2011. The Regional Election The May 2011 election in South Kordofan was one of the more contested elections in terms of campaigning and preparation. The slogans used by the two main parties made it clear that the losing party would not accept the results and that the dispute could lead to violence. The weakness of the National Election Commission and the Election Commission in South Kordofan aggravated the situation, ultimately serving to encourage the SPLM to reject the election results and accuse the NCP of rigging the election. Disarming SPLA in North Sudan The decision by the government in Khartoum to disarm all SPLA elements in the North by the 31st May 2011 was not based on the CPA security arrangement protocol. The CPA security arrangement protocol stated clearly that the Joint Military Units must be dissolved 90 days after the end of the interim period, meaning October 2011, not April 2011 as stated by the SAF chief of Staffs letter to the SPLA chief of Staff. Additionally,

nothing has been done to address the needs of the Nuba within SPLA. They are from North Sudan and no arrangements have been made to disarm them or reintegrate them into civilian life. This is particularly important, as it is difficult to disarm SPLA soldiers in South Kordofan and Blue Nile without addressing the remaining political issues in those areas. Many soldiers believe that the popular consultations in the region were delayed because the NCP wants to stall the process in order to keep the two states under its control. This dynamic was clear in Blue Nile, where the whole process has stalled out. The Scale of the Crisis It is clear from the reaction of SPLA in South Kordofan that they are well prepared for war. Almost all their troops are stationed in Jao (on the 1 January 1956 North/South border). The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is building up their army and military hardware before the May 2011 election. Currently, the size of their forces in the region exceeds the size it was in 2002, with two and a half divisions deployed in the area. According to the security arrangements in place, their armament levels are supposed to be at 1985 levels, or pre-war levels, meaning roughly one battalion. In addition to the armed forces, the government has armed not only the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) but also some Arab tribes. The state is now divided along ethnic lines, which has shown itself particularly in the politics of the state. The election results illustrated that the SPLM received most of its support from the Nuba and other African tribes and while the NCP received support predominantly from Arab tribes.

Addis Ababa Framework Agreement Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, signed on the 28th June 2011 by GOS and SLMA-N, is a step forward and needs to be implemented immediately, especially secession of hostilities and allowing humanitarian NGOs access to thousands of IDPs currently in need of assistance. At the time, the framework requires the use of intensive negotiations in order to resolve outstanding issues and ensure that the region does not return to war. It is clear that the framework agreement has been rejected by some segments of the National Congress Party (NCP) and this has delayed any agreement to end hostilities. These delays will ultimately increase the suffering of thousands of IDPs. I think one of the main reasons for the delay because the NCP want to change the situation on the ground as they are deploying huge numbers of forces to the region, as that might

improve their negotiations position, but until now they fail to make that needed breakthrough in terms of military gains and might harden SPLA position more as time is not in favour of Sudan armed forces (SAF) as the rain will make it more difficult for them to move around. The current situation on the ground The fighting between SAF and the SPLA still continues in many fronts, including in the suburbs of Kadugli. Both sides have built up their military hardware and currently show no signs of seeking a reduction in hostilities. The beginning of the rainy season in South Kordofan will make it increasingly difficult to reach IDPs, many of whom desperately need assistance. With little chance of a quick victory for either side, the continuation of the war will only bring more suffering. Furthermore, it will weaken the country at a time when it currently faces many other problems, including a deteriorating economy stricken by the loss of oil revenue. The regional dimension of the conflict The conflict between the SLA and the SPLA in South Kordofan has greater regional implications, largely as a result of its location and its links to the conflict between North and South Sudan. The SPLA in South Kordofan has many links to the SPLA in South Sudan, which will be the army of the new state. Hence, it is impossible for the conflict in South Kordofan not to involve South Sudan, even when SPLM leaders make it clear that they do not want another war. This conflict also shares the same root causes as the conflict in Darfur most prominently the issue of marginalisation at the hands of the central elite (an issue also faced by the state of Blue Nile). Additionally, the SPLAs future in North Sudan has not been settled, and the popular consultations are still pending. It is most likely that the armed movements in Darfur and the SPLA in South Kordofan will engage in some sort of coordination politically and militarily in order to put pressure on Khartoum. As a result, time is not at the side of Khartoum. On the 9th of July many things will change and Khartoum will have to negotiate with different groups, most importantly with South Sudan, in order to settle outstanding issues. What urgently needed now? The current conflict in South Kordofan has taken ethnic and tribal lines, and that is very dangerous and must be addressed immediately, as it will

have impact on the inter-tribal relations and will likely lead to larger conflicts. A process of inter-tribal reconciliation needs to be put into place to defuse the tension and prevent any possible actions which might be taken by any of the parties. Security arrangements must address the issue of the Popular Defence Forces, since they represent a threat to the peace and stability in the region. The current conflict between SPLA and SAF in south Kordafan might soon widen to include Blue Nile as SPLA in Blue Nile has made it clear that they will not engage in any security arrangement without resolving the remaining political issues at the time with Khartoum main condition is they will not enter into any political arrangement without security arrangement which mean disarming SPLA elements in the north. Time is not in their favour of Khartoum as rebel groups in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur might form an alliance and create a new north/ south war in Northern Sudan and they might change their objective to regime change and that will force Khartoum to fight in many fronts and we dont think they are prepare for that.