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AUCC Letter to Board

AUCC Letter to Board

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Published by Ariel Katz
AUCC submission to the Copyright Board replying to Access Copyright's response.
AUCC submission to the Copyright Board replying to Access Copyright's response.

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Published by: Ariel Katz on Jul 21, 2011
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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07/21/2011

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Osler.Hoskin
&
Harcourt
LLP
Suite1900,340AlbertStreetOttawa,Ontario,CanadaK1R7Y6613.235.7234
MAIN
613.235.2867
FACSIMILE
OSLER
July19,2011
Glen
A.
Bloom
DirectDial:
613.787.1073
OurMatterNo:
1059568
OttawaToronto
BYEMAIL
MontrealCalgary
Mr.GillesMcDougallSecretaryGeneralCopyrightBoardofCanadaSuite800-56SparksStreetOttawa,OntarioKIA
OC9
NewYork
DearMr.McDougall:
Access
CopyrightPost-SecondaryEducationalInstitutionsTariff,2011-2013
WearewritingtoyouonbehalfoftheAssociationofUniversitiesandCollegesofCanada("AUCC")pursuanttotheNoticeoftheBoarddatedJune16,2011.ThisletterconstitutesAUCC'sreplytotheresponseofAccessCopyright("Access")byletterdatedJuly8,2011(the"Response")toAUCC'sapplicationtoamendtheInterimTarifffiledJune8,2011(the"ApplicationtoAmend").
Introduction
IntheApplicationtoAmend(page
1),
AUCCexplainedthereasonitmadetheapplicationtoamendtheInterimTariff.Accesshadrecentlyrefusedtogranttransactionallicensestopost-secondaryeducationalinstitutionsinablatantefforttoforcetheinstitutionstooperateundertheInterimTariff.TheResponseconfirmsAccess'srefusaltogranttransactionallicensesandconfirmsthattherefusalisbasedonAccess'sdecisiontofiletheProposedTariffand"toestablishtheconditionsunderwhichusersmakecopiesofpublishedworks"(Response,page
11).
Remarkably,AccessdidnotrespondtoAUCC'srelianceontheBoard'sassurancethattheInterimTariffwouldnotbemandatory.Toreiterate,initsreasonsforgrantingtheInterimTariff,theBoardstatedatparagraph
45:
AninterimtariffdoesnotforceInstitutionstopayroyaltiesabsentanyevidencethattheyrequirealicence.Atariffappliesonlytothosewhoneedthelicence;thosewhodonot,neednotpay.Underthegeneralregime.whichappliesinthisinstance.userswhoseconsumptionpatternsjustifydifferentratesremainfreetosecure,fromAccessorfromothers.transactionalorotherlicencesthatwilltrumpthetariff.Thefactthattheinterimtariffcanbemodifiedatany
LEGAL_1:21095351.2
osler.com
 
OSLER
Page2timeensuresthatAccesswilldisplaygoodfaithinsuchnegotiations.AnymisconductonitspartwouldnecessarilybereportedtotheBoard,whichwouldtakeitintoaccountinanyfurtherconsiderationofthismatter.[footnotesomitted,emphasisadded]AUCCsubmitsthatAccessdidnotrespondtoAUCC'srelianceontheBoard'sstatementabovebecauseofitsfundamentalmisunderstandingofthegeneraltariffregime(sections70.1to70.5ofthe
CopyrightAct
(the
"Act"».
Althoughrightsholdersmayrefusetolicensecopyrightintheirworks,acollectivesocietysuchasAccesscannotrefusetograntalicensefortheworksinitsrepertoire.The
Act
protectsagainsttheabuseofmonopolisticpowerbyacollectivesocietybyproviding,throughsection70.2ofthe
Act,
ameansforausertoobtainalicensetotheworksinthecollectivesociety'Srepertoire.RecenteventsshowthatAccess'sattempttoforceAUCCmemberinstitutionstooperateundertheInterimTariffisclearlyintendedtoeliminatecompetitioninthegrantingofpermissionstoreproducecopiesofpublishedworks.Accessdoesnotonlycompetewithitsaffiliaterightsholdersinthegrantingofpermissions.NRCResearchPresshasrecentlyannouncedthatithasenteredintopartnershipwithCopyrightClearanceCentreofDenver,Massachusetts,UnitedStates("CCC").CCCoperatesRightslink®,afastandeasywaytoobtainpermissiontomakecopiesofpublishedworks.ByforcingAUCCmemberstooperateundertheInterimTariff,AccesswouldeliminatecompetitionintheuniversitysectorfromCCC.InthisreplyAUCCwillinitiallydiscussAccess'sfundamentalmisunderstandingofthegeneraltariffregime,illustratebyexampletheextremelypunitivefeesthatAccessisattemptingtoholdoverAUCCmembersinordertoforcethemintooperatingundertheInterimTariff,andthenreplytothejurisdictionalandsubstantiveissuespresentedintheAccessResponse.
TheGeneralTariffRegime
IntheResponse,Accessstates:(a)"Rightsholders(and,byextension,AccessCopyright)shouldbefreetodecideif,andhow,tolicencetheirworks"(page3);(b)"Rightsholders-andbyextension-AccessCopyright,shouldbefreetodecide.Thegeneraltariffregimeisbasedonacollectivesociety'srighttoestablishtheconditionsunderwhichusersmaymakecopiesofpublishedworks"(page11);
LEGAL_1:2
J
095351.2
 
