Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner, - versus G.R. No.

196804
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, - versus G.R. No.

197015
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------------x SAVE QUEZON PROVINCE MOVEMENT herein represented by FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR and HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR., Intervenor. x---------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR INTERVENTION

INTERVENOR SAVE QUEZON PROVINCE MOVEMENT, by counsel, most respectfully states, THAT: It is a juridical entity duly organized under existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines with principal office address at c/o

Resolution authorizing Hobart Deveza Dator, Jr and Frumencio E.

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Hobart Deveza Dator, Jr. Lucban, Quezon, copy of the Board

Pulgar to represent SAVE QUEZON PROVINCE MOVEMENT in filing this PETITION FOR INTERVENTION, as ANNEX A hereof; whereas petitioner Barbara Ruby C. Talaga, is of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at #5 Waling Waling St., Stephen Compound, Brgy. Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City, Quezon, where she may be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Commission; respondent

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS is a statutory body created under the 1987 Constitution with principal business address at

Commission of Elections, Intramuros, Manila, where it may be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Commission. PREFATORY STATEMENT We join the Petition on the ground that INTERVENOR is an interested party and taxpayer. We have the interest in the

determination as to who indeed was the real elected City Mayor of Lucena City, Quezon last May 10, 2010. It is our position that under existing laws and jurisprudence, petitioner Barbara Ruby C. Talaga could not substitute her husband former Mayor Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. whose Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled and withdrawn and therefore

disqualified. The Comelec has time and again ruled that there is no law passed by Congress proscribing Political Dynasties. Yet our Constitution has made it a state policy to regulate political or electoral behaviour when it declared that the State shall

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guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.1 Under our law the wife is an extension of the person of the husband. While admittedly the controversy at this instance

borders on election and political laws, it is believed that there are pronouncements and jurisprudence in civil law that can find application in the instant case in view of the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to foster morality and ethics in public service when they forbidden the proliferation of political dynasties among other social malaise. Congress of the Philippines procrastinated for the last 26 years in crafting legislation prohibiting political dynasties. Political dynasties have broad ramifications as they involve the wife, the direct descendants and ascendants and collateral relatives of the elected officials. For our particular purpose in this controversy, we focus on the relationship of the husband and wife. This Honorable Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation, on the local level, of one elected spouse bench warming for the other apparently in compliance with the three-term limit rule.2 This spectacle sociological
1
2

appears and

to

be

unregulated frictions

and

has

spawned to be

political

precisely

sought

Section 26, Article 2, - Declaration of Principles and State Policies, 1987 Constitution The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered a s an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. ARTICLE X Section 8, GENERAL PROVISIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1987 Constitution).

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addressed by the constitutional ban. We grant that there is no law, as yet, about the extension of the parents personality with that of the offspring or collateral siblings. But this Honorable Court has pronounced the law in regard to the merger of personality of the husband and wife. Once pronounced by this Honorable Court, its ruling becomes part of the law of the land.3 What are these rulings (or laws) that we believe we can rely on and stop the rampage of political dynasties in so far as the husband and wife are concerned? We defer to REMEDIOS SACLOLO and ERNESTO PASCUAL vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and SANTIAGO MADLANGSAKAY4 and MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES5 We adopt the Statement of Facts already well presented by the petitioner Philip M. Castillo in his Petition. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES a. Is Barbara Ruby C. Talaga an extension of the person of her husband; b. Can Barbara Ruby C. Talaga substitute her husband Ramon Y. Talaga as City Mayoralty Candidate during the last May 10, 2010 elections; c. Does Barbara Ruby C. Talagas substitution legally violate the 3-year maximum rule as enunciated in the Constitution, Local Government Code and Aldovino vs. Asilo case; DISCUSSION
3

(G.R. No. L-13274, January 30, 1960) (148 Phil. 295, 298-299, March 31, 1971)

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Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Article 8, Civil Code.

a.

Is Barbara Ruby C. Talaga an extension of the person of her husband; -------------------------------------------------------Barbara Ruby C. Talaga is an extension of her husband Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.

