Verhaeghen & Cerella – page 3reductionists is of cross-level unification, building explanations for cognitive aging from the bottom up, starting with gross changes in brain structure or neuronal functioning (see, e.g., thestrong claims in Li, Lindenberger, & Frensch, 2000, and Park, Polk, Mikels, Taylor, &Marshuetz, 2001).A second school of thought is well represented by Kausler’s 1991 monograph
Experimental psychology, cognition, and human aging
. The explanatory preference here istowards high precision, leading researchers to measure aging at the level of information- processing components. The emergent current in this process-oriented camp is computational – starting with mathematical models from cognitive psychology, the goal is to isolate those parameters whose modification reproduces the observed pattern of age effects (see, e.g., thestrong positions taken by Byrne, 1998; Kahana, Howard, Zaromb, & Wingfield, 2002; Meyer,Glass, Mueller, Seymour, & Kieras, 2001; and Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2000). The preferreddata are experimental, comparing performance (latency or accuracy) between a baseline task anda version in which the process of interest is manipulated.These two approaches to cognitive aging are opposite in many ways. One broadcasts itseffects at a macro-level and aims at breath; the other focuses its effects at a micro-level, and aimsat depth. The first engenders the impression that cognitive aging is orderly and simple; thesecond that it is diverse and messy. A third orientation has evolved at a meso-level: Aging isconceptualized in more detail than in macro-research, but at a resolution coarser than obtained inmicro-research (e.g., Hale & Myerson, 1996; Verhaeghen et al., 2002). The approach here has been to examine large data sets for communalities in the age effects from tasks thought torepresent similar kinds of processes, and for dissimilarities in the age effects from tasks differingin kind. Communalities are expressed as common “slowing factors” for related tasks;
Add a Comment