CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION A FEW IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS ON FERTILITY AN ARTICLE LITERACY IN INDIA

DATA ANALYSIS LITERATURE SURVEY ARTICLE

AND

AN

CONTRACEPTION INDIA

ON

MODERNISATION, FERTILITY CHANGES IN

CONCLUSION BIBLOGRAPHY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

INTRODUCTION
Unlike most empirical works on fertility analysis, this study is an attempt to analyze the dynamics of fertility and its determinants with a particular focus on the role played by female education and family planning programs in the context of a traditional society. The analysis is based on the application of the following dynamic time-series techniques in a multivariate context: co-integration, and variance decompositions. These "dynamic" tools are recently developed and hitherto untried in fertility analysis in the context of a poor developing economy, such as India. The results based on the above most recently developed methodology, broadly indicate that in the complex dynamic interactions, the importance of conventional "structural" hypothesis factor in bringing fertility down in the longer term cannot be denied. However, overall, in the short to long term, the findings appear to be more consistent with the recent "ideational" hypothesis (emphasizing the critical role played by the two policy variables in the analysis--i.e., changes in the female secondary enrollment ratios, and family planning programs--to ensure "initial" fertility decline) than with the conventional "structural" hypothesis (emphasizing a significant socioeconomic structural change as a pre-condition for "initial" fertility decline). THE PROJECT AIMS TO:
To study the trend in total fertility rate(TFR),literacy rate and analysis of couple protection rate (CPR) state wise, using a bar diagram. 2 To find out the correlations between couple protection rate, literacy rate and Total Fertility rate among the community. And also to find out the multiple correlation coefficient with the total correlation coefficients between pairs of variable. 3. To analyse the regression of total fertility rate on couple protection rate and of total fertility rate on literacy rate.

Project Title: Role of Education and Family Planning - A State Level analysis Couple protection rate (199092)=x1 47 23.6 42.8 23.1 47.8 49.3 49.7 58.4 49.1 63.3 36.5 53.7 34.9 20.7 13 36.3 58.7 31.8 49.8 56.1 19.8 57.4 60.3 Literacy rate (1991)=x2 44.09 41.59 52.89 38.48 75.51 61.29 55.85 63.86 56.04 89.81 44.2 64.87 59.89 49.1 61.65 49.09 58.51 38.55 62.66 60.44 41.6 57.7 75.29

State Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Tripura Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Delhi Source UNDP: HDR 2001

Total Fer 92)=y

A FEW IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS:

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE: The total fertility rate (TFR, sometimes also called the fertility rate, period total fertility rate (PTFR) or total period fertility rate (TPFR)) of a population is the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (1) she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime, and (2) she were to survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by summing the single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

COUPLE PROTECTION RATE:

Couple Protection Rate is one of the proximate determinants of fertility. Since fertility is affected by a number of socio-cultural and biological factors, an increase in contraceptives acceptance need not necessarily be associated with a decline in fertility

LITERACY RATE:
The traditional definition of literacy is considered to be the ability to read and write, or the ability to use language to read, write, listen. Literacy rate means the number of people in a country who can read and write. The term may also refer to familiarity with literature and to a basic level of education obtained through the written word.

FAMILY PLANNING:
Family planning is the planning of when to have children, and the use of birth control and other techniques to implement such plans. Other techniques commonly used include sexuality education, prevention and management of sexually transmitted infections, counseling and management, and infertility management.

DATA ANALYSIS
1. BAR DIAGRAM:

2 .

Multiple Variable Correlation Matrix.

CPR LR TFR CPR 1 0.65005 5 0.39009 LR 1 0.714 7 1 TFR

Planning for Life aims to improve the health of young men and women ages 10-24 by addressing their reproductive health needs and by promoting the integration of reproductive health (RH) and family planning (FP) as critical components of youth development programming. The purpose of the matrix is to provide youth-serving organizations with a guide of topics on family planning. The matrix can assist technical experts, program managers, health providers, peer educators and others to determine what topics and interventions best fit into their own respective programs while taking cultural paradigms into consideration. The depth of each topic should be viewed within the context of a continuous process, wherein a young person's knowledge base continues to evolve as they pass through each progressive age group. Although the topics may be the same, the information provided will differ by age. The tool can be applied in any setting or program serving youth such as schools, outreach and peer education programs, community-based youth services or youth-friendly clinics. Special attention should be given to vulnerable groups, such as working youth, street children, refugees, and migrant workers, who may need more information on risk reduction and preventive behaviours at earlier ages. Additionally, certain topics such as post-abortion care, child marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM) should be introduced in a manner that is mindful of both country relevance and cultural appropriateness. The matrix was developed by IYF in consultation with partner organizations and YRH experts from around the world, and field tested in workshops in Tanzania, India and the Philippines.