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Under Civil Law, the husband is an extension of the wifes personality. They are treated as one and the same person.6 For example donations between themselves are proscribed. Under Art. 133 of the Civil Code:
Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor.
6

We cannot subscribe to the opinion of the judge of the court below that to authorize the ejectment under the above circumstances would be a judicial construction of the law beyond the intent thereof. The provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199) should be construed in the light of the law, and the legal principles obtaining in this jurisdiction, especially those that regulate the relation between husband and wife. Under legal principles, by the contract of marriage, a man and a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as one. Whether under the common law or under the civil law, upon marriage the husband and the wife become one single moral, spiritual and social being, not only for purposes of procreation but also for the purpose of mutual help and protection, physically, morally and materially. There is between them a full and complete community of existence. Entre las del tercer grupo o de tipo finalistas las hay que atiendena la finalidad estrictamente sexual del matrimonio, y otras, mas aceptables, que atienden a la finalidad espiritual o integral. En este ultimo sentido, ya las definiciones de los juristas romanos senalaron la constitucion de una plena comunidad de la vida como finalidad juridicamente reconocida del matrimonio.... Modernamentese inspira en la misma idea Ahrens al considerar el matrimonio como in union formada entre dos sexo diferente conel proposito de una comunidad perfecta de toda su vida moral, espiritual fisica, y de todas las relaciones que son su consecuencia, y Kipp y Wolff, al definirlo como `la union de un hombre y deuna mejur dirigida al establecimiento de una plena communidad devida. Todas estas deficiones recogen la idea moral del matrimonio, propria de la civilizacion cristiana y moderna, y que inspira laslegislaciones positivas. No faltan, por lo demas, deficiones mixtas. En realdad, lastres notas aludidas de la legalidad, permanecia y plenitud sonotros tnatos aspectos parciales de la idea del matrimonio. Reuniendolos popdriamos definir este como la union legal de un hombrey una mujer para la plena y perpetua comunidad de existencia.Y si quisieramos definirlo en su acepcion de acto, podriamos decirque el matrimonio es el acto solemne por medio del para la plena yperpetua comunidad de existencia. (Castan, Derecho Civil, Tomo3, 6.a ed., paginas 445-446.) If there is unity and community of existence between husband and wife, then the husband may not be considered as a being distinct and different from the wife xxx (Saclolo v CAR, et al. supra.) In the same manner, the proscription of political dynasties as may be defined by law as enunciated by no less than the Constitution (certainly to regulate behavior that has caused untold destruction to our social and electoral fabric) should be construed in the light of the law, and the legal principles obtaining in this jurisdiction, especially those that regulate the relation between husband and wife(,) (that) by the contract of marriage, a man and a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as one. Whether under the common law or under the civil law, upon marriage the husband and the wife become one single moral, spiritual and social being, not only for purposes of procreation but also for the purpose of mutual help and protection, physically, morally and materially. There is between them a full and complete community of existence. The inescapable conclusion is that since Barbara is the extension of Ramon, the former is barred from running for the fourth time, and therefore disqualified per Section 26 Article 2 - Declaration of Principles and State Policies, 1987 Constitution and Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code which says: Term of Office. - xxx

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Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.

Dr. Arturo Tolentino observed, thus:

This provision refers to donations inter vivos. It is dictated by the principle of unity of personality of the spouses during the marriage, and is intended to avoid possible transfers of property from one spouse to the other due to passion or avarice. The intimate relations of the spouses during the marriage places the weaker spouse under the will of the stronger, whatever the sex, so that the former might be obliged, either by abuse of affection to the latter. The law seeks to prevent such exploitation in marriages which might have been contracted under the stimulus of greed.7

b.

Can Barbara Ruby C. Talaga substitute her husband Ramon Y. Talaga as City Mayoralty Candidate during the last May 10, 2010 elections; -------------------------------------------------------Matabuena versus Cervantes That is the reason why we are resurrecting the archaic doctrine of Matabuena vs. Cervantes. That case simply puts an end to an immoral practice of donating properly to a mistress. Is there no parallel between mistress donation from that of sidestepping the 3-term rule by letting the spouse run in lieu of the disqualified spouse? The doctrine laid down in Matabuena is not far fetched from the lis mota hereof. From our experience, when we had

revolutions we try to rearrange our universe. This Honorable Court can precisely do that as oftener as possible without the
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. xxx (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, page 349, emphasis ours)

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people going to the streets over and over again by the expedient of Matabuena vs. Cervantes. It is a matter of common knowledge that upon proclamation of petitioner wife, the husband, Ex-Mayor Ramon Y. Talaga acts as the City Administrator who for the most part performs, functions, and discharges, the office of Mayor of the City of Lucena; The spirit and intendment of the three (3) consecutive term limit is to promote the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service contained in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as sanguinely expressed by the late Commissioner Jose Nolledo when he cryptically said, And after holding office for two terms or more, he becomes very rich, and builds his own private army. Mr. Presiding Officer, political dynasty is really a social malady. The conjugal partnership of gains of petitioner wife Ruby and her husband is the continuing beneficiary of the salaries and emoluments derived as Mayor all throughout their combined incumbency; By virtue of petitioner wife's marriage to Ex-mayor Ramon Y Talaga, they are, by legal fiction considered as one. Petitioner wife and her spouse have jointly filed their Sworn Assets and Liabilities/Networth (SALN for brevity) and of course Income Tax Returns. This Honorable Court can take notice of this fact judicially and administratively. This is an eloquent indication of the joint persona of petitioner wife and her husband.

