Professional Documents
Culture Documents
September 2005
Current Legislation
In California, driving is a privilege, not a right. You must have a valid license to drive. A valid license is one that is not suspended, revoked, or expired, and it is issued to you by the California Department of Motor Vehicles. In 1994 the California legislature passed two bills allowing vehicle impoundment and forfeiture of vehicles operated by subjects driving while unlicensed or with suspended licenses. The rst bill, Senate Bill 1758 allowed peace ofcers to seize and impound for 30 days vehicles driven by a person whose license has been suspended or revoked or a person who has never been issued a license. Police can impound the vehicle whether the driver is the registered owner of the vehicle or not. Under the law, the impoundment of the vehicle is considered administrative in nature and does not require a judicial hearing. A subject who has his or her vehicle impounded is entitled to an administrative hearing, but the hearing ofcer can be anyone appointed by the impounding agency. This means that the agency can conduct the hearings with existing personnel and is not required to incur the expense of paying for either a court hearing or an independent hearing ofcer. The second law, Assembly Bill 3148, authorized the forfeiture of vehicles driven by certain repeat offenders. The law places a signicant burden on prosecutors, who must obtain court permission for the forfeiture and pay the cost of the hearing. Few police agencies and prosecutors ofces have attempted to implement forfeiture under this provision. Two years after Senate Bill 1758 became law, the California Department of Motor Vehicles commissioned a study on the effectiveness of the law as a deterrent to driving with a suspended license or without a license in California. The study found Studies show that rst-time offenders who had their vehicles impounded were 18 percent less likely to have that impounding additional convictions than those who received vehicles of citations but did not have their vehicles impounded. According to the study, repeat offenders who had their vehicles impounded were 22 percent less likely to have additional convictions than those who just received citations but did not have their vehicles impounded. The study also found that rst-time offenders were 25 percent less likely to be involved in a subsequent collision if their vehicles were impounded. Repeat offenders were 38 percent less likely to be involved in a subsequent collision if their vehicles were impounded.1
unlicensed drivers
38%
2
Law enforcement agencies have stated that these tools have helped decrease the number of unsafe drivers on public roads as well as reduce the number of hitand-run trafc collisions.
The differences between the impound and no-impound groups are even larger when the driving records of repeat offenders (i.e. unlicensed convictions) are examined. Repeat offenders whose vehicles are impounded have 34.2% fewer convictions, 22.3% fewer trafc convictions and 37.6% fewer crashes. These ndings provide strong support for impounding vehicles driven by suspended/ revoked and unlicensed drivers.3
There are a small number of drivers who appear immune to countermeasures that have proved effective for most highway users. These hard-core offenders continue to drive even after losing their license and are over represented in subsequent violations and crashes. It is estimated that as many as three-fourths of suspended and revoked (S/R) drivers continue to drive (van Oldenbeek and Coppin, 1965; Hagen et al., 1980; Ross and Gonzales, 1988; DeYoung, 1990). Even so, they are over represented in subsequent violations and crashes and, based on estimated exposure, are greatly over represented in fatal crashes (DeYoung et al., 1997). In California, based on an analysis of two-vehicle fatal crashes in which only one driver was judged to be at fault, compared with validly licensed drivers, S/R drivers were found to be over involved by a factor of 3.7:1.4 The California Legislature intended to provide safer roads for Californias motoring public by removing the vehicles driven by unlicensed, suspended, or revoked drivers for 30 days. A serious violation of the law calls for a serious response. The 30-day impound begins on the calendar day the car is towed and will be released at the conclusion of the 30th day after the individual obtains a release from the impounding agency.
