The Politics of Backwardness

THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESS Reservation PolicY in India
THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESS

Reservation Policy in India
Edited by
V.A. PAI PANANDIKER
under the auspices of CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH New Delhi
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Foreword
O social issue is perhaps as explosive in India, especially Hindu India, as that of reservations. A mere decision to
extend the period of existing reservations to Lok Sabha seats in January 1990, which should have been almost non-controversial, started large-scale caste riots and anti-reservation demonStrations in U.P. and Bihar and may well have spread to other parts of the country but for some timely political action to bring home to people that the govemment was not talking of any action on reservations for jobs. The National Front in its Manifesto for the Lok Sabha election 1989, specifically stated that the "recommendations of the Mandal Commission will be implemented expeditiously." Reservation for jobs and in educational institutions is perhaps the most explosive threat to the Indian polity today. A1l over the country, the young are angry on both sides---one demanding more and more reservations, the other against even the existing ones. Just a few years ago, the issue blew up in the face of the then Chief Minister of Kamataka, Ramakrishna Hegde, who had to use all his political skills to avoid a major blood-bath in Kamataka. In the early years of Independence, there was a great sense of guilt in Indian society, especially Hindu society, about the injustice of the caste system and the sufferings ofthe "outcastes" and the tribals, also referred to as Harijans and Girijans. In the first two decades, when reservations were sparingly andjudiciously used, there was no problem.
As the pressure for meeting the quotas and later the "roster" system came into play in govemment jobs and even educational institutions, political attitudes changed. What is more important is that by the 1970s, the composition and size of the so-called upper
castes also changed. Indeed, the numbers game changed and so also
the political rhetoric and political action.
The Politics of Backwardness
As India stands in the 1990s, the reservation issue---cspecially in government jobs and in the educational institutions, not only for the OBCs but now even for the Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribeshas been a very sensitive issue. Behind all this lies the changing nature
of the Indian polity,
economy and society. The question is where will it lead to? In order to discuss these issues and to look at the Indian experience in the major States, the CPR commissioned a series of papers which were discussed at length at the CPR in New Delhi. Based on these papers and discussions thereon, the present book is being presented to the larger academic and policy community in India. It is quite clear that the reservation issue is the single most serious threat in the 1990s to the intemal Indian polity. A mishandling of this issue could engulf India from north to south and from east to west into violence and turmoil. As one distinguished public official once said, India could enter a phase of "civil war". All thinking Indians and policy makers should, therefore, discuss and debate this issue and find some consensus lest the country plunge into serious internal strife. We hope this volume will help'in that direction of discussion and debate and possibly a consensus.
Centre
for Polity
Research
V.A. PAI PANANDIKER Director
New Delhi
List of Conhibutors
Panandiker has been Director of the Centre for Policy inthe Research, New Delhi since l9?3. He hadworked as Spial Officer Gwernrnent of Irdia as Ministry of Finance and was associated with the
V. A. Pai
as Chairman, Population Policy Committee, Plarming Commission and Industry' Chairman of the Expenditure Commission's Committee on intematiorul aca&mic atrd cultual A mernber of seviral national and of lndia inslitutions, he is Life Trustee of the Population Foundalron prolific ouput of publications and the Iniernational Centre, Goa. His and articles in includes more than 20 books, several research reports lenguge dulies. His lfie$ nublicatiu The Indrsn
Enelish r.**, the irrst Eabinet, in early 1997.
comprehensive study on the subject was released
Earlier Pran Chopra is Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research' He has been guest he was Risident Editor, Statesman, New Delhi' Director' commentator tlN Radio and among other things Editorial
piess noundation of Asia. Widely travelled" he has written exensively has also published on politicat matters in Indian and foreignjounrals' He
several books. the Academy of Shri Prakash, Ph,D. (Contab), is Research Professor at numerous Third World Studies, Jamia Mllia University, New Delhi' His rderence to India and Ctina with fubtications include those conceming issues. He has been awarded fellowships by the INLAKS l"o**ic fo*attion, Churchill College, Cambridge and the Japan Foundation
for his research.
SumaChitniswasuntilrecentlyVice.ChancellorofSNDTUniversity' ;;;"y. She has prwiouslv been Professor { thlfP Institute of iocial iciences and a Visiting Professor at the Stare University ofNew Vo* ui Suffulo and the Univirsity of Frankfurt. Her field of speciality
publications to her credit' is Sociology ofEducation and she has several
at G. Thimmaiah, Ph.D. (Bom.), did his post doctoral research Queens'
vt
The
politics of Bacluardness
lard Univenity, Australia and was later Visiting Scholar at Australian University. He has also been Visiting Fellow at Brookings ltlational
Institution, Washington. He was for some time Director ISEC, Bangalore
and has been on sweral official committees in Karnataka. He has more than a dozen books and numerous research papers on economic issues to his credit.
Cunently he is Member, Plarming Commission of India. Sachchidananda, D. Lit., is a distinguished anthropologist who was ducated at Patna University and SOAS, London Universi8. He has been Director A N. Sinha Institute, patrn and Vice-Chancellor Ranchi University. He has also taught at patna and New york Univenities. A profilic writer he has published several books and research papers in anthropology in India and abroad. Currently, he is Director, Sulabh Institute of Dwelopment Studies, patna. Chairman, West Bengal Municipal Finance Commission and one time Vice-Chancellor, iur<twan Uni_ versity. He has been Profesor of p'blic Administration at calcutta university and fte rndian Instime puDlrc 0f Aduunntrafion, New Delhi His special areas of interest and experience lie in field and local admin_ micro-level planning and dwelopmeng municipal and urban lstration; institutional issues.
Mrhit Bhattacharya was earlier
international journals and books
Dweloping Societies, Delhi and Editor of Alternatives. He is founder_ rnember of Lokayan and Member (Social Scientisb), National Commission for Backward Classes. Sheth has contributed articles to tndian and
Prof. D. L. Sheth is Senior Fellow at the Crntre for the study of
in the
areas
cornparative politics and grassroots mwements.
of political
sociolog5r,
Ghanshyam Shah is a professor at
Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. He was a Senior Fellow aad the Director at the Centre for Social Studies, Surat. His area of interest are Social Movements aad Minorities.
Lal Bahadur Shastri National
Research.
B. G. Verghese was educated at Delhi and Cambridge Universities. He has been Editor of The Hindustan Times md Tti Indfan Express. From 1966{8 he was information Adviser to the prime Minister. An ?:tl\: colgmnis! he received the Magsaysay Award for Journatism in 1995. Author ofa number ofbooks he is currently at the Centre for policy
List of
Conlributors
ix
Rqieev Dhavaru M.A. (Cantab), 8.A., LL. B. (Allahabad), Ph. D. (London) of the Middle Temple, Senior Advocate, Sqrrerne Court of
India, is a practising lawyer. A former academic, he has published various books and articles on constitutional and public law.
Contents
Foreword
Li$ of
Contibutors
vii
Chapter I Introduction
V.A. Pai Panandiker
Chapter 2
An
Overview Classes:
13
Pran Chopra
Chapter 3 Reservations Policy for Other Backward Problems and PersPectives Shri Prakash Chapter 4
29
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence
Suma Chitnis
88
Chapter 5
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies SCs/STs and OBCs G. Thimmaiah

Chapter 6
for
108
Reservation and After: The Case of

Sachchidananda
Bihar
16l
xii
Chapter 7
The politics of Backwardness
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Mohit Bhattacharya

Chapter 8
Scene
lg3
The Reservation System in

Shri Prakash Chapter 9 Reservations Policy
Gujarat
19g
Revisited
ZZt
D.L. Sheth
Chapter I0 Consequences of
Ghanshyam Shah
Reservations
24O
Epilogue
B.G. Verghese
Postscript The Supreme Court as Problem
256
Solver:
262
The Mandal Controversy

Rajeev Dhavan
INDEX
T3
Chapter
Introduction
V.A. Pai Panandiker
OR the last few years especially since 1990, India has taken a regressive turn in:o backwardness as a direction of the na-
tional polity. The issue of backward sections of the Indian

society had caused considerable agony to tlre founding fathers of the Indian Constitution. Who could not be insensitive to idustice inherent in an old civilizztion which while creating a social order also created by design or default many social injustices? Indian civilization had obviously many strengths. But it also had many weaknesses. These weaknesses especially of the age old caste system have given Indian society a deep sense of guilt and hence sorne of the transitional provisions of the Constitution regarding reservation of seats in legislatures and in the civil service.
The dilemma before the founding fathers was whether to undo history or to build a new India free from its historical evils and frailties. A new India built on its greater concern of human values, of
essential equality, tolerance aod
fie
inded the all-encompassing Dharma. founding fathers including B.R. Ambedkar decided in favour of building a new India where the evils of caste or community or even religious divide would not fetter tbe nation. A new India had to be
built.
The Constitution which came into force on 26 January 1950 was therefore a political and social manifesto of the nation. It enshrined the best of political and social values of India along with the best of other values available from other human experiences around the world.
India was to be a casteless society. Freed from the chains of history and moving towards a new political and social order where
the quintessential Dharma---or the principles which hold everything
together-was to be the guiding principle. H.V. Kamath, a distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly participating in the debates on 14 October 1949 while referring to the reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes said, "Men$en and even friends outside may dispute the wisdom of this course" and went to add "Before I close I only wish to express the hope that, beforc ten years have expired from the commencement of the Constitution, in this country of ours which has had an ancient history, this country of ours which is ancient, but ever young, there will be not merely no backward classes, socially and educationally backward classes left, but that all the classes will corne up to a decent normal human level, and also that we shall do away with this stigma of any caste being scheduled. This was a creation of the British
regime which happily has passed away. We have taken many strides forward in rernoving or doing away with the numerous evils that were associated with the British regime. This is one of the few that still remain. I hope, sir, that ere long, this stigma too will disappear from our body politic, and we shall all stand before the world as one single community." I Speaking on the Report of tlre Committee on Minorities Vallabhbhai Parel on 25 May 194.9 had much the sarne in his mind. He said "When we rnet this tinp, we found a considerable change in the attitude of the minorities themselves. Dr Mookherjee moved a nrotion for the drcpping of tlrc clause on rcservation of seats in the l-egislature on pogrlation basis. When this proposal was moved, Mr Muniswami Pillai, who was represcnting the Scheduled Castes, moved an arendment to the effect that the provision for reservation, so far as the Scheduled Castes are concemed, may be continued for a period of ten years. The general opinion in the Advisory Committee-which was alnrcst unanimous--was that this reservation so far as the Scheduled Castes are concerned, should be continued for that period and that Mr Muniswami Pillai's anrendnrent should be accepted." Vallabhbhai Patel concluded by saying "But in the long run, it would be in the interest of all to forget that there is anything like majority or minority in this country and that in India therc is only one community."2
Introduction
Speaking on this very issue on 25 August 1949, DrB.R. Ambedkar who was defending the ten years provision of reservation stated "For the scheduled tribes I am prepared to give far longer time. But all those who have spoken about the reservations to the Scheduled Castes or to the scheduled tribes have been so meticulous that the thing should end by ten years. All I want to say to them, in the words of Edmund Burke, is "Large Empires and small minds go ill together."r Alas after more than forty years of operating the Constitution, some of the transitional provisions especially of reservations have become the centrepiece of the Indian polity. Pernicious doctrine of "compensatory discrimination" has begun to be evoked as the remedy to the sins of the past. Whose sins? Of a social order which we have deliberately sought to obliterate? Or a discarded social order which we now want to revive. In an attempt to achieving nanow political ends, the V.P. Singh Government in l99O revived the old casteist social order. It was given a new lease of life. In faimess the V.P. Singh Governnrent did not invent the reservation theory. It has had a long history especially in the old Madras Presidency and in Mysore State. But the fight of nearly a century against the tyranny of the old social order was given up. Caste was henceforth to become the basis of govemnrcnt and governance in India. Reservations and more reservations in govemment service, in educational institutions, and in legislatures were to be the new directions of state policy. The doctrine of compensatory discrimination for reservations is pernicious for two rcasons. First there is no end to it. Secondly it does not serve the purpose for which it is meant. After nearly fifty yean of independence, India has the distinction of being one of the poorest and most backward countries in the world. And India is now fighting hard to become more backward. To go back to a social system which we consider the main weakness of our civilization. Who are the backwards? Is there any absolute criteria by which all backward castes can be classified as entircly backward? Or for that matter are all forward castes entirely forward? That India has many poor and disadvantaged is well accepted. What is diflicult to prove is that there are no poor and disadvantaged in almost any caste. Hence the logic of compensatory discrimination is almost impossible to end.
*. 4
Practically all castes, and perhaps even Brahmins in some cases, may be entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of compensatory discrimination.
Caste has developed such a political appeal that religions like Christianity and Islam which are not afflicted by the vice or sins of the caste system, have suddenly discovered their dalits or scheduled castes and are now demanding the benefits of reservations for their adherents. It is an extraordinary phenomenon that in the twilight years of the twentieth century, everyone is struggling to be backward. Compensatory discrimination has emerged as India's new "mantra" for practically each and every caste except perhaps the much villified Brahmin. This national competition for backwardness which the V.P. Singh Govemment has bequeathed to the nation contrasts sharply with global trends. The rest of the world is moving towards a more advanced civilization, materially and morally. The global mega trends are towards high technology, competence and competition. In India technology is suspect, competence is at a discount and competition is frowned upon as anti-smialistic. The world is moving towards greater integration intemally and extemally. India is moving in the opposite direction. The nations of South East Asia and East Asia comnpnced on the same joumey as India towards modernisation and economic develop nrcnt around t 950. By 1970, they had begun to tum the comer and by 1990, these nations had become the world's economic power houses. Even China which started late has now taken off as a major economic giant. The ideological shibboleths which kept China backward were replaced by a pragmatic emphasis on technology, competnce and competitiveness. The countries of East and South East Asia are rapidly integrating with the rest of the world. India has been waiting long to tum the corner. Meanwhile hundreds of millions of the Indian people wallow in poverty. Malnutrition, hunger, ill health, illiteracy afflict almost all castes, some more, some less. Compensatory discrimination and its ilk have brought India to compensatory backwardness. Compensatory because, if we do not go forward, the compensation is backwardness! Much is said against Manu and the Manusmriti. However much Manu may be reviled and abused, his laws ceased to operate centu-
Introduction
ries ago. There is no legal sanction behind any of the tenets of Manu including the Varnashram Dharma. However Manu has now been revived by the castes who see visions of political mileage in the revival. This casteist rhetoric may have a political appeal in the short run. But like every such epiphenomenon, it too is destined to fade away. The real challenge before India is to free itself from the clutches of this nefarious history, if one wants to call il so, and to move towards a new political and social order. The Indian Constitution guarantees such .a movement. How else could Mulayarn Singh Yadav' Laloo Prasad Yadav or Mayawati head the govemments of mega states like Uttar Pradesh or Bihar? Their rise to the highest political office is the very new political order that the Constitution envisaged.
The most important issue before India's new social order is to make the transfer of power work. It can and must work essentially through the political process. This is neither easy nor likely to happen either by caste politics or reservations. V.P. Singh's theory that reservations in the civil service are necessary to transfer power bristles with problems. Despite all the attacks on efficiency, the rot in the adminisration of the country coincides largely with the 1990s. There is a great deal of evidence that comrption and its twin inefficiency have rcached untold heights since 1990. As norms of efficiency and integrity have been thrown to the winds, scams of massive magnitude have come to the fore. It is by no means a coincidence that the large scale transfer of political power in rccent years has been accompanied by a quantum jump in public comrption. There is a new ethos in the working of the government machinery. The rule of law, ethical standards and integrity in administration are no more considered relevant. The cue now comes from the top. And it cascades down in the form of grand rapids. The state is for private benefit. Those in power rcserve the right to grab whatever they can. This is where the transfer of power
in India threatens the vitals of Indian polity.

Power does not suddenly become good in the hands of the poor or the deprived or the backward, no more than power does in the hands of the rich or the forward. The greatest damage to India's political institutions was done by an upper caste Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The caste of political leaders is no guarantee of either.moral or ethical
The Politics of Bachuardness or politically sound nonns. The theory that the poor or the backward are somehbw virtuous is no more valid than that the rich or the upper
castes are somehow superior. Comrption and criminality do not know caste boundaries. They never have. Nor does the economic or political status of the powerful. India's history is replete with social and political destruction by the wealthy and the powerful. Aurangzeb is only one such example. On the other hand the two grehtest Indians namely Buddha and Gandhi were not Brahmins and were accepted as great despite whatever the Brahmins may have had to say. No society has found a satisfactory means of identifying those who can be trusted with power. Perhaps only saints might qualify. But saints do not seek political power. It is therefore necessary for all societies to find ways of ensuring that political power is not abused or misused. The administrative system with its rules and regulations is supposed to be an antidote to or a check against the blatant abuse or misuse of power. To make the administrative system representative is neither easy nor workable. It has not worked anywhere in the world. The problem of recruitment to tle civil service, however, remains. What is merit? Is it no more than performance in a written examination which is held to be good for all time until retirement? Despite the antiquity of the civil service systems in the world, merit has remained up to a point an elusive concept. However technical competence is neither elusive nor difficult to measurc. The problem is more complex when it comes to general services like the administration or the police. .However, reservations deprive the selection by open competition of its relatively greater value and validity which it undoubtedly
has.
In a system where the aura of power politics is open for anyone, the theory of compensatory discrimination bodes ill for the administration or civil service. Representative democracy makes reasonable sense. A reprsentative bureaucracy which deals with the technical aspects of administration does not. Putting up the state for grabs at both ends bodes ill for democracy. And yet satisfactory means have to be found to deal with the perception thar administration is biased in favour of any group. Bureaucratic systems have to be devised to make it as "good" as possible. And to be "good' it will be necessary not only to have a
Introduction
better technology of administratiori but also "good" people. If this does not happen, demands for all kinds of reservations will make the bureaucracy an unworkable institution which it has virtually become
already. To go back to the second key issue. Does compensatory discrimination work? The simple truth is that it has not worked anywhere in the world. After more than four decades of reservation in India, the problem of social justice remains exactly where it was. Studies in the US also show that affirmative action in that country has not solved any problems. Why is it that reservations do not work? Perhaps the remedy is flawed or inappropriate. The theory of compensatory discrimination
is built around compensation for past social inequities. What are these? Generally low social status, low education and low income.
Why do they arise? Mostly because those suffering from these social inequities have made the mistake of being born into the wrong families. Children born of families with a higher social status, higher educational levels and perhaps a higher income enjoy a distinct advantage over those who are not.
ff this diagnosis
is correct, then the remedy to social inequities lies
not in political or legal action but in changing the societal structure. Societal structures are not amenable either to political or legal action, unless the state thinks it can in some way nationalise the family itself. People who seek political remedies for social injustices do so essentially to derive some political mileage, and not to solve the problem. Once their political objective is attained, it matters little what happens to the issue itself or for that matter, to the nation and the society
at large.
One of the groups which has suffered historic disabilities are the tribal people who are growing towards ten per cent of India's total population. The tribals have historically remained outside the prevalent socio-political structure of India. Unlike in many Western countries or those colonized by Western nations such as the United Stafes of America or Australia where the tribal population has been decimated, in India the tribal population has incredsed not only in absolute numbers but also as a percentage of the national population. However, the social and economic conditions of the tribals in India remain dismal. Of all the have-nots of India- the tribals ar: the
bottom of the pile. But as the tribals do not offer the same political mileage except in the north eastem region, the votaries of social justice have never been,greatly attracted by the cause of the tribals. If as the theorists of social justice argue, empowering the poor and backwards will automatically solve the problem of social injustice, then many States of the Indian Union and several African countries would be shining examples of success. They are not. Obviously power does not solve the problem. And reservations which are supposed to be proxies for power, have not done so either. It rs worth examining from global experience as well as national experience as to what works since the state cannot dictate the quality of families. The Soviet policies in Central Asia which consisted to a substantial extent of nomadic tribes seem to have transformed the Central Asian countries in fundamental ways. Large doses of social action in terms of education, health and intensive economic development including an excellent physical and social infrastructure seem to have worked. Within India several communities which were considered relatively backward only a few.decades ago have since made great strides. The Patels in Gujarat are a case in point' So are the nonKshatriya Marathas in Maharashtra or the Kurmis in Bihar. Unlike in the Soviet Union case, these communities focussed on those issues which helped them graduate from backward to forward status. This process which sociologist M.N. Srinivas called the "Sanskritization" process has had a considerable impact on many castes and communities in India. Quite obviously the Patels have gained by their own societal action rather than by external political props. The Patels do not need compensatory discrimination or reservation. They have shown what is doable in India. Intemationally the countries which have made dramatic impact on social inequities are many of our neighbours in East and South East Asia. They focussed on the few critical factors which dramatically influence all inequities. They are investments and growth, technology, health and education, and global competitiveness. These countries shared the same handicaps as lndia in the 1960s. Today they have practically done away with social injustice. Their strategy has worked and now they enjoy an economic and political status which
India will take a long while more to attain. Their focus was on societal change: to adopt advanced technology, to ensure health in
Introduction
the broadest sense, education to everyone, and to enable every indi vidual to enjoy the benefits of modem society. India in contrast has worked very hard to have a slow growth rate and perpetuate poverty. Its anti-poverty slogans have been the greatest frauds on the poor of India. ln 1967, the percentage of poor in
South Korea was-33.7. In 1990, it was only about 5 per cent' In contrast in India the percentage of the poor in 1970 was 43. In 1995 the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission had differing estimates of poverty. Both estimates are high' But one is higher. The Planning Commission in fact argues that India has larger numbers of tie poor. That such figures reflect a severe indictment of itself does not bother the Planning Commission. Do we need 40 years of planning to keep so many so poor? Is that the development strategy which we have followed since 1950-51? The votaries of reservation and compensatory discrimination do not ask as to who is guilty for keeping so many Indians poor and backward for so long, Nor do they ask how to rid India of its essential backwardness. The hypocrisy is often so great that when it comes to treating themselves for their heart ailments or cancer, these advocates of social justice have no hesitation in going to the United States of America often at the cost of the state. Nobody asks them that if reservations do not.affect quality then why not insist on treatment by medical practitioners who are products of the reservation quota. It is
not the inadequacy ofthe medical profession that is in question but of the politicians who preach one thing and practice precisely the opposite.
How does India resolve this issue? Not by political or legal means. Political instruments by their very nature are designed for the benefit of politicians, to get them into or keep them in power. Legal steps are also inadequate. The hapless Supreme Court can work and decide only within the provisions of the Constitution. Despite what has been written in this Volume, the Supreme Court did not and does not solve problems. It only defuses them. That by itself is no small achievement because time and again, the Parliament and the Cabinet have failed to solve this as well as many other pressing problems of India. It has left the baby in the hands of the Supreme Court which, luckily for the nation, has defused many a crisis. The way to solve the backwardness and poverty in India is by
l0
The politics of Bach,vardness
stability. That of the government, that of the state and that of the Indian society. The stability of the Indian society is indeed the
bedrock on which the entire edifice of the nation rests. Indian society must therefore address itself to this challenge as well.
societal change. That is what has worked in all achieving countries the world over. The challenge is therefore to the Indian society. The Indian society has repeatedly shown strength, capacity, and stability to face many a challenge. India has been govemed by three types of
It has broadly two options, endogenous and exogenous. For endogenous solutions, India must look inwards which is what we have done since 1950. This inward outlook has not worked. An isolated India suffers from inherent handicaps. All societies which have successfully made transitions to modern technologically and socially advanced nations in recent decades are societies which have looked outwards. But there is a massive challenge of intemal integration. Successful nations have also had to integrate their societies into cohesive ones. Many of India:s problems such as in Jammu and Kashmir or tlre North Eastem States emanate from the nation's inability to integrate them effectively into the larger national identity. Such social integration would not imply destruction of tlreir local identity. Indeed national integration and local identities are perfectly compatible as evidenced in most oflndia. India's civilizational strength has been unity in diversity-a larger Indian identity which subsurnes all the smaller identities. The most effective exogenous solution is integration with the world. This is the most important challenge to Indian society. Ironically it is India which philosophically proclaimed that the world is one family-Vasudhaiva Kutumbakarn. Perhaps long colonization by the British has made India a more defensive society. Some, therefore, see global integration as a threat to India. It need not be so. While Japan has taken full advantage of integration with the world, it has surrendered neither its sovereignty nor its socio-cultural identity. But countries like Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand know that without intemational trade and investments their economies and societies cannot grow. And without growth there is no social future, nor even basic national security. Global economic and over time larger global social integration is a historic necessity perhaps an inevitabiliw. This is a clear lesson of historv.
Introduction
1l
world. Such inregration will not prevent India from protecting its
India must, therefore, in clear terms integrate with the rest of the
essential sovereign or cultural interests. On the other hand integration will bring greater exposure of the people of India to new technologies, new ideas, newer types of organisation and a variety of other teans to bring about the desired societal change' It is by no accident
that little Mauritius, whose population is ?0 per cent of Indian descent from those who went as indentured labour, has a per capita
income ten times that of India. Integration on acceptable tenns pays' lndia must tierefore exercise that option in unambiguous terms' The objective of this integration is not only for India's philosophical orientation but more practically to help India grow economically and socially. As George Verghese has argued in this volume, the answer to poverty and backwardness lies in increasing the size ofthe cake. Thus far we have tried vainly to satisfy everybody by distributing limited jobs and economic opportunities through reservations' It is now necessary for India to create far more jobs, far more educational opportunities, far more growth and far more income to overcome social and economic backwardness. The politics of power or legislating compensatory discrimination have not and will not solve India's problems. They will create many many more. A well thought out high growth str.ategy and societal development and change will accomplish more. Unfortunately Indian politicians have not shown the ability to understand lessons of global human history. Indian society must do so and bypass the political class as much as possible' The Government, as our experience of nearly fifty years shows, is not sensitive to Knowledge. Its capacity to govern is in serious question' The people of India will therefore have increasingly to look after
themselves.
What about reservations? They must go sooner than later' The

transitional provisions of reservation in legislatures for ten years even for SC and ST have been extended to fifty. Further reservations for new groups are being made. Even more will be demanded until India is fractured and partitioned again. Message must go clearly from the people of India. Enough is enough. By the year 2020 all reservations must go. Seventy years of reservation is long enough time for those whose power politics depends upon it. The people of India especially the poor and the backward will gain far more by a rsurgent fast
12
growing and integrated India than by the divisive and wholly miscon_ ceived politics of rcservations. This volume is an attempt to look at the problems of reservations from differing perspectives and viewpoints. Most of the chapters of this volume were prepared around 1991. Much has happened since then an! hence we requested Rajeev Dhavan to prepare a postscript. The various authors have differing views on reservations in India. As only to be expected, some sftongly support reservations. Others strongly oppose reservations. The volume reflects the diversity of views and dissent on this vexatious issue which is likely to dominate
debate in India for quite some time to come. It is our hope that India will come out of this legacy and work towards an integrated and casteless social structurc.
REFERENCES
l. Constituent Assetnbly Debates-efrcial Reporr, Vol. X, Lnk Sabha Sec_ retariat, New Delhi, pp. 24243. 2. B. Shiva Rao, The Fmming of India,s Constitarion, Vol. IV, New Delhi. Indian Institute of Public Administration, 4, pp. 6O3-06. 3. Constituent Assembly Debates-Offcial Repon,yol.IX, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 697.
Chapter 2
An Overview
Pran Ch:oPra
fIE practice of reserving or restricting jobs in govemment
services for designated social groups goes back more than a hundred years- As with any practice which has such a long history, this one has also developed great complexity, deviations and mutations. Some of its manifestations bear little resemblance to the original. tn the process it has happened that what began as a specific solution to a specifrc problem in a specific area has infiltrated the
whole of society and its institutions, and almost all over India' Therefore whatever infection grows around these mutations will soon break out of its pafticular location and infect the whole body politic. Conversely, whatever problems are solved through "reservation" in one location will become more amenable to the same remedy in other places. The origins of "reservations" lie in whar is now Tamil Niidu' and in the protest of the non-Brahmins-all non-Brahmins, whether Hindu, Muslim, Christian or any other-against the overwhelming predominance of Brahmins in government services. Therefore the initial purpose of "reservatibns" was to restrict the proportion ofjobs which Brahmins may hold in governnent services, and leave all the rest open to an undifferentiated category, "non-Brahmins"- From this base. reservations infiltrated the educational system because, and rightly, the "non" felt that the cause of the Brahmins' predominance in govemment service was that they were virtually the only well educated community, thanks to their traditional functions in Hindu society and the high status thus achieved by them in the Hindu
t4
qualifications were to be found more easily among the Brahmins than among other communities. But this limited and specific causation had seeds of other causa_ tions in it, and these, more complex and far-reaching, were soon to flower, watered by four separate streams. The first stream was the great importance which the Indian mind has always attached to "government service." The only jobs to which the policy of reserva_ tions applied were those in government or semi-govemment offices, and these always constituted only a very tiny proportion of tlre total job market, especially if the market of the self-employed was in_ cluded in the total. This is as true today as it was when the policy of reservations began. But polemics regarding this tiny proportion of jobs have consumed an enornous amount of the energy of the opponents and supporters of the policy of reservations, and in recent years have caused social earthquakes of considerable intensitv. This is partly because of the belief, whetherjustified L not, that a man who is in government service can benefit many more of his caste and community and is a multiplier of benefits for them. But another reason is the sense of status which a govemment job gives, in the eyes of others, to the incumbent and also to the community to which the incumbent belongs. That is why job opportunities, or the lack of them, in other walks of life have attracted much less attention. Even the issue of reservation of seats in legislatures has not raised so much controversy despite the fact that legislatures are supposed to be the forums where govemment policies, at times including those concern_
early decades of British rule in India from th" p.ido-inun.. which a community may gain from its religious or other affinity with the rulers of the day; as for example, the job advantages Muslims ac_ quired in the states ruled by Muslim princes in Indiu, o. to some extent acquired during the later decades of British rule. The Brah_ mins acquired their high representation in jobs, both in British and 'princely" India, because candidates with the requisite educational
hierarchy. This causation distinguishes the Brahmins' predominance in the
ing reservations, are made or marred.

From this seedbed of government jobs the policy of reservations flowered into various fields of education in the course of a few
decades. Because education up to school leaving certificate level is a
An
Overview
15
in necessary qualification for applying for jobs' especially those jobs for gou"**ni service, the demand for a "reserved" quota of Iertain ethnic communities also brought with it a demand from these same communities for a "reserved" number of seats in education; the reservationists felt that without reserved seats in education, they
would not be able to fulfil their reserved quotas in governrnent

service. At one time the demand for reserved seats in educational institutions was confined to institutions of general education, because only
certificates of qualification in general education were required in applying for governmentjobs. But from here, the demand spread into inslitutions of professional education as well, such as engineering and medical colleges. This happened partly because certificates of qualification from these institutions also began to count in the market for govemment jobs, and partly because, as this market became satuiated. reservationists started to demand quotas of seats in the professional institutions as well for entering the market for profesiional jobs. Therefore the demand for reservation in institutions of professional education has become at least as insistent as in instituiions of general education. In fact, some major agitations for and against reservations in recent years began in institutions of professional education. But more potent has been the assistance given by the second stream to the further flowering of reservations. This stream originated in the growing, and growingly assertive, differentiation within that huge segment of Indian society which was earlier treated as an undifferentiated mass of "non-Brahmins"' So long as the oljective was only to restrict Brahmins and to assist non-Brahmins, the battle over reservations was only between two adversaries- That helped to keep ia intensity under control and to moderate the social turbulence caused by it. What helped even mone was that the Brahmins as a group werc tiny in number compared with the non-Brahmins, and they decided discretion would be wiser than resistance in an arena where democracy was going to give great power to greater numbers' They also showed, as expected, the subtlety of intellect and anticipation they required for realising that as India developed and the economy expanded, there would be other pastures for them to move into. Therefore, precisely in the region, that is southem India' in
16
The
politics of Backwardness
which they least resisted their ouster from pre-eminence in govern_ ment service, they most significantly gained new positions in busi_ ness, commerce and industry. But as the years passed the battle came to be ioined bv other adversaries too, and among them were many who pieferred io stand their ground and to fight for their rights (as seen by them). perhaps they chose to do so for a variety of reasons, and lack of flexibility and subtlety, such as the Brahmins showed, might well have been among these. But two other major reasons also persuaded them to take the stand they took. First, they lacked the education, the skills and other assets which the Brahmins had accumulated during the decades of their ascendancy and then used for making a strong bid in the newly emerging areas of the economy. Hence the insistence of these non_ Brahmins on their share in govemment jobs. Second, they had the numbers with which to fight out their battle in the newly emerging areas of democratic decision-making, a battle which the Brahmins, lacking numbers, could not wage. As the battle developed, new fronts opened up within the ranks of the non-Brahmins. The less favoured among the non-Brahmins fought the more favourcd with the same slogan of ,Justice for the underprivileged" with which the non-Brahmins as a whole had fought the Brahmins as a whole, one of the celebrated warriors on behalf of the non-Brahmins being called by that precise name, Justice party, in the former Madras presidency, wher6 the overthrow of the Brahmins from governr4ent and politics was soon to become more completeand to be accomplished more non-violently-than anywhere else in the country. However, on the whole the inner differentiations among the nonBrahmins as rival claimants for govemment jobs did not grow very rapidly. This is confirmed by Dr G. Thimmaiah in his paper on the history of reservations in Kamataka, including the former princely state of Mysore, which has the longest history of reservations along with what is now the state of Tamil Nadu. Dr Thimmaiah says ... . . from 1874 till 1947, the backward classes included all castes except Brahmins, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans" with very little distinction between them in terms of the reservations for them. But this began to change very rapidly after 1947 because of a sequence of accentuating causes. The first was that out of a variety of mixed motives, the
An
Overview
l7
scheduled castes Congress party decided to accord reservations to the the motives' and icheiutei tribes in govemment services' Among
Mahatma one was certainly the purely humanitarian one, urged by society had so repressed Gandhi and otheis, thai for centuries Hindu time by these castes and tribes that unless they were assisted for a be able to positive discrimination in their favour, they would never with others' But there iet their fair share of the cake in competition a political motive of a lower order' tlat the ivas also, undoubtedly, popuscheduled castes and tribes' forming around 20 per cent of the
gress.
Conlation, could be persuaded to become a loyal vote bank of the
But whatever the motives, they were soon to catalyse a sharp differentiation of interests within the "non-Brahmin" mass, sharper and soon to be more violent than the differentiation between the interests of the Brahmins and the "nc:-". The differentiators now had two arguments to choose from. First, the argument which had been
must used against the Brahmins, that they had cornered too much and argument be divested of some' The differentiators now used the same for demanding that those among the non-Brahmins who had comercd expense of other non-Brahmins must also be divested too much at
of some. And second, the argument which the Congress (and others too) had used in favour of reservations for the scheduled castes and tribes, that they had been so unjustly deprived of so much for so Iong
the that now tiere must be some discrimination in their favour' Hence
demand of the differentiators that there must also be some discrimination in favour of those among the non-Brahmins who were not of the scheduled castes and tribes but whom society had historically treated with some injustice and who therefore now deserved some discrimination in their favour. These twin arguments' one drawing upon the precedent created by the restrictions placed upon the Brah;ins, the other drawing upon the precedent created by the positive discrimination in favour of the scheduled castes and tribes became
the third stream which nurtured the flowering of reservations' The result was that, as Thimmaiah points out in his chapter, the second Backward Classes Commission in Karnataka, the Gowda Commission, "reserved jobs for specific groups constituting about 75 per cent per cent of the population. The jobs it thus reserved amounted to 68 of the total iobs."
l8
process. Just as the Congress tried to build up its vote bank among the
A fourth stream was soon added by the dynamics of the electoral of reserva-
scheduled casies and tribes by conferring the privilege
unon thern, !o5 altemative other parties, and later the Congresi too, tried to build vote banks by demanding the privilege for the more backward among the non-Brahmins---{hat is for occupation groups,
classes, castes and other social formations which collectively came to be known as the "backward castes". The proportion of the population
under the collective banner of the ..backward castes", who stood somewhere on the middle and lower rungs of the caste ladder, in the rural economy below the high land-owning castes and above the
scheduled castes, the latter being neither owners nor cultivators but at best only casual laSour and most often both jobless and landless.
to exceed the South in the vigour of ..backward castes" politics. The Socialist Party leader, Ram Manohar Lohia, set the pace by carving out an electoral base for his party among the backward castes in Bihar. The soil was very fertile for him, because under the antiquated but deeprooted land tenure system in Bihar, most land was owned, but not cultivated, by the higher castes, and cultivated but not owned by the peasant castes. The latter had indeed been severely exploited for generations by the former. Lohia used their vast numbers among the peasantry, and their resentments, to mobilise their political powei
jobs by caste quotas had started much earlier in southern India, the system of rcservations percolated through society and the social consciousness more widely there and much earlier. But from the early l!)60s onwards, northern India began to catch up and was soon
the northern with the phrase -backward castes." Since reservations
tion allows "special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." Until about the late 1950s southern India was more familiar than
advanced than the scheduled castes and tribes, were more backward than the higher castes, like the Brahmins and Thakurs. The Constitu_
of Kamataka thus classified by segnrents has now risen to 90 per cent. This term began to be used for casts which, although more
of
Lohia's very significant successes in the elections in Bihar in the period between India's third general elections in 1962 and the fifth in 1972 brucarl'rc, atemptation which no political party could resist. As a
An
Overview
19
result the backward castes became a major factor in Indian politics and in all parts ofthe country from about the late 1960s onwards' For a time they were even able to install their best known leader, the late Chaudhary Charan Singh, as India's Prime Minister, in 1979. His incumbency was quickly cut short by other factors in India's politics at that time. But it signified the strength of the backward castes, which has proved more durable than Charan Singh and has grown
further in recent years.

This has had the effect, in the first place, of giving the reservations principle a more entrenched position, and in the second place has made its impact on society as a whole deeper and wider. If the scheduled castes and tribes had been its only beneficiaries the practice of reservations might by now havebeen quietly allowed to wither away. Although no one objects in principle to positive discrimination for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, reservation of government jobs for them beyond the lO-year period originally allowed by the Constitution would have come under gteat pressure from the nonbeneficiaries, who in that event would have included the vast numbers of the backward castes. But, being important beneficiaries themselves, the "backwards", as they are sometimes collectively called, have not only prevented that; they have also used their political clout, much greater now than that of the scheduled castes and tribes, for making a stronger and on the whole a more successful bid for their full share of the reservations cake than the "scheduleds", if one may so call them, have been able to make, though it was primarily for their benefit that the framers of India's Constitution wrote the principle of positive discrimination into the Constitution itself. They are so attached now to the label "backward" because of the benefits it brings them that a leading caste among them, the Lingayats of Karnataka, fought hard and successfully when the state government took away the label from them on the plea, which was factually correct, that they had benefited well enough and long enough to have attained a much higher educational, social and economic status and therefore should make way for other backward castes. Being more differentiated now among themselves than they used to be when they were all lumped together as, and with, "non-Brahmins", different segments of the backward castes have gravitated towards different political formations. Conversely, different forma-
20
Thc potitics of Baclwardncss
tions have wooed different segments among them. Both aspects were amply demonstrated in Karnataka in the early 1970s when the Con_ grcss party, fearing that it was losing its hold on certain backward castes, worked out an altemative coalition for which it mobilised certain other backward castes. This has given the backward caste an
issue, and with it the issue of caste-based reservations, a much deeper
and more divenified penetration into society and politics than they might have attained otherwise. How deep and diverse was amply demonstrated in the mid-1980s when two of India's states which are among the most advanced politically, Gujarat and Karnataka, were
thoroughly shaken by inter-caste conflicts on the issue of reservations. Since the web of caste runs tlrough the whole of Indian society-it is pervasive not only among Hindus but in varying degrees among other communities
too-whatever inflames the threads
of this web inflames Indian society as a whole. Few things inflame them as much as issues of social stahrs and livelihood which, rightly
or wrongly, have come to be identified withjob reservations, and seat reservations in educational institutions as the route to jobs. The use---or misuse----of the electoral prccess for the purpose of consolidating the political clout of a caste in the interests of the caste
has often been criticised as undemocratic. But in its defence it is argued that even the framers of the Constitution must have assumed a nexus between social justice for a community, even if it be a caste community, and the community's representation as a community in the legislatures. That is why they provided that seats in prcportion to their share in the population shall be reserved for the scheduled castes and tribes in the Union Parliament and the state legislaturcs, for that is where policies are supposed to be made (a supposition which has been severely strained in rccent years, but that is a different matter). This reservation in legislatures was initially provided for a period of ten years from the cornrnencement of the Constitution, but was made renewable for another ten years if the need for it was still felt at the end of the first ten years. But it has been extended again and again by ten-year periods since the Constinrtion commenced more than forty years ago at the time of this writing, and its end is not in sight as yet. This only implies the ironic fact that this particular safeguard for the weak is not seen to have served its purpose. But let that be. What is more relevant here is a basic inconsistencv which
An
Ovemiew
2l
cannot be resolved without running into a more basic dilemma. The inconsistency is that while in the case of the scheduled castes and tribes reservations were seen to be necessary both in jobs and legislatures, for the "backwards" they were provided only in jobs. The logic which commanded the former dual reservations has not been extended in the latter case. But how long can it be denied to the "backwards", seeing the very great political clout they now command? A beginning has been made already in a few places. Legislation regarding local body elections, which under the Constitution are within the competence of states to legislate upon, has attempted in one state to provide for reservations for certain backward classes also. It is only a matter of time before the attempt is repeated in more states, succeeds in some, is then extended to more of them, and from there ascends to the Union level as well and into Parliament. When it does, we will no longer be voting as individuals on individual issues of the day but as groups bound together by primordial loyalties. We might then be no longer able to argue, as the Law Minister argued in Parliament as recently as 24 March that reservations cannot be made in the judiciary because they have not been provided for in the Constitution. They have not been provided for the "backwards" in local body elections and yet an attempt has been made to provide
them. Thus the actual operations and consequences of reservations have
brought to the surface some very troublesome contradictions and dilemmas. The foremost and most dangerous is illustrated by what
happened in Gujarat almost throughout the first half of the 1980s and especially in 1985. A severe and sometimes violent clash developed between the beneficiaries and opponents of reservations, and India's most rapidly advancing state, in economic terms, suffered a serious setback. The course and the rights and wrongs of the agitation have been discussed in detail by Shri Prakash in his second paper in this volume and need not be gone into here. But the point here is that this clash created the worry which triggered the seminar which is the subject of this volume. Because caste permeates Indian society as a whole, controversies over caste-based reservations are also similarly pervasive. Therefore, clashes similar to the one in Gujarat, unless forestalled in time, can be safely expected to rip up India as a whole
much more than such clashes can as, say, between Hindus and
22
nists.
Muslims, which are generally localised by the location of the antago-
And yet every approach at resolving or even containing these contradictions opens up more dilemmas than ii rqsolves. Take the first approach, which was also the first seed of what was later to become to-day's full-blown reservations problem. There was much to justify the restriction placed over a hundred years ago upon the preponderance of Brahmins in the services. But it opened up two dilemmas, and both are with us a hundred years later. The first relates to the efficiency of the services, the second to issues of social justice. The Brahmins, who had no special affinities with the rulers of the day, preponderated because they were the best available for the services. How far could the services go, without loss ofefficiency, in repl.lcing them with recruits from among those who in the circumftances of the day were less well-equipped for the jobs? But if the services had to take the first step in this direction in the name of social justice, how could they refuse to take the second, or the twentieth? How could reservation be restricted only to certain categories, and only up to a certain percentage even for these categories, when by the same logic other categories could also claim it, and in still higher percentages? The same logic which justified positive discrimination in favour of the first layer of claimants below the Brahmins justified it also in favour of all other layers below them and up to their full proportion in the population, with consequences for efficiency which could not be brushed under the carpet for long. The issue of efficiency was bound to arise sooner or later. The framers of the Constitution recognised that it would. In a section of the Constitution specifically intended for explaining "special provisions relating to certain clauses" made in other articles, in this case in Articles 15 and 16, Article 335 says: "The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of the efieiency of administration, in the.making of apPointment to services and posts . . ." (emphasis added). There is an inconsistency here in so far as this rider is not added to the reservations made for the same reason under Article 16 for "any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services of the State" (which means
An
Overview
23
whether at the level of the Union or State govemments). The Supreme Court has tried to rectify this inconsistency. In applying the Constitution to the laws, the Court has not only bent the knee to efficiency, it has done so in respect of all reservations. It ruled that the jobs reserved for any reason or class should not exceed half the total, and one of the reasons behind its ruling, as Shri Prakash explains in Chapter 3, was that it felt that otherwise efficiency would suffer. To that extent it can be said that the Supreme Court has removed the discrimination which the "scheduleds" would have suffered if the quantum of reservations for them had been restricted by considerations of efficiency but not the quantum of reservations for other classes and groups. But other inconsistencies remain. Why should reservations be restricted to half the total jobs when those who qualify for reservations within the prescribed criteria form upwards of 6O per cent of the total population of tlre country, or even a higher proportion in certain states under the criteria prescribed by them? And how can one place the demands of justice above the demands of efficiency in respect of half the jobs and reverse the order in respect of the other half? And can one afford half the services of
ineffrcient- assuming (an assumption the present writer does not accept at face value) that non-Brahmins are by definition less efficient-for the sake of benefining the very tiny proportion of the "backwards" and "scheduleds" who would be benefircd intris way, or who would be benefited even if the 50 per cent limit were removed altogether? On the pages which follow, three contributors have attempted to soften these worries in various ways. D.L. Sheth assures us that "for jobs in governrnent services and seats in educational institutions,
state being rendered
only thosc who meet certain minimum prescribed standards qualify. These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailing competitive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or lowered only to a certain degree" (emphasis added). He also assures us that "the rate of utilization by the SCs and STs" of the job quotas reserved for them "rcmains considerably low compared to tle extent of allocations made for them." But two difficulties arise here. First, not everyone is convinced that the prescribed standards are lowered only to a certain extent. The
24
contrary opinion, that they are substantially lowered, is much more widespread, and it is not confined to the categories adversely affected by the reservations for some other categories. Second, if the reservations policy is to be accepted only on the assumption that in fact it does not deliver the benefits to the intended beneficiaries, then it is a policy which will increasingly come under attack as it succeeds in delivering the intended goods, a fact which Sheth also admits (and regrets). Would it not be better then to eliminate the need for the slight lowering of standards for the beneficiaries, assuming the lowering is slight, by improving their competitiveness by other means before they are exposed to the competition, and then to expose them to the competition without lowering any standards at all for them? But of course this whole question of how to improve their competitiveness bristles with its own inconsistencies and contradictions, some of which have been discussed by Suma Chitnis. Mohit Bhanacharya has suggested another way round the clash between the demands of social justice and efficiency. He examines the demands of efficiency at two levels, the policy-making level and the level of policy implementation. He argues that there is only negligible, if any, representation for the scheduled castes and tribes at
the higher rungs of the administration, where policies are made. Therefore reservations cannot be blamed for any inefficiency at that level. But at the implementation level efficiency may well improve with the increased presence of those for whom the jobs are reserved. They belong to and therefore better understand the needs and the
modes of thinking and working of those categories of society for whom the reservations are made in the first place. This can make reservations a useful tool for social justice. But there are two difficulties here as well. First, there is an increasing demand, and one that is fully justified in its own terms, that the under-representation of the reserved categories at the higher rungs of the administration must also be rectified. Second, those who hold reserved posts at the lower rungs of the administrative services do not service only those social categories for whom reservations are made. They attend to the whole gamut of the services supposed to be rendered by the administration to society as a whole. On the argument that they have a special understanding of the needs of one section of society, could it not be argued that their understanding of the needs of the other sections of
An Overview
25
society might be below average? I would much rather put my faith in the view expressed by some very senior administrators present at the seminar, that after a little acclimatisation officials belonging to the beneficiary categories appear no different from the others in the level of their general efficiency. Sheth, Bhattacharya, Chitnis and others have also attempted to build a larger by-pass around the whole problem that arises from the practice of reservations for such large categories as castes, without
disaggregating a category in terms of its internal differentiations. This practice ignores the fact that there are as many differences in the levels of privilege and deprivation within a caste group as there are between caste groups. From this practice arises the very distressing anomaly that sometimes an abler and poorer candidate .of a higher caste, for which there may be no reservation, is overlooked in favour of a richer candidate of a lower caste for which there may be. These three and other participants in the seminar therefore suggested that for the purposes of reservations people should be classified by their economic status and not by caste, and in this way reservations would be for those who are really poor. Sheth also suggests that reservations should be made for Xhe poorer households, not for castes as a whole, because that would eliminate the complaint, widespread and very justified, that the better off within a caste group monopolise all the reservations intended for the group as a whole. But these remedies invite an objection which is as comprehensive as the remedies themselves.
The whole rationale for reservations rests upon the premise that the rigid.caste hierarchy of Indian society, especially Hindu society, has subjected the lower castes, as castes, to serious disabilities, and has done so for such long periods of time throughout history that the members of these castes are no longer able to take their due place in society through open competition. Therefore they must be assisted for a sufficient period of time through sufficiently positive discrimination in their favour so that they may come up to the level from which they can openly compete with others on an equal footing. Reservations for the poorer households rather than for caste categories as such would not be consistent with this rationale. Even less consistent with it would be the more general proposition that regardless of their caste the poor as a whole be given the benefit of
26
The
politics of Baclcwarclness
reservations. The disabilities of the poor of the highest castes cannot be put down to historic social discrimination; these arise from an unjust economic order, and the remedies for them must be found in the right kind of politico-economic policies for the polity as a whole, not in reservations for some on economic grounds. There is a morc legitimate case for so administering reservations that the benefits cannot in future be disproportionately comered, as they have been in the past, by a small segment of the entitled group. A remedy often proposed is that those within an entitled caste group who have already risen up to the average economic standard in the country, or who have enjoyed the benefits of reservations for a specified maximum period of time, should be debarred from a continued share in these benefits so that others. who have not benefited from them, may have better access to them in future. But this too has been opposed on the ground that this is an attempt to drive wedges within the entitled groups and to deprive such groups of the leadership of those among their kin who have risen to higher levels of competence. This opposition often comes from those who in fact have received disproportionate benefrtl within the entitled group. So it did also at the seminar which is the subject of this book, and it was argued with much cogency and force. However, being essentially an unreasonable position, and contrary to the basic consideration of social justice not only between but within social groups, it did not rcceive much support from other participants. Seeing how intricate are the contradictions and inconsistencies between and within the theory and practice of reservations, it should not surprise anyone that very diverse suggestions for resolving them were thrown up in the course of the intense discussions of the chapters. It is worth pointing out that despite diversity of opinion regarding specific recommendations and remedies, there was a broad agreement on a number of general approaches. In fact most of the recommendations flow from one or another of these approaches. It was generally agreed for example that in the given historical circumstances it was not only desirable but necessary for public policy to intervene in a big way to mitigate, even if it could not entirely remove, the severe injustices and disabilities which large sections of Indian society have had to endure through the centuries. The emphasis was less on questioning the intervention than on mak-
An
Overview
27
ing it more effective. Though opinions differed on the specific ways of making it so, most participants emphasised that while legislation providing for reservations was important, it was at least equally
important that this benefit should be made better known to the intended beneficiaries and they should be intensively tutored, at public cost if necessary, in the ways in which they could use the benefit effectively.
There was also little disagreement about continuing the reservations for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and also for the lowest among the other backward castes. The disagreement was mostly about extending reservations to the relatively better off among the OBCs. There was wide disagreement on the question whether the target groups of beneficiaries should be considered qualified by their castes or by their economic status. But it was generally agreed that whatever the criterion chosen, be it social or economic, caution was needed both in withdrawing reservations from those presently entitled to them and in extending them to groups not entitled to them already. Similarly, there was general agreement that the higher aim of social and economic justice for those most needing it should not be allowed to be frustrated by the benefit being monopolised by small sections within the larger entitled groups at the cost of the less enterprising but more deserving sections among these groups. But the clearest impression that the dimensions left on one's mind was that the case for reservations as_ well as the case against it, are transitory, and even more so are the specifics of the two cases. What is of more durable relevanae to the whole issue of reservations is the totality of the socio-economic process. Whatever the origins of the caste system in times now relatively remote, the hardships it started to inflict upon the lower castes in relatively recent times have crystallised out of an environment of economic stagnation and scarcity. The stagnation has congealed an association between certain castes and certain occupations, and where the occupations are of a demeaning kind in one way or another they have also demeaned those who are engaged in these occupations, and demeaned them as much in their own eyes as in the eyts of others. Stagnation has also inhibited those processes of socio-technological progress through which a society grows out of the more distasteful ways of meeting its
functional needs.
28
Scarcity has added to this its own problems. It has made upward mobility more difficult even for the abler and more enterprising among the lower castes. They are not only held back by the stigma of
caste but also by the sheer lack of economic space above and around them; the only way they can go is down. Caste prejudice is organised against them as a way in which the more privileged may protect their
own islands against any attempt at assault by the underprivileged

castes, which together constitute more than half the population. When
of the low-caste-poor (though admittedly it intervenes as much with a view to picking up votes as to giving some relief to the deserving) caste prejudice is mobilised as a dyke against an economic threat. From this it follows that just as the socio-economic disabilities of caste for the low-caste-poor have crystallised out of economic stagnation and scarcity, similarly the best solvent for the disabilities is also going to be social evolution and economic growth. This is not some kind of a latter day "trickle down" theory. Nor is it a stratagem against specific intervention by public policy for carrying specific relief to particular groups by the most direct and the shortest route. It is only an argument that if the confennent or withdrawal of specific benefits is attempted in ways which lead us into socio-political turmoil and then socio-economic dislocation, the worst sufferers are going to be those very sections of society which are the least able to afford any additional suffering. The controversy over reservations is therefore also a controversy over much larger social and economic
processes.
state policy intervenes on behalf
Chapter 3
Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes: Problems and Perspectives

Shri Prakash
SECTION
The Question of National Consensus
tIE call for evolving a national paEs. e significant
cross_section of active political leaders holding guidelines importunt official positions recognize the need for a set of which can regulati the future evolution of OBC reservations policy' A call for Uuitdlng a national consensus was fint made by the then
consensus on the issue of Backward Classes (OBCs) reservations policy for the Other political has by now been made by many leaders of different
Prime Minister
CanOtrl on 20 luly, 1985 in the context of quota efforts by the govemment of Gujarat to increase the reservation of the in educationJ institutions for the OBCs following the report by at Rane Commission. Subsequently' similar staternents were made least three chief ministers-those of Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. This provides the context for the present paper' it is obvioui that any attempt at evolving guidelines for a proposed ideas national consensus cannot be accomplished at one stroke' The in an ongoing put forward in this essay are meant to act as an input iiscussion which needs to be extended to include the academic adminisexperts, political leaders at the national and local levels and proracted process of interaction between those who t utott. Onty a produce a suggest, formulate and implement reservation policies can
nillv
30
Nehru.
common national understanding of this issue. At the outset of this analysis it is necessary to explain why the subject of reservations for the category widely tno*n u, OBCs_ properly described in the constitution of India as ..socially and educationally backward classes" (Articles 15(4); 1614;_needs to be treated separately from the issue of reservations for irr" schedul"d Castes (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST). In brief, the explanation lies as much in the history, sociology and politics of reservation policy as it does in the objective ofeffiiient ani egalirarian economic development. However, it must first be clarified that while discussing the issue ofreservations for SC/ST and OBCs it is not true to identify them as being associates or followers of particular political parties. No one can doubt the fact, as will be shown in deta;t below, that it yas the Congress party and its leaders who won over Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the leader of the Depressed Classes, from position a of relative hostility to one ofcooperation and leadership of the Constitu_ ent Assembly. In the post-1947 period too the Congi"s. govemments were active in promoting various welfare and participatory schemes for the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and ihe backward classes. In the case of the ',socially and educationally backward,, classes being included in the scheme of preferential poli"i"r, the Congress and its leaders again played a prominent role. The Objectives Reso_ lution of the Constituent Assembly was moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on December 13, 1946 and itresolved to provid" id"quut" safeguards for "minorities, backward tribal areas, depressed and other backward classes." So also, the famous clause 4 of Article 15 in which it is said "that nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and education_ ally backward classes ofcitizens or for the Schedulei castes and the Scheduled Tribes," was also moved for adoption by prime Minister
It
which had given prominence to caste and not to economic criteria, the states could frame their own OBC lists under Article l5(4) and
t6@).
time . At thewere of the framing of the Indian Constitution leaders associated
mosr political
decided in August, 196l that since no agreement could be reached on the implementation of the report of the Kaka Kalelkar
was again the cabinet, led by Jiwaharial Nehru which

Commission,
with the Congress party in one way or
Reservations Policy
for
Other Backward
Classes
31
parted company with their another. Later on when some of them caste and the ;;;;;.;;it"tion, thev tried to project the schgdu]3d founded the Ambedkar own tashion' Dr B'R'
OBC issues in their
n"p"ur"""
the Depressed Party of India to represent tl" ilt"Tttt of except in a few Ail;t, uut it did not do too well in the electionsout to outline his Ji"i"" of Maharashtra. Ram Manohar Lohia set society and make ri"*, on m" position of backward castes in Indian the Socialist Party' He that the basis of one aspect of the politics of into the dominant "twice assumed that his division of Hindu society political or potential bom" and other castes actually conformed to arena' A closer oolitical groups in the all-India national or electoral social structure !*urninu,ion of the regional variations and changes in the kind of expectations likely to *lrtti" ,f," country would belie to the decifollow from Ram Manohar Lohia's analysis' Subsequent were free to formulate sion of the central government that the states political figures their own lists of backward classes, several leading took the like Devraj Urs from the Congress party in Kamataka again
policy for the ini iuriu" in fo.th".iog the evolution of a reservations
of the nineteen backward classes- Indeed, starting from the latter half Backward Classes Commissions resixties, between 1965 to 1987
po*O't*i"" in Kerala, Kamataka,

^Nadu,
and Gujarat and once in Tamil National Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, in addition to the second in 1980' Sackward Classes Commission or the Mandal Commission It is interesting to note that these Commissions were appointed both often as a result of Uy Congr".. id non-Congress governments and a strategy for initiatiu"es coming from above or in pursuance of justice towards the backward classes' However' on promoting social (as in the case itri, puttiJut- issue often a non-Congress govemment the Mandal Comof the Venkataswamy Commission in Karnataka or power' In mission at the Centre) took up the issue after coming into
thecaseoftheMandalCommissionagain'theCommission'sreport by the is under consideration at present even though it was initiated

Janata government. It ha's not only been the different govemments which have agreed for drawing up on this method of appointing a Public Cornmission
OBC lists.
comprehensive survey of the opinions of political Pradesh releaders in 1978 in the Karimnagar district of Andhra party lines' vealed how opinions about reservation policy cut across
32
The
the expiry of the stipulated deadline and 18 per cent ,.iJin.v should be time-barred and hence not renewable (Study by N. Ramchander, in Reservation policy in India, ed. ty e.e.V. "Sfra._u sudhan Reddy). und K. Madhu_
Of the leaders interviewed, 72 per c,entbelonged to the Congress (I), I I per cent to the Janata pafiy, another I I per cent to the CpI and the rest had no parry affiliations. of these, z+ p..."ni-.uio thar reserva_ tions in general should be time_bound and;;;;;;;;;;"bte
afrer
It is therefore
the
as also the extent ofjobs/college seats reserved for them. By contrast, the quotas sanctioned for SC/ST as well as the
One fact which stands out. both in the evolution oi poficy anA in terms of agitational or protest politics intended to shape reservation i, thar much lol:y,reservations greater controversy and differences surround OBC than those meant for the scheduled castes and tribes. This also means that there are several aspects of the criteria used for classifying OBCs which remain under continuing discussion
between different political parties are Utuo"O unj *i"n ir comes to actual policy formulation and implementation there is often considerable overlap between the policies followed by
clear that on the issue of reservations the lines
diff.r*igou"rn_.ntr.
sc/sr
parties.
enjoy greater acceprance among the different national
scheduled liits naming
reservations is being raised primarily from a comparative view_ point. A vigorous intellectual and reformist opinion against the presence oflntouchability within Hindu society was first viiced by the social reform movements which started in the nineteenth century. Both the
remains a subject of separate study. In this paper the focus is strictly on the backward classes. The issue of the consensus about SC/ST
One reason for looking at the possible causes explaining the greater social consensus about SC/ST reservations and the more numerous differences relating to OBC reservations is to see whether at the policy lever the factors leading to the first result cannot be helpful in promoting a similar effort relating to the oBC issue. In this context, it might be observed that in recent years the consensus relating to SC/ST reservations has been under some strain in a few regions due to inter-caste conflicts. What possible consequences such conflicts may have, if at all, for the scheme of SC/sr reservation
Reservations Policy for Other Backward
Classes
33
Punjab believed in Brahmo Samaj in Bengal and the Arya Samaj in when it concemed the issue of promoting a dual process of reform moveuntouchability. As the Arya Samaj did through the Shudhi either through ment, the untouchables were to become caste Hindus possible formally adopting ritual ceremonies of the latter or through The fact inter-caste .irriug", as promoted by the Brahmo Samaj' required a change of perception against untouchability that a struggle
and
practii! on ihe part of the upper castes was best brought out in the philosophy and actions of Mahatma Gandhi' Temple entry movements for Harijans were to be accorrpanied by an effort at changing In retrothe traditional dislike of manual labour by the upper castes' of thinking which underpinned the policy of spect, it was this kind would enreservations for the Depressed Classes. Job reservations would accept to work with the sure that upper caste employees of former untouchables. By this it was hoped to better the conditions
SC/ST who provided the most vlsible examples of social and regional was backwardness in conEmporary Indian society' Such a policy justice and win the intended to be an illustration of growth with social of other deprived sections for the democonsent and participation cratic political system as a whole. Facts too supported the view that untouchabllity in itself constituted a key element of enforcing hierarchy within the caste system
and that
system.
untouchable castes had already been weakened considerably by the time of the 1931 census, that of strict residential segregation and marital exclusion in rural India was and is applicable' According to the 1931 census, e.g. of the Bombay Presidency, many of the known untouchable castes had moved away from their traditional occupations to others within the rural economy and society' Amongst the bhangis or the scavengers almost 572 ottt of every 1000 persons had stopp;d pursuing their traditional occupations' Similarly' 547 out of every 1000 chamars/mochis or shoemakers were no longer engageo
to undermine it, when successful would alter that "ifo.tt the law of occupational specialization in regard to Although
in their traditional occupations' Among the mahars or the village watchmen in the Bombay Presidency only 179 out of every 1000
were said to be foliowing their traditional occupation' If occupational for specialization or diversification is to be considered as a yardstick modemization, then the above mentioned untouchable castes were
34
The politics of Backwardncss
vol. VIII, Part I, Statement No.l7).
clearly ahead of others. Among the sutars or carpenters, for example, 776 outofevery 1000 persons were following tireir traditional occu_ pations,in 193 l. Among the lohars or blacksi.f ths in Bombay presidency this ratio was 731 out of every lW (Census of India, 1931,
Scheduled Castes in India.ICSSR, 1975). Such cases are known onlv
village chaupal and the right to use such facilities is a subject of many unknown informal personal struggles even today. G.S. Sharma has documented for us many situations in which barbers refused to serve chamars even when the latter were willing to pay for the former,s (G.S. Sharma, teg islation and Cases on Untouchability and 1"yi"_"1
might exclude him/her from using tlie village well, temple, or the
necessarily related to being more or less well_off or poor. The mere fact that one belonged to a caste locally considered; untouchable
o:l it. Discrimination on grounds of being an untouchable was not
In the pre- 1947 days, occupational diversification however did not remove the social disabilities associated with the stigma of untouch_ ability, a fact which remains true today when the Ind]an Constitution has abolished and outlawed untouchab ity and social practices based
when a formal complaint is made or a commission of inquiry

appointed.
factor they found was the continuing belief in caste endogamy. Another was the invisible rule that scheduled caste students iouid
A commission of inquiry appointed by the Rajasthan High Court to investigate reports on the continuing practice of untouchability in the town of Bari Sadri has found that not only does it prevail there but is sometimes seen in its crudest form. It has been lound that such discrimination prevails in govemment offices, the municipal council and in the lower munsif courts. Affidavis have been submitted to the commission by the scheduled caste employees in the primary health centre testifuing that they are not allowed to drink thl stoi,ed water nor is the night chowkidar of the municipal council allowed to use the office supplies; and the munsif court has denied minimum wages ro its scheduled caste employees for thrce years (Economic and politi_ cal Weekly, August 30, 1986). More such facts are included in Appendix I to this chapter. An all-India survey by a team of experts discovered many regional variations in the extenf of participation by scheduled castes in the educational system. HowevJr, on" com-on
Resemations Policy for Other Backward
Classes
35
that they contin,make friends only among'the scheduled castes and own status because of the treatment ued to have a poor image of their
they lacked they received from other caste students' Consequently' and were diffident the confidence to compete openly for employment I'ong Way about venturing into the private sector' (Suma Chitnis' A to Go: Repoi on a Survey of Scheiluleil Caste High School and
Another College Sudents in Fifieen States of lndia,ICSSR, p' 16l') that many from urban and rural areas .studyif college students found were prejudiced against the Harijans. (R'N' Prasad, Caste Prejudice
Amoig bollege Studrntt, A Socio-Psychological S/ady' Varanasi:

Rupa Publishers, 1979.)
need for protective discrimination or for job and political reservations was first voiced by those among the untouchables who had done well in relative economic terms. The mahars in the Bombay Presidency, for example, had been among the first to move away from theii traditional occupation as village watchmen and take up jobs in the army and the railways' This headstart led to motivation for ieform and the growth of political awareness among them' The
ihe
movement for political representation for the Depressed Classes was led by a su""esifol mahar barrister, B'R. Ambedkar' Similarly in the of th. chamars in the United Provinces, their consolidation into "ur. a a recognizable constituency followed the growth amongst them of the demand for leather fairly affluent section due to a sudden spurt in goois during the Second World War. It is these better off sections *ho huu" provided the leadership to the scheduled casteVtribes' The untouchable castes found advocates and leaders not only from among the ranks of their own better off section but also from among the many illustrious thinkers and social activists produced by the
growth of Indian nationalism-Swami Vivekananda, Jyotiba Phule' i{arain Guruswami, Ramaswami Naicker' Lokhitwadi, Gokhale' Agarker, Munshi Premchand, B. Pantulu, R'Venkatraman, etc' By the 1920s the country was dotted with movements for giving an equal
status to untouchables within Hindu society.
By 1924 the mahars in
the Bombay Presidency had launched a "self respect" movement under the leadership of Dr' Ambedkar. In Punjab the Adi-Dharm movement was started in l926.In Bengal there was the Nama Sudra Andolan, in the Madras Presidency the Adi-Dravida, and in Kerala the Adi Karnataka Andolan. The Charuman' Palaya, etc' harijan
36
achieve a consensus on this iss'le. It is to be emphasized that whereas untouchability in its different dimensions provided an easy all-India demarcating line within which the scheduled castes could be identified and about the removal of which many social and political leaders were in agreement with each other, the same was not true of the factors which led to the rise of the non-Brahmin movement, the progenitor of the social category later to be described as the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). What the following analysis will emphasize is that purely political factors and rcsponses had a much greater role to play in shaping the OBCs as a constitutional, legal and social beneficiary. Hence political action has a'much greater relevance in determining the legai and political time limits within which such a category can be socially beneficial, than is the case with the SCTST groups, who constitute a collectivity in a more fundamental cultural, economic and geographical sense. The origins of the social category called the OBCs goes back to the non-Brahmin movement and the decisions made by the ruler of Mysore to give preference to the backward classes. In re-examining this piece of history one has to ask a question which is of great contemporary relevance for policymakers today. Was the classifica_ tion of the OBCs, which emerged during this period, a natural outcome of a social movement or a policy decision of the existing govemment? This distinction has a vital relevance because the de_ gree to which the state has fashioned its own criteria and imposed its own interpretation on social events is more easily changeable than a policy franework that is the direct outcome of social conditions not acceptable to large groups of people. Thus untouchability creates a deprived social constituency which is unique in its own right and for whose abolition various special social devices are needed. Is this
helping the scheduled castes to fight untouchability through eco_ nomic, political, cultural and educational means. It was easy to
groups started movements against untouchability. In Andhra there was an Adi Andhra movement and in Kanpur an Adi Hindu move_ ment. Later Mahatma Gandhi published the newspaper F1a rijan. He also renanrcd the Akhil Bharatiya Anti_Untouchability lrague, started by Amritlal V. Thakkar, the Servants of Untoucha6les Socie8 and this subsequently became the now famous Harijan Sevak Sangh. There was thus an all-India scope and dimension to the movement for
Resemations Policy
for Other Backward Classes
37
equally true of the OBCs? [n order to answer this question one needs to reconsider some history.
SECTION II The Non-Brahmin Movement: Largely a Regional Phenomenon

One
of the factors that distinguished the social structure in Tamil Nadu from many other parts of India during the late nineteenth
century was the interlinkage between large landholding educational, professional and political leadership within many Brahmin families, which set them apart from families belonging to other castes and gave the Brahmins as a whole a well-knit appearance as a social and a political group. It is important to note that even at the start of the twentieth century Tamil Nadu-then a part of the Madras Presidency-was not a region dominated by extensive commercial agriculture. It could boast of few merchant princes and even fewer captains of industry. Unlike the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the
Ryotwari Settlement in the Madras Presidency did not lead to
a largescale transfer of land, primarily because the extent of the revenue burden imposed on agriculture had over the years been more closely related to the costs of production. The large-scale "sunset" auctioning of land in Bengal initiated certain changes in the social composition
of the landed elites. It created an avenue for upward mobility for

persons who had acquired wealth in trade as agents or carriers for the East India Company, which had been active in that region of India for
more than three centuries. Such a social process also widened the
caste base of the Bengal landed and urban elites, a phenomenon that
led to the coining of a new phrase, the Bhadralok, to describe the Bengal elite-a term which spanned families from at least three castes, Brahmans, Vaidyas or Vaishyas and Kayasthas. This to a certain extent foreclosed the attempts to mobilize sections of the affluent upper castes to head a non-Brahmin movement. It is to be
noted that the caste associations formed in Bengal in the nineteenth
century have disappeared after independence. There has also not been any real pressure from below for instituting OBC reservations which do not exist in West Bengal. Such social mobility was typical
of areas where landed property showed
a
quick turnover as in Bengal,
38
'
or.where clan systems were more prevalent than sub-castes. Govern_ ment-sponsored new land settlements in westem Up, where peasants
.of different origins predominate over older land settlements is another example. In the Jat-based villages, as in Punjab, Haryana or in regions of intensive commercial agriculture as in Gujarat, many
Kanbis could rise to become Patidars or Patels along with a relative increase in their affluence during intervals ofprice rise, as during the cotton boom in the 1860s or the First World War. Also, in Bengal, western UP, Punjab, and Gujarat there was no attempt at mobilizing a politi:al movement for demanding caste-based privileges, except for the untouchables, who existed everywhere in Hindu society. In contrast to other regions of India, in Tamil Nadu and Mysore, both parts of the Madras Presidency at that time, many of the Brahmin families wielded economic and social power quite out of proportion to their numbers. In Madras Presidency as a whole the Brahmins constifited 3.3Vo of the Hindu population. InTamil Nadu their share of the total population ranged from I % in the Nilgiri s to 3.7Vo in Tinnevelli, Chingleput and Trichinopoly. This contrasted for example with Gujarat where Brahmins constituted 5% of the population in Baroda state, in central Gujarat and north Gujarat, 47o in south Gfiarat and nearly 1Vo in Kathiawad. (Census of India. 1931, Madras Presidency and Baroda State.) In Tamil Nadu the Brahmins constituted a high proportion among the larger landowners. In Gujarat this position was occupied by Rajput or Patidar (Patel). In the Madras Presidency generally, the Brahmins had long been the literati and hence occupied the position of clerks, administrators and officials, whether tlre rulers were Tamil kings, Vijaynagar viceroys or the East lndia Company. Once again, the contrast with Gujarat or Bengal is interesting because in these two regions the literati came not only from among the Brahmins but also from the other castes like the Kayasthas or the Vaishyas, who as traders in Gujarat looked after personal or public accounts, etc. One hears of the famous Nagar Sheths of Gujarat who ran their businesses on their own (Kenneth Gillion: Ahmedabad). In Tamil Nadu the Brahmins invariably held the position of the village Karnam or the village accountant and in appreciation of their religious and secular services they had been awarded land ights as Mirasdars and lramdars. In the case of the Tamil and to a certain extent Telugu Brahmins, traditional status, access to landed wealth, generations ofinvolvement
..-
Reservations Policy for Other Baclcward
Clnsses
39
in the administration and aloofness from cultivation were responsible
for the Brahmin domination of the western-educated, professional '

middle class from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. This was best illustrated by the male literacy rates in English which were 28.21o for theTamil Brahmins as against 17.4% far the Vellalas, the leading non-Brahmin caste group in Tamil Nadu. Also, due to their greater involvement with English education the Brahmins could not be closely identified with the renaissance of the Tamil language and literature, a task performed mostly by members of the non-Brahmin intelligentsia. This again meant that the issue of developing a Tamil culture could become an added element in the opposition to Brahmin dominance as such. One of the consequences of the explicit Brahmin dominance at the regional level in many parts of the Madras Presidency was the attempt by the educated and professional sections of other castes to mobilize their caste associations. Between 1905 and 1930 a great number of caste associations were set up with the aim of strengthening caste identity, improving caste status and fostering mutual assistance. This provided the backdrop to the formation of the Justice Party and the demand for reserved seats for the non-Brahmins in the legislature. The mere existence of caste associations or even a non-Brahmin movement wzrs not sufficient to get the principle of political reservations for the non-Brahmins accepted. It was also a fact that at this time the British govemment, sensing the growing support for the nationalist movement, was looking for new allies who would support it within the framework of a limited constitutional government. The criteria for choosing such allies was that unlike the previous ones (zamindars, for example) who were chosen mainly for their loyalty, the new allies should enjoy proven mass support. The ability of the non-Brahmin movement to institutionalize itself into the Justice Party and win support from caste associations was a good reason why in March 1920 the British-appointed arbitrator Lord Meston decided in his judgement on the implementation of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms to neserve 28 of the 65 non-Muhammedan general seats. It was clearly the political factor which weighed with the Justice Party when they got the issue of reservations in the legislature settled in their favour. For the British govemment this was an act of expediency but in the special social situation of Tamilnad it signified the
40
entry of a new social strata into political life and activity. It needed the special sanction and support of the British state at that time to convert the heterogenous social groupings constituting the non-Brah_ min movement into a reserved political constituency within Tamil Nadu. Once the Congress-led Constituent Assembly had decided to introduce adult suffrage in 1949 the need for continuing with the political reservations for the backward classes disappeared. In this context, it must be recognized that the principle of reservations in employment or educational institutions fot the backward classes in the Indian Constitution was based on the concept of according welfare and equality to the backward sections of society and not on the principle of political expediency. In this sense there was a difference in the nature of the political principles that underlay the question of reservation for backward classes in the pre-1947 period and the way this issue was defined in the Indian Constitution. This distinction in the case of political reservations for the backward classes, which were discontinued after 1947, also extends to the reservation of government jobs. In connection with this issue the term "backward classes" first acquired a technical meaning in the princely state of Mysore. In 1918, the Mysore govemment appointed a committee to enquire into the question of encouraging members of the "backward communities" in public service. Marc Galanter has narrated the details of this process (Marc Galanter, Cornpeting Equalities, 1984, Chapter 6). What he has not emphasized is that during rhe British period the official committees, by and large, either included the untouchafles and the tribes within the rubric of the "backward classes" or when they excluded them they often went by the view generated by the non-Brahmin movement that everyone except the Brahmins were backward. Ai least in South India this view became so widespread that the Miller Committee, appointed by the Mysore govemment in 1918 under the chairmanship of Sir Lesley Miller, was prepared to ignore the fact that a few castes had the same literacy rate as the Brahmins. The Miller Committee classified the Mudaliars and Pillais as backward when they had a ten per cent literacy rate, almost the same as Brahmins. By this method the Mysore government hoped to keep all the non-Brahmin castes as their own supporters because they wrongly identified the leadership of the freedom movement with the presence ofpower hungry Brahmin leaders. Thus, purely political
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
4l
considerations were always crucial in the pre-1947 period in the classification of the backward classes. The need to tum a policy of granting concessions to the backward classes into an instrument for securing some kind of broad support against the nationalist movement meant that no strict criteria could be formulated for classifying the OBCs. Different committees used wide definitions to net as large
a cross
section as possible and there was no agreement on an all-India
basis on who constituted the backward classes. After the issue of the Non-Brahmin Manifesto in 1916 and the formation of the government in Madras by the Justice Party, the latter gave a definitive push to job reservations for the non-Brahmins in the govemment. The First Communal Govemment Order on September 16, l92l extended job reservations for non-Brahmins from revenue to all departments. A staff selection board and then a public services commission was formed to implement these reservation quotas. However, the attempt to raise the non-Brahmin movement to an all-India level on a social plane was a failure. The first all-India non-Brahmin congress was convened in Bombay by Ramaswamy Mudaliar. He openly described the non-Brahmin movement as 'Jobocracy: the securing of jobs to the men of our communities and I am not ashamed
of calling myself a job hunter." No other words could portray better the fact that at root it was the educated section of the landed nonBrahmin castes who were in the forefront of the demand for jobreservations. The second and last attempt to convene an all-India non-Brahmin congress was at Amaraoti in 1925. This occasion was marked only by a speech from the Raja of Panagal who suggested some constitutional reforms and inclusion of items like handspinning from the programme of the Indian National Congress. It was not only
the case that the backward classes movement remained restricted to the local and regional levels. Even when organizations like the BAMCEF were formed during the 1970s, these were associations mostly of persons already having government jobs and fighting for better or faster promotions. In this sense the non-Brahmin movement was the largest one of its kind and created the ground in South India for the formation of many caste-based associations that continue to sustain the demand for and practice of reservations there till today. The special conditions which produced the non-Brahmin movement in the South did not exist elsewhere in India to the same extent.
42
SECTION
The Constituent Assembly and the Constitutional provisions