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While the state policy on political dynasty is yet to be legislatively defined by Congress since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, this Honorable Court is not powerless to pronounce that the candidacy and substitution of petitioner wife as within the prohibition of the 3-consecutive term Rule as husband and wife are deemed, if not in actuality, by legal fiction, one and the same person. This is an existing law and that is what this Honorable Court pronounced in Saclolo and Matabuena vs. Cervantes. The proceedings of the 1987 Constitutional Commission is replete with the intendment of granting equal access to public service by prohibiting as a matter of state policy political dynasties which led to one commissioner to remark that the existence thereof is a "social malady"; As an adjunct to the aforestated policy, the 1987

Constitution in no uncertain terms pronounced the proscription of the 3-term limit which petitioner wifes husband with vast political resources and machinery gradually built from 1992 as City Mayor of Lucena, up to the present would like to subvert; By analogy, the doctrine in the case of Matabuena vs. Cervantes should be applied where the Supreme Court, starting at the premise that husband and wife are deemed one in personality, went beyond the letter of the law to serve the spirit with which the law was precisely framed. The Supreme Court went on to rule that:

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xxxxx

xxxxx

xxxxx

It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notice of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the Spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, that is it Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser lfri luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en is aplicacion de sus dispos ciones."

c.

Does Barbara Ruby C. Talagas substitution legally violate the 3-year maximum rule as enunciated in the Constitution, Local Government Code and Aldovino vs. Asilo case; -------------------------------------------------------Has Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. consumed the 3-term maximum term limit as mandated by the Constitution? The term limit under the Constitution is self-executory. In his Motion to Withdraw his Petition below, former Mayor Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. in COMELEC SPA No. 09-029 manifested in no uncertain terms:
Clearly, there was no misrepresentations on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioners ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws.

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Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy to the 2010 elections. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter respondent respectfully submits the represent case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.8

Hence, he has already admitted that the doctrine in Aldovino vs. Asilo9 applies to him and therefore although he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan in another case, he can no longer run for the fourth time because the suspension did not work as an involuntary interruption. Hence, for all intents and

purposes, he has already digested the 3-term maximum limit.

COMELEC SPA No. 09-029, Manifestation with Motion to Resolve (In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for having Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena City, Philip M. Castillo, Petitioner vs. Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. Respondent) Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the threeterm limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.

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The husband Ramon Y. Talaga, by filing his Certificate of Candidacy in the May 10, 2010 local elections has clearly manifested that he believes, notwithstanding the current

jurisprudential ruling, that he is qualified to run for the fourth time based on his erroneous opinion that his suspension in November, 2009 was an involuntary suspension of his term of office. Petitioner wife, taking the cue from her husband, filed her certificate of candidacy on May 4, 2010. The husband and wife team in effect run roughshod against the constitutional

proscription of term limits. Petitioner wifes filing was a subterfuge intended to circumvent the constitutional and statutory

prohibitions against a fourth and/or consecutive fifth terms of office of an elective local government official as provided under Article X, Section 8 in relation Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 which respectively state:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three executive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected10 xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which elective official concerned was elected11. (emphasis ours)

10

Article X, 1987 Constitution

11

RA 7160 Sec. 43 [b]

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In Saclolo, this Honorable Court was called on to rule on the meaning of Section 50 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, which provides that an owner may eject a tenant in order that he may cultivate it, only when he will personally cultivate his land. The reason given by the court below for denying the petition of the landowner-wife and her husband to cultivate the landholding is that it was the husband who wanted to personally cultivate the land which to the mind of the court below was not sanctioned by Section 50 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199. This Honorable Court said that the husband of the landowner-wife can owing to the legal fiction of complete community of existence. Extended to the present controversy: the law says that no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Who is the local elective official here? The husband Ramon Y. Talaga who was a three-term mayor of Lucena City. Can his wife Ruby substitute for him as candidate in the same position? Saclolo says no because they are one and the same. Is she disqualified to substitute her husband? Matabuena says yes because Justice Pablo said "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser lfri luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en is aplicacion de sus dispos ciones." SOCIAL MALADY, REGULATING BEHAVIOR