3. REGRESSION OF TOTAL FERTILITY RATE ON COUPLE PROTECTION RATE:

SUMMARY OUTPUT Regression Statistics Multiple R R Square Adjusted R Square Standard Error Observations ANOVA df Regression Residual Total 1 21 22 Coefficients 4.789641626 -0.029764782 SS 4.323554616 24.08948886 28.41304348 Standard Error 0.692332718 0.015331561 MS 4.323554616 1.147118517 F 3.7690566

0.390087107 0.152167951 0.111794997 1.071036189 23

Sig 0

Intercept X Variable 1 REGRESSION EQN IS Y=4.7896-0.029764X

t Stat 6.918121164 -1.94140583

P-value 7.7862E-07 0.06574712

Lo 3. -0

There is a negative correlation between tfr and cpr since beta is negative Null hypothesis for both alpha and beta is rejected since their t statistic lies in the critical regi to zero.

4. REGRESSION OF TOTAL FERTILITY RATE ON LITERACY RATE:

SUMMARY OUTPUT Regression Statistics

Multipl eR R Square Adjust ed R Square Standa rd Error Observ ations ANOVA

0.71 4703 192 0.51 0800 653 0.48 7505 446 0.81 3564 828 23

df Regres sion Residu al Total 1 21 22 Coef ficie nts 7.12 0626 718 0.06 3604 73

SS 14.51 3401 17 13.89 9642 31 28.41 3043 48 Stan dard Error 0.787 9625 7 0.013 5830 39

MS 14.5 134 012 0.66 188 773

F 21.9 272 9

Signifi cance F 0.0001 27209

Interce pt X Variabl e1

t Stat 9.03 675 757 4.68 265 795

Pvalu e 1.11 E-08 0.00 012 7

Lower 95% 5.4819 68854 0.0918 522

Upper 95% 8.759 2846 0.035 3573

Lower 95.0% 5.48196 885 0.09185 22

Upper 95.0% 8.75928 458 0.03535 73

Y=7.121-0.064X(1)

This is the regression equation of Total Fertility Rate(Y) on Literacy Rate(X1), for the data of 27 Indian States for the year 1992.We see that the two variables have a negative relation.

Analysi s:

Null hypothesis for intercept is rejected. So we conclude that alpha is not equal to zero.

We can say this because the t- statistic lies in the critical region. Null hypothesis for x variable i.e. beta is rejected so we conclude that beta is not equal to zero. Therefore there is clear evidence that there is a correlation between TFR and LR.

LITERATURE SURVEY:

South Asia, for the purposes of this chronicle, is composed of eight countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. There are sharp contrasts between these countries, be it in terms of demographic growth, population density, mortality and fertility rates, urbanization or literacy. And the situation within India, the largest country in the region, is itself one of major internal contrasts. Its 28 states each have distinct demographic traits population size, stage of demographic transition, density etc. as well as different economic, social and religious characteristics The fertility transition in India during the 1990s was characterized by large fertility differences between the countrys northern and southern states(22) (Nair and Vron, 2002). At that time, fertility in the southern states Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh was 2 children per woman, whereas women in the northern states Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan were still producing 3-4 children on average (Table 14). No single factor can account for these contrasts in fertility (Vron, 2000). Levels of infant mortality and fertility are certainly both lower in the southern states, but the changing relationship over time between these two indicators varies from state to state, as the covariation in these indicators over the period 1981-1994 shows. On Figure 8, each dot represents a combination of fertility and infant mortality at a given point in time, and each broken line plots the covariation in fertility and infant mortality in one state between 1981 and 1994. Over this period, the combined fertility and infant mortality values are consistently lower in the four southern states than in the northern states, and Generally speaking, at state level, no close relationship between fertility and infant mortality is observed. Variation in one of these indicators may be accompanied by no clear change, or even by an increase in the other, thus producing a somewhat erratic trajectory over time. The other variables usually considered have equally limited explanatory power. Though the states in the north of India are less urbanized than those in the south, and fertility is invariably lower in urban than in rural areas, the degree of urbanization does not explain the fertility level in a state: Bihar is less urbanized than Uttar Pradesh, yet fertility was lower there in the early 1990s, and Kerala, though less urbanized than Tamil Nadu, also had lower fertility (Table 15). The scale of fertility differences between urban and rural areas varies widely within states. Rural fertility exceeds urban fertility by 8% in Tamil Nadu while the difference is 45% in Uttar Pradesh. A relationship also exists between female level of education and fertility: more educated women have fewer children. On its own, however, the educational level of mothers does not explain the fertility differences: in 1991-1992, fertility among illiterate women ranged, for a national average of 4 children, from 2.31 in Kerala to 5.36 in Uttar Pradesh. Fertility also rises with the proportion of people living below the poverty line. However, comparable proportions living below the poverty line (43% in Madhya Pradesh and 45% in Tamil Nadu) can be associated with very different fertility levels (3.9 and 2.5 children per woman, respectively). Equally, the differences in fertility between states are not explained by the religious composition of the population, even though at the national level the number of children per woman does vary by religion (with a difference of one additional child for Muslims relative to Hindus in 1990-1992). In Tamil Nadu, Muslim and Hindu women produce the same number of children, whereas the fertility of Hindus in 1990-1992 ranged from 1.7 children per woman in Kerala to 4.7 in Uttar

