Joseph Estrada vs.

Sandiganbayan- parallel to individual liberty is

the natural illimitable right of thestate to self preservation- Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada prosecuted under RA 7080 (AnAct Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), he challengesthe constitutionality of the said law on the following grounds:a. it suffers from the vice of vaguenessb. it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminalprosecutionsc. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes alreadypunishable under the RPC, all of these are clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and tobe informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againsthim.- On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before theSandiganbayan eight separate cases against Estrada- On April 11, 2001 Estrada f iled and Omnibus Motion f or theremand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminaryinvestigation- It should be noted that the grounds rai sed by Estrada were onlylack of preliminary investigation, reinvestigation of offenses andopportunity to prove lack of probable case. The allegedambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law underwhich they are charged were never raised in his motion.- W arrants of arrest were issued to be serv ed upon Estrada, wherein he filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the factsalleged which gave way to finding a probable cause wereunconstitutionalSandiganbayan denied Estradas motion- The following are the issues in this instant petition for certiorari:a. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague b. The Plunder Law requires less evidence of proving thepredicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rightsof the accused to due process.c. Whether plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum prohibitum,and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to soclassify it.We only need to tackle the first issue:

- There exists the presumption of constitutionality and the burdenof proof rests on the party who is challenging the validity of thelaw, in this case Estrada failed to prove it.As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standardsand well defined parameters which would enable the accused todetermine the nature of his violation.- As long as the law aff ords some comprehensible guide or rulethat would inform those who are subject to it, what conductwould render them liable to its penalties, its validity is sustained.- It sufficiently guides the judge as to its application, the counsel indefending the one charged with the violation , and the accusedin identifying the realm of the prescribed conduct.- Nothing is v ague nor ambiguous in this law that may conf use thepetitioner in his defense.- Though, Estrada also contends that f ailure of the statute toprovide a definition of terms render the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being vague and overbroad of the natureand cause of the accusation against him, hence, violating thefundamental right to due process.- But a statute cannot be rendered void merely because termswere not defined- It is a well settled principle that words of a statute will beinterpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptance andsignificance if a definition is not provided.- A statute or act may be said to be v ague only if it lackscomprehensible standards that men of common intelligencemust necessarily guess its meaning and differ in its application.The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth and vagueness areanalyticial tools developed for testing on their faces statutes infree speech cases, they cannot be made to do service when whatis involved is a criminal statute.- Statutes which are f ound v ague as a matter of due processinvalidated only as applied to a particular defendant- Futher, invalidation of statutes are employed sparingly and onlyas a last resort.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution. ISSUE:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari? Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional? HELD:It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner. The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW TITLE : Philippine Judges Association vs PradoCRUZ, J .:

FACTS :The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No.7354. These measures withdraw the franking privilege fromthe SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land RegistrationCommission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certainother government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions asjudges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures.The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354(see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the petitioners). ISSUE :WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the followinggrounds:1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does notexpress its purposes;(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form werenot distributed among the members before its passage; and(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independenceof the Judiciary. HELD :1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of thebill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, orto be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicatesthe general subject, and reasonably covers all theprovisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead thelegislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance withthe constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, therepealing clause which includes the withdrawal of frankingprivileges is merely the effect and not the subject of thestatute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, whichis required to be briefly expressed in its title. 2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conferencecommittee is the mechanism for compromising differencesbetween the Senate and the House, it is not limited in itsjurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely newprovision. The court also added that said the bill in questionwas duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification bySenate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved byPresident the President. Under the doctrine of separationpowers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certificationof the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary.The court therefore declined to look into the petitioners'charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journalscertify that the measure was duly enacted. The court isbound by such official assurances from a coordinatedepartment of the government.3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protectionof the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarlysituated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It isnot based on substantial distinctions that make realdifferences between the Judiciary and the grantees of thefranking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problemof the respondents is the loss of revenues from the frankingprivilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw italtogether from all agencies of government. The problem isnot solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it fromothers, especially where there is no substantial distinctionbetween those favored, which may or may not need it at all,and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. AQUINO.BANGI.CAEG.DE GUZMAN.EBORA.GAVINO.GOZOS.HERNANDEZ.HERRERA.HIZON.ISIDR O.LAGRAMADA.LASALA.MAGRATA.MAGPANTAY.MALAMUG.MIOLE.PABLO.PACETE.POSTRADO.R AMOS.TOLENTINO.VILLANO.VILLANUEVA.YAP.YU 2010-2011