The perspective in terms of which the issue of reservations for the scheduled castevtribeyother backward classes (SCVST/OBCs) was to be viewed, was to change with the dawn of freedom. The British administration had at best produced a series of ad hoc responses and
of population of the Depressed Classes, with a view to gaining their political support to oppose the Congress by granting a few concessions. Neither the objective nor the criteria of an implicit preferential policy were ever stated clearly. They could not be, be_ cause in the minds of the British rulers most of these concessions were a short-term political device to try and split the nationalist movement. The debates in the Constituent Assembly on the other hand, and the measures or principles this distinguished gathering embodied in the Indian Constitution, set out the approach towards a reservations policy in terms of the goals of promoting nuional integration and providing social justice to the deprived soctions of the population. The exact meaning of the ideas and formulations of the Constituent Assembly need to be restated today, when opposite arguments are being put forward either for entirely doing away with a policy of reservations or for indiscriminately extending it on a grand scale. The middle course proposed by the Constituent Assembly, even if it was not written down in the Constitution explicitly, needs to be elucidated in order to devise a practical programme of action for attempting to build a national consensus on the reservations policy issue. The first feature to note in relation to the principle of preferential treatment in the Indian Constitution for SC/ST/OBCs is that the word caste is used only in rclation to the Scheduled Castes. Both in Article 15(4) (which is a part of the broader article prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth) and in Article
estimates
16(4) which is included within Article 16 promising equality of

opportunity in matters of public employnrent, the refercnce to those deserving special treatment is to "any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the Sclreduled Tribes" and to "any backward class of citizens which in the
Classes
43
the services under opinion of the state is not adequately represented in Article 16(4) the state." It is well known that both Article l5(4) and
wereintroducedbyPanditJawaharlalNehruaftertwojudgementsby of 'commuthe Supreme Court questioning the validity of the system nal' reservations of government jobs for the non-Brahmins in the debate' Madras Presidency. In a significant intervention during the "economically" had not Jawaharlal Nehru explained why the word Jawaharlal been used separately in phrasing Anicle 15(4) ' According to
of Nehru, this was becauie those who drafted Article 15(4) thought backwardness as cumulaiive. The.word 'Socially' in the Article' he said, covered many things and iertainly included 'economically'' (Parliamentary Debates, vol. XII-XIII (Part II)' col' 9830') The many things that cumulatively would constitute backwardness were not spelt out by the Constituent Assembly nor listed in the Constitution as such. It was assumed that this task would be performed by the Commission which may, according to Article 340' be
appointed by the President "to investigate the conditions of the r*iutty and educationally backward classes within the territory of
India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any state to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition'"
One fact however stood out. There were only very few persons either from South India or Bihar who thought caste in itself to be a primary
indicator of backwardness. The view expressed by Shri Chandrika Ram from Bihar was: "Our society is divided into three sections-the
highest consisting of that section known as Scheduled Castes and the
lowest as Harijans, while the third occupying a middle position between these two and consisting of a larger portion of our people is what may be termed as the Backward Class." Such an opinion was far less common than that expressed by Dr Dharam Prakash who said: "In fact there is no community which does not have a section of people which is backward, whether economically or educationallyor socialty." (C o nstitue nt As s embly D eb ate s : 3O | | | | 19 49' pp. 680-86') We will examine below the extent to which the post-1947 commissions on backward classes used caste as a primary factor in listing the backward classes.
It is not only that the Constituent Assembly sought to de-emphasize caste as a denotation of backwardness. Over time, it sought to
44
The
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled iribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.,, (Cinstitution of India, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 19g 1.) As opposed ro the interpretation proposed by Marc Galanter that no specific goal was set to be achieved through the policy of reservations, the goal was clearly stated to be the increased werfare of the weaker sections through a reduction of inequalities in income, education and other status facilities. The clear import of reading together the constitu_ tional provisions relating directly or indirectly to reservations is that as a device they were expected to be used for a long period of time, or as long as the majority view was that goals likl reduction in inequalities and status had not been fully achieved. At the same time, reservations were seen by the constitution
makers as a policy which also had some negative aspects and there_ fore needed to be worked carefully within well-defined li.its ro a, to carry the support of those who would not be able to benefit from it. In the case of reservations of seats in the legislature this consensus scheduled castes/tribes and then restrictrng the period of such reser_ vations initially to ten years (Article 334). The really educative part of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly was that the leaders of the scheduled castes sought actively to build a consensus on the issue of reservations by accepting and even proposing restrictions on the concessions being granted. It is remarkable that the clause re_ stricting the reservation of seats for the SC/STs in the legislature to
farticular to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities no1 only among individuals but also amongst g.oup, oip"ople residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations." Article 46 also states that "the state shall promote with special care the
order in which justice-social, economic and poliiical_shall inform all the instirurions of the national life, and ir s;all
38 clearly affirms that..the state shall strive to promote the welfare of the. people by securing and protecting as effectively as ir may a social
reduce and finally to abolish caste as an indicator of backwardness. Ttris aim is to be seen nor only in the legal abolition oi untoucnaUlity. It is also to be seen in the Directive priicipf", of Stut"
folicy. Article
in
strive
was sought to be achieved by limiting such reservations only to
Reservations Policy
for Othzr Baclcward
Classes
45
ten years only was introduced by Dr B.R. Ambedkar who was the prima donna among the Harijan leaders. When some of the scheduled caste members spoke against the time limit Dr Ambedkar reminded them that 'they have rcally no cause for complaint because the decision to limit the thing to ten years was rcally a decision which has been arrived at with their consent. If at the end of the ten years, the Scheduled Castes find that their position has not improved or that they want further extension of this period it will not be beyond their capacity to invent new ways of getting the same protection which they are promised here." (Constiuent Assembly Debates:291811949, pp. 696-7) Such a strategy had a definite impact on those from among the upper castes who might not have agreed with the policy of reservations for the scheduled casteytribes. As Jagat Narain Lal from Bihar put it: "If we have accepted this principle of reservation in the case of the scheduled castes and the aboriginals, it is because we have seen speaker after speaker rising from among the scheduled castes to support a time limit on reservations." (Ibid.,251811949, p. 691.) The moral of this illustration is that a conscious strategy of accepting a limit within which a policy of reservations is to be worked, provides a viable mechanism for promoting a consensus in rclation to such a policy and hence minimizes the social conflict likely to arise from having to accord preferential treatment to given sections of society, sometimes at the cost of others. In the context of a policy of backward class reservations, we need to rcnew the search for limits acceptable to the majority social opinion in different parts of tle country. Such a framework does not exist within the Constitution nor has one evolved subsequently at the national or local levels, giving rise to situations of inter-caste social and political conflicts on more than
.
one occasion.
The l0-year time limit was not the only compromise accepted by the scheduled caste leaders in order to promote a political consensus. In Article 335, which specifically promised that in the making of appointmens to services and posts in the Union or a state the claims of the members ofthe scheduled castes and tribes would be taken into consideration, a tough qualification was introduced which said that this would be done "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration." This part of Article 335 clearly states that unless the criterion of merit is combined with reservation of posts, effi-
46
The
entitled to avail of
ciency would be the likely cisualty. In purely formal terms, no such qualification was introduced in Article l5(4) and 16(4) menrioned above, which refer to reservation of jobs for the backward classes although in practice a minimum level of competence, as seen in a specific percentage of marks, is required of any candidate who is
a reserved quota. This defect needs to be removed since there is no reason why the qualification about efficiency should
jobs or college seats reserved for SCyST/OBCs should .,be confined to a minority of seats." In fact, in his final summing up of the debate on Articles l5(4) and 16(4) he specifically said that the word .,backward" had been brought in to limit the number of reservations to a minority of the available seats. In answer to a question by T.T. Krishnamachari whether his observation about reservations applying to only a minority of the seats was justiiiable, Dr Ambedkar said: .,If the local government included in this category of rcservations such a large number of seats, one could very well go to the Supreme Court and say that the reservation is of such a magnitude that the rule regarding equality of opportunity has been destroyed." (Cowtituent Assembly Debates; 3Ol | | | 1949, pp. 7 Ol-2.) It is pertinent to emphasize that Dr Ambedkar regarded the rule about equality of opportunity as being more fundamental and one which an excessive degree of reservations would tend to undermine. The need to be able to restrict reservations to a limit which does not encroach too greatly upon the principle of providing equality of opportunity needs to be re-emphasized today, when sbme political leaders visualize a rapid expansion of a system of reservations as a viable welfarc strategy through which they can mobilize quick political support. Whether this is at all a realistic expectation will be discussed in the last section of this paper. The point to be emphasized is that even if a strategy of expanding rcservations were to be politically rewarding, it would still conrradict the admirable principle laid down by the founders of the Indian Constitution, that reservations can be instituted only if ample safeguards are provided to ensure that equality of opportunity is available to the majority of the population.
not apply to both SOST and the OBCs. Further, Dr Ambedkar fully expected that in order not to contravene the more fundamental rule about all citizens having an equality of opportunity, the number of
Reservations Poticy for Other Backward
Classes
47
SECTION
ry
Problems Regarding Classification of Backward

Ctasses since 1947 The question ofbeing able to clearly demarcate the Scheduled Castes/ Tribes and the Other Backward Classes was left to be decided either by the President himself or by a commission appointed by him' lble' scheduled castes and tribes can be referred to only briefly because the main issue is the criteria used for classifying the OBCs and estiryat-
ing their
population.
., '
'
had estimated the total of the Depressed Cl4sss fne tggi ""nsus British India and Ll.l million in the States and to be 39.1 million in Agencies. The criteria used to identify these castes were not those of theoretical untouchability i.e., whether a caste, due to its varnd status, was considered susceptible to touch afid distance pollution. Each Provincial Superintendent involved with the 1931 census was told to "reckon as depressed only those castes who definitely suffer from serious social and political handicap on account of their degraded
position in the Hindu social scheme." The list of llepressed Classes put together by the l93l census was to be the basis for the special electoral representation given to the Depressed Classes in the 1935 Government of India AcL Then the Scheduled Castes order promulgated by the President in 1950 basically re-enacted the 1936 list. It is significant to note this fact because it takes away the edge from the
criticism that the scheduled castes list, as it stand$+eduF, is based on narrow political considerations favourable to the Indian National Congress then and the Congress(I) now' The 1941 census enunrerabd 12.6% of the total population of i'pdi:l*edlndia as the Depressed Classes. The l95l census updated thi( istimate to 14.5% of the population and according to the 1971
census the scheduled castes comprisd 14.6% of the population. After the additions and the deletions made by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order 1956, there have been no further changes in that list on an all-India basis apart from a few small changes being made for Jammu and Kashmir (1956),.-' Andaman and Nicobarlslands (1959), Dadra and NagarHaveli (1962)' Pondicherry (1964), Uttar Pradesh (1967), Goa' Daman and Diu
48
(1968),
levelled, by the leaders of the Bahujan Samaj party for example, has been that too few from the Dalits (SC/ST/OBCs) fin<t a place in govemment jobs or education and politics, and that very linle has actually been done for these deprived groups. This policy of relative neutrality in the matter of defining those groups to be included within
the scheduled caste list contrasts with the frequent changes made by the British government in granting privileges to new groups so as ro broaden the narow social basis of its political support. On this point there is also a contrast between the list of scheduted castes and those of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) both nationally (which has not been accepted by the government so far) and in those states where reservations exist for the OBCS. There has been a tendency to appoint successive commissions, often by govemments of different political parties, which have either increased or revised the number of social groups (usually castes) in the OBC lisrs and the proportion ofjobs or places in educational institutions reserved for them.
of creating a political alliance with them. One of the criticisms
in power to alter or add on to the scheduled castes liat in any significani *uy .o as to confer concessions on various new castes o. gaup, in the
hope
Nagaland (1970) and Sikkim (1978). This again demonstrates a vital aspect of the scheduled caste list often not emphasized enough. There has been little or no attempt by the parties
An interesting example of how the OBC lists tend to be prone to sudden expansion or suggestions for expansion is to be found in the comparison between the reports of the First National (Kaka Kalelkar)
Commission and the Second (Mandal) Commission on backward classes. According to the Kaka Kalelkar Commission (which re_ ported in 1955), 2399 castes were classified as backward. The Mandal Commission proposed to increase the number of OBCs to 3743
castes. The rationale behind this enhanced list was nowhere clearly explained and as the Mandal Commission chose not to publish data it had collected through its field surveys, no basis exists for a public debate on this subject. It
will always remain
trenchant mysrery as ro
why the Mandal Commission dara was hidden away from the public eye. In the absence of data with which one can cross-check the classification of OBCs, the Mandal Commission Report irltimately portrays the same problems which had stalked the Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report-the unavailability of a firm data base.
Reservations Poticy
for Other Backward
Classes
49
The two principal difficulties in classifying backward classes are concemed *ittt th" determination of the population of the OBCs and the use of various indices for listing the OBCs' It is necessary to look at these issues in some detail, both at the national and the state levels. It is a paradox that the commissions appointed and the critics who have examined their reports have not tumed their attention to the complex problem of estimating the population of the OBCs when they are listed caste-wise, as they have been so far. On the face of it, the figures of populations suggested to date scarcely bear comparison and indicate that a more systematic examination of the reports of the backward classes commissions should be undertaken as a sequel to this paper. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report estimated the OBC population at I 16 million or abotrt 32Vo of the total population io 1952. The Mandal Commission in 1978 estimated the OBC popu-
lation at 527o of total population. This included the Hindu OBC castes (43.7To of total population) and the OBCs from among the non-Hindu communities (8.4Vo of the total population). Incidentally' the Mandal Commission failed to furnish the absolute figures of the population involved and it escaped this responsibility in the main body of the report by merely referring to a Table in the Appendices which was not then published! (Report of the Backward Classes
Commission, vols. I & II, 1980, p. 56.) In effect, the Mandal Commission, like the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, made two separate calculations: one was a qualitative sample survey to collect its own data for designating the backward classes and tle second was a projection of census data from the 1931 census (which was the last census to give a complete breakdown of castewise population figures) in order to generate aggregate caste-wise population figures on an all-India basis. It is quite clear that the data collected through the sample survey could not give a clue to overall caste-wise population figures. Even the Mandal Commission, which conducted the largest exercise so far attempted at a socio-educational survey, could cover only two villages and one urban block in each district of India. In addition, it collected information through interviews and from the list of OBCs published by different states. According to the schedule of indices constructed by the commission it then finalized a state-wise list of OBCs. There was no certainty, first of all, that the method followed by the Mandal Commission had been
50
wise figures from the breakdown given by the sample survey. yet without the aggregate population figures no suggestion could be, made as to the overall share ofjobs or college seats that should be reserved because since the days of the .,Communal G.O.', of 1927 in Madras and subsequently the recommendations made by the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, the share of reservations for each group has been, in one way or another, proportional to its overall size. In order to calculate the overall proportion of different castes or clusters, the Mandal Commission undertook a different exercise. It assumed "that the inter se rate of growth of population of various castes, cornmunities and religious groups over the last half a century has remained more or less the same." (Mandat Commission Report, vol. I, p. 56.) Then on rhe strength of its socio-educational survey it culled out from the l93l census caste/community-wise population figures for those it classified as forward and backward groups. Thereby it obtained the following classification:
A A-l
Scheduled Castes and Tribes
Scheduled Castes (SCs) Scheduled Tribes (STs)
Vo
able to cover all the castes which claim to exist within the country. Then, given the small size of the sample, the great variations in the mix of castes from one area to another, and differences in fertility patterns within the same caste group and between states and regioni, there was little possibility of extrapolating aggregate, all_India, caste_
of population
A-2
15.05 7.51
Total of A
22.56
B_
B-l
B-2
B-3
Non-Hindu Communities, Religious Groups, etcMuslims (other than STs)

Christians (other than STs) Sikhs (other than SCs and STs) Buddhists (other than STs)
Jains
l.l9
2.16
t.67
0.67 0.47
16.16
cLt
B-4
B-5
Total of B
C
C-2 C-3
C-l
Forward. Hindu Castes antl Communities Brahmins (includingBhumihars) Rajputs

Marathas
of total popuIation of India

5.52
3-90
2.2r
Resenations Policy
for
Other Backward Classes

1.00 1.88 1.07
2.OO
5l
C-4 Jats C-5 Vaishyas, Bania, etc. C-6 Kayasthas C-7 Other forward Hindu casteVgroups
Total of C
TOTAI
1?58
56.30
A/B/C
D-l
D-2 D-3
OBCs Backward Hindu casteVgrouPs

43.7 8.4
52.O
within OBC 529o of religious groups under section B Approximate derived pop. of OBCs rounded off to a unit
There are several objections to the piocedure used and the results arrived at by the Mandal Commission. Its estimate of backward castes and groups from among the Hindus came to 43.7% of the population. This represents an increase of almost ll%: over the estimate of OBC population by the Kaka Kalelkar Commission which only considered the Hindu sections of the population. How is one to explain this increase, especially when the base year for both estimates is the 1931 census and when despite the slowness of the modemization process, the growth of primary, secondary and higher education has more than kept pace with the growth of population in India? It is difficult to argue from any given set of statistics that taking the urban and the rural sector together, socio-economic backwardness now covers proportionately a greater section of the population than it did in 1951. Either the Kaka Kalelkar estimate should be shown to be a gross underestimation or the data on which the Mandal Commission has based its calculations be made available before the estimate of OBCs at 52Eo of rhe population can be accepted. Looking at the methodology followed by the Mandal Commission one can conjecture that its estimates of population could not be right, even as an approximation. The Mandal Commission assumed that different castes have enjoyed, over the last 50 years, the same rate of growth as the all-India population. This is an impossible assumption for several reasons. Between 1931 and 1981 the annual rate of
52
The Politics of Baclcwardness
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Reservations Policy
for
Other Backward
Classes
53
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54
population growth has shown an increase. However, this increase has been distributed unevenly between the states and a single national Frcentage for the OBCs would not be applicable to rh; unless ir was an average of the actual sizes of the OBC popul.ation in separate states . Table I has been culled from part II-A of the General popula_ tion Tables published by the 1981 census. The lggl census pur together this special Table by taking the area of stales and union territories as found in 1981 and calculating the variation in each tenyear period since 1901. For our purposes it is sufficient to collate the data since 1931. Table I contains highly significant data. Since the Mandal Cornmission nowhere explained the exact method used by it to calculate the population, one has to assume that it used the average rate of population growth since l93l as a uniform standard applicable to all the castevcommunities. This average rate works out to 1.98% per annum between l93l and 1981, this being the average of a rate which varied from l.42Vo btween 1931 and l94l to 25% between l97l and 1981. A comparison will reveal how much of a gap there is between an average all-India rate of population growth and the rates of growth applicable to different states in different decades. Table II shows clearly that if the all-India rate of population growth is applied to the states there would be an underestimation and overestimation in different cases. Taking the overall, average, allIndia rate alone, it would be seen that in 8 states the rate will be below and in the rest above the all-India rate. Often. the difference is substantial. For example, Gujarat had an average rate of growth of 2.43Vo per annum between l93l and 1981. If the all-India rate of 1.98% is applied, the population in Gujarat would be.underestimated approximately by 23%.In Tamil Nadu a similar procedure will yield an overestimation of 2lvo. Since the base figures vary greatly according to the size and population density of a state, the percentage differences, which too will increase or decrease from decade to decade, also conceal immensely different magnitudes. It is inconceivable that a simple application of the all-India average rate of population growth would yield an accurate figure over 50 years, especially as it is being applied to different castes and social groups. The second major shortcoming in the Mandal Commission Report is that it entirely ignores differentials within the caste in the matter of
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward Classes
55
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population growth, income levels and educational attainments and facilities. An interesting World Bank study of fertility decline in India argues that it is associated with factors that operate much more at the level of regions, states and individual families than at the level of social groups. A fall in mortality rates and better educational attainment enabled parents both to make rational choices through family planning and also persuaded them to limit the number of children since education became a necessity for economic survival. The increase in wages of agricultural labour diminished the income of landowners forcing ihem to adopt fertility control. Wage increases boosted the cash income of female daily-wage earners, raising the opportunity cost of their time spent in bringing up children (K.C. Zachariah and Sulekha Patel, Determinants of Fertility Decline in India: An Analysis, World Bank Staff Paper, No. 699). The obverse corollary of this hypothesis is that given sufficiently high farmer income levels and labourer's wage levels, the need for family labour to undertake intensive cash cropping could lead to higher fertility rates among owner-cultivator groups. The first scenario of improved literacy producing a decline in fertility is true of Kerala, whereas the second scenario of an enhanced need for f4mily labour to undertake remunerative farming leading to a slightly'higher population growth inspite of improving standards of education is to be seen in Gujarat. In either case, however, an increase in population would, at the same time, be accompanied by a decrease in social and educational backwardness. It is clear that the Mandal Commission's figures of OBCs constituting 52% of the population cannot be accepted and needs to be re-examined by a committee which will have to design a survey method that will take into account the complexities affecting calculation of population growth in different states. The additional questions which the report oI the Mandal Commission will have to answer when analyzed in detail, are best illustrated from a close reading of several backward classes commission reports from the states of Kamataka and Gujarat. It should be remembered that when after prolonged debate and consideration it was decided by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's govemment not to accept the Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report (primarily because of its self-confessed weak and unverified data base and unexplained adherence to caste as the
Classes
57
principal index of classifying the OBCs), the Cabinet also decided in iuty t-lOt that the state governments should be free to appoint their own commissions to make reservations for the backward classes' both under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution' A more systematic discussion of these reports will be attempted in a later publication. Here one can pinpoint only typical problems which show the need for a detailed and thoroughgoing enquiry' One of the major paradoxes a researcher is bound to note when reading successive reports of the backward classes commissions is the abience of any effort by the later reports to delineate and explain the differences from the earlier ones. In as much as the backward classes commissions claim to base their decisions to grant privileged concessions to certain groups on authentic sociological research and not on any arbitrary dispensation, the contradictions between two reports pertaining to the same area need to be explained and accounted for, especially when they refer to key aspects of the issues under consideration. The Backward Classes Commission in Kamataka headed by L.G. Havanur took approximately five years to complete its work (1972-77). Subsequently, due to objections raised by several groups before the Supreme Court, the Karnataka government appointed a Second Backward Classes Commission headed by T. Venkataswamy in 1983. This commission submitted its report in 1986. Both the commissions conducted their own surveys and computed their separate lists of OBCs. The determination of caste-wise population by the Havanur Commission was made on the basis of a sample survey i n 1972-73 selecting at least one village in each taluka, one division or ward in each town municipality, two divisions in each city municipality and four or five divisions in the city municipal corporations throughout the state. Every individual in the selected 200 villages and 204 blocks was covered under the survey' The Venkataswamy Commission undertook an even more comprehensive door-to-door survey to enumerate the population of the state by religion, caste, and subcaste and to study the existing socio-economic and educational status of the communities. (Govemment of Kamataka, Report of the Second Backward Classes Commission, vol. I, 1986' pp.141-42.) A comparison with the earlier report was however not made and when this exercise was undertaken it showed imponant unexolained differences, some of which will be mentioned in this
58 paper.
^ Quile clearly, despite its declared intention, the Venkataswamy Commission did not undertake a comprehensive state_wide, door_to_ door survey. According to its own estimate published in Annexure 9.2 of_vol. III of the Report, whereas the Karnataka State population according to the 1981 census was 37,135,j14 at the 1971_ l gg l rate of growtlr, by 1984 it should have been 3g,920,gg3. The acrual population according to the caste-wise socio-educational survev con_ ducted by the Commission in 1984 was only 36,124,594 o, 232Eo less than the figure reported by the 19gl census and 9.l57o less than the figure projected on the basis of the lggl census for 19g4. This difference is neither acknowledged nor explained in the text of the report. A comparison with the Havanur Commission Report shows that one possible reason, when compared to the lgTZ survey, is that 8 castes with a scheduled caste component, had been included in the OBC list and were later transferred from it. The population of these 8 castes was 6,42,533. But when tle two OBC lists were compared in detail it was found that the Venkataswamy Commission had alto_ gether omitted another 39 castes which. had no scheduled caste com_ ponent and whose populati on in 19'12 was g,42,221. Among these were substantially numerous castes like the yadavas (4,46,993), Hanbar (34,001), Kodaga (82,271), Kolayam (ZO,97g) and Koracha (20,164). Again, no mention of this fact was found in the Venkataswamy Commission's report, much less an explanation of it. Considering that the population figure produced by the l9g4 socio_ educational survey (36,124,594) was the basis for its recommenda_ tions, any future report cannot be considered complete unless and until the following conditions are met: (a) a rigorous comparison is made with the previous reports on the Other Backward Classes commissions to explain differences in assumptions, survey methods and actual data collected; and (D) the data itself are sent to all the relevant experts, those interviewed by the commission and other associated persons for their comments, and those comments are then considered and acted upon before finalizing the report. By implication those reports, e.g., the Mandal Commission and the Venkata_ swamy Commission reports against which major objections can be raised should not be accepted unless new commissions have re_ examined their data.
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
59
In continuation of the general criticism of the methodology adopted by several commissions, it might also be pointed out that there has as yet not emerged any standard means of setting up a scale of indices to measure social and educational backwardness. In its judgement in the famous Balaji case, the Supreme Court had held that if a particular community is to be treated as educationally backward, the diver-
gence between its educational level and that of the state average should not be marginal but substantial. The court considered 50% divergence to be acceptable. It cited the example of Bihar, where according to the l97l census, the percentage of illiteracy was 807o. If only those whose social group has a 50% divergence from tle state average were to be considered educationally backward then no one in Bihar could be said to be educationally backward since in order to be so, l2OVo members of a caste/class would have to be illiterate. The Mandal Commission decided first of all to select about a dozen castes well known for their social and educational backwardness from among its own survey in a state and use the average oftheir level of achievement as the minimum divergence from the state average. For instance, one of the indicators for social backwardness is the rate of student dropouts in the age group 5-15 yeius tls compared to the state average. As a result of the above tests it was seen that in educationally backward castes this rate is atleast 25 per cent above the state average. Further, it was also noticed that this deviation of 25Va from the state average in the case of most of the 'indicators' gave satisfactory results. In view of this, wherever an indicator was based on deviation from the state average, it was fixed at 25Vo, because a deviation of 50% was seen to give wholly unsatisfactory results and at times to create anomalous situations. This should perhaps be considered one of the more enduring contributions made by the Mandal Commission to the OBC survey methodology. The one fuli-scale report on backward classes after the publication of the Mandal Commission Report was the Venkataswamy Commission Report in Karnataka. It was a bit of a regression in this case because instead of adopting the principle of divergence from the state average, the Venkataswamy Commission constructed a schedule of indices in terms of which any deviation above the state average was considered a sufficient qualification for backwardness. For instance, the state average for those not owning any house in Kamataka was
60
l3.llVo and for those owning only kuchha houses was 36.52Vo. Any caste/recognised social group, which registered a percentage higher than this scored one point on the scale of backwardness. Out of 17 such indices, ifa group scored 9 or more it was considered backward and 8 or less it was considered forward. Quite clearly, the practice of taking a single given figure as the average means that the marginal cases on either side of this limit have to be, in a sense, arbitrarily
classified. Out of the thirty-nine Hindu castes. and five non-Hindu communities listed by the Venkataswamy Commission, six had an exact score of 9, three had a score of 10. six had a score of I I and seven had a score of 12. Among those listed as forward, four had a score of 8, six had a score of 7 and nine had a score of 6. Another thirteen castes were assessed on a scale of 18-20 points, an exception
which raised doubts about the reason for the special treatment awarded
to them. A small exercise was done taking the absolute percentages against each caste and in the case of the castes listed as backward subtracting 3Vo and in the case of the castes listed as forward adding 3Vo, to see if this range made a differe4ce to their classification. Out of a sample of nine castes it was seen that four castes classified as forward would revert to the backward category if the 3Eo range were applied to them and one caste with a score of 9 would move over to the forward category. Clearly, the principle propounded by the Supreme Court and upheld by the Mandal Commission that a divergence of 5OVo or 25Vo fromthe state average should be the criteria for determining backwardness is more definitive and ought to be used in place of a single average figure. The same principle is to be applied in the case of a yardstick like the number of students passing the SSLC or High School exam in a given year being used as a measure for assessing the educational backwardness of a caste. A one-year average is not a decisive index to the cumulative stock of SSLC pass within a caste-group and it is this latter ratio or proportion which ought to be estimated in the course of a socio-educational survey. The general trend has been to use caste as one among many indices to assess backwardness. There are several difficulties in concretizing the use of caste as a criterion of backwardness to which attention needs to be drawn. One of the most basic difficulties, which was mentioned as early as the 1931 census in great detail, is the growing dissociation between traditional occupation and caste. As
Classes
61
Table
census of shows, based on the Imperial Tables of the 1931 on|y 33% on the 23 castes for whom all-India data is given in 1931' on their traditional occupaan average continued to depend mainly
III
tion. In
of Bhats and Chamars only 7 '77o were wholly "ur" traditional occupation whereas for the Jat cultivadependant on their
ih"
potters 37%' tors this figure was 657o' for the weavers 337o, fot the This table ieveals the great need for a fresh enquiry into the relationin order ship between caste and occupation in today's circumstances growth of a modern economy to understand how the process of the has affected vital aspects of the caste system' It is surprising tLat most of the surveys commissioned by the various baciward classes commissions have not undertaken to examine the existing relationship between caste and occupation' The Mandal Commission Report assumed a more or less static and unchanging relationship between caste and social structure but the data it sought to collect did not even seek to answer the questions contained in its definition of caste' On page 16 it produced its definition of caste'
According to the Mandal Commission Report, "When dealing with the living social reality what counts is not the fine metaphysical concepts embodied in great religious works of a people but the homeipun ideas that have percolated into the consciousness of the masses and become a part of their world view." One of the homespun ideas it propounded was: "In this sense the caste system hirs meant a divisionof Hindu society into numerous isolated castes and jatis who
marry among themselves, dine among themselves and broadly pursue iraditional occupations." (Mandal Commission Report, vols' I and II, 1980 p.16.) Yet neither the data collected, nor the indicators used under the heading for social and educational backwardness, touched on any of these points. The eleven indicators used were classified as follows:
A. Social
by others' which mainly depend on manual labour for their 2. Castes/classes livelihood. 3. Castes/classes where at least 25'% females and l07o males above the state average get manied at an age below 17 years in rural areas and at least lOVo females and 5Vo males do so in urban areas'
I . CasteVclasses considered as socially backward
62
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Resemations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
63
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64
4. Castes/classes where participation of females in work is at least 25Vo above the state average.
B. Educational
5. CasteVclasses where the number of children in the age group of5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25Vo above the state average. 6. Castes/classes where the rate of student dropout in the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the state average. 7. Castes/classes amongst whom the proportion of matriculates is aI least 25Vo below the state averase.
C. Economic 8. Castes/classes where the average value of family assets is at least 25Vo below the state average. 9. CasteVclasses where the number of families living in kuchha houses is at least 25Va above the state average. 10. CasteVclasses where the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the households. I l. CasteVclasses where the number of households having taken consumption loan is at least 25Vo above the state average. Subsequently all the social indicators were given a weightage of three points each; educational indicators a weightage of two points each and economic indicators a weightage of one point each. What is noteworthy is the fact that none of the indicators touched upon the three features earlier said to be the defining characteristics of the caste system namely marriage within the jati, inter-caste dining, and traditional occupations. Instead within the criterion 'social' the indicators used were such that they could not easily tell us much abcut backwardness. The first criterion,-Castes/classes considered as socially backward by others-is so relative that it could apply to most castes. In local terms sub-castes are arranged in an hierarchical order and in terms of formal language such usage characterizing a caste as being below your own persists long after economic and social practice has destroyed any real hierarchy. Every sub-caste would be considered backward by the one theoretically occupying a position above it. The second ofthe social indices pertains to "Castes/ classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their livelihood".
Classes
65
Now with the decrease in the phenomenon of landlordism and a slow rise in the wages of agricultural labourers since 1947 two tendencies have grown stronger--owner-cultivation with a greater'involvement of family labour and the opportunity for agricultural labourers to work. Hence the incidence of manual labour in agriculture has gone up. Such manual labour unlike that of the Bhangis or bonded labour is economically rewarding and hence enables one to live a better life' even to educaie one's children. It cannot be counted as a factor of backwardness. The third criterion is even less related to caste although it does provide a measure for indicating backwardness' This
is concerning casteVclasses where at least 25Vo females and 1O% males above the state average get married at an age below 17 years
in rural areas and at least 107o females and 57o males do so in urban areas. Now clearly there is very little evidence to show that marriage at an early age is determined by caste. It is much more determined by education, the need for children to participate in family work or income mobilization, and one's individual belief in ritual and religion. These factors are not in all cases determined by caste' The iemaining eight criteria are either educational or economic and once again, not related to caste. The contradiction between the desire to use caste as a means oI assessing backwardness and the inability to use it in any concrete manner is to be seen in the survey design of the Venkataswamy Commission Report which is the latest among the backward classes commission reports. A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has recently proposed the use of a caste-cum-means criteria for assessing backwardness. According to the authors, "we laud and appreciate it (caste-cum-means criteria) as a vital landmark in the march of the Other Backward Classes towards social justice and social equality." (Report of the Karnataka Second Backward Classes Commiision,vol. I, 1986.) Admirable as this desire might seem, it is a revelation to compare the questions actually asked during its survey by the Venkataswamy Commission Report. One then discovers that out ofthe 17 criteria that were applied to collect data, not one refered to the three characteristics considered fundamental by the Mandal Commission in defining the caste system : inter-caste marriage, intercaste dining and traditional occupation. The indices were divided into negative and positive aspects. In the case of the negative aspects, if a
66
the form of a list of castes to whom an income criterion is then applied, as happens now. The issue is whether in concrete empirical terms, one can measure or specifu backwardness caused by caste in the case of the OBCs and what weight is given to such indices. Clearly, if we try and use the three criteria suggested by the Mandal
Commission, namely inter-caste marriage, inter-caste dining and tra_
group scored above the state average it was an indication of back_ wardness and in the case of the positive aspects this happened when it scored a percentage below the state average. The two indices. each under the rubric of negative and positive social aspects respectively, were whether families belonging to specific castes were houselesV siteless, resided in kuchha houses and those residing in pa*&a houses and the share of the caste living in urban areas. The rest ofthe indices once again, were concerning economic assets, educational achieve_ ments, and facilities and share in government employment. (Govem_ ment of Kamataka, Report of thz Second Backward Classes Commission, vol. II, Annexure 9.6.) This great ambiguity between the use of the word caste and the total absence of empirical criteria for making use of it according to its acceptable sociological definition raises an important question about how to interpret the word 'socially' in the Constitution, which refers to "socially and educationally backward classes." Clearly, the ques_ tion is not whether a list of OBCs is written down and published in
ditional occupation, these would not be able to provide an empirical measurre of comparative social backwardness. Either ways are sug_ gested of using these criteria empirically or alternative ways of assessing social backwardness caused by caste are thought of and
of indices referring to education, income, assets, languages spoken, of female employment outside of the home, age of marriage, access to entertainment, etc. Some of these indices have not been used by the OBC commissions in the past but will be relevant, especially in regions where rural development has or will provide many villagers with facilities now mainly available to urban
travel, share
dwellers.
tively, a likely option is that no merhods are found ro relate backwardness to caste, the OBC lists are entirely drawn up in future according to occupation, where social backwardness is seen in terms
data collected by future surveys of Other Backward Classes. Alterna_
if
Resemations Policy for Other Backward
Classes
67
The inability to really make use of the caste criterion led the Karnataka government, after it had rejected the recommendations of the Venkataswamy Commission Report, to give priority to the income criterion. The Government Order specifying the groups of OBCs separately under Article l5(4) and under Article 16(4) listed Groups A to E as shown in Table IV below:
Table
IV
List of OBCs according to Kamataka Government Order in force since 13 October, 1986
Backward
Class
Under
Under
Article
Artick
16 (4) 5% l39o
16%
Income limit under both Articles
Is (4)
Group A Group B
Group C Group D Group E (Backward Special) 5% l57o
No income limit
Rs 10,000
t6%
9% 5% 50%
1r%
5%
5OVo
Rs 10,000 Rs 10,000
Rs
8,000
TonI
iV.B.: 1. Group
guardians.
A refers to Backward Tribes. 2. Income refers to family income of the citizens and hiVher parens/legal
3. Limit of reservations for OBCs at 50% in addition to the quota for SCJ
STs.
What determines the individual's qualification for being able to

use the reservation is not caste-determined criteria in this case but an income-determined criteria, virtually applicable to the entire popula-
tion subject to a means test. This is especially so because Group E refers to the Backward Special Group which according to the Karnataka govemment order "shall consist of the following citizens: (i) an actual cultivator;
(ii) an artisan; (iii) a petty businessman;

(iv) one holding an appointment either in Govemment service or corresponding services under private employment including casual labour; and
68
_(u)
The
any person self-employed or engaged in any occupation in_ volving manual labour." (Karnataka Government Order No. SWL 66 BCA 86, Bangalore, l3rh October, 1986.) There is no caste qualification as far as the Backward Special Group is concerned. It is to be considered why then there was still a need to list the castes separately in the OBC list. perhaps in Kamataka there is a tradition of having caste associations. As the analysis in the following section would show, the reach of these caste associations is often limited to the economically well-off sections of the castes. In this sense it is difficult to make caste into a mass issue and as an identity, its mobilizing power evokes a greatly diminishing response at the popular level (when one is talking of millions of people) than it does when one is talking of the elite groups, especially at the local levels and in the rural areas (when one is referring to hundreds or thousands of persons). The existence of the Congress and other parties as all-India organisations has already struck hard at the use of caste identities and groups. The emergence of regional political parties in India and their substantial success in mobilizing voter support, cutting across caste and other ethnic groups reveals the growing strength of identities other than caste. The region as a developmental unit within the nation is gaining a more extensive place in popular consciousness above that of tbe more localized identities like caste. This consciousness is quite different from that of the region in itself, which was more typical of the princely states of nineteenth century India. This is a factor that should be taken into account by those political leaders who might be tempted to see the issue of expanding reservations for the OBCs as a means of winning the political support of "the backward castes". It must after all be remembered that many caste associations have been set up at the initiative of political leaders. It was during the tenure of Devraj Urs as chief minister of Karnataka that economic and administrative facilities were extended for the organisation of associations ofbackward castes and more than thirty such new organisations sprang up. If Devraj Urs had hoped to create a long-term base of social or political support then he was to be sadly disillusioned. Once again, the issue raised by the electoral dimension of political behaviour of people leads us back to the relevance of caste, either as an indicator of backwardness or as a powerful lever of mass identification which must continually be
Resemations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
69
forced upon issues like that of defining the 'socially and educationally backward classes'. The question of caste needs to be examined separately before deciding on whether or not to dispense with it entirely in the context of classifying the Other Backward Classes. Another aspect of social reality which weakens the argument about listing entire caste groups as backward entities is the intemal economic and educational differentiation within the caste groups. The difference in economic conditions, assets and educational standards between castes would be evident when one examines the socioeconomic data put together by any of the backward classes commissions. Take the example of the tables published in the Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission in Gujarat. The difference between the average figures shown for various castes reveals how those classified as backward castes themselves have widely differing standards. Each household belonging to the Ghanchi caste spent Rs 4615 per household, while for the Rajputs this figure was Rs 3393, for the Bhois Rs 2871 and for the Bajania Rs 1318, even while all these cirstes were classified as backward. The range of expenditure within the caste group wds further indicative of internal economic differentiation, as the following Table
of selected castes shows:

Table V Average, Minimum and. Maximwn Annual Expenditure per Household belonging to Select Castes in Gujarat
Narne Caste
of
Annual
Ann
rul
Exp
e nditure
Ran g e
TonI
Expenditure Per HH in Rs
Minimum
120
Maximum
18,500 15,750 13,21O 13,900
Brahmin (F) Darji (B)

Kanabiheva (F) Rajput (B) Bajania (B)
4,070
3,830 4,224 3,393
1,318
7to
I,100
120 350
Bhoi (B)
Ghanchi (B)
2,87r
4,615
250
1,330
4,150 2,850
10,750
N.B.: (F) Forward, (B) Backward.
Such intemal differentiation marked all
tle
castes, including the
70
scheduled castes and tribes. For these two categories the income range was as follows:
Caste/Group
Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes tnissiion, Gujarat, 1976, vol.
Annual Eryenditure
3,191
Minimum 230
Maximum
36,2m
7,350
t923
tr, Appendix XXIX.
zto
Source: Repon of the Socially and E&rcationally Bactcward Classes Com-
These data show that without an income critria, merely including the entire caste group as backward hides severe income inequalities. In the case of the scheduled castes and tribes where a collective social
identity is morc developed because of the cultural deprivations like untouchability, non-inclusion within Hinduism etc., the bener-off might still suffer from psychological and social stigma and complexes. They would then need the support of their ethnic grcrups and would act to give them real leadership on the assumption that without a substantial number of their group achieving a higher status, their own social isolation would not be easily overcome. It is this distinct status of visible group deprivation of a social and culnrral type which distinguishes the scheduled casteytribs from the other backward castes. As one had argued earlier in the case of the OBCs, the commission rcports so far have failed to establish qmte-governed deprivation as being applicable to "socially and educationally backward classes", and this is especially true of the surveys conducted by the Mandal Commission and the Venkataswamy Commission. If caste is not shown to be the cause of backwardness, the case for applying only cultural, economic and educational criterion to identify
the backward classes is greatly strengthened. A quick survey of the kind of criteria prevailing in the states that have sanctioned rcservations for the OBCs shows that most of them alrcady specify an economic criterion. Only, it is applied to specified castes who are not represented within the educational set-up and the government services, in proportion to their population. The application of the income criterion in most states has been chosen without an explanation being given about it and has been made to change again without a proper justification on a number of occasions. The Mandal
Classes
'11
criteria' Instead' it estimated Commission did not specify any income und the proportion of families taking
the value of family u""t' t}te loans' Clearln the first criterion' namely t *r"ttofO the case of "onrumition r"*'y urr"t, is a difficuit rule to apply in ""f""-"f goois and the chances of wrong reporting are far greater i""r*"ra legitimale to of current familv income' It is also not il;;;;";;t"
the value
loans' since iisi all famities taking household consumption Hence' varieJgreatly from one household to another' ;il;;";"t an income criterion should be used' in different states has A summary of income criteria being applied Equali' U*" p.""ia"i Uy Marc Galanter (Marc Galanter ' Competingis necesIndia' Table 20)' It ,irtt to* and the Backward Classes in of the this data as a starting point for-an analysis ,urv to "onriO"r OBCs' inc'ome criteria to be used in classifying the Table VI Income Criteria for the Other Bachttard
Classes: A ProfiIe
State
Year
Name of GrouP
Estimate of OBC
Population as
share of Total
1.
Andhra
Pradesh
r97s (,
BC (ii) EconomicallY
92
listed
56w
castes/
communities
BC
All with income

under Rs 1500 Member of
2.
Bihar
1979
BC
list
Sovo
of
128 castes/ communities whose
annual income rs less than Rs l200oi-
3.
Gujarat
1978
19'12
BC
F-cono-
82 listed
communities N'A'
All with income

under Rs 4800 annually
micallY
BC
72
4.
Jammu & Kashrnir
1973
Socially
and Edu-
l.
Occupations
2. 19 communities
3. Border and
cationally BC
N.A. N.A.
8%
poor areas
42 Backward Tribes: No income
5. Kamataka
1986
BC Group
N.A.
limit
Group B
95 castes:
Within them those

having an annual income of Rs 10000 Group C
N.A.
5 communities:
Within them those

having an annual income of Rs 10000 Group D
N.A,
Within them those

having an annual income of Rs 10000 Group E 5 occupations:
castes:
N.A.
Within them those

having an annual income of Rs 8000
N.A.
1979
0) Bc
List of 16 communi- 45go ties, 129 castes

and 62 tribes
(ll)
Economi-
All with
annual
cally BC
income under Rs 4800 Members of listed communities with income

less than Rs 10000
6.
Kerala
1977
Socially
and Edu-
N,A.
cationally BC
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
IJ
1972
Socially
and Edu-
cationally
BC
Members of listed communities with income less than Rs 6000 Members of 560 listed communities with income less than Rs 8000
N.A.
19',10 BC
N.A.
1.
Maharashtra 1966
Tamil
oBc
BC
list of communities list of 105

communities
N.A.
51%
Nadu
1972
9. Uttar
Pradesh
1978
BC
list of 58
communities
N.A.
Based on Marc Galanter, op. cit., Table 20, and Kamataka Govemment Order of 13 October, 1986.
Although Marc Galanter has provided the data on the income criteria actually being used in states, he has said nothing on why tlese are so different or why they have been changed over time. The discrepancies in the known statistics for wages show that often the figures are far higher than those prevailing for jobs categorized as badly paid. Recently, the Labour Ministers' Conference in Delhi recommended a minimum wage of Rs 11 per day for agricultural workers. With this as the base ii can be seen that in a state like Bihar the annual income of an agricultural labourer would be Rs 3960. In actual practice, as one knows, the wages paid are often much less than this and so the limit of Rs 12,000 per annum which has been put
as a maximum criteria for the backward classes contains several other
income levels above that of the agricultural labourers. According to exhaustive data compiled by the Ministry of Labour, the wage rates of unskilled labour provides a good basis for assessing the income criterion set up for the backward classes in different states. There is a need to review these income criteria and justify a new one on the ground that it actually covers the educationally backward. In Kamataka the wage rate mentioned by the Ministry of Labour on 30.1.1985 was Rs 9.50 to Rs 14.00 per day, acgording to class of
74
example, Andhra Pradesh in lg1.1 and Gujarat. Exact istimates of OBC population are also not available in Gujarat, Jammu and Kash_ mir, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and several other states. At the verv least an enquiry is . alled for to determine the OBC population in those states wherc a reservation system already exists. Such a de_ mand is likely to arise in the future as this is one of the questions which groups excluded from the OBC list or individuals unable to make use of the reservation system could well ask. It also needs to be answered purely from the view of estimating the actual extent of social and educational backwardness and the economic poverty which is related to it.
backward classes under the latest scheme of the Karnataka Govem_ ment is Rs 10,000. This is three times the lower figure for unskilled labour and twice the highest salary given to artisans, handicraftsmen, etc. In many of the states there are no income criteria applicable, for
work and type of land. This gives us an annual income range of Rs 342O to Rs 5040. By comparison, the cutoffpoints for mosr groups of
SECTION V Policy Perspec-tives for the Future

The question of policy about reservations, as far as the backward
classes are concemed, is whether one should argue for an expansion of the reservation system, for cutting down its size, for freezing it at
certain levels, for its abolition or for other reforms within it to make it more effective as a means of promoting social equality, without provoking a breakdown of social consensus. It is important to ask this question now because conflicts over the reservation issue add to other conflicts like terrorism and communalism, which already threaten to fracture the Indian polity. Besides, the system of reservations had at one time, especially in the latter half of the 1960s and the whole of 1970s, appeared to many political leaders and policy makers as an important means of providing an escalator for representatives of deprived social groups or of those with nascent economic wealth but without a significant presence in the administration or in the educational world. If political leaders had taken the lead in establishing or extending the reservation system for the OBCs expecting to build a
Reservatiorc Pohcy
for Other Backward
Classes
'15
stable politicat base, their calculations have proved to be wrong' In every national election and major state election, those who have been ctasiitieO as OnCs have shown the calmcity and the will to take their own decisions. They have often been influenced by other identities and other issues. In so far as reservations provide jobs only to a few persons among a particular social group, their usefulness as an av-
inue of patronage or reward is very limited. This is especially so because the cohesion of social groups like sub'castes-a cohesion assumed by certain schools of sociology-never really existed' and if it did it has now been greatly loosened by a variety of factors like language, region, occupation and income, which tend to influence different members of these groups differently.
One kind of political opinion advocates eschewing any discussion or research on the subject of the reservation system in the hope that
this will prcvent notice being taken of its shorrcomings. This is shortsighted for it overlooks the real social factors which will continue to force a discussion about the manner in which the system of reservations is working and the limits that should be imposed on it so as to prevent it fKrm disrupting the social consensus that has characterized its operation for a long time. It is only when these factors are highlighted that it becomes obvious why the reservations issue is likely to be of political relevance for sonrc time to come. The four states where, in the last year, there has been a vigorous
discussion about the future course of the OBC reservation system (as well as protests against attempts at expanding it or excluding groups
already included in the OBC list) are Gujarat' Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. In addition, during the last several years' the two states where there have been protests against the expansion of the OBC rcservation system and the operation of a reserved seat system for the scheduled castes are Bihar and Maharashtra. One common observable feature in all these six states is that although they have a varying rate of literacy, the nunSer of colleges and the students enrolled within them are far above the all-India average. The key ratios to look at are those concerning the total number of students. In Kerala, the number of students in colleges is l27o less than the all-India average. In Andhra Pradesh it\s'llVo higher, in Bihar it is 43% higher, in Gujarat it is 28% higher, in Karnataka62%o and in Maharashtra 148% higher than the all-India average. In Kerala'
76
Table VII
Rates of Uterocy and Pattem of Higher Education in Several States
State/
%literote
%literare Urban
1981
AnIndia
Total
t98I
%literate RuraI r981
Nunber
of Colleges
Arts, Science
Total Nwnber
of
College
students
&
1961
Commerce
Total
19$n4
All-India
Aveiage per state Andhra
29.7 57.2
1983/ 84 3359323
159968
29.6
3652
174
5246
zso 420 473 28s 498 184 693
5l.l
23.2
287
hadesh
273176
Bihar
26.1
51.9 60.3 56.4 75.0
22.3 36.3
3
331
22844r
204697 259804 140226
Gujarat 43.8
Kamataka 38.4
l9l
314
128
t.l
Kerala
Maharashtra
69.2
67.8 38.0
472 397280 Source: l- Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census of India, 1981, Series l, India, paper 3, provisional population Totals, Workers
and Non-Workers, 1981.
47.O 63.8
2. University Grants Commission Report, l9t3l84
although the number of students enrolled in colleges is less than the alllndia average, the rclatively greater numbers in the schools make up for this deficiency. It stands to reason that in these states the number of educated job seekers will tend to be higher than in other
states or the all-India average. This fact is confirmed by a look at the statistics compiled by the Economic Monitoring Service of the Com_ merce Research Bureau in Bombay. These are reproduced in the
Table VIII:
Resertatioru Policy for Other Backward
Classes
7'1
Table VIII Job Seekers Registered with Employment Exchanges (as on June 30, 1980 except where speciJied otherwise)
(In thousands)
States/ AU
India
Matic Grad.uates ann including above postbut Sraduates

below
Toml
Unskilled manual
labourers and others
of
Toml all Job
Job
seekers
u; on
1985
Seelcers May 3 I,
All-India 5882
Average per
1415 7297 47 243
78'73
1517 Ul19
5l
806
srate 196
&
262
Andhra
Pradesh
uP
487.6 ll4 594.6 ll7

217
601.6
711.6
714.4 1504.4
118.8
1316 22t6 448 570 1368 tt34
2218 2650 652
Bihar Gujarat Kerala

Maharashtra
42.3 259.2 76.1 363.3 71.8 7ll 594
Kamatata 287.2
206.7
657
8ll
2461
639
493.2 l0l
539
2102
Source: Commerce Research Bureau, Borlll,zy, October, 1986-
Basic Statistics on State Economies of India

The number ofjob seekers shows the great pressure that exists on the economy to provide jobs or some form of self-employment- For those who consider themselves unemployed the sight of more jobs being reserved for specific categories is much less acceptable tlan the feeling that they have won or lost through a system of open competition. Indeed, our system of education has not been closely geared to the specific manpower needs of the economy and is therefore likely to produce a surplus of the wrong kind of degree holders. The psychology of the unemployed is not to demand reservations, but
78
to resist its expansion or demand the application of cultural, educa_ tional and economic criteria that are not limited by caste. A good example of such a reaction is the loss in popularity suffered by the Congress-led government in Kerala when ii did not implement its initial promise to provide a 15% reservation in schools, on the basis of only economic criteria. It would be an interesting exercise to carry out an opinion survey among the job seekers on their view of thl function and the future of the reservations system. No such surveys have been made so far. One of the elementary facts such u .u*"y may be expected to discover is the spread of educated job seekers over all the different social, religious and linguistic groups. Another important reason why the reservation issue is going to remain in focus politically is related to the question of how the population of the backward classes has been estimated so far. According to the information supplied by the central govemrnent rninistries and departments to the Mandal Commission, the latter estimated that the OBCs constitute 1255% of the toral number of govemment employees, whercas tbeir aggegate population is 52%. Their representation in Class I jobs is only 4.69%,i.e., less than l/lfth of their proportion to the country's total population. (Mandal Commission Report, vols. I and II, 1980, page 63.) As has been shown at length in this paper, the estimates of OBC population, both ar the national and state levels, are subject to varying but definite and often significant margins of error. Clearly, if the estimates of OBC popuIation themselves are questionable, then to say that only 12% of OBCs are govemment employees and compare them against an erroneous population estimate is equally mistaken. Until and unless a reliable estimate of OBC population is provided, other calculations based on such an estimate too will be suspect. The same observation may be made about the more detailed estimates which are often prcsented by Members of Parliament during the course of various debates. For example, during the discussion on the Mandal Commission Report in the Rajya Sabha in October 1982 one Member of Parliament prcsented a set of staristics Clable IX) which clairned to show the relative position of differcnt categories in various classified
services.
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
79
Table IX Relative position of various categories in Central Govemment Senices as presented by an honourable MP to the RajYa Sabha in October 1982
Scheduled Class Class Class
Castes
Other Baclcward Classes
I
II
.187o
2.59%
3.98%
13.569o 30.9SVo 16.837o
III & IV
8.4t%
4.83Vo
Total Services
Source: Parliamenary Proceedings, Parliament Library, october 1982, pp. 249-50.
vol XXIV,
11-15
The claim made in the above table cannot be a credible one so long actual basis for classifying the backward classes is unavailable. Whereas the MP had claimed that only 4.837o of all Central Government employees belong to the OBCs, the Mandal Commission had estimated this to be 12.55Vo. Clearly, such discrepancies arise because in order to strengthen the claims of the backward classes many political leaders are often prepared to use statistics that underestimate the actual extent of representation of the backward groups. There is a great need, if the future of the reservation system is to be properly assessed, for a more exdct estimate of the population of the backward classes. A committee of social scientists based at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, capable of taking dn objective view and working in tandem with the official machinery of the l99l census neds to be set up by the central government, to define the national criteria for determining the exact population of the backward classes, as per the intent of Articles l5(4) and l6(4) and reexamine the Mandal Commission Report, since it is still under consideration by the government. The scope of the committee need not be to set up reservation quotas but simply to clarify and settle, among other issues, the controversy regarding the population estimates of
as the
OBCs nationally. This should be done at the national level and in states where they are already recognized by the govemment and should cover central govemment services, as well as different levels
80
of the educational system. The report of such a committee will be a useful source of information for discussing welfare schemes of scholarships, loans and reservations meant for the backward classes. The committee itself may function in liaison with the Ministry of Welfare or that of Human Resource Development, who could provide the required facilities and information. Another area of reservation policy where guidelines issued by the central government or by Parliament in the form of an amendment to Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is needed is to specify rhe maximum limit for rescrvation quotas, with a provision for enforcing it by a certain date. While the state govemments will be free as before to determine
the composition of the backward classes, this general limit should provide a barrier after which selection may only take place on the
basis of merit. The reason why such a
limit was not prescribed by the
Indian Constitution makers is unclear. The intention to do so was clear enough in the summing up of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, as was mentioned in Section II of this paper. Dr Ambedkar had said that in all cases reservations should refer to a minority of posts, or else they would clash with the constitutional provision to provide equality of opportunity to all citizens.
Some time after the Constitution was enacted, the Supreme Court, in the famous Balaji case, ruled that reservations for scheduled castes/ tribes and the Other Backward Classes together should not be more than fifty per cent of the total available seats. Since it was a ruling of the Supreme Court and not enforceable by law, for some time it was observed by all the states. Soon enough, the 5OVo barrier was crossed and today Karnataka reserves 68Vo of seats and jobs for SC/ST/ OBCs, Kerala 54%,'tamil Nadu also 687o, Andhra hades.h approximately 43Vo, Jammu and Kashmir almost 507o, and Bihar close to 5l%. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has tried to rationalize this situation by advising, through a majority decision, that each state can fix its own quotas according to its specific condi-
tions. This is an important revision and from the standpoint of the letter and spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions an unfortunate one, since it encourages pressures for the further expansion of the reservation system. The govemment can help to remedy the situation by introducing the 50Vo limit as a part of the constitutional
provisions themselves, emphasizing that
a system
of reservation must
Resemations Policy
for Other Backward
Classes
8l
function alongside that based solely on merit and not swallow the
latter altogether. The share of reservations allocated to the scheduled up castes and tribes in this rule should come first and the difference to 5OVo be proportionately divided according to the criteria used for classifying the. backward classes. The case for such a constitutional amend-ment is strengthened by the fact that despite estimating the OBC populatio n at 52Vo the Mandal Commission recommended that onty CTVI of the central government jobs be reserved for the OBCs' This figure of 27Va was arrived at by deducting the 23Vo aheady allocated to the SC/ST from the 507o limit prescribed by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the Balaji case. A conference of different political parties is needed to discuss and forge a consensus on the issue of the 507o limit on reservations in all spheres as a whole' With this 507o as the maximum limit, states can feel free to adjust the level of reservations at the minimum possible, as per the existing social consensus and demand. Such an arrangement will both be flexible and have the additional merit of conforming to the known intentions of the Indian Constitution makers to restrict the reservations system to a minority share of available places. Finally, a major policy issue regarding the system of reservations as a whole is one of time limit, which may be a renewable one. Such a time limit exists in the case of Article 340 where reservations of political seats in the legislatures for scheduled castes and tribes is done every ten years. Many of the members of the Constituent Assembly suggested a similar time limit for reservations as a whole. According to them, a time limit, say of twenty years, would provide an occasion for a comprehensive review of progress in the implementation of the reservation quotas and the extent to which they have achieved the goal of social justice and equality. A strict enforcement of the education and income criteria will automatically provide an entry and exit point for members of a family entitled to use the reservation system. Thought may be given to another kind of entry and exit system. The Venkataswamy Commission had suggested that those families who have used the reservation system for three generations may be disallowed the future use of reservation quotas for some jobs and for college education. Such exclusion may be accepted if it is also provided that the right to avail of reservations can be restored to families which have not used the reservation system for three
82 generatlons.
administration. The Ministries of Education or Human Resource
The provision and enforcement of an entry/exit/re_enrry sysrem would require a proper monitoring machinery as a part of thi regular
Development may be entrusted with this task once it is agreed that there is need for an entry/exit system for individual families, and not groups as a whole, since this allows the small numbers of reserved seatvjobs to b accessible to a growing number of families within the same social group. With the growth in the numbers of the educated job seekers such an entry/exit system will prove popular. It would probably face resistance from within those groupVfamilies who have so far been able to use the system of reservations on a more continuous basis. In order that such resistance is not excessive and eventually gives way to a social consensus, two steps could be advocated. As earlier suggested, the direct descendants of those ;rho left the reservation system after having used it for a specified time could use it again after a period of time, if they satisfy the income and orher criteria for the users. Secondly, such provisions for entry/exit may be introduced as a part of a package scheme for the welfare of the backward classes, either in the form of an increase in the number of scholarships or through schemes for giving loans, etc. In tie present situation of a growing number of educated job
seekers, an expansion ofthe reservation quotas is not at all desirable. The present levels of reservation should either be reduced to at least the 5O% maximum limit earlier suggested or frozen at the existing level, thereby giving full scope to a system based on merit. The introduction of the reservation system into new areas should also be resisted since it offers a solution, if at all, to a tiny minority. If such
an extension becomes necessary as a concession
it should be accom-
panied by an entry/exit system from the outset. In today's circumstances and those of the foreseeable future, programmes of increased growth, increasing output and mass welfare rather than reservations for small numbers will meet the demands of the people. The adoption of a statutory maximum limit of 5OVo for all reservations on an allIndia'basis, an entry/exit system, a more rational criteria of classification and estimate of OBC population and a renewable time limit can provide, as suggested above, a meaningful basis for attempting to build a political consensus on the reservations issue during the com-
ing decade.
Appendix
A Report from the Times of India, Delhi' Monday, August 3l,l9E7

Ending Untouchability: A Far Cry
The Commission on Scheduled Castes and Tribes in its sixth report placd before Parliament has pointed out that the home ministry objective of July l97E to remove untouchability in five years has remained "illusive". The report for 1983-84 points out that the term 'tntouchability" has not been defined in the Constitution or the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 under which cases of this kind are investigated. Though several crses are registercd most of them remain infructuous because of doubts about the exact meaning of
the term'tntouchability".
The commission is equally concemed about the large number of
cases
regislered as well as acquitted. The cases are discharged because of failure to relat insults or attempts to insult on grounds of untouchability. Because of the mandatory provision of imprisonment of at least one month if the offence is established, even the rrial courts appear to hesitate in pronouncing anyone guilty. The courts, the rcport says, have no choice in choosing the mode or the minimum duration of punishment. lte report says caiegorically thatjustice is denied to the aggrieved-most of them belonging to the lowest socio-economic strata- No case goes beyond the trial coun. Out of the 9249 cases with the trial courts in 1983, only l95O were considercd by the courts and of these 1707 acquitted. The commission wfote to seven states, where the number of cases acquitted is the highest, to ascertain the reasons for the high acquittal rate. Only Tamil Nadu and Kamataka responded. They said because of the delay in investigation by the police as well as delay in disposal ofcases by the court, the witnesses were won over by the more powerful offenders. The commission has also ben critical of the calibre of the investigating police oflicials. Because of poverty, th victims were unable to pursue their cases in the higher cours. Only five states, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar have set up special courts to deal with these cases. The commission
84
has said unless such hearings are arranged
The potitics of Backwardness

within
a week
ofthe submission ofthe

cases
chargesheet, the acquittal rate
will continue to be high.
Though there is only a marginal increase
in the total number of
registered under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, the rise has been alarming in A.P., Kerala, M.P-, Delhi and Pondicherry. In Delhi the number of cases registered has risen by 266 per cent. The cases registered in Bihar, Gujarat, Kamataka,
Maharashtra, Orissa, U.P., Goa, Daman and Diu have decreased. The cases pending in the couts have risen from 4,545 i^ 1982 to 7,299 1983. The number of cases acquitted is on a disturbingly high side. In 1980, 69 per cent of the cases wete dismissed and in 1983 acquittal rate rose to 87 per
il
cent. State govemments are said to be providing legal aid so that victims can seek justice. Unfortunately, though legal aid has been announced by some states the numbers receiving assistance is not known. Under the PCR Act almost every state has set up a police cell to handle cases ofuntouchability but the commission has doubts as to \ hether such cells are really initiating cases. The commission has asked the home ministry to review the FCR Act. It has also called for a close look at the functioning of the special courts and police
cells.
Resemations Policy
for
Other Backward REFERENCES
Classes
85
A. Reports of ollicial Commissiolls on the Backward Classcs:

Report o! the First National Baclcward Class Convnission: Chairman" Kaka Kalelkar. 3 vols, 1983, New Delhi. 2. Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commhsion: Chairman' B'P' Mandal. Vols I to VII, 1980, New Delhi. 3. Report of the First Kanataka Backward Chsses Comtnission: Chairman' L.G. Havanur. 4 vols, 1975, Bangalore. 4. Report of the Second Karnataka Baclowrd Classes Convnission" Chairman, T. Venkataswamy. 2 vols, 1986, Bangalore' 5. Repon of the Socially aad E&tcationally Bacl<ward Classes Commission, Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1976. 6. Report of the Sociatty and Educationally Bacl<ward Classes (Second\ Commission, Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1983.
l.
B. Parliamenlary PaPers:
l.
Constituent AssemblY Debates:
(t
30-l l-1948 - Article 16 (4)

14-10-1949 - Article 335
(ii) 24-8-1949 - Article 330
(iii)
2. Lok Sabha Debates:
(i) 6-8-1977
Tribes.
Discussion Regarding Employment of Scheduled Castes and
(ii)
2O-12-1977: Statement by Minister of Railways on Public Sector Em-
ployment of SgsT/oBC.
(iii) 11-2-1982'. Debates on the Report of the Second Backward Classes Commission under Rule 193. (iv) 13-10-1982: Vol. XXIV. Further Discussion on Second Backward Classes Commission Report.
3. Rajya Sabha Debates:
(D 9-12-19'17: Half-an-hour discussion on points arising out of the answer given to question regarding reservation of quota in Central Services for Backward Classes and Minoritv Communities.
85
4. (tr) ll-10-1982 to 15-10-1982: Discussion on the need to imDlemenr the Mandal Commission Report, vot. CXXIV.
C. Reports of the C.ensus Commissioner, Government of India: (i) Cmsus of India, I93I Paill, vol. I, India Report, vol. VlI, India Report, vol. XIX, Baroda Report, Part I. (ii) Census of India, 1961, vol. V, Gujarat, Part V-A. (iii) Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part IA. (iv) Census of India, 1981, Series -1, India, Pan II-A (i), Table A-2, pp. 573 to 5E4. (v) Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census oJ India, 1981, Series l, India Papers of 1981, Provisional population Totals, Workers and Non-Workers. 1981. D. Other Government reports and publications:
Statement of Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers as fixed by the Central Govemment and Reported by the State Govemments as on lst January, 1987, Ministry of Labour Library, New Delhi. (ii) Univenity Grants Commission, Report for the Year 1983-84. (iid) Development Programme, l9E7-88, Planning Division, General Administration Depaiment, Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, February. 1982.
(t
E. Non-Governnrent sources of statistical data:
li) Statistbal Outline of India, 19U, Tat^ Services Limited, Department of Economics and Statistics, Bombay. (ii) Statistical Outline of Gujarat, 1963 Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar. (iii) Basic Statistics on State Economies of India, Economic Monitoring Service, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay, October 1986.
F, Unpublished dissertations, survey reports and papers: (t) C.P. Barthwal, Safeguards for Scheduled Castes in the Indian Constitution, and their Working, Ph.D. dissertation, Lucknow University, 1980, Social Sciences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi. (r;) Suma Chitnis, A Long way to Go . . . (Report on a Sumey of Scheduled Caste High School and College Students in Fifieen Sntes of India). Social Sciences Documentary Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi. (,rr) Victor S. D'Souza, Structural Constraints on Development: Thz Case of Scheduled Castes in India, XlWorLd Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, l8-22 August 1986, Symposium II, Session-4. (iv) Morton Weinfi eld, Counting Racial Minoities and Afirmative Action in
Reservations Policy
for Other Backward Clnsses
87
Canada. Xl World Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, 18-22 August, 1986, section on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations.
G. Books:
l. B.A.V. Sharma/K. Madhusudhan Reddy, eds., Reservation Policy in Indra. Hyderabad: 1980. 2. B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Fmming of India's Constiturton, vol.lY.
3. Constiturion of India-1981 (Allahabad Publication).
4. Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in lzdia. New Delhi, 1980. 5. David J. Elkins, Electoral Participation in a South Indian Context. Califomia: University Press, 1980. 6. David Amold, Iftz Congress in Tatnil Nadu, 1919-1932 Manohar, 1978.
7.
Dilip K. Basu/Richard Sisson,
eds ., Social
and Economic Development in
India: A Reassessrnnt New Delhi, 1986. 8. Eugene F. Iraschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India. New Delhi. OUP. 1976. 9. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (vols I and II). 10. Iqbal Narain, ed., St4te Politics in India. I 1 . Iswari Prasad, Rese rvation: Action for Social Equality. New Delhi : I 986. 12. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Iaw and the Baclcward Classes in India. Delhi: OUP, 1984. 13. Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India. New Delhi, 1968. 14. Vimal P. Shat/Binod C. Aggarwal , eds., Reservation, Policy Programmes and Issues. New Delhi, 1986. 15. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in India. New Delhi, 19E5.
H. Articles:
l. Marc Galanter, "Who are the other Backward Classes? An Introduction to Constitutional Pu z-zle;' Economk and Politicat lleeHy, vol.13, pp. 18l2-28. 2. Marc Galanter, 'Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representation: A Preliminary Assessment of India's Thirty-Year Experience with Reserved Seats in Legislatwes." Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. 14, pp. 437a
54.
3. M.V. Subbarao, "Pro-Reservationists vs. Anti-Reservationists." Social Change, vol.l2, no. 2, June 1982.
Chapter 4
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence
Suma Chitnis
An Outstanding Provision HEN the nationalist struggle for self-ruIe, conducted with courage, tenacity and forbearance for almost three quarters of a century, eventually resulted in political freedom for India in 1947, it was only the first step in independence
that had been won. The right to self-rule had been established, but the dreams and ideals that had fired the struggle had next to be translated into reality. This was a large and complex task.
Looking back, one is impressed by the eclecticism of the leaders responsible for designing and planning the country's future as an independent nation. They drew freely from the several social philosophies, ideologies, and political systems current at the time. As a result, the Constitution that they gave the country, anil the plans and the policies they made to define its future as a nation, combine sorne of the finest ideals of the twentieth century. However, although the combination thus forged was bold and full of promise, it was untested and untried. Inevitably it contained several flaws, ranging from contradictions in the conception of ideals, blind spots with reference to how these ideals could clash with established practices and vested interests, to inadequacies in the definition of programmes and strategies for their implementation. These flaws have now started to surface.
This paper discusses one of the inadequacies in the formulation of
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and
Tribes
89
what, in spite of its many inadequacies, is one of the most outstanding
provisioni of the Constitution of independent Indial i'e', the provision for preferential facilities for the advancement of the historically
disadvantaged scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' The particular inadequacy discussed in this paper is the failure to define the rcrms Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Denotation without Connotation

The Constitution names the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and "other" (socially and economicalll') "backward classes" as weaker sections of society eligible for special protection and care. It does not define the terms scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backward classes. Nor does it provide detailed criteria by which these groups may be identified. It only prescribes that in the first instance these groups shall be designated for each state by a Presidential order' in ionsultation with the governor of each state with subsequent modification by an Act of Parliament.:
Bold Provisions The Constitution dos not specify the special provisions to be made either. But the Government has been innovative in designing them. The provisions for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes are particularly bold. They range from facilitios for education,
health, housing, etc., routinely provided by a welfare state to a unique
policy of "reserved" seats in Parliament, in the legislatures and in other representative political bodies, "reserved" admissions in higher education and reserved jobs in several categories of govemment
employment. The rationale on which preferential provisions are based is that when a highly hierarchical society chooses to be egalitarian and decides simultaneously to be free and open, equality is not likely to be achieved unless groups that rank low in the traditional system of stratification are purposively assisted to leap across the gap that separates them from the others: The underlying assumption is that traditional disadvantage must inevitably operate as a handicap and traditional advantage as a head start, even if competition is in prin-
ciple free and open.
90
Inherent Problems Humane though it is, this rationale is inconsistent with the conven_ tional concept of equal citizenship. If all citizens are equal then none have a right to preferential provisions, however extenuating the cir_ cumstances. As may be expected, therefore, the preferential provi_ It was only with the aid of a Constitutional amendment emphasising
the spirit of equality and reiterating the commitment to go beyond sions provided in the Constitution were openly opiosed at the outset.
uled castes and the scheduled tribes could be retained.4 Quite apart from this problem with the established concept of equality, problems arise from the fact that reservations in education clash with some of the basic norms and practices by which educa_ tional institutions have functioned. For instance, the principles of qualification by tested performance, ranking on the basis of graded competence, reward for best performance and disqualification for poor performance. Similarly, in employment, reservations negate the principle of selection by qualification and promotion by seniority or by proven competence. Under the policy of reservations, barely qualified scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates have been admitted to institutions for higher education and in employment into slots where the qualifications required of those who seek to come in through open competition are high. In fact, in several instances tle performance level of those who are rejected in open competition is significantly higher than that of those who are admitted through reservations. This compromise has had to be pushed even further as criteria for "passing" in education and conespondingly for..promotion" in employment have been scaled down to facilitate the progres_ sion of those who are accepted on the basis of reservations.
literal interpretation of the ideal that the reservations ior the sched-
thi
Initial Acceptance
Initially, all these compromises were accepted with relative equa_ nimity, largely because the castes and tribal communities, listed in the Presidential Schedule, were, at the time of their listing, clearly at the bottom of the social scale. Regardless of whethei p., "upitu income, literacy or any such secular criteria were used to assess their situation, they were backward. In addition, the scheduled castes suffered the disability of a low caste status, including the traditional
Tribes
9l
from practice of untouchability and the scheduled tribes suffered were truly the most groups they if,isicut and cultural isolation. As in Indian society. Exceptions in terms of individuals iisadvantaged of the who had riade good were rare enough to leave the listing
groups in the Presidential Schedule valid's Under the circumstances' ii.,i"i uv denotation had a distinct advantage. It eliminared tedious groups would burea:uciatic procedures through which individuals and eligibilotlerwise have had to prove their "backwardness" and claim
ity for special Protection.