Pradesh. The most recent data for India, taken from NFHS-3, show persistently strong spatial disparities in fertility, ranging from 1.79 children per woman in Goa and Andhra Pradesh to 4 in Bihar (Table 16). Replacing the north-south division of India by a finer geographical subdivision that splits the country into north, centre, east, north-east, west and south does not cause any homogeneous regions to appear although the previous demarcation lines disappear. Thus, under the partitioning for NFHS-3, what is termed the north region contains Himachal Pradesh where fertility was 1.94 children per woman and Rajasthan where it was 3.21 children per woman. In the north-east region, fertility ranges from 2.02 in Sikkim to 3.80 in Meghalaya. The southern states, however, remain relatively homogeneous in terms of fertility, which is everywhere at sub-replacement level. 2.68 children per woman and 21.8% of the population lived below the poverty line, yet for similar fertility levels, as in Gujarat and Orissa (2.42 and 2.37 children per woman, respectively) the associated proportions in poverty diverged widely: 12.5% of the population in the former and 39.9% in the latter. The difficulty of identifying simple determinants of fertility at the aggregate level of states was clearly illustrated several years ago by a multivariate analysis of the relationship between fertility and womens education, which also considered the indirect effects of female education via infant mortality and age at marriage (Sharma and Retherford, 1990). The models explanatory power was not improved by introducing the level of urbanization. When the residuals were mapped, the deviations from the value explained by the model exhibited geographical contiguity by size, suggesting the influence of regional or local factors (religion, customs, and such like). The complexity of the processes at work was highlighted in a geographical analysis of the fertility transition in southern India by C. Z. Guilmoto and I. S. Rajan (2005), which showed that the explanation needs to include family planning programmes, socioeconomic transformations, and changing reproductive attitudes, and take into account local contexts and the changes affecting them. These authors also viewed the reduction in fertility as the consequence of a social change that diffused gradually between neighbouring populations (Guilmoto and Rajan, 1998 and 2001).

 The World health organization (WHO) and World Bank estimate that $3.00 per person per year would provide basic family planning, maternal and neonatal health care to women in developing countries. This would include contraception, prenatal, delivery and post-natal care in addition to postpartum family planning and the promotion of condoms to prevent sexually transmitted infections. The world's largest international source of funding for population and reproductive health programs is the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The main goals of the International Conference on Population and Development Program of Action are:
Universal access to reproductive health services by 2015 Universal primary education and closing the gender gap in education by 2015 Reducing maternal mortality by 75% by 2015 Reducing infant mortality Increasing life expectancy Reducing HIV infection rates in persons aged 1524 years by 25% in the most-affected countries by 2005, and by 25% globally by 2010

Those who enjoy the greatest power within a family can often be identified by the way the household's resources are divided. Judith Bruce of the Population Council, Mayra Buvinic of the International Centre for Research on Women, Lincoln C. Chen and Amartya Sen of Harvard University and others have observed that the sharing of resources within a household is often unequal even when the differences in needs are taken into account. In poor households in the Indian subcontinent, for example, men and boys usually get more sustenance than do women and girls, and the elderly get less than the young. Such inequities prevail over fertility choices as well. Here also men wield more influence, even though women typically bear the greater cost. To grasp how great the burden can be, consider the number of live babies a woman would normally have if she managed to survive through her childbearing years. This number, called the total fertility rate, is between six and eight in the sub-Saharan Africa. Each successful birth there involves at least a year and a half of pregnancy and breast-feeding. So in a society where female life expectancy at birth is 50 years and the fertility rate is, say, seven, nearly half a woman's adult life is spent either carrying a child in her womb or breastfeeding it. And this calculation does not allow for unsuccessful pregnancies
Given such a high cost of procreation, one expects that women, given a choice, would opt for fewer children. But are birth rates in fact highest in societies where women have the least power within the family? Data on the status of women from the 79 so- called Third World countries display an unmistakable pattern: high fertility, high rates of illiteracy,

low share of paid employment and high percentage working at home for no pay - they all hang together. From the statistics alone it is difficult to discern which of these factors are causing, and which are merely correlated with high fertility. But the findings are consistent with the possibility that lack of paid employment and education limits a woman's ability to make decisions and therefore promotes population growth.