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-----------------------* "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for OtherPurposes Connected Therewith."** Sec. 35. Repealing Clause . All acts, decrees, orders,executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or partsthereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act arerepealed or modified accordingly.All franking privileges authorized by law are herebyrepealed, except those provided for under CommonwealthAct No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087and 5059. The Corporation may continue the frankingprivilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 andthat of the Vice President, under such arrangements andconditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized usethereof

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al

Equal Protection In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular

and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Case Digest on People v. Jalosjos November 10, 2010

324 SCRA 689 FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress. HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez 22112010

Excellent

Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
y y y "Take Care" Power of the President Powers of the Chief Executive The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

FACTS: These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist,

thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017. ISSUE: y y Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

HELD: Take-Care Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees? The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to

enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff Facts:

On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal,issued 2search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and784 Units C & D,RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "WeForum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, andoffice and printing machines, equipment,paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of thesaid newspapers, as wellas numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature allegedto be in thepossession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"newspaper,were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory andprohibitoryinjunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants,and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the cityfiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from usingthe articles seized as evidence in criminal case.The prayer of preliminary prohibitory injunction wasrendered moot and academic when,on 7 July 1983, the Solicitor General manifested that said articleswould not be useduntil final resolution of the legality of the seizure of said articles. Issue: Whether or not the seized documents are considered real property and were seizedunder disputedwarrants? Held: Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles,instruments orimplements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried onin a building or on a piece of land and which tend directlyto meet the needs of the said industry orworks" are considered immovable property.In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by naturebecomesimmobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, butnot so when placed bya tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only atemporary right, unless such person actedas the agent of the owner.In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or buildingon which themachineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to theground, remain movableproperty susceptible to seizure under a search warrant

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) F: Upon application of the officers of the
govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the

perons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officers of the corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. (3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. (2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied w/. It was stated that the natural and juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be se Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767291-case-digest-stonehill-diokno20/#ixzz1SqnG57JS

Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon
offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line.

HELD: NO An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767289-case-digest-gaanan-iac-145/#ixzz1SqnVmo79

G.R. No. 131099 July 20, 1999 DOMINGO CELENDRO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILA VDA. DE GUEVARRA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: An administrative agency has no authority to review the decisions, let alone final decisions, of courts. The remedy of the losing litigant is to appeal to the proper court, not to file a petition before a quasi-judicial body. The Facts As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the undisputed facts of the case are as follows: [Private respondent] is the surviving spouse of the late Florencio Guevarra, an awardee of Lot No. 725 PLS, which contains an area of 7.7594 hectares, situated in Barrio Kapinisan, Municipality of Wao, Lanao del Sur. On the basis of a Homestead Patent No.

01418, Original Certificate of Title No. PAF-136 was issued to [private respondent's] late husband, who had been paying taxes due thereon until he died and was succeeded by herein [private respondents].1wphi1.nt In 1963, [petitioner] arrived in Wao, Lanao del Sur coming from Bukidnon Settlement Project, who occupied and tilled two (2) hectares of [private respondent's] property through the latter's tolerance, with the express condition that if and when that portion of the land should be needed by [private respondent], the latter needed only to demand . . . its return. After the death of [private respondent's] husband in 1975, [private respondent] started to demand [petitioner's] eviction, but due to the latter's request for extension, [petitioner] was allowed to stay in said property and till the same. Until finally, on March 15, 1992 [private respondent] wrote a formal demand to vacate the property and restore possession to the [private respondent]. When said demand remained unheeded, a case for unlawful detainer was commenced by petitioner before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Wao, Lanao del Sur against [petitioner] docketed therein as Civil Case No. 50. During the pendency of said Civil Case No. 50, [private respondent] filed [in the] MCTC a "Motion for Referral" of subject dispute to the DAR agency, which motion was denied (Annex "A", petition; pp. 13-18, rollo) on the ground that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and that the subject lot [was] no longer part of the resettlement area in view of the issuance by the government of title. Issues Petitioner submits, for the consideration of this Court, this lone assignment of error: The sole legal issue is whether or not the civil courts (Municipal Court and Regional Trial Court) or the Court of Agrarian Relations or the DAR Adjudication Board ha[ve] jurisdiction over the subject matter. 11 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wp

The Case This is the main question raised before us in this petition for review on certiorari challenging two [1] [2] [3] Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 in CAGR SP No. 32007. Both Resolutions affirmed the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax exemption on the latters income from the lease of its real property.

