The Effects of Stakes and Threat on Foreign Policy Decision-Making Author(s): Allison Astorino-Courtois Source: Political Psychology, Vol.

21, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 489-510 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791847 . Accessed: 24/08/2011 06:26
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Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2000

The Effects of Stakesand Threaton ForeignPolicy Decision-Making

Allison Astorino-Courtois
Department of Political Science Texas A&M University

Decision research demonstrates that individuals adapt decision processing strategies according to the characteristics of the decision task. Unfortunately,the literature has neglected taskfactors specific toforeign policy decisions. Thispaperpresents experimental analyses of the effectsof the decisional stakes(i.e., salience of the values at issue) and threat (risk of loss on those issues) on decision-makers' informationacquisition patterns and choice rules with respect to one offour hypotheticalforeignpolicy scenarios. Contraryto is the notion thatnormative(rational)decision-making more likelyin less dramaticsettings, the results indicate that elevated threat encourages rational decision processing, whereas heuristicprocessing was more prevalent in less threateningsituations. Interestingly,the added presence of high stakes magnified both threat effects. These results, although preliminary, suggest that stakes-threateffects are not direct reflections of stress and/or in complexityeffects, but should be consideredindependently foreign policy analyses.
KEY WORDS: foreign policy decision-making,process tracing,choice rule

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy decision-makershave grappled with an expanded arrayof decision problems. This has been the case especially in the areasof securitypolicy and the use of U.S. militaryforce abroad. Whereasin the past most decisions were associatedwith significantthreatsto key nationalsecurityconcerns, revision of the bipolarsecuritycalculus has increased the rangeof decision problemsto includea greaternumberof issues of lower stakes and lesser threats.For example,policymakersin the Bush administration, withina shortperiod, grappledwith decision events thatrepresented-and were perceived to represent-four distinct stakes-threat classifications.The initial interventionin Somalia in the final days of the Bush administration seen as a low stakes-low was threatdecision whereintervention considered"relatively'cheapandeasy' and was
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worthit."1By contrast,sendingU.S. groundforces into Bosnia for manyqualified as a low stakes-high threat decision task. Richard Haass (1994; see also Paof payoanou, 1997) reportedthat the "importance U.S. interests"in Bosnia was and while the natureof the fighting and logistical difficulty of a military unclear, operationin Bosnia suggestedthatU.S. casualtieswould be high in the event of an decision to send U.S. forces to the desert intervention. Finally,the administration's of Saudi Arabia under the bannerof OperationDesert Shield was considered a relatively high stakes-low threat intervention,whereasthe transferof that operation to the war fighting of Desert Storm clearly involved higher risk and thus representeda high stakes-high threatdecision (Haass, 1994; Powell, 1995). research demonstrates decision-makers a rangeof decision that use Experimental on of strategies contingent the characteristics the decisiontask(Hansen& Helgeson, & 1996;Payne,Bettman,& Johnson,1988,1993; Payne,Johnson, Bettman, Coupey, of 1990). Although these studies have enhancedour understanding the impactof environmental factors on decision processing, with a few exceptions they have generallyfailed to explorethe processingeffects of foreignpolicy-specific factors.2 Within the foreign policy analysis subfield, a substantialliterature has explored in but (i.e., crisis)situations has decision-making thecontextof highstakes-highthreat theseto othertypesof decisionsettings. stoppedshortof comparing Methodologically, manyof thesestudies(e.g., Allison, 1971;Brecher,1980;Haney,1994;Holsti,North, & Brody, 1968; Maoz, 1981; Smith, 1984) have tendedto focus on the outputof a decisionprocess,rather thantheprocessingstrategies usedin makingthe choice.This hasproduced considerable a bodyof workon the impactof variousdecisionfactorsin the evolutionof interational crises (e.g., the involvementof leaders'perceptions of threat,etc., in creatingthe international outcome), but the task factors that affect remainlargelyunexplored. pre-choicebehaviors As noted, two task factors that are of growing importancein post-Cold War decision-makingare the stakes (i.e., salience of the values at issue) and the threat to critical assets and personnel that a decision problem represents.The central questionguidingthepresentresearchis whether,andhow, makersof foreignpolicy characteristics a decision task. of adapttheirdecision strategiesto the stakes-threat The degree to which two key decision processes-information processing and choice strategy-are associatedwith differentdecision environmentsis examined. Specifically: 1. Do foreign policy decision-makersuse differentdecision strategiesaccordto the stakes-threat characteristicof the decision task? If so, which types of ing
I As reportedby Richard Haass (1994, pp. 69-70), a key member of the NSC staff at the time. AmbassadorRobert Oakley, in an April 1995 discussion group at Texas A&M University, has concurred. 2 Exceptions include Mintz et al. (1997) and the work of Tetlock, Suedfeld, and colleagues (e.g., Suedfeld& Tetlock, 1977,1992; Suedfeld,Tetlock,& Ramirez,1977;Suedfeld,Wallace,& Thachuk, Related studiesby Hybel (1993) and Khong (1992) providecase analyses of "analogizing" as 1993). a type of processingheuristicused by foreign policy decision-makers.