Deadly Crashes
Drivers with invalid licenses were far more likely to have been driving drunk and to have had multiple suspensions or revocations in the three years before the crash, according to a study from the AAA Foundation for Trafc Safety. The study shows that one in ve fatal crashes involves a driver who is not properly licensed. Additionally, a report (Griffen and DelaZerda, 2000) analyzing 5 years of Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data found similar ndings. Drivers operating on invalid licenses or no license at all at the time of their fatal crashes are different from the rest of us, according to a study performed by Dr. Lindsay Grifn of the Texas Transportation Institute. Dr. Grifn examined ve years of fatal crash data, identifying each drivers license status. Drivers with invalid licenses were far more likely to have been driving drunk and to have had multiple suspensions or revocations in the three years before the crash.5
Unlicensed Drivers
In response to a high number of collisions, specically hit-and-run crashes involving unlicensed drivers, law enforcement has emphasized the importance of unlicensed driver enforcement to its ofcers. While some residents may not see the value in towing away an unlicensed drivers car, law enforcement ofcials look at it much differently. The truth is, an unlicensed driver is very often a dangerous driver. In a published article, Capt. Terry Holderness, of the Fontana Police Department, studied the correlation between unlicensed drivers and trafc collisions. His research determined that unlicensed drivers, or those with suspended licenses, are 66.4 times more likely to be involved in a hit-and-run collision.
66
to be involved in a
collision
hit-and-run
Conclusion
Vehicle impoundment is having a positive effect on trafc safety in California Reducing the number of crashes & removing unlicensed drivers from the street.
Vehicle impoundment works and makes our streets safer. In an August 2005 letter, California Highway Patrol Commissioner M.L. Brown stated, Those who choose to drive while unlicensed need a powerful deterrent to stop them from driving and continuously placing the public at risk. In supporting Vehicle Code 14502.6 which allows a police ofcer to impound a vehicle for 30 days when that vehicle is operated by a person who is unlicensed or whose drivers license is suspended or revoked. Commissioner Brown said, although such impoundment is inconvenient and expensive, it serves as a necessary deterrent for suspended an unlicensed drivers. However, when an impound has been determined to be unreasonable or unfair, current law provides for the early release of the vehicle.12 In 2001 Ofcer David Whitham of the Santa Barbara Sheriffs Department conducted a study that looked at the effects on offenders who lost their vehicles under the impoundment law versus the effect on drivers who did not experience vehicle impoundment for the entire state of California. The study found that drivers with no prior unlicensed, suspended or revoked convictions had 24.7 percent fewer subsequent convictions, 18.1 percent fewer subsequent trafc convictions, and 24.7 percent fewer subsequent crashes. For repeat offenders, impoundment had an even larger impact. They had 34.2 percent fewer subsequent unlicensed, suspended or revoked convictions, 22.3 percent fewer subsequent trafc convictions, and 37.6 percent fewer subsequent crashes. However, there was no evidence that simply threatening vehicle impoundment prevented U/S/R driving. Apparently drivers had to experience the impoundment for there to be an impact. Vehicle impoundment is having a positive effect on trafc safety in California, reducing the number of crashes and removing unlicensed drivers from the street. Removing access to the vehicle by impounding it is one way to limit driving during periods of suspension or revocation.
Bibliography
1 California Department of Motor Vehicles, Evaluation of the Specic Deterrent Effect of Vehicle Impoundment on Suspended, Revoked, and Unlicensed Drivers in California, RSS-97-171, by D. J. DeYoung (Sacramento, Calif.: 1997). 2
J Safety Res. 2004;35(3):287-95. PMID: 15288562 (National library for public medicine)
Volume 2: A Guide for Addressing Collisions Involving Unlicensed Drivers and Drivers with Suspended or Revoked Licenses Guidance for Implementation of the National Cooperative Highway Program
4 5
6 Beirness, Douglas, et al. The Impact of Administrative License Suspension and Vehicle Impoundment for DWI in Manitoba. In C. Mercier-Guyon (Ed.) Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Trafc Safety. Annecy, France: Centre dEtudes et de Recherches en Medecine du Trac, 1997: 919-925. 7 National Highway Trafc Safety Administration. Trafc Safety Facts: Laws: Vehicle and License Plate Sanctions. Washington, DC: National Department of Transportation, National Highway Trafc Safety Administration, May 2003.
Nichols, James, and H. Lawrence Ross. The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions in Dealing with Drinking Drivers. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 6(2) (1990)
8
Voas, Robert, A. Scott Tippetts, and Eileen Taylor. Temporary Vehicle Immobilization: Evaluation of a Program in Ohio
9
National Highway Trafc Safety Administration. Trafc Safety Facts: Repeat Intoxicated Driver Laws. Washington, DC: National Department of Transportation, National Highway Trafc Safety Administration, May 2003
10 11
Texas Transportation Institute, Safety and Structural Systems Division, Unlicensed to Kill, by L. I. Grifn and S. DeLaZarda (College Station, Texas: 2000).
Investigative report on vehicle impoundments in the City of Santa Barbara By Russell Trehnholme in conjunction with PUEBLOL FULL report available at: http://www.immigrationfacts.info/New_Impoundment_Report_082210.pdf Report on Impoundment of Vehicles Driven by Undocumented Immigrants in the City of Santa Barbara Summary by Russell Trenholme In the spring of 2009, the organization PUEBLO requested (under the California Public Records Act) documents relating to vehicle impoundments by the Santa Barbara Police Department. The documents reveal that during 2007, 2008, and the first seven and one half months of 2009 the department issued 2,911 citations to drivers for driving unlicensed (CVC Section 12500). (This total does not include a much smaller number of citations for driving with a revoked or suspended licenseCVC 14601.) In fact, the number of citations for driving unlicensed exceeds all other traffic citations combined. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these unlicensed drivers are undocumented immigrants who have been ineligible for California drivers licenses since 1994. In almost every cases, when a driver receives a 12500 citation, the vehicle is impounded for a mandatory 30 days. To recover the vehicle, the owner must pay close to $2,000 in fees and impoundment charges. Understandably, vehicle impoundments are a majority source of distress in the Latino community and one of the principal sources of distrust of the SBPD. The data turned over to PUEBLO include hundreds of pages of reports compiled on checkpoints, Saturation Patrols, and Directed Patrols. These cover over 15,000 vehicle stops in which drivers licenses were checked. However, 75% of the 12500 citations are not covered by documents turned over to PUEBLO. The department claims to keep no data on these citations except the citations themselves, and they hold these to be confidential. The full report was written by Russell Trenholme with cooperation and input from PUEBLO staff and board members. The checkpoint and patrol report sheets were analyzed statistically using eight spreadsheets that tabulate all report data. Here are a few of the highlights of the report: 1. Over 12,000 checkpoint stops provide a good basis for estimating the percentage of unlicensed drivers on the road at night: 1.3% (The percentage of 14601 revoked/suspended drivers was 0.4%) 2. 2. The 1.3% figure is, if anything, high because recently received checkpoint report documents showing checkpoint locations reveal that multiple checkpoints were scheduled in Latino neighborhoods producing not a single DUI arrest but many impoundments (the most productive checkpoint locations in terms of DUI arrests were utilized only once each, involving less than 3% of the total checkpoint stops). 3. The police department and the City Attorney state that only lawful reason for a vehicle stop by a patrol is probable cause of an offense. If the patrol stops were all lawful, then a high rate of 12500 stops on patrol should be reflected in a high rate of observable moving
and equipment violations by 12500 unlicensed drivers. But the evidence is strongly against the assumption that all stops were lawful. 4. Saturation Patrols cited unlicensed drivers at a rate of 5.6%, over four times higher than found at checkpoints. However, over half the Saturation Patrols, with 332 stops, did not encounter a single unlicensed driver but gave out 58 citations for moving or equipment violations (at 17% of stops). The remaining patrols had just a few more stops (370) but had 42 12500 impounds and only 10% of the stops were cited for moving or equipment violations. This contrast does not support the view that the high 12500 stop rate occurred because the unlicensed drivers were committing over four times as many moving and equipment infractions as the average driver. 5. Directed Patrols cited unlicensed drivers at a rate 10 times the rate found at checkpoints, 18.6%. There were 539 impounds for unlicensed driver (12500) offenses. Once again, the modal number of 12500 stops was zero; 22 patrols with 277 stops did not encounter a single unlicensed driver. However, there were another 22 patrols with 184 stops that found unlicensed drivers on half or more of their stops. These very high 12500% patrols had a lower rate of moving and equipment citations than patrols which did not encounter a single unlicensed driver. This again undermines any claim that the poor driving habits of the unlicensed drivers resulted in the high 12500 stop rates. 