OSLER
Page3(c)"Theamendments
[AVCC's
proposedamendmentstotheInterimTariff]suggestthatonlyAccessCopyrighthastheobligationtolicensetheuseofworksinaparticularway"(page14);and(d)"AccessCopyright'sdecision,itself,nottolicenseonatransactionalbasisinthefaceoftheProposedTariffprovidingforablanketlicenceisaunilateraldecision"(page16).ThegeneraltariffregimewasestablishedbytheamendmentstotheActenactedin1988.Theseamendmentsremovedapreviousconcernthatthelicensingofcopyrightbyacollectivesocietyofrightsofcopyrightowners(otherthanthepublicperformancerightsofcomposersandmusicpublishers)wouldbecontrarytothe
CompetitionAct.
The1988amendmentsprovidedthatwherea"licensingbody",since1997knownasa"collectivesociety",concludedanagreementauthorizingapersontousetheexclusiverightsofcopyright,thelicensingbodyorthatpersoncouldfiletheagreementwiththeCopyrightBoardofCanada(the"Board").Section32ofthe
CompetitionAct
l
didnotapplyinrespectofsuchanagreementfiledwiththeBoard.TheamendmentsfurtherprovidedthattheDirectorofInvestigationandResearch(the"Director"),nowtheCommissionerofCompetition,couldhaveaccesstoanagreementfiledwiththeBoard,andiftheDirectorconsideredtheagreementcontrarytothepublicinterest,theDirectorcouldrequesttheBoardtoexaminetheagreement'.Eliminationoftheconcernoversection32,nowsection45,ofthe
CompetitionAct
enabledAccessandotherlicensingbodiestobeestablishedandtocollectivelylicensetheexclusiverightsofcopyrightofmorethanonecopyrightowner.Asaprotectionagainsttheundueexploitationofmonopolypowerbyalicensingbody,the1988amendmentsalsoprovidedthat,wherealicensingbodywasunabletoagreeontheroyaltiesandrelatedtermsandconditionsfortheuseofaworkwithinthelicensingbody'srepertoire,eitherthelicensingbodyortheusercouldapplytotheBoard.TheBoardwasembodiedtofixtheroyaltiesandrelatedtermsandconditionswithrespecttosuchuse".Theseamendmentsensuredthatalicensingbodywouldbeobligedtonegotiatelicensesfortheuseofworksinitsrepertoire.Ifitfailedtodoso,theprospectiveusercouldinvoketheBoard'sjurisdictiontofixtheroyaltiesandrelatedtermsandconditionsfortheuseofworkswithinthelicensingbody'srepertoire.Ineffect,whererightsholdersdecidedtohavetheircopyrightadministeredcollectivelythroughalicensingbody,theirrightsweresubjecttoacompulsorylicensefixedbytheBoardifthelicensingbodyandtheuserwereunabletoagreeonthetermsofuse.
Nowsection45ofthe
CompetitionAct.
2
The1988amendmentsmaybefoundatS.C.1988,c.15,s.14.ThesefurtherprovisionsmayalsobefoundatS.C.1988,c.15,s.14.
LEGAL_1:21095351.2

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