T H E B R O Y H I L L L E T T E R
“Historical experience tends to support the proposition that a suf
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ciently determined Fed can peg or cap Treasury bond prices and yields at other than the shortest maturities. The most striking episode of bond-price pegging occurred during the years before the Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord of 1951. Prior to that agreement, which freed the Fed from its responsibility to
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x yields on government debt, the Fed maintained a ceiling of 2-1/2 percent on long-term Treasury bonds for nearly a decade . . . The Fed was able to achieve these low interest rates despite a level of outstanding gov- ernment debt (relative to GDP) signi
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cantly greater than we have today, as well as in
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ation rates substantially more variable . . . Interestingly,though, the Fed enforced the 2-1/2 percent ceiling on long-term bond yields for nearly a decade without ever holding a substantial share of long- maturity bonds outstanding.” – Ben Bernanke, De
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ation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here (2002)“The rare occasions of liquidity traps are very different from typical economic recessions. Consequently, they require a unique monetary policy response. Economic theory tells us that in such circumstances monetary policy should aim to lower the real, or in
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ation-adjusted, rate of inter- est by temporarily allowing in
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ation to rise above its long-run path . . . The higher in
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ation would decrease the real interest rate, raising the opportunity cost of holding money. This would provide an incentive for banks and corporations to release funds for investment and in the pro- cess spur job creation.” – Chicago Fed President Charles Evans (2010)
Executive Summary
Policymakers have put all their eggs in a basket that has never been “stress tested,” hatched from a chicken that no one hasseen for a century. Unconventional has become conventional, especially in terms of monetary policy. But current policy isunlikely to be as effective in supporting aggregate demand as “economic theory” would suggest. The transmission mecha-nism to the real economy is broken. In a
Balance Sheet Recession
, monetary policy is hopeless, so
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scal policy is requiredto
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ll the gap in private sector demand. De
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cit spending is harmful when it fails to enhance long term productivity or toproduce a future stream of cash
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ows capable of servicing the increased debt load. But an intelligent
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scal response is oneof the few weapons in our arsenal for dealing with a protracted downturn. Needless to say,
Cash for Clunkers
does not
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tour de
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nition of “intelligent.” We need smart policies from strong leaders such as investment in infrastructure, incentivesfor research and development, a simpli
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ed and predictable tax policy, and heaven forbid someone actually address ourlong term entitlement liabilities! While consumers’ desire to pay down debt is positive for the long term health of the economy, the lack of new credit ham-pers the economy’s ability to recover through the normal post-recession cyclical channels. As such, government spending is required to arti
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cially support economic growth while the private sector rebuilds its balance sheet and is once againable to support healthy levels of credit creation. Fiscal policy is the only way to deal with a large output gap.
Frontloaded Fiscal Austerity
is counterproductive and would only serve as a de
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ationary shock to aggregate demand - especially if thedeveloped world’s economies pursue it at the same time (don’t look now, but this is exactly the policy being jammed downEurope’s throat today). History warns that when governments stop stimulus too soon, recessionary forces reassert them-selves. Poorly timed de
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cit reductions can reduce GDP and prompt a drop in tax revenues, translating into bigger de
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cits,more cuts, less taxes, etc. (i.e. Southern Europe). This is the type of self-reinforcing cycle policy makers have nightmaresabout. Unfortunately, maintaining
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scal stimulus for the entire duration of a
Balance Sheet Recession
is politically impossible. There are many, many years of deleveraging ahead of us.
Lower for Longer
We have long believed that the path of least resistance for interest rates is down, at least until the deleveraging processhas run its course. In other words, demand for credit will remain muted until the private sector reduces its debt to moremanageable levels. Fiscal de
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cits are not crowding out private sector borrowing because the private sector doesn’t want
SECOND QUARTER 2011