strategy. Soviet nuclear doctrine, expounded in a wide range of Russian defense literature, hasfive related elements:
Preemption (first strike).
Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and because the war may last for some time, even though the initial hours are decisive).
Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.
Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the U. S. under its concept of mutualdeterrence.Soviet Doctrine is both a continuation and an extension of the Soviet belief that all militaryforces -- nuclear and conventional -- serve a political purpose as guarantor of internal control andan instrument for territorial expansion. Thus, large military forces are accepted in the SovietUnion as a rational capital investment, regardless of their impact on social programs.Soviet writing on nuclear strategy has been largely ignored, or has been ridiculed in this country because if its jingoism and crudity, and the obscurity of Communist semantics. It is a strategy of "compellance," in contrast to the U. S. doctrine of deterrence.But "... the relationship of Soviet doctrine and Soviet deployments (is) sufficiently close tosuggest that ignoring or not taking seriously Soviet military doctrine may have very detrimentaleffects on U. S. security."Finally, "... as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the functionof war, mutual deterrence does not really exist. And unilateral deterrence is feasible only if weunderstand the Soviet war-winning strategy and make it impossible for them to succeed."
Article PreviewWhy the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight& Win a Nuclear War
IN A RECENT interview with the
, Paul Warnke, the newly appointed head of theArms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded as follows to the question of how the UnitedStates ought to react to indications that the Soviet leadership thinks it possible to fight and win anuclear war. “In my view,” he replied, “this kind of thinking is on a level of abstraction which isunrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in those terms, which would indulge what Iregard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate theminto the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win.”Even after allowance has been made for Mr. Warnke’s notoriously careless syntax, puzzlingquestions remain. On what grounds does he, a Washington lawyer, presume to “educate” theSoviet general staff composed of professional soldiers who thirty years ago defeated theWehrmacht-and, of all things, about the “real world of strategic nuclear weapons” of which they