The Changing Parameters of Backwardness
Howevelr. after about two-and-a-half to three decades of the operathe tion of the policy of protective discrimination, the parameters of tribes The scheduled castes and the scheduled situation "ttungio. longei as uniformly backward as they had been when the were no provisions for preferential facilities for them were
constitutional tie made. Individuals from several of the casteVtribes included in of education, employment' occuSchedule had moved up-in terms pational and economic status-to belong to the lower middle or 'middle classes. In instances where they belonged to the all-India services such as the I.A.S., or were in high political office' they had moved up to be part of the upper class elite' As individuals they had of reached a polnt at which they seemed to be much less deserving
preferential provisions than the mass of the population, particularly the mass that stood below the poverty line'6 In some instances entire casteytribes had advanced to a point where they were clearly less disadvantaged than some castes/tribes not includ;d in the Schedule. We do not have adequate data on this issue yet, but even on the basis of the limited data available one may
hazardthestatementthatthereisapossibilitythatcommunitieslike the Mahars of Maharashtra or the Chamars of U'P' and Gujarat are today better-off than some ofthe castes that were not considered to be baciward enough to be included in the Schedule' Yet, as castes/tribes listed in the Prisidential Schedule, they continue to be eligible for
these provisions. What is even more significant is that they continue to use the provisions freely. As may be expected this causes strong resentment. Caste riots on the issue of reservations have grown to be
a common phenomenon
of Indian life since the mid-seventies'7
92
f,u, been extremely uneven.,Carefully documented studies "u.t"Vt that reveal in each state some casteVtribes have used, and continue to use, most of the facilities to the exclusion of the other casteVtribes in the Sched_ ule. usually the casteytribes that have failed to use the facilities are backward because they are not even in a position to reach out to the support offered.
While this reversal of status between the scheduled casteVtribes and the others creates one set of problems, other problem, ari; of the fact that the advance of the different scheAuf"O
if".
;;,
Punjab and the Mahars of Maharashtra refened to above were amonqsr those recommended for descheduling.8
dure for the purpose and in 1955 the Government did appoint the Lokur Committee to advise it on the revision of the existing lists of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This committee noted the creation of "vested interests" in the listing and categorically stated that "the time has come when the question of deschiduling of rela_ tively advanced communities should receive serious and urgent con_ sideration." It further went on to point out that in view of the consti_ tutional abolition of untouchability ..it would indeed be inappropriate to apply the sole test of untouchability in preparing the list of the scheduled castes . . . Nevertheless, having regard to the historical. background we have, in revising the list, adopted the list of extreme social, educational and economic backwardness of castes arising out of the traditional custom of untouchability." In fact, it went so far as to admit that "the line of demarcation between high castes and low castes, which was fairly clear in the past has tended to become blurred," implying thercby that the problems of the scheduled castes could be bracketed with those of the rural and the uftan poor. More immediately, the committee recommended descheduling of fourteen tribes and twenty-eight castes. The Chamars of Bihir, U.p. and
The Need to Deschedule those who have Advanced The obvious solution in the face of these anomalies would be to "deschedule" the individuals, castes/tribes that have ,.advanced,,. In fact, Article 342 of the Constitution anticipates a process of dcscheduling, inasmuch as it clearly specifies a parliamentary proce_
However, it is significant that the committee made these recom_ mendations exclusively on the basis of the suggestions they solicited
Tribes
93
from "several persons who appeared before us, including eminent social workers." They did not go through a systematic process of
using the 1961 census and other data available at the time. In any case the scheduled caste leadership was extrcmely hostile to the report and the recommendations it had made faded away. In subsequent efforts to review and revise the lists made in 1969 and in 1976, controversial
issues such as whether or not to include converts to Islam and Christianity and non-scheduled caste persons married to scheduled caste individuals in the lists, or how rigidly to adhere to area rcstrictions, etc. have surfaced, but they have never been squarely confronted. They have been accommodated almost ad hoc into the administration of preferential provisions. Meanwhile, in response to political pressure from the scheduled casle/scheduled tribe leadership, the ten-year term initially set by the Constitution for the operation of reservations in political bodies for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes has been successively extended, three times over, to further ten-year periods, stretching this particular provision, now scheduled to terminate in 1991 to forty years instead of the ten initially planned for. The evasion of controversial issues and submission to political pressures suggests that in the very first instance, the Government of India swept some explosive problems relating to the issue of preferential provisions under the carpet by adopting the denotative method for the selection of castes and tribes to be included in the Presidential Schedule. These are now beginning to fester. In order to handle them it is useful to look at the evolution of the terms, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to identify the political overtones that they have acquired through the process of their evolution. The rest of this paper concentrates on this task.
The Politics of the Evolution of the Terms

The terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are the most recent of a long series of labels that have been used to denote a particular sector of the socially and economically disadvantaged population in
Indian society. The scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes, together with some other disadvantaged sectors, have often been collectively referred to as the "depressed classes" and the "backward classes".In addition, each ofthe several groups have been referred to
by some specific terms. For instance, the scheduled casbs have been
94
referred to as untouchables, ex-untouchables, outcastes, and Harijans. The scheduled tribes have been refened to as the Aboriginees and
Girijans. First used in 1935, the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have evolved through a variety of philanthropic, administrative and political compromises and considerations. They cover a cluster of separate deprivations such as poverty, illiteracy, poor access to education, health care, employment and other opportunities. In addition, the term'scheduled caste' connotes a low position in the caste hierarchy, generally implying subjection to the social stigma of untouchability and all the other oppressions that go with low caste status in Indian society. The term 'scheduled tribes' denotes an aboriginee population that practices animistic religion and is physically and culturally isolated from the mainstream. These two sets of characteristics have historically been considered to be significant enough to mark the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes as distinctively different and more disadvantaged than the mass of the
rural and the urban poor.

Depressed Classes and Backward Classes Early, upon their arrival in India, Christian missionaries identified low caste Hindus, particularly the untouchables, and the tribals as an. oppressed people to whom the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man and of a loving and a compassionate God, would hold special relevance and appeal. Accordingly they paid special attention to these 'depressed classes' in their welfare and proselytizing activities.e By the second half of the nineteenth century, Hindu reformers inspired, and perhaps embanassed by the initiative taken by the missionaries, were also actively engaged in the cause of the 'backward classes'. Already, in the 1860s Jyotiba Phule of Maharashtra had drawn the attention of the British govemment to the plight of those who suffered from caste disabilities. He made a bold and passionate appeal for some action on their behalf.t0 All this had a cumulative impact. During the second half of the nineteenth century the British govemment took a decision to take special measures for the welfare of the"depressed classes"J I Inspired by British benevolence, some native rulers, such as the Princes of Baroda, Kolhapur and Travancore were also stimulated to act on
Tribes
95
behalf of the depressed classes. Towards the end of the century, the issue derived an added meaning as reports about the discriminations suffered by Indians in South Africa began to trickle in. The parallels wer too sharp to disregard and consciences that had hitherto remained insensitive on the issue were awakened. By the 1880s, special schools, scholarships and other assistance for the depressed classes had been established, both by the British govemment and by the native rulers. Activity on their behalf was particularly marked in Madras, Baroda, Kolhapur and Travancore, but all over the country reformers had awakened to a new sense of responsibility towards these hitherto neglected sections of the society. Typically, in 1895 Justice M.G. Ranade shonglv underlined the "claims of the aboriginals and untouchables on Hindu society."l2 This many-sided support was effective. Members of the depressed classes, who for centuries had either consciously (the untouchable castes) or through circumstances (the tribes) been excluded from leaming, now had opportunities for education. The rigidity of castedefined division of labour and occupation was broken. Untouchables as well as other lower castes gained access to occupations that they had earlier been denied. Both the untouchables and ihe tribals gained a new confidence and a sense of worth.
The Birth of the Term "Untouchable" Inevitably, tlte attention and exposure that they gained and the opportunities they experienced gave some of the several groups from
among those lumped together as the 'depressed classes' a new sense of identity. It forced them, as well as the other Hindus who had been party to their subjugation to question their situation. It was in the course of this process that in 1909 the problem of the lowest castes was first conceptualised under the rubric of'untouchability'. Shridhar Ketkar used the term in a study of the caste system published in September 1909.13 Soon afterwards, in October 1909, the Maharaja of Baroda used the term 'untouchable' in the course of an address that he delivered to the 'depressed classes' mission in Bombay.ra Meanwhile, the tribals were already being referred to as aboriginees.
The Politics of Philanthropy
It would be unfair to claim that charity or philanthropy played no
96
part in Christian missionary, British or the reformers' action on behalf of the "depressed classes". On the other hand, it would be
naive to believe that their intentions were purely philanthropic. The missionaries were zealously committed to proselytization and both the untouchables and the tribals were vulnerable to conversion. As regards the intentions of the British government, it may not be too
far-ferched to suggest that the strategy of 'divide and rule' is likely to
have influenced the British decision. Official action on behalf of these two severely neglected sections of the population, particularly the untouchables was bound to embarrass the Hindu elite and create for them an awkwardness that had immense political value to the British in the context of the nationalist demand for self-ruIe. The actions of the Hindu reformers must in tum, to some extent at least, have been a political response to Christian missionary and British government overtures.
The Politics of Numbers

Regardless of whether, and if so to what extent, the support for the 'depressed' classes was consciously conceived of as a political strategy, the fact remains that it had far-reaching political implications. Towards the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the nationalists had been pushing for greater participation in government. However, as this movement gathered momentum towards the end of the century, the Muslims started to fear that the Hindu majority would dominate them, if and when the British acceded to the nationalist demand. To safeguard their interests they petitioned the Viceroy to provide them with reserved seats as representatives to be elected by a Muslim electorate. The British agreed. The petition, presented in 1906, brought the Muslims separate electorates in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. The visible success of the Muslims brought the idea of communal electorates to the minds of other communities like
the Sikhs, who similarly feared domination by a Hindu majority.

Since communal representation was to be proportionate to the size of a community in the population, the politics of numbers was born.15
Political Leverage from "Untouchability" One of the first expressions of this politics was that the Muslims sought to chisel down the size of the Hindu representation with the
Tribes
97
claim that "properly speaking the outcastes are beyond the the Hinduism, and therefore, their strength should not go to swell heard' numerical force of the Hindus." Their voice must have been for 1911 seriously raised a question as for the census commissioner fifth to to whether the 'depressed classes', who numbered between a be enumerated separately' sixth of the total population, should not While the Muslim League as well as orthodox Hindus promptly supported the suggestion, the Indian National Congress, eager to
pale of
prevent the fragmentation of the Indian force took the opposite stand' is significant that this claim on the part of the Congress was
it
new inlerest in the welfare of the untouchables' At the second meeting of the Indian National Congress in I 886, Dadabhai Naroji, its President, had categorically declared: "A National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the entire natioir has a iirect participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social reforms and other class (caste) questions to class (caste) congresses"' But by l9l7 the Congress stand had changed so far as to prompt an "anti-disabilities" resolution on behalf of the untouchables' In retrospect, this resolution appars feeble and lukewarm' It reflects the fact that the Hindu leadership of the Congress, which earlier was extremely slow to respond to Ranade's call for action on behalf of the untouchables, did begin to recognize the political need to hold the untouchables in the Hindu fold. But they had not really warmed up to the idea. There was an absence of fervour and sympathetic conviction in the framing of the resolution' Later' when the administrative reforms of 1919 provided a few nominated seats for the Depressed Classes, and the 'untouchables' began to form their own political base to organise themselves separately under the leadership of Ambedkar, it became even more imperative for the Congress to retain them as Hindus. Alert to the situation, Mahatma Gandhi, who was just emerging as the new leader of the Congress, made their welfare a plank of the Congress policy' But with due deference to Gandhi's personal commitment to the removal of untouchability and the uplift of the untouchables, a review of the functioning of the Congress at that point clearly indicates vested political interests. The politicization of the issue of tle untouchables
u".o.p*i"d
by
was further accentuated by the fact that the British government

responded by stepping up its own welfare activities for the depressed
Thz Politics of Bacl<wardncss
classes-aossibly
as a
and declared illegal, age-old practices by which the untouchables were denied access to schools, wells, roads, etc.r6
for land, housing, schooling and government jobs for them
foil to the Congress. It announced fresh schemes
Polarization of Pmitions and New Labels Meanwhile, Ambedkar, who was himself an untouchable. and
Gandhi continued at loggerheads with each other. Ambedkar, a staunch democrat, strongly influenced by his experiences as a student in the USA and comnftted to a secular, political resolution of the conflict
was firmly convinced that the untouchables were unlikely to advance unless they were allowed separate political representation and power.
He was determined to gain such representation for them and to

organise them politically for further advance. Gandhi as a spirirualist, was al3ogether opposed to the solution that Ambedkar proposed. He
coined the term Harijan (people of God) for the untouchables and claimed that it was possible to remove untouchability and its accompanying evils by a change of upper<aste Hindu hearts. He fondly referred to the tribals as "Girijans" who could be easily assimilated. While the term "deprcssed classes', had thus differentiated be_ tween thi terms "untouchables", "Harijans" and ..Girijans', in the political dialogue with the Ambedkarites and Gandhians, the British continued to use the original term. This had significant implications as will be evident from the following.
The Communal Award and the Containment of the Conllict In 1928 when the Simon Commission visited India, Ambedkar
demanded reserved seats for the untouchables in legislative bodies, special educational concessions, and recruitnrcnt to govemnlent posts. These werc accepted in the Commission's report. As expected, Gandhi finnly opposed separate electorates for the untouchables though he conceded them to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Anglo-Indians. In spite of Gandhi's objections the Communal Award granted by the British in 1932 gave the untouchables regular votes in the general eleclorate and granted their demand for separate electorates in areas in which they were concentrated. Gandhi protested with his epochmaking fast and finally Ambedkar was forced to compromise in the Poona Pact, which provided 148 reserved seats instead of the Zg
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes

separately elected members provided in the Communal Award. It also provided a system of primary elections for those seats; a panel of four candidates was to be chosen by electors from what was significantly refened to as the "Depressed Classes". In this terminology and in the Poona Pact, the opposition between Ambedkar and Gandhi was contained without resolution of the qpnflict that lay at the root namely, that Gandhi denied untouchability while Ambedkar made it the core issue. Regardless of this, untouchability scored a new height as an issue of social and political concem. Shortly after the signing of the pact a conference of Hindu leaders met at various places and adopted a resolution declaring their commitment to assimilate the
Harijans.tT
The G.O.I. Act of 1935 and the Birth of the Schedule With the principle of separate representation thus firmly established, the administrative task of listing the relevant castes had to be accomplished. Accordingly, they were listed (i.e., scheduled) in 1936 in order to give effect to the provisions for special electoral reprcsentation as per the Government of India Act of 1935. But the listing
presented several problems. From 1908 onwards there were several estimates of the size of the depressed classes in the country. In 1908 Risely counted 50.6 million. In 191 I Holdemess placed the figure at 50 or 60 million. So did several others, including the census of 1911. However, Baines in l9l2 placed it at a low 34.8 million. In 1917 Sir Henry Sharp, who was Educational Commissioner placed it even lower at 3l .5 million. The Franchise Committee appointed to implement the 1919 Reforms fornd 42.2 million in British India. A quarter or a third as many were estimated in the princely states. The census of l92l and the Mudaliar Committee of 1924 conformed to the rough figure of 50 million. However, in 1928, official figures quoted a much lower 28.5 to 29 million. The Hartog Committee of 1929 set the figure at 29.76 million. But at about the same time the Nair Committee placed the figure at 214.5 million, whereas the Simon Commission itself placed the figure at 43.6 million. In 1931 Hutton as Census Commissioner
estimated the figure as 31.2 million, excluding Bengal but while doing so, he had encountred serious problems. This is significant. It indicated that the task of defining who was to be given separate
100
representation was already diffi cult.
From Disability to Untouchability

During the nineteenth century, the British had been able to roughly
ideltify the 'depressed classes' for administrative purposes. They do not seem to have been specifically concerned with identifying victims of untouchability in this context. But as the issue of untouchability came to be politicized, British administrators grew to be increasingly aware of the need to take note of the 'untouchability' factor in the process of their identification of the depressed classes. It seems that initially the definitibn of untouchability did not pose any problems. Conceptually, untouchability appeared to be stark
enough to be identified in terms of a practice of ritual and social exclusion. In fact, political bargaining on behalf of the untouchables had proceeded on the assumption that untouchables throughout India wene set off by some uniform and identifiable usages. Thus the Governnpnt of India's Fifth Despatch in Constitutional Reform (1919) mentions that "though they are defined in varying terms (they) are broadly speaking all the same kind of people. Except for the differences in the rigidity of their exclusion they are all more or less in the position of the Madras Panchamas, definitely outside that part of the Hindu community which is allowed access to their temples." But as enumerations were made, sharp differences were evident in the North and the South. In fact, it was apparent that untouchability, as practised in the South, for instance in the Bombay and Madras regions, did not exist in U.P. Yet Hindus in U.P. were divided into high and low castes and the consequent marginalisation, deprivation and oppression werc as acute as they were due to the practice of untouchability in the provinces of Bombay and Madras. In order to resolve this problem, Hutton as Census Commissioner in l93l developed a series of criteria to gauge the incidence of disabilities. These were as follows:18 I . Whether the caste or class in question can be served by Brahmans or not; 2. Whether the caste or class in question can be served by the barbers, water-carriers, tailors, etc., who serve caste Hindus; 3. Whether the caste in question pollutes a high-caste Hindu by contact or proximity;
DeJinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and
Tribes
101
4. Whether the caste or class in question is one from whose hands a caste Hindu can take water; 5. Whether the caste or class in question is debarred from using public conveniences such as roads, ferries, wells or schools; 6. Whether the caste or class in question is debaned from the use of Hindu temples; 7. Whether in ordinary social intercourse a well-educated member of the caste or class in question will be treated as an equal by the high-caste men of the same educational qualifications; 8. Whether the caste or class in question is merely depressed on account of its own ignorance, illiteracy or poverty and but for that would be subject to no social disability; and 9. Whether it is depressed on account of the occupation followed and whether but for that occupation it would be subject to no social
disability. The Entanglement of Ritual and Secular Disability With the bracketing of caste and class in sevon out of the nine indicators listed above we notice the unresolved tangle of ritual and secular disability. This entanglement has caused serious problems. The remarks of subsequent cornmentators are significant. Galanter
remarks that "the tests clearly point to the incidence of disabilities as the crucial test." reLelah Dushkin.anothereminentscholar on the issue remarks that "it is at least clear that occupation, ignorance, illiteracy or poverty or any such forms of backwardness were not intended to enter into the definition process." Hutton himself had made it clear: "From the point of view of the state, the important test is the right to use public ssnvsnignss5-1eads, wells and schools-and if this be taken as the primary test, religious disabilities and the social disabilities involved by them may be regarded as contributory only." Some importance must be attached to them, since obviously if the general public regards the persons of certain groups as so distasteful that concerted action is resorted to in order to keep t}tem away, persons of those groups do suffer a serious disability. Are they disabilities per se or are the religious, ritual discrimina-
tions (leading to disability) the crux of the problem? Galanter emphasises the disabilities without reference to their source, which,
on the other hand, is exemplified. Dushkin points out that backward-
lO2
ness in terms ofoccupation, education, etc. was not intended to be the
basis of the definition, implying that caste is the core issue. Hutton clearly emphasises the absence of the right to use public conve-
niences-thus stressing again the ritual factor. Does it mean that preferential provisions are primarily to take care of this factor?
Free Scope for Administrative Discretion Meanwhile, the existence of multiple criteria left census superintendents ample scope to use their own discretion in the compilation
of provisional lise. Thus, there is considerable variation in the basis on which people have been classified as untouchables in the different provinces. Moreover, even the application of a criterion could not guarantee uniformity for the simple reason that the exact form that the debarment or exclusion took, could vary substantially from province to province. For instance, in some cases debarment from a temple meant that the paxticular caste was forbidden to approach tle temple. In other cases it merely meant exclusion from the inner sanctuary. In some cases debarment from water entailed the requirement that they use a separate water supply. But in others it meant denial to any decent water supply, or dependence on the upper castes to serve water to the lower castes. One of the most serious consequences of these two factors is that castes that were included in the Schedule in one province were omitted in another. hoblems also arose out of the fact that census superintendents and commissioners did not adhere strictly to Hutton's criteria. Often they excluded castes that were ritually untouchable, but had advanced educationally or economically. Correspondingly, they included castes that were not untouchables but were visibly at the bottom of the social strata. As may be expected, these anomalies left the Franchise Committee with serious doubts. However, testifying before the Franchise Committee in defence of the listing as it stood, Dr Ambedkar, the spokesman for the untouchables emphasised that "it is a fatal mistake to suppose that differences in tests of untouchability indicate differences in the conditions of the untouchables." The crucial element he emphasised was "the odium of avoidance" by the upper castes. Once this element is present, he claimed "the whole ofthe class ofuntouchables so ascertained must be taken into account for the purpose of representation, without any funher distinction between rich and poor,
103
advanced and backward. educated and uneducated . . ." Others testi-
fying before the Committee, particularly Tambe, Chintamani and

Bakhale rejected Ambedkar's position. They pointed out that outside of Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces the untouchables do not constitute a distinct section of the population. They claimed that in the other provinces, "untouchability is the adjunct not of the person but of the occupation he occupies." The majority of the Committee felt that denial of access to temples and causing pollution by touch should be accepted as tests of untouchability and that those who are
only economically poor and in other ways backward should not be included in the Schedule.2o The Committee finally decided, with considerable hesitation, the list of untouchables in the North and the East. But on the whole, commentators agree that the castes included in the list were socially the lowest Hindu castes in their particular provinces and they were listed, partly at least, on that basis. It contained over 40 million people. By the census of 1941, the figure, roughly proportionate to the total increase of the population of the country, had risen to 48.8 million, constituting l9percentof the Hindu population and 12.6 per cent of the total population of undivided India. The Presidential Schedule When the President of newly independent India promulgated the
Scheduled Castes Order in 1950, he basically conformed to rhe lisr of 1936 with two major additions: some Sikh castes, and castes from areas that had not till then been included in the Schedule. In 195 I and 1956 a few changes were again made, but these were mainly in the nature of correcting errors. The only major change was the inclusion
in
1956
of all Sikh untouchables in the list. There were no
other
policy changes
Tribals The identification of tribals was less difficult. Upto the early twentieth century they were included within the depressed classes. But in the wake of the Communal Award, they were clearly identified as aboriginals who pracrised animistic religions. The general
notion since then has been that this category should include groups distinguished by their "tribal characteristics" and by their sparial and
104
cultural isolation from the population. The problem here is that the tribals mix animism with Hinduism and that except for a few exceptions, their spatial and cultural isolation is not absolute enough for them to be marked without overlap with the rest of the population.
The other important point is that there is an underlying current of concern towards insulating them from exploitation by sophisticated outsiders and towards protecting them from domination by the main-
stream culture. The British protected the tribals by placing them outside of ordinary administration and by treating their habitations as separate reserves.2rThe Government of India Act ofl935 provided for sepzfate representation for the "Backward Tribes" just as it did for untouchable castes. Accordingly, a list of backward tribes was promulgated for the purpose.
Complications in Listing Scheduled Tribes The post-independence scheduling of tribes was much less complicated. In 1950 when the President promulgated the list of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, he only made some additions to the 1935 list of Backward Tribes. Further, there were some transfers from the earlier scheduled caste list (e.g., in Bengal) to the tribes' list and vice versa. However, it would be mistaken to infer from the ease
with which the listing was done that the matter was simple
and
uncomplicated. Rather, the complications were glossed over. The scheduled tribes were defined partly by habitat and geographic isolation but mainly on the basis of their social, religious, linguistic and cultural distinctiveness and "their tribal characteristics." Just where the line between tribals and non-tribals should be drawn has never been clear. The issue is intricately intertwined with controversy over the extent to which tribals are Hindus. Ghurye describes them as "backward Hindus". Others like Haimendorf describe them as animists.22 A great deal has been written on the theoretical complexity of the caste+ribe distinction, but ttre boundaries remain hazy and unresolved.
Willingness to Accept Ambivalence Moreover, as with the scheduled castes, not all who could qualify for listing have been listed. No religious test was specified. The underlying assumption is that tribals practise animist religions. Yet'
105
converts are included. Attempts to exclude them have failed. In 1951 the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had remarked that no uniform test for distinguishing the scheduled tribes was available. He requested the state govemments for their views. After considering the points suggested by each state, he settled upon some common elements: tribal origin, primitive way of life, remote habitation and general backwardness in all respects. In the context of what has been said so far these criteria should appear nebulous and difficult to apply precisely. Nevertheless only a few years later they were declared to be fully satisfactory. In 1956, the Horr.e Minister referred to the "well-defined and easily ascertained" criteria. In 1961 the Dhebar Commission felt no need to solve the problem of identifying the tribals.23
An ldeal that has Soured

One wonders at such statements. The foregoing discussion indicates that the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have not yet been precisely defined. Indicators listed from time to time provide broad outlines in terms of which casteVtribes may be included in the Schedule, but boundaries between those to be included and the others are often hazy. Worse yet, the weightage to be accorded to poverty, rural residence, gerierations of illiteracy and other secular aspects of their marginalization has not yet been determined. By way of summing up it may be useful to look at some of the bold implications of this. The Lokur Committee's statement that the line between the disadvantages of class and caste is already quite blurred, may not be as valid for rural India as it is for urban India. Nevertheless the fact remains that it has become invisible in many quarters. Under these circumstances, the failure of the government, to deschedule those who have advanced, amounts to a failure to accept this reality and forces those who are affected to question the govemment's intent. In this context, it is difficult to forget the vesred political inrerests rhat had initially prompted the Congress to pay attention to the untouchables. Correspondingly, it is difficult not to suspect that vested interests continue to influence the Congress govemment, particularly from descheduling the castes which have advanced. In a sense, the fact that the terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are not clearlv
i
I
106
defined aggravates the matter as efforts to deschedule distintegrate at the point at which policy must define the basis for descheduling. As all this happens, the magnificent ideal of equality for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes sours. It degenerates into a political game, creating a crisis of credibility, and fouls up the ethos of democracy in
India.
At another level, with respect to the more immediate challenge of advancing the quality of life of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes, the failure to define the terms has other far-reaching implications. Because cf the 'denotative' approach there is a ten-
dency to lump the various castes or tribes together as an undifferentiated mass of 'backward' and disadvantaged people. Very
little is done to focus action on the exact inadequacies suffered. This is unfortunate. Studies into the substance of the disadvantages suffered by the scheduled casteytribes, and their impact, as also the
steps taken to help them remove these disadvantages are as yet very meagrc. But the few that are available clearly suggest that there are
several different disadvantages that constrain the advance of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and that it is necessary to understand each of these carefully to direct appropriate ameliorative or remedial action. The continued reluctance to define the elements tiat constitute the 'backwardness' of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes results in a failure to recognise and to anend to the specificities of their situation. It reduces to mechanical, administrative measures, what should be carefully designed strategies for the advance of a historically disadvantaged section of the Indian society. NOTES AND REFERENCES
l. Ref. Constitution of India, Article l5(b) of Part Ill-Fundamental Rights' Articlb 46 of Part lV-Directive Principles of State Policy, and Articles 330' 332 and 334 of Part XVl-Special Provisions Relating to Certain Clauses. 2. Ref. Anicle 366 (Definitions) of Part XIX Miscellaneous (24) "Scheduled Castes" means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such
castes, races or tfibes as are deemed under article 341 to be Scheduled castes
for
the purposes of this Constitution. (25) "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this
Constitution.
3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities, University of Berkeley and Los
Delinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and
Tribes
107
Angeles: Califomia Press, 1984, pp. 4l-83 4. Ref . State of Madras v. Champakatt Dorairaian, A.I.R. 1951 S.C- 226, l95i S.C.J. 313. Venlcataramana v. State of Madras, A.l.R. l95l S-C. 229. Jagwant Kaur v. State of Bombay, A.I'R. 1952 Bom. 461. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, para 2 (1951) and Artiple 15(4), which articulates the
amendment.
5. Marc Galanter, op. cit., ChaP. l. 6. Suma Chitnis, A lnng Way to Go. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
1981, pp. 154-56.
7. A. Yagnik, "Spectre of Caste War", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. xvi, no. 13., 1981, pp.553-55. 8. Department of Social Security: Report of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of the Lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Lokur Committee). Delhi: 1965, pp. 6-10. 9. Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp.53-54. 10. Dhananjay Keer, Mahatma Jotirao Phooley: Father of our Social Revo' lution, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964. 11. D.N. Sadanshiv, Resenations for Social Justice. Bombay: Current Law Publishers, 1986, pp. 2-3. 12. Marc Galanter, op. cit., p. 24. 13. Shridhar Ketkar, The History of Caste in India. Ithaca: Taylor and Carpenter, 1909, pp. 86. 14. Sayaji Rao III, Maharaja of Baroda. Speeches and Addresses, I'ondon: Macmillan Co., 1912, pp.'44-45. 15. (i) Eleanor Znl7iot, "Dr Ambedkar and the Mahar Movement", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, p. 141. (ii) The Hindu population was already dropping steadily. According to the Census of 1881 Hindus constituted 74.3 per cent of the total population of British India. By 1911 the figure had dropped to 69.3 per cent. 16. Eleanor Zelliot, op. cit., p. 166. 17. Marc Galanter, op. cit.,pp. 122-26. 18. J.H. Hutton, Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Oigins.3rd e.d. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 194. 19. Marc Galanter, op. cit., pp. 128-29. 20. Report ofthe Indian Franchise Committe, 1932. vol. l, p. 203. Calcutta: Govt. of India, Central Publication Branch. 21. Muc Galanter, op. cit., Chap.5. 22. G.S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tibes, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1963,
p.
19,
23. Scheduled Areas and Tribes Commission (U.N. Dhebar) Report 1960-61, 2 vols. Delhi: Manaser of Publications.
Chapter 5
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies for SCs/STs and OBCs

G. Thimmaiah
1. Socio-Political Background of Reservation Policy ARNATAKA has a long history of protective discrimination nolicf for uplifting the socially and educationally backward \sections of the population of the state. In order to understand and appreciate the significance ofthe role played by the state government in improving the socio-economic and educational conditions of SCVSTs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and minorities in the state, it is necessary to review the history ofthe reservation policy in Kamataka. The present Kamataka was crcated in 1956 by integrating Kannadaspeaking areas of the former Hyderabad state and of former Bombay and Madras provinces with the then princely state of Mysore. Though the reservation policy of the government of Mysore was influenced by the reform movement in the former Madras province, particularly the social revolt sponsored by the Justice Party, Mysore had developed its own rudimentary policy of reservation as far back as 1874.t During the period between 1874 and 1885 the government of Mysore reserved 20 per cent of middle and lower-level jobs in the police department for Brahmins and 80 per cent for Muslims, Hindus and
I'if f( I
Indian Christians. Again from 1914, the govemment of Mysore introduced a system of nomination of qualihed backward class candidates to the posts of Assistant Commissioners. Even so, it was
realised that the backward classes (including SCs and STs) could not
Kamatakn Government's Reserttation Policies
109
break the monopoly of the Brahmins in the state government servrce' It may be interesting to know that between 1881 and l9l0 the
demand for jobs for locals inspired by a sort of "sons of the soit' theory was going on among the Brahmins. At that time, the Mysore Maharaja was advised to appoint Diwans (Chief Ministers) from outside the state who came mostly from former Madras Province' These Diwans used to help their kith and kin belonging to their own
was resented by the local Brahmins who raised a hue and cry against the Tamil Brairmins' domination of govemment jobs in the Princely state sub-castes
to get employment in the state govemment. This
of Mysore. It would appear as though the Mysore Brahmins themselves behaved like backward classes, asking for reservation of state govemment jobs for Mysore Brahmins only. However, this controversy came to an end with the appointrnent of Sir M. Visveswaraya as Diwan of the then Mysore state in 1910. But Visveswaraya himself resigned in l9l 8 on the issue of reservation for backward classes in government service. This needs some elaboration.
The social reform movement, the resultant communal order in the Madras Province and the monopoly of the Brahmins in Mysore government jobs created a lot of discontent among the backward classes. No govemment, not even the princely government, could ignore the demands of a vast majority of the people for a sha-re in the govemment service. As a positive response to this demand, the First Backward Classes Committee was appointed under the Chairmanship of the Chief Judge of Mysore Chief Court, Sir Irslie C. Miller. This committee which submitted its report within a record time of about ll months, laid the foundation for the reservation policy for backward classes in the state of Kamataka. In fact, the thirty-onepage report has many original ideas about the criteria to be adopted for identifying backward classes, measures needed for promoting their education and the reasons for compromising on merit for adequate representation of the backward classes in government service. The Miller Committee was the result of the political awakening of the backward classes in the princely state of Mysore. The two numerically dominant communities, the Vokkaligas and Lingayats' while strong economically, were educationally backward. Therefore, they could not compete with the Brahmins for govemment service, who constituted only 3.4 per cent of the population. They, thereforc,
110

.
took the lead in demanding reservations in state govemment jobs. They were supported by other backward castes, Muslims, Indian Christians, SCs and STs. They got a semi-democratic political forum
to articulate their demands. In 1882, immediately after the rendition of the princely state back to the Mysore royal family, a Representa_ tive Assembly was constituted as a forum for consulting different sections of tle society on state govemment matters. Most of these members were nominated on the basis of thefu economic and social background. This Representative Assembly gave rise to a political awakening among the backward classes, though the economically better-off among them took the lead. There was also another historic factor which paved the way for the early emergence of the backward classes movement in Karnataka. During the reign of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan which extended over 80 years, the population of Muslims increased in the state and a large number of them came to hold important positions. After the fall of Tipu many of them suddenly found themselves powerless. British rule had reduced substantially the influence of the Muslims in society. The next generation of Muslims started asking for a larger share in the govemment service, which provided a complementary support to the Vokkaligas and Lingayats in their political ambitions. Simultaneously, the Christians also started growing in numbers after the establishment of the British rule. Thus the local dominant castes, i.e., Vokkaligas and Lingayats, longing for power, got an opportunity to articulate their demands through the Representative Assembly and made common cause with Muslims and Christians. All of them, put together, constituted a major portion of population, who came to be known as the non-Brahmins. Though SCs and STs were numerically significant even in the former Mysore state, the awarenels among them was not sufficiently strong until Independence and the introduction of the Constitution. It was this coalition of self-interest groups which compelled the Maharaja of Mysore to break the monopoly of Brahmins in government service and throw it open through reservation to non-Brahmins. Although the fortunes of the backward classes fluctuated, dependent
as they were upon the social-political whims and fancies of the

Diwans who succeeded Sir M. Visveswaraya, the Maharaja could not reverse the policy of reservation as it was demanded by an influential
Karnataka Government's Resemation
P olicies
lll
and large section of the people of Mysore. After Independence and up to the time of the reorganisation of the state 094't-1956), the Miller Committee recommendations were implemented. By the time Mysore was integrated into. independent
India, the Brahmins had accepted willy-nilly the growing power of the backward castes. Because of their minority position, the new political system came to depend significantly upon the numerical strength of these castes. During this period, the dominant communities, along with SCVSTs and the Muslims' resorted to yet another interesting strategy of driving the Brahmins out of the rural areas'
The dominant communities which controlled the elected government after Independence, introduced tenancy abolition legislation, under which the Brahmins lost their izam land to the tenants.2 In the South, particularly in Mysore, Brahmins never cultivated the vast lands they owned under th e inamdari system. Their tenants belonged mostly to the dominant communities though in some places there were SCs also. This political strength was effectively and intelligently used by the dominant communities to weaken the economic base of the Brahmins in the rural areas. As a result, after losing their lands, the Brahmins moved to urban areas in search of white-collar jobs. Though they suffered during that transition period, through their resourcefulness and ingenuity they rehabilitated themselves comfortably in the
urban areas.
After the integration of the
state
in 1956, it became necessary to go
through the exercises of reservation once again, in view of the merger of the areas from other states which did not have any consistent reservation policies. The attempts of the government of Karnataka to prepare a uniform list applicable to the people of all the integrated areas were frustrated by the High Court.3 Therefore' the Second Backward Classes Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of a backward class political leader, Dr. Nagana Gowda in 1960, to determine the backward classes and to recommend the extent of reservations. This Commission identifred the backward classes basically on the basis of caste, though it used educational levels and proportion of people of each caste in govemment service as addi tional criteria. By using all the three criteria, the Commission de-
clared one of the dominant communities, the Lingayats as forward. This led to a legal banle which ended in the Supreme Court striking
ll2
down the state govemment order on reservations in 1963. Conse_ quently, the state government implemented a modified reservation policy between 1963 and 1977, under which the income of rhe
parents and their occupation were taken into account for determining the backwardness of the people.
This period (1956-1972) was also marked by the rule of Lingayars
in Kamataka under the chief ministerships of S. Nijalingappa
and
Veerendra Patil, who did not want their own community to be excluded from the list of backward classes and lose tle benefits of reservation. At the same time, it was alleged that the two dominant communities cornered all the benefits under the earlier as well as modified reservation policies and that a new set of guidelines was required for determining the backward classes. At this juncture, the backward classes movement took a different turn under the political leadership of Devraj Urs. Until that time , all the non-Brahmin castes and communities were considered as backward classes. But a general feeling that Lingayats and Vokkaligas dominated the political, economic, educational and even administrative spheres was exploited by
Urs to divide the backward classes. He devised a new political strategy after the 1969 split in the Congress party to wrest political
power from the two dominant communities in the state, by uniting the non-dominant minority backward castes, the Muslims and SCVSTs. Though he was successful in this attempt to begin with, the arithmetic of backward classes compelled him not to ignore Vokkaligas torally. He wanted to formulate a new reservation policy consistent with his new political strategy. For this purpose, he found in L.G. Havanur, an active proponent of the new backward classes ideology, an able policy adviser. While the status of the earlier backward qlasses inquiry bodies was only those of committees, Urs elevated it to that of a commission and appointed the First Backward Classes Commission in 1972 under the chairmanship of L.G. Havanur.
This Commission submitted its report after prolonged deliberations in November 1975. However, it also left out certain sections of the Lingayat community. When the partially modified governmenr order on reservation was implemented, the national emergency had already been declared. The Lingayats could not take to the streets against the recommendations of the Havanur Commission and had to wait for a more appropriate time. After the emergency, they decided
Karnatakn Govemment's Reservation Policies
113
to seek judicial remedy' The Karnataka High Court upheld the recommendations of the Havanur Commission but partially struck down the modifications introduced in the govemment order' Even then the Lingayats went on to appeal to the Supreme Court which directed both the governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to review the list of backward classes in the light of fresh data.
This judicial decision forced the government of Karnataka to appoint the Second Backward Classes Commission in 1983' which suUmitteO its report in 1986, excluding not only the Lingayats and Vokkaligas, but also 13 other communities which were still etiucationally backward and were also numerically in a minority position' This sparked off a state-wide agitation and ultimately forced the Janata govemment to reject the recommendations of the Commission. The fresh govemment order, issued in 1986' brought back most of the communities (the former non-Brahmins) to the backward classes list for the purpose of reservation' This, in brief is the story of the backward classes movement in Kamataka' It is necessary at this stage to mention the diversity of the backward classes movement in Karnataka after the reorganisation of the state. We have noted earlier that from 1874 lill 194"1, the backward classes included all castes except Brahmins, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. The pre-independent backward classes movement in Mysore state is known as the non-Brahmin movement, as it included all the
non-Brahmin communities of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. The SCs and STs were part of the backward classes in the princely state of Mysore, but were followers rather than leaders in the backward classes movement. But after 1947, particularly after the introduction of the Constitution which guaranteed proportional reservation for SCs/STs, they started emerging as a separate backward group in Karnataka. This group became very powerful during Urs's rule. Consequently, Ambedkarism took deep roots in Karnataka in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They not only started fighting for their constitutional share, both in admissions to educational institutions and govemment jobs, but also introduced a roster system in appointments to governmentjobs and reservations in promotions for SCs and STs in government service. Over and above these, they even started asking for a share in the reservation meant for other backward classes. An interestine feature of the backward classes movement in Karnataka,
ll4
particularly in the 1980s, has been an unprecedented unigr among the SC and ST leaders for the purpose of claiming their legitimate share. Cutting across party lines and ideological overtones, they have be_ come a powerful vocal minority in all the state public platforms, including the Legislative Assembly and the Council. Today they are a force to rcckon with by political parties and other sections of the
society.
Another interesting development in the backward classes movement in Kamataka has been the subtle move of L.G. Havanur to organise the Bedas and Nayaks under one group: backward tribe. This tag, given to Nayaks in Maharashtra, was used by him to further
upgrade the status of the Bedas for the purpose of rcservation as a backward tribe. It may be mentioned in this context that the Havanur Commission classified the OBCs into backward tribes, backward castes and backward communities and recommended their sharcs in the reservation in ascending order. Furtheq by using the constitutional provision given to SCs and STs, he manoeuvrcd to see that the income ceiling was not fixed for the castes included under backward tribe. Then he started lobbying in Delhi for getting ST status to backward tribes and this has been challenged by the Second Backward Classes Commission and others. But the fight is still going on. The third recent development in the backward class movement in tle state of Kamataka is the fight which has been going on between the Lingayats and Vokkaligas for the backward class status. When the Lingayats were declared as forward by the Havanur Commission they were furious, not merely for conferring on them the unprofitable forward status but also for isolating them from the Vokkaligas. They would have accepted the forward status if the Vokkaligas were also made forward. This intention was explicitly made known to the Supreme Court. Sensing the true intention of the appeal preferrcd by Lingayats before the Supreme Court, the Second Backward Classes Commission made Vokkaligas also forward. Though initially it satisfied the Lingayats, the ugly turn that the recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Commission took made the Lingayats also to retrace their steps and fight for the backward tag. The final consequence of this development has been that the Vokkaligas have emerged
as champions of the neglected minority backward castes in Kamataka. This is because it was the Vokkaligas who took the lead in organising
Karnataka
G ov
rnment' s Resemat ion
P olic ie s
115
the l3 other minority castes which were made forward and organised the joint agitation against the recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Commission.
Finally, the Muslims have emerged as an identifiable group, jealously guarding their own backward tag rather than supporting the
broader backward classes movement. In other words, there is a clear evidence of every single group of former backward classes trying to protect its own group interests without bothering about the loss or gain to other sections of the OBCs. The unity of all OBCs, SCs/STs and minorities is becoming shaky and their split is becoming open. This is evident even within each major community. For instance, the fight for supremacy, both in political leadership and for controlling the money-spinning educational institutions, has been going on between different sub-castes within the Vokkaliga community. There is a possibility of an anti-reservation movement erupting as it did in Gujarat. Furthermore, if Vokkaligas and Lingayats unite for political reasons, it may manifest itself in the form of a second anti-Brahmin movement in Karnataka.
2. Share of OBCs, SCs and STs in the State's Population The formulation of any reservation policy depends upon reliable data on the backward classes population of a state. In Kamataka, as elsewhere in the country, caste-wise population data are not available. This forced the Second Backward Classes Committee (1960) and the First Backward Classes Commission (1972) to estimate and even 'guestimate' the caste-wise population. This has created a lot of controversy relating to the numerical strength of each caste and community in the total population. Perhaps the only committee which had the benefit of reliable data on caste-wise composition of population was the Miller Committee (1918). This committee which was appointed in 1918 used the 1911 census data, which provided castewise demographic information, for formulating its recommendations. Table I gives the Caste-wise population of Hindus, Muslims, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians in the princely state of Mysore according to the 1911 census. It may be observed that the depressed caste population constituted a major proportion and next came the
Vokkaligas. This was how powerful the Vokkaligas were in the former princely state of Mysore until after Independence. Subse-
ll6
The Politics of Baclcwardne ss
Table Share of SCs/STs and OBCs in the Total Population of Princely State of Mysore
No.
Sr. Castel PopulComna- ation nin

l.
Per cenl
Ijterate
to total Hindus
population
Per cent Literate to
total in
Vo
of total literate
literate English
Hindu
Hindus
in Enplish
75.14
populatian
Brahrnin 193137 3.59 80409 27.35 15455
J. 4.
f.
(3.39),r (23.S9)+ (52.95)+ Kshatriya 36894 0.69 6031 2.05 638 3.10 (0.0s)+ (r.71)+ (2.r9)+ Vokkaliga 1328237 24.72 42206 14.35 717 3.58 (12.36)1, (2.52\* Q3.ZA1* Lingayat 728571 13.56 66665 22.67 804 3.92 (12.77)* (19.55)* (2.75)+ Mudaliar ll87l O.22 3217 1.09 799 3.88 (0.2t)* (0.x1* Q.lq+
Other Hindus not specially
backward
Specially backward or
Depressed
527891
11.68
(11.01)*
64059
(l8.zg)*
10.70
(9.23)*
21.79 1499
7.29
(5.r+;*
Classes
Total
?447636
45.54
(42.9O)+
31467
636
3.O9
(2.18)'r'
8.
Mohamme- 291708
dans
Hindus 5374237 100.00 29N54 5.11+ 34831

34ml
100.00
20568
100.00
10.22* 1307 2.29+
4.48+ 8.33*
9. Indian
Christians 10. European
0.60* 0.09*
7820
U3t
AngloTotal
Indians
5213
4199
t.23* 3987
t00.00+
13.66+ 100.00
5705359 100.00+
3,!0940
29190
Note: * These figures are with reference to total population of the state. Source: Govemment of Mysore: Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider Steps Necessary for the Adequate Representation of Communities in the Public Semice, 1919, p. 24.
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies
tt7
Table
II
Estimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and their Relative Shares in the Total Population of Kamataka in 1960
Caste/Community Estinated
PoPulation
Percentage
to the
total Hindus
1.35 1.80
Percentage to the total population of thc state
Banajiga 3. Beda 4. Brahmin 5. Darzi 6. Devanga

2. 7. 8.
l. Ahasa
Ganiga 9. Idiga 10. Kshatriya 11. Kumbara 14558C0 12. Kuruba 13. Lingayat 32930001C 861700 14. Mahratta ' 28300 15. Meda 112200 16. Mudali 120800 17. Nayinda 142000 18. Neyagi 43800 19. Rajput 36600 20. Satani l527OO 21. Thigala 220700 22. Uppata 23. Vokkaliga 27M3OO 1214800 24. Yaisya
25. Viswakarma 26. Yadava 27. LamarLi 28. Waddar 29. Nayar 30. Kodaga 31. Other nonScheduled Hindu
Castes
4824OO
248800 332400 1002100 905700 65000 221000 Gangakula 460800 90700 528600 78200 109100
1.18 1.58
5.44 4.92 0.35 1.20 2.50 o.49 2.87 0.42 0.59 7.90
17.88
4.74 4.28
0.31 1.05
2.18 0.43 2.40 0.37 o.52 6.88
t:.f /
4.08 0.13 0.53 0.57 0.67
0.21
4.68 0.15
0.61
0.66 o.77 0.24 0.20 0.83 1.20 14.90 0.79 2.62

1.69
0.9"1
0.17 0.72
1.04 12.98
0.68 2.28
1.47
310700 178400 359800 24600 56200 703600
0.84
1.95
|.70
0.12 o.z7 3.30
0.13
0.31
3.82
ll8
Total nonScheduled Hindus Scheduled
The Politics of Backwardne ss
15514800
84.24
0.48
100.00
73.37
Tribes
87600
0.41
Total Hindus
18418{nO
87.09
100.00
TotalPopulation 211473c0
of the state
Sorrce: Govemment of Mysore, Mysore Backward Clnsses Committee: Final Report,1961, p. 41.
quently, the Nagana Gowda Committee (1960) did not have rhe benefit of reliable caste-wise population data, as it was not available from 1951 onwards. Therefore, the committee projected the population of all the castes by using the rate of growth of population between l93l and 1941. According to this estimation, as shown in
II, Lingayats constituted the highest proportion of state population, the next highest being the Vokkaligas. Thus the Vokkaligas, who were a nunrerically dominant backward community in the princely state of Mysore, were reduced to second position after the first position. The SCs and STs, though constituting about 14 per cent of the population, came to be separately trcated under the special provisions of the Constitution and became a separale entity after Independence. However, the Christians and Muslims continued to be a part of the backward classes though they enjoyed minority status under the Constitution. The hrst Backward Classes Commission (1972) which is popularly known as Havanur Commission also faced the sime problem of lack of data on caste-wise population. However, the Havanur Commission used, wherever necessary, the 1911, l93l and 1941 castewise census data as the base-year data for projecting the population of different castes, depending upon their availability from these various censuses. The Commission projected the population of different castes by using the growth rate of total population. The projected population of different castes for 1972 is shown in Table III. It may be observed that the relative position of the two dominant communities-Lingayats and Vokkaligas-remained the same because of the use of constant growth rate for projecting the caste-wise
Table
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies

Table
ll9
III
Estimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and their Relative Shares in the Total Population of
Karnanka in 1972
Sl..
Castd
Estimated
No.Communiry population
of 1971
Per cent to total Hindus
popubrton n the. of 1972 state.

355246 2108
Estimated
Percentage
population
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
l.
Agasa Ambalavasi Arasu
346463 2059
19595
1.37 0.01
l.l8
0.01
0.08
1.82
2t245
4724109
0.07
1.57
Balija
Bandi Banjara
460505
t4459
345487 1484168 8059
2002100
0.06
L36
5.86 0.03 0;19
0.01
14793 353882
15196
0.00
1.18
(Lamani)
Beda Bhaat 8277 5.06 0.03 0.68
0.01
Bhunt
205r93
'2622
10. Bogad 2553 11. Brahmin t23E42l 12. Chakkan 4930 13. Chaliyan 2524 14. Chapparabanda 2943 15. Chaptegara 2609 16. Charodi 1815 17. Chunchar 57t4 18. Darzi to84'24 19. Devadiga 6s375 20. Devanga 273692 21. Dombam 10346 22. Gambit 6630 22. Gangakula 695888
4.89 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
12694s5 5048 2584

3001
4.23 0.o2
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
2670
1858
o.o2 0.43 0.?5

1.08
58n
I11567
67440
280546
105E2
o.o2 o.37 o.22 0.93
24. Ganiga 25. Garudi 26. Gatti

27
152983
JA'I I
0.04 0.03 2.75 0.60

-0.01 0.01
o.(X
0.02 2.38 0.58
0.01
6733
712922
156898
2535
10099
Gavli
0.04
0.01
2693 2596 10344
0.01 0.03
0.01
28. Ghadi 29. Giddidki 30. Ganiga 31. Gosavi 32. Gujarathi
2852
44118
29r8
45137
0.1?
0.01
0.15
0.01
2822 7784 2398
0.03
0.01
2902 7968
z.59
0.03 0.01
r2a
33.
Gurav
17867
34. Halwaki Wakkal 44706 35. Hambar 33270 36. Hoovadiga 13078 37. ldiga 659383 38. Jogi 43955 20f.23 39. Kanbi 40. Kanisan 2320 10485 41. Kasai 42. Kasar 9975 43. Kodaga 84812 44. Kolayan 20488 45. Komarpallic 16965 16965 46. Koracha 9066 47. Koraga 95758 48. Korarna 2456 49. Kotari 12412 50. Kotegar 51. Kshatriya 7J391 17002 52. Kudihi 53. Kumbara 213006 10147 54. Kurma 55. Kuruba 1984697 699'l 56. Ladar 57. Lingayat 4292392 58. Mahraua 1012648 21883 59. Mala 8974 60. Malava 3125 61. Malavali 3191 62. Marata 30981 63. Meda 18163 64. Moger 102010 65. Mudali 66. Mukkavan 5229 11194 67. Nadar 4178 68. Natuva 33958 69. Nayar 70. Nayinda 186958 216378 71. Neygi 6543 72. Pandit 73. Pandarem 1619 74. Patramela 1975 11563 75. Patwe Keri
0.07 0.18 0.13 0.05 2.60 0.17 0.08

0.01
18279 45832
34001
0.06 0.15
0.11
11392 657654 45072

21091
0.04 2.25 0.15 0.07

0.01
0.04 0.04 0.33 0.08 0.07

0.0E
2375 10733
10237
86271 20979
17357
20164
9283 98055 2515
12707 75301 17410
0.04 0.38
0.01
0.04 0.03 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.33

0.01
0.05 o.29 0.07 0.84 0.04 7.83 0.03

16.93
218399
10408
2032032 7153 439299

1036377
0.04 0.25 0.06 0.73 0.03 6.77 0.02
14.9
3.45 0.07 0.03
0.01 0.01
3.99 0.09 0.04

0.01 0.01
2402
9188 3190 3246
1.t2
0.07 0.40 o.o2 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.74 0.85 0.03
0.01 0.01
3t742
18591
0.1I
0.06 0.35 0.02
rM979
5354
11453
0.(X
0.01
4280 34696
191.502
221725 6694
1656
0.12 4.64 o.74 0.02

0.01 0.01
2022
0.05
t1796
0.04
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies
t2r
0.06 0.27
0.01
76. Rajapuri 77. Rajput 78. Sanyasi 79. Satani 80. Shikalagar 81. Sillekyatha 82. Satanike 83. Sudir 84. Udugadusidda 85. Tigala 86. Uppara 87. Vaisya 88. Viswakarma 89. Vodda 90. Vokkaliga 91. Yadava 92. Other nonScheduled
18604 78069
0.07
0.31 0.01
19050
80052
3447
35tJ
52125
o.2l
0.01
53459
2787 18153
0.18
0.01
27U
18132
0.07
0.01 0.01 0.01
0.06
0.01 0.01 0.01
27t5
3375
2778
3453
)L/,J 2232'19
3052
217128 377487 174247 674698 447695 3455699 435686 966118
0.86
1.49
0.74
386573
178580
t.29
0.59 2.30
1.53
0.69 2.66
1.77 13.67
r.72
3.79
690689 458560 3546171 446893 982702
11.82 1.49
3.28
Hindu Caste Total

Scheduled
21251086 83.89 Tribes 231268

25332388
2176s362
236865 25945432
72.53 0.79 86.46
0.01
100.00
Total Hindu
population of the state

Nate: The district-wise base year population of different castes was projected
to 1971 by using the district growth rate between the base year population and
the 1971 population. The projected district-wise population of various castes estimated for 1971 and adjusted for the changes in the area and population as per reorganisation of the state is further projected to 1972 using the district-wise growth rate of population between 196l and 1971. Sorrca: Govemment of Kamataka, Report of the First Backward Classes Commission. 1975. Vol. L
population. It may also be noted that though both the Second Backward Classes Committee headed by Nagana Gowda and the First Backward Classes Commission headed by Havanur projected the rate of growth of population by using caste-wise census data from the
122
The
pre-Independence censuses, they did not use the same method. The difference in the relative shares of population of various castes pro_ jected by them is partly on account of different methods used for projections. The Second Backward Classes Commission (19g3) headed by T. Venkataswamy realised the weaknesses of the caste-wise population projected by the earlier Backward Classes Comminee and Cornmission and decided to conduct household census in Kamataka to estimate for the first time after Independence the caste-wise population. The Commission also collected other relevant socio-economic information through household survey for determining the relative backwardness of different castes. For this purpose, the Commission canvassed two schedules, one for the caste and community associations and another for households. The Commission however admifted that the data collected by it were an underestimate to the extent of Z per cent. But actually the total population of Hindus, including SCs and STs, as estimated by the commission for 1984 was less than tle total population of Hindus as estimated according to the l98l census. The difference was to the extent of l0 pbr cent. What is more, in the controversy which followed the release of the Second Backward Classes Commission Report, it was pointed out that one of the members, after examining the household data collected, circulated a note among the members of the Commission contending that the total population covered by the Commission was about 70 per cent only. This would mean the caste-wise population was underestimated by the CommisSion to the extent of 30 per cent. This has also been confirmed by several caste associations in the state. We have projected the caste-wise population of the major caste among Hindus by using the rate of growth of different castes between 191 I and 193 1 , and also by using the proportions of different castes
of the
1931 census. These caste-wise population projections are
presented in Tables VII, Vm and D( in Annex 4. It may be observed that the population, according to our estimate, is slightly more than the Hindu population as revealed by the 1981 census. But the Hindu population as estimated by the Second Backward Classes Commission (Table IV) is an underestimate to the extent of l0 per cent on paper. However, the relative positions of major casteVcommunities do not change. The Lingayats rop rhe rank, followed by Vokkaligas
Karnataka Government's Reservation
Policies
123
Table IV Population of Castes/Communities and their Relative Shares in the Total Population of Karnataka in 1984
Population
% to total population
Agasa Ambalavasi Ambalakaran Baandhi BalUa
306-141
1.00
179 188
6435 479905
11707
0.00 0.00 o.02

1.33
Bevaji
Beda
Bestha
Brahmin Budubuduki Bunt Darzi

Dasaru Deshabandari
994196 1013028 1377550

9661
0.03 2.75 2.80

3.81
298952
117872 42733 2325 104310 268146
0.03 0.83 0.33 o.L2

0.01
Devadiga Devanga
0.29 0.74
0.01 1.46
Gatti Golla
Gondali Goniga Gudigara
3270
529222
17587
123t4
2941 69295 24441 2963
0.05 0.03
0.01
Halwaki Wakkal
Helava
0.19 0.07
0.01
Hindu Sikkaligara Hindu Hugar Idiga

Jetti Jogi Kamma Kaniyan Kanjirabat
l0(X9
917953 4766
0.03 2.54
0.01
21122
89065
1ll5
200 60586
0.06 0.25 0.00
Negli
o.17 0.23 0.08 0.02
Katik
Kodagaru Kote Kshatriya
84f/.3
28578 6927
Kottari
124
Kshatriya
158523
Kudubi
Kumbara Kuruba Ladara Lingayat/Veerashaiva Maratha Medara
24483 252439 2501465 4459
0.44 0.07 0.70 6.92

0.01 16.92 5.ZV
6ttM66
1t57547
37824 172547 10642 57163 215272
Mudaliyar
Nagadha:u Nayar Nayinda Neygr
Pategar
234884
15472
55851
Rajput Raju Kshatriya Rayaravat
0.10 0.48 0.03 0.16 0.60 0.65 0.04 0.15

0.01
5299 426
Negli
0.01
Hindu Sadaru
Satani
sc
ST
21160 20934 573t027

1015601
0.06 0.06
15.86
siddi
Somavamsha Kshatriya
Tewar
Tigala
Uppara Urs Vaisya Viswakarma/
Panchala
4848 24727 4971 211107 472968 28865 277495 708836 4219520
2.82
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.60
l.3l
0.08
0.7'l
1.96 11.68
Vokkaliga C,N.K.
Other Religions Buddhist Christian Gurka
Jain
2445N
0.68
r3269
682634 670 304013 3963071 3251 6643
0.04
1.89
0.00 0.84
10.97 0.01
Muslim
Parsi
sikh
Total population of the state
o.o2
100.00
J6r24594
Karnaaka Govemment's Reservation P olicies
r25
Notes'. 1. SC = Scheduled Caste 2. ST = Scheduled Tribe 3. CNK = Caste not known Baclcward 4. These caste-wise population data were estimated by the Second survey' Classes Commission (1983) based on its household VoI III' 1986' Source: Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commission, pp. 28-30.
and among other backward classes which are in minority' Kurubas, Marathas, Idigas, Viswakarmas and Upparas come in that order' The relative positions of artisans are insignificant. Thus the general observation that the numerically two dominant communities are also eco-
nomically and politically dominant is supported by their relative demographic position in the state. As far as the SC and ST population is concerned, we have got fairly reliable data from successive censuses. However, the data on ST population, as revealed by the 1981 census are not reliable becauie all the Bedas have reported as Nayaks with a view to getting the ST status.4 Hence, we find a sudden rise in the ST population of Kamataka in 1981.
3. Recommendations of Different Commissions 3.1. Miller Committee's Recommendations We have already mentioned in the first section that the Miller Committee provided the rationale for the reservation policy in the princely state of Mysore as far back as 1919. The Committee also iuggested two basic criteria for determining the backwardness of different castes and other social groups. These criteria continued to be followed by successive committees and commissions' with suitable modifications. The Miller Committee used the criterion of educational backwardness with reference to the percentage of literates in English in each of the castes and communities. Since knowledge of English was considered a necessary qualification for government service' the literacy rate in English of the different castes and communities was used as an important criterion for determining their educational backwardness'
This broad criterion was fair enough. However, some degree of arbitrariness was injected while applying this criterion by treating
126
The politics of Bachrtardness
point. The second criterion used by the Miller Committee was the pro_ portion of people of different castes and communities in the state govemment service. Even here, the Comminee excluded the menial and inferior jobs, which according to the Committee were not rel_ evant as in any case the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes would predominate in these jobs. The Colnmittee classified those castes and communities whose population had less than 5 per cent of literacy rate in English and also those whose members were not adequately represented in the government service as backward classes. The Committee did not bother about limiting the representation in government service to the proportion of population of each caste, because the number of non-Brahmins in government service was abys-
those castes and communities as backward whose English_knowing literates were less than 5 per cent of their population. The Commir tees did not elaborate the reasons for using 5 per cent as the cut-off
mally low.
The Committee countered the argument of merit, which was advanced against reservation, in the following way: ..Efficiency, however, is not to be measured solely or even mainly by academic qualifications and it will not be denied that there are many important branches of the adrninistration in which other qualities such as sympathy, honesty of purpose, energy and common sense go as far to make an efficient officer as literary superiority."s Further, the Committee maintained that ". . . under the present system of Govemment, the officers of the Government in the higher grades of the service have necessarily much influence in shaping the policy of the administration, and the efficiency of the services viewed as machines for securing the even and uniform progress of the State, is likely to be increased by the presence in their ranks, of officers of different communities . . . For the fact cannot be ignored that an officer in the exercise of his duty making appointments and promotions finds it easier to see the virtues of his own community than those of others."6 The Comminee observed, with reference to the field-level jobs in government service: "It is these officers who come most frequently in contact in their official capacity with all the classes of people of the State, and from the point of view of general administration it seems desirable that in these grades a full representation of all important
Kamataka Goverrnent's Resemation Policies
127
communities should be found.-7 These argunrents were used for

recommending reservation in government jobs for the non-Brahmins. After so justifying the policy of reservation, the Committee found that all non-Brahmins, except Mudaliars, Anglolndians and Europeans, were educationally backward. However, the Committee recomrnended that the Mudaliar and Pillai communities should also be
included in the backward category though the Committee did not justify or elaborate the reasons for this violation of its own criteriaAccordingly, all the non-Brahmins were classified as backward classes by the Miller Commiuee. This is the reason why the backward classes came to be known as non-Brahmins ia the former princely state of Mysore. It was realised that a separate rcservation for each caste-group was not possible at that tfune and therefore, the Comminee classified all castes into: ( I ) Brahmins, (2) other caste Hindus, Mohammedans and Indian Christians, and (3) the depressed classes (SCs and STs). The Committee recomrnended that while applying the reservation policy to governnentjobs, first preference should be given to SCs. This was so that the dominant backward castes and communities would not monopolise and corner the benefits. Thus the extent of rcservation was supposed to be implernented in reverse order, first to the depressed classes and then for other classes such as Hindus, Muslims and Indian Christians and finally open to the Brahmins. The Commir tee recommended: "within a period of not more than 7 years, not less than one-half of the higher and two'thirds of the lower appointments in each grades of the service and so far as possible in each office are to be held by the members of the communities other than the Brahmin community, preference being given to duly qualified candidates of the depressed classes when such are available."s The Committee suggested grant of exemptions from qualifying educational tests, preferential treafinent in the case of equal or nearly equal qualifications, relaxation of severity of prescribed tests and prescribed the selection of a minimum proportion of backward classes in making appointrnents. Though the Committee examined the need for a roster system in promotion, it found this very difficult to apply at that time. The two Brahmin members gave dissenting notes to the Committee's report. One of them recommended proportional repre-
128
sentation for each caste in order it prevent the dominant among the backward communities cornering the benefits of reservation. But the other member, M.C. Ranga Iyengar, simply rejected most of the
joining the service. The government in its order dated 16 May l92l accepted the recommendations of the Committee in regard to reservation but not
on promotions. The govemment order did not specify the percentage
recommendations on the ground that any reservation would harm efficiency of administration by preventing persons with merit from
of reservation but only indicated that the proportion of backward

classes in government service would be gradually raised to 50 per cent of the total strength within seven years from 1921. The maximum age for entering government service was also increased from 25 to 28 years and spme relaxation was made in regard to the qualifying tests and examinations for appointments in some departments of the government. 3.2. Nagana Gowda Committee's Recommendations
The Nagana Committee used three criteria for the purpose gf classifying backwardness: I . Social backwardness of a community judged by the status of the community in society in general, apart from individuals. Thus the first criterion used was the caste if the people were in the Hindu caste hierarchy.
2. General educational backwardness, based on certain fixed standards. The Committee used the state average of students of different communities studying in High School in 1959-60. For this purpose, those below the state average were classified as educationally backward. 3. Representation of Communities in govemment seryice.
The Committee submitted an interim report in which
it
recom-
mended the prcentage of literacy of several communities as one of the criteria. In addition to this the number of students of each commu-
nity studying for the last three high-school classes during 1959-60
was also used and those communities whose proportion was equal to and below the state average were classified as educationally backward and eligible for reservation.
In its final report, the Committee further classified
backward
Kantataka Government's Reservation Policies
r29
classes into 'backward class' (Group-A) and 'more backward class' (Group-B). The more backward classes were those whose standard of education was less than 50 per cent of the state average, and those
whose standard of education was above this limit and up to state average were grouped under backward class. The Cofirmittee recommended that 50 per cent of the seats in the technical institutions and 45 per cent of the jobs in govemment service should be reserved for the backward classes. The Committee distributed these percentage reservations between more backward and backward classes in the following ways: For admission to technical institutions, 28 per cent for backward classes and 22 pet cent for more backward classes' In regard to appointment in govemment service, for the purpose of Article 16(4), the Committee determined that only 45 per cent of the backward classes was under-represented; of this 2l per cent constituted backward classes and 24 pet cent constituted more backward classes. These proportions were determined on the basis of their relative shares of the population. The Committee estimated that the total population of backward classes in the state was about 57 per cent, comprising 33 per cent backward classes and 24 per cent more backward classes. The Committee recommended for the first time that all the students from families whose income was less than Rs. 1,200 per annum should be given free hostel and educational facilities' But the Committee did not use this income criterion for the purpose of reservation in admission to technical institutions and for jobs in government
service.
The Committee also recommended that these reservations should be reviewed after l0 years (i.e., by l98l), and the communities which show improvement in their educational status and representation in govemment service be removed from the list after such a review. One rnajor recommendation of this Committee was that the entire community of Lingayats was made forward. There was a note of dissent against this recommendation by a member, M.S. Patil' who was a Lingayat. He alleged that the Committee deliberately got the originally estimated percentage of Lingayat students studying in High Schools revised by the Director of Public Instruction (DPI) so as to make it more than the state average (6.6 per cent) with a view to removing Lingayats from the backward classes list. This recommen-
130
Thc politics of Baclcwardness
dation sparked off a political conftoversy and in the legal banle which followed the Mysore High Court struck down the govemment
order implernenting the recomnpndations of this Committee.
3.3. Havanur Conmission's Reconunendations The Havanur Commission had leamt the lessons from the past developments in reservation policy, both for the purpose of develop-
ing the methodology and appropriate criteria for determining the educational backwardness of different castes and communities. as also for forrnulating the recomrnendations in such a way as to satisfy judicial scnrtiny. The Havanur Commission got a selective sample survey otr households done in order to obtain information on the socio-economic status of differcnt castes and communities in the. state. This infonnation was used rnainly for the purpose of determining the eronomic staus as also for examining the nexus between the economic and social staars of different sections of the people. But the Commission used the 1972 datzrc,lating to the percentage of students of different castes who passed the SSI-C examination, for determining educational backwardness. Those castes and communities whose percentage of SSlC-passed students was equal to or below the state average werc classified as educationally backward and those above the state avefirge were classified as forward. Knowing the judicial opinion against using caste as a criterion for determining the backwardness of the people, the Havanur Commission avoided the explicit use of caste but used the educational criterion in such a way as to obtain the sarne result. For reservations in govemment jobs under Article 16(4), the Commission used the proportion of people from each caste and community represented in governrrent service. The Havanur Commission Report classified the backward classes into three grcups: (l) backward tribes, (2) backward castes, and (3) backward communities. The backward tribes were similar to scheduled tribes. Backward castes were rnostly the artisans and such other backward castes, other that the dominang majority backward communities. The backward communities includcd all other dominant casteVcommunities, except Lingayas who should be treated as forward. In other words, the Havanur Commission confirmed tle recomrnendation of the Nagana Gowda Committee but with more logic and empirical justification. The Commission fixed the proportion of
Kamataka Government's Reservation
Policies
131
reservation according to the poPulation of these categories in the total
population. The government of Karnataka, while implementing the recommendations of the Commission, added seven more castes to the backward castes list and also prescribed a family income criterion of Rs. 10,000, both to filter the better-off among even the backward castes and communities as also to satisfyjudicial opinion. Even then, the Lingayats questioned the govemment order in the court of law. The High Court used the principle of severability and upheld the major recommendations of the Havanur Commission, but deleted those castes which were added by the government. The Court also upheld the fourth category, 'Backward Special Group', which the govemment order had created, under which all those candidates whose parents were engaged in traditional occupations and had very low incomes were made eligible for 5 per cent reservation. The Lingayats went in appeal against the judgement. The Supreme Court allowed the state govemment to constitute a new Commission to collect fresh data and determine the backwardness of the people. Accordingly, the Second Backward Classes Commission was appointed in 1983. 3.4. Venkataswamy Commission's Recommendations The Second Backward.Classes Commission used multiple criteria to determine the socially and educationally backward sections of the people for the purpose of reservations in admission to educational institutions and in government service. The Commission used 17 indicators of which 9 were negative and 8 positive indicators. The 17 indicators included percentages for the following: illiteracy in each caste, students studying in each caste, households livingin pucca and /<utclra houses, landless households, households owning above 20 standard acres of land, households having an annual income of Rs. 5,000 and below, households having an annual income of Rs. 20,000 and above and finally, representation in Classes I, tr and III state govemment jobs. If a caste or a community scored 9 and above points in this set of l7 indicators, it was considered as educationally backward. The castes and communities which scored less than 9 points were classified as forward for the purpose of reservations under
Article 15(4).
132
For the purpose of reservation in government service under Article 16(4), the proportion of each caste population to the total population was used. The castes and communities which had more than the proportion of their population in government service were declared
as forward.
Using these criteria, the Commission recommended that32.98 per cent of tle total population of the state was educationally backward and required reservation under Article 15(4). But the Commission recommended only 27 per cent of reservation for this 33 per cent of
population, which was identified as educationally backward. No explanation was given as to why and how this 27 per cent wils determined. Further, the Commission used separate tests for reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). It used the proportion of each caste representation in Classes I, II, and III jobs twice, once as a part of 17 indicators for reservation under Article l5(4) and again while identifying the castes for reservation under Article 16(4). Whenever
the Commission found contradictory results, such as when some of the castes which were classified as educationally and economically backward became forward caste for the purpose of reservation under Article 16(4), the Commission tried to escape from such inconsistencies by using l8 indicators for the purpose of resolving the tie. The Commission used 17 indicators to classify the educational backwardness of only 62 castes. The remaining 13 castes did not consistently satisfy either the economic backwardness tests or educational backwardness tests. Some of these castes became educationally forward in terms of the basic tests but still economically backward, while they appeared economically forward. In order to resolve this contradiction, the Commission combined the educational test criterion with the l7 socio-economic indicators, making a total of l8 indicators and prescribed 10 as a minimum score for qualifying for the backward classes tag. Thus, for 62 castes the Commission used 17 indicators and for 13 castes it used 18 indicators. The Commission recommended the application of a family income ceiling of Rs. 15,00O per annum for eliminating economically better-off families among the backward classes. It also recommended abolition of 'Backward Special Group' and 'Backward Tribe'. The Commission's report was not unanimous and therefore became controversial. Almost half of the members gave dissenting
Karnataka Government's Reservation
Policies
133
notes and five of them submitted a dissenting letter to ihe chief minister of Kamataka, requesting him to reject the entire report. In the course of this controversy, the choices of the multiple c$teria and also the data used were questioned. The Commission's recommendations bristled with arbitrariness. First, the coverage of the survey was disputed. As already mentioned, it varied from 70 per cent to 90 per cent and more imponantly, Bangalore City was not adequately covered by the survey. Second, the data used for determining the status of different castes in terms of illiteracy, percentage of students studying in SSLC, percentage of urban population, and percentage of selfemployed were all found defective as they did not tally with the state averages of the 1981 census. The criteria used werc not appropriate, partly because there was double weightage given to each of the criteria, like the percentage of families having an annual income of Rs. 5,000 and below and having an annual income ofRs. 20,00O and above, prcentage of landless families, percentage of families owning 20 standard acres of land and above and percentage of families livingin pucca and ftutcfta houses. The Commission used 9 points for determining the backwardness of 62 castes and l0 points for the remaining l3 castes. Besides, the Commission used the state average equal to or above for determining the 62 castes as backward but only above the state average for 13 castes. The most important test for determining the educational backwardness of different castes was the percentage of SSLC pupils in other castes. The Havanur Commission used the April 1972 SSLC results, whereas the Venkataswamy Commission used the April 1985 results. The caste-wise information was reported to have been obtained from 3017 High Schools out of a total of 3244 High Schools in the state. It was found that the information about caste was not insisted upon from the students appearing for the SSLC examination. How reliable then was the data on caste-wise percentage of SSLC passed students which the Commission used? Apart from this, the results of one examination cannot really indicate the educational backwardness of different caste-groups because education is a longdrawn process. Therefore, we must take an average of all or several years of SSLC qualified people to the total number of SSLC qualified people to determine the educational status ofeach caste-group. Though the Commission collected data on the total number of SSLC qualified
134
The Politics of Baclorardness
people in each caste through the household survey, it did not use them for reasons not explained anywhere. What is rnore, the Havanur Commission classified all those castes whose percentages of SSLC passed students in the total population of different castes was equal to and below the state average as backward and classified only those whose percentages were clearly above the state average as forward. But the Second Backward Classes Commission classified even those castes whose percentages were equal to the state average as forward. This has been found to be arbitrary and contrary to the existing judicial interpretation. As a result of all these weaknesses, the Second Backward Classes Commission's report created heated political debates in the state. The state govemment, while appointing the Second Backward Classes Commission, had excluded representatives from the two major castes (Lingayats and Vokkaligas) from the membership of the Commission. If this was done in the hope that it might ensure the impartial working of the Commission or force it to include the dominant castes in the list of backward classes, that hope did not materialise. Other members, belonging mostly to minority backward castes did not work as a united team, as is amply evident from the dissenting and other submissions appended to the report. Subsequently, a lengthy letter written by five members of the Commission to the chief minister disowning the recommendations exposed the weaknesses of the Commission. As a result the govemment of Karnataka was forced to reject the recommendations of the Commission and issue a temporary government policy. This brder retains the basic classification of the backward classes made in the govemment order of 1977 . The only difference is that it includes Lingayats also as a backward community for the purpose of reservation under Articles 15(4) and
'16(4).
4. Extent of Reservation
We have got information on the extent of reservation for the purpose of admission to ducational institutions under Article l5(4) and for government jobs under Article 16(4) from the recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Committee of 1960, the first
Backward Classes Commission of 1972, and the Second Backward Classes Commission of 1983. Besides, we have got similar informa-
Karnataka
G ove
rnment's
Re se
rvation P olic
ie s
135
tion on the extent of reservations actually made by the state government through the government orders which were issued from time to
time. However, we do not have information about the extent of reservation made in the princely policy based on the recommendations of the Miller Committee. The Miller Committee's recommendations were accepted by the then state govemment and the government order was issued in 1921. From l92l till the govemment order was issued, it remained in operation. And this order covered almost 97 per cent of the population because it excluded only Brahmins, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. People of all other castes and communities were made eligible for reservations. These castes and communities included all the non-Brahmins Hindu castes, SCs, STs, Indian Christians, Muslims, Jains and others. But no clear-cut percentage of feservation was made for each of these castes and communities. The govemment order had broadly reserved about 50 per cent of the total jobs and admissions to educational institutions for all backward classes. Even this percentage was proposed to be achieved over a period of seven years. The Second Backward Classes Committee, (Nagana Gowda Committee), estimated that about 57 per cent of the population in the integrated Kamataka state could be considered backward. This excluded SCs and STs who constituted 18 per cent of the total population. Further, the Committee classified the backward classes into 'more backward'and 'backward'. It was estimated that the 'backward' group would be about 33 per cent and 'more backward' would be about 24 per cent. But the Committee recommended 28 per cent of reservation under Article 15(4) for the backward group and 22 per cent for the more backward group, thus making the total reservation only 50 per cent. This excluded 18 per cent reservation for SCs and STs. If we take into account both these reservations, the total reservation would be 68 per cent, covering 75 per cent of the total population of the state. However, for the purpose of reservation in government service under Article 16(4), the Committee recommended 45 per cent reservation only. Accordingly, the Committee fixed 21 per cent for the backward group and 24 per cent for the more backward group. Thus, under reservation in govemment jobs under Article 16(4), the total percentage of reservation came to 63 per cent. The details relating to percentage of population covered and the percentage of quota of
136
reservation are indicated in Table V.
The Havanur Commission recommended classification of backward classes into three groups for reservation under Article 15(4) and
l6(4), viz. Backward Tribes (BT), Backward Castes (BC), and Backward Communities (BCM). The then govemment accepted the recommendations but added seven more castes to the BCM category and
the Christian converts from SC group to BC group. The extent of reservations and the population covered by the recommendations of Havanur Commission are shown below:
Percentage of reservation recommended by Havanur Commission for purpose of Article 15(4)
Vo
of popu-
lation
Quota of Reservation
1OVo
2. 3.
Backward Castes Backward Tribes
14.49
8.00
44.52
6% 32%
Total
Percentage of reservation recommended
for purpose of
Quota of Reservation
Article 16H)
% of popuT-
--EacEwffi-eommunitiei 2. Backward Castes 3. Backward Tribes