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tasks are associated with the more cognitively taxing information processing strategies? 2. Is there an association between the stakes-threatpropertyof a decision problemand the type of choice rule used? Stakes and Threat as Decision Task Factors PresidentGeorgeBush outlinedthe Duringthe last days of his administration, crisis: principlesinvolved in a decision to intervenemilitarilyin any international where and "Usingmilitaryforce makes sense as a policy where the stakeswarrant, when force can be effective,. .. where its applicationcan be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice."3 More formally,Bush was describingan evaluative guide includingassessmentof the perceived salience of the issues involved and the nation's ability to address them. In addition,he said, policymakersshould anticipatea gain (or savings) in termsof criticalassets associatedwith takingany action. In foreign policy decision-making, the salience of and threat to national interestsare criticallyimportant interrelated characteristics. and task They are also distinct.Holstiet al. (1968) identifiedthe salienceof a particular issue substantively to a decision-maker-the individual's degree of "involvement"in a decision situation-as a crucial variable in explaining his or her decisions. However, because these authors(like many others)limited theirstudyto international crises, it is unclearto what degree the notion of decisional involvementis relevantin less critical settings. Indeed, as a result of the focus on crisis decision-makingand the need to distinguish these settings from others, foreign policy decision analyses typicallymergedecision stakesandthreatfactors(see, e.g., Brecher& Wilkenfeld, 1982; Hermann,1961). Following the conceptuallead of Holsti et al., isolatingthe stakesfrom the threatlevels thatcharacterize particular a decision event leaves the stakes associated with that event as a function of the salience of the interests, principles,or values at issue.4The threatis then defined in termsof the anticipated loss of assets (e.g., humanand materialcosts) associatedwith action or inactionin that instance.Thus, a high-threat decision problemmight involve projectionsof a numberof casualtiesor a large monetaryexpense, regardlessof the natureof large the issues at stake. As for example the Bush administration's decisions to invade the stakes were perceived to be critical)or whetherto send troops to Iraq(where Bosnia (where the stakes were generallyperceived to be low).

3 Addressto the U.S. MilitaryAcademy,West Point,New York,5 January1993, as excerptedin Haass (1994, p. 203). 4 The salienceof an international event is not the sameas the salienceof information aboutit. The former is takenhereto referto the presenceof criticalnationalconcerns,whereasthe latteris typicallydefined in terms of "memorableness," the accessibility and ease of recall from memoryof certainbits of or information(Posavacet al., 1997; Stasser, 1992).

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Are foreign policy decision-makersany more diligent in evaluating high stakes-high threatdecision problems than they are in situationsinvolving less importantissues or lesser potential losses? Two difficulties arise for analysts interested in the task factors that affect foreign policy decision-making under variousconditions.First,especially as comparedto most foreign policy problems, decision tasks typically tested in experimentalanalyses involve relatively simple choices between equally simple or straightforward alternatives.5Second, and relatedly, because the balance of this work has been conducted by analysts of humaninformation processing,consumerchoice, andpsychology, the effect of the stakes-threat characteristicof a decision event-two of the most prevalenttaskrelated considerations in the foreign policy setting-remain untested. Nevertheless, the researchon stress,complexity,andmotivationeffects on foreignpolicy decision-makingcan provide some direction. The wide literature decisional stresseffects has shown thatelevated stress on levels can work to diminish decision performance (Maoz, 1990) by limiting informationsearch(Brecher,1980; Holsti, 1976, 1979), acceleratingnoncompensatory processing (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981), and reducing decision accuracy (Mandler, 1982). The stress associated with restricted time for a decision, in particular,has been found to evoke the use of simplifying and cognitively less demandingdecision strategies (e.g., lexicographic decision-making,elimination by aspects), presumablybecause decision-makersare forced to evaluate only the most criticaldecision information(Lebow, 1985; Maoz, 1997; Payneet al., 1988). Similarly,analysesof the effects of the complexityof a decision taskgenerally indicatethat more "difficult"decision problemsencouragethe use of simplifying decision heuristics.Studiesas substantivelydiverseas those by Olshavsky(1979), Ostrom and Job (1986), Paquetteand Kida (1988), Payne et al. (1990), Payne, Bettman,andLuce (1996), and PelhamandNeter (1995) have foundthatas choice problems become more complex, individualstend to shift to effort-saving,nondecision strategies.6 compensatory,and dimension-based Jacoby(1975) and Stone andKadous(1997) showed thatdecision accuracyis lost as well. On the otherhand, research has also associated increased motivation with indicatorsof normative decision-making,including expanded informationsearch and considerationof a greaternumberof decision alternatives(Posavac et al., 1997; Webster, 1993).
5 Keren(1996) commentedon the bias associatedwith the (easier to where study)gamblingparadigm, decision tasksarerepresented "well-structured as tasks,like choosingbetweengambles" unambiguous that fail to capturethe complexity of real decision-making. 6 These studies measurethe complexity of the decision task (i.e., its structural complexity) ratherthan the cognitivecomplexitywith which a decision-maker that approaches problem.Cognitivecomplexity reflects the degree to which a decision-maker differentiatesand integratesdiversebits of information in makinga choice (Astorino-Courtois, & 1995;Barner-Berry Rosenwein, 1985; Suedfeld& Tetlock, of 1977), whereas task complexity (Payne, 1976) refers to the characteristics the decision problem itself (e.g., the numberof dimensions and alternativescontainedin the decision matrix,the severity of the value trade-offs,etc.).