The Facts The Facts are undisputed.[4] Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives. In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

In deliberating on this petition, the Court expresses its sympathy with private respondent. It appreciates the nobility its cause. However, the Courts power and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. We concede that private respondent deserves the help and the encouragement of the government. It needs laws that can facilitate, and not frustrate, its humanitarian tasks. But the Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. Indeed, some of the member of the Court may even believe in the wisdom and prudence of granting more tax exemptions to private respondent. But such belief, however well-meaning and sincere, cannot bestow upon the Court the power to change or amend the law. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are hereby dated February 16, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that the income tax. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent. The facts are as follows: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, 1 petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint. Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CAGR NO 110662

FACTS: Respondent Raf ael S. Ortanez f iled City a complaint f or annulment of marriagewith damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriagelicense and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.Among the exhibits off ered by priv ate respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. CA dismissedthe petition stating tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other v ariantt h e r e o f c a n b e a d m i t t e d i n e v i d e n c e f o r c e r t a i n p u r p o s e s , d e p e n d i n g o n h o w t h e y a r e presented and off ered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth andfairness and the even handed administration of justice. ISSUE: W/N Tape recordings are admissible as evidence.HELD: No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping andOther Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expresslymakes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.Clearly, respondent s trial court and Court of Appeals f ailed to consider the af ore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absenta clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of thesame, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

BLAS F. OPLEv. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: (1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and (2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling:YE S Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al. G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
En banc FACTS: In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman

On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman. 2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405). HELD: An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions: 1. Where the depositor consents in writing; 2. Impeachment case; 3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials; 4. Deposit is subject of litigation; 5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders.

BAYAN V. ERMITA (DONE)

Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 Held: Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right ascitiz ens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in

public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permitcan be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, onthe other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the publicassemblies held without the permit. Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of thepress, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government forredress of grievances The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers toall kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists,

not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard. In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law,all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written

notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

ABS- CBN vs. COMELEC, GR 133486, Jan 28, 2000

This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 . Petitioner asserts that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group from conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections. The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case? RULING: The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."7 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,8 when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,9 when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,10 or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

SWS vs Comelec
Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.

CASE NO. 7 A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors. RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA. PONENTE: JUSTICE VITUG FACTS: The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings. On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the

plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis: "The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. "There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings. "Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or illperceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada." Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not to grant the request for Radio-TV coverage of the trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the plunder cases against the former president Joseph E. Estrada. RULING:DENIED. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information outweigh the fundamental rights of the accused along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it DEPRIVES THE COURT OF THE DIGNITY which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. An accused has a RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL BUT IT IS A RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO HIM, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1752847-case-digest-secretary-justicevs/#ixzz1SqxuceBv

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Column of Ramon Tulfo Facts:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court. Issue:Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt Held:Yes. 1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. 2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt: a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case. b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted both. 3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having written the articles. Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.

J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all foreign military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be held somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression.

Issue Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy

Ruling The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.

Sanidad vs Comelec - A case Digest

PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras COMELEC respondent; through its SolicitorGeneral

Type ISSUE: Whether

of

petition

filed:

PETITION

FOR

CERTIORARI

Section

19

of

COMELEC

Resolution

No.

2167

is constitutionalor

not.

FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad:

1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 constitutionand Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD: Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

Reno v. ACLU:
U.S. Supreme Court Finds Disputed Provisions of Communications Decency Act Unconstitutional

On June 26, 1997, in the first Internet-related U.S. Supreme Court case ever to be decided, seven justices found the disputed provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the decision but dissenting in part. Decision Highlights: y y y y The opinion was a ringing endorsement of the Internet as a "dramatic" and "unique" "marketplace of ideas." The Court determined that the World Wide Web is analogous to a library or a shopping mall, rejecting the government's argument that it could be viewed as more akin to a broadcast medium. The justices found that although sexually explicit material was "widely available" online, "users seldom encounter such content accidentally." In its First Amendment analysis, the Court explained that "the many ambiguities concerning the scope of [the CDA's] coverage render it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment," and declared that the Act "unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection." The Court found that the lower court in this case "was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the ban on 'dial-a-porn'" invalidated in an earlier decision -- Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Examining the issue of whether the rights of adults should be compromised in order to protect children, the justices declared that "in order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another...[w]hile we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials,...that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Author: Sam Biers Facts: Mr. Miller sent five unsolicited advertising brochures through the mail addressed to a restaurant. When opened the manager and his mother complained to the police. The brochures advertised four adult