There is also good reason to think that lack of income- generating employment reduces women's power more directly then does lack of education. Such an insight has implications for policy. It is all well and good, for example, to urge governments in poor countries to invest in literacy programs. But the results could be disappointing. Many factors militate against poor households' taking advantage of subsidized education. If children are needed to work inside and outside the home, then keeping them in school (even a cheap one) is costly. In patrilineal societies, educated girls can also be perceived as less pliable and harder to marry off. Indeed, the benefits of subsidies to even primary education are reaped disproportionately by families that are better off. In contrast, policies aimed at increasing women's productivity at home and improving their earnings in the marketplace would directly empower them, especially within the family. Greater earning power for women would also raise for men the implicit costs of procreation (which keeps women from bringing in cash income). This is not to deny the value of public investment in primary and secondary education in developing countries. It is only to say we should be wary of claims that such investment is a panacea for the population problem.

Little Hands Help....

One motive, common to humankind, relates to children as ends in themselves. It ranges from the desire to have children because they are playful and enjoyable, to the desire to obey the dictates of tradition and religion. Once such injunction emanates from the cult of the ancestor, which, taking religion to be the act of reproducing the lineage, requires women to bear many children [see "High Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa," by John C. Caldwell and Pat Caldwell; Scientific American, May 1990]. Such traditions are often perpetuated by imitative behaviour. Procreation in closely knit communities is not only a private matter; it is also a social activity, influenced by the cultural milieu. Often there are norms encouraging high fertility rates that no household desires unilaterally to break. (These norms may well have outlasted any rationale they had in the past.) Consequently, so long as all others aim at large families, no household on its own will wish to deviate. Thus, a society can get stuck at a self-sustaining mode of behaviour that is characterized by high fertility and low educational attainment. This does not mean that society will live with it forever. As always, people differ in the extent to which they adhere to tradition. Inevitably some, for one reason or another, will experiment, take risks and refrain from joining the crowd. They are the nonconformists, and they help to lead the way. An increase in the female literacy could well trigger such a process. Still other motives for procreation involve viewing children as productive assets. In a rural economy where avenues for saving are highly restricted, parents value children as a source of security in their old age. Mead Cain, previously at the Population Council, studied this aspect extensively. Less discussed, at least until recently, is another kind of motivation, explored by John C. Caldwell of the Australian National University, Marc L. Nerlove of the University of Maryland and Anke S. Meyer of the World Bank and by Karl-Goran Maler of the Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics in Stockholm and me. It stems from children's being valuable to their parents not only for future income but also as a source of current income. Third World countries are, for the most part, subsistence economies. The rural folk eke out a living by using products gleaned directly from plants and animals. Much labor is needed even for simple tasks. In addition, poor rural households do not have access to modern sources of domestic energy or tap water. In semiarid and arid regions the water

supply may not even be nearby. Nor is fuel wood at hand when the forests recede. In addition to cultivating crops, caring for livestock, cooking food and producing simple marketable products, members of a household may have to spend as much as five to six hours a day fetching water and collecting fodder and wood. Children, then, are needed as workers even when their parents are in their prime. Small households are simply not viable; each one needs many hands. In parts of India, children between 10 and 15 years have been observed to work as much as one and a half times the number of hours that adult males do. By the age of six, children in rural India tend domestic animals and care for younger siblings, fetch water and collect firewood, dung and fodder. It may well be that the usefulness of each extra hand increases with declining availability of resources, as measured by, say, the distance to sources of fuel and water.

Families with greater access to resources are, however, in a position to limit their size and propel themselves into still higher income levels. It is my impression that among the urban middle classes in northern India, the transition to a lower fertility rate has already been achieved. India provides an example of how the vicious cycle I have described can enable extreme poverty to persist amid a growth in well-being in the rest of society. The Matthew effect - "Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath" - works relentlessly in impoverished countries

CONCLUSION:
This analysis suggests that the way to reduce fertility is to break the destructive spiral. Parental demand for children rather than an unmet need for contraceptives in large measure explains reproductive behaviour in developing countries. We should therefore try to identify policies that will change the options available to men and women so that couples choose to limit the number of offspring they produce. The most potent solution in semiarid regions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent is to deploy a number of policies simultaneously. Family planning services and measures that empower women are certainly helpful. As societal norms break down and traditional support systems falter, those women who choose to change their behaviour become financially and socially more vulnerable. So a literacy and employment drive for women is essential to smooth the transition to having fewer children. But improving social coordination and directly increasing the economic security of the poor are also essential. Providing cheap fuel and potable water will reduce the usefulness of extra hands. When a child becomes perceived as expensive, we may finally have a hope of dislodging the rapacious hold of high fertility rates. Each of the prescriptions suggested by our new perspective on the links between population, poverty and environmental degradation is desirable by itself, not just when we have those problems in mind.

BIBLOGRAPHY:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: