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The Creation of NSA Part 3

The Creation of NSA Part 3

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Published by John Greenewald
The following document(s) have been shared with Scribd users by The Black Vault, http://www.theblackvault.com, the world's largest private collection of declassified government documents. With well over 600,000 pages of declassified material on a vast array of topics, The Black Vault has fascinated users worldwide on the internet for more than 15 years. Check out the site, and help pass the word!
The following document(s) have been shared with Scribd users by The Black Vault, http://www.theblackvault.com, the world's largest private collection of declassified government documents. With well over 600,000 pages of declassified material on a vast array of topics, The Black Vault has fascinated users worldwide on the internet for more than 15 years. Check out the site, and help pass the word!

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Published by: John Greenewald on Aug 21, 2011
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DOCID:
3575727
UNCLASSIFIEOliFOR
O ~ t - 1 C i A i . .
ti:;::
m ~ L Y
CryptologicAlmanac50
th
AnniversarySeries
The
Creation
of
NSA-
Part
2
of
3:
The
Brownell
Committee
(D)SYNOPSIS:
AfterWorld
War
II,
the
Anny
and
Navy
cryptologic
organizationssought
to
eliminateduplication
of
effort
andsunnount
budget
difficulties
by
formingacooperativeorganization,theJointOperatingPlan.However,theJOPadministratordidnothavesufficientauthoritytoachievethesegoals.Alaterattemptatunification,the
Armed
ForcesSecurityAgency,didwellinintelligenceproduction,
but
failedtoachievethesavingsexpected
of
it.ItalsofailedtobringtheServiceCryptologic
Agenciesinto
closercooperation.
(D)
NOW,
ON
WITH
THE
STORY:
TheseniormilitaryleadersfightingthewarinKoreawerealsodissatisfiedwithAFSA.AllhadbeenseniorleadersduringWorld
War
II
andhadhadaccesstothehigh-leveldecryptsfromGerman
or
Japanesecommunications.Whentheydid
not
receiveequivalentmaterialsconcerningtheirenemiesinKorea,theyerroneouslyconcludedthatAFSAwasnotdoingits
job
adequately.(D)
Among
thedissatisfiedleaders
of
thecivilianagencieswere
Dean
Acheson,thesecretary
of
state,andWalterBedellSmith,director
of
CentralIntelligence.Smith,asEisenhower'sdeputyinWorld
War
II,hadlearnedwell
how
toachievehisgoals
in
theface
of
bureaucraticreluctance
or
interservicerivalry.
He
also
met
frequently"one-on-one"withHarryTruman.(D)AchesonandSmithweretwo
of
themostinfluentialfiguresinthe
Truman
administration.They
joined
ingoadingthepresidentinto
new
directionswithCOMINT.(U)
In
responsetothisdissatisfactionwithAFSA,PresidentHarrySTruman
on
13
December
1951wieldedthegreatall-purposebureaucratictool:
he
orderedastudytodeterminecorrectivemeasures.HisdirectivewasissuedtoSecretary
of
State
Dean
AchesonandSecretary
of
DefenseRobertA.Lovett,
who
furtherentrustedthisresponsibilitytoacommitteechairedbyGeorgeBrownell.(U)GeorgeA.Brownellwasaprominent
NewYork
attorney
whohad
servedasaconsultanttotheStateDepartmentandtraveledasPresidentTruman'spersonalrepresentativetoanumber
of
nations,includingMexico.Servingwithhim
on
thecommitteewereCharles
E.
Bohlen
of
theStateDepartment,Briga-dierGeneralJohnB.
pprO",/ed
for
F:elease
b ~ /~ ' J S A .
or
6-12-2009
FOIA
Case
#
5256
 
DOCID:
3575727
Magruder,VSA(Ret.),andWilliam
H.
Jackson,SpecialAssistanttotheDCI.Notethatnorepresentative
of
theJCS,underwhomAFSAwasplacedorganizationally,servedonthecommittee.
(V)
Thisquartetchangedtheshape
of
theV.S.COMINTcommunity.(D)Forsixmonths,housedattheCIA,theBrownellCommitteeconsulteddocuments,heardtestimonyfromAFSAandtheservices,andconferredwithexperts.Basedonthese,theCommitteeissuedalengthyreporton
13
June1952.
(V)
TheBrownellReportwashighlycritical
of
thedefmition
of
theresponsibilities
of
thedirector
of
AFSAandtheallocation
of
means.Thereportwasparticularlydisparagingaboutthemethodsfordeterminingpriorities,showingmarkedconcernoverthepersistence
of
uncoordinatedArmyandAirforceCOMINTactivitiesintheKoreanConflict.ThereportnotedrealduplicationamongtheservicesandbetweentheservicesandAFSA.
(V)
Finally,theBrownellCommitteerecognizedCOMINTasanationalasset,aresourceforthegovernmentasawhole.COMINT,itsaid,had
to
beorganizedandmanaged
to
reflectthisconcept.(D)TheCommitteeproposedthatAFSAbemadethekeystone
of
governmentCOMINTactivities,andthatthedirectorbeinvestedwithstrongerpowers.TheBrownellrecommendationsweredesignedtoleavemilitaryCOMINTagenciesinapositiontomeetmilitarysupportrequirements,butinconjunctionwith,notapartfrom,representatives
of
thecivilianintelligenceunits.
(V)
As
thenonmilitaryagencieswereaverse
to
continuedmilitarydomination
of
COMINT,astheysawit,theBrownellCommitteeprovidedforsubordination
to
thesecretary
of
defenseandfore-stalledanyinclinationtoplaceNSA,likeAFSA,undertheJCS.
(V)
Notsurprisingly,thethenAFSAdirector,GeneralRalphCanine,saidtheBrownellCommitteereportcontained"eminentlysoundconclusions."
(V)
AFSAwasredesignatedtheNationalSecurityAgency,withoutchangeinpersonnel,funds,orfacilities.Thedirector
of
theneworganization,however,wasgivensolidauthorityoverCOMINTresourcesintheDefenseDepartment.(D)WhentheJointChiefscreatedtheArmedForcesSecurityAgency,theyhadentrusted
to
itresponsibilityforproducingcryptographicequipmentandmaterial,andforcoordinatingtheR&D
of
COMSECequipmentintoone,nonduplicativeprogram.While

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