Total
lation
14.47
19.20 8.00
4t.67
l6va
t0%
6Vo
According to the Havanur Commission's report, 45 per cent of the people of the state, excluding SCs and STs, were made eligible for reservations. Including 18 per cent of SCs and STs, the total population covered for reservation under Article 15(4) and l6(4) was 63 per cent. But the govemment expanded the Havanur Commission's list
by adding seven more castes/communities, viz. Arasu, Ganiga, Balija' Devanga, Satam, Rajput and Muslims. It also created a new category
of Backward Special Group (BSG), under which economic backwardness was the sole criterion and people from any caste or cornmu-
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies Table V Extent of Coverage and Percentage o.f Rc ".:rvatwts Recommended by Various Backward Clitr*" Committees/ Commissions in Karnataka
Percentage of
137
Population Percentage of Quota of Reservation Covered OBC + sC & ST -- Total OBC + SC & ST = Total PopulPer cent ation covered Quota
Reser-
vation As per
Miller
97Vo
50%
Committee's Recommendations
As per Govemment
Order of
1921
9'IVo
SOVa
As per Nagana Cowda

Committee's Recommendations
Interim
Report
57Vo
187o
=759o 75Vo
25qe
a l$/o = 4-l9t
As per Nagana Gowda Committee's Recommendations Final Report 57% + 18Vo = As per Govemment
Order of
5O9o
+ +
lSVa = 68Vo
(45Eo)
1960
57Vo
18%
=75Vo 63%
22Vo
lSVo =
4OVa
As per Havanur
Commission's
Recommendations
45% + 18% =
32% + 18Vo = 50Va
As per Govemment
Order of
1977 1979
63% + 189o
=81%
4O%
+ +
lSVa = 58Vo
As per Covemment Order of As per Venkataswamy
499o
+ 18% =67% +
lSVo
4O7a
ISVo
58?o
Commission's
Recommendations
33Vo
5l%o'
27% + lSVo = 45Vo
138 As per Govemment Order of
The Politics of Bacla,vardne ss
1986
777o
lSVo = 95Vo
5OVo+189o=68%
Note: This is for reservation forjobs under l6(4).
nity could qualify for reservation under this category. Therefore, the Govemment Order of 1977 covered 77 per cent of the total popula-
tion, including SCs and STs and also Muslims. According to this order, the number of castes and the percentage of reservations were as follows:
BCM BC
16 castes 129 castes
20%
lOTo
5Vo
BT
BSG
62 castes open to all
5%
But this order was questioned in the High Court and the High Court removed seven castes from the list of backward classes. Accordingly, the government was forced to issue a fresh order in 1979. According to the 1979 order, 63 per cent of the total population was covered. This included SCs, STs, Muslims and the Backward Special Group. The relative shares of reservations of OBCs under the 1979 government order were as follows:
Baclcward
Class No. of
under
category
Article 1s(4)
9 114 58
Castes
No. of Castes
Modified % of
Resemation under Article
under Anicle 16(4)
BCM
BC
ln
58
open to all
l)
20% 'to% 5% 5%
t8%
lOTo
BT
BSG
5% 5%
The Venkataswamy Commission's recommendations covered only 32.98 per cent of the population, excluding SCs and STs. Including SCs and STs, it would be 5l per cent of the total population. This reduction was mainly because of the elimination of a number of castes from the list of backward classes.
The recommended percentage of reservations is shown as follows:
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies

Backward Class/ Group
No.
t39
Recommended en'at ion unde
Vo
o[
Castes
PercenlaSe oJ PoPulation
of
and
Comrnunities
t<
20
R es
Artic le
15(4)
17.77 15.21
147o 137o
16(4
But the government did not accept the recommendations of the ad hoc Second Ba&ward Classes Commission' Instead, it issued Lt
as educaorder specifying the castes and communities to be treated tionally baciward and the extent of reservations' The list of backacward ;lasses and the modified percentage of reservation made cording to this order are as follows: No.
Group
of
No.
of
Castes
Castes
9o of Reser' vation wrder
9o
of Reservation under Article

16(4)
wd.er
undcr
Article
1s(4)
5
Articlc
ts(4)
A.
Article I6(4)
Backward
Tribe (BT)
61 135 7 7
All '
6l
119
B.
C. D.
Backward
Caste (BC)
l)
l3
16
11
Backward
Community (BCM-D
'l
16
l6
9 f
Backward
Special GrouP
Community (BCM-II)
E. Backward
The Janata Government order of 1986 has retained the earlier existing total reservation quota of 68 per cent consisting of 50 per cent for OBCs and 18 Per cent for SCs.
According to the Govemment Order of 1986, about 95 per cent of the total population has been covered by the backward classes list and the total percentage of reservation continues to be 68 per cent' This is mainly because of the retention of backward special group under which people from any community can claim backwardness if their
econornic position warrants it and also because Lingayats were brought
l4A
reservation.
back to the backward classes list. Consequently, the recenr govem_ ment order covers a larger percentage of people for purposes
of
government service. Looked at the coverage from this angle, only about 25 per cent of the total population might become eligible for competing for benefits under reservation. There are several reasons
of the qualifying tests introduced in order to ditermine eligibility for reservation. These are the family income limits and the minimum prescribed educational qualifications which entitle people to get into
However, it is necessary to remember that mere coverage in terms ^ of total population will not benefit such a large population, because
for this.
wbo qualify for admission into educational institutions and sovern_ ment jobs will be those who pass SSLC and above eduJational examinations. This proportion of the population may be estimated by using the literacy rate. At present, the literacy rate in Karnataka is about 34 per cent, of which ar least 15 per cent would be eligible for reservation benefits under OBCs, and another l0 per cent under SC
benefits under reservation. This means that the total percentage of people other than SC, ST and BT, who will be eligible for reservation under OBC category would be around 33 per cent. This 33 per cent plus 23 per cent would be 56 per cent. Out of this 56 per cent, those
family income limit is up to Rs.10,000 we may reasonably assume that another 20 per cent of the people will become eligible for
people, of whom 18 per cent are SCs and STs and 5 per cent are BTs. Out of 36 per cent of people who are below the poverty line, if we deduct this 23 per cent, we are left with only 13 per cent. Since the
The existing reservation for SCs and STs is lg per cent. Under the new Government Order, about 5 per cent of the population (it is actually 4.63 per cent as estimated by the Venkatasw;my Commis_ sion), is identified as Backward Tribes. Since there is no income ceiling for them, the entire BT population is entitled for reservation. In the case of OBCs, i.e., those who are covered under B, C, D and E groups, there is a family income ceiling of Rs. 10,000 for castes which are included under B, C and D groups and Rs. g,000 under E group. The estimated poverty line for the state of Kamataka for the year 1983-84 is abour Rs. 5,750 for a family offive. people below the poverty line in rhe state in 1983-84 consriture about 36 per cent of
Kamatakn Government's Reservation
Policies
l4l
and ST categories. In other words, the effective percentage of popuIation which will be eligible for competing for benefits under resewation will not exceed 25 per cent of the total population in the state. This would be about one crore of people. Even out of this one crore, those who are already over-age (above 30 years) may come to about 50 lakhs. So every year, 50 lakh persons will be eligible for reservation under the OBC, SC and ST quotas. This will come to about 12 per cent of the total population. Without attempting to estimate the really eligible percentage of population, some people have unnecessarily magnified the percentage to give an impression that reservation will benefit virtually 95 per cent of the total population of the state. 5.
Applicability of Income Criterion

Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are intended to enable the government to
formulate such policies as are necessary to promote the educational advancement of the socially backward sections of the society. However, they do not indicate clearly as to what constitutes social backwardness, though educational backwardness can be judged with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in the course of his reply to the debate on the First Amendment to the Constitution, clarified that social backwardness mentioned in Clause (4) of Article 15 included economic backwardness also. Accordingly, successive judgements ofthe High Courts and the Supreme Court on the issue of reservation have interpreted that caste alone cannot be considered as an indicator of social backwardness. They have maintained that the level of income of the family should also be considered as a necessary criterion for determining the social backwardness of different
sections of the people.
It is curious to note that Article 335, which concems reservation for SCs and STs in government service does not explicitly indicate that government should take into account the family income of SCs and STs. As a result, Courts have interpreted that there is no need for applying the income criterion while making reservations for SCs and STs. In contrast, even though Clause (4) of Article 15 does not explicitly mention the income criterion, the Courts have held that it is necessary to apply it in order to filter the better-off sections of the OBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation. This'varying interpretation gives the impression that the Courts, while reviewing the
t42
constitutional reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs have interpreted similar constitutional provisions differently with regard to the application of the income criterion. It looks as though the Courts have themselves tried to create different constitutional provisions for reservations for SCVSTs and OBCs. This has not been noticed by scholars, members of backward classes, legislators and even legal
commentators.
Until such interpretation was given by the High Courts and the Supreme Court, the state govemments, which were implementing the
reservation policy, did not impose the income criterion to eliminate the better-off sections of the backward classes from enjoying the benefits of reservation. In Kamataka, the Miller Committee did not bother about the income criterion in 1919. After Independence and
even after the introduction
of the new Constitution, the
Second
Backward Classes Committee
of 1960 did not prescribe any income
criterion for making reservation for the OBCs. The Committee only indicated that those students whose family income did not exceed Rs. 1,200 per annum may be given free hostel facilities and other assistance to enable them to improve their educational levels . The Havanur
Commission also did not impose any income criterion for limiting reservations to only tle worse-off sections of the OBCs. However, the Government Order of 1977 which was formulated on the basis of the recommendations of the Havanur Commission did prescribe an income criterion. All OBCs whose family income was Rs. 10,000 and above were disqualified from enjoying benefits of reservation and a lower income limit of Rs. 4,800 was prescribed for those who would claim reservation benefits under the BSG category. The Second Backward Classes Commission justified this income criterion and enhanced the family income limit to Rs 15,000. Accepting the income criterion as a necessary test for preventing the better-off sections of OBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation, the Government Order of 1986 has also prescribed the income criterion of Rs 10,000 for backward castes and backward communities I and II and Rs 800 for the BSG. No income criterion is prescribed for the backward tribes. Thus it may be observed that in Kamataka even those groups of people who are identified as backward classes and who are in need of special assistance under the reservation policy, have to satisfy the
Karnanka Government's Reservation Policies

minimum family income criterion. This has introduced
143
a concept of equity into the reservation policy. Unfortunately, the way it has been implemented or enforced has made a mockery of the whole equity principle. There have been innumerable cases of false income certificates being produced, particularly by the better-off sections of the candidates from rural areas, belofging to backward castes and communities and enjoying the benefits of reservation. Even members of backward castes and communities employed in government service have tried to resort to adoption of children to get the benefits of rescrvation. It is true that the government of Karnatalia has started prosecuting those who have submitted false income certificates but such cases are very few and perhaps only to counter public criticism. It has been rccognised by all right-thinking people that an income criterion should be used to filter the better-off sections of both the SCs and STs from enjoying the benefits of reservations under our constitutional provisions. I-et us hope that the Govemment of India and the state governments will muster sufficient political courage to enforce this equity criterion for reservation, both for OBCs and SCV
STs, at least after 1990.
An Overall Evaluation In the state of Kamataka a majority of the OBCs have been enjoying benefits of the reservation policy for a long time, both in admissions to educational institutions and in government service. Consequently, some communities like the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats have come to enjoy adequate representation in the state government service. This is evident from the data published by the Second Backward Classes Commission for 1984 (see Table VI). Though the population of various castes and communities has been underestimated by the Second Backward Classes Commission, we may surmise with a reasonable degree of accuracy that these two communities are adequately represented in the state government
6. service. However, the case of other castes and communities is open to question, because of the unreliability of the data, even from official sources. As far as SCs and STs are concemed, Karnataka seems to have
achieved a miracle in the past l0 years. The SCs and STs have a reasonable proportion of governnrent jobs. They have also been
144
Table VI
Representatiort of Various Castes and Communities in State Government Semices in Kamataka
(,
Religion/
Percentage
of
Percentage
of
No. Caste
population as per l9E4 suney
representatnn
in State Govt. Service
l.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Hindu
Agasa 1.00
Ambalavasi Ambalakaran Baandhi
0.00 0.00 0.02

I,JJ
0.75 0.00 0.00 0.03

1.50
Balija
Bavaji
Beda Bestha
0.33
2.75
0.04
l.l1
|.79
15.54
2.80
3.81
Brahmin Bhunt
10. Budu-Buduki
ll.
12. Darji 13. Dasaru 14. Deshabandari 15. Devadiga 16. Devanga 17. Ganiga 18. Gani 19. Golla
0.03 0.83 0.33 0.12

0.01
0.29 0.74 0.45

0.01
0.03 0.84 o.37 0.05 0.00 o.29 0.76 0.02 0.76 0.03 0.03
t.46
0.05
0.03 0.01
20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
Gondhali Goniga Gudigara
0.0r
0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.04 o.28
0.01
Halwakki Wakkai Helawa Hindu Sikkaligara Hindu Hugar
0.19 0.07
0.01
ldiga
Jeni
0.03 2.54
0.01
Iogi
Kamma Kaniyan
Kanjirbat Khatik
Kodagaru
0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 o.17 o.23
o.0l
o.l4
1.56
Karnataka
G ov e
rnme nt' s Re se n
ation P olic
ie s
145
35. Kote Kshatriya 36. Kottari 37. Kshatriya 38. Raju Kshatriya 39. Kudubi 40. Kumbara 41. Kuruba 42. Ladra 43. LingayataN eerashaival 44. Maratha 45. Medar 46. Mudaliar 47, Nagartharu 48. Nayar 49. Nayinda 50. Neygi 51. Pategar 52. Rajput 53. Ravula 54. Raya Ravut 55. Hindu Sadaru 56. Satani 57. SC 58, ST 59. Siddi 60. SomavamshaKshatriya 61. Tewar 62. Tigala 63. Uppara 64. Urs 65. Vaisya 66. ViswakarmaPanchala 67. Vokkaliga
Other Religions
0.08 o.o2 0.44

0.01
0.07 0.70 6.92

0.01
0.10 0.o2 o.62 0.07 0.03 0.50

2.81
0.00
19.68
6.92 3.20 0.10 0.48 0.03 0.16 0.60 0.65 0.04 0.15 0.00
0.01
3.26 0.04 0.49 0.03 0.18 0.47 0.84 0.03 0.57

0.01
0.06 0.06
15.86
2.82
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.60
1.31
0.08 0.77
1.96 I 1.68
0.00 0.02 0.17 8.53 2.75 0.00 0.07 0.00 o.29 0.83 0.17
1.34
2.24
11.74
68. Buddhist 69. Christian 70. Gurka /1. Jaln 72. Muslim 73. Parsi 74. Sikh
Commission, Vol.
0.04
1.89
0.01 3.93
0.00 0.84
10.97 0.01
0.02
o.o2 0.80 9.45 0.00 0.00
, 1986, pp. 245-47.
146
enjoying a roster system and preference in promotions. The dispute is only over achieving the maximum constitutional percentage
ofjobs in each and every govemment department. Those who are lagging behind in the field of education as well as in govemmenr service have been the artisan castes like barbers, washerman, blacksmiths, carpenters and the like, whose main weakness lies in their insignificant numbers. It looks as though it is mainly the numerical strength of a caste or community which enables it to mobilise political power and get its due adequate share in government service and
share
in educational institutions. It is surprising that the govemment of Karnataka has not bothercd to make an assessment of the impact of the reservation policy on various castes and communities in the field of education and in the wider socio-economic sphere. No attempt has been made, even by the scholars, to throw light on this aspect. Further, no scholar has attempted to find out the performance of the candidates of different castes and communities who got admission into educational institutions and entered govemment service under reservation as compared to those who got admissions and jobs through open competition. Though such a study will almost certainly be controversial as well as difficult to conduct, its relevance from the point of view of policy and social science research methodology cannot be overstated. Finally, it looks as though the 'sociology of knowledge' is allpervading in formulating policies, rccommendations, and even implementing reservation policy in this country and particularly in Karnataka state. For example, the two members of the Miller Committee from the Brahmin community gave dissenting notes by using merit as an excuse. They cannot escape from the charge of trying to defend the interests of their own caste; rnerit was only an excuse to rationalise their arguments. In the case of the Second Backward Classes Committee, one member belonging to the Lingayat community submitted a dissenting note against the majority recommendation of mi*ing Lingayats forward. Though one may argue that he was equally interested in protecting the intercst of his own commdniry, the argument had advanced in his minute of dissent gives an impression that the Second B ackward Classes Comminee ( I 960) manipulated the data to show that the educational status of Lingayats was above the state
average.
Karnataka
ovennment' s Reserv ation Policie s
r47
The dissenting notes of the two members from the Brahmin community to the Miller Comrnittee did not deter the government from accepting the majority recommendations' But the dissenting note of a member from the Lingayat community created not only a political uproar, but also judicial interference into an important social policy in Karnataka, which ultimately distorted the reservation policy until almost 1977. In the case of the Havanur Commission, though there were differences of opinion, L.G. Havanur made sure that the report would be acceptable to all. But of all backward classes commissions/ comrnittees, the work of the Second Backward Classes Commission has been considered the most biased. First, the Janata Govemment saw to it that no members from the major communities, i.e., Brahmins, Vokkaligas and Lingayats, were appointed to the Commission, for fear that they block the work of the Commission or challenge the recommendations by putting minutes of dissent. What followed was a sad story. Almost half the members of the Commission submitted dissenting notes, five of them submitted a separate letter to the chief minister requesting him to reject the report and one of them charged another mernber of having manipulated the whole report. The aborted attempts of some members of the minority castes of backward classes to remove Vokkaligas and Lingayats from the backward classes list was evident from the dissenting notes and the letter written by five members to the chief minister of Kamataka.e It appears as though the Commission first decided on its recommendations and then started using only relevant data and information to rationalise them. Wherever the household survey data did not manipulated data were used. From this it becomes evident that caste prejudice is deep-rooted in Kamataka. The impression that one had, namely that only Brahmins were jealous of others having reservation is not true. They were as
much guided by their self-interest as were the Vokkaligas and

Lingayats. The only difference was that the Brahmins, being numerically small, were not so powerful politically as to resist their exclusion from the backward classes list. The Lingayats and Vokkaligas, on the other hand, have been able to muster sufficient political power to resist attempts to eliminate them from the backward classes list. Even so, Urs had devised a reservation policy so as to isolate Lingayats from other backward classes by taking the support of Vokkaligas. But when both Vokkaligas
148
and Lingayats were made forward it was politically difficult for any government to resist the combined strength of these two numerically and politically powerful communities. The Second Backward Classes
Commission lost a great opportunity for formulating a meaningful reservation policy based on hard facts and with a sense of faimess. Though its intention seems to have been to eliminate both Vokkaligas and Lingayats from the list of backward classes, the Commission should have chosen appropriate criteria and used reliable data and information to support such a recommendation. The future of the backward classes in Karnataka bristles with conflicts and contradictions. We have already mentioned some of them at the end of the first section. It is desirable, at this stage of socio-economic development of the state, to allow these castes spirit. as otherwise too much spoon-feeding will make them unfit for survival in the competitive world. There was a time when they required the government's protection and help for their educational advancement. Time has come for them as well as for the government to realise that perpetual continuation of the reservation policy will do more harm than good. Therefore, both for SCVSTs and for OBCs the reservation policy will have to be reviewed more frequently and the relatively better-off sections among them should be asked to compete rather than continue to ask for reservations.
Annexure
Composition of the Backward Classes CommitteedCommissions in Karnataka (Miller Commitlee, 1918)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Sir Leslie C. Miller Sri C. Srikanteswara Aiyar Sri M.C. Ranga Iyengar Sri M. Muthanna Sri H. Mr. Nawab Ghulam Ahmad
President
Chennaiah Basavaiah
Member Member Member

Kalami
Member Member
European-Christian
Brahmin Brahmin
Kodava
Sri M.
Member
Vokkaliga Muslim Lingayat (Sadar)
Mysore Backward Classes Committee

(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 1960)
Designation CastdReligion
l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Dr. R. Nagana Gowda, MLA Shri M.S. Patil Retd. District Judge Sri B. Koragappa Retd. District Judge Sri A. Bhimappa Naik, MLA Sri Ramachandra Rao
Junga
Chairman
Member Member Member Member Member Member Member
Kuruba Lingayat Not known Naik Brahmin Brahmin Vokkaliga Muslim Bhunt
MLC
Sri F.D. Ghodke, Ex-MLC Sri K. Puttaswamy, MLA Sri Mahmood Sheriff*, MLA Sri M.B. Shetty Under Secretary to the Govemment, General Administration Department
Secretary
Note: +He was appointed as an additional member of the Committee vide Govemment Order No. P & D 132 SAD 60 dated 26 September, 1960.
150
First Backward Classes Commission

(Havanur Commission, 1972)
Narne
Designation
CastelReligion
Beda
l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Sri L.C. Havanur, MLC Sri Y. Ramachandra Ex-Minister Sri K.R. Srinivasulu Naidu,
Chairman
Member
Kuruba Velama Naidu Devanga Uppara Rajpul
Member Member Member Member Member
MLC Sri K.M. Nagana Sri A. Masana Shetty

Sri Dharam Singh, Sri P.T. Habib
MLA
Sri (Deputy Direcior of Bureau of Economics and Statistics)
Puttasomachary
Darzi
Viswakarma
Secretary
Karnataka Second Backward Classes Commission

(VOnkataswamy Commission, 1983)
Name
Designation
CastelReligion
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Sri T. Retd. Secretary, Kamataka lrgislature
Venkataswamy Bheemappa Cheluvaraju
Chairman
Yadava
Dr. S.
Member Member
UPPara
Professor of Surgery, Bangalorc Medical College
Dr. K.H.
Raju Kshatriya
Professor of Pol. Science, Bangalore University Sri M-V. Soorachari, Sri Vidhyadhar
Ex-MLA
Prof John B.
Professor
Advocate Member Member Guruji, Member Member Member
Viswakarma
Madiwala
(Agasa) Christian
Kutinha Balappa
of English, Devar's College, Bangalore Dr. Ammenbala Social Worker Sri R.S. Labour
Kumbara Ediga (Namdhari)
Naik lrader
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies
l5l
Mudaliar (Vellala)
Bedar Nayinda
9. Prof
10. 11.
12.
13.
A.M. Dharmalingam Professor of Law Sri M.L, Muttennavar, MLA Prof B. Puttaiah. Advocate Prof V. Venkataraman Ex-TDB President Sri M.S. Helwar, Advocate
Ex-controller,
State Accounts Deptt.
Member Member Member Member Member Member
Balija
Balija
Kuruba
14. Sri H. Chil*anna
tf.
Sri V.D. Veerakyathiah IAS, Director, Backward

Classes and
Secretary
Vokkaliga
Minority Dept., Govemment of Kamataka 16. Smt Shantha Kumari IAS Devraj
Secretary
from 12.6.84
Christian
lVora: Sri Basheeruddin, a Muslim, who was appointed as a member, resigned on 17.6.1983 as he was concurrendy appointed member of the State Minorities
Commission.
Annexure 2
Terms of Reference of the Backward Classes CommitteedCommissions
(Miller Committee,
t.
Changes needed,
I 91
8)
if any, in the existing rules of recruitment to the public scrvice. Special facilities to encourage higher and professional education among members of the backward communities. Any other special measures which may be taken to increase the representation of the backward communities in the public service without materially affecting efficiency, due regard being paid also to the state by a wider difhrsion of education and a feeling of increased status, which, it is expected will thereby be produced in the backward communities'
Mysore Backward Classes Committee
(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 196O)
l.
To suggest the criteria to be adopted in determining which sections of the people in the state should b treated as socially and educationally backward. and
To suggest the exact manner in which the criteria thus indicated should be followed to enable the state govemment to determine the persons, who should secure such preference, as may be determined by govemment, in raspect of adrnission to technical institutions and appointments to Govemnrent services.
First Karnataka Backward Classes Commission

(Havanur Commission, 1972)
l.
To suggest the criteria to be adopted for determining whether any classes of

persons in the state other than the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes may be trcated as socially and educationally backward classes; To investigate into the living and working conditions of all such classes of persons with special reference to the difficulties under which they may be labouring and to make recommendations as to the special provisions which are necessary to be made by the Government for their advancement and for the promotion of their social, educational and economic interests generally;
Kamataka Government's Reservation
Policies
as
153
backward classes in
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
To make
list of all classes which may be regarded
the state; To suggest what reservations should be made for such classes in tle educational institutions maintained by the state or receiving aid out of the state funds; To suggest what other concessions like scholarships, etc., may be givn to
such classes bY way of assistance;
To determine to what extent such classes are represented in the senices

under the state and to recommend what reservation of posts in such services may be made for them; To generally advise the govemment about the steps to be taken to ensur adequate safeguards
for the backward classes of citizens in the state.
Second Karnataka Backward Classes Commission (Venkataswamy Commission, I 983)

1.
J.
The Commission shall review the existing list of Backward Classes as approved in G.O. No. SWL 12 TBS 77 dated 22.2.1977 and as amended from time to time and in the light of the provisions contained in Articles l5(4) and l6(4) and other relevant provisions of the Constitution and in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the subject. The Commission shall make a scientific and factual investigation of the conditions of the Backward Classes in the state and recommend specific measures for their advancement. The Commission shall review tbe measures so far taken by the State govemment for the welfare of the Backward Classes and the betterment of their conditions and assess the effectiveness of such measures in improving the conditions of backward classes and in particular in matters relating to education and representation in public services of the state. The Commission shall examine and assess with reference to concessions' privileges and benefits given to them by the State Govemment, the improvement in the conditions of the "most backward classes" in education
and other matters. The Commission may make recommendations as to the further steps that should be taken by the State Govemment to improve the conditions of the
5.
"Backward Classes" in respct of: (a) education, including reservation of seats in professional colleges and institutions of higher leaming; (b\ representation in public industry;
(c) (e)
@ rural credit, marketing
k)
trade. commerce and industry: and cooperation; housing; grants; and community development.
t54
6.
The Politbs of Baclcwardness
7.
The Commission may make recommendations in respect of short-term and long+erm measurcs to be taken by the State govemrnent for raising the level of backward classes. The Commission shall on the basis of relevant material so gathercd by it examine and recommend whether the reservation ordered in G.O. No. SWL 12 TBS 77 d^d, 22.2.1977 and as amended from time to rime may continue or will need any modification. The Commission shall cover all such questions and issues as have a bearing upon: (a) the question of enumeration and classification of Backward Classes in the State; (D) the question of reservation in dmission in educational institutions including professional colleges and institutions of higher learning; and
(c)
the question of reservation of appointment of posts in favour of Backward Classes in the services under the state.
Annexure 3
Duration of the Backward Classes Committee/Commissions Appointed in Karnataka
Commiuees/ Commissions
1. Miller
(
Date
of appoinment
Date
of submitting
the report
Total time
taken
234
Committee
23 August,
1918
July,
1919
months
l9l8)
234
2.
Nagana
Gowda
8 January,
1960 1972
16
May,
196l
1975
16 months
Committee
0960)
3.
Havanur Commission
(ln2)
September,
19 Nov.,
3 years
2 months
4. Venkataswamy. l8 April,
Commission 0 983)
1983 3l March, 1986 3 years
156
Annexure 4 Table VII Projected Population of Various Castes and Communities in Karnataka
Caste
2. Banajiga 3. Beda
1971
Eo
to total Hindus
1981
1984
1987
4. Besta
5. Brahmin
6. Darzi
7. Ganiga 8. Golia 9. Holeya 10. Idiga
11. Jogi 12. Koracha 13. Korama 14. Kahatriya 15. Kumbara 16. Kuruba
l7
. Lingayat
18. Lambani 19. Madiga 20. Meda
5079090 18.26 6229684 6623233 7041644 360065 1.29 M1633 469533 499195 3208344 11.53 3935148 4183744 4448U5
0.r2 42219 44886 47722 0.10 33310 35414 37651 0.14 48046 51081 54308 0.28 94032 99972 106228 0.59 202073 214839 2284rr 1719721 6.18 2109299 2242550 2384220 16551 s2218 18319 207968 282094 213419 669622 52567 197112 325263 0.06 0.i9 0.07 0.75 1.01 0.77 2.41 0.19 0.7r 1.71 20300 21582 64M7 6E093 22469 23888
271194 367856 27&303 873200
3298M l.l9 404565 430123 457295 1595805 5.74 1957312 2080962 2212423 s33892 1.92 654838 6962M 740188 1264873 4.55 t55t4l2 t649420 1153619 83907 0.30 1029t5 109417 116329 142811 0.51 175163 186229 197993 1047063 3.76 r2842ffi 1365391 r451U7 380815 1.37 467083 496590 527961 202036 1.05 358193 380821 4f/;879 34421 27158 39172 76665 164751
21. Mudali 22. Nagxta 23. Nayinda
22946 72395
Z.
Neyge
25. Panchala 26. Vaisya 27. Satani

28. Tigala 29. Uppara
25s080 345998 261766 821315
25398
288326 391094 295884 928363
30. Vokkaliga 31. Vodda

Others
3928539 14.12 4818493 5122893 5446523 534740 r.92 655878 697312 741364 4580617 16.46 56t8288 5972213 6849854
27819600 100.00 34121728 36277308
39068299
241765 257038 398947 425150
64475 68548
72878
2',73276
450945
Total
Hindus
ly'ote: This projection is based on the national growth rate method assuming that the average Hindu growth rate of O.O2M2 hold good for all castes.
Kamatalea Government's Reservation
P olicies
r57
Table VIII Projected Population of Various Castes in Karnanka

Caste
I9EI
4t2339 377654
Eo
to lotal Hindus
1.29 1.19
19E4
1967
Agasa 2. Banajiga J. Beda

Besta
l.
423925 388266
426873 390965
t827tt6
6rrn9
t448215
96069 16351r 1198834 436014 334367 39410 31095
,14850
f. Brahmin
6.
8. 10. 11.
Dazi
Ganiga
5.74 1.92 4.5s 0.30

0.51
r87M59
l89l5l9
632E25
1499'253
62il56
148891I 987685 168106 1232522
4482.tr1
Golia Idiga
3.76
1.37 1.05
9. Holeya
Jogi 12. Koracha 13. Korama

14. Kahatriya
15.
o.l2 o.lo
0.14 0.28 0-59 6.18
1E.26 1.29
343763 40518 31968
9945s 169274 1241090 451383 346153 40800 32190
46lll
46/.3l
90871
87777
90244
193932 2A24322
Kumbara
l8E63l
1968993 5815300 412256
i6. Kuruba
17. Lingayat 18. Lambani
19. Madiga 20. Meda 21. Mudali
195230 2038396
5vt8713
423841
ffi20279
426788
367339r
18950 59787
I1.53
377f615
19483
6146;1
38m871
19618
0.ffi o.l9
0.07 0.?5
22. Nagarta /.J. Nayinda ai Neyge
20974
238113 322983 2A4354
7666,8r'.
l.0l
o-77 2.41
25. Panchala
26. 27.
21563 244404 332058 251221
61895 2r7 t3
246506
334366 252967
Vaisya
Satani
788224
61477 232025 382875
793708
623U1
28. Tigala
29. Uppara 30. Vokkaliga 31. Vodda
-tL.
60186 225643
0.19 0.71
372410
4497978 612250
l.7r
14.12
233639 385537
4AAy4
629455 5391950
46565U
633831 5429490 32974757
t.92
16.46
Others
5U4575
318s2029
Total Hindus
100.00 3n47A90
for
I 93
Nrt
'. Ttttr is based on the 1931 caste-wise proportions prorated for 1981
census Hindu population. Hindu population is prorated
I proportions and
projected for 1984 and -The
'
relative proportions of differcnt castes would remain constant for all
1987.
three vears.
158
The Politics of B ackwardness

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Karnataka Covernment's Resemation Policies
159
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160
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Report of the Committee appointed to Consider Necessary Steps for the Adequate Representation of communities in the public service (6hairman: Leslie C. Miller), 1919, p. 4. 2. G. Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz, The political Economy of Land Reforms in Kamataka, New Delhi, Ashish publishing House, 1993. 3. Report of the First Baclcward Classes Commission (Chairman: L.G. Havanur), vol. I, 1975, p. 7. 4. S. Bheepamappa and C. Thimmaiah, ..politics of ST list in Kamataka,, (Mimeographed), 1985. 5. Op. cit., p. 2. 6. Op. cit., p. 2. 7. Op. cit., p. 3. 8. Op. cit., p. 49. Govemment of K amataka, A Nett Deal For Baclovard Classes in KamatakaNovember 1986, pp. 10-12.
Chapter 6
Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar

Sachchidananda
Introduction T'f 7 HEN India became free and the new Constitution was promulgated, a promise was made in the Preamble to \ru V Y secure to all its citizens social, economic and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and
equality of status and opportunity. It had been realised by the fathers of the Constitution that socio-economic conditions in India militated against these principles; and, therefore, conscious and concerted efforts had to be made to reduce inequalities and to liberate the weaker sections of the community from the exploitation and injustice meted out to them by oppressive social and economic structures. It is in pursuance of this objective that Article 46 of the Constitution stated that the "state shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation." The follow up action in this regard constituted a package of legislations, ameliorative programmes and preferential schemes for the benefit of the weaker sections. It was hoped that this would lead
to removal of social and religious disabilities, social and special segregation, facilitate larger participation by socially disadvantaged groups in the national polity and to protect them from all forms of
exploitation and oppression.
Reservations or discrimination in the reverse, is part of this package of policies while reservations in posts and educational institu-
t62
tions had been in vogue for the weaker sections of the population
even during British rule. The only innovation was reservation of seats for scheduled castes and tribes in state and Union legislatures. The
justification for compensatory discrimination has been put in terms of the need to compensate for past discrimination, rationalised by the implied collective guilt of the ruling groups for past misdeeds and a presumed collective right of the victimised group to redress through this process, regardless of whether individual members of the group
suffered from past discrimination. This implied a kind of patemalism. Many fonns of colonialism and despotism have been rationalised by a paternal ideology that claimed that the system was benevolent to the oppressed. The critics of this policy have held that whatever its stated intent and ostensible rationale, its effect is to reinforce and perpetuate group inequalities and differences it claims to diminish or abolish. The compensatory discrimination is said to stigmatise and demean everyone it touches and results in a system that has more in common with intemal colonialism than with equal association. Ifowever, few in independent India have voiced disagreement over the view that the weaker sections of the population deserve and need special help to bring them up quickly to the level of the other sctions of the population. However, there has been considerable debate about who is deserving of such help, about the form it should take, whether enough has been done etc. A number of reports on the scheduled tribes and castes have stressed the point that enough has not been done for them. There are others who feel that the reservations have been overdone, and have proved to be costly in terms of efficiency, utilisation of talent, morale and basic faimess. Reservation on the basis of caste has been taken as a regressive step since it seems to have accentuated caste consciousness and has been detrinrental to the growth of secularism. It has been held that the reservations constitute a profound contradiction between the objective of a casteless society and the method of evaluating backwardness on a caste basis (Smith, 1963: 316). Rudolph and Rudotph (1962:150) describe the caste basis as a critical contradiction in the govemment's effort to eradicate the effects of untouchability.
hofile of the Population

Bihar is the second largest state in the country from the point of
Resemation and After: The Case of
Bihar
163
view of population. It has a large percentage of people belonging to

the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes' The scheduled castes account for 14.51 per cent of the total population. They are spread all over the state. However, their presence in the
predominantly tribal region is marginal.
In about 90 blocks their
population ranges between 2O and 4O per cent. However, a larger population of scheduled castes live in the high density population regions in north Bihar. The scheduled tribes form 8.31 per cent of the total population. They are largely to be found on the Chotanagpur plateau and in the Santhal Parganas Division. They are in majority only in a couple of districts. Each of these communities is divided into a number of distinctive castes or tribes. The Muslims form 13.5 per cent of the population but a part of the Muslim community consists of the Muslim backward castes like the Momin, Kunjra, Churihara, Idrisi, etc. After 1941, no caste census has been published. It is, therefore' not possible to know the exact population of each caste. However, an attempt has been made by projecting the caste data on the basis of the 1931 census allowing for the natural increase in population. The four higher castes, the Brahmanas, the Rajputs, the Bhumihars and the Kayasthas constitute around 13 per cent of the total population of the state. The backward castes altogether account for 52 per cent of the population. The largest single caste is that of the Yadavas who are also known as Ahirs and Gwalas. They comprise l1 per cent of the population and are spread in all the districts of the state except the tribal areas. Earlier, their main occupation was cattle grazing and sale of milk and milk products, but, in course of time, the bulk of them have acquired land and in most cases, they constitute the majority of small, medium and in some cases, rich farmers are also drawn from their ranks. In some districts like Saharsa, they form the dominant caste. In view of their large population they are represented in all political parties and have a sizeable number of MLAs from their caste in the Bihar Assembly. The next largest caste is that of the Kurmi who form 4 per cent of the population. They have been traditionally land-holders and in some districts, they constitute the bulk of the medium and rich peasantry. Agricultural development in the districts of Patna and Nalanda has been largely successful due to their efforts. Koeri is another caste traditionally devoted to vegetable growing.
l&
Yadava, Kurmi, Koeri and 3l other castes comprise the advanced sections of the backward castes in Bihar and figure in Annexure II of the List of Backward Castes. Annexure I consists of 94 educationally
and economically depressed communities who are only a shade better than the scheduled castes. Among them the Nonia constitute a
very large caste. Originally they were devoted to production of

saltpetre but now most of them are landless agricultural labourers. A number of Muslim castes who are weavers, tailors, vegetable sellers, cloth dyers have been recognised as backward castes among the
Muslims.
Extent of Reservations
The scheduled castes have been allowed 15 per cent reservations of posts whercas the tribals have been given l0 per cent in the state as a whole. However, the percentage varies from district to district
depending upon the concentration of the tribal or the Harijan population. 12 per cent reservation has been allowed to the comparatively weaker sections of the backward castes or to the castes who figure in Annex I and the rest of the backward c.rstes have been given 8 per cent reservation with the proviso that if suitable candidates are not available from Annex I to fill their quot^ of 12 per cent, the unfrlled quota would go to members of Annexure II. As matters stand this is usually the case as the membrs of Annexure I are educationally so backward that candidates with the requisite qualifications required for the different jobs are not available amongst them. This 20% reservation for backward castes in posts does not include such candidates from these castes who are selected in the general quota on their own merit. In July 1979 the Chief Secretary issued a circular that 2O7o resenations would also include the candidates who got into the services on their own merit, thus in effect reducing the reservation quota for backward castes. However this circular has been rescinded now. Up till now the backward caste reservations do not extend to state government undertakings or to such institutions which are run with government gnnts like universities or local bodies. Reservation of 3 per cent of the posts has been allowed for women who may belong to any caste and 3 per cent reservation has been provided to the economically backward people (non-income tax payees) belonging to the higher castes. Thus an effort was made to give some relief
Reservation and Afier: The Case of
Bihar
165
to the poorer sections of the higher castes. All the reservations except that for the scheduled castes and tribes came into being in 1978
during the Chief Ministership of Shri Karpoori Thakur. Reservations have been provided for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes and otherbackward classes in the various educational institutions of all kinds and at all levels. Besides this, there are at present 29 reserved seats for the scheduled tribes and 46 for the scheduled castes in the state. The provision for reservation in Irgislature has been extended from decade to decade by legislation. It may be noted that the reserved seats for the scheduled tribes has gone down from 33 to 29 due to slow rate of population growth among them. The
four extra seats were turned over to the scheduled castes whose rate growth is higher than that of the general population in the state.
of
Recommendations of Different Commissions The scheduled tribes and castes in Bihar were listed in the President's order issued in October 1950. This list has been revised from time to time every ten years. Many communities who feel that on account of their socio-economic backwardness they should be included in the list of scheduled tribes and castes, make representations to the Govemment. After detailed enquiries the State Govemment forwards its own recommendation regarding the acceptance or rejection of their representation to the Govemment of India. As a result of this, certain changes have been made in the list. It may, however, be noted that no community in Bihar has up till now been descheduled. A few years after the promulgation of the Constitution, the Kaka Kalelkar Commission was appointed to go into the question of drawing up a list of other backward classes at the national level.
The Commission in its report listed 127 castes both Hindu and Muslim with a total population of 15.3 million or 31.1 percent of tie state's population. However, on account of certain political reasons, the Commission's report was not accepted by the Govemment of India and it was left to Commissions appointed by the state govemment to draw up a list of backward communities in their area. For this
purpose and certain other ancillary tasks, the Bihar Government appointed a Backward Classes Commission with seven members under the Chairmanship of Shri Mungeri Lal, a former Congress Minister in December 1971 . The terms of reference of the Commis-
166
sion were as follows: 1. to examine the extent to which the orders issued by the state govemment in regard to the reservation of posts and services for scheduled castes and tribes have been implemented by the various departments and to explore the circumstances in which some of the orders were not implemented; 2. to examine whether the different departments have considered the claims of candidates belonging to the other backward classes in making appointments; 3. to examine the extent of representation of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the various state government undertakings; 4. to evaluate the different welfare programmes being implemented for the scheduled tribeVcastes and other backward classes; 5. to assess whether the steps taken for the progress of other backward classes are adequate. The Commission discovered that the representation of scheduled castes and tribes at the various levels in the services was highly unsatisfactory. The following table shows their representation in the various classes of services in 19'12.
Scheduled Castes
Classes
of
Total number
of posts 890 5229 102859 27442
setvice
Class Class Class Class
Percentage of resetvation
15.00
Number of SC holding posts

25
Percentage in position
/.J 2.7 4.1 13.4
II III IV
15.00
15.00 15.00
t42
4313
3685
Scheduled Tribes
Classes oJ
Total Number Percentage

of
service
posts
of resenalion
Nwnber
SC
of Percmtage hol.ding in position
I II III
IV
5229 102E59 nM2
890
10.00
10.00
lq.0o
10.00
15 60 4651
2273
2.O
l.l
4.5
8.2
Resemation and After: The Case of Bihar
t6'l
The Commission was of the view that the Appointing Officers are not fully aware of the various government orders and instructions,in regard to reservations, rosters and carrying forward instituted by the
State Government for seeing that the level of representation, as prescribed by the Govemment, in the services for scheduled castes and tribes are attained. It was pointed out that many appointing authorities did not care for such instructions even though they were aware of them. The Commission emphasized the need for having an Employment Cell in the Appointment Department which would see that Government instructions in regard to reservation are implemented. It also recommended the setting up of an Employment Committee at the State level consisting of officials and non-officials which would inspect Govemment, semi-Govemment and Govemment aided offices to see whether the reservation orders are observed. The Commission endorsed the provision for reservations in promotions for scheduled castes and tribes only in the interest of social justice even though it caused frustration among such officers who had been superseded by their colleagues belonging to these-communities. The most important work of the Commission was to identify 128 backward communities in the State hailine from Hindu. Muslim and Christian faiths.
The Roster System

Rosters have been prepared in respect of posts to be filled in by general people and by scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Such arrangement has also been made at the Divisional and District level. There is a system of carry forward by which the reserved posts which could not be filled at a particular point of time due to the dearth of qualified persons from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Close
observation, however, revealed that this practice was not strictly followed and many of the posts reserved for the tribals and the Harijans were promptly filled in by the Selection Committees with candidates from outside as suitable candidates were not available. It was, therefore, decided that since there is no dearth of people from these groups to filI in the Class III posts the reserved posts in this category should be filled solely by persons from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. If, in spite of such effort, no scheduled caste or scheduled tribe is available, a full report has to be furnished explain-
168
ing the whole situation to the Appointment Department which will then issue them permission for the dereservation of the posts in question. It was further desired that appointing authorities should try to collect information from legislators from the SC/ST constituencies, the Harijan Sewak Sangh, District Welfare Officers, the Dalit Varg Sangh, Adimjati Seva Mandal, Ranchi, Santal Pahariya Seva Mandal, Deoghar, and the Musahar Seva Mandal at Rosera, Darbhanga. These organisations should inform the candidates about
these vacancies. The reserved vacancies should be advertised at least
In spite of these efforts, if suitable candidates are not available from a particular category, the persons from the other category could be appointed. In case a competitive examination is held for recruitment to a particular post, the qualifying marks for the SC./ST candidates is 10 per cent lower than for otler candidates.
three times.
Filling up of the Reservation Quota In 1990 with the advent of the Janata Dal government in the state, a drive was mounted for filling up vacancies in the reservation quota. At the end of the year, the position in this regard was as follows:
Class of Services
Total of
No. posts
Percentage of reserva-
No.
of SC
Percent- No. oJ Percentage in S? portion age in
tion
port on
I II III
IV
6707
23558
86482
16327
l47o 14% t4% 14%
lOVo 454 to% 1291 10% 5l5l

IOVo
2049
t4.77 186 18.24 654 t6.79 ?414 7.99 917
4.U
3.6 3.58 1.78
Source:
hptt.
of Personnel, Govt. of Bihar.
These figures do not include the positions filled in the Department of Minor Irrigation, Relief and Rehabilitation and Human Resource Development as these were not available at the time of compilation. It is thus clear that so far as the scheduled castes are concemed, in the top three categories they have already exceeded the reservations provided. The scheduled tribes are much behind in the race and they have not reache d even SOVo in the Class II and IIL While in Class IV they are very poorly represented. Their overall percentage would go up in all categories of posts as the numbr of positions in the Minor
Bihar
169
Irrigation and Human Resource Development are considerable.
Applicability of Income Criteria

Post-matric scholarships are awarded to all scheduled caste/tribe students according to a means test based on the parents'/guardians' income from all sources. Full maintenance allowance in the form of scholarship and full fees are paid in the case of students whose parents'/guardians' income does not exceed Rs. 150 per month. However, for professional courses such as medical, engineering, agriculture and higher technical courses, full maintenance and full fees are admissible to students whose parents'/guardians' income does not exceed 1,000. For suth students, half maintenance allowance and full fees are admissible for other courses. For the other backward classes, the applicants are divided into two categories: (a) those whose family income is below Rs. 1,500 per year; and,
(D) those whose family income is between Rs. 1,500 and Rs.
2,000. For technical courses, the upper limit is Rs. 2,400. Priority is given to applicants in the frst slab. The remaining funds are turned over to the candidates in the higher slab. In case the income is the same preference is given to merit.
Children of such members of the backward castes who paid income tax were not entitled to reservation in posts. However, most of the income tax payers belonged to govemment service or to professional classes largely in towns. Tlte rich and middle peasants in the villages are not in the income tax net and as such members of their families have escaped the provisions of this restriction.
Performance Evaluation It is generally alleged that compensatory discrimination in Government services at the time of recruitment and promotion is responsible for a decline in administrative efficiency. This has been attributed to the presence of govemment servants with poorer qualifications. It is assumed that there is a direct conelation between tested merit of govemment srvants and the effectiveness of administration. Many research studies have shown thal in recent times there is a general lowering of standards in the efficiency of government employees. This may be largely attributed to the rapid expansion in the cadres and general lack of commitment to work. The contribution of
170
the poor quality recruits and the promotees to this phenomenon is precious little. A study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission reported that in the All-India non-technical services, the percentage of first division entrants dropped from 42 per cent in 1950-55 to 25 per cent
in 1960-65, while the entrants with third class degrees
rose from 4 per cent to 19 per cent. However, this phenomenon can hardly be attributed to reservations. It merely shows that Government service does not appeal to the academically most qualified people since there are attractive openings in the business sector. Among the third class entrants reported in the study, only a minority belonged to scheduled castes and tribs. In general, however, the perfonnances of adminiskative or educational institutionS in which a proportion of positionVseats arc reserved for allocation on the basis other than merit does not reveal any noticeable deterioration. This is on account of the fact that the number of such positions is so small that the impact, if any, on the total performance of the institution is negligible. At the same time, the effect of the reservations has not been positive so as to make the institutions more rcsponsive to the needs of the deprived area or communities. In some cases, there might be zealous members of the
deprived communities who may try to see that benefits of development progranrmes reach their own needy bretlren. However, the obstacles in this are so many that their efforts may be frustrated. Sometimes reservations in recruitment or promotion may depress the motivation or performance of those who feel that their just claims have been bypassed. However, since it is the general norm, the bulk of them are prepared to take the shock of routine supersession as they cannot avoid it. The frustrations in govemment services arc so many that one cannot suffer under them too long. As the general commitment to work is low, the poor motivation of some workers does not affeit the performance significantly. There is no difference between the effect of reservations for SC/ST/OBC and for other categories like women, ex-servicemen and economically backward people as their percentage is very small. There has been no empirical work on such themes. Even if nothing very different may emerge from such research, it is worthwhile to go in for this. It is another qdestion whether recruitment of people with lower academic qualification really affects the administration. There are
Bihar
l7l
other factors that count for better performance in govemment service. Some of these factors differ from post to post. The requirements at the clerical level would indeed be different from those at the level of officers. Similarly, the qualities required for extension officers in the rural areas would be different from those required of establishment officers in the Secretariat. However, if at any point of time it is felt that the SCYST recruits have lower efficiency as a group, special training can be devised for them so that their skills, knowledge and insights are improved and they are better able to face the challenges of their job. As we get nearer to the prescribed percentage in each category, these relax-
ations can be withdrawn and-the deficiencies,
if
any, should be
removed by in-service training. It is also advisable to keep the reservations only up to junior level posts in class I. Genesis and Growth of Backward Class Movement
The other backward classes included a number of peasant castes. They occupy a low position in the Varna hierarchy and have low levels of literacy. They are poorly represented in Government jobs and white-collar occupations but in some areas, such castes occupy a dominant position in tle economic and political spheres of village life. Not infrequently they are small land owners. In many cases, where they are numerically predominant, their control over decision making may be decisive. Dominant castes of this kind have developed a vested interest in remaining backward since it enables them to have education and employment. On account of their voting strength they also have political clout. . The British rule released the backward castes from the grip of traditional sanctions. New codes of laur refused to recognise the rights of upper castes to the exclusive use of particular symbols of status. Avenues of sanskritization were thrown open to ever increasing sections of society. Those .who seized the first opportunities naturally belonged to the intermediate or middle range castes who were much above the pollution line. Caste associations helped them claim higher status or intemal reform made them shed practices considered degrading by the upper castes. Sanskritization lowered the fences between sections of society which, at one time, were sharply separated. Social mobility was enhanced by the spread of
172
education.
However, after some time, there was a conflict between the de_ mands of power and the demands of status. Whereas the backward castes were prompted to merge their identity with the higher strata to enhance their status, considerations of power and economic advantage led them to define their identity in opposition to rhe higher castes. This is the dilemma of backwardness. A low caste would like to acquire a high sounding title, claim kshatriya status and assume the symbols of a high caste, and at the same time, it would insist on its right to be frustrated. In their attempts to gain social acceptance, the
backward castes are increasingly tuming to political action. The

general elections have shown the backward castes the importance organised politics. Adult suffrage has given them larger chances
of of
participation in the political system. According to Myron Weiner, India has become tremendously politicised. Politics has become the avenue for personal advancement in a society in which commercial activities offer little status and administrative posts are relatively few
in number (Weiner, M.: 1960: 192).

The backward casies insist on underlining their separate identity on account of the concessions and advantages given to them by the Govemment. The Central Govemment decided to do away with the communal definition of other backward classes but it left the State Govemments free to take any action they deemed fit. Andre Beteille (1967) writing in the early sixties had hoped that on account of the vast changes in the structure of Indian society, the backward classes are likely to lose much of their identity. However, in spite of the profound changes, the traditional structure slill seems to be intact and the backward classes instead of suffering the erosioo in their identity still need the reservations as a prop for their progress. It is not that social networks do not cut across the boundaries of caste, but at the group level, caste identities still have an importance of their own. Among the backward castes also, an elite has emerged. During the struggle for backward class reservations in Bihar in 1978-79, the backward caste elite were able to mobilise large sections of the masses for the cause. Few among the latter realised that only some were going to be benefited by this decision and these would be members of the caste elite group. On the issue of reservations there was a sharp conflict of interest between the upper caste elite and the
Reservation and Afier: The Case of Bihar
173
backward elite.
acln the post-Independence period two important developments castes' The first ."t..ot"O ttt. political mobiliiation of the backward most areas bewas the abolition of landlordism' The landlords in
among the backlonged to the upper castes. The advanced sections They were liberated from *url .Utt were substantial landholders' to play a the subordination to the upper caste landlord and began their larger numbrs' more important role in village affairs by dint of introThey were also the beneficiaries of agricultural developments adthrough communi{ development progmmmes' They took
duced to raise their vantage of tile spread of education. Thus they were able well as their standard of living' Their insociai consciousness, ns prices of creased income from larger production as well as better
agricultural produce enabled them to accumulate a surplus which ciuld be o."d fo. engaging in political activities' The Yadavas and the Kurmis were firsi to take advantage of these opportunities since that some of their families were quite affluent' It may be mentioned the grandfather of Sri B'P' Mandal' Chairman Sri Ras Bihari Mandal, to the Interof the Backward Classes Commission, was educated up the second session of the Indian mediate standard and had attended
National Congress in Calcutta in 1896' The introduction of adult franchise and of Panchayati Raj in the state in the fifties enabled them to realise the strength of numbers through voting power. The sha4r distinction between the upper backwards and the-lower backwards is on aciount of the very low level of
socio-economicdevelopmentamongthelatterwhichreducestheir percentcapacity to.absorb development. They have also very poor' physical survival ug" of ilt"t""y and are more worried about their than about social consciousness or political mobilisation' The first move for the mobilisation of the backward caste in Bihar couldbetracedtolST0whenKurmieducatedelitesfeltthenecessity of social reform (Verma, K.K.:1979). For this purpose' two conferwas ences were held at Danapur and Sonepat in that year' This Kshatriya Sabha' In l9l0 the followed by the formation of the Kurmi
and the Sabha was registered at Patna' a constitution was drawn up
*u"*"nt *oi placed on an organised footing' Sri Sajivan Lal Sinha
who later on became th President of the Sabha claimed that the the Kurmi was the purest Kshatriya. Muzaffarpur was the venue of
r74
The Politics of B achoardness
ence but also held important positions as office_bearers
In 1924 the All India yadava Mahasabha was inaugurated at Allahabad. Yadav leaders from Bihar not only attended the Confer_ in
that
lTth session of the Sabha in 1929. Some delegates of the Kurmi Mahto of Chotanagpur who were considered quie distlnct from the other Kurmis also attended the Conference. It w;s at that meeting that the Kurmi Mahto were recognised as akin to other Kurmis. It was recognised at the l gth session of the Sabha held purulia at that unity among different sections of the Kurmi would enable the community to gain power in the political field. The Sabha at the same time advanced a claim for Kshatriya status on behalf of the Kurmi. In 1939, Sri Dasu Singh, an advocate from patna, stressed the need for the fusion of different Kurmi sub-castes for the purpose of political mobilisation. He hailed from a well-to_do Kurmi i"-ity *u. active in the Kisan Sabha as well as in the Coneress. "nd Much earlier, Sri Singh tried to unire the Kirmi, Koeri and the Ahirs. The Kurmi were agriculturists, the Koeri were vegetable grow_ ers and the Ahirs made a living by rending cattle and seliing milk. All these communities had an agricultural base. The new organisation called Triveni Sangh was formed in 1925.
Federation.
movernent and was also a legislator for a long time. He became Minister in the Congress government and later was president of the Legislative Council. He was also rhe president of the Backward Class
organisation. The first backward caste leader to become a Minister in the Bihar government was Sri Guru Sahay Lal, a Kurmi advocate from patna district. He was a member of the Interim Ministry headed by Mr. Yunus in 1937 for three months. Another important Kurmi leader was Sri Deo Saran Singh who took an active part in the freedom
At the thirtieth session of the All India Kurmi Mahasabha at patna 1972 leaders from other backward castes addressed the .,pichhra Jagao Desh Bachao.,, 4th"ltng. The general slogan was The Conference resolved to organise a youth cadre ,,Bhumi putra Fauj" to bring about internal social rcform and mobilization of not only Kurmi but ofother backward class people. It also demanded the creation of a separate Public Service Commission for backward classes. The Kurmi Sabha was an example of how a caste sabha
in May
175
various dismight be deparochialised to a certain degree to include consciousness of a new It gave these communities tinlt .utt" "ntities. identity which was a basis for their political mobilisation' fne faka Kalelkar Commission's report wurs submitted in 1956 By but its recommendations were not ac@pted by the Government' Backward Classes 1960 the tide was strongly against the definition of by community. In
1961- the
Government of India decided to drop the iiea of drawing up a national list of Other Backward Classes' The GovernStates howeveiwJre free to do so' The view of the Central test rather ment was that it would be better to apply the economic was than so bv caste to determine backwardness' The caste criterion to the held is contrary to the principle of social justice and was unfair would tend to perpetuate caste and other poor. The caste- criteria
*ood.r"u," in the recipient both vested interest and a sense of
helflessness. However, in 1966, the All India Backward Classes Feieration pleaded that social backwardness could only be determined in terms of caste. In Bihar the influence of the backward castes had been steadily were increasing. Sri Birchand Patel and Sri Shiva Nandan Mandal Bihar cabinet in the fifties and early influential ministers in the
(1963-67) sixties. During the chief ministership of Sri K'B' Sahay minister but considered Sri Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav was not only a good his right hand man. The backward castes were represented in strength in the Socialist, Communist and Jan Sangh parties' Backward caste mobilization received a shot in the arm with the party advent of the Socialist Party on the political horizon' The the leadership posts in political committed itself to securing 6O% in parties, govemment services, business and armed forces for Shudras' ifriiunt, Scheduled tribes, religious minorities and women- Dr' Lohia had iealised that these backward classes could provide an important source of support in the struggle to unseat the Congress' By 1962, the upper backward castes accounted for 22% of the ."-b"o of the Congress Legislature Party' The K'B' Sahay cabinet with had 2OVo representation of these castes in 1963' In the year 1967 vote increased from 57o to the Congreis debacle, the Socialist Party l'lVo and its seats from 7 to 68. In the Mahamaya hasad Sinha's cabinet Karpoori Thakur became the Deputy Chief Minister' There were 7l mimbers hailing from backward castes in the different
176
parties in the Bihar Assembly. The yadavas emerged as the second largest caste group after the Rajputs in 1967. . During the next four years Bihar was plagued by political instabil_ ity with nine coalition ministries and three ipells of presiOent,s rule. Three of them were headed by backward class leaders like Sri B.p. Mandal, Daroga Prasad Rai and Karpoori Thakur. The new barsain_ ing power of the upper backwards for getting a larger share ii the
headed
than a symbolic breakthrough for the backward classes. The split in the Congress party in Noyember 1969 created new opportunities for backward castes. In the Daroga Rai ministry the backward and scheduled castes received special attention and were given 53Vo ministerial posts. During the Congress ministries between I97217 backward class representation in the cabinet varied between 2O and 28Vo.In the 1977 elections, a large number of backward caste candidates won the elections. The yadavas alone had 36 members. In the Karpoori Thakur ministry the backward caste members got 42Vo rcprcsentation while the forward castes had to remain content with only 29Vo.In its election manifesto the Janata party had called for an end to caste distinction and promised to ensure that the other backward classes do not suffer from any discrimination or inequality. It promised a radical reduction of disparities in favour of the weaker sections of the society. There was also the promise to reserve 25 and 33Vo of all appointments to govemment service for backward classes. The issue of reservations for backward castes came to a head early in
ministerial posts was very much evident. Atthougt the ministry by Sri B.P. Mandal lasted only 47 days, it rJpresented more
1978.
Sri Jaya
Prakash Narayan and the Janata party Chief
Chandrashekhar had declared themselves to be in favour of economic criteria to judge a man's backwardness. The Janata Legislature party and even the State cabinet were sharply divided over the issue. There was persistent pressure from the backward caste lobby. A massive demonstration demanding immediate declaration of the government's intention in this regard was organised. The Backward Caste Federa_ tion offered satyagrah and courted arrest. Large processions were organised for and against reservations by different youth organisations. There were large scale disturbances in many parts of Bihar. Ulti_ mately, on 2l March 1978, the Bihar govemment adopted reserva_ tions with modifications. It provided reservations only in appoint_
Resemation and Afier: The Case of Bihar
177
not be availed by ments and not in promotions. Reservations could income was Rs' 1'000 a month or more' These
families whose violent disturamendments did not satisfy the warring groups and iun.", .ontinued to grip ih" ttut"' In November 1978' the Chief according Minister announced thi revised reservation formula which was the best in the circumstances' to Janata Chief Chandrashekhar in the context The Parliamentary election from Sitamarhi was fought reservation in serof backward cas6 reservations. Twelve per cent in Annex II' vices was given to communities of Annex-I' 87o to those 3Va for eco3% reservitions were given for women in general Ni persons. At about that time the Central Governnomically backward Chairman to ment appointed a Comrnission with Sri B'P' Mandal as
leaders had determine the criteria of backwardness. Anti-reservation Commission to console themselves with the hope that the Mandal might look into the issue dispassionately and find.a solution to the
prJbt.rn. In course of time the Mandal Commission submitted its ieport but the Govemment of India has up till now taken no action
upon it. Absence of Scheduled Caste Movement Although scheduled castes in Bihar form a substantial proportion of the population they have not been able to pull their weight in politica^l decision-making in the State. This is on account of their extreme poverty and misery. Unlike the border states of Haryana and West Bengal, untouchability is deeply entrenched in the state' Seventy-six pir cent of the scheduled castes make a living by agriculture' Howevei, very few of them are land owners' The percentage of cultivators in the scheduled caste population is about 24 while the percentage of agricultural labourers is 55. All the cultivators however
-are
not land owners and this group includes share croppers and others who have leased lands from others. Under conditions of extreme poverty, it is not possible for them to have any political conscious-
n.s. inty
are all the time busy in solving problems of survival' Absenie of mobilisation among them is also on account of their educational backwardness. The percentage of literacy among the scheduled castes in 1971 was 6.53. Literacy for males was 1l'92 and that for females 1.03. Among those who go to school the enrollment is also poor and the drop-out heavier as compared to the general
178
population. It is thus clear that even after Independence the growth in education among the scheduled castes is extremely slow. In lg1l only 1.3 per cent had reached the level of matriculation or above. During the time of the freedom struggle some young men from the
scheduled castes were impressed by Gandhdi's work and joined the Congress party. The process was facilitated because very few of the scheduled castes had turned to Christianity. In general, they accepted the Congress party and in elections--before and after Independence_ they supported the Congress. As early as 1937 Shri Jagjivan Ram was made a Parliamentary Secretary in Bihar and from 1946 onwards there was always one Cabinet Minister from the scheduled castes in
Bihar.
After some time, when factionalism developed in the Congress the Harijan leadership also came to be divided into important factions. Some leaders, however, were also to be found in the Socialist party,
Communist Party and the Jan Sangh. However, except in 1977, the Harijans have solidly voted for the Congress. In the Congress itself they have not been able to build a united lobby of their own so that they could ventilate their grievances jointly and press the government for the solution of their most important problems. The absence of a movement may also be attributed to the fact that in no region do they form a majority ofthe population and even in the constituencies reserved for them, they have to depend largely on the votes of the non-scheduled castes. Thus, it is not possible for a very outspoken or a belligercnt candidate to win a election. Only one who is acceptable to the dominant population can be elected. In short, the Harijan leaders are not leaders in their own right. They are subIeaders attached to dominant faction leaders in the Congress or other national parties and their fortunes wax and wane with the fortunes of their leaders. Under such circumstances, the scheduled caste movement did not take off in Bihar.
An Overview
In Bihar there is no opposition to reservation for scheduled castes and tribes. Some years back, there was great opposition to extending
the benefits to the other backward classes (OBCs). Even now reservations for the OBCs arc resented particularly to those in respect of promotions. However, public opinion has now bowed to the inevi-

table.
179
Reservations have got to be viewed as a strategy for raising the quality of life of groups rather than of individuals' It is essentially meant to mitigate backwardness emanating from historical processes and conditions of social injustice in which certain groups have been remaining for a long time. The state can initiate other steps for eliminating socio-economic handicaps faced by individuals of any community. Since caste is still a measure of evaluation of status in society, it has to continue as a criterion for reservation' In the backward caste, however, the economic criterion can be strictly enforced so that the benefits do not accrue. to undeserving members of the community and reach the persons who need it most. Those who have
enjoyed the benefits of reservation should not claim it for their children. Unfortunately, this does not happen and communities develop vested interest in backwardness. It is not desirable to enlarge the percentage of reservations for such
categories as ex-servicemen, freedom fighters, handicapped, etc. Such categories should be given all facilities including finance, skill' train-
ing, etc. to compete with other candidates on equal terms. Other

things being equal, preference may be given to them. Our experience suggests that the aims of reservation could be better achieved if they are supplemented by measures which would enable the target groups to compete with others on equal terms in open recruitment. This can be done through pre-service training or supplementary coaching for entry into professional colleges like medicine, engineering, etc. so that their initial handicap is removed and they would no longer suffer from an inferiority complex all their lives.
Reservations have definitely benefited the target groups in facilitating entry into educational institutions and in govemment service' This has given them security, status and wealth. Many families have moved to the middle class category and they are all the time striving for moving up the social ladder. Unfortunately, however, the benefits have tended to cluster around some communities and also in some families. This is perfectly natural. Because of some pre-intervention' endowments or opportunities, certain sections of the population take time by the forelock and reap the benefits. It is, therefore, necessary not to leave this to the natural process. Those in charge ofdistribution
180
of benefits must take special care to see that the most deserving people get it and the distribution is more equitable. The more back_ ward communities among them must be identified. The income cri_ terion may be used to block certain families enjoying higher incomes from getting benefiS. This step would also blunt the resentment of the non-scheduled caste poor. It would not be desirable to exclude entire communities from getting the benefits as there would still be large numbers of people in them who deserve such help. In isolating such sections of people use may be made of the generation of the income criterion.
REFERENCES
l. Beteille, A., '"The Futurc of Backward Classes" in philip Mason (ed.), India and Ceylan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967. 2. Blair, H., "Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihaf', Economic and
Political WeeHy, Jan. 12, 1980. 3. Jha S.S., Pofirtcal Elite in Bilar, Yora & Co., Bombay, 1972. 4. Mukherjee, N., Perspectives for a Policy in Seminar No. 268, December
1981.
5. Roy, R., 'Caste and Political Development in Bihat'', in R. Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indiar, Politics, Oriert l-nngmans, New Delhi, 1970. 6. Pflr&,,1., State Politics in India (A Study in Coalition Politics in an Indian State), Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982.
7. Rudolph, S.H. and Rudolph, L.I., Thc Modemiry or Trad.ition, Political D*elopment in India, Chicago Univenity Press, Chicago, 1967. .' 8. Sachchidananda, Haijan Elite,T\omson Press, Faridabad, 1977. 9. Smith, D-E , /z/rd as a Secular Snte, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
Yerma"K.K, Changing Role of Caste Associations,National Publishing House. New Delhi. 1979. ll. Weiner, M., "Politics of South Asia" in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman @n.), The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1960.
1963lO.