6. Four Directed Patrol officers had 12500 stop rates of 33%, 34%, 37%, and 48%. These officers had a lower rate of moving and equipment citations than the four officers with the lowest 12500 stop rates. These officers were sent out on Directed Patrol far more often than the officers with the lowest 12500 stop rate. 7. The ratio between unlicensed and suspended/revoked drivers at checkpoint stops was about 3:1. On Directed Patrols the rate increased to 7:1 even though DMV statistics reveal that suspended/revoked drivers are terrible drivers, much worse than unlicensed drivers. This suggests that some officers are targeting unlicensed drivers, perhaps by using the fact that unlicensed immigrant drivers generally drive older, low value vehicles which are otherwise rarely encountered in Santa Barbara. 8. Statistical analysis shows that the distribution curves of 12500 rates per stop are not the normal, bell-shaped curves, that would result if uniform stop procedures were being followed (regardless of whether the procedures only allow lawful stops or not). Instead, the curves are asymmetric, skewed right by a few high 12500% officers. The 12500 stop rates obtained by the high 12500% officers are statistically impossible if uniform stop procedures were in place (even if the true mean value of 12500 was the 18.6% found on Directed Patrols). 9. There is a financial inducement for Directed Patrol officers to impound vehicles since their overtime pay comes from Administrative Fees collected as part of the impoundment process. 10. The reporting process is seriously flawed, reflecting many of the problems criticized by the State Attorney General in his investigative report on the Maywood Police Department. The full report contains suggestions for improved reporting. All of these matters are discussed at length in the report. Other conclusions are: 1. The department misinterprets the laws authorizing impounds of cars driven by unlicensed drivers. There are two such laws, and each has important exceptions to impound or early
vehicle recovery. These exceptions are ignored by the SBPD which, under its mandatory tow policy, impounds almost all cars whose drivers are cited for 12500, unjustly ignoring the important exceptions. 2. The mandatory tow policy conflicts with the opinion of the State Legislative Counsel who states that impounds that ignore the community caretaking doctrine (removing road hazards) are not lawful, regardless of the wording of the state statute. The State Attorney General concurs with this. 3. One of the most important conclusions, based on a detailed analysis of studies published by the DMV and others, is that there is no evidence that undocumented immigrant drivers are dangerous. There is good evidence that revoked/suspended drivers are dangerous, and that unlicensed drivers who are not undocumented immigrants are dangerous drivers (evidenced by studies of unlicensed drivers prior to 1994, when undocumented immigrants were eligible for drivers licenses). Copies of the full report, with supporting spreadsheets, are available by emailing rtrenholme@gmail.com
http://californiawatch.org/public-safety/car-seizures-dui-checkpoints-prove-profitable-cities-raise-legal-questions http://www.insidebayarea.com/my-town/ci_16587514
The San Joses policy change still under legal review will incorporate parts of all the above changes, said Sgt. Ronnie Lopez, a police spokesman. Unlicensed motorists cited for non-hazardous violations would have a chance to find a legal driver to remove their car. Or, if worst comes to worst and its obstructing a roadway or for some reason we have to tow it, wed like to tow it without having the 30-day impound, Lopez said. The police department is motivated in large part by the logistical challenges impounds present. As the San Jose Mercury News reports:3 Police statistics show that about 80 cars a week are towed from unlicensed drivers and held for the mandated month long impound, often ending up abandoned for good. (San Jose Acting Police Chief Chris) Moore said the policy was taking up a lot of officer time up to an hour a tow and not slowing the flow of unlicensed people behind the wheel. Many buy cheap cars, according to police, and when they lose them to the impound, they buy another. This is by no means a change that allows people to drive without a valid license. That is still illegal, Moore added. But the intent of the tow policy was to remove those drivers from the road, and the problem is that it's not doing that. Until two years ago, officers potentially faced legal liability if they did not impound an unlicensed drivers car. In 2004, a California Highway Patrol officer arrested Scott St. Pierre for driving under the influence and for driving with a suspended license, court records show.4 The CHP had St. Pierres car stored, not impounded. Just hours after being released from jail, St. Pierre was again driving his car and caused a fatal accident that killed another motorist, Jerry Walker. Walkers family sued the highway patrol, arguing the agency failed to follow state law and impound the car for 30 days. In 2008, a state appellate court ruled that CHP officers had discretion on whether to seize cars in those situations.
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Unlicensed to Kill Prepared by: Lindsay I. Griffin, III Sandra DeLaZerda Safety and Structural Systems Division Texas Transportation Institute The Texas A&M University System College Station, Texas Prepared for AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety 1440 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 201 Washington, D.C. 20005 202/638-5944 www.aaafts.org June 2000 Full Report Available at: http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/unlicensed2kill.pdf Abstract Five years of fatal traffic crash data (FARS 1993-1997) were analyzed to learn more about the license status of drivers involved in fatal crashes. This data set included 278,078 drivers who were involved in 183,749 fatal crashes. Of particular interest were drivers in three aberrant categories: (1) drivers with an invalid license (i.e., a suspended, revoked, expired, or canceled/ denied license)20,596 (7.4%); (2) drivers with no known license 10,228 (3.7%); and (3) drivers of unknown license status7,632 (2.7%) It was found that 20 percent of all fatal crashesone fatal crash in five involves at least one improperly licensed driver as defined above. Further analyses sought to show the involvement of these aberrant drivers in fatal crashes as a function of several variables: age, sex, vehicle type, previous DWIs, previous suspensions and revocations, and so forth. A brief review of the literature considered three vehicle sanctions or modifications that have been developed to reduce unlawful driving: vehicle impoundment, electronic driver licenses, and ignition interlocks.
Unlicensed to Kill: The Sequel Prepared by Robert A. Scopatz Clayton E. Hatch Barbara Hilger DeLucia Kelley A. Tays Data Nexus, Inc. Prepared for AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety 1440 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 201 Washington, DC 20005 Tel: 202 -638-5944 Fax: 202-638-5943 www.aaafoundation.org January, 2003 Full Report Available at: http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/unlicensedtokill2.pdf Executive Summary In 2000, the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety published the report Unlicensed to Kill, which was based on a study that examined the license status of drivers involved in fatal crashes during the period 1993-97. The results showed that 20% of all fatal crashes in the United States involved at least one driver who did not have a valid license at the time of the crash. This report gives the results of a new study of state practices regarding drivers involved in fatal crashes that also has updated and extended the findings of the original Unlicensed to Kill report. The new studys reanalysis of the data in the first report (using data on fatal crashes from 1993 to 1999) confirmed its results: Approximately 20% of fatal crashes involve at least one driver who did not have a valid license at the time of the crash. These data also show a wide variation across states in the proportion of drivers involved in fatal crashes who lacked a valid licensefrom a low of 6.1% in Maine to a high of 23.1% in New Mexico. Furthermore, trend analyses show that the proportion of drivers involved in fatal crashes who lack a valid license showed small but steady declines during the 7-year study period. The proportion of suspended drivers (those whose licenses were suspended at the time of the crash) involved in fatal crashes increased slightly, from 4.5% in 1993 to 5% in 1999. But the proportion of drivers who were unlicensed; whose licenses had been revoked, expired, or canceled; or who had an unknown license status all declined by a small amount during the 7 years. The Issues The original Unlicensed to Kill report raised serious issues about states ability to control the unlicensed driving situation. First, to find out if unlicensed drivers are overrepresented in the fatal crash statistics, it would be good to have a reliable estimate of the population of drivers who are unlicensed or driving under an invalid license. Second, to help states better understand and
address the problem of drivers who operate a motor vehicle without a valid license, it is important to explain the reasons why states differ so much in their overall experience on this issue, and why they differ in particular types of license status violations among drivers involved in fatal crashes. The questions to be answered include: Why are some states proportion of drivers involved in fatal crashes who have an aberrant license status so much lower than the national average? Why do even states with very good records appear to have problems with particular classes of license violations? For offenders driving under the influence of alcohol, how do the states laws affect a motorists willingness to drive without a valid license? What effect is there, if any, of recent laws suspending the licenses of people who fail to pay child support or commit other offenses not related to driving? How do state procedures for notification of changes in license status affect the way courts and drivers behave? How do the enforcement of penalties for serious traffic violations and the prosecution of repeat offenders affect the states proportion of drivers without a valid license? Are there other factors to consider, such as residency or citizenship status and insurance costs? This report seeks to answer each of these questions by presenting the results of research in the context of the available literature, data, and expertise of practitioners