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From the records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission the following exchanges were recorded to fortify the intent of the Constitutional proscription on dynasties and the term limits :
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

MR. SARMIENTO. This seems to be a very unpopular section. But may 10 speak in favor of this section inspite of its unpopularity wthin this august body? Political dynasties, Mr. Presiding Officer, are the bane and waterloo of young, promising but poor candidates. And this is true in the provinces, even in my own province. By including this provision, we widen the opportunities of competent, young and promising but poor candidates to occupy important positions in the government. While it is true we have government officials who have ascended top power despite accident of birth, they are exceptions to the general rule. The economic standing of these officials would show that they come from powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.] So, I believe that with this provision and considering that social and economic inequalities will be with us for many years, maybe for decades, then there is wisdom for the inclusion of this section in our Constitution. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

MR. COLAYCO. I have one angle which has not been mentioned and which makes the concept advanced by Commissioner Nolledo very meritorious. One of the worst effects of political dynasties is that it breeds graft and corruption. I will give one actual example. In a city ion Metropolitan Manila, the mayor has been in power for easily 20 years, even before Marcos came to power. He has several children. What was the result? One took care of the graft coming from the discos. Another one received a monthly pension from the so-called motels. Another took charge of the gambling casinos. A fourth one took care of the market collections. But the chief of police looked the other way because he has been given a share in the loot. Because of the length of time the mayor has held power, he did not bother with the public criticism against his administration. This is something still happening. A group of concerned citizens in this same city created a special committee to help the present OIC. In the beginning they thought that the OIC was acting in good faith, but lately, they heard that he was following the footsteps of his predecessor. This condition exists not only in this city, We go a little farther to the Visayas. You know whom I am referring to. This politician has such a strong private army that not even our army dares to do something about it. And what is this political dynasty doing? The same thing that the previous dynasty I mentioned is

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doing. His wife and children are all in power. Some are mayors, others are governors, et. cetera. And in each place where they are in power, graft and corruption is present. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx MR. NOLLEDO. And after holding office for two terms or more, he becomes very rich, and builds his own private army. Mr. Presiding Officer, political dynasty is really a social malady. And I disagree with Commissioner Monsod who says that the people are against the provision. in fact, in practically all forums wherein I appeared, the people overwhelmingly support the rule against political dynasty.12

Somebody said somewhere that it is a tragedy when history repeats itself, it becomes a comedy when we keep repeating and repeating it (for 26 years and counting). We urge this Honorable Court to see the inequity of local dynasties, the depth and breadth thereof is Marcosian in proportion. We lopped off the head of the Marcos hydra only to find ourselves faced with multiple headed monster, the Talaga Dynastry as one of them and hundreds of local variations. For twenty years this country labored under the Marcos dynasty. This Honorable Court does not have to look far beyond. Prior to 1986, anyone identified with President Marcos or his family, founded his local fiefdom. The pernicious result is that those big fishes in small ponds began monopolizing not only the political power at the grassroots but also holding the economic the local

opportunities

thereabouts

thereby

constituencies at stranglehold politically and economically. It is a

12

(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission Sept. 23, 1986 pp. 939-940, emphasis ours)

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truism that a little power corrupts, how much more complete

domination over an LGU by someone who has total control of practically the social and economic well-being of the people? Shall we rely on his conscience and the dictate of his god? As to Marcos dynasty, shall we belabor this sad part in our history here? Of course we say, the people elected them anyway. That is the usual excuse, the supreme voice of the people being the voice of Providence. But this Honorable Court has spoken thru Saclolo and Matabuena. This Honorable Court has laid down the law even ahead of the policy laid down by the Constitution on political dynasties. It is NOT petitioner wife Talaga we are after here. She is just an example. She is not sui generis with an enviable record. The types of the Talagas are all over us. Neither are we promoting either petitioner Mr. Philip M. Castillo or Vice Mayor Roderick Alcala. The mushrooming Talagas all over us could no longer be denied. With dynasts in our midst, we are ruled by these men and women not the law or the Constitution. The reason we proscribe dynasties is because it is anathema to the Rule of Law. It is a throwback from the past. One may say again, but they are elected, arent they? Yes, but they hold, the purse of the LGU, the proverbial Internal Revenue Allotment. With the advent of local autonomy, local taxes are held with jealousy by these local dynasties. Who do you think can lick them in an even keel election? But with millions (or billions) at their disposal from the IRA (whether one likes it or not the law

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says the IRA belongs to them, plus the real property taxes to boot), who do you think can beat them in a fair and square elections? Shorn of legal balderdash this is the message enshrined in the 1987 Constitution which says;
"Sec. I. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This provision is restated in Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
"Sec. 43.Term of Office... (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected...."