Schedule
181
List of Extremely Backward Classes 1. Kapadia 2. Kanu 3. Kawar 4. Kalandar 5. Kochh 6. Kurmi (Mahto)
40. Dhimar 41. Dhanwar 42. Nonia 43. Naiya 44. Nai 45. Namsudar 46. Pandu 47. Pal (BheriharXGaren) 48. Pradhan 49. Pingania 50. Pahira 51. Bari 52. Beldar 53. Bind 54. Banjaraalakar 55. Shekhra 56. Bagdi 57. BhuiYa 58. Bhar 59. Bhuiya 60. Bhaskar 61. Mali (Malakar) 62. Mangar 63. Madar 64. Mallah (Surhia) 65. Majhwar 66. MarkandeY 67. Moriyari 68. Malar (Malhor) 69. Molik 70. Rajdhohi 71. Rajbhar 72. Rangwa 73. Banpar 74. BeAia 75. Shota (Shota) 76. Sang-Trash (for
Nawadah distric0
(only for
7. 8. 9.
1
ChhotanagPur Division) Kewat (Kaut) Kadar Kaura
10. Korku
1.
Kaibart
Paharia
12. Kumar Bhag 13. Khatwa 14. Kharwar 15. Khatouri 16. Klangar 1?. Khatik 18. Khekta 19. Khatwe
20. Khond 21. Gorhi (Chhabi) 22. Cangu (Nagesh) 23. Gangeta 24. Gour or Gonr 25. Gandharb 26. Gulgalia 27. Gour 28. Chain 29. Chapota 30. Chandrabansi (Kahar) 31. Tikulhar 32. Dhekaru
33- Tanti (Tatwa)
34. Tamaria 35. Turha 36. Tiar 37. Tharu
38. 39.
Dhanuk Dhamin
77. Agaria 78. Aghouri
182

Abdal
Kasab
79.
Halalkhor Bhingi (Muslim) 90. Miriasin (Muslim) 91. Madari (Muslim) 92. Meershiiar lUustiml 93. Saeen (Muslim) 94. Momin (Muslim) Nor: Those castes and classes in respect of whom the wordMuslim has not specifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu and Musrim communities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim Teli.
81. Chik (Muslim) 82. Dafali (Muslim) 83. Dhunia (Muslim) 84. Dhobi (Muslim) 85. Nut (Muslim) 86. Pamaria (Muslim) 87. Bhathiara
8o
(Kasai)
il
i,lXlffJj,'#1,.
Annexure
II
wani, Thathera, Kalwar, patwa, Kamlapuri, Vaishya. SinduriaBania, Mahuri-Vaishya, Awadh Bania, Bangia Vaishya (Bengali
List of B$kward Classes
l.
Amat
2. KagJi 3. Kamar (Lohar & Karmkar) 4. *Kurmi 5. Kuswaha (Koiri) 6. Kosta 7. Gaddi 8. Ghatwar 9. Churihar (Muslim)
10.
I
Bania), Barnwal. Agrahari

Vaishya, Poddar)
22. 23. 24.
Mukri (Mukeri) (Muslim)

Yadav (Gwala, Ahir, Gora, Ghasi,
Chanau Jadupatia
25.
12. Jogi (Jugi) 13. Tamoli 14. Teli 15. Dewhar 16. Nalband (Muslim)
)6
11
28.
29.
Mehar) Rajbansi (Risia or Polia) Rangrej (Muslim) Rautia Raeen or Kunjara (Muslim) Laheri Shivhari
17.
Prajapati (Kumhar)
18. Partha 19. Barhi
30. Sonar 31. Sutardhar JZ. Sukiar

JJ. Idiris or Darzi (Muslim) 34. Isai Dharmawalambi (Harijan)
20. Barai 21. Bania (Sundi, Halwai,
Roniar,
35.
Pansari, Modi, Kasera, Kesar-
Ishai Dharmawalambi (Anya

Pichari Jati)
Nare: Those castes and classes in respect of whom the word Muslim has not specifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu and Muslim commtr_
oities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim Teli. +Added to this schedule by another ordinance.
Chapter 7
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene

Mohit Bhattacharya
EFORE describing the policy of .reservation' in West Bengal and its actual implementation, some preliminary remarks are
in order. The reservation policy, discussed here, relates exclu_ sively to jobs in govemment establishments. political reservation. that is reservation in legislatures and local govemment bodies, is not included in tlris discussion. Reservation of seats in educational insti-
purview of this essay. It is assumed that the rationale for .reservation' as discussed in the course of the framing of the Constitution of India is well_known and
does not need rciteration here.r What can be mentioned, in passing, is that the constitutional incorporation of the reservation provision was preceded by the imperial policy of reservation during British rule, when reservations were made for different sections of Indian society using communal symbols like castes, in a bid to win political support from these sections. This is not the place to go into the evolution of reservation policy as it was worked out during the colonial rule. Sensitivity to historv is. however, helpfrrl in understanding the essentially p oliiicat natuie oi
tutions such as medical colleges, universities, etc., is also outside the
reservation policy, that is apparently directed toward providing be_ nefits to designated sections of society blt really intended to ensure group support for the ruling class.2 Since 1977, West Bengal has been having a distinctive political regime under the leadership of the CpI(M). The l,eft Front govern_
184
The Potitics of Bac*wardness
ment has been consistent in declaring political and administrative Through support to the economically neglected sections of the society' and decentralisation of powu conrcioos policy of rural mobilisation there ers to the grass-roots (panchayats and municipal) institutions' increase has been a regular effort to politicise the rural masses and Alongside this' a series of their level oi political "onr"ioosness' economimeasures has been adopted to offer concrete benefits to the barga' or registration cally weaker sections. ihese include 'operation of sirare croppers to guard against their eviction from land, redistribu-
tion of ceiling-surpius land to the rural poor and distribution of

homestead land to the rural homeless. Economic benefits have been
assured to the rural poor through the administration of beneficiaryoriented rural development programmes. The law and order machinalso been overtly tumed to the needs of the poor and instrucery
tras
tions have accordingly been issued to the local police to stand by the side of the poor and the vulnerable sections of the society' More importantly, the frontal organisations of the party have been active in the rural areas, organising the masses and sensitising them to the social and political environment within which they have to live and struggle to survive. It is *ithin this broad philosophy and strategy of governance followed by the CPI(M)-led lrft Front govemment in West Bengal that one has to review the working of the reservation policy in the
state. According to the CPI(M) theoreticians, caste-based reservation policy tends to perpetuate narrow caste-consciousness and therefore u itindtun." to the development of class-consciousness' Such a
i.
policy is basically intended to serve the purposes of a bourgeois i"-o.tu"y. By generating inner conflict among the toilers and splir ting the unity of the oppressed class' the policy of reservation proves to ie a stumbling block to the revolutionary class formation'3 The CPI(M)-ied Left Front government in West Bengal took office on June 21, 197?. Even before the Left Front victory, the l'eft parties, as partners in the successive united Front governments preieding the Left Front regime, had conducted vigorous political campaigns among the peasantry to win electoral support' A common minimum programme was now drafted to spell out the concrete measur.es to be actually pursued and implemented by the newly elected regime. The pro-poor decentralist development and rural
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal
Scene
185
mobilisation featured boldly in the declared policy objective.a The Chairman of the Left Front Committee, Promode Dasgupta,s gave a call for "a struggle for establishing the rights of poor peasants, agricultural labourers, village craftsmen, etc., against the vested interests and exploiting classes in the villages," by activising the panchayat bodies at the grass-roots level. The caste-based reservation policy, in the context of this broader political objective of the Left Front government, seems not only antagonistic but also pernicrous. Nevertheless, to the new regime, the policy is one of the many "givens" of the Indian constitutional framework within which it has to function, despite ideological differences. According to the 1981 census, West Bengal has a total population of 54.6 million, out of which the scheduled caste population is 12.00 million and the scheduled tribe population 3.00 million. Thus the SC
constitute 22 per cent and the ST component is about 6 per cent of the state's total population. The geographical distribution of ST population is uneven throughout the 16 districts of the state. The districts with sizeable (more than l0 per cent) ST concenuation arb Purulia, West Dinajpur, Bankura, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling. High concentration of SC population (more than 20 per cent) can be found in the districts of Burdhwan, Birbhum, Bankura, 24-Parganas, Nadia, West Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar.
The Mechanics of Reservation In fulfilment of the constitutional obligation to ensure adequate representation for the SC and ST communities in different employments under the state govemment, the Government of West Bengal had been extending the right of reservation to the members ofthe two communities' through executive orders issued by the govemment in
Till August, 1976 this had been the practiae and the prescribed percentages of jobs renewed for the SC and ST communities were respectively 15 per cent and 5 per cent. In practhe Finance Department.
tice, however, the provision of executive orders was not actually
* In reply to the Mandal Commission's queries, the Govemment of West Bengal did not agree to the idea of identifying other backward classes on the basis of caste. The govemment argued instead, that poverty and low living standards are better indicators of backwardness than caste.
186
e Politics of Backwardness
adhered to by most govemment establishments. It was discovered in
1976 thar the overall position of representation of the SC and ST communities in the state services was not encouraging, the actual percentages being far below the prescribed percentages. In order to give statutory backing to the reservation policy' the
Congress state govemment enacted the West Bengal Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and
Posts)
Act, 1976. This Act, along with the Rules framed under it,
came into force with effect from August 15, 1976. Some of the major highlights of the Act are as follows: I . The Quota. As a general rule, a reservation quota is fixed for direct recruitment to services and posts in an "establishment": 15 per
cent for SC and 5 per cent for ST. The state govemment may, from time to time, increase the percentage so that the rcservation shall not exceed 25 per cent in the case of SC and 10 per cent in the case of ST. Also, different percentages may be fixed for different districts in accordance with the percentages of population of SC and ST in such
districts. ln respect of the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial), the percentage shall be 10 for SC and 5 for ST. 2. The Scope. The Act applies to any offices of the state government, a local or statutory authority constituted under any State Act, or a corporation in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the state govemment, the universities and colleges, primary and secondary schools and other educational institutions that are owned or aided by the state govemment, and an establishment in the public sector. The 'establishment in public.sector' means any industry, trade, business or occupation owned, controlled or managed by the state government or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a corporation established by or under a Central or State Act, in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the state govemment, on a local or statutory authority constituted under any state Act. The Act does not apply to any employment in the West Bengal Higher Judicial Services on any employment which, in the opinion of the state government is of a scientific and technical naturc. Central government establishments, private sector units and employment in domestic services fall outside the purview of the Act'
Scene
187
In view of the specialised qualification or experience necessary for ajob, the state government, by notification, may exempt any particular services or post from the provisions of the Act. 3. Promotion Posts. The Act provides for reservation in vacancies to be filled by promotion, as distinguished from direct recruitment. The general principle of the 15 per cent and 5 per cent quota, as applicable to direct recruitment, applies in this case also. Similarly, the reservation in promotion posts may be increased to 25 percent for SC and l0 per cent for ST. The number of SC or ST employees appointed on promotion to unreserved vacancies will not be deducted from the promotion quota reserved in such services or posts for the members of the SCIST. No reservation is envisaged to any post in the pay scale going up to a maximum of Rs 2375. 4. The Roster System and the Carry-Forward Rule. Under a notification dated August 16, 1976, the stare govemmenr had increased tbe reservation quota to 25 per cent for SC and l0 per cent for ST. It was explained that the enhanced percentage would be applicable only if the total number of SC/ST employees in any service or cadre was less than 15 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, of the total number of employees in that service or cadre recruited since the year 1972. The implication was that the enhanced percentage would cease to be effective as soon as the prescribed percentage of reservation (15 and 5) would be attained in respect of any service or cadre. In practice, the reservation system operates through a 2O-point roster in which the third, thirteenth and eighteenth vacancies (i.e. 3 out of 20) are earmarked for the SC candidates, and the 8th vacancy (i.e. one out of 20) is similarly earmarked for the ST. In t}te absence of a qualified SC/ST candidate in a particular year, the vacancy is carried forward for the next two years only and not
beyond. 5. Control Provision. For enforcement purposes, provisions have
been made in the Act for a reporting system from the appointing authority to the state government (i.e. the administrative department dealing with the Act). In every department under the state government, an officer has been designated as the liaison officer for the purpose of implementation of the provisions of the Act in the departmental establishment. For the inspection of establishments (to check
188
whether the provisions
of the Act and Rules are actually
being
observed), a number of officers have been authorised to act as inspecting officers. Any SC/ST candidate, who is adversely affected on account of non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or Rules, may bring the fact to the notice of the state government. In that event, the state govemment may call for the records from the establishment concerned and take appropriate action. As is customary in public administration, a number of registers and forms and returr,s have been suggested for recording and reporting purposes. At least, formally speaking, the paper work in the government seems thorough and aboveboard.
The Reality on the Ground Despite legislative intention and formulation of elaborate rules and regulations, the fact remains that accurate information and data on the actual position in regard to reservation of posts for SC and ST categories are not available. Since this is the situation in regard to
employments under the Government of West Bengal, the position in other establishments in the public sector, universities, colleges and local bodies is anybody's guess. Maintaining an information system is surely not tle strong point of govemments, especially under present conditions, *hen govemment organisations have proliferated at all levels, both secretariat and field, making it well-nigh impossible to keep track of employee data. The State Department of Scheduled Castes and Tribes Welfare is the nodal agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Act and maintaining and updating statistical information on reservation. The departments are to statutorily submit annual retums on reservation, both for vacancies and promotion posts. But such returns are extremely irregular and the defaulting departments are too many to count. The machinery for regular collection, processing and retrieval of employment (reservation) data within the Scheduled Castes and Tribes Welfare Department is thoroughly inadequate. Staff census is undertaken at certain intervals by the state govemment's Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics. Whatever census data are made available by the Bureau tum out to be the only "authentic" information on employment under the govemment. The last such staff census report
Scene
189
was published by the Bureau in 1982. According to the data supplied by the Bureau, the "provisional" estimate of the total number of state government employees is 4,01,000. This includes even the miscellaneous category of employees drawing pay on consolidated, piece-rate, work-charged and contingent basis. On April 1,1982, the shares of the SC and ST in total government employment in West Bengal stood as follows:
General Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes 85.95
1
1.58
Total
100.00
Clearly, the prescribed quota could not be reached in both categories. Appendix II presents a complete picture of the distribution of SC/ST categories among the different job groups. Their representation on the higher class of jobs (A and B) is extremely low. In the clerical (group C) category, the representation by contrast, is not insignificant. But in the lowest category of group D jobs (peons, messengers, sweepers, etc.), the share of SC/ST is substantial. Interestingly, the sweepers and scavengers forming one part of Group D employees are drawn largely from the Scheduled Castes (62.447o).ln the case of other Group D jobs-peons, messengers, book-binders, etc.-the statutory quota for both SC and ST has been fulfilled. From the limited data, it can be safely infened that in purely govemment jobs, the statutorily prescribed reservation quota for both SC and ST could not be reached. The representation of these two categories in lower jobs-mostly unskilled and manual-has nbt posed any problem. But thejobs at higher levels, especially groups A and B, have remained virtually out of their reach. Incidentally, the posts at higher levels, including those in group C, are filled on competitive basis through the State Public Service Commission. The gatekeeping function in the hands of the State PSC may be so rigorous as to dissuade the SC/ST candidates from applying for higher governmentjobs. Alternatively, such candidates may be finding the PSC's screening process too hard to fcllow. In this connection it may be worthwhile looking at the failure rate of SC/ST candidates in PSC's tests and exarninations. In the absence of time series data, it is not possible to say if the
190
situation in regard to reservation has been improving or deteriorating over the years. The enactment of the law in 1976 was motivated by the desire to place the system of reservation on a statutory footing. It was also stated at that point of time that "the overall position of representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State services was not at all encouraging." From the 1982 statistics, it does not appear that there has been any marked improvement in the overall position since the enactment of the law. This state of affairs has not gone unnoticed by the Govemment of West Bengal. Recently (August, 1987), a meeting was convened to review the position. Among others, the ministers present at the meeting included the minister in charge of Land and Land Reforms and the minister for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare. The secretaries and other officers of tlle different state departments, including the chief secretary attended rhe meeting. The minister for SC/ST Welfare was critical of the departments which had failed to enforce the job reservation provisions of the Act. As the minister said: "In a number of departments, including the Land and Land Reforms Department and the Agriculture Department, not more than 13 per cent of the employees are Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Even the Public Service Commission had failed to provide the requisite number of such applicants for the posts of lower-division clerks in different departments of the state government. people
from these castes and tribes qualified for the posts of lower-division clerks were not wanting and it was not clear why the PSC had failed to select such candidates for the job." A decision was taken at tle meeting to familiarise the senior government officers with the provisions of the Act. Issues connected with the jobs for the SC/ST members were to form part of the administrative training cuniculum of the officers of the state govemment. The upshot of the discussion at the meeting was that the Act and the rules relating to reservation were henceforth to be strictly enforced and the departments of govemment were reminded of their statutory duties in this regard.6 Such 'shake-up's in government are not uncommon and the bureaucracy has its own way of living with them. For the time being, there is likely to be a lot of running around and issuance of letters and reminders. But to keep up the tempo of data gathering and informa-
Scene
l9l
most
tion processing in government on a regular basis is
ungovernment-like. Unless there is an 'effective demand' for data and information, collection of data for the sake of collection does not make sense. In other words, the data on reservation have not so far been of any consequence for the government of West Bengal. For the future, one has only to keep one's fingers crossed.
The Efticiency Question
Against this background, it is frivolous to look for the impact of the reservation policy on efficiency in govemment. Measurement of efficiency in government is a highly complex job. Cutting red tape' speeding up files and papers and the O&M kind of streamlining point to a crude type of administrative efficiency. This is easy to achieve. Then there is the question of efficiency in the sphere of major decision-making which can be called p olicy efficiency. Major decisions in regard to location of industries and plants, sectoral investments, multi-crore purchases of military hardware and so on call for unusual tact. administrative sense, innovativeness and creative foresight. This is where policy efficiency counts. There is still another kind of efficiency which can be called semices efficiency. The concern here is with the impact of government programmes and projects on the ground. It is not uncommon in govemment to come across frantic efforts to spend money on projects. However, the outcome at the ground level in terms of crop productivity, disease eradication, poverty alleviation and, more importantly, clientele satisfaction seems nobody's concem. Yet, service efficiency is essential to improve the public image of government. Of the three kinds of efficiency, policy efficiency is largely in the hands of the top echelons in govemment. As stated earlier, in West Bengal the representation of S(7ST in the highest category ofjobs is insignificant (SC 4.63 and ST 0.92 respectively). So, the policy level is virtually out of bounds for them. At the clerical level, the reprcsenJation of SC and ST is significantly high-9.50 per cent for the SC category and 2.08 per cent for the ST category. But administrative efficiency, as defined earlier, depends on a variety of factors such as organizational format, morale, motivation, competent supervision, on-the-job training and above all, a clear and obvious need for efficiency within the organization. This
192
is, no doubt, a short checklist of conditions of efficiency. Without a thoroughgoing enquiry into the administrative structure and process, it will be rash and unscientific to pass any judgement on the state of administrative efficiency in West Bengal that could be attributed solely to the reservation policy. The third kind of efficiency is basically field-oriented. In recent times, West Bengal's performance at the field level has been rated high, be it in land reforms or the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which is essentially an antipoverty programme. On the basis of somewhat sketchy information, it may not be out of place to commend the efficiency of field services. To the extent it is due.to the efforts of the lower level field bureaucracy, the credit should go, along with others, to the SC/ST members, whose representation is much higher in the lower category of group C jobs.
It would pose an extremely difficult methodological problem to measure the impact of the performance of this very small section of employees on total Govemmental performance. But, at least in public forums like the press or the legislature there has not been even a ghost of a complaint that the efficiency of the govemment of West Bengal is going down because of the operation of the reservation policy.
The Political Framework Instead of searching for the will-o'-the-wisp of efficiency in government, the more important question about West Bengal's reservation policy is : Why is there almost a rotal absence of agitafion on the issue of 'reservation'? Why didn't West Bengal go the Gujarat way? How does one account for the absence of the Bihar+ype caste confrontations in West Bengal? In other words, the policy on reservation needs to be examined within a broader framework of the social basis of regional politics. Obviously, such large issues are likely to take us away from the mundane problems of implementation of reservation policy and its impact on govemment efficiency. We arc willy-nilly drawn into an involved discussion on the social basis of political power. To draw a broad-brush picture of politics in West Bengal, the first item that deserves special mention is the role of the ,bhadralok' in Bengal politics. The gentle, urbane and English-educated Bengali
Scene
lg3
bhadralok has been basically urban and Calcutta-based. With the collapse of the zamindari system of landownership by the early 1930s, the new bhadralok came forward to give leadership to programmes of radical agrarian reform, and political movements.
There were successful attempts in many parts of undivided Bengal to
mobilise the peasantry against state extortions and oppressive landlordism. The movement of the sharecroppers gathered momentum, demanding a more favourable share of the produce. The Tebhaga agitations durin g 1946-49 were spearheaded by the intelligentsia and brought within its fold the small ar,d the landless peasants and a large section of the scheduled castes. After Partition, the Calcutta-based bhadralok had virtually very little interest in land. He was not a party to the dispute over land, rent, share of produce-the entire gamut of agrarian relations. As Partha Chatterjee describes the bhadralok posture: "Whether it has been a question of landlord versus tenant, orjotdar venus sharecropper, or the fixing of procurement prices for foodgrains, the highly vocal and articulate bhadralok intelligentsia have judged the issues not as insiders in a struggle between contending agrarian parties, sharing the modes and categories of thought developed over
centuries of collective communal allocation of rights and entitlements relating to the use of land and associated economic activities. Rather, the bhadralok have viewed such questions from a distance, from the prspective of urban consumers of agricultural products, and issues of agrarian relations, land reforms, food prices-which fonn the bread and butter of state politics under the Indian Constitution-have been seen in terms of much more .objective' categories: landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, small peasant, agricultural labour, distress sales, terms of trade between agriculture and industry, etc. These are the terms in which the debates have been conducted in the political arena, party conclaves, mass meetings, and in the media, and when battle lines have been drawn, the upper-casre intelligentsia were to be found in leading roles in every contending party-the ruling party and the party of the opposition, parties of status quo and parties of change."z The absence of any organised political articulation of the big peasantry (West Bengal being basically a small farmer dominated state), considerable fragmentation of the middle castes, and the over-
r94
Thc Politics of Backwardness
all cultural domination of the bhadralok have stood in the way of aggregation of caste interests in West Bengal's political scene' Politicization of caste and the resultant caste conflicts in many states in India have mainly been due to the use of caste as a political device for acquiring power, as the acquisition of power has provided access to the scarce resources at the disposal of government' West Bengal's story has been different. The rise of left and radical politics has ied to the forging of links with the rural masses for purposes of political mobilization. Even from the pre.Independence days, the left parties have been active in mobilizing the peasantry against the major issues of oppressive rents and taxes, and the appropriate share of crop, and land to the tiller. Sharing of common political values by the members of different castes has paved the ground for a 'class' orientation among the rural masses- Hence' battles arre waged between classes and not castes, and the slogans are political and not parochial'
Last, but not the least, the radical land reforms programme undertaken by the Irft Front govemment and decentralised local development through the aegis of the panchayats have ensured a degree of distributive justice in the countryside. The radical politics of the Left Front has so far been able to encapsulate tlre primordial social groupings in rural Bengal. The longevity of secular politics hinges on the steady growth and dissemination of radical politics. It has to be seen
how long political radicalism survives in the midst of an inhospitable pan-Indian political environment. To sum up, West Bengal's response to the reservation policy has been marginally administrative and basically political- Attempts are no doubt being made to fill up the prescribed quota to fulfil the constitutional obligation. But the real emphasis has been on "conscientizing" the economically weaker sections and politicising them. As the Government of West Bengal told the Mandal Commission, "poverty and low levels of living standards rather than caste should be the most important criterion of backwardness," and what is needed is to formulate comprehensive programmes of ecnonomic development and educational advancement of the poorer sections of the society. This, in brief, symbolises the political response of West Bengal to the reservation PolicY.
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene
195
Appendix I (Report from The Statesman, Calcutta, August 1, l9g7) "State failing to meet reservation quotas"
A number of departments in the West Bengal Covemment have failed to enforce thejob reservation provisions of the West Bengal Seheduled Castes and Sched-
to Mr Dinesh Chandra Dakua, the State's Minister for Scheduled Castes ani Scheduled Tribes in Calcutta on Friday. About 2gVo of t}re State's population
belongs to these categories, he said. Thejob reservation quota for Scheduled Castes and Tribes was 15./o and SVo, respectively, in West Bengal. But in a number of departments, including the
uled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and posts) Act, 1976 accordins
Land and Land Reforms department, not more ahan lj% members of the employees are Scheduled Caste and Tribe, Mr Dakua said. Even the public Service Commission had failed to provide the re4uisite number of such applicants for the posts of lower division clerks in different departments of the State Govemment. People from these castes and tribes qualified for the posts oflower_ division clerks were not wanting and he wondered why the pSC had failed to ofthe secretaries and other officers State Govemment was held at Writers' Building to review the job situation. Mr Benoy Chowdhury, West Bengal Land and Land Reforms ,Minister, who was present at the meeting, also stressed the need for strict implementation of the provisions of the Act. The State's Chief Secretary, Mr Rathin Sen Gupta, also attended the meeting. To make all the senior Govemment officers aware of the provisions of the Act, issues connected with jobs for Scheduled Caste and Tribe members will be included in the administrative training curriculum of the officers of the State Govemment, Mr Dakua said. Mr Dakua said in Calcutta on Thursday rhat thousands of Scheduled Caste and Tribe students in West Bengal are being inconvenienced by delays in the payment of their scholarship. The Minister said that administrative lapses were the primary reason for the delay. Mr Dakua said that in the pre-matriculation stage nearly Rs 7 crores were to be given to the students as scholarships and in the post-matriculation stage nearly Rs 6 crores were earmarked for this purpose. But for the past few years the scholarship has never been available to the shldents on time. It was a sorry state of affairs, he said. The Minister convened two meetings recently in which it was decided that the administrative machinery should be geared up so that eligible students can be given the scholarships on time. It was suggested that the Gram panchayat bodies should be involved in selecting the eligible candidates and that they refer the names to the authorities concemed with the payment ofscholarships. Eadier, the school authorities were entrusted with the job of selecting students but on many
select such candidates for the job. Mr Dakua said that on Friday a meeting
of the different departments of the
196
occasions they failed to refer any names, he added' has Our Special Representative in New Delhi adds: The Central Govemment of Scheduled Castes and decided to rename the Commission for the Welfare Castes and SchedScheduled Tribes as the National Commission for Scheduled Commissioner will be vested with more powersuled Tribes. The The Commissioner will be concerned with reservation quotas for Scheduled
CastesandTribesinthepublicservices,theiradmissiontoeducationalinstitu. The tions and the execution of anti-poverty programmes among other things' report to the President will be submitted by the end of July Commissioner's
impleevery year and to insure that the recommendations of the report are it twice a year at his meetings with rn"niei, ft" Prime Minister will review Scheduled Castes and Tribes MPs and the Chief Ministers'
APPendix II Distribution of Employees of the Government of West Bengal by Category of Post and Caste as on lst April' 19E2
CateBory
Total No. Scheduled
Castes
Schzduled Tibes
of
post
of
Employecs
to No. of % to No. of 7a to No. of Emplo- total hrplo- total Emplo- total yi"t No. in Yees No. in tees No- in Col' 2 Col.2 Col.2
Group Group Croup D
B C
57935
3479
6.01
9.50
475
4225 4350
0.82
2.O8
53981
202726
107540
t9256
t't 434
179245
93.17 88.42
'19;14
(excluding
swe.epers and
t6.2t
62.M
4.05 85756
scavengers)
Group
7'l 19
4789
530
6.8? 24c0 2.35 5245
31.09
(swepers and
scavengers onlY)
*Others
(exclud.
5955
570
9.57 27.t4
I1.58
140
88.08
ing sweepers and scavengers)

*Others
(swpers
7A
l9
46430
8.57 45
2.47
344669
64.29 85.95
and scavengers onlY) Crand Total
401000
9901
pay on
charged and contingent basis. Slzrce: Staff census, 1982. Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics' Figures are Provisional. Note: (2) Total No. of state government employees as on 1 4 1982 as per provisional estimate is---4.01,000.
()
Resenation Policy: The West Bengal Scene

REFERENCES
I.
197
The debates of the Constih-rent Assembly on this issue have been summarised
in Rao, B. Shiva, ed., The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study. Vol. l, pp. 192-201 and Chap. 25. New Delhi: Indian Institure of public Administrsrion,
1968.
2. Gopal, Guru. "Politics of Reservations: A Class Approach.,' Sociery and Change, vol. IV, nos. April and June, Calcutta: 1985. 3. Randive, B.T. Caste, Class and Property Relations. Calcutta: National
Book Agency, 1982. 4. Ghosh, Anjali. PeacefuI Transition to Power: A Study of Marxist politicat Strategies in West Bengal, 1967-77. Appendix VI. Calcutta: Firma KLM private
Ltd., 1981.
XIV. No. 2, August
5. AP. "Class-Caste Dimension of PanchayatiRaj;' The Marxist Review, 1980. 6. The Statesman (Calcutra Edition), August 1987. (See Appendix I.)
vol.
7. Chatterjee, Partha. "Caste and Politics in West Bengal" in Gail Omvedt el., lnnd, Caste and Politics in Indian,lrares. Delhi: Authors Guild publica-
tions, 1982.
Chapter 8
The Reservation System in Gujarat

Shri Prakash
HERE are two basic reasons why an enquiry into the evolution and functioning of the system of reservations in Gujarat would be more significant than a similar analysis of other states in India. The first reason is that as a state and a distinct
economic and social region, Gujarat has produced a pattern of devel-
opment, in which there has been a grbater distribution of growth downwards, for a variety of reasons. Such a distribution of gains from development-relatively much better spread out than in states like Bihar or West Bengal-has not required the help of an extensive system of reservations, which has remained within moderate proportions. The second reason is that among otier causes, the attempt to expand-or in one sense overextend-the system of reservation quotas has produced unnecessary social conflict that can only obstruct the normal process of growth. In such a situation there is a need to rely much more on alternative methods of generating growth and helping to distribute the gains of development, methods that have the sanction of a social consensus behind them. An argument of this kind has an absolute cultural relevance in a region where the name and philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi are a household word. At any rate, the meaning of a non-violent strategy of social change and democratic transformation are the same. They involve an attempt at peaceful change of ideas and social practices and seek to minimize, if not altogether abolish conflict and violence. In this sense the need to work the reservations strategy within well defined limits nationally and locally, has to be a conscious political decision.
The Resemation System
in
Gujarat
199
It is important to substantiate the claim that the gains from development in Gujarat are better spread out than in other states. For this purpose one can compare Gujarat with Bihar and West Bengal. In terms of size and area the three states are more comparable than in terms of population. All threc arc moderate-sized states as mav be seen from Table I below.
Table I Development Profile of j Indian States: Gujarat, Bihar and West Bengal
Population in millions (1981) 2. Persons per square mile (1981) 3. Urban pop. as % of total (1981) 4. Totat inhabited villages
l.
34.1
69.9
54.6
174
402
12.5
6t5
26.5
38024.
3l.l
t8l l4
1297
67546 906
85
(198r) 5. Average population per village (1981)

1055
6. Per capita power consumption (KWH) (198283) 7. Per cent villages electrified
8. No.of tubewellVpumpsets
as on (31/3/1985)
252
87%
29700)O
49% 193000 26%

59Vo
5t%
41000 4lVo
83Vo
9. Literacy (1981)
population
7o
of total
44% 94%
10. Students in Class I-V as % of total pop. in age group 6 to 11 (1976-77\

I
l.
Students in Class VI to VIII as % of total pop. in age
42%
u%
l4%
33Vo
group l1 to l4 (1976-77)
12. Students in Class IX to XII as % of total pop. in age
2t%
17Vo
group 14 to l7 (1976n7)
13. Number of colleges (1983-84) 285 14. Toral studenrs 2.04.697 (1983-84) 15. Women students as Vo of total 33%
enrolled
473 2,28,441
l5Vo
348
2,48,559
3O7o
2m
16. Population served per hospital bed (1984) 17. Estimated no. of couPles
l062
Jf /J
2987
t3061
8288
eligible for sterili sation in March l98l (1000) 18. (a) % of estimated
no. sterilised (b) between 1981 and 1984 (also total no. '000) 19. Area in hectares covered under afforestation ( I 980-83) 20. New drinking water wells built (1980-83) 21. Area benefited through
16.5Vo
7 .1Vo
13% 1066
915 5344 12094 42385
1004
783
247 1,49,401
2707 9220
72052
minor irrigatior/flood works (hectares)( I 980-83) 22. Soil, waler conservation

and land reclamation (hect.) (198G.83) 23. Number of tractors (as on 31.3.1983) 24. Total daily capacity of dairy plants in ('000
78159
591
14893
47000
22040
4000 374
t277
r82
litres) 1979
25. Central l,and Development
Banks-regular members 4,81,216 3,15,000
78r9
(31/tr81) 26. Prirnary Land DeveloPment 5685 Banks (31/6/81) members 7902 27. Number of Primary Housing Societies (31/6n980) 28. Number of members of PHS 2,40,74r
(31/6/1980)
269
16810
1,39,037 1131
50300 1349
29. Bonowing by members of

PHS (31/6/1980) Rs. lakhs
22,383
92
30. Minimum Needs Prograrnme (1985-90) outlay (Rs. Lakhs)
(a) Rural housing (do) (b) Rural water supply (do)
6300 8000
15000
1400
9500
17500
(c)
Rural roads (do)
600 3500 3500

5577
31. Post Offices in rural areas: Rural pop. per Post Office (1982/83
on
3018
5965
Bureau, Bombay, October, 1986.
The Resenation System in
Gujarat
2Ol
gains from growth relate to facts like per capita power consumption, per cent of electrified villages, number of tubewells and pumpsets, proportion of literate population, share of women among those en_
The key indicators which bring our the grearer distribution of
rolled for higher education, the number of couples sterilized, milk production, membership of the Land Development Banks and pri_
mary Housing Societies, loans to members of these societies, invest_ ments in extending rural housing and water supply, the numbers of people served by hospitals and post offices. On all of these counts, Gujarat is ahead of Bihar and West Bengal, as may be seen from the data presen0ed above, particularly when it is realized that in terms of population Bihar has more than twice the numbers than Gujarat and West Bengal 60 per cent more. Yet, even in absolute figures, Gujarat is ahead of the other two states, when most of the indices are consid_
ered. This shows a grcater spread

Gujarat.
of gains from
development in
The main question to be considered is whether the system of reservations has had much to do with this greater distribution of gains. The answer has to be in the negative for two reasons. Firstly, there were no reservations for OBCs in Gujarat in the educational institutions and state serv'ces until April l,l97g. Secondly, even the reservation system for the SCVSTs in Gujarat evolved slowly, over time. It was formalized and expanded as the proportion of educated persons within these communities grew and the govemment per_ ceived the possibility and the need for their greater presence and participation within the administration. Before looking at the actual evolution of the rcservation system in Gujarat, it has to be emphasized that the SCVSTs have been able to achieve much else, besides getting government jobs through the reservations system. The percentage of literates among scheduled castes in Gujarat is almost 40 per cent according to the lggl census while the ratio for non-SC population is zl4 per cent. This is still higher than the all-India averages which are 2l per cent for scheduled castes and 39 per cent for the rest of the population. Similarly, in the case of urbanization in Gujarat, 32.69 per cent among the SCs live in cities, which is higher than the 30.98 per cent for the non-SC popu_ lation. In West Bengal, where the share of population estimated to be
Iiving in urban
areas is 30.44 per cent, almost the same as Gujarat, the
202
share
of SCs is only 12.41 per cent. Clearly, the process of social integration between SC and non-SC communities will be more advanced in cities than in rural areas, in today's circumstances- This is especially so in Gujarat where many of the SCs in urban arcas work
in textile mills.
From the time of its formation and before that as a part of Bombay Province, there was reseryation of seats for S(YST in the kgislative Assembly and the two Houses of Parliament in Gujarat, as in other states. In 1967, out of 168 Irgislative Assembly seats I I werc reserved for S(7ST and out of 24 Lok Sabha seats 2 were similarly reserved. According to the Gujarat Panchayat Act of l96f in Gujarat at least one seat in every panchayat had to be reserved for a scheduled caste and one for a scheduled tribe, where they were in large numbers. In addition, the state governments had the power to increase the
number of seats prcportionate to the SC/ST population in a village or

a district.
As regards rcservations in the educational institutions and in government employment in the 1950s, very few posts were reserved in the then Bombay Province, Saurashtra and Kutch for the depressed or the backward classes who then consisted mostly of scheduled castes and tribes. The Government Reporter of 16.5.51 carried a notification for reserving some more posts in class III and class IV for the backward classes and this provision was ofhcially implemented from 9.5.53. (Mahesh H. Dave, "Backward Classes and Reservation" in Haroobahi Mehta and Hasmukh Patel ed', Dynamics of Reservation Policy, Patiot Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p.l0l.) In order to fill these posts backward class candidates were to be called from the
General Administration Department and their number was to be fixed
on the basis of posts vacant since November 1950. (Government Reporter of 8.12.54 in Dave, loc. cit.) It is true that when stocktaking was done in October 1959, it was found that there was a huge backlog of reserved posts that had not been filled. Besides upper caste prejudices (which resisted the entry of SC/ST candidates in posts filled through direct recruitment)' one reason may be the lack of incentive on the part of SCVSTs to go in
for government employment when they were getting other jobs which allowed them to stay with their families in the cities e.g., jobs in the Ahmedabad mills. The govemment did not reserve any posts in Class
The Reservation System
in
Gujarat
203
and Class II services until 20.9.1969, when the quotas were more precisely defined. In Class I and II jobs, 5 and 10 per cent respectively were reserved for the SC/ST; in Class III and IV it was 7 and 14 per cent. At the district level, since 1950, posts in Class III and IV had all along been reserved more or less in proportion to the SCyST population. Since 1964, if no backward class (or SC/ST) candidates were available for the 'reserved' posts, such posts had to be carried forward for the next two years within the limit of the district population. Thereafter they could be filled from the unreserved class. From the 1970s, efforts were made to publicise reserved posts through voluntary agencies working among backward and tribal people. The roster system was introduced in all classes of the services. A 40-point roster was created for Class I and II posts and a 1OO-point roster for Class III and IV, whereby one post after every 40 or 100 was reserved for the backward classes with a maximum limit of 45 per cent and a carry-forward prbvision for two years. The list of backward classes was drawn, as before, from the lists of the scheduled castes and tribes and the lists maintained by the Ministry of Education for the award of scholarships to students from among the backward classes. It was in the early 1970s that the issue of expanding reservations for the OBCs acquired a renewed momentum. In the early 1960s, the Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report, the Lokur Commission Report and several significant judgements of the Supreme Court had promoted a discussion on the reservations issue. The reasons for an enhanced emphasis on state-sponsored redistribution of incomes in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were several: the increase in the rate of inflation after the drought of 1965, the growth in the numbers of educated job seekers, and last but not least, the growing emphasis, on the part of Congress (I) (led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) and some other political parties, on bringing the backward classes into the arena of representative leadership. Hence the increasing presence of legislators from the backward communities within the state and the national legislatures. This created the impression that by expanding reservation quotas from above through statutory action, the political representatives of the backward classes would be able to enhance the social and economic power of their own communities. The logic of such thinking lead the political representatives drawn from the back-
204
ward communities to build up pressure for action on the OBC reservations issue. The first step often was the appointment of a Backward Classes Commission to finalize a list of those who would be entitled to use OBC reservations and the size of reservation quotas. One can count at least ten Backward Classes Commissions which were appointed between 1965 and 1978, whereas there had been very few in the period 1947-1965. Additional measures like the sening up of special schools or hostels meant only for the OBCs or specific castes among them, finance commissions for giving loans, etc., were also proposed and undertaken by varicus political leaders e.g., Devraj Urs in Kamataka and Karpoori Thakur in Bihar. Gujarat too was drawn into the vortex of the demand that an expansion of the base of the political leadership should find an immediate reflection within the bureaucracy, the academia and other sections of the professional and business worlds. Unlike Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu, where there was a social consensus about the operation of the reservation system through which the elite had themselves risen in the British period, in, Gujarat the process of the rise of new social groups, like the Pattidars, had been much more self-propelled and carried out without an excess of state assistance.
Hence, ifa strategy of reservations was now to be prescribed, a social consensus had to be built up around it. The appointment of the Backward Classes Commission in 1972 wder the chairmanship of Justice Baxi may be seen as the first step in trying to build such a consensus. It must be realized, that it would be difficult to actually implement successfully a policy of reservations, unless there was a social consensus since those in charge of implementing it would not be drawn from those communities for whom it was meant 4nd if they did not agree with such a policy would seek to undermine, delay or retard its implementation.
On this point, there is a marked contrast between the responses evoked by reservations for SCVSTs and backward classes in the legislatures and the reservations in govemment jobs and the public
sector. Whereas there has been little protest against political reserva-
tions for the SCVSTs and the period of their continuance has been
extended several times, that is not the case where attempts have been made to expand the reservations system in the educational and employment spherc. The dominant elite groups consider the policy has
The Reservation System in
Gujarat
2O5
gone beyond its function of providing social representation to the backward classes and is now being used to oust them of areas which they feel should be mainly controlled on the basis of skills and training. They are sought to be removed through the use of unfair state action, by blocking the avenues for their economic and social mobility. This belief on the part of the elite is the real divider between consensus and conflict. When the belief takes root that this limit has been transgressed, protest is a natural corollary, whichever govemment may be in power. The case of Gujarat illustrates very clearly that while there is a consensus ahut preferential treatment to the SC/ST/OBCs in every sphere of education and employment, the elite groups are not ready to countenance the use of the reservations policy as a battering ram to forcefully deprive them of opportunities for social and economic mobility. The Baxi Commission identified 82 communities as constituting the OBCs. These included the Bafan, Dafer, Fakir, Gadhai, Galiara, Hingora, Julaha, Mir or Langha, Darban, Makrani, Miyana, Pinjara, Sandhi, Sipai, Theba and Wagher who were Muslims and Khristi or Gujarati Christian converts from the scheduled castes. Its report was submitted on 27 February 1976. The Baxi Commission Report estimated the OBC population to be 45 per cent of the overall population in Gujarat. It recommended that l0 per cent seats should be reserved in medical, engineering, dental, technical, agriculture and veterinary colleges. It further recommended that for admission to these seats, OBC candidates should have marks which were not more than 5 per cent below the lowest for non-reserved admissions, with an absolute minimum of 55 per cent as qualifying marks.In addition, 5 per cent seats were to be reserved for the OBCs in Class I and Class II state services and 10 per cent in Class III and Class IV. The 10 per cent OBC quota was to be reviewed by the governrnent after 10 years, in March 1988. These recommendations were accepted by the then Janata Party govemment on April 1, 1978. Together with the existing quota of7 per cent for the SC, 14 per cent for ST and l0 per cent for the OBC, this brought the aggregate of jobs and seats reserved to 31 per cent. It is noteworthy that in 1978 there were no protests against the Baxi Commission except complaints by some communities that they had been unfairly excluded from the OBC list. The Baxi Commission
206
too did not publish the data it had collected through its survey, giving
rise to doubts about the complete validity of the classification proit. Indeed many of the prominent organisations who could be said to be mobilizing the backward classes themselves did not agree with the Baxi Commission. The Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha alleged that the Commission had left out the poor among the intermediate and even the upper castes, in its haste to include only castes like the Kolis and the Barias who constituted almost 65 per cent of the list of OBCs put together by the Baxi Commission. The Kshatriya Sabha argued "that caste, community and religion should not be the citeria to determine backwardness in the formation of a socialist state. Any one whose income is below the limit of income tax, no matter of which caste he is-be it Kshatriya, Patikar, Vaniya, Brahmin, Harijan, Adivasi, etc.,-should be considered backward. One becomes backward because of one's limited economic income." Some of the
posed by
leaders also pointed out that there were castes in the Baxi Commission's list which did not even have a 5 per cent literacy rate and they could not be expected to use the OBC reservation quotas. Little information exists about the actual utilization of the 10 per cent
OBC quota and the social background of those who are able to use it. Following these representations, the Congress(I) govemment appointed a second Backward Classes Commission in 1981 headed by Justice C.V. Rane. It was asked to consider whether there were "any other Castes/Communities/Classes which fell in the category of socially and educationally backward classes". The Commission was also entrusted with the task of making suitable recommendations on the question whether certain number of seats and posts should be reserved for the OBCs in proportion to their population. The Rane Commission submitted its report in October, 1983. In a major departure from the criteria used by the previous Commissions the Rane Commission rejected caste as a measurement of backwardness. It argued that with occupational diversification and the emergence of contractual relationships, an occupation criteria should be used to classify the OBCs. It identified 63 occupations as backward, covering about 35 per cent of the population, which was 10 per cent less than the Baxi Commission's figure of 45 per cent at that time accepted in Gujarat as denoting the size of the OBCs. It recommended only 28 per cent total reservations for the OBCs so as to keep
in Guiarat
207
limit of 50 per cent set up by the Supreme Court' At a meeting on l0 January 1985 the Gujarat Cabinet under the leadership of Chief Minister Madhavsinh Solanki' accepted the recommendation to enhance the OBC reservation quota by l8 per cent but rejected the new criteria of income and occupation'. It also set up a one-flran committee to identify any other caste/communities eligible for using the OBC reservations in terms of the criteria recommended by the Baxi Comrnission. As is well known, following a strong agitation, the implementation of this quota was postponed' It is instructive to look at the pattern and causes of the persistent
witlin
the aggregate
unrest against the reservations system in Gujarat. What is noteworthy is that as a new phenomenon, it has appeared on the social and political scene only in the late 1970s. During the days of the Nav Nirman agitation of the early 1970s, also led by the college students
of Ahmedabad. reservation was not an issue, although the carryforward system and the roster system had been in existence for several years. Yet, in November 1979 some students of the B.J.
Medical College, Ahmedabad filed a case in the Gujarat High Court against the carry-forward, the roster and the interchangeability systems. They lost the case in court, whereupon they resorted to direct
action.
Before analysing the pattern of the unrest, it would be useful to look at the causes which have shifted the focus of social conflict on to tlre reservation of seats and jobs. For several decades after 1947 there was little or no open protest against the rcservation system in Gujarat. However, by the end of the 1970s several factors-among them the most significant being the rapid expansion of the educational system at the school level--had begun to cause a growing scarcity of college seats, for which competition was becoming fierce. Between 1961 and 1981,literacy increased from 3l percent to 44 per cent in Gujarat, the number of high schools from 1099 to 3153 and the number of colleges from 102 to 371. Between 1965 and 1981 the number of college students increased from 50,000 to 1,80,000' drawn from a variety of castes. The number of govemment employees has risen almost four times, from 1,06,0@ in 1960 to 4'43,952 in 1980. During the decade 1970 to l980job seekers registered at the employment exchanges in Gujarat rose more than three times, from I '50,000 in l97Tto 5,21,000 in 1982. Among them, 58 per cent or 3,1 1'000
2O8
were educated. Evidently, college education is either producing more degree holders than there are jobs or producing the wrong kind of degree holders. In spite of the increase in the number of the educated job seekers, the numbcr of schools has gone on increasing. Between l9g0 and 1985 secondary schools in Gujarat increased from 3l lg to 4104_ 486 more than the target set in the Sixth plan. Similarly, the state government had sanctioned 558 new higher secondary schools dur_ ing the Sixth Plan when it was supposed only to have 525. As a result, the number of students registered in l1 and 12 class has gone up at a much faster rate to 3,45,0@ from 1,95,000. In addition, there is now at least one Industrial Training Institute in every district of Gujarat and among all the states it has the highest number ofstudents enrolled in vocational courses. At the last count this was 63,00,000 in 19g5. This data clearly reveals that the rapid expansion of the education system at the base has created both a shortage of college seats and govemment jobs at the same time. The pressure, especially on students from upper caste/class families to get into professional colleges such as engineering or medicine, has increased considerably. Having lost the case they had filed against the system of carryforward, the roster system and that of interchangeability, the students of BS Medical College in Ahmedabad put forward a set of demands to the Ministry of Health of the Gujarat govemment on 3 I December, 1980. These demands reflected their intention of maximizing tlre number of college seaG available for use through competition in any
one year. Apart from demanding the abolition of the carry-forward and the roster systems, the memorandum went on to demand a reduction of the reserved seats and an incrcase in unreserved seats at the post-graduate level. The demand for the abolition of tlre carry_ forward system in the colleges must be seen in the light of the fact that in practice, the specified number of SC7ST applicants is not reached. In 1981, there were only 7 SCVST applicants for the 17 reserved seats in the post-graduate medical courses. In 1979-g0, in the rrcdical courses, there werc only 507 SC/ST applicants out of a total of 4500 seats. According to their share of the state's population (2lVo) the number of applicants should have been 945. The students felt that reserved seats were being carried forward when they were not being made use of.
Th.e Reservation System
in Gujarat
209
Although the government did not concede the demand of the students for a total abolition of the reservation system, it agreed to terminate the carry-forward system after some days of agitation on the part of the students. The unfilled seats were now to accumulate only up to 45 per cent. A ftesh list of the unfilled seats was to be made every two years, even if the percentage of the unfrlled seats did not reach 45. In addition, the govemment declared that the system of interchangeability of seats would be abolished. According to this system, vacant seats in one reserved category used to be transferred first to the next reserved category (SC-ST-OBC carry-forward for 2 ye:us unreserved) within the defined limits of 13 per cent for ST and
25 per cent of the total reserved seas. Lastly, the govemment agreed to add one seat to the unreserved category for each SC seat filled in the specialised departments. All these measures helped to overcome the shortage of seats and maximize the utilisation of existing seats in any one year. In the l98l agitation there was also some mobilization against the SC cultivators and agricultural labourers in the rural areas surrounding Ahmedabad e.g., in the village of Jetalpur. But from the students' point of view the issue of reservations was quite separate from problems of wages for agricultural labourers, use of common grazing grounds (gochar) in the villages or formation of Harijan cooperatives. Even within reservations, ending the roster system was not as important as winding up the carry-forward and interchangeability systems. Proof of the students' priorities was that they unconditionally withdrew their agitation on I 3 April, I 98 I after the government had made the concessions noted earlier. Hence it cannot be said that the 1980 anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat was part of a broad social upper caste reaction against the rising incomes and status of the SCVSTs. The different strands need to be separated. The more general issue of reforms in the reservation system within the colleges was a students' issue. In demanding these reforms, the students could at best mobilize an urban agitation. The cause of the renewed anti-reservation agitation in 1985 was the acceptance by the Madhavsinh Solanki gcvernment of the 18 per cent increase proposed by the Rane Commission for the OBCs. A month after the announcement of this decision by the Cabinet on January I l, the engineering students of Morbi College in Saurashtra-
2to
who were also responsible for the Nav Nirman movement in 1974went on strike, protesting against the aggregate of reservations being raised to 49 per cent of the seats. They werc soon followed by the medical students of Ahmedabad, on whose call almost 30 colleges in that city joined the agitation. Consequently, examinations were postponed and teaching suspended. No public leader of any importance spoke out openly on this occasion, in sharp contrast to 1980-81 when many had opposed the anti-reservation agitation. The. Ahmedabad students soon formed the All Gujarat Educational Reform Agitation Committee (.\GERAC). AGERAC began organising processicns and bandhs which at first received a mixed reception but soon brought forth a significant response from different social groups. One of the major arguments advanced by the students was that even the existing reservation quotas for SC, ST, OBC were not being fully utilized. According to figures quoted by a Gujarat govemment spokesman the actual utilization had ranged from I I .6 to 17 per cent in various courses. The probable reason behind this was that very few among the fifteen plus age groups from the SCJSTVOBCs were enrolling for graduate courses and higher degrees. According to one calculation only about I per cent of the population in the fifteen plus age group among the SCVSTVOBCs enrolled themselves even for the graduate courses, while this ratio was 6.6 per cent for the rest of the population. (Vimal P. Shah, Az Assessrz ent of Education Among the Scheduled Castes in Gujarat, Gujarat University, 198O.) The students felt that the increase of l8 per cent for the OBCs in education and public employment was clearly a case of overextending the rcservation system. Whatever purpose it might have been intended to serve politically, in terms of its social utility it could only serve to delay the entry of qualified students to colleges and increase the number of entrants with less than average marks. While many of them were prepared to accept the existing l0 per cent OBC quota in the name of rcpresentative justice, increasing this was in their view, tantamount to forcefully excluding them from the chance of competing for a college seat. Some of the students were in fact demanding the total abolition of the reservation system when the existing 10 per cent OBC reservation quota would come up for review in 1988. It may be recalled that the Baxi Commission had asked for a review of the functioning of the OBC rcservation quota after l0 years-
The Reservation SYstem
in Gujarat
2tl
The students set up two new organisations to carry forward the anti-reservation stir, which lasted for 161 days from 18 February, 1985. Its highlight was an indefinite strike by college students, first in
Ahmedabad and later during several other bandhs. These two bodies were known as the Akhil Gujarat Navrachna Samiti and the Navrachna Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti. Unlike on previous occasions they were now backed by the parents' federation known as the Gujarat Vali
Mahamandal. These bodies were an urban, middle class protest move-
ment, against the overextension of the reservations system. They were not organised along caste lines and sought to unite all students
and parents. The anti-reservation agitation acquired a rural base mainly through the participation of the govemment and the district panchayat employees who were opposing the continuance of the roster system for
deciding on promotions for the SCs/STs/OBCs. They also put forward the argument that the reservation criteria should be structured in such a manner so as not to exclude the poor amongst the Brahmin, the Bania or the Patidar communities. In January 1985, the intemees and resident doctors of government hospitals joined the students of medical and engineering colleges
when the latter organised a strike. The agitation continued despite the announcement by the govemment in early April that it would appoint a high-powered committee to look into the reservation issue and not increase the OBC or SEBC (Socially and Educationally Backward Classes) quota until tlis report was received. The agitation received a further boost when, towards the end of April, the state government employees went on strike demanding an end to the roster system. They were soon joined by thejunior doctors, lawyers and the district panchaya! employees, paralysing completely the functioning of the state in May and June, 1985. At this time, more than 150 business organisations of Ahmedabad observed a bandh for five days starting from 5th June, to protest against lawlessness. They included cloth
merchants, dealers in books and stationery, edible oil' spices and foodgrain, electrical appliances, radio and television, laundry owners, footwear dealers, etc.The strike by govemment employees and district panchayats was given a sharp focus when the confederation of 118 unions of state government employees, known as the Gujarat Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal announced an indefinite strike on 7 June. This was done with a view to forcing the implementation of the
212
eleven-point programme for reforming and restricting the roster system, earlier suggested by the Sadhwani Committee appointed by the Gujarat govemment. Soon the civic staff in Ahmedabad and Baroda joined the strike. Between I July and 18 August when the strike ended, 60 per cent of the govemment's workforce was on strike. They had, in that period, been joined by 10 lakh primary teachers. The numbers involved were truly significant and could not be brushed aside as protest by the minority elite. The government's position was made unenviable by the fact that there was very little protest against the anti-reservationists. At the outset the SC textile workers employed in the spinning and carding departments in Ahmedabad struck work on 24th and 25th February but this action failed to spark off any counter movement, apart from some sporadic protest from the Harijan youth in some cities. It was at once obvious that the issues of reservation policy only concemed a tiny minority of the well-educated sections among the SCs/STs and failed to enthuse the sweepers, scavengers, or cobblers, who had little in common with the middle class dalits. Moreover. the scheduled tribes in Gujarat numbering 37,33,422 in 1971 or 14 per cent of the state population are concentrated mainly in Sabarkantha (17,88,004), Surat (827,682), the Dangs (88,028), Banaskantha (77,758), Valsad
(77
6,215), Panchmahals
(7 12,7
l3), Bharuch
(40,381), and Vadodra (473,117). In the remaining 9 districts, less

than one per cent are from among the $cheduled tribes. Many of the tribal districts are contiguous, providing a thick belt inhabited by the STs on the eastern and southern side of the state. Still, the basis for uniting even the scheduled castes and tribes is very shaky, for even in the rural areas they are divided by different occupations. This occupational diversification may be seen from Table II. The small and scattered middle classes among the SCs/STs do not provide any basis for supporting an agitation for expanding the OBC reservation quotas which does not benefit them directly. Economic diversification among OBCs is much greater than that among SCs/ STs and they have very little social or political organisation. Associations like the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha which have existed since the 1950s are basically constitutional and electoral platforms at best
(486,90 I ), Kutch
capable of acting as ginger grbups within one or several political parties and not capable of running a mass agitation. They are also
The Reservation System in Gujarat
213
Table
II
Distribution of Total Workers by Industrial Categories among SCs/STs: Gujarat 1971

Industial Category
No. of SC
Workers
Vo
total
lflorkers
18.3
to No. of ST SC Workers
Vo
to
total ST
Workers
2. Cultivators 3. Agricultural
labourers
110,371 280,355
2,636
46.59 0.44 0.84 5.17

10.54 2.39 1.07
14,609 728,380
637,842
I
48.34 42.33
4. Livestock,
Fishing
Forestry,
5. Mining and Quarrying 6. Manufacturing:
5,064
3,400 10312 35,068 11,856 12,762 13,603
0.22 0.68
2.33
31,110 63,414 7. Construction 14,388 8. Trade and Commerce 6,451 9. Transport and 16,632
(a) Household Industry
(D) Other than Household
Communications 10. Other Services
0.79 0.85
0.9
2.76
Source: Census of India, 1971, Series 5 Part 1A, p.169
handicapped by the fact that among their supporters not many are from the educated middle classes and hence directly interested in the issue of reservations. Even the Gujarat Khet Vikas Parishad started by Mr Jinabhai Da{i is concerned with organising the rural poor who have little to gain from reservations. The contrast was to be seen in the strcngth of the anti-reservation agitation which disrupted life statewide and the weakness of those who set out to oppose them. It has already been pointed out how thousands of students and lakhs of government employees went on strike. Certain towns in the Anand and Upleta districts observed bandhs for as long as five to nine days in succession. Curfew was in force over all of Ahmedabad for an unbroken period of nine days. Certain middle class areas in the walled part of the city were under curfew for more than 10 weeks. The five-day bandh by Mahajans in Ahmedabad, the closure of clearing operations by banks for 27 days and the simultaneous and prolonged curfew in 10 towns-all these
2I4
happened for the first time in Gujarat.
It involved a vast expenditure of time and energy on the part of thousands of people, time and
energy which could have been put to more constructive uses. By contrast, those who tried to mobilize sections of tle backward castes against the anti-reservation stir did not get much of a response. A few sporadic protests were made by some scheduled caste students in the colleges but to no avail. Towards the start of August there was a rally in Rajkot by 7000 members of the Dalit Sangh from all over Saurashtra to express support for the roster system. About 12,000 state government employees said to be belonging to the backward castes and classes marched in a procession through the streets of Baroda on a Sunday to counter the anti-roster agitation. The demonstration was organised by the Gujarat Karamchari Utkarsh Mandal. It was the high watermark of the backward classes protest against the anti-reservation stir but its weaknesses revealed why a strategy of mobilizing the backward classes on a platform of expanding the reservation system would not work in Gujarat-in the short run, or as will be argued below, in the long run either. The central govemment as well as the state government realized that a strategy of confronting a movement lhat had the active support
of broad sections of the citizens could not yield anything but further conflict and confrontation. Hence, the decision was taken to remove the then chief minister Madhavsinh Solanki, who had become too closely identified with the strategy of expanding reservations and to bring in a new chief minister, Amarsinh Chaudhari. The Cabinet appointed two sub-committees to look into the issues of reservation and the roster system from 16 July onwards' An agreement was signed with the majority of the students on 19th July and the dissident minority was brought around later on. In this first accord the governmeni agreed to postpone the implementation of the new reservation quota for the OBCs for one year and to appoint a committee to look into the question of using the economic criteria to classify the OBCs' when the original OBC quota of l0 per cent came up for review in March, 1988. This committee would be appointed before the end of 1987. The students called off their stir on 30 July. The anti-reservation agitation of the government employees continued, even after the strike of the municipal employees was called off on 3 August. The workers of the Gujarat State Electricity Board
The Resemation System
in Gujarat
215
started their strike on 6th August, again demanding the end of the roster system. Subsequently, the leaders of the govemment and panchayat employees signed an accord and the 73-day-old strike came to an end. This agreement had 15 points. Although the full abolition of the roster system was not conceded according to S.C. Naik, Secretary of the Gujarat Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal, the government and panchayat employees were happy about the terms
of
the agreement. According to him they had imposed a brake on the unresricted use of the roster system by persuading the government to finalize the rules for service a..rd classification only in consultation with the employees. The fixation of minimum experience for promotion under the roster system would also be finalised in consultation
with the employees. The highlights of the agreement are the introduction of minimum experience rules, as recommended by the Sadhwani Commission. It provides for an option to fix the minimum experience period in
consultation with the employees instead of accepting the set norms of 5, 7 and 8 years recommended by the Commission for different categories of promotion. The minimum service rules will be fixed with retrospective effect from tie date of issuing of orders by the govemment. The government also finally agreed to retrospectively consider, ftom 24 March 1981 the "hardship" cases, who had to be bypassed in promotion due to the operation of the roster system. All such cases would be considered on a one-to-one ratio and would be given notional promotion from the retrospective date when they were deemed to have been promoted. Furthermore, in cases where the SC employees have already gained more than 8 per cent promotions in their cadres, their further roster promotions will be frozen. This agreement has succeeded in winning the consent of the majority of the government employees. It also provides a kind of model for subsequent national modifications that might b made in the working of the roster system. In my view, it is imperative to answer the question whether in the long run, in a state like Gujarat, the OBC reservation system ought to be expanded. Before answering this question it is worthwhile finding
out what proportion of the population in Gujarat is classified as OBCs. The Baxi Commission Report (1976) had not publishd its
survey data but had still estimated the OBC population to be about 45
216
per cent (Mahesh H. Dave, Backward Classes and Resemation, op. cit., p. 102). The Rane Commission estimated the OBC population to be 35 per cent of the overall state population (ibifi.It did not seek to explain the reasons for the difference between the two estimates. The Rane Commission, rather than solving the problem of how exactly to use caste characteristics to measure backwardness, simply chose to overlook the existence of castes altogether. It is necessary to work out a schedule within which caste-generated backwardness is given due weight and is specified in terms of measurable indices but is still considered much less important than income, eCucation, culture and occupation. Hence, the task of the committee which the Gujarat government has promised to appoint before the end of 1987 should
be twofold: l. It must first of all ascertain the population of the Other Backward Classes in Gujarat in terms of a schedule that mainly encompasses income, education and occupation, while treating caste backwardness as a very small element of the overall schedule. It must ascertain the proportion of OBC employees in the government on the basis of such comprehensive criteria. The income criteria should not be high in comparison to the poverty line family income. 2. It is only then that the question of a small representative reservation quota should be considered for the OBCs. In doing so, two
factors must especially be kept
in view: (a) the level of
higher
education among the OBCs and (D) the actual utilization of reservation quotas by OBCs in the last ten years. In a state like Gujarat where social consciousness against the restrictive aspects of reservations is widespread, it is imperative to keep the size of reservation quotas as low as possible. The need to introduce an exit system for families who have used reservations for two or three generations should be
kept in mind. It is important to realize that some of the reasons which militate against the use of the reservation system on an extensive scale in Gujarat have to do with the greater spread of gains from development in Gujarat. During the British period the single most numerous caste, the Patidars, were the main beneficiaries from the extremely limited growth which took place. However, since the Brahmins did not dominate in Gujarat in the same way as they did in Madras, the Patidars did not have to struggle against them. The Vanias too were
in Gujarat
217
growth of a non-Brahmin movement. By the time the Kshatriya Sabha was organised in the nineteen fifties the patidars as a social group had risen high enough in most spheres not to be interested in mobilizing a backward classes movement. The Kshatriya Sabha itself was supported by multiple groups-Rajputs, Bariyas, Raniparaj, artisan castes, etc.-who were intemally differentiated and widely spread out all over Gujarat. Unlike the Lingayats in Karnataka, there
was no compact social group to provide a leadership to the backward classes, nor is one likely to emerge. Table III from the l93l census gives an idea of the well spread out or scattered nature ofthe Gujarat castes, a phenomenon which must have become even more developed with greater urbanization, education, travel, and migration. Political alignments in Gujarat did not strictly follow caste lines, if caste is n.urowly defined in terms of inter-marriage between village groups or gotras. For one thing, Gujarati castes werc more like clusters which had often been added to by new waves of invasions, settlers, travellers or diminished by migrations. As the l93l census
amongst the elite castes and as such no common hostility could be directed against the Brahmins. Hence, there was no basis for the
pointed out, the Gujarat Brahmins had 84 divisions widely different from each other because of dialect and social environment. Similarly, the Gujarati Vanias had 40 sub-castes, each a real caste differer,t from the others, and some recruited from Rajputs. They did not offer a unified target for social protest as did the Madras Brahmins nor did they organize as a single caste. The Patidars themselves were split into landlords and Kanbis or cultivators with linle basis for building a determined statewide caste unity. No political party or group in Gujarat came to be based on single caste groups. The Congress Party in Gujarat for instance, always had a mix of different castes in its ranks and expanded its social base as more groups entered education and modern politics. This further lessened the chances of backward castes emerging as a cohesive entity. Hence, a strategy of trying to mobilize backward castes through a reservations system would be a non-starter in Gujarat. The need there is to mainly use educational and economic indicators to identify
the backward classes. Any future effort at revising the OBC list should keep this fact in view. It should also be remembered that reservation as a means of
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219
distributing the gains ofdevelopment is not very popular in states like Gujarat where other delivery mechanisms-tenancy reform, co-operatives, rural transport, education, welfare and panchayati administration have been successful in promoting a wider distribution of economic gains. The industrialization and the urbanization p(ocesses have created a middle class which is gradually absorbing elements of different social and ethnic groups or sub-castes. Indeed, the greater
the success in promoting those institutions which distribute economic, cultural and political gains, the less the demand for using
reservations to accelerate the entry of members of different rural and urban social groups into the middle classes. Given the realization that
of resources and opportunities remain a major problem, groups, like individuals, will normally accept a moderate but social increasing representation within the modernization process. As long as this takes place on its own, the demand for reservations will not
scarcity
grow; it is likely to stagnate or decline. This is the single most significant lesson from the experience of the reservation system in
Gujarat. REFERENCES
A. Government Reports:
l. Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission. Gujarat State, 1976,2 vols. 2- Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (Second) Commission. Gujarat State, 1983. 3. Development Programme for the Gujarat State, 1987-88. Planning Division, Ceneral Administration Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, February 1987. 4. Census of India, 1931, Vol. XIX, Baroda, Part I, Subsidiary Table l. 5. Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part lA.
B. Newspaper Reports and Analyses:
l. Times of India, Delhi, 10 July, 1985, Girilal Jain, "Gujarat Politics." 2. Indian Express, Delhi, l9 July 1985, Parveen Sheth, "Gandhi to Solanki." 3. Indian Express, Delhi, 20 July, l985, "Prime Minister's Call for National Consensus on OBC Reservation Policy." 4. The Hindu,21 July, 1985, "Gujarat Agitation Continues." 5. Times of India, Delhi, 30 July, 19E5, "Report on Gujarat Negotiations."
22O
6. The Hindu,31 July, 1985, "End to Agitation in Sight." T.lndian Erpress, Delhi,3l July. l985. "Repon on Gujarat Stir." 8. Indian Express, Delh|5 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir. 9. The Statesman, New Delhi, l2 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir. 10. Indian Express, Delhi, 19 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir. 11. Times of India, Delh|20 August, 1985, Report on end to govemment
employees strike in Gujarat. 12. Indian Express, Delhi,6 December, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir. 13. Indian Express, Delhi, S December, 1985, Report on Cujarat Chief Minister's call for a "national consensus on the reservation quotas for the Other Backward Classes." 14. Indian E-rpress, Delhi, l1 December, 1985, Report on Students' Stir in Gujarat. 15. Times of India, Delhi, 14 December, 1985, Report on Accord Reached with Gujarat Students. C, Unpublished Papers and Surveys:
l. C.P. Barthwal, Ph.D Dissertation, Lucknow University, " Safeguards for Scheduled Castes in thc Indian Consthution and Their Working," Social Sciences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi. 2. Ghanshyam Shah, Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-reservation Agitations in Gujarat. Centre for Social Studies, Surat, December, 1986.
D. Non-Government Published Sources of Data:
l. Statistical Outline of Gujarar, 1983. Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar. 2. Statistical Outline of India, 1984. Tata Services Limited, Depanment of Economics and Statistics, Bombay. 3. Basic Statistics on State Economies of India. Enonomic Monitoring Service, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay.
Books:
l. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in 1nda. New Delhi, 1985. 2. A.M. Zudi, Annual Register of Indian Political Parties. Haroobhai Mehta and Hasmukh Patel, eds., Dynamics of Resenation Pollcy. New Delhi, 1985.
3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: law and the Backward Classes in India. OUP. Delhi. 1984.
Chapter 9
Reservations Policv Revisited

D.L. Sheth
HE anti-reservation agitations, which began in the late seventies in Bihar and spread to other parts of the country, seem to have succeeded in two important respects. At one level, tley have succeeded in reopening the basic issue of the validity of provisions of positive discrimination for, and preferential treatment of, the weaker sections of society-a policy embedded in the Constitution of India. At another level, the agitations have forced the state to rcstore the status quo ante with respect to further implementation of the policy. In a state like Gujarat, where the agitations were more persistent and virulent, they have forced reversals of policy on the govemment. The impact that the agitations have made on the minds of the policy makers and of the intelligentsia in the counry is quite significant. The agitations have in fact been able to exercise political power and influence quite out of proportion to their bases of support in society. The policy is now questioned both at the level of principle and at the operational level. Two inter-related questions are posed: (i) Are reservations consistent witn the principles of equality and secularism as enshrined in our Constitution? and (ii) What criteria for identifying beneficiaries should be devised, so that they promote, rather than militate against, the basic values and goals of social transformation envisaged in the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in the Indian Constitution? It is in the light of these questions that we shall
222
The Politics of Baclo,vardness
examine in this paper the policy of reservations and its rationale, evaluate its performance and make some suggestions for making the policy more effective.
The Policy and its Rationale It should be remembered that reservations are part of a much larger policy package. It comprises a series of legislations, ameliorative programmes and preferential schemes, designed to benefit the weaker sections of society. The package has evolved over a long period of time and has been administered by the Central as well as the State govemments. Although the history of these policies dates back to the first decade of this century, the present set of policies derive their legal status and legitimacy from the Indian Constitution.
The overall package, as it operates today, is addressed to three sets
of policy goals. First, to remove social and religious disabilities of certain specified groups suffering disabilities on account of their
social segregation and spatial and cultural isolation; namely the scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST). Second, to facilitate and promote equal participation with others, of all socially disabled and disadvantaged groups in organized sectors of the country's economic and political life. This is sought to be achieved through provisions for preferential treatment in education, in government employment, rcservation of seats in Parliament, state legislatures and local bodies and through other ameliorative measures and schemes designed to improve their life chances. With the exception of reservations in legislatures, the other preferential measures are not confined only to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; they also extend to the cate-
gory described in the Constitution as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, better known as the Other Backward Classes (OBC). Third, to protect, if necessary through legislative action and executive orders, all these groups, also described in the Constitution as weaker sections of society, or simply, the backward classes, from all forms of social injustice and exploitation. Reservations, along with other measures of protection and
upliftment of the weaker sections of society, should thus be viewed as an instrument of a larger social policy of the state, addressed to a long-term goal of creating a civil society through extending effective citizenship rights to the vast sections of the population who have
Reservations Policy
Revisited
223
been historically deprived and marginalized. In articulating these goals, the policy has acquired multifarious contents, of which reservations is one. Thus, we have a series of laws
which aim at removing disabilities, such as the Untouchability Offences Act of 1955, the subsequently amended and tightened Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, the legislation to prevent forced labour, and the amended Criminal Tribes Act of 1952, removing the legal disabilities suffered by the so-called criminal tribes. We also have protective laws preventing alienation of tribal lands, regulating moneyJending and providing debt-relief and legal aid to the weaker sections. Besides, there are schemes and programmes for land allotments, housing, scholarships, subsidies, etc., aimed at providing
physical security and promoting occupational mobility of these groups. The Five Year Plans have a special feature in the form of tribal and scheduled castes components of plans. The most significant and now
a controversial aspect of the policy is however the provision of

reservations. Although these provisions are based on the same valzes
and rationale that inform other parts of the policy package, their impact is felt adversely and directly by those outside the beneficiary groups and that too in the vital area of social mobility where the means of mobility are always scarce and competition intense.
The beneficiaries of reservations comprise three types of communities: ex-untouchables, designated as Scheduled Castes (SC) (over 104 million), the spatially and culturally isolated communities of tribals designated as the Scheduled Tribes (ST) (over 5l million) and the vaguely defined category of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens called OBC (an estimated 300 million). The OBC is a category consisting of a wide array of groups in need of preferential treatment, but it does not have any centrally identifiable, systemic characteristics such as social segregation or spatial isolation found respectively in the case of SCs and STs. By and large, the groups in the OBC category are at the lower rungs of che Sudra castes. They are socially disadvantaged in terms of occupational mobility and have, in the past, suffered from different degrees of ritual prohibitions. Let us now briefly review the extent of benefits each of the above categories is entitled to receive and has, in fact, been receiving. For the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes reservations arc made
224
for seats in the legislatures, in govemment employment and in educational institutions, in proportion to their strength in the population.
Forjobs in government services and seats in the educational institutions only those who meet certain minimum prescribed standards qualify. These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailing competitive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or lowered only to a certain degree. For the other backward classes there is no provision for legislative
reservations; nor are reservetions in governmentjobs and educational seats, in their case, mandated by the Constitution. Instead, the matter of reservations for the OBCS in these two areas is left to the discretion of the state govemments. Similarly, there are no provisions of reservations for the Other Backward Classes in Central Government services. Since the constitutional provisions in their case are only en-
abling and not mandatory, no such reservations for them exist in West Bengal, Orissa, Assam, states of the north-east, Rajasthan or in any Union Territory. It is only since the mid-seventies, thanks to
electoral pressures, that the states of north India, Gujarat and Maharashtra have begun to extend the benefits of reservations to
Other Backward Classes. But the extent of benefits is quite moderate in these states. Compared to their massive strength in the population, the reservations made for tlem are only 10 per cent in Cujarat, 14 per cent in Maharashtra, 15 per cent in Uttar Pradesh and 14 per cent in Himachal Pradesh. For entry into educational institutions, the standards are only marginally lowered for them. For example, all the OBC students admitted between 1979-80 and 1983-84 under the reservation provisions in a medical college in Ahmedabad, had obtained between 76 to 79 per cent marks at the Standard XII examina-
tion.t
The story is quite different in the southern Indian states. There reseNations for the Other Backward Classes have existed, in one form or the other, for over half a century. The extent of reservations there has reached the point of saturation, covering almost their proportional strength in the population.2 Performance
What has the policy achieved? Even after half
a
century of prefer-
Reservations Policy
Revisited
225
ential treatment only a negligible number of the SC, ST and OBC officers can be found in Class I positions of the government services. For example, of all the Class I officers on the rolls of the Central Government in 1979, only 5.68 per cent belonged to the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes taken together and a mere 4.69 per cent
came from the OBC category.3 In the public sector, in 1975, there were only 1.4 per cent scheduled caste and 0.6 per cent scheduled tribe officers in Class I positions. A 1971 survey of Indian managers showed that only one per cent among them came from all the three categories of the backward classes taken together.a In the north Indian states and in Gujarat and Maharashtra the utilization raie of reservations in govemment services and educational institutions by the Other Backward Classes is much less than the allocations made for them. For example, in Gujarat, against 10 per cent reservation, the utilization of seats by the OBC students in the engineering and medical colleges has not exceeded 5 per cent since 1980.s The unfilled seats have since been dereserved and made available to the non-backward population. To sum up, the backward classes have registered some progress in social mobility through reservations. But their presence in professional and white-collar jobs is, even today,
insignificant. Clearly, the provision of reservadons is not enough. For reservations to improve the life chances of the socially disadvantaged significantly, other components of the policy will have to show a much higher operational efficiency. The low rates of utilization, for instance, are indicative of the poor performance of the entire policy; for utilization is essentially a function, not of availability of benefits, but of the capacity of the potential beneficiaries to receive the benefits. For developing this capacity, effective performance of other aspects of the policy is equally, if not more, important. For example, in Maharashtra and Gujarat, the scheduled castes have, over the last decade, reached the national level of literacy. More importantly, over the last ten to fifteen years, the number of scheduled caste graduates, postgraduates and professionally trained graduates has increased phenomenally in these states. Their number runs into thousands. This has obviously increased their capacity of receiving the benefits of reservation. Given the very low base of the sixties there has been a rapid increase in the number of SCs in sovernment offices and in
226
educational institutions, making their presence more visible in the eighties. And yet, even in these two states, the rate of utilization by the SCs and STs remains considerably low compared to the extent of allocations made for them.
To a significant extent, it is this improvement in the rate of utilization that has led to elite resentment and agitations against the policy. It is not accidental that the anti-dalit agitations have since acquired a persistent, even vicious, character in these two states. konically enough, the degree of protest against the policy seems to be related to the extent of its successful implementation. Here lies the paradox: when judged by the policy's own objectives and the values and goals that underlie it, its performance on all counts is much below any reasonable expectation. In no event, does it pose any serious threat to the life chances of the upper and the middle castes.
But with the change in the overall climate of elite opinion on the issue of reservations. even a small increase in the rates of utilization is seen as disturbing the status quo ante and brings the policy under attack. The upper and middle castes hgan to feel acutely insecure in the mid-seventies, when many states in north India, and the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, started providing reservations for the Other Backward Classes. It was not only the higher rates of utilization by the scheduled castes, but the actions that were taken, although belatedly, to extend reservations to the OBCs, that was responsible for the
agitations. In the mid-seventies, the backward classes commissions appointed by many of these states stafled submitting their reports, recommending reservations for the Other Backward Classes. In 1978 the Central Government appointed the Second Backward Classes Commission which, in its report, submitted in 1980, recommended central action in regard to reservations for the Other Backward Classes, assigning to the Centre the same role that it plays vis-a-vis the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The Commission used caste as a criterion to determine the social and educational backwardness of the groups of potential kneficiaries. The population of the Other Backward Classes thus included was around 52 per cent of the total population. But in order to keep the total reservations for all categories within the limit of 5O per cent, prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Commission recommended only 27 per cent reservations for the OBC with the
Reservations Policy
Revisited
227
caveat that the south Indian states, which had already made reserva; tions above 27 per cent, would remain unaffected by this recommendation. Taking a cue from the Commission's recommendations, the state of Gujarat appoinled its own Second Commission in 1981. It recommended an increase of 18 per cent reservations for the OBCs, thereby raising the quantum ofexisting reservations for them from l0 per cent to 28 per cent, thus keeping the total reservations in the state wifhin the prescribed limit of 50 per cent. That increase had to be withheld in the face of agitation. Prior to rhis event, in 1977 government directive3 were issued to semi- and non-govemmental organr zations receiving government grants or subsidies to reserve 13 per cent of jobs for the scheduled castes. Although, by and large, the provision remained on paper, it gave rise to acute resentment in the middle classes. The agitations in Bihar, Maharashtra and lately in Gujarat were thus a sequel to this belated, even if diluted, implementation of the policy. These agitations have successfully stalled any further implementation of the policy or its rationalization in the north and westem states. The agitations seem to have 'succeeded' in one other respect. They have created an acute fear of conflict among those of our elite, who think that these problems can be resolved painlessly and whose rhetoric implies avoidance of a clash of interests that social change inevitably entails. Instead of gearing the state and its policies to meet such conflicts they would rather retreat to the safer ground of the status quo ante. Any honest and effective measure to implement a transformative social policy-be it land reforms, reservations or the removal of untouchability-is bound to generate conflicts. Maintaining the sfaras quo on such issues is no guarantee that it will not be disturbed. In fact, what actually happens is that issues that are at one time solvable in the legal-rational frame of a policy process, get pushed into the arena of direct action; for the implementation of a
policy is often not backed by the political will. The population

affected by the sratus quo and the disaffected political activisrs then take the issues to the streets, away from the legislatures and administrative apparatus of the state. It is in this context that the two major issues, thrown up by the agitations, need to be considered.
228
Two Major Policy Issues Two issues have prominently figured in recent agitations and in the debates they have triggered off in intellectual circles. One pertains to the legitimacy of reservations for the Other Backward Classes and the other to the criteria used for identifying beneficiary groups. We shall now examine these two issues in the larger perspective of the values that underlie the policy. us first take up the issue of reservations for the Other Backward Classes. We have seen that the provisions of reservations made for this category are not at all sinilar, either in type or extent, to those made for the scheduled castes and tribes. But the rationale is similar.
lrt
Although, the OBCs are not direct victims of untouchability or physical and cultural isolation, some communities among them are
disadvantaged and oppressed by the hierarchical system of castes and as such in need of preferential treatment. But the problem of identifying specific beneficiary groups among the OBCs is quite complex. This has caused several legal battles, constitutional amendments
and movements and agitations as well. And yet the solution is nowherc in sight. In fact, reservation has ceased to be a problem of administrative decision-making. It has now become an acute political problem, complicated by the history of policy itself as well as by the economic and social changes that have taken place since Independence. These changes have affected the OBC communities much more than any other section of the society. Unlike the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' the Other Backward Classes were tie first to enter the reservation system and that too by using political means. Not being totally oppressed and marginalised like the scheduled castes and tribes, they were the first among the backwards to organize and mobilize themselves in the form of a movement. Its beginning can be traced to tle formation of the Justice Party in 1916 in Madras. It began as a social reform movement to fight the ritual domination and cultural pre-eminence of the Brahmins. But it soon entered the then prevailing scene of competitive ethnic politics, with a view to wrenching concessions and benefits from the British Govemment. In the process, the non-Brahmin groups distanced themselves from the independence movement led by the Congress and earned for themselves the label of being 'British loyalists'. When the reservation policy was reconsidered at
Reservations Policy
Revisitid
229
the time of making the Constitution, this label probably came in rheir
way. But, by then, they had acquired significant political clour,
ar
least in the states of South India and in parts of the erstwhile Bombay
Presidency-areas beyond which the movement did not spread. The movement succeeded in obtaining for the backward classes of the south a series of concessions and reservations, both from the British
Govemment and from the princely rulers who themselves were against the Brahmin domination. As far back as in 1918 the princely state of Mysore declared all non-Brahmin communities as "backward classes" and allocated for them caste-wise quotas of seats in colleges and jobs in state services. This measure in fact marked the beginning of the system of reservations in India. The movement then demanded and got from the British Govemment in 1919, a share of political representation. Thus, the movement politically established the claims of the backward classes for reservations at the national level and won them in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies. Although the movement started as a front for all backward classes, including the lowest ones, as it developed, it became an organization of the middle and lower castes. The scheduled castes, then known as the "Depressed Ciasses" had to chart out a different political route for themselves. A part of the leadership and organization of the Depressed Classes operated from within the Congress party. But another part acted separately and autonomously, often in tandem, with the backward classes.
In the process of making the Constitution when the policy of reservations was being considered anew, the problem of the backward classes appeared different from that of the scheduled castes and tribes. This is because the fear of ethnic conflicts that had characterized the independence movement, loomed large in the minds of our Constitution makers. There was also a change in their perception caused by the improved economic and political conditions of the Other Backward Classes. As a result, although their claims for preferential treatment were conceded in principle, the Constitution remained silent on the criteria and mechanisms of sustaining and realizing these claims. It seems the claims were conceded only grudgingly and half-heartedly. It is important to remember that the whole issue of reservations was debated and the policy was conceived by the makers of our
230
Constitution in the context of minority rights. The policy, as then conceived, had a two-fold objective: One, to protect the interests and rights of those religious and other minorities who were likely to be affected adversely by the change in the balance of power after Independence. Accordingly, reservations for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians and some groups of the backward classes in legislatures, the cabinet, government service and education were discussed and recommended by the Minority Rights Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly. Two, to extend special privileges to the deprcssed castes, tribal population and other backward classes to help them overcome their social disabilities and backwardness and thus enable tlem to participate in the 'national mainstream' with full citizenship rights. It is an interesting chapter of the politics of Constitution-making that, by the end of the process, through a resolution moved by Dr Ambedkar, all the previously existing reservations, except for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were abolished. Specific provisions for reservation of seats in legislatures and in the services were made in the Constitution only for these two categories. For the Other Backward Classes only a refernce to the protection of their interests was made in one of the Directive Principles. Later, a general reference in the amended Article 15 allowed the states to take steps for the advancement of the Socially and Fducationally Backward Classes. Only Clause 4 of Article 16 made a somewhat direct reference in this regard. This Article is about guaranteeing equality of opportunities for all, but Clause 4 makes provision for reservations of posts for what it describes as "any backward class of citizens" and that too only if a class is not adequately represented in the services of the state. The worrds any and adequarely arc significant. Moreover, through Article 340, the procedure to determine the need for reservations and the criteria for identifying beneficiary groups within the category of socially and educationally backward classes were left to investigations by commissions which the President may appoint. As against this, Article 335 makes explicit provision of reservations for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. In addition, some time-bound provisions, which have now expired, were made for Anglo-Indians. On the insistence of the Sikh leadership, the depressed castes of Sikhs
were eventuallv included in the scheduled castes list. As for the
Resemations Policy
Revisited
231
religious minorities per se, they were all kept out of the reservations provisions. Indeed, some like the Parsis opted out of their own
volition.
Vy'hat does this add up to? The Constitution is unambiguous and
emphatic about according preferential treatment to the scheduled

castes and tribes.
It has however left
a great deal
of ambiguity with
rcspect to the
OBCs-in the matter of specifying the benefits, in
laying down criteria for identifying the beneficiary groups and in

making provisions for monitoring and implementing the policy. Consequently, as noted earlier, there is no central policy of reservations for the Other Backward Classes. It is largely left to the discretion of the respective state governments. Such ambiguity has led to innumerable law suits. And now the issue is being fought in the streets in those states which have exercised their discretion in favour of the OBCs in the recent past. This is a dangerous development since it seriously threatens the legitimacy of the entire policy of positive discrimination, not just in favour of the OBCs but also in favour of the scheduled castes and tribes. Issues which were settled long ago are now being reopened. Reopening the issues has become possible because the criteria for classification, even of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are not clearly defined in the Constitution. It more or less accepts lhe classification made by the Govemment of India Act of 1935: any caste, race or tribe designated by the President as "scheduled", can be included in the list. And once included, only Parliament has the powers of exclusion. It was possible-then, as it is possible now, to include in the scheduled liss several communities currently classi-
fied as OBCs whose conditions are no better than those of the scheduled castes and tribes. But theso communities have been inationally lumped with the well-to-do and upwardly mobile middle castes among the OBCs. Many among the OBCs, once considered as backward, have over the years acquired considerable political clout and some economic power. They have also improved their social status. Yet, because they are classihed as OBCs, they continue to receive the benefits of rcservations. It is precisely for this reason that the problem of inclusion and exclusion of groups in this category has become a political, rather than an administrative problem. In it also lies the source of increasing
232
rcsentment among the non-beneficiary groups. The prevalent criteria of identification are essentially social, rather than economic. Hence, the OBC category today includes, especially in some southem states, the dominant castes of agriculturists, who at the local level are often locked in conflict with the scheduled castes. At the same time, the
category also includes a large number of extremely backward and socially deprived groups whose condition of disability and disadvantage is in no way better-in some cases even worse-than that of the scheduled castes and tribes. In the states of north India and in Gujarat and Maharashtra, where reservations for the Other Backward Classes have been introduced only recently, the groups identified as socially and educationally backward, by and large, include communities of the latter type. They comprise ex-criminal tribes, nomadic communities, scheduled castes converted to Christianity or Islam and a whole range of small castes which suffered from untouchability in relative, though not in absolute terms and are engaged in caste-bound marginal occupations. These groups have little or no capacity to receive benefits. Yet, enhanced reservations are demanded and given in their name. But, in reality, a large part of the benefits actually go not to them but to a minority of the well-to-do and advanced communities, which are technically classified as "backward". If strict criteria of disability or social disadvantage were to be applied, they would no longer qualify for the benefits of reservations. And this is what the upper castes strongly resent. It is significant that the states in which reservations for the OBCs have recently been enhanced and where agitations have taken place happen precisely to be the states where the issue of classification has been wmngly handled. In these states, the category of scheduled castes has been artificially restricted and the category of OBCs correspondingly expanded. Whereas the national ayerage of scheduled caste population is about 16 per cent, in states like Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh around 25 per cent are classified in that category. In West Bengal the comparable figure is 22 pr cent. As against this, a meagre 7 per cent are included in the category of SC in Gujarat and Maharashtra. This obviously means that many a marginal caste suffering only relative untouchability is included in the scheduled castes list, say in a state like West Bengal. Similar castes are included in the OBC lists in states like Guiarat and
Resewations Policy Revisited
233
Maharashtra. This imbalance in classification has led several states to enhance reservations for the OBCs. The enhancement is intended to cover the deserving but has so far left out backward communities in the prevailing SC and ST lists. Clearly, there is a case for disaggregating the category of the Other Backward Classes and for thoroughly rationalizing the scheduled lists.o A number of communities included in the Other Backward Classes, which by their condition of disability and disadvantage are closer to the scheduled castes or tribes, need to be integrated into the respective lists of scheduled castes and tribes.T This will not only remove the patent anomalies we now see in the OBC category, it will do much more. At present, the scheduled castes carry the social identification of untouchability. The entry of several "touchable" but extremely backward castes into the schedule will erode such identi-
fication.
Now let us consider the issue of criteria for reservations. We saw that there is ambiguity in the Constitution about tlre status of the Other Backward Classes, and there is also the rise of a section of politically dominant castes among tlem. These factors together have led to a demand for changing the prevalent criteria of reservations. The demand, now being made through agitations, is not only for modifying the criteria. The agitators seek to alter the very basis of the present system of blassification, which will affect not just the Other
Backward Classes but also the scheduled castes and tribes. The crux of their argument is that economic backwardness should be the criterion for identification of beneficiaries, in place of the present complex one, based on social disability and disadvantage. Such a demand, if it is conceded, will call for changes in the basic structure of our Constitution, involving the Fundamental Rights, not only of the s'bclally disabled groups but also of the religious minorities. For the neif$-bmand recognizes equality only among individuals 4ua individuals, didt between groups. The Constitution, on the other hand, is sensitive to the problems involved in realizing equality in a country of religious and cultural pluralities on the one hand and oppressive caste hierarchies on the other. So, it has, through various provisions, worked out a fine balance between these two notions of equality. The Indian Constitution cannot accommodate any demand that trades one notion of equality for the other, without undermining
234
its basic character.
The Politics oJ Bacltwardness
As it now stands, there is little doubt that the Constitution stipulates social and retgious disabilities (e.g., untouchability) as criteria for the identification of beneficiary groups. These characteristics, when compounded with economic and educational backwardness, cre.ate a structural situation of backwardness, which the policy seeks
to overcome. The policy of preferential treatment is thus conceived in the context of membenhip of a group, that is socially disabled and
disadvantaged. It is zor for any individual or household which may be poor or otherwise economically deprived. Put differently, reservation is a device to eliminate backwardness
arising from historic conditions of social injustice in which certain grcups arc located. It is not meant as a scheme to counter conditions of economic backwardness or poverty of individuals or groups that may arise as a by-product of the development prooess itsef. Of coursc, there is nothing to prevent the State from formulating special schemes for overcoming economic backwardness. But rcservation is not fipant for that pupos. So, to repeat my poinL there is no sanction in the Constinrtion for applying economic criteria" either exclusively or primarily for reservations. There seems to be no escape from using caste as a primary critcrion for identifying the beneficiary groups of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and for including the other truly marginalized groups from among the OBCs
into the scheduled lists.

As for the rcmaining communities within the OBC category, other criteria such as income, education, or occupation can be brought in.
There is oo constitutional impedinrcnt
in doing this because the courts have already offered interpretations of the OBCs' ambiguous status in the Constitution. While holding caste as the primary criterion for identifying social and educational backwardness the courts have'approved the use of other criteria as well. In fact, in many states the identification of beneficiaries is done at the individual and household levels from among the OBC communities, by applying the income and educational criteria. This means that only the deserving individuals or households within the communities and not the communities as a whole are entitled to preferential treatnrent. The status of the scheduled castes and tribes, in the Constirution, unlike that of the OBC, is however, quitc different. These categories,
Reservations Policy Revisited
235
specified in the Constitution, have substantial social content.They are referred to as "castes", "races" and "tribes" and specific lists of them are constitutionally authorised. While the lists were, for the most part' inherited from the 1935 Act, the Constitution gave a wide latitude to
the govemment to include any new group, which in its opinion, deserved to be included. But the Constitution did not empower the government to change the rationale of classification itself which is based on considerations of social disability and not of economic backwardness per se. "social disability" is a condition shared by all the members of a group; it is not a characteristic of only a few households within that group.
Constitutional stipulations apart, it will be a mistake to apply the logic of economic criteria to scheduled castes and tribes. It is true that there is among them a small section which has improved its economic condition. But, for them, the problem does not end with economic upliftment. In fact, it often begins with it because they continue to suffer acutely from status disability. There is abundant empirical evidence to show that wherever they have improved their economic position by availing themselves of benefits from special schemes, they have become targets of atrocities.
The perpetrators are often the locally dominant castes of the so-called backwards. Reservdtions, thus, allow the scheduled castes a route to escape from the life of social tenor in villages to the anonymity of towns and cities with the help of education and government jobs. The problem of the scheduled castes and tribes is thus qualitatively different. For them, both the economic and social disadvantages constitute two sides ofthe same coin. They are poor because of their status disability; and in order that they may get rid of their status disability, the first thing they have to do is to move out of poverty. And when they begin to move out of poverty they become targets of atrocities. A recent analysis based on 1977 -78 data shows how different the problem of poverty is for.the SC/ST population from that of the general population.E The rural population of the SCs and STs,
taken together, is about 27 per cent and the incidence of poverty among them is over 70 per cent. Whereas, the 73 per cent nonscheduled rural population has an incidence ofpoverty of 54 per cent. (Among the se 54 per cent, a vast majority are members of the communities belonging to the OBCs.) The picture of urban poverty
236
in terms of divergence between the scheduled and non_scheduled populations is even worse. For 13 per cent urban scheduled popula_ tion the incidence of poverty is close to 60 per cent; for g7 per cent non-scheduled urban population the incidence of poverty is 43 per cent. A similar pattem was observed with respect to per capita consumption. The average per capita expenditure among the bottom half of the population was found to be substantially low for the scheduled population than for the rest of the population. These data leave little doubt about the fact that economic back_ wardness for the scheduled population is of a systemic nature, arising out of their social condition; for them it is not a random occunence. Unless the barriers of social structure are removed, they cannot graduate either from their present state of penury to any livable standard, or from social bondage to a state offull citizenship. Ifsocial policies of the state were aimed at creating a civil society, they have to protect and promote the interests of these communities through reverse discrimination in their favour. The upper castes, which are getting agitated about reservations forget that for long they have been the beneficiaries of a parallel and on-going system of discrimination in their own favour. It is not accidental that in Madhya Pradesh, the govemment bureaucracy is dominated by Kanya-Kubja Brahmins, or that the clerks and officers in a particular nationalized bank have, for long, been recruited largely from two sub-castes of Gujarat-one of the Brahmins and another of the Banias; or that, until recently, jobs in the Western Railway were almost monopolized by the Anavil Brahmins from Gujarat. Again, in Gujarat, the sons and daughters of medical doctors, irrespective of . their poor performance in schools, manage to get admission to medical colleges. One can go on and on with such examples. The point is that it is not the application of social criteria for reservations which consolidates the caste system. It in fact enables the backward popu-
lation to move out of traditional, caste-bound occupations. By decoupling caste and occupation it destroys the material base of the
caste system. Once this process is accomplished, caste may remain as a form of social consciousness, a political identity, whose members are socially and occupationally so differentiated that it loses its basis in any collective sense in society. What has consolidated the caste system in modem times is, in fact, the informal but ongoing system
Reservations Policy
Revisited
237
of social preference and discrimination in favour of the upper castes,

described above. It has imparted a peculiar composition and charac-
ter to our middle class. Our middle class, as it is now constituted, comprises largely the dwija castes and the upper rungs of the Sudra castes. This narrow caste character of our middle class can change only if its members are recruited from a wider social base. The middle class is, no doubt, quantitatively expanding. But it is not getting sufhciently diversified. Such a socially stagnant middle class cannot process or dissolve identities that lie outside its limited cultural ambit. An expanding and diversifuing middle class, on tle other hand, can become a solvent of old identities, with the new groups drawn into its fold also contributing to shaping its culture. Reservations reverse the process of ongoing discrimination, and prevent the social and cultural self-perpetuation of our traditional upper-caste based middle class. By enabling people from a cross-section of castes and religions to get into the system of higher education and white-collar jobs, reservations contribute to the diversification of the middle class. Suggestions for the Policy From the analysis presented so far, follow certain conclusions and suggestions for policy. The rcservation policy has been wavering in several of its aspects and has been diluted in its implementation. My first conclusion is that it needs to be firmly reoriented in the basic values enshrined in the Constitution, namely of equality and social justice. Hence, preferential treatment must continue until the basic goal of bringing significant numbers from the lower social strata of the population into professions, white-collar jobs and govemnrcnt services. is achieved. The problem, as it is now unfortunately formulated, is not of favouring specific groups. It is a problem about the kind of society and political system we want to build. Let me illustrate this with an episode from the past. During the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, Sardar Patel argued against a time limit for reservations. He suggested that reservations continue until the backward classes had visibly improved their position. But Dr Ambedkar, who is today thought ofby some people as a sectional leader, pleaded that the issue should be considered in larger national terms. He argued that on a
238
The Politics ofBackwardness
matter like this the future generations of parliamentarians should not be bound by the Constitution. So, a time limir should be ser so thar
future parliaments, in their wisdom, could continue or discontinue it. contrast, our discussions on the issue today have come to be narrowed down to only legal, constitutional and parochial aspects;
In
they lack the political imagination that should inform thinking on such a problem of vital importance for the system as a whole. We must, therefore, elevate the discussion of this issue to the larger framework of values and goals for a social policy. Secondly, the cther aspects of the policy, especially the enabling measures aimed at increasing the capability of beneficiary groups to receive benefits of reservations, need to be vigorously implemented. At present the constitutional obligation of the State is remembered only at the time of elections. The action appears as a political gimmick and tends, thereby, to discredit the entire policy. Lastly, I shall recapitulate the suggestion I have already made, in somewhat clearer terms. The state should, after detailed surveys,
incorporate the oppressed communities of the Other Backward Classes, which today exist on the margins of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, into the scheduled lists, and the allotments should be proportionately increased for these categories. This will not only remove the persistent anomaly and reduce the resentment felt by the non-beneficiaries, it will help blur the social identification of groups comprising the ST and SC categories. From the remaining communities of the Other Backward Classes, those with comparable educational and economic levels (say, above poverty line) to that of the non-scheduled and non-backward population, should be identified and listed separately. While they may continue to receive benefits of enabling provisions of the policy, they
should be excluded from the benefits of reservations. For tbe still remaining ones, who have yet not graduated to the specified level of economic and educational attainment and could also not be included in the scheduled lists, the beneficiaries should be identified by applying the economic and educational criteria from within the communities listed as OBCs. Thus, by first applying the criterion of social identification, we can proceed with applying other criteria such as income, land-holding, occupation, education and habitation to locate the beneficiaries from within each OBC community. This will ensure
Reservations P olicy Revisited
239
that households within each community of the OBCs,which may be in feed of preferential treatment can actually get it, as also exclude those who have improved, over time, their economic and educational position. This calls for a centralized policy of reservations for the OBCs to be followed uniformly by the states. Also needed will be systematic surveys by an independent authority to assess changeV improvements in their economic and educational conditions. But I wish to end this paper by repeating what I have already said: For the scheduled categories, even after the lists are enhanced, only the social criteria will have to be used, at least until their status disability ceases to come in the way of their social mobility. NOTES AND REFERENCES
l. Mahesh Dave. 'tsackward Classes and Reservation' in Haroobhai Mehta and Hasmukh Patel, cds., Dywnics of Resemation Po&cy' New Delhi. 1985' p. 100 Gable 7)2. The rqsefvations for OBC are 50 per cent each in Kamataka and Tamilnadu, rto per cent in Kerala and 25 pe.r cent in Andhra Pradesh . IbA., p. 97 Clable 2). 3. Govemment of lndia:. Reports of the Backward Classes Cotnmission,Fitst Part (vols. | & 2), 198O, p. 42. 4. Data from Sagra C. Jain, "Indian Manager: His Origin and Career," 1971. Reproduced in Mahesh Dave, op. ar., p. 98. 5. Mahesh Dave, op. crt , p. 100 (table E). 6. The classification of OBCs in Bihar, for example, recogrrizes this division. Accordingly, Bihar has two OBC lists: one comprising the rclatively advanced backward communities and the second listing the extremely backward communities. Separate quotas are allocated to each with a view to prevent comering of the benefis by the 'dominant' castes among the backwards. 7- This anomaly was recognized in Cujarat, but only a partial attempt was made to correct it. For example the Bavchas, Bhils and Padharias who in the first instance should have been included in the Scheduled Tribes list were excluded from any benelit of reservations. It was only in the mid-seventies that they were included in the OBC list by the First Backward Class (Baxi) Commission of Gujarat- Subsequently, on the recommendation of the State Govemment they were included in the Scheduled Tribes list. In the sarne way, the Mochis, ctassified as OBC by the Baxi Commission were included in the Scheduled Caste list. Such an exercise needs to be undertaken on a larger scale, not only in Gujarat but also for other states. 8- K. Sundaram, "Economic Growth and Endemic Poverty in India ' in Ponna Wignaraja and Akmaal Hussain, eds., D*elopment, Democracy and Regional Caopemtion.Tokyo: United Nations University (forthcoming publication), I 987.
Chapter
I0
Consequences of Reservations
Ghanshyam Shah
major objective of the various provisions enshrined in the Constitution providing reservations for the scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes and the other backward castes is to build an egalitarian social order in place of tlle fragmented and homohierarchical social order. The provisions aim at improving their socioeconomic condition and integrate them with the mainstream. A review of the implementation of these provisions raises two questions: One, to what extent have the deprived communities in general and certain groups or individuals among them in particular taken advantage of the legal provisions and improved their condition? And what are its consequences on the deprived communities, in regard to their unity and common identity? Two, how does the dominant stratum of society react to these provisions and what are the consequences of the provisions on the present socio-political system? At the outset, it should be mentioned that the ruling class had evolved the strategy of making provisions for reservation in the Indian Constitution out ofpolitical exigency to resolve the challenges that they faced in maintaining their dominance.t It is a different thing that the measures have further sharpened the social contradictions. It should be mentioned that the Congress recognised, as far back as in 1917, the necessity of "removing disabilities imposed on rhe Depressed Classes" when the depressed classes demanded .communal representation' like that of the Muslims and the sikhs. And the Congress agreed to accommodate the Hariians in the distribution of
Conse que nce s of Re se rvations
241
Assembly and Parliament seats when the British govemment offered 'communal representation' to the depressed classes at the Round Table Conference. Initially Gandhi refused, in the Second Round Table Conference (1932), not only to consider separate electorates but he opposed any form of special representation involving reserved seats for the SCs. Without belittling the moral ground on which Gandhi opposed separate representation, his political calculation also should not be ignored. Gandhi feared that 'the separate electorate will create division among Hindus, so much so that it will lead to bloodshed. 'Untouchable' hooligans will make common cause with Muslim hooligans and kill caste-Hindus."2 Several tribal groups demanded separate electorates in the 1930s and some of the tribes, particularly from North-East India demanded a separate state outside India on the eve of Independence. These tribes entertained apprehensions that the Hindus would introduce their laws and customs "to supersede our own customary laws."3 I mention this with a view to underscore two points: One, the dominant groups accepted reservation not because of the conviction that it was necessary to build an egalitarian social order, but because of the pressure exerted by different minorities. Two, the groups exercising political domination in India desired to secure the support of the depressed classes for maintaining their own power vis-a-vis the dominant groups of other communities.
Political
Reservations for political positions has apparently reduced the monopoly of political power of the traditionally dominant groups. The latter have been compelled to part with some parliamentary or legislative seats to the SC/ST individuals. Consequently, members of the dominant groups resent political reservation, as their chances for contesting from their home constituencies, which happen to have been declared as reserved, are sealed. One can cite examples where the influential political leaders successfully notified and denotified some of the constituencies as 'reserved' or 'general' to enable them to contest from a 'safe' constituency. Moreover, the double-member constituencies were abolished in 1961 . One of the underlying reasons for the abolition was that it favoured the election of SC/ST legislators from the unreserved seats. "Having (by their own estimate) done
242
most of the work, spent most of the money, and mobilized most of the
votes for the party ticket, non-scheduled caste politicians faced the prospect of being edged out of the contest by scheduled caste bloc voting. If untouchables gave both of their votes to scheduled caste candidates regardless of party affiliation, a non-untouchable candidate might be defeated for the general seat by his own party running mate."4 For instance, V.V. Giri was defeated in the 1959 election by a scheduled tribe candidate. Thus, the double-member constituency provided an oppornrnity to S(7ST candidates to get elected from the general constituency. With the abolition of tle double-member constituency, the S9ST candidates have been gradually pushed to the reserved constituencies
only. This is evident from the fact that the number of SCYST candidates elected from unreserved constituencies for the Vidhan Sabhas have declined after the 1962 general elections. ln 1962,48 SCyST members were elected for Vidhan Sabhas from unreserved constituencies.
In 1977 only three were elected instead.s Though SC/ST political leaders have secured legislative positions, they have not proved very effective in implementing the laws enacted for the benefit of the SCYST. A number of studies on the contribution of the SCTST legislators show that they did not actively participate in the debates in the state Assemblies or the Parliament concerning issues affecting the deprived communities.6 Despite the constitutional directive "to make laws prcscribing punishment" for acts contravening fundamental rights related to disability arising out of'untouchability', SC members of Parliament could not effectively expedite the Untouchability (Offences) Act. It took Parliarnent five years to pass such an Act, which however, by and large, remained on paper. During the I 960s, the total number of case s registered with the police under this Act, throughout the country, was less than 5,000, with only 700 cases rcsulting in conviction. After repeated demands from the press and the liberal-minded intelligentsia for stronger protective legislation, the Protection of Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1976. The Bill was lying with the Parliament for six years, indicating not only the callousness ofthe ruling party but also the ineffectiveness of the scheduled caste MPs in pressing the government to pass the Bill. The authorities have by and large rcmained indifferent in implementing the Act with any seriousness. A police officer of Tamilnadu was
C onsequences of Re se rvat io ns
243
reported to have said: "If we (the police) take this law seriously, half the population of Tamilnadu will have to be arrested. In any case, the police have better things to do than go poking their nose into the private affairs of the people."7 Nor did scheduled caste MLAs use
their political power for the effective implementation of the Acts. Even SC/ST chief ministers could do very little to protect the civil rights of the communities they represented. For instance, an SC leader, D. Sanjeeviah, of Andhra Pradesh became the chief minister because of the numerical strength of the scheduled caste MLAs in the
Assembly in the early 1960s. But the state's per capita expenditure on SC welfare was the lowest in the country. The scheduled caste MLAs of Andhra were indifferent to the Kanchikaderla "Harijan burning" incident in | 968.8 Similarly, the scheduled tribe chief minister of Gujarat, Amarsinh Chaudhari, could do very little to prevent the atrocities against the tribals of Valia taluka. He failed to arrest the police officer who raped a tribal woman. In fact, the police department did not cooperate in the inquiry against the culprit and the chief minister was helpless. The SC/ST MLAs and MPs do use their numerical strength as a bloc power in the faction-ridden party politics and they work as a balancing force between two rival factions. In retum for their support to one or another faction, they bargain for political positions in the Cabinet or various committees or statutory bodies. But they cannot act effectively when the atrocities are committed against members of their communities; nor do they pressurise the administration for the implementation of minimum wages or distribution of land. The SC/ST MLAs and MPs owe allegiance to their parry. They contest as party nominees and get the benefit of the party machinery, both in terms of numerical and financial support, which enable them to secure victory. Moreover, the political parties select those SC/ST persons as the party candidates who are willing to toe the line of the party bosses, and avoid taking militant positions on problems conceming the SCsiSTs. The party bosses are more interested in capturing power rather than in improving the conditions of the deprived communities. Moreover, they select those persons as party candidates who are educated and relatively better off. Hence, a majority of MLAs and MPs belong to the upper strata of these communiries. It is significant to note that a large majority of the scheduled caste MLAS
244
The Politics of Bachanrdness
of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra have no personal experience of untouchability. This is indicative of their decaste status.e One of the SC leaders complained: "This system does the scheduled castes no good because the people in the reserved seats belong to the party in power and are often incapable persons. Although they are educated, they dare not speak out against the party in power. They do not represent their people to the party and government, but represent the party in power to their people."ro l.ooking at the rcpresentation of the various caste groups in legislative bodies, it is safe to assume that there would not have been significant differences in the numerical strength of the SC/ST members in the state Assemblies and Parliament without reservation. It may be possible that these numbers would have been smaller in the fifties, but it would have been increased like that of the OBCs in the subsequent elections. However, it is certain that because of reserva-
tion, S(YST political leaders, whose numbers are assured, have been co-opted easily by the national political parties. As the SC population is scattered unlike that of the STs, one may speculate that the SCs
might not have got adequate number of seats in the Assemblies and Parliament proportionate to their population. Like the Muslims, they would have had to depend mainly on the 'good will' of the party bosses; or they would have become more militant and would have opted for the extra-parliamentary path.
Government Employment
Reservation in government employment for the depressed classes was introduced in 1943 by the British govemment. But at that time, hardly any qualified persons from the 'untouchables' and tribals were available to take advantage of the reservations. In fact, "in 1941 the
government decided that no useful purpose would be served by reservations for scheduled tribes as too few were available for appointments."rr In 1953, SC and ST combined together did not occupy even half-a-per cent (0.35 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST) of Class I; and 2 per cent of the Class [I (1.29 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST) positions. They werc less than 7 per cent in Class III (4.52 per cent SC and 2.3 per cent ST). SC occupied 2l per cent of the Class IV menial positions, including sweepers. In the caste hierarchy, the upper and middle castes consider menial work as polluted and meant
Consequences of
Reservations
245
for the ati-sudras. Hence, the concentration of SC in Class IV positions is not surprising. The position of SC and ST did not substantially improve in the first decade because in order to secure govemment jobs, they were required to pass qualifying examinations for which at least eleven years of education even for Class Itr jobs was needed. This was the initial period for reservation as well as for the higher education of the SCs and the STs. Moreover, some of the states did not enforce reservations in the early fifties for state government jobs. And, there was no reservation for internal promotion till 1957.12 Some departments, on the recommendation of the Home Ministry, extended reservations to the promotion posts filled by departmental examinations. But it was severely curtailed in 1963. As a result, ". . . not a single scheduled casteitribe candidate has been promoted either on the basis of departmental promotion examination or on the basis of ad hoc selections,"r3 an organisation of SC/ST employees declared. The roster system for promotion was introduced in the early seventies, thanks to the mounting pressure built up by the SC/ST govemment employees against discrimination experienced by them in departmental promotion and dereservation of the posts. By the end of the seventies the presenpe of SC/ST employees in different departments at various levels had become conspicuous. The proportion of the SC was 5, 7 and l3 per cent respectively in the Class I, II and III in 1979; though the STs were lagging behind the SCs, they occupied I per cent each of Class I and II and 3 per cent in Class IIL The reservation of posts in public sector undertakings came into force in the midsixties, though it was agreed to "in principle" as far back as 1954. Consequently, SCs occupied 2,4 and 16 per cent and STs occupied 0.47,0.97 andT.41 per cent in Class I, II and III respectively in the
public sector in 1978.14 It should be noted that the SCs and STs could occupy govemment positions in such numbers primarily, though not solely, due to reservations. The OBCs who got reservations in the late sixties and early seventies lag behind SCs and STs in govemment jobs despite their larger numerical strength. They constitute 5 and 11 percentages in Class I and II respectively as against 6 and 18 per cent of the SC/ST in the respective classes.rs Thus, reservation has positively helped (though not to the extent expected) members of SC and ST, who were
246
The Politics of Backwardnes s
able to qualify. This has sharpened the stratification among the SCs
and the STs.
small stratum has become middle class, getting
disassociated from their traditional caste ties in day-to-day relationships because of their imitation of the life-style and values of the established middle class. As a result, the composition of the middle class has changed to some extent during the last three decades. In the
past, the middle class was almost solely constituted of upper and middle castes. Now, low castes including SCs, and STs have entered it. This has paved the way for the middle class to become cosmopolitan in terms of its caste character, providing opportunity to persons of
different castes to share its class character.r6 To my mind, this is a prerequisite for building a secular society. On the other hand, the number of students studying for higher education has increased more than 15 times (from 3.6 lakhs in 195051 to 47.5 lakhs in 1982-83).t7 Of course, this size is confined to a microscopic minority of the Indian population,- only 5 per cent of persons in the age group between 17 and 23 years. A vast majority of them belong to the upper social strata-traditionally the upper and middle castes. However, all those who have studied up to or above matriculation are not absorbed in the job market. In fact, the rate of
the educated (matriculates and above) unemployed is far higher than
the rate of rise in education. There were 1,61,599 educated unemployed in 1952. The number has gone up at an alarming rate81,43,900 educated unemployed persons in 1980.18 Since education among higher castes is higher than that among the SC' ST and OBC' they constitute a larger proportion of the educated unemployed. The upper and middle castes, which have had a monopoly of middle class jobs, have increasingly felt threatene& as SC/ST and OBC started taking advantage of reservation in greater numbers' Though some members of the Constituent Assembly opposed the constitutional provisions related to reservations for SC, ST and OBC in 1948-49, there was no widespread uproar at that time from the upper and middle castes. This was perhaps because of two reasons: One, at that time, reservations were abstract and did not directly
affect them as there were not many SC/ST qualified candidates seeking government employment; and two, in the prevailing atmosp-here of democracy and equality there was wishful thinking that the
country would be so prosperous in
a decade
or so that reservation for
Consequences of
Resemations
247
jobs would be redundant, and caste and religious differences would disappear. Today the situation is more gloomy than in the early fifties. Overall unemployment has increased. On the other hand, the
SCs, STs and OBCs have started asserting their rights and are taking
greater advantage of the reservation policy.
Despite past ideological and ritual mechanisms to control the exploited castes, in the course of history, conflict between the dominant castes and lower castes has come to the surface. The so-called harmonious relationship among the castes continued so long as the lower castes did not resist exploitation and social injustice. Contemporary tensions between upper and middle castes and lower castes on the issue of reservations reveal the same pattern. The dominant castes have started opposing reservations on various grounds. And wherever possible they have sabotaged the implementation of reservation orders. Govemment officers belonging to upper and middle castes who are against reservations hesitate and, if possible, delay the implementation of govemment orders regarding recruitment or promotion of SCs, STs and the OBCs. One can offer a number of examples showing the delaying tactics on the part of upper caste officers in implementing reservation orders. Wherever possible they dereserve the positions on one excuse or another. And those who are recruited often experience humiliation. Their errors are magnified. They get alienated from their other colleagues in the office and are compelled to join hands with their caste fellows. The caste bias is reflected in the trade unions as well. The union leaders who belong to upper or middle castes not only do not show sympathy for the SC, ST and OBC employees but they also openly oppose the reservation policy. The grievances of SC/ST employees are not properly attended to. Some ofthe trade unions have even given a call that the members of the unions who are not SCVSTs "must be united to start a struggle" against the SCVSTs.le Consequently, trade unions tend to split, and in some places SC/ST/OBC employees form their own unions to protect their interests. The conflict between the dominant castes and deprived castes has come to the surface before in High Courts and the Supreme Court. There were 113 cases reported in law reports about 'compensatory discrimination' from 1950 to 1977. A majority of the cases relared ro departmental promotions and admission to professional courses. The
248
judiciary, like the government administration, is dominated by the upper and middle castes; and their caste/class bias is reflected ;n their judgements. Marc Galanter observes: "No judge has emerged as the champion of compensatory discrimination; Justice (later Chief Justice) Gajendragadkar probably comes closest by virtue of his opinion in Dora and Rangachari, two of the small number of Supreme Court cases in which the scope of preferential treatment was given a broadening, expansive interpretation. A few other judges sat often enough to display a consistent tendency to curtail its operation."2O Those judge: who have been in favour of preferential treatment often vac-
illate on the question of whether caste should be the basis for recognising backwardness, including that of SC and ST.2l
Upper and middle castes launched agitations against reservations for SC, ST and OBC in Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya hadesh and Andhra. Particularly, the numerically large groups such as Harijans and some backward castes who have taken to higher education and secured govemment jobs were the targets of attacks by the agitators. In Gujarat and elsewhere, houses of the Harijans and backward castes were set on fire and some were killed, injured and terrorised. The upper caste agitators have succeeded in curtailing the reservation
facilities.22 It is often argued that reservation on caste basis is responsible for the ugly face of casteism. It invokes caste feeling and strengthens caste consciousness which is antithetical to secularism. This view assumes that casteism was not strong before the introduction of reservation. It also assumes that the members of the upper-middle castes are benevolent, tolerant and secular. They oppose reservation
because
it
strengthens casteism and hampers the process of
secularisation. To my mind, this assumption is unfounded. The upper castes are 'secular' so long as their monopoly is maintained and they are allowed to share the benefits among themselves. There was no reservation for the OBCs in many states, including Gujarat, till the mid-seventies. But even a cursory analysis of Gujarat politics would convince anyone that before 1976 caste consciousness was as strongif not more so-than after the introduction of reservation for OBC in 1978. The only difference is that after 1978, the upper and middle castes have had to share at least some of the govemment positions with the OBCs when the latter began to assert their rights. Gujarat
C onse quence
s of Re s e rv ations
249
politics in the fifties was often considered as non-casteist because there was no apparent conflict between the upper-middle castes and OBCs.23 Such an illusory situation had been treated as reality because at that time power was shared by political leaders belonging to upper and middle castes. As the OBCs started asserting their rights their demands were branded as 'communal'. To my mind, one of the prerequisites for building a secular society is to create a mechanism,
whereby persons from different castes and communities can enter the same arena and work together. In the present Indian situation, reservation is the mechanism whereby persons from different castes can come together for secular activities.
Merit and Efficiency

It is often argued that though reservation provides socialjustice to the deprived groups, it entails a heavy cost by sacrificing efficiency and merit. At the outset, let me state that I do not consider efficiency
as a non-issue, nor do I believe that reservation has no impact whatsoever on efficiency. Nevertheless, the above argument of efficiency displays either a great degree of bias against the deprived groups by prejudging their ability, or an abstract and partial notion of efficiency.
The above argument is at best based on stray cases rather than on a systematic study. It assumes that performance in examination and efficiency are closely related. While judging academic performance, one needs to keep in mind the educational system which is structured,
in more ways than one, in favour of the better-off sections of society.24 Students belonging to upper and middle castes/classes not only
have a more congenial environment, they also study in relatively better schools and enjoy other facilities such as private coaching. On the other hand, students from deprived groups, besides suffering from discrimination, lack the facilities and environment for studies.
Teachers belonging to the upper and middle castes generally pay less attention to the SC/ST/OBC students. The inability of these teachers to bring students at least up to minimum standards should also be considered inefficiency. However, the inability of teachers to create confidence among all the students, irrespective of caste, and their failure to bring them up to a minimum level have yet to become an issue of academic or political debate. The efficiency of those teachers
250
who violate the basic legal and ethical principles of teaching by practising discrimination against students in the classroom and examination usually go unchallenged. The assumption of a'direct relationship between efficiency and examination performance needs thorough scrutiny. I have not seen any published empirical study examining the co-relationship between these two variables. The University Commission Repon (1950), known as the Radhakrishnan Commission Report pointed out that the examination system is'linvalid, inadequate, subjective and therefore not reliable." As late as 1976, the University Grants Commission observed: "Examinations have come to dominate the educational process; passing them is more important than acquiring education."2s It also admits that, "The marking ofthe scripts even at the best public examination is hurried and superficial. The marks obtained in examinations are not a reliable measure of a student's performance (leave aside achievement); the combination of raw marks lacks validity."
The studies by Edwin Ha4ler,26 Mukherjee,2T George,2E etc. show variations of 15 marks by different examiners for the same set of
scripts. This is applicable not only to literature but also to mathematics, physics, zoology, botany, chemistry, etc. The evidence presented
by these studies clearly shows that difference in percentages in marks, even of 15 per cent, do not definitely reveal a high or low
ability.
Notwithstanding these in-built limitations of the examination system, and assuming that the system is not defective, the fact remains that classroom studies have very little bearing on most of tle work in non-professional spheres of administration. Govemment servants of Class I, tI and trI ranks find very little relevance from what they studied at graduate or post-graduate level in their day+o-day office work. Even a cursory look into the list of the employees of large private companies reveals quite a few in each company who are just matriculates or graduates holding very high executive positions. Some of them have even less than ten years' experience. Needless to say, more often than not they are the sons arid daughters of relatives or friends of the directors. Here I am not questioning their efficiency. What I am arguing is that examination performance and actual work do not necessarily go together. And 'under-qualification' of these executives in private sectors, who gotjobs through nepotism has not
Consequences of Reservations been questioned by those who worry about merit.
251
Efficiency is related to commitment to one's profession and a sensitivity towards the societal problems; not to mere ranking in
examinations. This is true of all technical and professional courses. It should be bome in mind that all those who qualify to join professions, say medicine, engineering or aeronautics, have passed the required examinations. A recent study of Bombay medical students by Padma Velasker shows, that SC/OBC students have more commitment towards the profession and the poor patients than students of the upper castes and classes. The latter are more interested in making money rather than in serving the patients.2e By now, we are familiar with the malpractices committed by well-qualified medical doctors who are in the rat race for status and money. It is often argued that the present day inefficiency in the administration is due to reservation as less qualified persons are recruited.
This argument has no validity whatsoever. Even today the total number of persons in government departments recruited through
reservation is very small. One wonders how such a small number can
have such a determining influence on the very large number of employees who are recruited on 'merit' and claim to be more efficient. West Bengal has relatively less reserved seats in government
jobs than Tamilnadu or Gujarat. But on any count, the administration in West Bengal is no more efficient than that of these two states. By rearranging the data of the Administrative Reforms Commission, Marc Galanter demonstrates that even if the SC/ST candidates who secured third division were not recruited on reserved seats, the positions would have gone to the "others" who were also placed in the third division, though "higher percentage of third class degrees."3o Moreover, there are quite a number of departments which still do not have SC/ST/OBC members. Such cases are many in the universities at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. Do we require a study to show their inefficiency in imparting knowledge and undertaking meaningful research? I feel that we should examine the issue of efficiency in the context of the overall work ethos prevailing in contemporary Indian society, irrespective of a person's caste or community. The issue is equally related to the administrative structure and procedures which are formed by upper-caste/class mer.nbers who provide administrative leadership.
252
The Politics of Bachoardness
Uneven Distribution of Benelits and Its Consequences Reservations have by and large not improved the overall condition of the deprived communities i.e., the SCs, the STs and the OBCs. They still lag behind the upper and middle castes in educational and economic spheres. Only a small number have succeeded in acquiring the benefits of reservation. The fortunate among the deprived communities are those who have property or marketable skills which enable them to acquire secondary or higher education. It should be noted that the SCs, the STs and the OBCs are not homogeneous communities. They are divided not only into several endogarnous groups of high and low status, but economic differentiations also exist among them. For instance, 6 per cent of the ST households in Gujarat own more than 15 acres of land. Some of them have irrigation and other infrastructure facilities to produce marketable surplus.3l In the north-east frontier regions, till recently, slavery existed as an institution among some tribes, in which one tribe conquered another and enslaved its members. These slaves worked as agricultural labourers.32 In Mizoram, land is auctioned by the government or leased out for a specific period to so-called 'progressive' farmers who can afford to pay the price. Such land is taken by a new class of capitalist farmers who take to "farming with the purpose of finding a profitable channel for their accumulation."33 Similar economic differentiations exist among the SCs and the OBCs. The differentiations are accentuated by the development strategies of the post-Independence period. In the present development strategy, only those who have a viable quantum of land and possess infrastructure facilities produce a marketable surplus. And those who can produce a marketable surplus can afford to provide education to their children. Our educational system, needless to say, caters to the needs of a small section of society which is in a privileged position. It condemns the bulk of the children belonging to the poor to be rlropouts and failures.3a Hence, despite scholarships and o\er facilities only very few students from the deprived communities can have high school and college education. One needs money to travel from one's village to the town where the high school is located. And without secondary education, they have no scope for taking professional education or govemment jobs. Similarly, looking to the prevalent electoral system, no one can successfully fight elections for an As-
Consequences of
Resewations
253
sembly or Parliament seat without at least some financial standing. One needs a piece of land with infrastructure, a business or a permanent job with an assured income which enable one to contest elections.35
As a result of the reservations, those who acquired political positions and govemment white-collar jobs have formed a tiny middle class. They have adopted the life-style in dress, diet, etiquette, language etc., of their peer group, the upper and middle classes. Their interaction with their kin and clan brethren is limited and they find it difficult to adjust themselves to their traditional way of life. They are
alienated from their communities. On the other hand, they experience
iubtle discrimination from the non-deprived communities who dominate the political and economic sectors. The situation frustrates them. Overview
a very small number of in acquiring political and administrative positions. As a SC/ST/OBC, result the circle of the middle class has been widened. Economic differentiations among the deprived communities have become sharp, which have initiated the process of disintegration of these groups. However, the privileged strata of the deprived communities have not yet integrated in the middle class dominated by upper and middle castes. To some extent, reservations have throttled the growth of militancy among the deprived groups. On the other hand, the tension between the traditionally upper and middle castes and lower castes have come to tlle surface. Violence erupted in the streets for settling the issues. This is inevitable because those who dominate political and economic spheres would not like to share the benefits; whereas the deprived groups arc bound to assert their rights.
Reservations have certainly helped, at least
NOTES
l.
See Ghanshyam Shah, "The Congress and the Deprived
Ram Joshi and R.K. Hebsur eds., Social Intemention
for
Communities" in lustice. Bombay:
Popular Prakashan, 1986. 2. Quoted by Eleanoi Zelliot, 'Gandhi and Amhedkar: A Study in Ladership" in Michael M ahar, The Ilntouchables in Contemporary lndiaTuscon: The
University of Arizona Press, 1972.

3 .
Ghanshyam Shah
Minoitizs
and Nation Building: A Case of Muslims and
254 '
The
Scheduled Tribes in Ind.ia. Y aranasi: Banaras Hindu University, 19g3. 4. Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste polirics', in Michael Mahu ed., The Untouchables in Contemporary India. Aizona: The University of Arizona
Press, 1972.
5. Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and, Schedukd Tribes 1978-79, (fwenty-sixth Reporr), Delhi, Manager, Covemmenr of India press, 1980. For further discussion see Ghanshyam Shah, "protective Discrimination, Equality and Politi calWill" in Reservatian: Policy, programmz and Issues, eds., Vimal Shah and Binod C. Agrawal. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1986. 6. G. Narayana, "Rule Making for Scheduled Castes: Analysis ofLok Sabha Debates," Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. XV, no. 8, February 23, 1990. 7. Dilip Hiro, The Untouchables in India. Lnndon: The Minority Rights
Group, 1982.
8. Dushkin, ap. cir.
9. Manseesha Tikekat " Scheduled Caste Legislators in Maharashtra." ph.D. thesis, Bombay, Department ofCivics and Politics, 1986. See also Shiva Reddy,
" Harijan Elite in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh." Ph.D. study under progress, Surat, Centre for Social Studies. 10. Dushkin, op. clr. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities. Delhi: Oxford University press,
ll.
1984. 12. Ibid. 13. rbid. 14. Repon of the Commissioner- op. cit.
r5. rba.
16. Ghanshyam Shah, " Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-Reservation Agitation in Gujarat." Mimeographed. Surat: Centre for Social Studies, 1985. 17 . India 1954 and 1984. Delhi: Publications Division, covemmenr of India, 1955 aad 1985.
18. India 1954 and Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy. Bombay: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1982. 19. Repon of the Commissioner. op. cir. 20. Galanter, op. cit. 21. For Justice D.A. Desai's views, see Haroobhai Mehta and Hasmukh Patel, eds., Dynamics oJ Reservation Poiicy. New Delhi: patriot publication,
1985.
22. Ghanshyam Shah, "Middle Class Politics: A study of Anti-Reservation Agitations," Economic and Political WeeHy, Annual Number, May 1987. 23. Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Sentiments, Class Formation and Dominance
in Gujarat" in Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, eds., Caste, Class, Ethnicity and Dominance. Delhi: Oxford University Press (in Press). See also, "strategies of Social Engineering: Reservation and Mobility of Backward Communities in Gujarat.', Paper presented in the seminar on Comparative Dimensions of Ind.ian Elections and Party Politics, organised by the University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, June
t987.
C ons
equenc e s of Re s e rv ations
255
24. Citizens for Democracy, Education

Publishers, 1978.
for Our
People. Bombay: Allied
25 . University Grants Commissi on, Examination Reform: A Plan of Action. Delhi: University Grants Commission, 1976. 26. A. Edwin Harper Jr., "Ninety Marking Ten: A Study of Examinations," Indinn Educational Review, vol. 2, no.l, January 1987. See also Research on Examinations in India. Delhr: National Council of Educational Research and Training, 1976. 27. N. Mukherjee, "On Examinations," Journal ofGuiarat Research Society, vol. 23, 1961.
28. A. George, Srurdy on Assessment of Standard Valuation and Comparative Performance of Collcges in the Pre-University Emmination-Kerala: Department of Statistics, Kerala University, 1964. 29. Padma Ramkrishna Velasker, lnz quality in Highzr Education: A study of Scheduled Caste Students in Medical Colleges of Bombay. Bombay: Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 1986.
30. Galufier, op. cit. 31. Ghanshyam Shah, "stratification among the Scheduled Tribes in the Bharuch and Panchmahal Districts of Gujarat" in S.C. Malik, e.d., Determinants of Social Sntus in India- Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1986. 32. B.P. Mishra, "Kirata Karyokinesis: Mode of Production in Tribal Societies in North-East India" in Arvind Das and V. Nilakant e'ds', Agraian Relations in India. Delhi: Manohar, 1979.
33.
IbA.
34. Citizens for Democracy, Education
for Our People. Bombay: Allied
Publishers, 1978. 35. Ghanshyam Shah, "Stratification and Reservation," Mainstrmm, vol. XIX, no.41. June 13, 1981.
(I thank Mrs Deviyani Punalekar for drawing my attention to the study on examinations.)
Epilogue
B.G. Verghese
NDIA is a very large, plural, diverse society, more diverse than any in the world. With the burden of ancient wrongs, mistaken priorities and lags in performance much that is inegalitarian
remains. The Constitution the people of India gave to themselves in 1950 pledged Justice, Liberty, Equality of status and opportunity, and Fratemity. While it provided for equality of opportunity it did recognise social and economic realities and admit of special considScheduled Tribes
eration for the claims
of members of the Scheduled Castes and in the making of appointments to public services
"consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration". It also provided for the appointment of a Commission to investigate the condition of (other) socially and economically backward classes and to recommend measures for their amelioration. In the one case the reference was to certain disadvantaged caste categories and to tribes and in the other to "backward classes". In either case the categorisation is on the basis of collectivities deserving of group benefit rather than of individuals meriting compensation. The idea of preferences or positive discrimination through affirmative action has been well articulated and many variants have been in vogue in the United States and elsewhere. Preferences or reservations as they have been called in India are not novel either, going back to a century and more in the former Madras presidency and the princely state of Mysore. These preferences were based on elaborate government orders prescribing recruitment to specific posts in a
Epilogue
chapters.
257
given communal rotation. These have been discussed in the earlier

Post-Independence saw no controversy about reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as they were and still are clearly seen as having suffered historical prejudice or neglect for which they must be compensated. As notified by the President without any fuss or acrimony, they were found to constitute around 22.5 per cent of the population, 15 per cent being Scheduled Castes and the rest Scheduled Tribes. Problems however arose with the attempt to define the backward classes, these being far more numerous and far less distinctive at any boundary. [n a poor country, most people are "backward". But where to draw the line among those who claim to be more backward than
others?
The first Backward Classes Commission under Kaka Kalelkar was defeated by this challenge. The second so-called Mandal Commission enumerated 52 per cent of the population as "backward" but limited the cut off point for preferences to some 27 per cent. With the 22.5 cent SC and ST reservation, the Commission wished to remain within the outer limit of 50 per cent reservation which the Supreme Court had once prescribed with reference to equality of opportunity, though some States subsequently exceeded that limit. This is where the country stood when the storm broke in August 1990 with the National Front Prime Minister, V.P. Singh's resolve to implement the Mandal Report. The course of events that followed have been described. The country divided. Protest spilled on to the streets. Passions reached a dangerously strident pitch with numerous
pr
anti-reservation immolations by impressionable youth. The eye of the storm was in the northern, largely Hindi states rather than in the South, where this battle had been fought decades back, or in the Western shtes where the reservation issue peaked about a decade ago. The eastem region was least affected as the backward classes here constitute a rather small proportion of the population. The criticism against "Mandal" was that it defied merit in a situation of large and growing educated unemployment. Further, it was felt to b "unscientific" in defining who was backward, lacking in proper economic criteria in failing to provide for any exit; and
258
burdensome in appearing to include a system of rostering, carry-over and promotions. Some of these latter objections disappeared following clarification that they did not form part of the package. But there remained strong objections on the ground of merit and of splitting the nation into what could become a pe(manent caste divide when integration and national unity were the need of the hour.
Admittedly, implementation of the Mandal Report had been included in the National Front manifesto and the President's Address. But the actual announcement was made with such little public prepa-
ration and in such a highly political context, as
if to counter a
troublesome party warlord, that the matter came to be seen as a further unfolding of political gamesmanship rather than as a measured step forward towards social reform. Equally, many critics found the announcernent begged the question of the uplift of the backward classes in a more comprehensively structured manner. It made no reference initially and subsequently only in passing to attacking the roots of backwardness by pressing forward energetically with universalisation of primary education, vocational training and skill formation, agrarian reform, access to credit and employment opportunities to the backward and so on. Without emphasis on tlese, the Mandal package appeared only to touch the fringe of the problem, offering a cosmetic solution for a real problem by coopting some among those who had been unable to ascend the escalator of social progress and economic opportunity through primary schooling. The critics certainly had a case. But so did the champions of the Mandal package. V.P. Singh defended his proposal on political grounds. In his words, only by sharing the "throne" (of bureaucratic
power) would the backward ever be in a position to control the "treasury" or the decision-making process leading to the prioritisation and funding of economic opportunity. [n his view, the permanent government in the form of the bureaucracy wields great power and unless the backward classes become part of that apparatus as power brokers or decision makers they will not be in a position to steer the ship of state towards preferred shores. Hence, in his judgement, it is futile to wait for the educational system to create a meritocracy
among the backward classes who might be able to compete and enter the privileged halls of bureaucratic or govemmental power. On the
Epilogue
259
contrary, once empowered, the rest would follow. The Mandal protagonists argued that the Mandal Commission had built certain economic criteria into the definition of backwardness on a point-system and they defended the absence of any exit on the ground that the percentage of backward classes cunently employed in Class I and II posts in the Central Govemment was way below their numbers and that the preference accorded was to a class rather than merely to individuals. Further, caste was taken only as one element in determining class and the ambit of backwardness extended to Muslims, Christians and others who qualified under the test ofbackwardness. In order to answer the criticism that backward class reservation would squeeze out the disadvantaged among the socalled forward castes, some reservation was to be accorded to the poor irrespective of caste. Despite these clarifications, conffoversy raged. The merit issue was repeatedly stressed. Not only should meritorious applicants not be excluded from opportunity in govemment service to accommodate less qualified backward class candidates, but the constitutional injunction about "maintenance of effi ciency in administration" should not be ignored. The pros and cons were debated back and forth. What is merit? How is it to be evaluated and by whom? If the administration has thus far been carried on predominantly by "meritorious" candidates of the forward castes then how is one to explain the mess and muddle in which the country finds itself? Furthermore, backward class candidates could be given special coaching and training both before and after selection. For some the din and dust appeared to tum more on issues of degree than of kind. With some sronger and more visible eligibility and exit criteria the package might be acceptable alongside other measures for attacking rural and artisanal backwardness, and through education. But it is also quite evident that a certain middle class hysteria had also been unleashed among other urban forward class circles on the basis of an unspoken triage-type or first-come-firstserved theorem in a situation of job-seekers outpacing new job opportunities. Howsoever one measures it, anyone who has looked at the problem objectively must admit that there are categories of persons outside the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are genuinely
zffi
The Politics of Bachuardness
socially and educationally backward. Such backwardness not merely handicaps them but constitutes a drag on society, sharply militating against the constitutional imperative of equality and fraternity. It may well be that the Mandal figure of 52 per cent wrongly estimates the size of the backward classes and that if the political fat is taken off the reality may be nearer 30 per cent. Be this as it may, while accuracy is necessary and important in all things, the impact of reservation for the backward classes in terms of substituting competition and merit by preference was to be limited to 27 per cent under the National
Front package. There could be heartburning among the backward classes as to who might be included or excluded, but reservations would remain limited to 27 per cent. Against this though, it can equally be argued that a deserving candidate qualifying in open competition might be prepared to be
displaced by a truly backward class candidate deserving of preference. He or she would, however, resent being elbowed out by one who might in fact be more privileged than himself or herself in life but more "backward" by notification in the list of backward classes. Some of the more rerent state backward class commissions like the Chinappa Reddy Commission in Andhra Pradesh have clearly defined an exit criterion which would exclude children of parents who have attained a given and easily measureable social or economic status. Adoption of such a system would be relatively simple, automatic and non-discriminatory and would have the further merit of creating space within the reserved 27 per cent quota for the more deserving among the backward categories. This is an important consideration as the backward classes, like the Scheduled Castes are not an undifferentiated, monolithic mass but a highly stratified group distinguished by deepening shades of disadvantage and deprivation. Ifno differentiation is made within the group then the highest castes or class among those Scheduled or defined as backward will garner all the benefits not just in the first round but in succeeding rounds as well, depriving the less privileged of any share of the cake. This factor has been repeatedly brought to notice in rcspect of 40 years of Scheduled Class reservation and has been a cause for much dissatisfaction among the lower rungs of Scheduled Castes who have seen a new and sometimes parasitic elite rise on their backs. The point is well taken as no Scheduled Caste has
Epilogue
261
ever been denotified. Once in, always in and the devil take the hindmost, defeating one of the principal pulposes of reservation-to
uplift the lowest and most deprived.

The entire debate must of course be seen in the context of popula-
tion growth far outstripping job opportunities. India is today adding 16 to l7 million net to its population annually. More significantly, it is adding between eight and nine million net annually to the labour
force. This is a horrendous burden and weighs even more harshly on a developing society with large numbers at or below the poverty line. And since social status moves fairly closely with economic opportunities, placement in the job market and the acquisition of skills to move up the ladder or to be upwardly mobile becomes very important. Any consideration of reservations without reference to the growth of the economy and opportunities for people to improve their position in life must therefore be inadequate and incomplete. Unfortunately, the debate on preferences in India has tended to ignore these larger and ultimately more relevant secular trends. As a result, public policy has focussed too much on the micro aspects of who is in and who is out by juggling with definitions without giving equal thought to tlre far more basic task of enlarging the cake, widening opportunities and placing a rein on numbers. When everything is said in favour of reservations for the backward classes it still remains less important to legislate fair shares of a small cake than to strive to make everybody more competitive through education and otherwise enable them to take a full and equal place in
an achieving society in which the cake grows far more rapidly. Levelling up in the end is a better answer than levelling down,
although the latter is not to be altogether excluded or.denied.
Postscript
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: The Mandal Controversy

Rajeev Dhavan
I
NDIA's Constitution makers are partly to blame for subordinating the "justice" texts of the Constitution to the "political" texts. Many of the promises wrinen into the Constitution resulted from ' political compromises ratler tian a deeply felt commitment to particular values. For fear that a nation torn by distress may not come together, many demands were symbolically brushed under a mythical
J I I
carpet which was yet to be woven. Many compromises were intended to remain compromises unless the coincidence of strong political will and fortuitous good luck made their fulfilment possible. This is not intended to belittle the Justice' texts of the Constitution, nor dampen the ardour of those who think that politics is more than the 'art of the possible'. Yet, politics-no less democratic politics as any otheroften suffers Justice' into further compromise. The various forces that compete for success are unequally poised and rewarded with unequal and uneven results. Constitutional controversies are firmly located in the politics that give rise to them. This is no less true of the controvprsies which erupt in courts of law as those which find expression in parliamentary fora or on the streets.l We are concerned here with the vague promises of special treatment made to a nebulously defined class of persons who have come to be known as the "other backward classes" (OBC).'?The term itself
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal
Contoversy 263
suggests a residuary concem and puzzled many in its relatively short
joumey into constitutional acceplance. Before Independence, the

OBCs were variously included amongst the "depressed classes", with the term 'backward' acquiring administrative meaning in the princely state of Mysore in 19183 and a loose definition in the Hartog Committee as consisting of "(c)astes and classes which are educationally
backward".a At least one
politician-S.D. Singh Chaurasia-claimed
that he coined the phrase around 1930. Yet, by 1948 a vigilant Constituent Assembly was confused by the term-not quite sure who the OBCs were and what their 'otherness' (aird, if so, from whom) consisted of.5 Decades would elapse before various persons and authorities sought the courage to provide clear constitutional answers to this question. At the time of Constitution making, spokespersons for many groups and communities demanded "special treatment". The more heady demands-such as those by the Muslim League-for separate representation led to Partition. Had the logic of special electoral representation in parliament and the administration on communal lines been accepted, each religious group or community would have been justi fied in demanding similar representation in ways that could only have been divisive.6 The cardinal principle evolved by the Constitution appears to be thatfear of majoritarian discrimination was not by itself a sufficient ground for constitutionally designated preferential treatment which would be accorded to only such communities and groups which had historically suffered both hostile discrimination and disadvantage. To this end, three kinds of preferences were envisaged: special electoral representation in legislative bodies Qtreferential electoral representation) 7, special recruitment in public services Qtreferential employment)8 and special schemes, action and accommodations in other areas especially those relating to welfare and education (preferential teatmenr).e The formal decision that there should be just one electoral roll did not exclude providing for special reservations for untouchables, tribals and the Anglo-Indian community for a transitional period of l0 years which has, in tum, been extended decennially from time to time into the next century.r0 As far as preferential treatment and employment were concerned, the largest anticipated beneficiaries---other than untouchables and tribals (and. to a more
264
limited extent, women and children)-were the OBCs.rr The absence of criteria to define OBCs and the lack of awareness of the potential benefits that could accrye as a result of preferential progftImmes rendered these constitutional promises relatively non-contentious. They have yet to acquire a politics that would give them substance. Even though the Constituent Assembly had no reason to doubt K.M. Munshi's explanation that the term 'OBC' "signifies peopletouchable or untouchable belonging to this community or that, who are so backward that special protection is required (for them) in the services"t2, the term was less of a misnomer for delegates from the south of India where such preferential schemes for such backward or depressed classes had been in operation for some time. In 1921, the princely state of Mysore had already instituted a programme for "recruiting all communities other than Brahmins who (were) . . . not adequately represented in the public service".l3 By 1925, similar programmes in Bombay virtually covering all backward classes otler than Brahmins, Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banias and Christians even though a later committee in 1930 clarified that "in ordinary
usage the phrase Depressed Classes is taken to mean untouchables".ra
'sensing the opening up of preferential benefits, a nascent politics rapidly gathered momentum to voice the demands of the yet to be clearly defined OBCs. The breeding ground for such demands was to be found in the many movements against brahmin domination in the South as opposed to movements elsewhere (such as the UP Hindu Backward Classes League) which interpreted terms like 'depressed' and 'backward' classes ejusdem generis as-4roadly speaking----of the same genre as classes that suffered from the practice of untouchability. In Madras, the Madras Provincial Backward Classes League (started in 1934) wanted to extend special treatment to a large number of non-brahmin communities-a goal that found substantial recognition in special public jobs reservations provisions of l947.ts With opportunities in the air, backward classes federations were formed in many States (such as Bihar in 1947) and nationally (such as the All India Backward Classes Federation founded in 1950) because the intended beneficiaries felt that the Constituent Assembly had "mustered courage to take up the problem of (OBCs) . . . and place it on a national plane".to By 1954, it was estimated that there were some 88 reasonably known such organizations. But, apart from
Controversy 265
the broad object of maximizing the possible uses of the new dispensation, each group had its own agenda.l7 It is not surprising that the
first cases that reached the Supreme Court in l95lr8 concemed a distinctly anti-brahmin Madras scheme which sought to divide the benefit of reserved job and other quotas principally to non-brabnin
communities. That the scheme was struck down as being communal in nature was inevitable. Yet the scheme was not formulated with malafide intent but was based on a genuine mal-understanding of who were to be included amongst the 'backward classes'. The absence of any r-rational indication of the criteria to be used to identify the backward classes meant that each State (or, conceivably local
authority or institution) could devise their own definition and

programme until a national policy or the judiciary caught up with
them.
In order to ensure that tle OBCs were identified, high powered State Commissions were appointed amongst which the more well known are the ones appointed by Mysore in 1960-1, Maharashtra in
1964, Kerala
in
1966, Kashmir
in
1969, Tamil Nadu
in
1971,
Kamataka in 1975, Gujarat in 1976, Bihar in 1978 and various other States at different times.re By this time, electoral politics had become imbricated in the formulation of OBC policy. The wider and more extensive the definition of beneficiaries and benefits, the larger tle grateful vote bank that would vote for the regime. Each of these schemes ran into constitutional rough weather when they came to be
examined by the judiciary. Unsure of the deadly mix of righteous 'justice' and 'unscrupulous' politics that such preferential programmes could engender, the Union Govemment steered clear of taking a definite position. The strong modemist secularism of Nehru abjured caste based divisions to traverse from social life into public policy. Since the OBC programme was in relation to classes other than the untouchables and tribals in whose favour favourable schemes had already been inaugurated, there was an intuitive de-prioritilation of the OBC cause. A Commission was appointed in 1953 to determine the criteria for identifying the BCs other than the untouchables and the tribals (who by this time had come to be described as the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) after the "Schedules" in which tleir names were included). The task of the (Kalelkar) Backward Classes Commission
266
which reported
in 195520 was not to identify the 'poor' but those communities and groups who suffered additional or special disadvantage so as to entitle them to special preferential treatment. Its exercise ended by identifying 113.5 million people comprising some 3l.8Vo of the population which was in addition n rhe 2O% (or so) for SC and ST. It had received 3344 memoranda and interviewed 5636 persons, but in the main relied on census reports and the general impressions of public persons and social workers. Where data was sparse or unavailable, a 'benefit-of+he-doubt' - principle was used in favour of inclusion of that community in the OBC list. The prescriptive measures suggested were reservations for jobs in public services on a sliding scale (257a,33tlrrd, and 4O7o in Class I, [I, and III and IV services respectively) and massive reservations (of 70Vo) in medical, scientific and technical colleges in addition to various other supportive educational welfare measures. In a society in which social status mobility had come to be identified with government jobs and specialist professional technical opportunities, such extensive'reservations' of posts in services and admission seats in educational institutions could not but alarm the mainstream non-beneficiary communities whose members would be directly affected by this 'reservations' programme. Quite apart from the predictable consequentialist effects of the Commission's prescriptions, there was an ideological resistance to using 'caste' as a basis for identifying disadvantage in an India which had set its aims at establishing a casteless society. The Report was undermined-in this regard by a dissenting note by its own Chairperson and three others who rejected caste as a basis for identifying OBCs,2t It was this question of caste to identify OBCs that provided the vehicle to attack the Commissionk recommendations and put them in cold storage for several decades. Even if various lists were used by the state governments to provide educational and other benefits, the initiative of devising comprehensive preferential employment and benefit schemes for the OBCs passed
on to the State Governments; and, came under the shadow ofjudicial
scrutiny. But, the Backward Classes Commission's report of 1955 defined the central issue for future controversy namely, could 'caste' ever be
a
criterionfor futennining backwardness? Rather than concern itself with the plight of backward classes who deserved preferential treat-
Controversy 267
ment, the controversy became both ideological and political in nature. Politically, it was easier and electorally more fortuitous to
define backwardness in terms of 'caste', especially because there was no denying that caste considerations were chiefly responsible for the combination of discrimination and disadvantage that led to backwardness. However, since Nehru's India had committed itself to eradicating caste and creating a casteless society, any kind of adherence to caste was seen as a symbolic surrender that undermined the
very foundations of India's egalitarian constitutional order.z2 The argument represented the triumph of symbolism over reality. Nor did it make sense to argue that the Constitution forbade helping victims of caste on the grounds that they belonged to one. To the Government the answer lay in using "economic criteria", hoping that the States would adopt such a pattern because casie criteria were inimical to justice. Not willing to throw the electoral baby out with the ideological bath water, the central government in its letter of 14 August 1961 permitted the state govemments to choose their own criteria for defining backwardness but added that in its view "it would be better to apply economic tests than go by caste".23 By emphasizing the discretion of the state government and yet making its ideological stance clear, it sought to have the best of all possibilities. But, surely, it was justice considerations that required the Govemment to get to the root of the true causes of the injustice; and, not the symptoms that might manifest itself as the social description of a class. If the economic criteria consisted of a 'means' or 'income' test, the term 'backwardness' would become inter-changeable with 'poverty'. If a more complex occupational test were used, any honest proposal could not discount 'caste' for the purpose of defining 'backward' occupations or exclude the strong possibility that the identified class had caste characteristics. Meanwhile, the States went their own way. It is misleading to conclude that preferential schemes for 'backward' classes were motivated solely for the electoralr benefit of building political vote banks for elections. Such schemes were in operation in Princely States, like Mysore, long before electoral considerations loomed ahead as rewarding possibilities. Anti-brahmin movements in the South were notjust rooted in historical anger but also inspired by genuine considerations of justice which-at least, at that fime-had not been devalued to a point fiat they were viewed
268
purely as devices for electoral gains, de hors the sentiments that inspired them. Be that as it may, from the early sixties the dominant tone of the debate-both in courts and otherwise---concerned itself, in the main, with the use of 'caste' criteria to define backwardness. The ideological indecision of the government was reflected in Court
decisions.
il
Before we turn :c judicial pronouncements, the constitutional dispensation merits scrutiny. A family of articles of the Constitution in the
fundamental rights chapter deal with equality,2a commencing with
the foundation right that the "State shall not deny to any person equality before law and equal protection of laws" (Article l4). From this flow further injunctions against general discrimination by the State (Article 15(1)) only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth as well as discrimination in the matter of State employment only on these grounds as well as on the grounds of descent and place of birth (Article 16(2)). Inherent in rhe promise of equality is the assurance that unequals will not be treated unequally. This, by
itself, provides the basis for preferential treatment of, amongst others, socially disadvantaged groups and persons. But, the Constitution went further. Specific provision was made in the original Constitution for preferential employment for the 'backward classes':
"Nothing in this (equality) article shall prevent the Srate from

making any provision for tle reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which-, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State" (Article 16(4)).
Following some awkward observations in the Madras communal