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is it (and Althoughthe existingliterature clearlyinstructive, yields only restricted aboutthe likely effects of stress,complexity,and seeminglyconflicting)suggestions on contexts.Specifically, motivation decisionprocessingin the variousstakes-threat stressandcomplexityresearch be usedto anticipate can stakes-threat effectsif we are to accept two assumptions: decision-makers consistentlycognitive that are willing morequestionably) perceivedtaskcomplexityand/ordecithat misers,and (perhaps If sion stressrise in parallelwith stakesandthreat. these conditionsobtain,we could then expect higher stakes and higherthreatdecision problemsto elicit simplified, and Motivation effectsresearch dimension-based, noncompensatory decision-making. if seems to support oppositeproposition we believe thatmakersof national the policy aregenerallyhighlymotivated at decision-makers, leastin the politicalarena.Thatis, as decisionstakesandthreat woulduse less simplistic rise,decision-makers (i.e., more decisionstrategies. cognitivelydemanding) Research Design and Methods Withoutthe benefit of invasive researchtechniques,thereis currentlyno way to gauge with precision which decision strategyor strategieshave been used in a given circumstance. It is possible, however, to identify a number of decision processes associated with normative and heuristic decision-making (Ursic & Helgeson, 1990). This paper reportsthe results of a test of stakes-threateffects on two importantdecision processes: the individual's information processing pattern and the choice rule used. For the sake of clarity,the test hypotheseshave been phrasedas suggested by the stress/complexityeffects literature. That is, that decision strategies will most clearly represent cognitively taxing, normative (rational) theories of choice under low stakes-low threat conditions, whereas simplifying decision strategieswill appearwhen stakes and threatare high. The hypothesesto be tested are: tend towarddimensionalinformation Hypothesis1. Decision-makers processunderhigh stakes-highthreat and conditions, towardalternative-based ing processing as stakes-threat diminish. choice strategiesin high Hypothesis2. Decision-makersuse noncompensatory threat situations, and do more compensatoryprocessing as stakesstakes-high threatdecline. Experiment Design, Sample,and Instruments Decision process data were collected accordingto a between-groupsfactorial were randomly design in which 140 Texas A&M University undergraduates assigned to receive one of the four hypotheticalforeign policy decision problems outlined below. Although university undergraduatesare not generally known to be decision-making experts, research has shown that they can provide reliable empirical estimates of the variance between experimental groups (e.g.,

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Hansen & Helgeson, 1996; Payne et al., 1990, 1993; Stone & Kadous, 1997; van Schie & van der Pligt, 1995). In addition, neither domain experience nor expertise appear to affect processing patterns in unstructured decision tasks such as those studied here (Devine & Kozlowski, 1995). There is also no evidence that experimental subjects adapt choice strategies according to whether the consequences are known to be real or hypothetical (Wiseman & Levin, 1996). The experimental manipulation (independent factor) in this study was the foreign policy decision setting as distinguished by stakes and threat levels. Participants received decision scenarios representing one of the four experimental treatments: low stakes-low threat, low stakes-high threat, high stakes-low threat, or high stakes-high threat choice problems. Each scenario described hypothetical international situations to which the United States was considering a response.7 These are summarized below.8 (The full text of the first scenario, together with the text of the corresponding decision matrix, appears in the Appendix.) Low stakes-low threat (monsoon in Rongkur): A monsoon has caused deadly flooding in the impoverished nation of Rongkur. Wealthy land-owners there are taking advantage of the devastation to mount a violent campaign to oust Rongkur's socialist government. The fighting and flood damage have now halted critical relief efforts by internationalaid agencies. Unless these are restartedimmediately, 1.5 million flood victims will die of starvation and water-borne disease. Low stakes-high threat (warfare in Teursho): Intense fighting continues between Teurshonis and Elodowis on the island nation of Teursho. Nearby Elodoteur has supplied heavy weapons to Elodowi fighters, who have dominated the bitter interethnic fighting. If the previously brokered U.N. cease fire is not enforced, more than one-quarter of Teursho's civilian population will die from injury, starvation, and disease. High stakes-low threat (Zubani-Kabyli conflict): The oil-rich nation of Zubani, a former province of Kabylia, recently won its independence after years of bloody civil war. Zubani is now threatened by a Kabyli attack apparently intended to re-annex its "lost province." Kabyli troops are believed capable of overrunning Zubani in as few as 5 days, but would not engage a defensive force they could not defeat.
accuratelyassessedthe intendedstakes(83%)andthreat (89%) for each setting manipulation. Experimentparticipants' posttest stakes and threatratings(1 = lowest to 10 = highest, for both) also served as a reliabilitycheck on the manipulation. Mean scores by treatment groupare as follows: Treatmentgroup Self-reportedstakes Self-reportedthreat Low stakes-low threat 4.2 3.8 6.2 4.5 High stakes-low threat Low stakes-high threat 5.1 5.1 7.2 6.4 High stakes-high threat 8 For the sake of congruitywith analyses of decision-makingin the actual cases, the scenarios were based on the criticalelementsof the Bush administration's Somalia,DesertShield, Bosnia, andDesert Stormdecisions.
7 In an independent samplepretest,respondents