at the state and national levels. Chapter 1 introduces the issues and reviews the literature. Chapter 2 presents the methods followed in conducting the research. Chapter 3 presents information on the laws, driver-control practices, and procedures of six states that seek to reduce a persons ability to drive without a valid license. Chapter 4 presents recommendations gleaned from successful state practices that could be emulated by other states and promoted by AAA clubs. To introduce the research problem, chapter 1 defines terms, reviews the literature, highlights findings of various researchers, and explains limitations on data and methods. For instance, by setting the involvement rate of validly licensed drivers as the norm, one group of researchers calculated that drivers whose license has been suspended or revoked are 3.7 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash than are validly licensed drivers and that unlicensed drivers are 4.9 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash. Their methodology has limitations, however, most notably the need to establish the identity of the driver at fault in a fatal crash. Another problem is that it is hard to arrive at reliable findings for unlicensed drivers simply because so little is known about them. Another aspect of the problem examined is the paradox of reinstatement: Drivers who have lost their license and have not had it reinstated may behave in a safer fashion than those who have had it reinstated or those who are granted a hardship license. Still another aspect is the evidence that suspensions and other sanctions can help bring drivers back into compliance. For instance, researchers found that Florida drivers who were convicted of operating their vehicles while under the influence of alcohol and fail to resolve their behavioral issues before license reinstatement had 75% higher violation rates and 97% higher crash rates than drivers who were reinstated after resolving their behavioral issues.
Overall, studies thus far of drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked or who are unlicensed have been linked to recidivism of drivers suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol. More recent work has begun to look more closely at drivers who were suspended for other reasons, but data on these drivers are lacking. It is clear that well-crafted, aggressively enforced laws can have an effect on the behavior of drivers suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol. It also seems probable that suspension of driving privileges is generally interpreted (by the drivers) to mean something short of a total ban. The majority of them still drive at least some of the time. It is important to note that there are sizable gaps in the data available on drivers behavior in general and that these gaps cause a corresponding lack of completeness in the literature on traffic safety. Moreover, though it makes good logical sense that license sanctions do work, the lack of complete data makes it impossible to be certain just how much of a deterrent is possible with license sanctioning programs. Because people continue to drive while their license is suspended or revoked (and while they are completely unlicensed), the general deterrent effect of license sanctions is not as strong as it could be. This report therefore seeks to answer the question of how best to develop programs to keep these drivers from behind the wheelbecause if they do not drive, they do not contribute to traffic safety problems. Research Methods In developing a list of sample states for the research, an attempt was made to identify states that have enacted and studied the effects of laws such as administrative license suspension and vehicle actions such as impoundment. In particular, those states that were lower than the national average in the proportion of crashes involving drivers with any type of aberrant license status were considered candidates. The selection process was biased toward states with a large population so that any changes in the measures reported in the earlier Unlicensed to Kill report and updated in this report could be viewed as real and not as an artifact of relatively small shifts in the population. There was no attempt to select states perceived as representative. Instead, a deliberate decision was made to focus on the states that appeared to have had some success at reducing the fatal crash involvement of drivers with an aberrant license status. Once candidate states were identified, officials of each state were informed of the level of effort required to participate and were asked to provide written documentation of their problem of drivers operating vehicles with suspended or revoked licenses or while unlicensed and of their laws and procedures for dealing with problem drivers. Each state also identified key personnel that could be interviewed as the project progressed. Six states ultimately agreed to participate: California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon. The laws of the six participating states were thoroughly reviewed. Then members of the project research team visited the states to gain a thorough understanding of the states laws and practices regarding licensure, loss of license, reinstatement, and penalties for violating the licensure provisions of the law. Standard practices in the enforcement and adjudication arenas were also explored through interviews with key personnel in each states driver-control and -licensing branch of the department of motor vehicles.