reservations cases (1951),b the Constitution was amended to add to the already existing provision permitting "any special provision for women and children" (Article 15 (3)), a further clause to make explicit what was already implicit:
"Nothing in this article (general equality in respect of State
Controversy 269
action) or Afticle 29(2)) (admissions to aided minority schools) shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes"
(Article l5(4))
The provisions in the general discrimination article (Article 15) werc different from those in the State employment article (Article 16). The common thread was that preferential discrimination was permissible both generally and for state jobs. It also seemed that the employment provision used the wider term "any backward classes" whereas the
general provision included within its catchnrent Scheduled Castes and Tribes; and, in addition, "any (other) socially and educationally backward classes". Hence, the question: who were the "other backward classes?" Although the Constitution made specific provision for the President to appoint a Commission to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes and make recommendations on the steps to be taken by the Union and States on dealing with their problems, tle question of how they would be identified and by what criteria remained open. But, in order to fully comprehend the context in which schemes were being devised and considered by the various High Courts, it is necessary to understand what was at stake. Apart from financial support and earmarked welfare schemes, the general preferential programmes acquired a cutting edge when professional educational schemes 'reserved' special seats and quotas for the SC and ST as well as the other backward classes. This has come to include notjust seats
in mainstream tertiary education but also preferential access to scarcely available seats for professional education; and, through such access, to jobs. Every reserved seat meant a lesser chance for general candidates to become doctors, engineers, lawyers and such professionals. The speciJic employment related reservations cut deeply into the availability of public service jobs which were highly prized in India as secune constitutionally protected employment, the incumbents of which exercised the power of the State at all levels of administration. As far as the SC, ST and OBCs were concemed, there was no way (other than by reservations of seats and jobs) that their members
could ever join the ranks of professionals or occupy govemment
270
positions of power. It was, to use a now famous phrase, a question of 'competing equalities'26 and determining whether the edge would be given to the backward classes to achieve real and substantive equality or to the merit candidates from the forward classes. It was understood that while some relaxation could be made in favour of the backward classes, both reserved and mainstream candidates would have to meet the prescribed minimum eligibility criteria. In other words, illiterates would not be treated as literates. nor would butchers be selected as surgeons. The requirement of competence would not be compromised. It is in this context that the issue of reservations slowly, but surely, exploded into law and politics. A rapidly transforming nation was opening up professional and public service opportunities in an India whose populace were hungry for social mobility jobs, status, wealth and power. Such an issue could only attract controversy. The ideological resistance to using 'caste' to identify 'un-equals' and redress inequality by giving preference to groups identified on the basis of 'caste' sought to make the Constitution 'caste blind' in precisely those areas of social action on which its egalitarian eyes should have been wide open. The initial reaction of the judiciary was enviably balanced. Following the Supreme Court's lead in the Madras cases (1951)'z7, in 1958, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court2E refused to permit these provisions to be used to "remove communal disparity", and the Mysore High Courtze refused to countenance a thinly disguised attempt to cover all but the Brahmin communities. But, while the Mysore Court had misgivings about the identified groups, it was perceptively just in concluding that while criteria other than caste could be used to identify such beneficiaries,
". . . (it was not possible to accept) . . . that backward classes cannot be determined on the basis of castes, and tley must always
be determined on the territorial, economical, occupational or some
such basis . . . (IX cannot be said with any such rigidity that determination can in no case be made on the basis of caste".3o This set a realistic tone on the discussion, and should have quelled all sensible controversy. No doubt, this did not obviate the need for showing the backwardness of the 'caste' in question and the kind of disadvantage or discrimination it suffered. But, the desire of diverse
Controversy 271
governments to assist identifiable groups and communities whose inclusion in the list of beneficiaries was controversial added more fuel to fire. By the time the Supreme Courtsr dealt with the Mysore cases in 1963, it was obvious that the schemes would fail for other reasons (concerning the relative level of literacy required to qualify as 'backward classes'). But, Justice Gajendragadkar did not want to miss the ideological wood for the trees. Aware-perhaps annoyedby the anti-brahmanical nature of the reservations but unwilling to state this intuition openly, ideologically against the use of casre to define governmental programmes, inspired by a Hindu reformism, anxious to project the view that 'caste' was an aberrational and artificial addition to Hinduism and not its basis, Justice Gajendragadkar, in the Supreme Court, placed his anxieties on an eclectic pedestal to make the plea tlat the issue had to be examined in a "rational and scientific way".32 For him this meant that both caste and poverty were relevant for determining backwardness, but caste could not be the sole or dominant test.33 It is this aspect that was emphasised by Justice Subba Rao in a case that was reported in the next year in 1964, where he refused to equate 'caste' witi ,class' but permitted caste to be one of the factors that would define a class.3a Such an approach was practically impossible even if theoretically sound. To undertake the task of identifying individuals who share .backward' common characteristics was asking for a national social census from which, new and old groups would be identified. Such a task was nothing short of Hercuiean. Apart from being unmanageable and expensive, it was like determining which needles in a multitudinous nation full of haystacks were socially similar. Surely, the correct approach was to start with groups (including caste groups which would invariably be the most numerous); and, then, consider whether the groups were backward. Apart from this impracticality, this approach has conectly been described as "flagrantly unhistorical"3s since the choice of the word "classes" in the constitutional text could not, by any stretch of imagination, have implied that the Constitution makers wanted to exclude 'castes' from consideration as OBCs. Indeed, the very identification of SCs (untouchables) and STs (disadvantaged tribes) showed that hostility to, and rhe disadvantage suffered by, traditional disadvantaged caste groups was precisely what the Constitution makers wished to amend.
272
Juristic proclamation had secured the ideological victory of minimizing the importance of caste in identifying backwardness, but it brought its own problems. If the OBCs could not be just caste groups, there was no knowing where to stop' Surely, traditional groups and communities were all entitled to be considered for preferential prograflrmes as long as they were able to show that they fell within the prescribed indicia of backwardness. Elections, and the need for
captive vote banks, drove the govemment into increasing the catchment of groups identified for preference. Kerala's attempt to include the Ezhavas and the Muslims found judicial rebuke-not necessarily because of the manner in which the group was defined but because of the lack of supporting data.36 If one Pandora's box Oased on 'caste') was partly half shut, another more general box was re-opened. Communal reservations or reservations of rural communities were sported for examination and found wanting. But the resistance to 'caste' as a criterion continued on the strikingly reductionist and over-simplified argument that the Constitution's aim of a 'casteless' society prevented constitutional functionaries from rectifying the cumulated injustice of centuries encrusted in the caste system. A fragile refuge from proceeding in this over-stylized manner was sought in declaring that a class could never solely be based on 'caste', which probably meant no more than saying that although the group tested for 'backwardness' could be a caste group, it would still have to be shown that the group was socially and educationally backward.3T But, the ideological tone of the judgements shows resistance to the idea of groups being identified by their caste. The attempt to exclude caste groups as beneficiaries is all the more inacceptable because the arguments over
caste are confined
to the OBCs even though they apply with a similarly forceful logic to the SC (if not the ST) as well. Yet' the
question is not one ofjust academic importance because it goes to the heart of the purpose behind the reservations. Are reservations only about rectifying the imbalances of the past? If that is the case, it would be limited to those categories or classes who were 'backward' at the time the Constitution was promulgated and who would, by the by, become 'forward' as time passes. In this view, although these
provisions of the Constitution were not expressly transitional, they could be treated as transitional by force of interpretation in that no new groups would be added to the OBCs list on the basis that some
Controversy 273
future social, economic or political circumstances may create new OBC groups who constitutionally deserved preferential treatment. It is not necessary for our present purposes to explore this further except for the limited purpose of accepting that although 'caste' groups were historically the main intended beneficiaries of preference, other groups could also be included within the rubric of such remedial justice. To that extent, the 'not-caste-alone' formula could not be ignored. But, such an approach was not intended to exclude 'caste' groups but to include others. The possibility that new groups
can also claim preference as part of the mandate of equality cannot be
foreclosed for the future. Where the Constitution does not intend a provision to be transitional, interpretation should not render the use of its beneficial provisions otiose for the future. After all, apan from electoral reservations, special provisions for SC and ST, women and children have not been declared transitional. The Constitution is a living document, to be used to achieve its Justice' imperatives in the future with as much force as it might have endeavoured to have done so in the past. There are many new disadvantaged groups that could be created-whether by migration or the exigencies of social and economic life. To exclude the possibility of a substantive justice for such groups does not sit easily with the Constitution's aims and
objects.
The muddle over the issue of 'caste' was inspired by ideological considerations; but it soon acquired a social momentum bordering on an undeclared 'caste'war-at least at the level of perceptions, litigation, public response and politics. As the govemments responded by identifying a large number of enormous OBC expectants, the Courts were invited to intervene. The judiciary's initial intervention echoed both the views of the central government and Nehru's philosophy. This symbiosis of juristic instinct and government policy is by no means 'a-typical' of judicial decision making in India; or-for that matter 'anywhere'----else. There was a distinct 'class' (in the Marxist sense) element in all this. Having lost their campaign with the state govemments, the privileged classes looked to the central govemment and the Courts for protection. It is a matter of record that they won a partial success with the Courts. But it was a success which-over the sixties and into the seventies-slowly lost ground.
274
ilI
The judicial response of the sixties failed to interpret the mandate of equality contained in the Constitution in all its fullness. The mandate of equality in the Constitution encompasse s both anti-discrimination (that citizens be dealt with on the basis of their merit without taking into account their antecedents of caste, race, sex, place of birth, residence and so on) as well as a positive commitment to eliminate disadvantage (by giving preferential treatment to persons to overcome their disadvantage). Needless to say, even the anti-discrimination principle is founded on the assumption that unequals should not be treated equally. So, if disadvantaged persons are treated on par with the advantaged such action would be, ex facie, discriminatory. Preferential treatment is not an exception (or for that matter even an addition) to the anti-discrimination principle. It is very much a part of equality.3s Even if preferential treatment were not written into the Constitution, schemes of preferences-no less in tle matter of oppor-
tunities for professional education as well as government jobswould not fall foul of formal principles of equality. If nothing else, the joumey of the American Supreme Court into issues related with affirmative action demonstrate this most ably even though a recent
judgement of the Supreme Court may support a break in the continuity of that Court's egalitarian commitment to substantive social equality.3e It is, of course, arguable that preferential discrimination is of two distinct kinds.4 Thelrsr relates to preferential treatment in the matter of welfare and the creation of special schemes in order to enable self improvement. The second is preferential employment which'entails either the preferential selection of disadvantaged candidates (where the candidate otherwise meets the eligibility requirement for the job) or the relaxation of some of the eligibility requirements Out never below the qualificatory level consistent with an efficient discharge of thejob in question) or the creation of special inservice training and other programmes and benefits (which both
compensate disadvantage as well as enable self development).at These distinctions betw een p refe rential tre atment and p referential employment arc by no means water tight. During the course of arguments in
the Mandal case, it was suggested that India's Constitution itself acknowledges and accepts this distinction since it locates the com-
Controversy 275
pensatory discrimination programme in two distinct locations in the chapter on Fundamental Rights, namely the general preferential treat' ment prograrnme which is in the Article which otherwise injuncts general discrimination by the State inter alia, on grounds of caste (Article 15(4)) and the p referential employment programme whichis in the Article dealing with a similar non-discrimination in matters of public employment (Article 16(4)).42 But the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the compensatory schemes could be put in such rigid compartments.a3 Yet, the distinction is both rational and not without constitutional or public significance. Time and time again, those against reservation in public employment have argued that the proper approach is not to reserve jobs for the less meritorious (even if minimally qualified), but to create educational and other opportu-
nities so that, in the course of time, the disadvantaged and their

children may overcome their handicap. So, the war cry of even some of the sympathetic anti-reservationists in relation to preferential employment was "Training: Yes; Jobs: No". Such an argument gets increasingly thin in its generosity when the anti-reservationists further argue that preferential admission to courses in professional education (such as to medical, engineering, law, architecture and so on) should be placed on par with preferential employment-since such admission to and success in such courses is a pre-condition to a professional career in these fields. This argument has now been decisively rejected by the Supreme Court which has-it would appear-affirmed the distinction between affirmative action and preferential employment which it rejected somewhat cursorily in its Mandal judgement.aa Some anti-reservationists take the argument further and assert that there should be no reservations in tertiary education at all; and all that should be done is to either minimally relax the examining criteria to give the disadvantaged a fighting edge over merit candidates or to create special facilities for their self improvement at primary and secondary levels. By leaving even the conceptual foundations of reservations under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) unclear, the Supreme Court has left many options open and invited litigation on the application of the principles flowing from the Mandal jtdgement on employment questions to other areas. Without getting into too many finite distinctions, one important Indian aspect of preferential public employment cannot be over-
276
looked. Govemment jobs in India have a special status. In order to ensure the independence of the civil service, the Constitution contains various protections for govemment employees in the mat[er of their dismissal, removal or rcduction in rank.as Since any action taken against public employees is a function of the government, all such actions are liable to be tested against the fundamental rights chapter and set aside ifthey are arbitrary or unreasonable. But these layers of constitutional protection-and all the litigation that they have given rise to-are expressions of the importance of the status attached to government jobs and nc: the reason for it. Apart from the importance attached to the 'job' security of state employment, a social and cultural importance is attached to government jobs in India at all levels-be they ever so low. The IAS (Indian Administrative Service) and the other services carry a special significance in the matrimonial market which is eclipsed only (even if that) by the importance of well-off business and industrial families and groups. With the growth of private sctor, the eclipse is gathering ground, but not sufficiently to take away the social shine from the status of civil
servants and bureaucrats. After Independence, India's massive regulatory economy made bureaucracy extremely powerful because the latter was the custodian of the power exercised by the Indian State. In
a 'license' Raj in which permits and permissions arc required for virtually everything, govemment servants soon became possessed of the kind of absolute power that corupts absolutely. But, quite apart from the dividends that would flow from power corrupting itself, there is no denying that the formal power of the State in India is visibly exercised by politicians and administrators. It
is in this sense that the present writer successfully argued before the Supreme Court in the Mandal case that job reserving for the SC, ST and OBCs were an instrument for their empowerment in order to enable them to share the power of the State.$ The form in which this submission was made found favour with the majority judgement of the Court. To a cynic, it may seem that the Indian State was up for
grabs and any reservation programme was no more than an unscrupulous conspiracy to capture as much of it as possible. Such a cynical reading ignores the social reality that certain castes, groups and communities had not only been systematically excluded from sharing
both social power and the power of the State by a combination of
The Supreme Court as problem Solver: Mandal
Controversy
277
rost-itsentitrem;;;;;;##;"":"Jr".r"il:'Jtiilil,l.iiir,;ll
Mysore case ( 1963) on the consequentialist ". iasis that
of the elite resisting an assault on their priuileges. During the fifties and sixties, the fun'damental fallacy in the ap_ proach of the courts_led by the Suprem" Coun_*u. a steadfast yl.usal 1o give due importance to the ieleological aims of the Consti_ tution. Faced with a massive litigation preme court silenced appeals to "r;i;;';;"r,rs, rhe su_ social justice .onoin"o in the Direc_ tive Principles of State policy on a format Ufu"t_iJt". .."Aing of the constitutional text that such principles were ..not eiiorceable by any though) . . . fundamenial in the governan-ce of the coun_ "oy.Ij"]"n try".i? Thi: had,its impact on rhe inrerprjation oi irre .equality, mandate of the Constitution. In the very first ,"r"*utlon, aur" in 195148, the Court made it clear rr,r uair..tiu.l.in.iiiJUurra upp"uf to the reasonably clear provisions O"aIng *itfr equality was interpr.et not permissible . By 1962, when the Supreme c""n *", considering the applicability of reservarions to promoti;;;;';;"n through both Justice Gajendragadkar and Justice Wanchoo ui"r1o trc p."f"._ ential employment provisions a s exceptions to the equality provisions and nor as a parr of them.ae Once the ,.r.*u,io;;;;;ramme was relegated to the status of an
tional scheme rhat seem to have been
sustained discrimination and deprivation, but were likely to be so excluded for many years to come. The reservation p.og.u*rn" *ur, thus, not just a vehicle to achieve ,*Af ,oUlity;.but, no less, an exercise in egalitarian democracy enabling the .have nots, to share power with the ,haves'. It is these normati;e urp".u
dr"*;.;1;;;robsrs - -' *-,
of rrc constitu_
quest for real equality. This was f"rtt
-io'
;urtin"O
U" fu*ou,
wholesale reservations of seats in "o;;;;.il""tuded all technical, _Ji*f and engi_ ---neering colleges or institutions of that kind,,.sd Put in this form, the dilemmas inherent in the compensation discrimi_
try is so great that it would cause great pr.:rOl." of the coun_ to national interesrs if considerations of merit-aie by
"(t)he demand for technicians. scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and experts for the economic advancern#
nation programme were highly exagger"t"d.
d;-;;;;ramme
(as
278
The Politics of
ackwardnes s
posts in professional education or manifest in the reservation of seats against the seen as not only in qovemment employment.l was' thus' which was perceived. as being con-
p,i";;;ffi;'iilq""ritv national interest' It i"t".i*itt.,i"t, but aiso inimical to the overallthe Constitution did view that
took the was not the case that the Court rather' "reservations" of seats and posts' Much such not empower
it
were available also for promoeven conceded that "reservationJ' take the view that although such donal posts.sl But, it seemed to were-ty and large-against the "reservations" could be made, they an exception: p""ciple of equalityio which they were gtJrn
"iii" ini *.t" further a-threat to the national inrcrest' one aspect of the equality
.unJu* in*-oiscriminaiion substantive and remedial utf""t li"Aing
w-ith
The fundamental fallacy in emphasizing the on grounds of merit) and ignoring disadvantage) was highlighted
redrlsinc the inequi
social ties of cumulatively sedimented powerful passage: S"UUa Rao in a 1964 case in a ily
l"ui*
Article 16 is rule with special the general an instance of the applicatiin of says of appointments under the State' It reference to opportunity in matters all citizens ii.iit .rt"ri te "qo"tity or opportunity for *.L:ll"t under the to "t to t' oppointt"nt relating would go to "mployment it stood alone, all the backward communities State. If social structure; the said rule the wall in a society of uneven basic conception' unless a oi equafity would remain only an utopian enforcement brings practical content was tiven to it' Its itrict avoid. To make my point clear' about the very situationit seeks to down to run horses iJ" o" ilfoutution of a horse race' Two and the arsset an ordinary horse -other a race-one is a first class race point' Though are made to run from the same starting one. Both torun the race' in opporrunity theoretically they are given equal io's" is-not given an equal opportunitv to ordinary ;;;;; that is denied to it' So a compete with the race horse' Indeed' weight or a ;;;ii;"p may be iiven either in the nature of extra otherwise doing so' what rvould start from a longer distance' By would be made a real one' The have been u tu'"t of u totpetition of the Constitution at the -Centuries makers same difficulty had confronted of calculated oppression and the time it was maOe' "Article
of equality' 14 lays down the general rule
Controversy 27g
habitual submission reduced a considerable section of our com_ munity to a life of serfdom. It would be well nigh impossible to raise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity was strictly enforced in their case. They would not have any chance if they were made to enter the open field of competition without advertitious side till such time when they could stand on their own legs. That is why the makers of the Constitution introduced cl.(4) in Article 16. The expression .,nothing in this article', is a legislative device to express its intention in a most emphatic way thit the power confened thereunder is not limited in any way by the rriain provision that falls outside it. It has not really carved out an exception, but has preserved a power untremelled by the other provisions of the Article."52 However, despite the lucidity of this explanation, the emphasis on the anti-meritorian principle and the ideological resistance to using caste
it clear that the compensation discrimination programme was an exception to equality and not a fulfilment of it, confening no more than a discretionary power in the State. The truth is that till the end ofthe sixties, the socialjustice aims of the Constitution (whether contained in its preamble, the Directive Principles or the chapter on Fundamental Rights) were not given the constitutional weight they deserved. This recognition came slowly as judges came to talk of the pivotal importance of the Directive prin_ ciples. In the famous Fundanental Rights Case (1g73)s3 due impor_ tance was given to the broad commitment of democratic iustice in the Preamble to the Constitution which-despite its unabashldly rhetori_ cal tone--did, after all, reflect the Objectives Resolution of 22 lanu_ uy 1947, passed by the Constituent Assembly after so much unex_ pected discussion.sa In this case-which represents a turning point in India's constitutional history in more wayJ than one_all tt iuOg", werc agrced as to the importance of a truly egalitarian society.sl Later " on, when Justice Krishna Iyer reflected on the importance of this sea change in the Supreme Court's approach, he felt that the Fundamental Rights case (1923) '.had clinched the issue of primacy between . . . Fundamental Rights and Directive principles . . ., neither part
as a criterion for identifying backwardness continued with a desree of uniform ambiguity. The judgements went out of their way to mlake
280
justice- texts began to being superior".s6 Over the years' the social guiOi the interpretation of fundamental rights which had' hitherto' rather than foncemed themselves much more with individual claims justice within which they had to be in. UrouA"t conspectus of social understood and interpreted. It was in the famous Thomas casesT that the basis of this fundawas examined mental fallacy about the substantive aims of equality with the issues in the case and found wanting. We are not concerned SC cand! concerning the relaxation on certain criteria for reserved provisions ' ' ' for the dates. Theimajority took the view that "special backward classes and reservations of appointments advancement brile oyt and posts for them to secure adequate represen'."d?1 :; t Another judge conient of equality guaranteed (by the Constitution)"'s8 ari to achieve equality' we can never afford to relax' exhorted: ;wrtif" in"qourity is easy, since itdemands no more than to float with equality is Oimcut for it involves swimming against tfr" "orrtnt, underscore the parameters of the reversal' Justice
tf
fe
"ti*"
it'."se As if to iisf,na Iyer emphasized that "(rFservation based on classification .f tt t*itq and^forward classes without detriment to adminisrative of equality"' For standards . . . is but an application of the principle intendment of these provisions fri- "t"l clear vision oi the true
O"*onOt
u
ilt"-y
pollution and dwells in all and that ancient environmental account for the ,o"iuf pfu..."nt, which the State must extirpate' human .ocio-economic backwardness of the blacked out "orrent. ."e All this did not silence the narrow view of equality being areas . in the earlier .unuurr"a by some of the judges who found refuge formal view of equality' To them jurisprudence to take a mu"h rnot"
idea that O""p understanding of the Indian spiritual secular
it"
treatment for 'l.r"ution of classes for favoured and preferential of equality of (would) ' ' ' erode the concept poifi. ".pfoy."nt citizens in matters relating to the employmnt all ipp"n*iiy for
under the State".6l shifted the But once the Thomas case (1976) had successively equality mandate was to be under: Uatance of focus by which the recourse to the ,iooO,joOg"t like Iirishna Iyer lost no time in seeking
to emphasize that "equality clalses in our constitumeaning"'62 iionat etttic trive an equalizing ttttug" and egalitarian Iyer went out Tho^o, *a, con""m"d with SC' But' Iustice Krishna
ino^i, titing
Controversy Zgl
of his way to state that "But the core reasoning has crucial significance in all cases of protective discrimination. The process of equalisation and benign discrimination are integral, and not antagonistic, to the principle of equaliry. In a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stamp and incurable actual inequality, it is sophistry to argue that pro_ gressive merBures to eliminate group disabilities and promote collective equality are anathema on the score that every individual has entitlement on pure merit of makers. This nanow .unsocial, pedantry subverts the seminal essence of equal opportunity even for those who are humble and handicapped. Meriiocracy, cannor displace equality when the utterly backward masses labour under group disabilities. So we may weave those special facilities into the web of equality which, in an equitable setiing, provide for the weak and promote their levelling up so that, in tni tong run, the community at large may enjoy a general measure of real equal opportunity. So we hold, even apart from Article l5(3) and (4) that equality is not negated or neglected where special provisions are geared to the larger goal ofthe disabled getting over their disable_ ment consistently with the general good and individual merit. Indeed, Article 14 implies all this, in its wider connotation. and has to inform the interpretation of Article 15."63
Iustice Krishna lyer's view found support from various colleagues
who stressed the importance of State action being directed to ensur_ .ing that "under-privileged, the deprived and exploited are . . . protected and nourished so as to take their place in an egalitarian soci-
marginalised predicament into which their future had been rnsensi_ tively mortgaged and from which they were unlikely to emerge in the near future without the help of a comprehensive compensatorv dis_ criminatory programme.
"equality of opportunity', musr be ,u"h u. ro yield to :ry", :9 that "equality of results" .".6a The argument was not that ,,public employment may be treated as a new form of private property-_ because there was a danger that the reservatirons programme be viewed in that light.6s Much rather, it was because the Indian State had an overall remedial commitment to uplift the OBCs from the
282
There is one other constitutional aspect that merits examination' principle Even under the general doctrine of equality, there is a broad and earthat the State may classify persons into various categories for differential treatment' Recognising mark tle various categories
difference is not, by itself, conuary to equality' Accordingly' founded on doctrine of classification permits classification which is with the purpose rational criteria which bears a nexus or relationship for, and in the context of which, the classification was made' If no No classifications were made, the cause of equality would suffer'
the
doubtJusticeSubbaRao'swarningthatthedoctrineofclassification
shouldnotbecomeasubstituteforequalityitselfneedstobebornein no mind.6 But, for our present purposes, it is important to stress that have been one has ever proteited where preferential admissions given to parti;hr classes of persons irrespective of-merit and notiuitttrt-&ng the fact that the class so earmarked for preferential treatment his not been a disadvantaged class' Under the not so well known doctrine of'source', admissions to tertiary and even professional education have been permitted to classes like sportsperson' children of freedom fighters' children 'of India's diplomats abroad' If reservachildren of foreigners from certain countries and so on'67 tionscanbemadeonthebasisofarationalclassificationinfavourof otherwise privileged persons' the case for reservations for the disadvantaged can hardly be without egalitarian merit' Such reservations are mentioned only to emphasize that apart from the compensatory discrimination programme there are various other kinds of reservations which also eat intG-but have not been regarded as an impediment to-the narrow concepts of a merit based equality' This also demonstrates that the prejudice against caste based compensatory
discrimination may be founded more on social prejudice and less on intimations of the public interest to which appeals have been made' This prejudice is demonstrated by the fact that the concept of a "creamy layer" (denying the benefit of reservations to the truly better off amongst the disadvantaged) has been imposed on the OBC reservation but not on reservations either under the doctrine of source or
resrvations for the SC and 5T.68
Animated by the personality of individual judges constitutional theory has to keep pace with political crisis. Unfortunately' accounts
of thi Supreme Court's jurisprudence on compensatory discrimina-
Controversy 2gj
tion have tended to be 'a-historical' , treating the whole period of its development en bloc without recognising the social and political nuances that gave rise to thejuristic change ofheart.6e Since the form in which law is practised is declaratory in nature, the historical-as opposed to the factual---4ontext within which the decision occurred is often flattened out of the discourse. Of course, lawyers and judges playing around with precedents are aware of the circumstances in which precedents are born-no less the tussles in court and the
ambitions and personality of the judges that dominate the creation of constitutional jurisprudence. However much one would like to believe that judicial decision making is preconceivedly bounded by the cast iron constraints of the rule of law, the truth runs much further and goes well beyond this declaratory assertion. euite apart from the vast discretions which the 'law' itself concedes to the judges and the expectation judges will decide on neutral and principled grounds,To the internal politics of a Court and the extemal circumstances in which it is situated and to which it responds play a pivotal role.?r When judges (especially those of the higher judiciary) decide, they are both policy makers and legislators. That they err on the side of caution and hide behind the mysticism of legal argument in articulating their power is inevitable. Many judges stay within rhe confines of the received arguments within the law because of their personality, their conservative perception of their own role and their belief that their overall function is to decide and, perhaps, warn, but not innovate. Yet, even such conservatism must not be tom out of its context ai a mere personality trait. As experienced actors in a complex political economy, the judges-more than anyone else-know the value of the stakes involved in any legal argument, not just for the litigants but also the class and other interests which are visibly and invisibly also before the Court.72 The Court does not just confront public discourse with its judicial wisdom. In most cases, it works with government to resolve issues, sometimes taking the lead and sometimes embarrassing the government into constructive response. There are more than occasional failures in this equation of understandings. Invariably, the govemment, using its power to appoint judges, seeks to insure itself against unexpected risks. But, even the govemment is aware that a wholly captive judiciary will lack the credibility that gives legitimacy to the constitutional enterprise as a
284
whole.
It is in this context that we have to view the interplay between the judiciary, and the Union Pnd state govemments over the finite edges of the jurisprudence of 'reservation'. Even though the 'Congress' Union Government in the fifties and sixties had taken the ideological stance that reservations should not really extend beyond the SC and ST to extend to caste based OBCs because this was inconsistent with the goal of a casteless society, the Congress state governments of the South, animated by powerful anti-Brahmin sentiments' had plans of their own. While the Supreme Ccurt in 1951 had no difficulty in knocking out generally communal reservations, it failed to give credence to the historicity of the claim of a large number of caste communities who had been systematically deprived of access to wealth, power, status and opportunity and who were determined by the sheer dint of their numbers to stake their claims through the new democratic process. Both electorally and otherwise, no govemment could ignore their claim or 'rubbish' it as unreasonable. The historical facts were incontrovertible; and the demands that flowed from these facts more than insistent. It was typical of Nehru's policy to wax eloquent in Delhi about a casteless society, but permit-for electoral and otler reasons-the exploration of caste based reservations by Congress State govemments.T3 Nehru's party-as opposed to his government-could have tried to resolve these controversies by shessing the egalitarian and remedial nature of caste based reservations and entering a caution against the political exacerbation of the issue beyond responsible proportions. But' the Congress chose not to evolve a base-line of principles from which constructive thinking on this issue could commence. The Central Government bowed out, leaving the Supreme Court to deal with the issue without being unmindful of the ideological stance that Nehru and his government
had generally taken on this issue. At the tum of the fifties, the Supreme Court was just coming out
of a major controversy with the govemment over land reform.Ta Political distrust of the Court was slowly easing. A series of 'fair'
non-political appointments to the Supreme Court (which are a credit to Nehru's govemment), left the Court with an interestingly brilliant crop ofjudges.?s In this scenario, it was Justice Gajendragadkar who stepped forward to take charge of the situation in various areas of
Contoversy
285
contention where it was felt a stable jurisprudence was called for' Gajendragadkar came to the court with an apparatus for Sanskrit learning, a reputation in labour matters, a suave capacity for judicial management, an affinity with the Nehru government views on secularism and socialism and a fund of patience and energy. If anyone could restore consensus to a divided court and tidy up the Court's negative image, he was the judge to do it. We are not here concerned with his contribution to labour law or issues concerning freedom of religion and the numerous other matters on which he pronounced with authority.?6 What is significant is that apart from the occasional unimportant judgement, Justice Gajendragadkar somehow managed never to be in dissent. He found the median point around which he could build his consensus and if this meant a more enduring' albeit eclectic jurisprudence, there were a thousand pragmatic reasons for steering the middle path without giving the game away. His landmark Mysore jldgement (1963)?7, set the tone for all the other judgements on reservations that followed. Symbolically, it accepted the central govemment's stance on caste based groups without foreclosing the issue. Practically, it left the state govemments free to pursue their policy of reservations but threatened future judicial interference if they went over the top (although it was not entirely clear what the top was!). When his colleagues struck a slightly different note' he let tlose comments sit on the record knowing that his 'constitution bench' judgement could not be dislodged easily. He defended his judicial approach as being consistent with the task of achieving 'social engineering through law'' For several years, the arguments on reservations used his efforts as their starting point.?8 After the Congress split of 1969, the official testarnent of the Union Government was a socialism in favour of the 'have nots" Having won the 1971 war with Pakistan, the govemment came in with a landslide victory. That was not enough'to sustain electoral support. 'Underdog' socialism was presented as a reason for the empowerment of the govemment against its opponents. The supersession of the claims of three judges to be appointed Chief Justice of India in 1973-(which was a needless and arbitrary act) did not add to the government's reputation. The Emergency (1975-77) further sullied that reputation.Te It was around this time that some judges appointed in the seventies went about reconsffucting the jurispru-
286
dence of the Court.
If the name of Justice Krishna Iyer comes to mind, it is because it is often eclipsed by reference to some of his colleagues who constituted a cabal which slowly but steadily rewrote the socialist jurisprudence of the Court. This time the jurisprudence of the Court was less concemed with the empowerment of the state whose arbitrariness was itself sought to be disciplined by the
Court. Human rights and socialism were not treated as antithetical.so
Nor was 'human rights' a bourgeois concept, but one which could be used to protect ordinary people from the everyday atrocities that plague their lives. Like Gajendragadkar, Krishna lyer, too, possessed masterly skills. Like him he, too, had never ventured into dissentusing supportive judgements to advance his arguments and cause. In such exercises, issues do get fudged; and, they did at the hands of Justice Krishna Iyer as well. To describe his judicial universe is to traverse vast intricate areas of decision making and judgement writ_ ing.81 The Thomas case is not just his testament, but also the statement of the other judges. It constitutes a major, albeit symbolic, restatement of the equality mandate. Reservations were not a necessary evil and exception to the principles of equality but very much a part of them. Speaking for himself, Krishna lyer would not have gone too
far in favour of backward classes. His brief stopped with the protection of SC and ST. For him the really disadvantaged were the untouchables. They were a 'super classification' whom the Constitution had joined for special attention. Since Thomas was concerned with SC and with relaxation of criteria rather than reservations, he seized this opportunity to force the reinterpretation of the mandate of equality itself.82 Once the juristic reversal was complete and the new human rights based socialism found its feet, he moved away from the controversy. Even after retirement when his voice was heard on so many issues from powerful national platforms he was relatively silent on the issue of reservations for OBCs and the Mandal controversies of 1992 which tore India's politics apart in 1990. As his colleagues confronted these issues, they were aware that the reservations debate had become stodgy and would need refinement. Krishna lyer,s endorsement of an American professor's insight that there was a .creamy layer' among the OBCs which had been 'liberated' from disadvantage found independent endorsement from Justice Chinappa Reddy in 1985.83 The Court seemed to take the view reservations were an
Controversy 287
entire
acceptable part
progiu*.
veJial levels again. Particular focus was diverted towards ensuring by the that the prograrnme was not abused by being appropriated '.r"u.y iuy"t' amongst the disadvantaged' No less troubling was the programme maintenance of standards and the lengths to which the Pandora's box was not opened' would be allowed to go. As long as But' when these issues jogged along under the scrutiny of the Courts' which became the lid was itu"g op"n, they unleashed controversies sufficiently potiiicatty unmanageable for the govemment to off-load the entire controversy on to the Supreme Court which was expected to devise the final solution.
*ould need to be re-examined if it ever reached contro-
of equality- But the jurisprudence of the
IV
ever B.P. Mandal, M.P., was destined to be more famous than anyone
or imagined he would be. Whether it was in quest of a vote bank Manifesto of 19?7 made it clear that it would socii justice, the Janata make implement the now forgotten Kalelkar Commission of 1955' government service jobs and "forreservations betw een 25-33Vo for year mulate a special programme within the framework of the five caste and plans for the substantial advancement of the scheduled trites ana other . ' . backward classes ' ' ' provide adequate funds for the the purpose . . . (and set up) special machinery ' ' ' to implement fulfilment of the relevant constitutional guarpro!ra*-" and assure antees".* A large number of States had evolved their own compenperhaps satory discrimination. The arguments of principle lay buried' had eluded the on"oioforr"bly so. But, what was at issue and what emreservationisti was the inclusion of prognmmes of preferential ployment in the Central government. This was the prized serviceof the Indian ailegedfy the real home of the administrative power a handful of jobs were affected' At lower statJ. Ai officer level, only jobs that were levels, there were a great deal more. But' the handful of the cream of the civil at stake were the ones that were regarded as service-jobs for which many werc willing to paYe away their lives' make To go back and use the Kalelkar lists of 1955 simply did not ,"nJ". So, u n"* Commission was appointed under the Chairmanship
of B-P. Mandal:
288
tle reservation of appointments or posts in favour of such backward classes ofcitizens which are not idequately represented in public services and posts in connection witi the affairs of the Union or of any State; and (iu) prcsent to the president a rcport setting out the facts as found by them and making such recommendations as they think proper."
sion for
"(i) to determine the criteria for defining the socially and edu_ cationally backward classes; (ri) to recomrrrcnd steps to be taken for the advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens so identi_ fied: (irr) to examine the desirability or otherwise of making provi_
The Commission was empowered to
the
"(a) obtain such information as th'ey may consider necessary or relevant for their purpose in such form and such manner as thev may think appropriate, from the Central Govemment, the State Govemrnent, the Union Territory Administrations and such other authorities, organisations or individuals as may in the opinion of the Commission, be of assistance to them; and (D) hold their sittings or the sittings of such sub_committees as they may appoint from amongst their own members at such times and such places as may be determined by, or under the authoritv - of
Chairman."8s
the bag_ gage of the past and unsure whether the Mandal report w:rs a gift or a liability, pleaded for more rime and consultation in l9g2 and made a weak promise to implement Mandal in lgg3 as it transited closer to the next general election.e By late 1989, a new Janata govemment was sworn in. Its prime Minister, V.P. Singh, had resolved to impletrcnt MandaL Despite the
The Commission had the usual power to obtain information and organize its work and sittings as determined by the Chairman. With t_r:l:"" extended by one year, the Commission rcported on 3l Dec. 1980 rather than the sarne date in 1979. By thii time, the Janata government had gone. The Congress governnrent, carrying
Controversy 289
massivecriticismofthisdecision-bothatthetimeandafterthefall
policyof the Singh govemrnent as a conse{luence of pursuing this this decision was a canny decision-not half as foolish or foolhardy there was as it is made out to be. Singh and his colleagues knew that dominated politics that had a tremendous discontent with caste exemerged in the North of India which not only systematically property and cludeil certain backward castes from power' position, politics but also maltreated the latter. One chapter of Mandal was ievoted to the differences between the North and the South and drew pointed anention to the absence of mass movements in UP and Bihar forward the cause of the backward castes against the "tradi io "urry semi feudalism in UP and Bihar (whereby) the forward castes tions oi . , . keep tight control over smaller backward castes and prevent(ed) them fromJoining the mainstream backward classes movement"'87 politically The OBCs had notjust to be preferentially treated but also politics and social justice had found a powerful mobilised. Electoral meeting ground which would alter the very basis on which elections would be-fought in the near futurc- Mandal was the means by which was to be the highly successful antihigher caste politics of the South a new political ernutu:ted. What was being sought to be released was
energy.
To re-capitulate the events of 1990 is as unnecessary as rt rs Aunecessary to analyse them' Singh's fateful memorandum of 13
gust 199b was prefaced by a powerful statement in ?arliament' For tirn n" *gontint of principle was already concluded- SC and ST It reservation-s existed. Self betterment schemes were not enough' was a question of empowerrnent.
"We consciously want to give them a position in the decision making of the country, a share in the power sructurc ' ' ' Merely makin! programmes of economic benefit for various sections of to society will not do . . . There is a very big forc,e in the argument involve the poorest in the power structute''a He was conscious that "when changing the structure, there will be
resistance". We do not really have to go into grcat detail on the events of August to October 1990 which led to chaos in Delhi as students
antisoughi to immolate themselves, protesting that Mandal was
290
meritorian, ruinous, unfair, political, caste based and communal and wholly contrary to the public interest. The newspaperF-led by Shourie in the Indian Erpress-swung into action, pretending that what was happening was in fact, a popular revolt.se The newspapers carried portentous stories that implementing Mandal would result in illiterates running the country and unqualified butchers becoming qualified surgeons. Such portrayals were literally inflammatory. The arguments proceeded with guile and speed. The object was not to discuss the issue but to bring down Singh's govemment which-left to itself-was poised to alter the very basis on which the future of electoral North Indian politics was to be written. It was also clear that in a short span of a few months, the Singh government had demonstrated an intent to fulfil their election promises on a number of issues with speed. Given is uncertain party position in parliament, Singh could have been defeated on the floor of the House. But. the other parties did not want to be seen as paralysing parliarnent. They wanted the issue out in the strcets in the form of a popular revolt to silence Janata's ambitions once and for all, by depicting the latter as a party not fit to govern. For our present purposes, it is not necessary to do more than highlight some aspects of the controversy. In the first place, the argument about merit had little merit in it. The scare that was beins paraded by way of incitemenr overlooked the simple truth that ttrei werc 22Vo reservations in the Union Government for SC and ST. All the arguments pertaining to 'nrerit' applied equally to the SC and ST reservations. But, no party or public person dared to speak too loudly about the SC and ST dispensation. Mandal would increase the percentage to 2'l%o more.If that was the issue, it _was a far narrower issue than the one that was being paraded for incitement. Second, there were OBC programmes already in place in virtually every State up to the permissible limits of 50% which had earlier been suggested by the Supreme Court as a rule of thumb. So, what was at issue here
were a handful of officer class jobs in central Govemment with which the protesting middle class students were directly concemed. The issue of backward class reservations had been settled for all
govemments except the central govemment. All that was being done by Mandal was to rcduce central govemment's resistance to accepting what was settled policy in every state of the Union. Third, the
Controversy 291
entire campaign was politically inspired and for the sole political purpose ofiringlng down the then lanata govemment'e0 This is self eviient from the attitude of the other political parties whilst the
controversy was set alight on the streets of Delhi and elsewhere' Like the dog in Sherlock Holmes's adventure of the Silver Blaze, it was curious that the political parties said virtually nothing about their own commitment to implementing Ma ndat while the controversy was still raging. If contraryto their nature, they failed to bark, like Nero they
dJo cho.e to fiddle while Delhi and other cities were victims of manipulated conflagration. There is one question which the other
political parties should have asked themselves and answered with the at direct honesty that it deserved while the Mandal controversy was its pitch and 6eing used as an instrument to bring down V'P' Singh's Govemment. The question was : apart from minor adjustment to the have caste based lists approved by Mandal, would the other parties for the Centre and implemented Maiial to create OBC reservation Union Territories; and, if so, whether they would do so to the same remains extenr of 49Vo (including the 22Va for SC and ST)? The fact an that the major political parties-conscious that they were to fight to ask and answer this question honestly for election sotn-failed fear that they might lose the OBC vote' Yet, in retrospect' the position of iach one of the potitical parties was to support the
'implemeniation
of
Mandalbutto remain silent about it' In fact' when the Congress came to power, they issued a further memorandum' They noionly approved the 277o reservation ordainedby Man"dalbut wentfurthertodetaill0%furthervacanciesfor..othereconomically backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation"'er Consider the consequences if the when Congress had made this position clear in the August of 1990 would have broken the conthe Mandal controversy erupted. This clear spiracy of silence and forced the other parties also to assume a was not Janata's position on Mandal. The real failure of govemance iecision to implement Mandal which, by itself, could have been democratically discussed. The real failure was on the part of other political parties who were determined to have the issue decided on
ihe streets. This colossal failure to countenance the most elementary requirement of honesty put the then govemment to ransom' A matter (since they that could have been resolved by the parties tlemselves
292
were all really ad idem on the issue of implementin g Mandat) went to the Courts for solution, with Justice Ranganath Mishra (the presid_ ingjudge in the initial stages) assuming a wait-and_see posture in the granting of an interim injunction instead of taking a definite stance.
overlook the fact that various state govemments had compiled lists of OBCs which-along with the criteria they were based on_hud b""n approved by various High Court and Supreme Court judgements. But, it went one step further and conducted a survey with the advice of a distinguished panel of experts. In 405 out of 406 districts everv household in two villages and one urban block were surveyed and the data analysed.es Even this was not regarded as definitive. Having toured the country and got .personal' impressions, various other groups were also tested for backwardness. The test for backwardness was contained in an eleven point criterion:
The Mandal conroversy was politically engineered and contrived into fame. into controversy, the Mandal Report was nakedly pa_ ,Plunged raded for scrutiny. Experts associated with it, disclaimed their ap_ proval. Sociologists who had been waiting in the wings ro have their say joined the chorus.e2 Every aspect of the Report was attacked. Unlike the Kalelkar Commission, what Man dal uted to do was stress the need for empirical data while emphasizing its paucity.e3 If castes were a starting point, it was only natural to refer to the l93l census after which reference to caste was not available in any later census. Since the 1961 census contained information about various tribes, it was used for that purpose.ea The Mandal Commission could not
"As a result of the above exercise, the Commission evolved eleven 'Indicators' or 'criteria' for determining social and educa_ tional backwardness. These I I .indicators' were grouped under three broad heads, i.e., Social, Education and Economic. They are:
(A) Social
(i)
Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by oth_

ers.
(ii)
(iii)
CasteVClasses which mainly depend on manual labour
for their livelihood.

CasteVClasses where at least 25% females and 1096 males
Controversy 293
(tv) (B) (v)

(vr)
above the state average get married at an age below 17 in rural areas and at least l0% females and SVo males do so in urban areas. CasteVClasses where participation of females in work is al least 25Eo above the State averase.
years
Educational
Castes/Classes where the number of children in the age group of 5- 15 years who never attended school is at least 25Vo above the State average. Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the State average.
(vii) (C)
(viii)
CasteVClasses amongst whom the proportion of matriculates is at least 25Vo below the State average.
Economic
CasteVClasses where the average value of family assets is at least 25Vo below tle State average. Castes/Classes where the number of families living in Kutcha houses is at least 25Va above the State average. CasteVClasses where the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the households. Castes/Classes where the number of households having taken consumption loan is at least 257o above the State
average.
(ix) (r) (xt)
As the above three groups are not of equal importance for our purpose, separate weightage was given to 'Indicators' in each group. All the social 'Indicators' were given a weightage of 3 points each. Educational 'Indicators' a weightage of 2 points each and Economic 'Indicators' a weightage of one point each. Eco-
nomic, in addition to Social and Educational Indicators, were considered important as they directly flowed from social and educational backwardness. This also helped ro highlight rhe lacts
that socially and educationally backward classes are economically
backward also.
294
The Politics of Bachuardness
It will be seen that from the values given to each Indicator, the total score adds up lo 22. All these l l Indicators were applied to all the castes covered by the survey for a particular State' As a result of this application, all castes which had a score of 507o (i.e.,ll points) or above were listed as socially and educationally backward and the rest were treated as 'advanced'. (It is a sheer coincidence that the number of indicators and minimum point score for backwardness, both happen to be eleven.) Further, in case the number of households covered by the survey for any particular caste were below 20, it was left out of consideration, as ihe sample was considered too small for any dependable inference."
"In the end it may be emphasised that this survey has no pretensions to being a piece of academic research' It has been conducted by the administrative machinery of the Government
and used as a rough and ready tool for evolving a set
of simple criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness' Throughout this survey our approach has been conditioned by
practical considerations, realities of field conditions, constraints of iesou.ces and trained manpower and paucity of time' All these factors obviously militate against the requirements of technically sophisticated and academically satisfying operation."e6
The 'social indicators' were weighted at 3 points each' the educational at 2 and the economic at l. Having identified the groups (including caste and other occupational group), it was unable to get a fix on the exact number of OBCs since no head count had been done' On the basis of the 1931 census, it made a guess that after excluding the forward classes and assuming a uniform rate of demographic growth for all, the OBCs were approximately 527o. Although the use of 50 year old data and the crude method of calculation have been criticised, not too much turns on the figure of 52Vo- In line with Supreme Court judgements that the overall reservation should not exceed 5O%, the Commission did not rely on its own guess to propose a further 52Vo reservation but chose to propose 27Vo as sufficient to provide the compensatory equity that would tilt the
balance in favour of OBC empowerment. Given the nature of the task and the experience of the Commissions appointed by various states'
Controversy 295
the Mandal Commission had done well. The only real attack on it was the old ideological attack that it entrenched caste, took reservations to
the farthest limits

layer.
of around 50% and failed to isolate the creamy
The Government Memorandum of 13 August 1990 was to be prospectively applied from 7 August 1990, with 27Vo OBC reservations excluding all those OBCs who had been selected on merit anyway and giving preference to those OBCs who were in the lists that were cofilmon to Mandal and the State.eT Wlen the Congress came in with the experience of a post-Mandal election behind them, they did not, in their Memorandum of 25 September 1991, alter the 27 Vo but created a further sub-section-not of the creamv laver but of the 'more backward' comprising of the .poorer' sections of ihe OBCs who would be given a preferential edge over the mainstream OBCs. They also added a further residuary 10Zo of .economically' backward not covered by the list of OBCs.e8 The extra l0qo took the total reservation over the 5OVo level, perhaps deliberately to tempt constitutional providence. The distinction between the .more backward' and the 'backward' was an interesting political gimmick (even if the distinction could be constitutionally justified), because the memoran_ dum evolved no method of determining who the more backward would be; and, merely, promised that a separate list would be issued separately. The Congress's attempt to appear different_and justify its earlier silence-floundered for content. The matter was literally dumped before the Supreme Court which, in turn, constituted a nine judge bench partly to enable a safety of numbers; and, partly to give itself the leeway to reassess the entire issue without being hindered by earlier Constitution benches which had authoritatively quelled previous controversies. Since emotions and politics had been charged in exaggerated proportions, the circumstances under which the Ma ndal case came to be argued were necessarily dramatic. To the imposing presence of nine judges were added a battery of lawyers.ee What may have added to the drama was the unlikely figure of Ram Jethmalani, (who is usually associated with the causes of well-off accused and detenus), defending Mandnl with zest. With this kind of Bench, the judges were in the commanding position of re-inventing the entire jurisprudence on reservations. Conscious that they were ,.sitting in a larger
296
The Politics of Bachttardness
bench", they "kept in mind the relevance and significance of the principle oi ttorc decisis (not disturbing a previous decision) ' ' ' to unless, of course, there (were) . . ' compelling and strong reasons consisting of depart from it."rm Yet thb Bench split into a majorily Justice Jeewan Reddy (writing for Kania C'J, and Venkatachaliah' Ahmadi and himselfl and Sawant J writing for himself and a minority consisting of lustices Thommen, Kuldip Singh and Sahai---+ach writing their own judgements.lor Justice Pandian's judgement was -*ith the majority although he differed with them on crucial *o.. questions by taking a stance against the exclusion of the creamy luy.r, on giving preference to the more backward on the basis of on economic means tests and on rigidly holding on to the 507o ceiling taking into account the adequacy of represervations inespective of resentation.lo2 The differences between the majority and minority were principally on the importance which the latter attached to merit and to using the economic criteria to identiS backwardness' The Court began by posing 8 issues to itself' These were: would be exhaustive of the right to reservation to posts in services
under the State? (it) What would be the content of the phrase 'Backward Class' in Article 16(4) of the Constitution and whether caste by itself could constitute a class and whether economic criterion by itself could identify a class for Article 16(4) and whether Backward Classes in Article 16(4) would include the Article 46 as well? (iii) If economic criterion by itself could not constitute a Backward Class under Article 16(4) whether reservation of posts in services under the State based exclusively on economic criteria would be covered by Article 16(1) of the Constitution? (iv) Can the extent of reservation to posts in the services under the State under Article 16(4) or, if permitted under Article 16(l) and 16(4) tosether, exceed 5O7a of the posts in a cadre or service under the State-or exceed 56Vo of the appointments in a cadre or service in any particular year and can such extent of reservation be determined
(i) Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1)
and
wiihbut determining the inadequacy of representation of each class in

the di'fferent categories and grades of services under the State? (v) Does Article 16(4) permit the classification of 'Backward
Controversy
2g7
Classes' into Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes or permit classification among them based on economic or other consid_
erations?
legislatures of the State or by law made by parliament? Or could such provisions be made by an executive order? (vi;) Will the extent of judiciat review be limited or restricted in regard to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage of reservations made for such classes, to a demonstrably perverie identifi cation or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage? (viii) Would reservarion of appointments oi posts .in favour of any Backward Class" be restricted to the initial appointment to the post or would it extend to promotions as well?
(vi) Would making "any provision" under Article 16(4) for reser_ vation "by the State" necessarily have ro be by law made by the
discourse and which occasioned differences amongst thejudges them_

selves.
It is not necessary to analyse the response to all of them but only identify the core issues that were important both to public
tions.r03
Th9^1e
were re-cast by Justice Jeewan Reddy into 10 sets of ques-
Thefrsr preliminary quesrion was much too easily disposed of. It related to whetherthe government could simply by executive order launch on such an extensive and controversiil .t ung.. The answer that, in the absence of rules (which, too, could be promulgated by the govemment), the government could introduce reservations on its mere ipse drxir is far from satisfactory. No doubt, in service jurispru_ dence, the govemment could determine the contractual terms on which it was going to recruit its civil seryants and deal with their conditions of service as long as such terms did not offend the Consti_ tution. Yet, it is necessary to record the discomfiture ofJustice Sahai:
"Reservation by executive order may not be invalid but since it was being made for the first time in services under the Union, propriety demanded that it should have been laid before parlia_ ment not only to lay down (a) healthy convention but also to consider the change in social, economic and political conditions in the country as nearly ten years had elapsed from the date of the submission of the Report, a period considered sufficient for evalu_
2g8
ation if the reservation should be continued or not'"ro4

The argument of the majority
tlat insistence that reservations should
te proiideO ty tarliament would disable local bodies from introducinj ro.tt progr*", does not seem convincing''* we were conceined here with the national civil service who were given special protection by the Constitution-a policy that could well have been an chall"nged on grounds of violation of fundamental rights' Indeed' context, had warned that the 'execuold ruling of 1t5516, in another tive' poier could be used to fashion policy but not to interfere with
p"opl"', rights. Schemes involving reservation for the.civil service
they rfroofO U" Jonceived and evolved on a statutory basis because
involve more than a simple condition of service' If they are not declared by law and Eimply left to the ipse dixit of the.govemment without any parliamentary oversight' the important policies that un-.. n"n.t subjected to democratic scrutiny' Once the derlie thern government has gone through the exercise of appointing a Commisiion and making responsible statements in Parliament, later governby legments should h;ve either implemented the recommendations into islation; or at least,-as Justice Sahai put it-taken Parliament power to make confidence. No doubt, to deny the govemment the parliamentary apgrolral may bring both day-to-day rules without concerned executivelovemment and Parliameni to a halt' But we are -a should have been the major policy issue. Parliament here with Singh had major testing ground fot the nalidity of such a policy' V'P' then' Parliament maie the relevant statement to Parliament' But' protests' Had abdicated the issue to politically manipulated mob Parliamentexaminedtheissueandvotedonitateachstage'each political party-indeed, each member-would have had to take a ,t-d on ihir-itsue. This would have prvented politicians standing by and gleefully watching the fun as they watched V'P' Singh's gou.-ni.o* to a halt and crumble' The reason underlying the irt" ttt"t executive orders without legislative backing cannot alter questions peopte's rights is founded on the sound assumption that be routed through Parliament and deterionceming-suctr righs must
renders Parliamined by Law. The procedure approved by the C,orrrt
legislation is ment entirely powerless on this major issue' If no prima facie unassailable' Even lquired, the nttification becomes
Controversy 2gg
parliamentary disapproval would not be enough to dislodge it or the govemment making it. The purposes of democracy are ill_served if Parliament (and, therefore, the people) are kept outof the discussion to be confronted with a notiftcatory fait accompli. Beyond the preliminary question as to how such policies should be _ declared lay the main question which goes to the hiart of the debate: Is the Constitution caste blind"ttot For a society to agree nor ro discriminate on grounds of caste, colour or religion is unexceptional, but can any society be totally blind to the fact that discrimination stems from very deep rooted prejudices which the Constitution seeks to outlaw. The whole point of positive discrimination mandate is to empower-ven mandate-the govemment to take steps to evolve a programme to combat the social circumstances whictr would eradi_ cate the evils that flow from casteism, racism and bigotry. America has a serious problem of racism. Can the State in that country simply ignore what is happening in society on the basis that since the law forbids the State to discriminate on grounds of race, it has no other choice but to do nothing for black people on the assumption that the Constitution forces the State to be .colour blind'. If thi agencies of State in America were to assume total colour blindness in respect of their actions, they would, in fact, be perpetuating injustice of the worst possible kind and inviting riots and unrest. The simple injunc_ tion of non-discrimination does not enjoin the State to be a spectator to racism. If special protection has to be given to protect blacks from rascist attacks, it is the duty of the State to provide this protection. If the victims of racism require special schemes, the Stateiannot plead colour blindness and refuse such remedial justice. The constitutional command not to discriminate falls miserably to the ground if endemic disadvantage continues to be sustained in society. The injunction against discrimination cannot apply to compensatory discrimination. If it did, the latter concept would be totally dissolved in a way that would endanger and mal-construct the concept of equality whlch is fundamental to the constitutionai enterprise as a whole. By its very nature, discrimination involves actions that are d irected work againit persons who belong to the group or class against whom discrimina_ tion is impermissible. A scheme that is discriminatory in favour of such a person, group or class does not discriminate against them. The fact that it may mal-effect others is precisely why such schemes are
300
The Politics of Baclatt ardne s s
subjected to tests of proportionality. But positive discrimination must be schlmes, by virtue of being part of the mandate of equality' in the liberally construed since they seek to achieve equality much actions are harshly construed ,.." *uy, just as anti-discrimination Equalsince ttrey.perpetuate and promote the injustice of inequality' significance ity is a compoiite social concept of pivotal constitutional *A not iuti a black letter law rule to be applied mechanically' One would h"ave thought that the one lesson to be leamt from American jurisprudence is tie refusal of its Courts to accept that the American "Constitotion is colour blind-even if the judges have wavered on the extent and length to which schemes of compensatory discrimination judges' the can go. Whatever the reservations of some American meama.lo-rity in a 1990 caser08 insisted that "benign race-conscious 'remenot surls mandated by Congress---+ven if those measures are
past dial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of constitutionally pergovernmental or societal discrimination-are irissible to the extent that they serve important government objecsuffer tives . . .". It refused to accept that such programmes should rather than be strict scrutiny and be kept within narrow confines
allowed to flower with the flavour of the Constitution's comprehenpresence of sive egalitarian imagination' Perhaps, unnerved by the -<lissent, Supreme Court in Mandal----even after the Indian some precedent Thomas-refused to accept the full value of the American Instead it chose to after having been apprised of it thoroughly'r@ unimake the somewhat lame summary that in America "no single to be still form pattem of thought can be discemed ' ' ' Ideas appear
even if recent American legal thought is reasonably uncompromiziag -suggest full throated support of reservations in a less judgements higher education. The real argument was not about reservations and compensatory principle of discrimination being or not being a primary part of the equality (for only Justice Thommen saw the compensatory discrimipart of nation programme as an exception to equality rather than a the judges i,ttor"1 ir o-ver the permissibility of affirmative action' All *"r" in no doubt ihat affirmative action was a necessary and proper part of the equality mandate. The majority linked affirmative action ly ,nt S,u,. to the goals of the Directive Principles' going beyond a
inevolution''.ll0Infact,onthebasicquestionof.colourblindness'
The Supreme Couft as Problem Solver: Mandal
Controversy
301
simple appeal to substantive equality.rrr The minority was a little less exuberant. One of the minority judges frowned on the idea of job reservations, preferring the creation of educational and other opportunities, with the added caveat that any measure must be narrowly tailored to achieve intnded goals.rr2 The real debate was over whether the use of 'caste' to identify 'beneficiaries' of compensatory discrimination was part of a massive resurection of a caste ridden society in which people would acquire a vested interest in sporting caste identities, and with it caste biases, prejudices and enmities. If Justices Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao had somewhat fudged thc issue by suggesting that 'caste' could be a criterion but not necessarily the only onerr3, later judgements in the late sixties had been less equivocal and accepted that the term 'class' could be equated with caste.rra If the wrong that was sought to be redressed was 'caste', how could 'caste' be eliminated from defining the wrong which, itself, was perceived as being caste based? Thomas had closed the issue.r15 But the fact that a political wedge had been used to open Pandora's box helped its juristic lid from being thrown open. The majority judges very cautiously steered themselves out of getting bogged into the controversy over 'caste'. For them, such a controversy was arid. It was a hangover from the past. By invoking Ambedkar for the view that backward classes "are nothing else but a collection of certain castes", the majority dived for historical cover precisely where they could find it because Ambedkar was both an untouchable leader as well as the person entrusted with piloting India's Constitution through the Assembly.r16 He was, thus, the oracle on this question twice over. But having neutralized the controversy by appealing to legislative intent, Justice Jeewan Reddy sought to minimize the importance of 'caste' to the whole issue. For him the identification of group was only a preliminary steprrT. A 'caste' was not even a potential beneficiary until and unless it met the test of 'backwardness'. As if to soften the blow, it was reiterated by way of logical possibility that the preliminary identification need not be a caste group. There was a tendency on the part of a majority to take the theoretical stance that a 'class' could mean anything--ven a caste. By accepting that the historical intent was to benefit caste groups but the definitional sprawl encompassed others, the majority managed to
steer its way past the somewhat over-charged discussion over Mandal
302
entrenching a caste based society.rrE In a sense, there was nothing more to say; and, much of it had been said before. Yet, the harsh truth was that once Mandal was electorally appropriated, it polarised politics along caste lines. There was no point pretending that the identification of groups along caste lines was purely 'preliminary' in nature; and the reality was fulfilling the test of 'backwardness'. Justice Kuldip Singh expressed himself with his usual candour by projecting the simple truth that Mandal and its
discontents showed that the caste system was "trying to raise its ugly
head in various forms".rre Justice Sahai, as was his wont, put his finger on the problem when he said: "The real issue is not reservation but identification".r20 He was surely right in hinting that the debate on the inclusion of 'caste' had prevented the Court from evolving a test to identify backwardness. For him although backwardness was not limited to SC and ST, any OBC should have suffered from similar discriminations and disadvantage.r2r If the majority were right and the real issue was one of 'backwardness', its jurisprudence on this vexed issue did not really travel too far. While Justice Kuldip Singh eliminated 'caste' considerations from featuring in the test of backwardness altogetherr22 and Justice Sahai refused to read backward caste as synonymous with backward classr23, Justice Thommen looked for secular criteria grounded in material circumstances so that the benefits of reservation were extended to those who suffered as a consequence of "segregation in slums and ghettos and afflicted by grinding poverty, disease, ignorance, ill health and (being) haunted by fear and anxiety".r2a All these were, in most cases, felt more pointedly by caste groups. Yet, for the minority, that was not the point. They wanted the Court to reassess its previous wisdom and look at the matter afresh. It was not enough to leave these matters to the executive. For them, it was for the Court to be a little more forward in its definition bf 'backwardness'. The minority were right to the extent that the majority had left things fuzzy on the issue of caste in a way that virtually all the pending uncertainties about backwardness remained uncertain. When the dust has settled, people will look in vain in the majority texts for a consistent and reliable meaning of 'backwardness'. What the majority explicated did not add fresh insights into our understanding of the compensatory discrimination programme. Confronted with the issue of caste, the ma-
Contoversy
303
joriry skilfully depicted it as unproblematic in theory and a mere preliminary step in the identification of BCs in practice. But' the
majority did not venture further than that. It had solved its immediate problem by conceming itself with the criterion and methodology used by Mandal and concluded that it was not wanting. But, many
things were kept in the air. Should the backward classes be similar to the SC and ST? Could there be future OBCs? What exactly were the criteria to define OBCs if they were not just 'caste' and not just poverty or economic deprivation? For the majority, this was for a future Commission to decide. And if they got it wrong, there was
always judicial review ! Having accepted the argument of the reservationists in the context of the political situation in which it surfaced, the majority did not send away the meritocratists empty handed. There were several important concessions that were made to the latter. One such concossion was in response to the common sense intuition that the reservations were going to the wrong people. This did not necessarily arise from either Ma ndal or the notification implementing it except to the
limited extent that the Congrcss notification entailed giving preference to the "poorer sections" of the OBCs125. There was no doubt that within every "clasJ', some would be less well off, others much better
off. The question was whether it was wise to devise criteria to give preference within the class to the 'more backward' (M/BC). More important, could these distinctions be taken to their logical limits so that the 'more forward' amongst the BC who were alleged to constitnte the 'creamy layer' of the OBCs De excluded from reservations altogether2 Way back in 1963, Justice Gajendragadkar refused to accept that the Constitution coantenanced breaking a class into 'backward' and 'more backward'126. Years later, in 1985, Justice Chinappa Reddy felt that such distinctions "would be necessary to help the More Backward Classes, otherwise those . . . who might be a little more advanced . . . might walk away with all the seats".127 This distinction would make no difference to the merit candidates who
were to be excluded anyway. If any thing, the argument was that the potentially more meritorious amongst the OBCs should be excluded because they belonged to a creamy layer amongst the OBCs and were no longer OBCs. Nothing would be gained by the merit candidates from such a distinction except the satisfaction (if it can be called that)
3M
The politics of Baclcwarfurcss
of splitting the OBCs into rwo groups and depriving possibly the best of them of rcservational benefits. What was not clear-and remains unclear-is whether the purpose behind these distinaiow is to efiect
a more equitable distribution of benefits or whether it was to exclude some persons altogether2 What may have been lost sight of was the
by an 'individual', it arose out of belonging to a .group'. If the 'group' as a whole transited out of 'backwardness', it would not be entitled to any preference at all.r28 But, was there really any scope for
making mini-distinctions? And, would such mini{istinctions be based on individual characteristics? Or, would the endeavour be to identifv a sub-group? Justice Pandian refused to be drawn into this controversy. It was not required for the purposes of the case.r2e While there was some truth in the assertion that the crcamy layer may be usurping reservations, but this was not to deny that they were members of that backward class. He felt that the fact some individuals were success stories neither affected the beneficiary status of that OBC nor occa-
peculiar nature of the right involved. Although the right claimed was
sioned the circumstances whercby some individuals were ..segre-
was of significant proportions, the entire community could be redesignated and would cease to be OBC. The arguments over the 'creamy layer' appear attractive, but are fundamentally flawed. A family does not cease to be a member of a group that is subject to caste and other discrimination because, it had through sheer dint of
personal effort, achieved some professional or financial success. The creamy layer policy says to individual members of a class: ..Do well
gated, picked up and thrown ovemight out of the arena of backward classes".r3o The answer lay in eliminating . pseudo communities who have smuggled into rhe backward classes (being) . . . weeded out from the list of backward classes . . . by the Government on proper verification"- 13r The learned judge was egainst these mini-classifications. They were an invitation to trouble. Where the .creamy layer'
will be penalized". The whole controveny over the creamy layer may well be an attempt to penalize those who have made a good effort to struggle against their inequitous condition. yet, the 'merit' lobby could not be sent back empty handed. The .crcamy layer' solution was a response to the grouse (rather than a grievance) nursed by the merit candidates. The majority judgement of Justice Jeewan Reddy saw no impediment to creating the lower classifica_
and your children
Controversy 305
tion of 'more backward classes', but refused to make such a classification mandatory, but found fault with the ambiguous promise of the Congress notification to threaten to create such a category without devising the basis on which it was made.r32 However, the majority clearly felt obliged to respond to the discontent which rumoured that
reservations werc going to the better off amongst the OBCs such as children of parliamentarians, civil servants and the like. But, how was this to be done? The majority accepted that reservations aimed at group backwardness. They also agreed that no simple income test could be used to sepuate the cream from the nflk.r33 Such a separation would necessarily be based on criteria as complex as those for determining backwardness. Financial success or income could never be a test by itsef. It is precisely this controversy that was somewhat perfunctorily disposed ofby a twojudge bench ofthe Supreme Court which considered the Bihar and UP creamy layer schemesr33(u) which had created a 'thin' creamy layer designed to exclude only those who were superlatively successful. Indeed, a 'thick' creamy layer to include mere success stories would destroy the rcservation programme and overlook the fact that the 'creamy layer' concept took away an already accrued right. This could not be done lightly on the same basis as the normal constitutional jurisprudence dispensation (based
on the doctrine of classification), invoked in respect of granting privileges to distinct classes. In the Bihar-UP Creamy Layer case judgement-Kuldip Singh J (one of the minority 'Mandal' judges)
and Justice Saghir Ahmad J.-the court simply accepted, that certain classes of 'success stories were per se excluded without elucidating
the concept
of'social advancement' which is crucial to defining the creamy layer; and overlooking the fact that even if a 'success' story person may have conquered his disadvantage he remains the victim of discrimination. The 'creamy layer' judgement is unsatisfactoryif for no other reason because it is incomplete. Shocked by the thinness of the Bihar-UP creamy layer, it missed a real opportunity to found its decision on this vexed question on a sound juristic basis. As if grappling with 'backwardness' was not difFrcult enough, the Court invented a new but skewed and unlimited concept of'social advancement' to exclude those "whose advancement . . . renders them misfits as backward classes".r3a Unlike the creation of 'more backward classes' which was optional, the identification of the 'creamy
306
layer' was treated as compulsory, without which the govemment' s reservation progran ne would, itself, not survive unless the govemment devised acceptable 'social advancement' criteria within four months.r35 It would follow-although this was not expressly statedthat every OBC reservation scheme in the states or elsewhere would become otiose unless 'creamy layer' exclusions were incorporated in the scheme. This put at risk all OBC reservations. Having done this the Court seems to have conceded the argument in principle by explicitly stating that the 'creamy layer' exclusion would not apply to SC and ST candidates.ri6 If the Court was right in principle, there is no justification for not extending such exclusions to the SC and ST.
What made the contradiction even glaring was the fact that most of the complaints about the 'cream' hi-jacking the benefits of reservation werc in relation to the SC and ST. Both the form and content by which the majority defined the creamy layer was acceptable to the minority judges. However, they settled for simpler tests-such as means tests (Justice Thommen)r37, economic ceilings (Justice Kuldip Singh)t3E, social status or economic affluence (Justice Sahai).r3e Such simpler tests were naturally more manageable. But mere income or means testing would result in arbitrary exclusions. Income windfalls would not by, themselves, eliminate backwardness. At the same time, more complex tests on which the constitutionality of the whole programme depended, was inviting trouble. Justice Pandian was right when he said that the "argument for the exclusion of the 'crcamy layer' on the face of it appears to be attractive and reasonable"r{ yet, it was over-simplified and, arbitrary, and concerned evolving criteria that were possibly so complex that they were virtually unmanageable and ignored the very nature of the group rights on which the entire concept of reservations was based. The majority's zealousness in picking up this issue (when it did not warrant examination) was a concession to the meritocrats without advancing the cause of meritocrats any further or benefitting their number.
This concessionary over-zealousness to the meritocrats manifested
itself in one other major controversy which was picked up gratuitously without any relevance to the case. This concemed the maintenance of "reservations" for promotions. The impugned notification was not concerned with promotional reservations but only initial direct recruitment. But, reservations in matters of promotions was
Controversy 3Oj
framed as an issue to be discussed and answered by the Court. During arguments, some counsel got the impression that the issue had been dropped.rarln fact, Justice Ahmadi specifically dissociated from the majority judgement on this aspect because it "did not arise for consideration and hence need not be answered".la2
The minority who-in any event-felt that the reservations programme went over the top had little difficulty in supporting the elimination of promotions from the catchment of reservations. Agreeing that it did not arise for consideration, they felt it was "too vital . . . to be overlooked"ra3 (Justice Thommen), "violative" of equalityraa (Justice Kuldip Singh) and defeated the "entire object of equalization'tas (Justice Sahai). Even Justice Pandian joined this aspect of the decision which permitted reservations in promotions to continue for five years before the final discontinuance. ta6 The iustification offered by the majority was rhar the 9 judge Constitution bench was constituted, "to finally settle the legal position relating to reservadons"147 The Mandal case was the 'final look'. But, if that were the case, why was not a final shape given to the criteria for backwardness and social advancement? What the Court decided to do was to ovemrle a long standing decision of 1962, the challenge to which was repelled in 1982.ra8 In the Mandal case, the Court ovemrled the 1962 decision with prospective effect five years hence. Promotional reservations were also to be abolished for SC and STs (who were not before the Court) and not just the OBCs (who were before the Court). Here we see a marked-and unexplained---contrast with the 'creamy layer' exclusions which were applicable only to OBCs. Since both were decided ostensibly as issues of principle, there was no reason for treating the various backward classes differentially on issues as important as this unless one accepted Justice Krishna Iyer's view that
the SC and ST were a group who were 'super-classified' by the Constitution itself for super preferential treatmentlae. And, if that was the underlying intuition for not applying the creamy layer exclusion to them, there were equally strong reasons for applying promotional reservations to them even if they were not applicable to the OBCs. This is without prejudice to our argument that the Court should not have pronounced on this issue at a1l. Both the creamy layer and promotional reservations issues seemed to have entered the Mandal
discourse as side issues to support the general argument that reserva-
308
tions were too extensive and overgenerous. The court appears to have rushed into these issues, leaving behind a debris of unresolved political and juristic questions. In May 1995' Parliament stepped in to use its power to amend the Constitution to reverse the Mandal Judgement ST'r50 on ih" irro" of promotion in so far as it affects the SC and to have ceased to Somewhere along the line, the majority seemed discuss the issue on principle and concerned itself with the psychology of those for and against such reservations' They felt that such re-servations would "destroy the will to work, compete and excel" and were "bound t(: generate a feeling of despondence and 'heart bum ing' among members of the general non-reserved categories"' Con-
viiced thai this would happen, the 'birth mark' of reserved candi dates was sought to be eliminated because it was felt that such birth
marks were "crutches" which neither blessed them that gave nor those that received-apart from not being "in the interest of efficiency (and) . . . not in the larger interest of the nation'"I50(") During
nrguments, the anti-reservationists had made much of the constitutiJral provision that recommends that claims of the SC and ST shall
be considered "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration".r5r There was no evidence whatsoever that 30 years of promotional reservations had undermined efficiency' It was assumed that this would instill 'heart bumifrg' in the general candidates and induce a 'crutches' mentality in the reserved candidates' It has already been stressed that no scheme of reservations sacrifices competence, even though merit may be compromised to some extent' So'
th"r" *u.
a bottom line on the extent to which efficiency would be
undermined. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically allowed relaxations and concessions from merit requirements to continue'rs2 Unfortunately, the Court lost sight of, and did not discuss the reasons for which resirvations exist. Reservations become necessary because the beneficiary class not only suffers from cumulative disadvantage but also because they are likely targets for future discrimination' lf the intuitions about 'heart buming' are important, there was no less a resentment on the part of the BCs to whom prefereqtial access to the really important posts and positions of power were denied' Reservations in piomotion guarded against future discrimination to important
posts rather than simply secured easy promotions'
If
such reserva-
iion.
*"r"
not made, the OBCs, SC and ST would be open to
Controversy 309
precisely those prejudices and biases that had plagued them over time in trying to get "adequate representation,' in those areas (of promotional posts) where real power was exercised by senior officials. One
cannot help feeling that the Court's decision on promotions concerned itself more with the emotions Mandal had generated rather than with all the issues that should have been considered. Ifconcessions to the merit candidates were in the air, there was, at least, one more to come in the shape of the ceiling that could be imposed. Having treated reservations as part of the principle of equality, the Court unanimcusly took the view that reservations made in the enabling provision (Article l5(4) and l6(4)) were .exhaustive' of reservations and preferences for the OBCs.r53 If this was so, nothing tumed on the somewhat grander principled stance that reservations were part of equality and not an exception to it.lsa Once reservations were confined within their own narrow sphere, the Court (with the exception of Justice pandian) took the view that the 5OVo rule in educational institutions admissions should be applied also to job reservations.r5s Unlike Justice Pandian who accepted the argument that the test was 'adequacy of representation' in the services at the given point in time under review; (and, therefore, leeway had to be given to the administration to achieve adequate levels irrespective of any mechanically pre-ordained percentage test),rs6 the majority took the view that 'adequate representation' was not proportional representation. 15? The figure of SOVo was simply accepted while leaving open the possibility that the rule may be transgressed after exercising "extreme caution" in "extraordinary situations" where people in remote are:rs have to .be brought into mainstream national life.t5E The 507o rule was not to be applied to the cadre as a whole, but only to the year in question.rse This would place a .go-slow' on the programme as a whole especially because any carry forwards from the previous year would also have to meet the 5OVo tariff. 160
There were some concessions to the reservationists. The trst was that the tariff would apply to reservations proper and not to exemp_ tions, concessions and relaxations which lowered the merit criterion and incrcased the competitiveness of the BCs.r6r The sec ond conces_ sion was that the BCs selected by merit would not be included in the computation of the 5O% threshold of promissible reservations. How_ ever, the pithy paragraph dealing with this concession did not clarifv
310
where whether it was open to a govemment to fix a lesser quantum was to sufficient candidates got in on meritr62' The third corcession of relatreat reservations other than those of the BC (such as those separate tively privileged persons under the doctrine of source) as a tne sOEo
as to whether compartmentJ63 However, there remains a question mark (in the wider sense as rule would cover all reservations
including all persons or groups who are given
preference or preferdeclare that ential tre-atment) even though the Court did ambiguously it would not.r6a The reason for keeping BC (including SC and ST) other reservations separate was to ens'rre that BC reservations
a
and
were not conespondingly whittled downr65' But' what would greatly in if the combined strength of BC and other reservations went rigorous on whether excess of 507o? The Court was also insufficiently
happen
theextranon.BCreservationswereconfinedtocategoriesofdisad. whether they vantaged persons (for example, the handicapped) or of source) to could-atso be extended (as they had under the doctrine the doctrine of the relatively privileged (such as those identified by of diplomats abroad being reserved children ,oo.." u*, fo, "*a*ple' the majority educational seats and so on)?r6 Amidst this untidyness' did endeav-ur to do some tidying up' govemments Aware that lack of courage had made successive the over the years-and even more so in the Mandal case-pass 'buck' of deciding these very difficult questions on to the Court' the judges found themselves dealing with matters that could-and with a sfroita-nuu" U"en decided by responsible politicians liaising the people' in a responsible responsible govemment and,-perforce, W"
already drawn attention to various parties maintaining going on' but takiog a pro".y. a si'lence when the Mandal agitations were the storm had ftfunauf position (with even greater reservations)-orce the tfo*n ou"t and the V.P. Singh Govemment had fallen' But' once judge bench, the court was seized of the issuJand referred it to a nine all the principl es de novo and Bench was torn between deciding solving' the instant crisis' The long drawn arguments in against iourt showed linle let up. The popular protests were directed The arguments of noriust OnC reservations but ieJervations pet se' different and exaggerattfre anti-t"tanOal lawyers in Court were no perhaps' u,ti.utut O sentiments that rese ations (including and' they had not "aiy SC and ST reservations) were going to be-if
n"*
1.Ut"*
rp."iuffy
Controversy
3ll
already become-the ruination of the country. The nation was at peril. That is the reason why the Court ventured into questions concerning SC and ST reservations with such ease. Once the 'national peril' argument found an emotional place in the intellectual apparatus of legal argument, the Court was invited into a compromise that would save reservations programmes while at the same time being egged on to respond to the ire of meritocratists whose protests struck a chord with the Cout.t. It cannot be overlooked that what was before the Court was not the reservation poli cy per se which was part of the Constitution's dispensation and which no amount of legal frowning could drive into obsolescence. What was involved was a very small programme of the central govemment which the latter's political cowardice and ideological confusion had allowed to lay fallow for many years. The Court could have chosen to nanow its focus, but it did not do so overtly.
V
T\e Mandal judgenrent contains a mass of material. Since what was in issue was the report itself and its methodology, a summary of the report became necessary. The judicial summary was dry and matter of fact-making as little of the Report and its critique as possible.16T Since the Supreme Court of India and America had both painted their gray in gray on these questions, reference to American decisions added ballast to the arguments.r6s In fact, the majority judgements add very little to the received precendental wisdom of the past. When past jurisprudence was put into question-such as in the case of promotional reservations-the reversal was based on a calculus of gauging competing sentiments on the issue rather than exhausting all the principled arguments. The Court seemed determined to make a policy decision and did so with majoritarian self assurance. On the
very crucial question of defining 'backwardness', the majority seemed to accept that the Constitution was not caste blind, but its hesitation in blessing the use of 'caste' as the determinant criterion seemed to suggest some empathy for the critics for reservation, even though this empathy lay hidden in its reasoning and was not frankly explicated.
The majority judgement seems inconsistent especially in relation to not applying the creamy layer to SC and ST but applying the aboli-
312
The Politics ofBackwardness
tion of promotional reservations to them. The latter decision on rennving reservations in the matter of promotions caused the governrnent to seek a constitutional amendment to rectify the Court's decision on promotions in so far as they were applicable to the SC and ST. The Court did not strike down the proposals in the Mandal Report, but interpreted them in a way that made it difficult to implement thes proposals because of the insistence on excluding the creamy layer without providing reasonably identifiable criteria to identify the cream. The truth is that the Court's decision on the Mandal care cannct be the last word, on many matters-both politi
cally and constitutionally. This has already surfaced in certain cases before the Supreme Court. Equally, the issue of reservations for promotions and the extent of reservations have become live political
issues once again.
Despite the length of the judgements, the Mandal judgement was really a'problem solving' decision.r6e The problem that was to be resolved was not the compensatory discrimination programme, but the protest to it. After Thomas the answers to many of the questions---cspecially the manner in which the issue was to be appmached-were, more or less, settled. There were a few loose threads conceming the carry over rule which could have been resolved less expensively.rTo The Govemment had diverted anti-reservation protest in the direction of the Court. Within the Court itself, the minority judges were in sympathy with such protest. They successfully pushed
the majority into a post-Iftomds assessment of the entire jurisprudence on this vexed issue. The majority, too, yielded to the antireservationists in various ways, but, aimed for a compromise. That is exactly how the judgement turned out. It was essentially a compromise. Principled decision making was given the go by. After the judgement, more protests could have ensued; but they did'not. As with so many publicly contentious cases-of which Mandal and the Babri Masjid cases are examplesrTr-the cooling period during which the arguments were heard in Court had a sobering effect. Besides, Indian democracy continues to exude some respect for the Supreme Court so as to give a qualified social and political finality to the latter's decisions.
Controversy 313
VI
The Mandal controversy pre-occupied the nation for a period of one and a half years. By itself, it was a controversy of finite proportions. All that was involved was an extension of similar programmes that already existed in various states to the cadres of the central govemment-a move that was long overdue. Since no political party was against the changes proposed in the Mandal report (especially the Congress which not only implemented it but added a further rcsidu-
ary lOVo reservation to the Mandal recommendations of 2il%), the