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High stakes-high threat (Assiami invasion of Pathan): Assiam, a nation has listed by the StateDepartment a sponsorof international as terrorism, occupied the mountainregion of neighboringPathan.This is clearly an effort to exploit takenfromPathanwould likely be used Pathan'srich uraniumfields. Any uranium to expandAssiam's small arsenalof nuclearbombs,andas a sourceof income from black market. the sale of uraniumon the international Procedureand DependentMeasures Experimental Process tracing is a research technique that allows observation of various indicatorsof an individual'schoice strategy.Most studiesof information processing use some form of informationdisplay board(IDB) in an experimentaldesign (Nakajima& Hotta, 1989). IDBs present subjects with an alternative(rows) by dimension (columns) matrixof decision informationand "trace"subjects' moves through the decision set. In experiments where computerized IDBs are used, collection of the decision process data is invisible to the subject. The Decision Board, a Macintosh-basedIDB platform,was used in the present study to trace subjects' informationprocessingpatternsand final choice.9 Participantsbegan the experiment with a practice exercise to familiarize themselves with the Decision Board.After readingthe assigned decision scenario (i.e., treatments1 to 4), they returnedto the Decision Board to view information regardingthe consequencesof four choice alternatives(specific to each scenario) on four value dimensions:the economy, foreign relations,nationalsecurity, and domestic opinion. Information displayedin the 4 x 4 matrixwas hiddenfrom view moved to "open"the cell by clicking it with the computermouse. untila participant consisted of a short As in Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes(1997), cell information assessment of the impact of an alternativeon a given dimension, as well as a numeric evaluation.For example, an informationcell from the high stakes-high threat scenario at the "U.S. air strikes"choice alternativeon the "international affairs"dimensioncontainedthis text:"Somenationswill criticizeunilateral action as reflectingU.S. disregardfor the views of the restof the world.Also, a successful strike could cause 25,000 Assiami casualties-a figure certain to incite international condemnationand limit our ability to influence reactions to future world crises. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 4." Informationcells could be accessed only once, and only one cell could be were instructed access only as muchinformation to opened at a time.1 Participants as neededto maketheirfinalchoice, whichthey indicatedby clickingon the desired
9The Decision Boardplatformwas developed by Mintz and Geva (1997) and applied in Mintz et al. (1997) and Mintz (1999). 10 This constraint a resultof the problemsof interpreting is searchdatacollected in a multi-accesssetting. To limit the possible effect of this constraint the decision strategyused, we allowedthe participants on to take brief notes if desired.

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alternative.At the end, each participant completed a brief posttest questionnaire. An experimentsession lasted about30 to 35 minutes. The two dependent measures are indicators of importantdecision operations: informationprocessing patternand choice rule. As shown in Table I, the values of each factor fall along a continuum from the expectations of cognitively demanding, normative decision models at one end, to use of simplifying strategies at the other. Processing pattern. Participants'information processing strategies were evaluated according to their pre-choice moves through the decision matrix as recordedby the Decision Boardprocess-tracer. Alternative-based decision-making that an individual considers all (dimensional) informationon a given implies alternative beforereviewinginformation the next alternative on (Mintzet al., 1997; 1976). Dimension-basedprocessing, on the other hand, is indicated by Payne, nonsequentialcomparison of alternativeson a single dimension at a time. The cognitive processing demands of the former are greater than those requiredto comparealternativesalong a single dimension.1 A processing strategy (PS) index was developed to measure the degree to which participants'acquisition of decision informationfollowed a primarilydimensionalor an alternative-based The processingpattern. index is a revisedversion of one proposed by Billings and Scherer (1988) that measures an individual's information the processingby subtracting numberof alternative-based (i.e., dimenmoves throughthe decision matrixfromthe numberof dimension-to-dimension) sion-based moves, and dividing by the total numberof these moves.12Because dimension-to-alternative alternative-to-dimension and moves are not figured into the Billings-Scherermeasure,it can fail to distinguishbetween genuine alternative-based processing and a patternof indiscriminatemoves throughthe matrix with, for example, only a single alternative-to-alternative comparison. The PS index was amendedto accountfor the full pathof a decision-maker's informationacquisition (i.e., it includes non-dimensionaland non-alternativebased shifts) so as to minimize the indeterminacy the originalmeasure.The PS in measureis a conceptuallysimilarbutmoresensitiveindicator the cognitiveeffort of a decision-makerhas expendedin gainingdecision information. The PS index was calculatedas PS = (a - d)(a + d + s) (1)

