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Digests Accession Industrial

Digests Accession Industrial

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BERNARDO v BATACLAN
(1938; Laurel)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land fromPastor Samonte thru a contract of sale. Thereafter, Bernardoinstituted a case against said vendor to secure possession of theland. Bernardo was able to obtain a favorable decision from thecourt. The plaintiff found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, inthe said premises. It appears that he has been authorized by formerowners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and makeimprovements thereon. Thus, plaintiff instituted a case againstBataclan in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. In this case, plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to bea possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sumof P1,642, for work done and improvements made. Both partiesappealed the decision. The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing thedefendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and byreducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendantto purchase the land in question from P300 down to P200 perhectare. Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when thedecision became final to exercise his option,
either to sell the landto the defendant or to buy the improvements from him
. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire
"torequire the defendant to pay him the value of the land at therate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18,000 for thewhole tract of land."
The defendant indicated that he was
unableto pay the land
and, on January 24, 1934, an order was issuedgiving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant thesum of P2,212.Subsequently, on April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the part of the defendant,ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The landwas sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro for P8,000.
ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TORECOVER THE COURT MANDATED COMPENSATION ARISINGFROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO
HELD: NO. Manresa, basing on Art 448 of the NCC, where the planter,builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arisesbetween the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the ownerof the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of theland. The law provided a just and equitable solution by giving theowner of the land the option to acquire the improvements afterpayment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planterto pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. In this case,the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, asowner of the improvements to pay for the land. The defendant avers that
“he is a possessor in good faith andthat the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yetbeen paid to him.”
Defendant further claims that he has a right toretain the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of theCivil Code. While the said argument is legally tenable, the samemust perforce be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost hisright of retention as he failed to pay for the land.
“The law, as wehave already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for theland”.IGNACIO v HILARIO
(1946; Moran)
Facts:
Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaintagainst Damian, Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning theownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential.After the trial of the case, the lower court under Judge Alfonso Felix,rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portionwith the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article361 of the Civil Code.Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same CFI (now handled byrespondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad), Hilario and Dres prayed foran order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to paythe Ignacios for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot,the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their ownexpense and to restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot.After hearing, the motion was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence,the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) arestraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by JudgeNatividad; (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them thesum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot forP45; or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by JudgeNatividad and ordered the lower court to hold a hearing in theprincipal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildingsand of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as theperiod of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise theiroption either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the
 
last instance, the period of time within which the Ignacios may payfor the land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. After such hearing,the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidencepresented by the parties; with costs against Hilarion and Dres.
1. Right of retention of builder in good faith
 The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned byanother, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he ispaid the value of his building, under article 453. Article 453 providesthat “Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; butonly the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until suchexpenses are made good to him. Useful expenses shall be refundedto the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, theperson who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase invalue which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof."
2. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell hisland to the owner of the building; Right of remotion onlyavailable if he chose the latter and the owner of the buildingcannot pay
 The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, underarticle 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to theowner of the building. Article 361 provides that “The owner of landon which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shallhave the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing orplanting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.” He cannothowever refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land andcompel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where itis erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after havingchosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
3. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null andvoid
 The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove theirbuildings from the land belonging to Hilario and Dres only becausethe latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land,is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought tobe executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
4. Original decision did not become final as it failed todetermine the value of the buildings and of the lot; and thetime to which the option may be exercised
In the decision of Judge Felix, the rights of both parties were welldefined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it failed todetermine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they areerected as well as the periods of time within which the option maybe exercised and payment should be made, these particulars havingbeen left for determination apparently after the judgment hasbecome final. The procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment hasbecome final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can bedone therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had,the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within whattime may the option be exercised, and certainty no authority isvested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of  judicial discretion. Thus, the judgment rendered by Judge Felix hasnever become final, it having left matters to be settled for itscompletion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remainedunsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the present case.Francisco Depra vs. Agustin Dumlao GR L-57348 16 May 1985Facts: Depra is the owner of a parcel of land to which Dumlao, livingin an adjoining lot, had built a kitchen that encroached an area of 34square meters. The encroachment was discovered in a relocationsurvey of Depra’s property. Upon discovery, Depra’s mother wrote ademand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment.She then filed a case of Unlawful Detainer against Dumlao.In the trial court it was proven that Dumlao was a builder in goodfaith; thus the Municipal Court rendered it judgment that reads:Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with theplaintiffs, as lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over thedisputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters, therent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, payable by the lesseeto the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent isdue; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decisionshall have become final.Neither party appealed. However, Depra did not accept the paymentof rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the MunicipalCourt.Depra then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao,the latter admitted the encroachment but alleged, that the present
 
suit us barred by res judicate by virtue of the decision of theMunicipal Court.DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null andvoid ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is anencumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.Issue:I. Whether or not the Municipal Court’s decision was null and void abinitio because it has no jurisdiction over the case?II. Whether or not the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRAconform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law, for a"builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith"under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448?Held:I. Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of theDecision of theMunicipal Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgmentin a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7,Rule 70, Rules of Court). The Municipal Court over-stepped itsbounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forcedlease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law.Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction overwhich belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)(Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg.129). Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, itsDecision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to thesubject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decisionwere valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to differencein cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was thedeprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the causeof action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainercase "shall not bar an action between the same parties respectingtitle to the land. "II. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been builtsown or planted in good faith,shall have the rightto appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, afterpayment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, orto oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,and the one who sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. Insuch case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land doesnot choose to appropriate the building or trees after properindemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and incase of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereo(Paragraphing supplied)Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either topay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell theencroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuseto pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell theencroached part of his land, 5 as he had manifested before theMunicipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it wasmade in a void proceeding.However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Factsin the Court of First Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court tohave ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have thekitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, afterhaving chosen to sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay forthe same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingness topay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
SARMIENTO V. AGANA129 SCRA 122
 
FACTS:
While Ernesto Valentino was still courting his wife, latter’s motheroffered a lot for the construction of house by the spouses. Itwas assumed that the wife’s mother was the owner of the land,which would eventually transfer to the spouses. It turned out thatSarmiento was the owner of the land. Sarmiento filed an ejectmentsuit to which the trial court found out that the spouses arepossessors in good faith and ordered Sarmiento to exercise optionbased on Art 448. Sarmiento did not exercise any of the options. The

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