silence and reticence of the vaf.ous political parties whenthe Mandal agitation was at its pitch was nothing short of dishonest. There is every reason to believe that there was an overt nexus between the politics of bringing down the V.P. Singh government andthe Mandal agitation. But, let us assume that this was not the case. Under these circumstances, the politioal parties were obliged to take a stance; and, not stand idly by. It is their forbearance that-precipitated the crisis. Those against Mandal pitched their legal and political case very high as a general anti-reservationists case, by re-arguing basic issues
which had long been settled by both politics and law. Their two central arguments were: the importance of merit to equality and the public interest and the need for the Constitution to be 'caste-blind' in identifying beneficiaries for the compensatory discrimination programme. But, both these arguments did not just apply to the Mandal Report on OBCs. They applied with equal force to SC and
ST reservations. Instead of these efforts being treated as settled by the Supreme Court, they struck a chord with the minority judges (who sought to reassess the very basis of reservation in so far as they affected the OBC) as well as the majority judges (who also went along with the minority on the crucial questions of the creamy layer, percentage of reservations and the applicability of reservations to
promotions). Trying to minimize the importance of 'caste', tle masought to demonstrate it was a preliminary starting point, 'backwardness' being the second and more important ttr,st. But, they failed to shed too much light on the criteria to be nken into account while considering backwardness. Yielding to the anti-reservation argument as a whole, they conceded exclusion of reservations for promotions even for SC and ST (which was not in issue before the Court) but excluded the 'creamy layer' exclusion for the SC and ST
jority
314
without elucidating the meaning of 'social advancement' which was crucial to determine the nature and extent of the creamy layer. The result was somewhat chaotic. When UP and Bihar decided to link 'social advancement' to.property ownership and income, the civil service status of the parents and their graduate qualifications, these tests were immediately challenged before the Supreme Court which has now notjust approved but almost mandated the creation of a thick 'creamy layer' which-taken to its logical conclusion-will swallow up the reservation itself. When the whole question of using .efficiency based public interest arguments' and the 50Zo ceiling on
reservations was raised in the context of professional medical education after the Mandal judgement, the Court backed down-hinting that these questions were really for the govemment and not for the Courts.rT2 The Mandal judgement had declared that reserved candidates who had been selected on merit would be wholly excluded from
computing the reservation quota. But, a later Constitution bench made it clear that the "fact that (a) considerable number of members
of a Backward Class have been appointed/promoted against general seats in the state services may be a relevant factor for the state government to review the question of iontinuing reservation for the said class".r73 Most important of all, faced with the Mandal judgement exclusion of reservations from promotion from 1997 the Congress Government amended the Constitution to reverse the decision
of the Court on this question. The States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have expressed their discomfort with the imposition of the 5070 rule and would like to take reservations beyond that level. In retrospect, the Supreme Court did not quell controversies but raised fresh ones anew. Many have already surfaced and are before the Supreme
Court.
But, the more lasting effect of the Mandal controversy was on electoral politics. The V.P. Singh Govemment may have fallen because of the controversy. But the Janata party and its allies made much of the whole controversy in the elections that followed-in particular, in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where they managed to secure the trust and vote of the beneficiary 'backward classes'. The other parties tried tc cash in on the 'Mandal' vote bank but failed. This was especially true of Congress which had tried to enlarge the Mandal dispensation after the V.P. Singh govemment
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Contoversyr' 315
fell, but had kept silent when the controversy was in full swing' What the Mandal controversy did for a large number of neglected communities was to galvanise them-provoking them from their p-olitical stupor. Since they had been vilified during the campaign, they were noiembarrassed to strike back. Aware that elections and reservations were a source ofobtaining power of a kind that they had not imagined in their life time, their members organised their political life in pursuit of power. If V.P' Singh had driven his govemment to disaster' ih" irtu" he had raised was responsible for transforming issues of social justice into avenues for political opportunities and claims for political power and political justice. So far, India's polity has maniged to keep these two aspects ofjustice separate' The aftermath of "political justice tl:re Mandal controversy volunteered the demand of now!". Development and empowerment for the backward classes, generally benefits the advantaged. Social equity is thrown in to
upp.ut" the badly off. The new demands for political justice and
empowerment meant that the various agendas of the State would no longer be decided by the advantaged with the disadvantaged as onlooker beneficiaries. A particular patronizing concept of power and welfare that had been the hallmark of the Indian state was being challenged at the hustings. South Indian politics had already been transformed by these new intimations of political justice' Now, it was the tum of the North. If India had not noticed that it was walking on a razor's edge, it would now have to cope with "a million mutinies".r7a And, if some blame is to be pointed in some direction, it must be in the direction of the advantaged who had for too long neglected the disadvantaged communities. The revolt of the BCs seems unequivocal, possibly irreversible-at least, for the moment' NOTES AND REFERENCES
l. See R. Dhavan: "The constitution as the situs of struggle: lndia's Constitution Forty Years on" in L. Beer(ed) Cottstitutional Systems in late Twentieth Century Asia (London, 1992) 373-461. For an account of the discourse in India's Constituent Assembly on questions of human rights see R Dhavan: "Tidy Intuitions, untidy discourse :Conversations on Human Rights Discourse in Iniia's Constituent Assembly (1993) PILSARC Working Paper No' 20)' 2. The term "Other Backward Classes" (OBC) stems from the distinctio'l between Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) who are given
3r6
express recognition by the Constirution
in varjous anicles (e.g., article. l5 (4) (positive-action) l7 (dealing with "untouchabres"), art. 243 (Di and article 243 (T),_art. 330,332, 334 (Special legislative representation),'provisions)) arr i:S (recognition of their special claims), art.,338-9 (specij officer and and the 'backward classes' (mentioned jn 16 (4) preferential state employment), -article art 15(4) (positive action); arricle Z3(DX6) and arricl e U3 (.f)(6) (eletions to lo-cal bodies), art 340 (Commission to investigate neir conOitiong. See further Marc Galanter who first asked .,Who are tf,e other gu"k*uio Classes? An Introducrion to a Constiturional puzzle', (197g) 13 EpW lSl2-2g. The title ofhis essay echoes the exasperated question asked by one member of the constituent assembly : "Who are those Backward classes,,(197g) 7 CAD 697. . 1 G.O. (Govemment Order) of 1921 (referring earlier GOs) is ro be found in the state of Mysore's Nagan Gowda Rep ort of thi Backward Classes Committee (Mysore 1961) pp. 57-61. The discussion on these historical urp""t. i, ,o b" f:lld I Y Galanter: Competing Equatities : Law and the Ba.iara Ch"se" in India (Delhi, Oxford, 1984) 154-62 who has made the task ofevery researcher easier and more focussed and who directed me to these and other references.-4. Indian Statutory Commission (lg2g') 39g.
5. For the Constituent Assembly Debates [C.A.D. (194g) 7 CAD 672-jo4:for the antecedent discussion in Committees see B. Shiva Rao: The Framing of India's Constitutian : Study Volume (196g) pp. 192-201. For an anatysis see M. Galanter (supran.3) pp. 159-62 and contrasiihe Suple4e Court,s own handling of these discussion s in I ndra S aw hney v. IJnion of I iia (l 992) Supp. 3 S C C ZSO (]y1e1!ter tle Mandal case) at pr. 38-41 pp. 37 4-5 (per pandian J); pr. 265 pp. jll-jO_ ana nn, 466-469 (per Thommen ljfpr. :S:_its pp. a77_8a (per Kuldip Sineh JI pr.4,?7-s pp.544-5 (per Sawant rj; pr. 570 p. !i6; pr. !z+_5; pr. 6lo p 615-6 pr. 687-694 pp. 658-662; pr. 772_717 pp. Zt t_S; pr. 779 pp.'714_5. Unfortu-nately, the supreme court did not examine the hisioricat context and tenor of the discussions in the Constituent Assembly and its Committees. _ 6. The initial plan was to havejoint electorates se;arate communal electorate being veroed by the Constituent Asse mbly (Vl CAD )47). It was only on 16 June
1949, that an amendment was moved that there should be u r,oll f9r 4l (see VIII-CAD 930): For a summary see Shiva Rao. Framing of India's Constitution : Study Volume (1968) 466_g. 7. Article 330 and 332 (reservations for Scheduled Castes (SC) _ and Sched_ uled rribes (sr)) (note art. 331 and 333 also reserved special seats tbr AngloIndians). All these were for l0 years; but they have been periodicatty extended ten Jears at a time. At present, they are due to expire on 26 Jan. 2000 for the background, see M. Galanter: "compensatory Discriminations in politicar Representatlon : A preliminary assessment of India,s Thirty year experience with reserved seats in Legislature,, (1979) 14 Economic and bolitical Weekly (EpW) 437-54. 8. Article 16(l) and (4) read with article 335 of the Constitution. 9. Article l5(3) (speciat provision for women and children); l5(4) (special provision for SC and ST and other backward classes).
"o.;";;;;;;
Controversy 317
10. Constitution (Eighth Arnendment) Acr, 1959; Constitution (fwenty rhird Amendment) Act, 1969; Constitution (Forry fifth Amendment) Act, l9g0; Con_ stitution (Sixty Second Arnendment) Act, 1989. I l. It is difficult to say whether the magnitude of the OBC's was as large as a mixture of patronage and belated discovery has enabled it to become. By the mid seventies, the constitutional importance of the .OBC's was well established as the link between group favoritism and electoral victory were becoming more and more apparent. See M. Galanter : "Who are the other Backward Classes?'
(1978) 13 EPW tEt2-28. 12. WI CAD 697 (30 Nov. 1948).
13. The G.O. is reprinted in the (Nagan Gowda Mysore) Brckwelrd Classes Committee (1961) 57 at 5E.
I 4. See [O.H.B. Starte'l Depressed Classes and Abongirml Tnbes Committee (Bombay Presidency). 15. See G.O. 190 of 20 t?[|,. 1944l. @ 343 of 2t Nov 1947 of rhe pubtic Services Deparnnent and the discussion in S- Saraswarhi: Mittoities in the Madras State; Group Interests in Modem Poiirrcs (Delhi 1974) l2l-12,4; irrtd more generally R- Hardgrave: The Dravidian Movemenr @ombay 1965) 16- A phrase taken from Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh spokesman for the OBCs who claims to be responsible for the initiation of such courage; see Galanter (supm n.3) p. 162 f,.n. 44;The Report of the Working of the All-India Backward Classes Federation from the date of its Fonution upto 30th September 1955. (1955) and subsequenr rcports. 17. The protferation of OBC Groups was necessarily created because of the constitutional opportunities and noa the other way round. Ambedkar, well aware that so many problems exist at local level, described the future with his usual perspicacity when he said "we have left it to be determined by each local govemment. A backward community is a community which is backward in the opinion of the Govemmenf' (see VII CAD 7(D; n nb"d*o had not visualizd that the rnassive political appropriation of the 'Opinion of the Government" would tum India upside down. Galanter's cornment that the .opinion' of the govemment "is determinative only of the group's 'hnder-representation" not of its backwardness" (supra n. 3 p: 16O frr. 34) seems to beg the question : who, then, would determine "backwardness"? 18. State o;f Madras v- Champakam Dorairajan AIR l95l SC 226; Venkntaranmna v. State of Madms AIR 1951 SC 229; see also the High Court discussion reported AIR 1951 Mad lm. ^t I 9. A list of the various Commissions is gSva in the Mandal cue, (supra n. 5) in judgement of Jeewan Reddy J's at pp. 7ffi-762 and,pandran J at pp. 367 which include.s the following in the Table as shown below: '"The list of Commissions appotnted by the various States and the Central Govemment is given as under:
318

COMMISSIONS OF BACKWARD CZ"ASSES
l9l8-1990 Andhra Pradesh Manohar Pershad Committee (1968-69)
Bihar Gujarat Haryana Karnataka
Ananta Raman Commission (1970) Muralidhara Rao Commission (1982) Mungeri Lal Commission (197l-76) A.R. Bakshi Commission (1972-76) Justice C.V. Rane Commission (1981-83) Justice R.C. Mankad Commission (1987) Gumam Singh Commission (1990) Justice Gajendragadkar Commission (196 /-68) Justice J.N. Wazir Commission (1969) Justice Adarsh Anand Commission (1976-77) Justice L.C. Miller Committee (1918-1920: Mysore) Naganna Gowda Commission (1960-61)
L.G. Havanur Commission (1972-75)
T. Venkataswamy Commission (1983-86)
Kerala
Maharashtra
Punjab Tamit Nadu

Uttar Pradesh Atl India
Justice Chinappa Reddy Commission (1989-90) Justice C.D. Nokes Committee (1935; Travancore-Cochin) V.K. Vioshvanatham Commission (1961-63) G. Kumar Pillai Commission (1964-66) N.P. Damodaran Commission (1967 -70) O.H.B. Starte Committee (1928-30; Bombay Presidency) B.D. Deshmukh Committee (1961-64) Brish Bhan Committee (1965-66) A.N. Sattanathan Commission (1969-70) J.M. Ambasankar Commission (1982-86) Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission (1975-77) Kaka Kalelkar Commission (1953-55) B.P. Mandal Commission (1979-80)
Notes:
Where two dates are mentioned they refer to year of appointment and year of submission. Where only one is mentioned it refers to year of submission which is also the year of appointment in some cases. 2. The three commissions of the colonial period mentioned here had an ambit wider than those groups that later came to be known as "Backward
l.
20. (Kalelkar Report ofl) Backwartl Classes Conmtisslon (1955 in three volumes); see further N.D. Majumdar: "The Backward Classes Commission and its work" in Planning Commission: Social Welfure in India (Delhi 1955). For comments on Kalelkar in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) at pr. 584 pp. 599 (per Sahai J.) pr. 656-658 pp. 638-640 (per Jeewan Reddv).
Classes".
Controversy 319
2l . Kalelkar felt "it would have been better if we could determine the criteria of backwardness on principles other than caste". (Report supra note 20: l, xiv). On this second thought se Jeewan Reddy, I - in the Mandal Case (pr. 656 p.
639.) Dissents objecting to the use ofcaste were also entered by Dr. Anup Singh, Shri Arunanshu De and Shri P.G. Shah. The Govemment (in the Ministry of Home Affairs) Memorandum on thc Repon of the Backward Classes Corunissdoz [Delhi, 1956] criticized the report. Later the Study Teatn on Social Welfare of the Backward Classes (Delhi 1959), amidst contradictions in the Repon formally insisted that economic criteria should be the basis of the dispensation of benefits in govemment programmes. 22. ln the debate on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, whilst Ambedkar was clear that OBC's were "nothing else but a collection of certain castes" (1951) XII-XIII P.D. (ft.II) Col. 9006 (18 May) Nehru wanted ro eliminate "all these infinite divisions" around which a "vast number of fissures or divisions" have developed "including" the "caste system and religious divisions". (iDrd, Col 9616). On Nehru generally on law and the constihrrion see R. Dhavan "Introduction" in R. Dhavan (ed) Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi
1992).
23. Laater of 14 August 196l reproduced in the Report of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (1960-l) II, 366; also referred to in the Mandal case
(supra 24. 25. 26. 27.
1958
n.5) at pr. 658 pp. 639-40).
Articles 14-18, Constitution of India. Supra n. 18. The title of M. Galanter's book (supra n. 3). Supra n. 18. 28. Sen Jagar Nath Babu v. State of J&K AIR 1958 J&K
affirmed AIR
J&K
14.
29. See Rana Kishna Singh v. Mysore AIR 19ffi Mys 338; see also A.R,V. Achar v. Madras AIR 1954 Mad 561; Hariharan Pillai v. Kerala AIR 1968 Ker 42,Cf Kerala v. Jacob Mathzw (1964'12 Ker 39 rev: AIR 1964 Ker42 cf cases in which religious groups gratified for reservation irrclude Kesava lyengar v. Mysore AIR 1956 Mys 2O. 30. Ramakishna Singh v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 Mys. 338. 31. Balaji v. State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649. 32. Ibid., pr. 36 p. 664, pr.23 p.659. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.
Ibid., pt.22-25 pp. 659-660. Chitalekha v. Mysore AIR 1964 SC 1823 at 1834. M. Galanter (supra n. 3) p. 194.
Kerala v. Jacob Mathcw (supra n. 29). P. Rajendran v. Madras AIR 1968 SCi0l2 at l0l4-15; A.P. v. Sagar AIR 1968 SC 1379. High Court reactions betwe.en BaIQi (supra n. 3t) and Rajendran include Jacob Mathew (supn n. 29) and Hariharan v. Kerala (AlR 1968 Ker 42) Sukhdev v. Govt. (1966) | Andh.WLR 294, Desa Rayadu v. AP PSC AIR 1967 AP 353 and Sagar y. AP AIR 1968 AP 165; Nanda Kisftore Sharma v.,Bihar AIR 1965 Pat 372; Umesh Chandra v. Singh AIR 1968 Pat. 8;
320
Pat.296.
Chait Ram v . Sikander AIR 1968 Pat. 337; Hridaya v. Mohd. Shnrif AIR 1968
38: While these debates were ostensibly put to rest by Stcte of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (19'16) 1 SCR 906, the Mandaljudges obviously felt that they simmered sufficiently for the Mandal case to finally hold that preferential discrimination was part of the corrective mandate of equality and not an exception to it (see pr. 741-2 pp.69l-2 (per Jeewan Reddy J.); pr. 165-72 pp. 406-8; (Pandian J.); pr.
428-32 pp.515-7 (per Sawant J.). While Kuldip Singh J. admitted that they
operate in the same field, he opined that "article 16(4) being a special provision regarding reservation, it completely takes away such classification from article 16(l)" (at pr. 382 p. 491) - suggesting that article 16(4) is really an exception to article 16(1). He specifically agrees (at pr. 383 p. 491) with Sahai J. who (at pr. 563 pp. 580-l) demarcates constitutionally allocatable areas to each of these articles. Art. 16 (1) deals with substantive equality which is a fundamental right of the citizen enforceable in a Court of Law whereas art. 16(4) is part of ". . .
equality which is an obligation of the State not carrying a constitutional compulsion." This approach greatly reduces the importance of 16(4) but raises the question of its enforceability as a power coupled with a duty (on which see Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan AIR 1987 SC 537 at 546). Morc generally see A. Goldman : Jr stice and Reverse Discriminalion (Pnnceton 1979); W.T. Blackstone and R.D. Heslep (ed) Social Justice and Preferential
Treatmmt (Atheni, Georgia 1977): N.E. Bowie: "Equality and Distributive Justicd'(1970) 45 (142) Philosoplry 140-8; B.R. Gross (ed) Reverse Discrimination (Blrffalo, 1977); ibid: Reverse Discrimination (New York 1978); M.
Cohen, T. Nagel T. Scanton (ed) Equa liry and Preferential Treatmzn s erinceton 1977). R. Dworkin : "What is Equality2" (1981) Philosoplry and Public Affairs
185-U6.283-345.
39. See generally Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 98 L. Ed.843 (347 US 483); Billing v. Sharpe (1954) 98 L. Ed 884 (347 US 497); and more spe*ifically De Funis v. Charles Odegaard (1974) 40 L.Edn (2d) 164 (416 US
312); Regents of the University of Califumia v. Bakka (1978) 57 L Ed. (2d), 750 (438 US 265); Fallilovev. Phillip M. Khitznbk (1980) 65 L. Edn. (2d) 9O2 (448) US 448); Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (1990) 58 fW (5053). More recently, the US Supreme Court seems to have become less enthusiastic in its support for preferential discrimination. For how US case Law was dealt within the Mandal case see L Reddy J at pr. 715-733 pp.675-686; Pandian J. at pr. 161-4 pp. z105-6; Thommen at pr. 258 p. 436; pr.322p.461; Sawant J. at pr. 419 pp. 512:,pr.47O-473 pp. 531-2 (quoting Brennan J's view on Bakka (supra) that the Constitution is not "colour blind"); Sahai J. at pr. 557 p. 573-4 (on the political question doctrine), pr. 558-9 pp. 515-6i pt.565 p. 583, pr. 575 p. 591-2; pr. 614 p. 618, pr. 624 p. 624: pr. 628 p.626. What is siglificant is that each judge seems to draw their own conclusions from the same American decisions. 40. The Supreme Court in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) rejected this distinction, reftising to accept that such initiatives can be confined within water tight
Controversy 321
constitutional compartments see pr. 846 pp. 755-6. 41. For aspects of the importance of this distinction in terms of definine govemment programmes see J. Edwards: positive Discimination, Social Justici and Social Policy: Moral Scrutiny of a policy practice (Inndon 19g7) which advocates the somewhat conservative approach of restricting state action to positive action schemes for disadvantaged groups to better tiemselves rather than preferential appointments and benefits in particular areas such as employment, distribution of land and the like. 42. This was suggested by R. Dhavan both in oral arguments and the written submission in the companion case (S reenarayana Dharma paipalana yogatn v. Union of India WP 1094 of 1991 : Written Submissions of Rajeev Dhavan for the Petitioner) to Mandal case along with which it was heard. 43. Supra n. 40.
,14. See Ajai Kumar's case (infra n. 172). Even in the Mandal case what is rejected is not the distinction but the exclusive location ofeach such programme in specified articles in the equarity dispensation of the constitution and no other. 45. Article 3 I I of the Constitution of India. For an interesting exploration of providing bureaucracy such protections see U. Baxi,s ..Introduction to M. Rama Jois: Serylces und.er the Slare " (Bombay t927) xiv - xii.
46. This was the strong submission made by R. Dhavan to the effect that "reservation" were a form of , power sharing" (see Wittm Submisslon supra n. 42, see Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 750 p. 699 and esp. pr. ?gg p. 720). Ttre maiority judges accept this argument (see Jeewan Reddy at pr. 694 p. 662; pr.7gg p.7V5; Sawant J. at W.414, p. 509 pr. 482 p. 538). 47.The afticle37, Constitution oflndia. For the earlier view ofthe Directive Principles which marginalized the importance of Directive principles see R. Dltayy: The Sunreme Court of India : A Socio-I*gal Analysis of its Juristic Techniques (Bombay 1977) 87-94. The turning point was tie famous h-undamental Rights case (Kesavananda v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC Z2). There_ after these principles were trcated notjust as a source of empowerment but also responsibility. On the need to emphasize the importance of socio_economic rights see R. Dhavan: "Ambedtar's prophecy: poverty of Hwnan Rights in India" (1994) 36 loumal of The Indian Law Institute g-36. imbedkar,s famous speech that by igloring social and economicjustice India was entering a.,life of contradiction" see Xl CAD 979-80. More generally see B.p. Jeewan Reddy and R. Dhavan "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights" in D.N. Beatty (d) Hunan Rights and Judicial R*iew: A Comparative perspective (London, 1gg4) 175_ 2_26. On the Directive Principles see K. Markandam : Direcrive principtes of State Policy (Delhi, 1960): P. Diwan and V. Kumar(ed) Directive principles Juisprudence (Delhi, I 982). 48. Champakatn (supra n. 18) 49. General Manager v. Rangachari AIR 1962 SC 36 (per Gajendragadkar J and per Wanchoo J.). 50. Balaji (supra n.3l) ar pr. 32 p. 662. 5l . Rangachai (supra n. 49) eventhough the Mandal case rcversed the view

promotions' that reservations were constitutionally permissable in the matter of (1964) 4 SCR 680 at 700' 52. Devadassan v. Union of India 53. Kesavananda (suPra n. 47). trouble and 54- See I CAD 57-65 (13 Dec. 1946). But the Resolution ran into : "Introduction" in R' Dhavan (ed) was debated at length; see further R. Dhavan
NehruandtheConsriruriaz(Bombay1992)XXIv-XxvllandProfessorMittal,s contribution in the same volume (at pp- 22-44)' Objectives Resolu55. Kesavananda (supra n.47) on the importance of the pr. 15 p 306; pr' 82-91 pp' 32O-3; pt 292 tion of 22 Jan. 194? and its goals at
;.
p. +'le
ZSZ-O 1p.t
JJ); at pr' 648 366 (pr Sikd CJ); pr. 486-9 pp. 408-410 (per Shelat and Grover pr' Hegde and Mukerjea JJ); pr. 890 p' 849 (Ray J last sentence); ip"t p. 709-10 (per Palekar J);.pr' l47l-5 pp' r Se pp. ell-slper Reddy J.); pr- 1302 pp' 922Xfta"na J); pr. 162G1 pp.852-3 (per Mathew,J); pr ' 1863-7
3 (per bwivedi
pp 330; pr' 178 pr sutstantive equality see Sikri CJ at prs. 82-91 pp' 320-3 ' 136 and Grover JJ at pr' 489 p' 410 Hegde and p. 339 (on minorities); Shelat p' 581; i"tuke4ea JJ at pr. fl8 p. 479; Ray J at pr' 1013-4 pp' 500;-pr' 1016 p' 709-10;Xianna J at pr' ReAdy f at pr. t 159 pp. 637-8; Palekar I at pr' 1302 J at pr' 1475'p.789; pr. l+tii-Z pp.792-4; Mathew J' atpr' 17O7 p' 879; Beg pp. g0Z-4; Owivedi J at pr. 1867 p. 923; Chandrachud I xpr'212Opp' 1303-7
999-1000.
56. N.M. Tlnmas (supra n. 38\ 906 at 976-77 ' 57 . Thomas (suPra n. 38). 58. Ibid at Pr. 932-3. 59. Ibid atp.95l-2 (Per Mathew J). 6O. Ibid at 973 (per Krishna lyer J). at 959 (agreeing 61. Ibid ar942-41(per Khanna J); Gupta J at pp' 986-7; Beg with Gupta and Khanna JJ) and at pp. 960-l ' (risnna Iyer J in A.S. Iyer v' Balasubramanyam (1980) I SCR 1036 at
l.); pi. ZOIS p. 986 (per Chandrachud J') On the question of
62. 1066 G-H. (1980\ 2 SCC 768 at 63. Krishna lyer J. in Jagdish Saran v. lJnion of India Charles Skaria v. C' Mathew (1980)2SCCatpr' 15 pr. 29 pp. ?81-2; see also (1981) 2 SCR l8-5 64. Chinappa Reddy J' in ABSK Sangh v' IJnion of India ar 257-259 generallYTaIe 65. Chin-appa neOOy f. in State of Maharashtra v' Chandra Pradhan (1983) 3 SCb'387 at pr. 2 p. 390; Cf. Varadarajan at pr' 19 pp 39l-2' On ireating benefits as 'property' see Chaies Reich: Iha Greening of America (London 1970) and hii article'The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LI 733' But
pp.767-69.
notethecriticismofthisviewR.Defriend:"WelfareLawLegaltheoryandlegal (London) education" in M. Paning and J. Jowell (ed) llelfore law and Policl'
43-64. 66. See Inchrnn Das v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 353 at 395 see also A.S. Iyer (supra n. 62) at 1067-8. (1970\ | 67. On the doctrine of source rr:e Chitra Ghosh v' Union <tf India

SCR 413; D.MCftanchala v. State of Mysore (197
Controversy 323
t)
S'tpp. SCR 6O8; Nidamarati
v. State of Maharashtra (1986) 2 SCC 534; Deepak Sibal v. State of Punjab (1989) 2 SCC 145. For an interesting decision on reservations for women see
Government ofAP v. PB Vijaykumar (1995) 4 SCC 520. lt is not clear whether this is treated as a form of reservation or part of the doctrine of source as a reasonable classification. For a situation which has both aspects of "source" and "reservation" see Swati Gupta v. State of UP (1995) 2 SCC 560. An estimate of constitutionally permissible quotas after taking into account both "source" and "reservations" quota is overdue. I had raised this in my submissions in MandalThe Court, however, treated "Source" reservations in addition to the 50% SC/ST and OBC reservation. This leaves open the possibility of IOOEa reservations. 68. On the creamy layer concept see infra n. 83. 69. This is no less true of Galanter's Competing Equalities (supra n. 3); sera review of this book by R. Dhavan : "Marc Galanter's Competing Equalities" (1986) 28 kw and Policy 365-377. 70. The idea of'neutral principles' is taken from H. Weschler : "Towards neutral principles of law" (1959)'13 Harvard LR l. 71. Unfortunately, too much legal analysis tends to be over-reductionist and simplistic in its approach to judicial decision making, as for example J.A.G. Griffths : Policies of the Judiciary (London 1980), or U. Baxi's: The Supreme Court and Politics (Lucknow. 1980). 72. Apaft from Sastri CJ's candidly confessorial statement in this regard in State ofMadrasv. 14G. Rop AIR 1952 SC 196 at 200 that even the predilections of a judge are part of judicial decision making, the actu4l process of such decision making is much more complex. For an account of the Supreme Court in the early years see R. Dbavan : The Supreme Court of India (supra n. 47). Judges do belong to a class but their class bias is tempered by their intimations of their judicial role. Judges are purposive in their intent and artful in their use ofjuristic techniques but they do not wholly abandon their craft to the momentary exigencies of the bias of the moment. Were that not the case, the reputation of the judiciary as an institution of governance would surely have fallen to dubious levels of malappreciation. 73. See P. Singh : "Nelrru on equality and compensatory discrimination" in R. Dhavan (ed). Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi,l992) I l0 generally. Nehru was uncomfortable with reservations on caste lines but was forced to give a free hand to his party to appeal to caste in elections. It is Nehru's legacy that there was no OBC reservation in the Union's civil services till 1992 -long after his death. It is no less Nehru's legacy to substitute words for wisdom, allow rhetoric to triumph over reality and allow pragmatic considerations to give way to arguments over principle. 74. The legal slory is recounted in R. Dhavan : Suprente Court of lnclia (supra n. 47) 128-205. 75. Clcarly the formula now evolved of the Chief Justice having a decisive say was extant in the 50's and 60's. The following line of Chief Justices from 1950 to 1973 Kania, Shasrri, Mahajan, Das, Sinha Gajendragadkar, Sarkar,
324
The Polirtcs ofBackwardness
Subba Rao, Wanchoo, Hidayanrllah, Shah, and
Gajendragadkar and Constitutional Interpretation" (196) I J-I-LI. 479; S-N. Dhyani : "Justice Gajendragadkar and Labour Lad'(1967) 7 Jur IJ 69; P.W. Rege: "Contributions of Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar to Hindu Law" (f966) 8 JII"I 58E. In the field of 'secular-socialism' , apart from Barzii (sr?ra n. 3 I )' note his judgements on the freedom of religron (e.g. Tilkayat v - Raiasthan AIR I 963 SC 649; Dursah Conminee v. Hussain Ati AIR l%l SC 1'z02) and his redefinition of the very concept of a 'Hindu' (on which see YagnapurusMasji v. Mullas NR 1966 SC I19, on which see Galanter : 'Law and Society in Modem India' (Delhi 1989) 237 and J.D.M. DerretL '"The definition of a Hindu" (1966) 2 SCC Inl 6?; "Hindu - a definition wanted for the purpose of applying a personal law' (1968) 70 Tzitschrifi Verglcisclunde Rechswissensch{t. 77 . Balaji (supm n. 3l). 78. For his general appmach see : P.B. Gajendmgadkar I'aw' Liberty and Justire (I-ondon 1965); Constitution of India (l-llrldlon l97O); Secularism and
Sikri speaks for itself. his judicial decision making see P.K. Tripathi : "Mr. Justice 76. On
the Constitution of India @ombay 1972); Indian Democmcy : Its Maior Impemarives (Delhi 1975); Indian Parlianunt and the Fundanenml Rights
(Calcutta 19721; Kashmir : Prospea and Retmspect (Bombay, 1967); Tradition and Social CIwryc (Bornbay 1967): lau'aharlnl Nehm : Glimpses of the Man
and his Teaching (Nagpur 1967); Imperatives of Indian Federalism (Bombay,l968) as also his autobiography .The etr*. of Balaji (sr?ra n. 3l) is self evident. It was cited and refened n ia Devadasan v- Union of India (Mudholkar J.) AIR l95/- SC l79i Tiloki Nath v - Statc a/J&K (Subbarao C.J.) AIR t967 SC 1283; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of hdia (Rann Swami J.) AIR 1968 SC 507; P. Ralendran v. Stalte of Madms (Wanchoo C-J.) AIR 1968 SC l}l2: Sute of A-P- v. P. &gar (Shah J.) AIR 1968 SC 1379; D'N. Charnhala v . Smu of Mysore AIR l97l SC 1762; A Periakarruppan v - State ofTamil Nadu (Hegde J) AIR l97l SC 23O31' Janki Pmsadv. State of J&K NR 1973 SC930;
A.R. Chomdhry v. Ilnion of India AIR 1974 SC 532; A-B-S.K. Sangh (RIv) v. Union of Indb NR l98l SC 298; S.S. Shatma v. Union of India AIR l98l SC 588; A.B.S.K. Sangh (Ny) v- Ilnion of India (1981) I SCC 246 at707'l SCC 397 at4os; K.C- Vasanth Kuur v. Sarc of Kantnla (1985) Supp. SCC1|4 at725,746,777; Chotdradtur Paswan v' Snte ol Bihar (lgaA\ 2 SCC 214 ^t 217 Deepak Sibal v - Punjab Universitt (1989) 2 SCC 145 at 1591' Smte of AP v . K. Ranganathan (199()) 4 SCC 636 at 638; Sr. Stzplcn's College v- University of Delhi {1992) I SCC 558 x 612: Molan Singlania v. Union (1992) Supp I SCC 594 il 6311' Indm Sawhney (the Mandal case) (1992) Supp- | SCC2l7 ^t 381, 394, 396, 4Al, M, 4lO, 4r2. 4m, $8, 44A, 44r, 444, 44E, M9, 451' 452' 4s4. n6,477,5r9,52r,522,526,545, 555, 558, 559, 584, 585, 593, 598' 613'
6l l, 6t2, 687, 692, 700, 713, 715,7 19, 721, 722' 725' 616, f43, 656, 665, 726, 729,731,736,738,'139,749, 759: T. Sudhaknr Reddv v- Govt' of A.P. (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 439. But Balaji had that 'tu2ry' quality of landmark judgements of the period interpretative rather than pontificatory but leaving a considcrable roorr fa judicial manoeuvre" After reviewing Baloii and Chitmlatllta
ffi,
Controversy 325
Justice Sawant rightly observed in the Mandal case (sap ra n. S) xpr.459 p. 527 that the observations in those cases "leave many things unanswered". 79. The literature on this is summed up in R. Dhavan : The Supreme Court
of India (Bonrbay 1977) 27-28.

80. See R. Dhavan: "Human rights and Socialism
:
India,s unfinished experi-
ment" in J. Chan and Y. Ghai : The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A Comparative Approach (Hong Kong, 1993) 451-466. 81. See generally H . Swap: For whom the Law is Made : Mind and Faith of lustice V.R. Kislma lyer (Seelisburg 1984), K.M. Sharma : .,The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer" in R. Dhavan (et at1 Judges and the Judicial Power 316-336 ibid : Judicial grandiloquence : Would Fewer Words and Shorter Judgments do" (1973) 4Inwasia 192; N.C. Bedhan: Justice V.R. Krishna lyer-A Statesman 'Judge' (1981) 1 Jabalpur Law euarterly 24. 82. Thonas (supra n.38). Although Thonns hu been criticized as being purely symbolic in significance (see M. Galanter : ,.Symbolic activism: A judicial encounter with the contours of India's Compensatory Discrimination Policy" in R. Dhavan et aI. Judges and the Judicial power (supra n.8l) 229) yet an important controveny conceming the egalitarian basis of reservations neeCed
to be resolved. 83. In an interview Krishna Iyer J. says that it was professor Marc Galanter who coined the word and it was passed on by Justice Krishna Iyer to Chinappa Reddy J. who used it in K. C. Vasanth Kumarv. State of Kamamka (19g5) Supp. SCC 714 at pr.72 p.225 from where it entered the discourse of the law and policy on reservations. For the discusiion on the creamy layer in the Mandal case (supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy I at pr. 79O-93 pp. 722-725; per Sawant J. at pr. 520-22 pp. 553-54; per Thommen J. pr.295-7 pp.454-65; per Kuldip Singh J. pr. 385 p. 492; per Sahai I xpr.627 p. 626; per pandian J. at pr. 219-211 pp. 422-25 . ln the UP-Bihar Creamy layer judgement (see Ashoka Kumar Thakur v . State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 503) Kuldip Singh J. seems ro rely more on economic criteri^to determine "backwardness',, thereby converting his minority view in the Mandal case (shared with Thommen and Sahai JJ) into the view of the Court. 84. Manifesto of the Janata Party (1989). 85. Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Delhi 1980) - {hereafter Mandal Reportl pp; vii reproduced in the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr.659 p. 640. 86. In the first debate in 1982. Shri R. Venkararaman (later president oflndia, then the Minister of Defence and Home Affairs) felt that ,lhe problem that confronts Govemment today is to arrive at a satisfactory definition of backward classes and bring about an acceptance of the same by all the States concemed". A meeting of Chief Ministers was to be called. By 1983 - as the general election drew near - P.C. Sethi, Minister for Home Affairs stated more confidently and
with less reserve : ". we now desire to continue this commission and implement its re.ommendations". These statements are quoted in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) pr. 672-3 pp. 649-50 per Jeewan Reddy J.).
326
87

. Mandal Report (supra n. 5) p. 36 subpara 6 see "Chapter
VIII : North
South Comparison of Other Backward Classes Welfare" pp. 31-36' 88. V.P. Singh speech in Parliament quoted in the Mandal case (supra n' 5) pr. 674 pp.650-1. The Memorandum of l3 August 1990 is reproduced at pr' 675
pp.65l-2.
89. Arun Shourie, then, editor of the India E;?ress led the campaign instilling doubt where there was conviction and fear where there was doubt. Thus, it is a matter of record that Singh had introduced legislation about the electronic media and ombudsperson (Lokpal) and initiated a debate on official secrecy' This was a part of a unique and marked eagemess to implement the manifesto quickly and comprehensively. 90. For further elaboration on this see R. Dhavan: "Reservations :Equality or Deceit" (1990) Hindu (4 Dec.); ibid: "Economic criteria relied on by Mandal" (1990) Hindu (5 Dec.) 91. See the Congress's Memorandum of 25 Sept. 1991 (quoted in Mandal case (supra n. 5)) which added lOVo of vacancies in civil posts and services under the Govemment of India for "other economically backward sections ofthe people, . . . uncovered by any of the existing schemes ofreservations" in addition iothe2TVo for the other OBC's already suggested by the Mandal Report (r pra n. 85) and declared in the Memorandum of 13 August 1990 (sapra n 88)' 92. The 'Preface' to the Mandal Reporl (supra n.85) (ix) acknowledged, the service of Professors M.N. Srinivas, Jogindra Singh, B.K. Roy Burman who seem to have abjured their contribution when, years later, the Report became controversial. In fact the Report (pr. 3.12 p 13) suggests Prof. Srinivas headed a panel to devise the methodology (pr. 41.4 p. 50; Vol. II' 99-101)' 93. Mandal Report (supra n- 85) pr. 3.1-3.2 pp. 12 also quoted in the Mandal case(supran.5) pr. 661 p. 641. Note also the survey of state programmes in the Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter II pp. 5-1 l.
94. See Mandal Report (ruprd n. 85). The location of the 1931 Census containing "considerable detail" is in the Experts Report (rlid pr. 5 p' 99)' The Census of 1961 was used to identify tribals and the like (ibid pt. 12.7 p. 54) The Census of 1931 was used for projecting numbers under broad, but necessarily, crude assumptions about demographic growth. 95. Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter XI : "Socio-economic field survey and Criteria of Backwardness pp. 50-53. The various Schedules are found at Vol.II pp. 102-112; and the list of the floods survived at pp. 1 13-1 19; see also the study by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Part II Volume IV of the Report (at pp. 139-164) and the Socio-educational survey tables in Vol' V pp'
t6'1-225. 96. Mandal Report (srpra n. 85) pr. 11.23 - p 11.25 pp. 52; also Mandal Judgement (supra n. 5) y.667 pp 645-7. 97. Supra n. 88. 98. Supra n. 91. 99. Mandal case (s upra n' 5), Sahai J's judgement thanks the various lawyers at pr. 637-8 pp. 631 which read as follows :
Controversy
327
"Valuable assistance was rendered by Shri K.K. Venugopal and Shri N.A. Palkhivala, the leamed senior counsel, who led the arguments and placed one view. They were ably supported by Shri P.P. Rao and Smt. Shyamala pappu, Senior Advocates. Arguments were also advanced by Smt. Hingorani, Mr. Mehta, Mr. K.L. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Ashri, Mr. Vishal Jeet, Shri K.N. Rao and Col. (Dr) D-M. Khanna appeared in person as interveners and were of
assistance. Shri Ram Jethmalani, the leamed Senior Advocate appearing.for rhe State ofBihar was equally helpful in projecting the other view. Shri K. parasaran,
the leamed Senior Counsel for the Union of India while supporring Shri Jethmalani placed a very dispassionate view ofthe entire matter: Dr. Rajeev Dhavan was also very helpful. Shri R.K. Garg, Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, Shri S. Siva Subramaniam, Shri Poti, Smt. Rani Jethmalani also made submissions. Shri Ram Avadesh Singh argued in person." l00. Mandal case (supra n.5) at pr. 683 p. 657. For the manner in which the referedce to the larger bench took place see pr. 679-685 pp. 654-658 l0l. The judgements (see Mandal case, supra n. 5 pp. 217-772) occupy a total of around 450 printed pages divide as follows : headnote (pp217-360); and then thejudgements of Pandian (pp 361-430), Thommen (pp. 430-469), Kuldip Singh (pp. 469'501); Sawant (pp. 501-579); Sahai (pp. 57 t-631) and Jeewan Reddy JJ (pp. 631-772) - containing, as they do; a mixture of detailed analysis
and hyperbole.
102. Mandal case (supra n. 5) Pandian I at V. 200-207 pp. 415-19 (on the means test); at pr. 211-218 pp. 420-422, ageeing with Balaji (supra n. 31) that, the division into 'backward' and 'more backward' was not salutary ; atpr.219234 pp.422-426 on the need to reject the creamy layer; at pr. 178-191 pp. 4103 on the need for a flexible percentage as approved to a rigid 507o ceiling on reservations. 1O3. Mandal case (supra n.5) pr. 681 pp. 654-655 ar pr. 682 pp. 655-7 (per Jeewan Reddy J). 104. Mandal case (supra n.5) per Sahai J. pr. 636 pp. 630-l 105. Mandal case (supra n. 5) pr. 735-6 pp. 687-8; see also Pandian J at pr. 170-2; pp. 407-8 Kuldip Singh J, at pr. 392 pp. 495; Sawanr J. at pr. 526-8 pp.
357-8.
106. State of Punjab v. Ram Jawayya Kapur AIR 1955 SC 549. 107. Constitutional Caste blindness in India is like Constitutional 'Colour' blindness in America where the argument has been rejected in a series of cases which affirm the duty to de-segregate (see Edwards v . Califurnia (1941) 31 4 US 16O; Brown v . Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483; Green v. County School Board of New Kent Counry Q968) 391 US 430; Swann v . Charlotte - Mecklenburg
Board of Education (1971) 402 US.; Wright v. Council of City Emphoia (1972) 407 US 451) and the need to take affirmarive action on rhe basis of the forbidden categories e.g. colour; or, as in our case, caste (see DaFanis v. Odegaard (1974) 416 US 312; Regents of University of Califurnia v. Bakke (1978) 438 US 265; Steelworkers v.lleber (1979) 443 IJS 193; Fullilove v. Khutznkk (1980) /148
328
us
lO8. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC (1990) 58 IW 5053 A powerful minority (consisting of O'Connor for herself, Rhenquist CJ, Scalia and Kennedy
JJ) demanded greater scrutiny. 109. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the references (supra n' 3). 1lO. Mandal car,e (supra n.5) at pr. 733 p. 686. llDa. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the details cited at fn 38. Mandal case (supra t. 5) per Jeewan Reddy (at pr' 641-2 pp. 632-3; pr' 649-655 pp. 635-40; per Sawant J (at pr. 415-8 pp. 508-1 l; pr. 429 pp. 515t pr. 480-482 pp. 536-8); per Pandian I (at pr. 11 p.364; pt.2l'2 pp.365-66; pr' 37
448).
lll.
p.373).
112. In the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) the minority does not question the importance of the Directive Principles (e.8. Thommen I at pr- 297 -8 p' 455' Sahai J at pr. 564 p. 582 pr. 627 pp.625-6 and also on Rawls and Dworkin at pr. 615-6 pp. 619-20).lt simply ignored their importance - its intuition being that positive action to help OBCS, rather than reservations, is the answer. I 13. See Balaji (supra n. 31) and (Chitralekha (supra n. 34)
ll4.
Supra n.
37 .
115. Thomas (supra n. 38). 116. Mandal case (supra n. 5) refeting to Ambedkar at pr. 40 pp. 37 4-6 (per Pandian J) pr. 251 p. 433-4, pr. 265 pp. 439'4O, pp. 446-469 (per Thommen J)
pr.356-7 pp. 479-80 pr.362-3 pp. 481-483 (per Kuldip Singh J), pt 446 pp. 322-3i pr.49?-8 pp. 3zl4-5 (per Sawant J); pr. 569 pp. 585-6 pp. 574 p. 589, pr.
618 p. 622 (per Sahai J) pr. 687-94 pp. 658-662 (per Jeewan Reddy J), with each
judge deriving different strengXhs and accents from the same intervention. ll7 . Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pa lewan Reddy J. that the identification of the group was only a preliminary step at pr. 782 p.716. This muddles the issue somewhat. The cri teia for backw^rdness is "seculat''not 'cas!e', which, in tum, is one of the principal causes of "backwardness" ll8. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 756 to 765 (pp' 700-706) pr.772-779 pp.710-714; pr.784 p. 717-8 (per Jeewan Reddy J); at$.44-89 pp 376-385
(per Pandian J.)
ll9. Mandal
Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pt 34O p. 472. l2O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 567 p. 584. l2l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 571 p. 586-7. 122. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr' 349-351pp. 47 5'76. 123. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 568-570 pp. 585-6. 124. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Thommen J . pt ' 323 sub. pr. 4 pp. 462^t
125. Mandal Case (supran.5) atpr.677 p.653 where the Memorandum of 25 Sept. 1991 is reproduced in full. The reference to "poorer" sections is in pr. (1) and is relatively easier to handle as a principle of preference on the basis of a simple means test. 126. Balaji (supra n.31) at pr. 29 p. 661. 127. Chinappa Reddy J in K C. Vasanth Kumar v. Srate of Kamataka (1985)

Supp, SCC 714 at
Controversy 329
V.
72 p. 763 using graphic language to suggest the "creamy
layer" is "snapping away" posts. lnthe Mandal case (supra n. 5),Iewan Reddy J uses the imagery of "lapping" up the benefits at pr. 79O p.723. 128. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J. pr. 228 p.4Z and generally ^t on subdivisions within a group at pr. 21A-234 pp. 42U426. 129. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 229-234 pp.4%-426 per Pandian J. 130. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J at pr.225-6 pp. 4234 rclying on Chinnappa Reddy J. in Vasant (rupra n. 127). 131. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet Pandinn I x pr- 228 p. 424. 132. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 801-803 pp. 729731; pr. 843-5 pp. 753-755; pr. 793 - pp. 725. 133. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr.792 pp.7?-45. 133(a) Ashol<a Kwnar Thakur v. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC ,103. 134. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy at pr. 792 p. 72,4., Sawmt J. has a more comprehensive approach atqr,.520-22 pp. 553-554 requiring the development of "sufficient capacities" before exit frorn the reserved category is
warranted.
135. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 793 p.725. 136. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet le,ewan Reddy J at pr.792 p.725. Clearly, the non-application of the creamy layer concept to SC and ST. 137 . Mandal Case (snpra n. 5) per Thommen J at pr. 295 -6 pp. 454-5; pr.323
(6) and (7) pp. 463. 138. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J. at pr. 385 p. 492.' 139. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr.629 p.626 suggesting a slightly wider exchtsion in addition to the income test. l4O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at pr. 221 p. 422. 141. Even on the very last day, it seemed that although the question of promotions had been framed as one of the issues (see Manda I case supra n. 5 at pr. 681 pp. 654-5 Issue VIII), this question would not be re-examined since it did not necessarily arise in respect ofthe impugned notifications. Yet, it is arguable that it did so arise in that allocation of reservation was in rcspect of all vacancies. But this point was not adumbrated as the reason for going into this question. 142. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Ahmadi J atp.74A fn.145. The majority conceded that the promotion issue was not before the Court (pef Jeewan Reddy
J at
V. 220-l
pp. 741-2).
143. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Thommen J. at pr. 300 p. 456; also prs.
300-314 pp. 456-460. 144. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr. 379 p. 490; and generally at prs. 371-381 pp. 487-91. 145. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Sahai I pr. 622 p. 623 and generally pr. 620-625 pp.623-4. 146. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at W. 2A2 p. 4n. 147 . Mandal Case (sipra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 321 p.741. 148. General Manager, S Rly v. Rangaclai (19621 2 SCR 586:' Suu o! Punjab v. Hira Lal (1971) 3 SCR 267i ABSK Sangh u. Union of India (1981) 2
330
The Politics of Backw ardness
SCR l8-5; see also Comptoller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan (1986) 2 SCC 679 at 694. 149. Thomas (supra n.38) Krishna Iyer J at p. 9'74. 150. The Constitution (Eighty Fifth) Act 1995 which added article l6(4A) to the Constitution which reads as follows: "Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from makilg any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State."
l5oa. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 828 p.746;' l5l. Mandal Case (supra n.5) at pr. 819 pp. 741-1. This is a Constitutional requirement emanating from article 335 of the Constitution which reads as follows: "The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State." 152. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 831 p. 748 (in respect of promotions); also pr. 837-8 pp. 751 citing Snte of MP v. Nivedin larn (1981) 4 SCC 296 as an example, but cautioning (at pr. 83 of p.752\ that in certain technical posts pertaining to the physical sciences and mathematics reservations may not be
advisable at all.
153. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 743-5 pp. 693-5, per Pandian J at pr. 168-9 pp. 407, per Sawant J at pr. 4304 pp. 516-7; per Thommen J at pr.323(3) pp 4621' per Kuldip Singh J atpr.382-3 pp. 491; per Sahai J at pr. 566 pp. 583.
154. This is best brought out by Sawant J in Mandal at pr.430-l pp. 516 who saw article 16(4) being used for OBC reservations and article 16(1) reservations being used for generally handicapped persons bringing the latter within the general concept of equality (see Mdndal case supran.5 pr. 430 p. 516). Indeed, the only real justification offered by the majority for the 5OVo ceiling on reservations is that reservations are "special provisions" to be keptirithin "reasonable limits" - so much for reservations being a part of equality and not an exception
to it; 731-737; Thommen I (at pr. 299 p. 456); Kuldip Singh pr. 384 p. 491-2 (agreeing with Sahai J); Sawant J at pr. 495-518 pp. 542-552; Sahai J at pr. 6l I 619 pp. 616-622. Earlier precedent seems 1o have twisted. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963) | Supp. SCR 439', Devadassan v. Union (1964) 4 SCR 680 and State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 are made to sound more definitive than they were or intended to be. Insufficient emphasis was placed on the difference between Chinappa Reddy J and Venkataramiah J respectively in K.C. Vasant Kumar v. Kamataka (1985) Supp. SCC 714 on the interpretation of Balaji.
155. Mandal Judgement (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 804-814) pp.

156. 157. 158. 159.
Controversy
331
Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at prs. 177-l9l pp 409-413. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 807 p. 734. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 810 p. 735 (per Jeewan Reddy J.). Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 814 pp.736-7 (per Jeewan Reddy J). 16O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 817 pp. 739-40. 161. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) note the references at pr. 152 supra.. 162. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 811 p. 735. This was reiterated in R.K. Sabarwal (infra n 173) but has given rise to a considerable amount of confusion on whether a person who has got promotion can get the benefit of access to further promotion on the basis of his seniority which has, admittedly been accelerated because he was promoted earlier with the aid of reservation. This was not tully conceded in Union oJ'India v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 6 but was in a further case from Punjab (see A7'lr Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 2
SCALE 526.
163. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735 where Jeewan Reddy J makes a distinction between "horizontal reservations" (across caste lines) and "vertical reservations" under art.l6(4). But horizontal reservations are not just limited to "handicapped' (as Justice Jeewan Reddy suggests) or such similarly situated disadvantaged persons but to all persons who are specially classifiable as deserving of an allocative quota. This is based on the doctrine of source (on which see fn.67 supra and cases cited there). 164. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735. 165. Ibid. But there is nothing to prevent the executive from reducing the numbers (see Kuldip Singh J in Sabha rwal (infra n.173) and Jeewan Reddy J. in V.P.S. Chauhan (infra n. 173). Equally, reservations and quotas could well block merit candidates altogether (Cf Deepak Sibal supra n. 67) 166. On the doctrine of source see further the cases cited at n. 67 supra and note the comments at n. 165. 167 . Mandal case (supra n.5) per Pandian J (at pr. 30-2 pp. 368-9, pr. 124150 pp. 395-402); per Thommen J (^t pt.246-249 pp. 931-33) per Kuldip Singh J (at pr. 369 p. 485; pr. 393-4 pp.495-500); per Sawant J. (atpr.423 p.5i 3); per Sahai J (at pr. 556 p. 571 pr. 585-88 p. 599-602) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 659673 pp. 640--50). It is almost difficult to believe from a reading ofthejudgement that controversies conceming this issue and case brought down a govemment judgement in 1990 and threw, at least, Delhi into chaos. 168. Supra n. 39. 169. Curiously, there have been very few critical appraisals of the Mandal judgement and its aftermath. l'10. Mandal Case (supran.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 814-8 pp. 736-740. l7l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5); Babri Masjid case (M. Ishmail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360. 172. On the 'Creamy layer see the UP - Bihar cases (supra n.83) and on postgraduate medical education see Ajai Kutnar Singh v. State of Bihar (1994) 4 scc 401. 173. R.K. Sablrurwal v. State of Punjab (1995) 2 SCC'145 which stopped the
332
operation ofthe quota beyond the prescribed percentage limits. While the author of this Constiturion Bench ruling (Kuldip Singh J) was in a minoriry in Mandal (supra n. 5) and clearly wanted to restrict rcservations in the matter of promotions till 1997, the author of the majority judgement in Mandal (supra n. 5), Justice Jeewan Reddy, was more circumspect and left it to the Govemment in Union v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684. Justice K. Ramaswami J. however
felt preferential seniority could be given even at the initial stage (see Ghaulat's
case (1995)
5 SCC 625).
(London l99l ).
174. A phrase taken fiom V.S. Naipaul's : India A Million Mutinics now
'This is PILSARC Working Paper No.l09 and anybody who will reproduce
it may kindly acknowledge that it is
a PILSARC Working Paper.
Index
A Long Way n Go: Report on a Sur216 vey of Schcdaled Caste HighSclnol Backward Classes Comrnission, 17, 31 and College Sndents in Fifieen Backward Classes movement, in Bihar, Swes of India,35 l7l-77 Adi Andhra movenpnt,36 Backwadne,ss, changing parameters of, Adi Dharma movement 35 9l-92 Adi Dravida Andolan,35 Baines,99 Adi Hindu movernent, 36 Balaji cw,59, 8G8l Adi Kamataka Andolan, 35 Baxi Comrnission ,20!-cf.,210, Zl5 Adimjati Seva Mandal, 168 Beteille, Andre, 172 Agarker,35 Bhanacharya Mohit,2+25, t83 Ahmadi, Saghir, 296,3O5,3Ul Bhumi Putra Fauj, 174 Akhil Bharatiya Anrt-Untorclability Bihar, Lcague, 36 absence of Scheduled Caste move-
Akhil Gujarat Navr*hna Samiti, 2l
Ali, Hyder,
'
Agi(AGEIIAC),2IO Federation, 175,264 All India Kurmi Mahasabh4 t74 All lndia Yadava Mahasabha, l?4 Ambedkar, 8.R., l, 3, 3G31, 35, 45All
Gujarat Educational Reform tation Commine All India Backward Classes
ll0
An
among thz Schedtled Castes in Gujarat, 2lO Aurangzeb,

Assessnent
46,97-98,
IO2-03,23O,237,3O1
of Education
ment in, 177-78 backward casres, 164, 181-82 backward class movenent in, l?l77 development profile, 199-2OO population, 162-64 reservation in, l&-82 exrent of, 164-65 filling up quota for, 168-69
income criteria appticability,

169
BAMCEF,4I Babi Masjid cw,3l2
perfonnance evaluation, 169-71 recommendations, 165-67 roster system, 167-68 Bihar-UP Creamy Lster case, !O5
Buddha 6 Burke, Edmund, 3
Backward classe.s, 9rl-96 Bacl<ward Classes and Resemation, Casu Prcjudice anong Colkge Sal.
334
dents : A Socio- Psycholo gical
The Politics of Backwardness Sndy,
AruIysk,56
Dharam Prakash, 43 Dhavan, Rajeev, 262 Dhavan, Rajiv, 12 Dhobar Commission, 105
35
Chandrashekhar, 176-77 Chandrika Ram, 43 Chatterjee, Parth, 193 Chaudhari, Amarsinh, 21 4, 243 Chaurasia, S.D. Singh, 263 Chinappa Reddy, 303 Chinappa Reddy Commission, 206
Disabiliry, 100-01 Dushkin, Lelah, 101

Dynamic s of Reservation
P olicy,
202
Chitnis, Suma, A-25,88 Chopr4 Pran, 13 Communal Award, 98-99, 103

Companies Act 1956, 186 Compensatory discrimination, theory of, 3-9 Competing Equalities, 40,7 | Constituent Assembly, and constitu-
Economic and Political Weekly,34 Employment exchanges, job seekers regi stration with, 77
First Backward Class Commission, see,
Havanur Commission Franchise Committee, 99, 102
tional provisions for reservations.
4t-46
Constitution of India, article 14, 268
Gajendragadkar, 271, 277, 284-86, 301,303 Galanter, Marc, 40, M,71,73, lO1,
z5r
Gandhi, Indira, 5,203, 241
afiicle 15, 22,30, 42-43, 46, 67, 79-80, 131-32, 134-36, r4t, 230, 268-69, 27 5, 28r, 309 article 16, 22, 30, 42-43, 46, 67, 79-80, 129-30, 132, 134-36,
| 41, 230, 268-69,
27
Gandhi, Mahatma, 6, 17, 36, 97-98,

178, Gandhi, George, Ghurye,
198
5,
27 8-7
9,
Rajiv, 29 A., 250 G.S., 104
296-97,309
article 29,269 article 38, ,14 article 46, 44, 161,296 uticle 334, 44 article 335, 22, 45, 141
Gillion, Kenneth, 38
Gin, v.v.,242 Girijans,98
Gokhale, 35
Govemment job, reservation policy for SCs/STs and OBCs, 13-28, 108-
article 340, 43, 8l

afticle 342, 92 Criminal Tribes Act of 1952,223 Dakua, Dinesh Chandra, 195
59, |64-96, 198-21 9, 221-53,256316
appraisal, 256-61 consequences, 240-53 evaluation, 221-39
Dalit Varg Sangh, Ranchi, 168 Darji, Jinabhai, 213

Dasgupta, Promode, 185 Dave, Mahesh H.,202, 216 Depressed classes, 47, 94-100. 225. 240 Determinants of Fertiliry Decline: An
in Bihar, 164-82
in Gujarat, 198-219
in Kamataka, 108-59
in West Bengal, 183-96 Supreme Court judgement and, 262-316 Govemment of India Act 1935,47,
Index
335
Kaka Kalelkar Commission, 30, 4851, 56, 165, 175, 2'0.3, 257, 265, 287,292 Kalelkar, Kaka, 30, 48-51, 56, 165,
175,
104,231,235 121 cujarat, development profile, 199-200 literacy in,207-08

99-100,
Gowda, Nagana, 111, 118,
reservation policy and system,
m3,257,265
219 213
198-
Kamath, H.V., 2
Kamataka, govemment service, caste and communities rcpresenGujarat Karamchari Utkarsh tation in, 143-45 population, Gujaiat Khet Vikas GujaratKshatriyaSabhu2o6,2I2,2lT caste-wise, 115-25 pmjected caste wise, ll8-21, Gujarat Panchayat Actof
workers by industrial categories
in,
Kania,296
214
Mandal,
Parishad,2i3
1961,2O2 cujarat Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal, 21I,215 Gujarat Vali Mahamandal, 21 I Guruswami. Narain. 35 104 Harijan,36
Haimendorf,
Harijan Sevak Sangh, Ranchi,36,
156-59
relative share, 122-24 share oi OBCs, SCVSTS, I 1525
reservation policies
and OBCs
for
SCs/STs
in, 108-59
Harijan3,98-99 Harper, A. Edwin,250 Hartog Committee,gg Havanur, L.G., 57, ll2-14, 147 Havanur Commission, 57-58, 112-15,
ll8,121-22,130-31,133-34,13637,142, 147,150, 152-53,
composition, 150 duration, 155
168
extent of, l3z1-41 evaluation of, 143-48
income criterion applicability,

141-43 percentage of reservation recommended, 13G37
155
population, 115-25 recommendation of Commissions, 125-34
socio-political background of,

108-15
recommendations, term of reference, Higher education, pattern Holdemess, 99 Holmes,
130-31 152-53 of,76
Krishna Iyer, 279-81,286, 3O7 Krishnamachari, T.T.,46 Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha, 173
Hutton,99-100,
Sherlock,29l 102
Inamdari system, I 1 I Indian Express,Z90 Iyengar, M.C. Ranga, 128

Jeewan Reddy, Job seekers, registration with
Lal, Guru Sahay, 174 Lal, Jagat Narain,45 Lal, Mungeri, 165
kgislation and
Cases on
ity and Scheduled Castes 34
Unnuchabilin India,
296-97,3Ol,3O5
ment Exchanges,
77
Employ-
Literucy rate,76 Lohia, Ram Manohar, 18,31 Lokhitwadi, 35 Lokur Committee,92, lO5,203
336
Madhusudhan Reddy, K., 32 Mandal, B.P., 173, 176-77,287

Nair Committee, 99 Nama Sudra Andolan, 35
Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 176 Naroji, Dadabhai, 97 National Backward Classes Commission, 3l Navrachna Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti, 211 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 30, 43, 56, 141,
Mandal Commission, 31, 48-51, 54, 56, 58-61, 65-66, 70-71, 78-79, r77 . r85 . 257 -58 and Supreme Court judgement,
262-3r6
critgria for determination of backwardness, 292-93
Mandal. Ras Bihari. 173 Mandal, Shiva Nandan, 175 Manu, 4-5 Manusmriti, 4 Mayawati, 5
Mehta, Haroobhai, 202
265,267,273,284-85
Nijalingappa, S., I l2
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) classificati on of, 47-74 income criteria fot, 7 l -7 3 reservation policy for, 29-82 constitutional provisions, 41 46 fu ture perspectives, 72t82
Meston, 39
Miller Comminee, 40, 109,

125 -28, 135, 137, 1 42,
1
lll,ll5,
4647, 1 49,
152, 155 composition of, 149
duration, 155
recommendations, 1 25-28 term of reference, 152 Miller, Lesley, 40 Miller. Leslie C.. 109 Mishra, Ranganath, 292 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 39 Mookherjee, 2 Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, 96 Mudaliar Committee, 99 Mudaliar, Ramaswamy, 41 Mukherjee, N., 250 Mungeri Lal Commission, 165-67 Musahar Seva Mandal. Rosera. 168 Mysore case.27'7 Nagana Gowda Committee, 17, 1l l15, 118, 121-22, t28-30,135, 137 , 142, 146, 149, 152, 155
in Bihar, l6l-82 in Gujarat, 198-219 in Kamataka, 108-59 in West Bengal, 183-96

national consensus on, 29-37 non-Brahmin movefienL 37 -42 see also, Reservation Policy see also, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs Pai Panandiker, V.A., I Pandian, 296, 304, 306, 309 Pantulu, B., 35 Patel. Birchand. 175 Patel, Hasmukb, 202 Patel. Sulekha- 56 Parel, vallabhbhai, 2
Patil. M.S.. 129 Patil. Veerendra.
12
Permanent Settlement, Bengal, 37
composition, 149 duration, 155

recommendation, I 28-30 term of reference, 152 Naicker, Ramaswami, 35 Naik, S.C., 215
Philanthropy, politics of, 95-96 Phule, Jyotiba, 35, 94
Pillai, Muniswami. 2
Planning Commission, 9 Poona Pact, 99 Population, Bihar, 162-64, l8l-82
Index
caste and traditional
5.J1
ocorpation-
suggesdons, 237-39
t96,218 classification, 50-51 growth,54-55 Gujarat, 218 292-93 job seekers, 77

literacy
wise, 62-63, 115-25,
156-59,
Supreme Court judgement and, 262-316 uneven distribution of benefits of,
252-53 Resemation Policy in India,32
indicators of classification,
61-62,
Risely, 99 Ritual disability, 101-02

Rudolph, L.1., 162 Rudolph, S.H., 162 Ryotwari setdement, 37 Sadhwani Committee, 212,215 Sahai, 296-98, 302, 306-07
Sahay,
Kamataka, 115-25,
rate,76
156-59 of,
variations in', 52-53 West Bengal, 185,
196
Positive discrimination, principle
19
Prasad, R.N., Premchand,
35 Munshi,35
K.B., 175
Sanjeeviah, D., 243 Sanskritization process, 8
Protection of Civil Rights Act
83-84.223.242
1955,
Santal Pahariya Seva Mandal,
Deoglar,
169
RadhakrishnanCommission,250
176 N.,32 97 Rane, C.V.,206

Rai, Daroga Prasad, Ramchander, Ranade, M.G., 95,
Rane Commission
Sawant, 296 Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs, changing parameters of,9l-92 definition of, 88-106
Reservation appraisal,
policy, 256-61 consequences of 49
, 29, 206,
2O9
initial acceptance, 90-91 need to deschedule,92-93

politics of evolution of, 93-94 Presidential Order, 103 provisions in Constitution, 89
appraisal, 256-61 consequences,240-53
Govemmentemployment,244- reservationpolicyfor,
political, Ul-44 Constitutional provisions, 22, 30, 42-44, 46, 67,79-80, 92, 12932. 134-36, 141, 23O-3'l, 262-
meritandefficiency,249-51
evabation,221-39 in Bihar, 162-82 in Gujarat, 198-219
316
evaluation,
in Bihar, 162-82 in Guj arat, 1 98-2 1 9 in Kamataka, 108-59 in West Bengal, 183-96
major
221-39
in Kamataka, 108-59 in West Bengal, 183-96

Supreme Courtjudgernent,262-
316
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order 1956,
issues,228 perfornance, 224-27 rationale,222-24
47 Second Backward Classes Commission, J?e, Venkataswamy Commission
338
Second Backward Classes Committee,
The Politics of Backw ardness Untouchability, 33, 83-84 Untouchability Offences Act of 1955, 223,242 Urs, Devraj, 31, 66, 112-13,204
Velasker, Padma Ramkrishna, 251 Venkatachaliah, 296 Venkataswamy, T., 57 , 122 Venkataswamy Commission, 31, 5761, 65, 67, 70, 8r, 122, 131-34, 140, 137-38, 150-51, 153-55
Karnataka, sae, Nagana Gowda

Committee
Secular disability,
l0l -02
195
S*gopta Rathin,
Servants of Untouchables Society, 36 Shah, Ghanshyaq 240 Shah, Vimal P., 210 Sharma, B.A.V., 32 Sharma. G.S., 34
Sharp, Henry, 99
Sheth, D.L., 23-25,221 Shri Prakash, 2l , 23 , 29
composition, 150-5
, 198
Silver Blaze,291 Simon Commission. 98-99 Singh, Charan, 19 Singh, Dasu, 174 Singh, Deo Saran, 174 Singh, Kuldip, 296, 3O2, 3O5 -W Singh, V.P.,3-5, 257-58, 288-89, 298, 310. 313-15 Sinha, Mahamaya Prasad, 175 Sinha, Sajivan Lal, 173 Smith. D.E.. 162 Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission, Gujarat, 69 Solanki, Madhavsinh, 2Ul, 209, 21 4 Srinivas, M.N., 8 State economies, of lndia,77-82 Subba Rao, 271, n8,282, 301 Sultan, Tipu, 110 Tebhaga agltatons, 193 Thakkar. Amridal V.. 36 Thakur, Karpoori, 165, 175-76, ?M Thimmaiah. G.. 16-17 Thomas case, 280, 286, 300-01, 3 12 Thommen, 296, 30O, 302, 3O7
Titrles of
duration of, 155 recommendation, 131-34 term of reference, 153-54 Venkatraman. R.. 35 Verghese, B. George, 11, 256 Verma. K.K.. 173 Visveswaraya, M., 109-10 Vivekananda, Swami, 35 Wanchoo, 277 Weiner, Myron, 172 West Bengal, development profi le, 1 99-200 reservation policy, 183-96 actual position of, 188-91 impact of, 191-92 mechanics of, 185-88 political framework, I 92-94 report on, 195-96 West Bengal Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation Vacancies in Services and Posts) Act t976, 186, r95 World Bank, 56 Yadav. Yadav, Yadav, Yunus,
India,83
Tribals. 103-04
Laloo Prasad, 5 Mulayam Singh, 5 Ram Lakhan Singh, 175

174
Triveni Sangh, 174

Untouchable. 9+98. 100-01 political leverage from, 96-98
Zachariah. K.C.. 56

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THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESS Reservation PolicY in India