book titles and an adult movie. Some descriptive language, pictures and drawings of men and women engaged sexually were displayed. Issue(s): Whether material, included in a mass-mailing program, soliciting the sale of adult books and movies can be subjected to state regulation as a criminal offense? Holding: Yes, but limited to where the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays sexual conduct specifically defined by state law in a patently offensive way; and taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Procedure: Jury convicted Miller of a misdemeanor distribution of obscenity charge. Appellate Dept Superior Ct Affirmed b/c statute was based on and reflected Memoir test. USSCt Vacated and Remanded. Rule(s): 1st and 14th Amend Rationale: States have an legit interest in prohibiting the dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode used has a significant danger of offending unwilling recipients or theres a risk of exposure to juveniles. 1st must Define the standard used to i/d obscene material that a state may regulate w/o infringing on the 1st Amend through the 14th. Roth - the mailing obscene materials does not recv 1st Amend protection. Then in Memoirs a new three part test for obscenity was created; 1) dominant theme of prurient interest in sex; 2) material is patently offensive to current community standards; and 3) material is utterly without a redeeming social value. Problem with Memoir test: Required proof obscenity was utterly w/o social value, the prosecution had to prove a negative as an impossible BoP in criminal case. This standard is no longer the Constl standard. No state since Roth has been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscenity subject to state regulation. Under U.S. Const 1st Amend limitations on state powers do not vary from community to community, but this does not mean a fixed, uniform national standard of what precisely appeals to the prurient interest or what is patently offensive. If a jury applies the standard of an average person under the current community standards, the material will be adjudged by its impact on an average person and not a sensitive person. DISSENT: J.Douglas, suspect material must first be condemned as obscene in a civil proceeding, and then only after if a party continues to publish, show, etc. then a vague law has been made specific, and a criminal prosecution at that point would not violate void for vagueness test.

Roth v. United States

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Petitioner: Samuel Roth Respondent: United States of America Petitioner's Claim: That publishing and selling obscene material is protected by the First Amendment. Chief Lawyers for Petitioner: David von G. Albrecht and O. John Rogge Chief Lawyer for Respondent: Roger D. Fisher Justices for the Court: William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Harold Burton, Tom C. Clark, Felix Frankfurter, Earl Warren, Charles Evans Whittaker Justices Dissenting: Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II Date of Decision: June 24, 1957 Decision: Federal and state laws that prohibit the publication and sale of obscene material are constitutional. Significance: The Supreme Court officially declared that obscenity is not protected by the freedom of speech. It also defined obscenity for future trials. Samuel Roth ran a business in New York City. He published and sold books, magazines, and photographs that dealt with the subject of 0sex. Roth advertised his goods by mailing descriptive material to potential customers. He was convicted in federal court for violating a federal law that made it a crime to mail obscene material. In a separate case, David S. Alberts ran a mail order business in Los Angeles, California. Alberts also sold material that dealt with the subject of sex. Alberts was convicted in a California state court of violating a state law that made it a crime to sell obscene material. Roth and Alberts both took their cases to the U.S. Supreme Court. They said their convictions violated the freedom of speech. The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging [limiting] the freedom of speech." Roth was convicted under federal law, which is governed by the First Amendment. Although the First Amendment only mentions the federal government, state and local governments must obey it under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This allowed Alberts to argue that his conviction under California's obscenity law violated the freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme Court decided to review both cases to determine whether the First Amendment protects obscenity.

