1.2 Additional characterizations of strong evaluation
1.3 Is the notion of strong evaluation too broad?
1.4 Is the notion of strong evaluation too narrow?
2HUMAN AGENTS AS STRONG EVALUATORS
2.1The disengaged and engaged perspectives
2.2Philosophical anthropology and the engaged view
2.3Why transcendental arguments?
2.5The identity crises of Anna, Bertha and Cecilia
3.1Introduction: an end (in itself)
3.2Descriptive or metaphysical personhood
3.3The moral status of actual persons
3.4The moral status of potential persons
3.5 The moral status of the fellow members of the species
CONSIST OF STRONG EVALUATIONS?
4.1Idem, ipse, collective and species-identity
4.2Varieties of ipse-identity
4.3The formation of identity in self-interpretation
4.4Can one's identity and self-interpretations be criticized?
5.1Re-identifying, acknowledging and recognizing
multidimensional, practical and strict
5.3Due recognition and responses to reasons and values
5.4Three dimensions of recognition
5.5Recognition - a precondition of personhood and identity?
6CULTURAL MORAL REALISM 1: AN OUTLINE1
6.1 Phenomenological, hermeneutical, expressive, cultural
6.2The phenomenology of moral reactions and cognitivism
6.3Evaluative features of situations and a plurality of goods
6.4The engaged perspective and the relationality of values
6.5How not to face the intercultural diversity of values
6.6How to face the intercultural diversity of values
7.2Are values metaphysically queer?
7.3Conclusion: quasi-projectivism and a return to moral realism?
8.1Meaning of "good" and "a good"
8.2Pluralism, generalism and incommensurability
8.3Are values equally "cultural"? Varieties of culture-ladenness
8.4Norms and reasons for action
9.1The reversed argument and the variety of goods
9.2The non-objectivist argument
9.3Is non-objectivism acceptable?
9.4Objectivism, reflection and evaluative knowledge
9.5Validity and universality
9.6Conclusion: internal criticism without internalist restrictions
10DOES MORAL REALITY NEED SOURCES?
10.1 The first level notions: ordinary values and our access to them
10.2Ontological background pictures
10.3 Does the constitution of goods need 'constitutive goods'?
10.5Korsgaard's question (and answer)
11EVALUATIVE BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE
11.1Acquiring moral beliefs and knowledge: normal cases
11.2Cases of missing knowledge
11.3 Real and motivated disagreements
12MORAL REALISM AND REASONS OF ONE'S OWN
12.2Orientation and commitment
12.3Uniformity and stance-sensitivity of reasons
12.4The nature of personal resonance