We therefore appeal to this Honorable Court to resolve the above-entitled cases and declare the two (2) cited cases: REMEDIOS SACLOLO and ERNESTO PASCUAL vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and SANTIAGO MADLANGSAKAY and

MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES, as the law that regulate behaviour in so far as the issues posed in these cases are concerned. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Petition for Intervention be allowed; and the persona of Barbara Ruby C. Talaga be deemed by legal fiction an extension of the candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled and invalidated and

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therefore disqualified: Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.

Such other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for. Makati City, Metro Manila for Manila, July 29, 2011. SAVE QUEZON PROVINCE MOVEMENT (SQPM) Lucban, Quezon by: FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR AND HOBART D. DATOR, JR. Assisted By: ESCOBIDO AND PULGAR LAW OFFICES 2 Floor, Africa Bldg., #2041 Edison cor. Aragon Sts., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, MM Telefax Nos.: 887-3120 / 887-3121 Website : sonnypulgar.com katataspulong.blogspot.com E- mail: feplaw@yahoo.com
nd

by: CELSO O. ESCOBIDO Roll of Attorneys No. 23974 IBP No.: 801855 / 01-11-11 / Quezon City PTR No.: 4645107 / 01-11-11 / Quezon City MCLE Compliance No. III - 0065104
Republic of the Philippines ) Quezon City, Metro Manila ) s.s. x-------------------------------x

VERIFICATION

CERTIFICATION

1.

We are the Intervenors in the above-entitled case;

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WE, HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR. and FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, both of legal age, married, Filipinos, with office and postal address at 2nd Floor, Africa Bldg., #2041 Edison cor. Aragon Sts., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, Metro Manila, declare under oath, THAT:

2. We have read and understood the said Petition for Intervention and all the allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge or based on authentic records; 3. We have not commenced any other petition or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency; 4. To the best of our knowledge, no similar Petition for Intervention is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal agency; 5. If we should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before said courts or tribunal, we hereby undertake to promptly inform this Honorable Court of that fact within five (5) days therefrom. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have affixed our signatures this ___th day of ____________, 2011 in Quezon City, Metro Manila.

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR Affiant

HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR. Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___th day of ____________, 2011 in Quezon City, Metro Manila, affiant:
is personally known to the notary public; was identified by notary public through Competent Evidence of Identity as defined by Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, thru the presentation/production of the ff:

Drivers

License

No.

TIN ID No. _________________ Passport No. _______________ Company ________________ I.D.

Com.

Tax

Cert.

No. on at

________________ SSS ID No. _________________ GSIS ID No. _________________

______________ issued ___________ issued _________________.

Doc. No. _______; Page No. _______; Book No._______; Series of 2011.

Notary Public Until December 31, 2011 PTR No. 4645107 issued on January 11, 2011 at Quezon City, Metro Manila TIN No. 449123974

CELSO O. ESCOBIDO

NOTICE

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THE CLERK OF COURT SUPREME COURT Manila Greetings: Please be informed that the foregoing Petition for Intervention is being submitted to this Honorable Court for its immediate consideration and approval upon receipt hereof. This shall serve as a request to the Honorable Clerk of Court to submit the foregoing Petition for Intervention to the Honorable Court for its consideration and approval.

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR

HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR.

EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Sec 11 Rules 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure)

The following Petition for Intervention is being served by registered mail for lack of personnel to effect personal service.

FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR cc:

HOBART DEVEZA DATOR, JR.

ATTY. ANTONIOUS G. COLLADO Counsel for Philip Castillo ALTAMIRA CAS ALABA & COLLADO LAW OFFICES Unit G, 19th Floor Strata 100 Bldg., F. Ortigas Jr. Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City ATTY. GEORGE ERWIN GARCIA Counsel for Respondent Talaga Ground Floor, Laiko Bldg., Cabildo St., Intramuros, Manila COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Intramuros, Manila BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUCENA CITY Commission of Elections, Office of the City Election Officer, City Hall, Annex Building, Isabang, Lucena City, Quezon

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