GERONA V. SEC OF EDUC

FACTS: RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremonycompulsory for schools. The implementing rules(Department Order 8)says that the anthem must beplayed while the flag is raised. It also says that everyonemust salute the flag and no one is to do anything whilethe ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is torecite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan). Petitioners children attending the BuenavistaCommunity School in Uson, Masbate refused to salutethe flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They didnot do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah'sWitnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt notmake unto thee a graven image, or any likeness ofanything that is in heaven above, or that is in earthbeneath or that is in the water under the earth. Theyconsider the flag to be an image in this context. Becauseof this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955. Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that theirchildren be exempt from the law and just be allowed toremain silent and stand at attention. SecEd deniedpetition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitionedand issued. ISSUE: WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional HELD: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order nondiscriminatory Therefore it is constitutional RATIONALE: The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it'sexercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then theformer must yield. What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain thatit is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol ofRepublic of the Philippines. It is not a religious symbol.Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. Thedetermination whether a ceremony is religious or not isleft to the courts not to any religious group. Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand duringflag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boyscout activities. Their objection then rests on the singingof anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judgedto be completely secular. It does not even pledgeallegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem isalso secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speakof resorting to force, military service, or duty to defendthe country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement ofthe flag salute. They were not criminally prosecutedunder a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey thesalute regulation they merely lost the benefits of publiceducation. Take it or leave it. Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were membersof Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that warand preparations for war are gainst God's wishes. Theydid not take required military service training which wasrequirement to graduate. Court said that they were notbeing drafted to attend university. University did notviolate due process when it required the mil service. Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two JehovahsWitness children were expelled from school for refusingto salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupilsin flag ceremony did not infringe due

process. WestVirginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette:reversed the former decision at a divided court. This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Specialcircumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled thestudents although attendance in schools is mandatoryturnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories.Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollmenthere in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions andexemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn'tattend school. There is no penal sanction for failing toattend school. Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society andcommunity life he becomes a member and must give upsome of his rights for the general welfare just likeeverybody else. The practice of religion is subject toreasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the state. Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: SarahPrince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under theChild Labor law because her hiece distributed religious consti 2 all stars 2

GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION

consti part 10: free exercise clause pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control ofparent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoesnot include liberty to expose child to ill health. This casewas decided after Barnette, supra. SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flagsalute. It was Merely enforcing a nondiscriminatoryregulation applicable to members of all religions. Statecarried out duty to supervise educational institutionsand teach civic duty. Petitioners do not question the right of the school toconduct the flag Salute ceremony but question theattempt to compel them. The trouble ofexempting thepetioners is that it would disrupt school discipline anddemoralize the greater student population. There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like anunderstanding that anti-war religious believers will notbe made to fight but help war effort in other non-combatways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not thecourts. DISPOSITION: decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. No costs

Aglipay v. Ruiz Case Digest

Aglipay GR Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though thegreater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. Issue: Whether Held the issuance of the postage stamps / was in violation of the Constitution. Ruling: v. 45459, 13 Ruiz March 1937 A (64 case Phil digest 201)

There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court insetting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA 259 SCRA 529 (1996)

F: This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV

program while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with such.

Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner.

Pamil v Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)02/14/2011

0 Comments F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.

The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesPhilippine government in action and the Philippine constitution HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.

G.R. No. L-25246: Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union

Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU. Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional. HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

Mark Jorel O. Calida | 1C 2007 | Introduction to Law

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR
AM No. P 02 1651, August 4, 2003, June 20, 2006 FACTS: Escritor, a member of the Jehovahs Witness, was charged for immoral conduct for co habiting with a man without the benefit of a marriage, their relationship bearing a child.Shesecured a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, indicating their churchs approval of their union in accordance with the beliefs of the Jehovahs Witness. ISSUES: Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light of the Free Exercise claus e. RULING: No. The state has the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor. This test involves three steps: 1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious belief without inquiring into the t ruth of the belief. 2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling. 3) The state used the least intrusive means possible. The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the governmen t would have the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritors position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Since neither Estrada, Escritor nor the government has filed a motion for reconsiderati on assailing the August 4, 2003 ruling, the 2003 decision has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to reopen this ruling constitutes a contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would overturn the parties right to rely upon the Supreme Courts interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive dueprocess. In its June 20, 2006 ruling, the Supreme Court held that, Escritors sincerity is beyon d serious doubt. She procured the certificate 10 years after their union began and not merely after being implicated. The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred po sition in the hierarchy of rights. The states broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family is not a compelling interest enforcing the concubinage charges against Escritor.The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach thatgivesroom for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming that there w as a compelling state interest, the state failed to show evidence that the means the stat e adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to Escritors religious freedom. Hence, Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2010 CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): Marquez vs. Disierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405. ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405). HELD: No. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

The 1987 Philippine BILL OF RIGHTS THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE III Bill of Rights

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. SEC. 2 The right of the peole to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolableexcept upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. SEC. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. SEC. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. SEC. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. SEC. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. SEC. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. SEC. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. SEC. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. SEC. 18. (1) NO PERSON SHALL BE DETAINED SOLELY BY REASON OF HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any from shall exist except as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted. SEC. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. SEC. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. SEC. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. SEC. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.