where a is the numberof consecutive moves within the same decision dimension, d is the numberof consecutive moves on the same decision alternative, s is the and numberof dimension-to-alternative alternative-to-dimension or shifts. Values of
1See Payneet al. (1988, 1993) for morecompletediscussionsof the cognitivedemandsassociatedwith variousdecision strategies. 12TheBillings-Schererindex = (a - d)l(a + d), where a = total alternative-to-alternative moves and d = total dimension-to-dimension moves.

Stakes and Threat in Foreign Policy Decision-Making Table I. Summaryof ProcessingCharacteristics Decision Strategies by Cognitively demanding (normative)strategies Pattern Rule Effort-saving(heuristic) strategies

497

Alternative-based < < < < > > > > Dimension-based Compensatory < < < < > > > > Noncompensatory

Pattern Rule

this index range from -1 (completely dimension-basedprocessing) to 1 (completely alternative-based processing).The following illustrateshow the PS scores were calculated.
Alternative1 Alternative2 Alternative3 Alternative4 Dimension A Dimension B Dimension C Dimension D 8 9 1 7 5 4 2 3 6

In this example, the decision-maker began his search of the 4 x 4 decision matrix by accessing information on the implications of Alternative 2 for Dimension A (labeled "1" for the first information cell accessed). He next took two dimension-based moves (i.e., examined the impact of Alternatives 2 and 3 on that Dimension), then shifted five times and ended with one alternativebased comparison (between Dimensions C and D on Alternative 1). Following Equation 1, then, PS = (2 - 1)/(2 + 1 + 5) = .125, indicating only a slight amount of alternative-basedprocessing. Choice rule. The second dependentmeasure taps the compensatoryversus natureof the decision rule an individualhas used in makinghis noncompensatory or her final choice. A choice process is noncompensatory in a multidimensional if, problem,a low score on one decision dimension(e.g., nationalsecurity)cannotbe offset by a high score on anotherdimension (e.g., economic stability).Decision alternatives associatedwith the low value areeliminatedfromfurther consideration despite theiradditivevalue (i.e., value across all decision dimensions).For example, an elected official might considerher popularityratinga critical aspect of all dimensionwill offset a low policy decisions. Because no value on a "noncritical" popularityscore, alternativesassociatedwith popularityratingsbelow her threshold value-even if the overallmaximizingchoice-are rejected.Noncompensatory processingis identifiedas a simplifyingheuristic(see Mintz & Geva, 1997; Payne et al., 1990). By comparison,more cognitively demandingcompensatorychoice allows interdimensionaltrade-offs, so that a high value on one dimension can value on another.Once compensatorytrade-offs compensatefor an unsatisfactory are made, an additive rule is typically applied and the maximizing alternativeis chosen. Normative decision models (e.g., rational,weighted additive value, expected utility) generallyassume compensatorydecision-making.

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How can we identifythe extent to which a compensatory noncompensatory or choice strategyhas been used? Payne et al. (1988) suggested the conceptuallink between the consistency-selectivitywith which an individual accesses decision information the choice ruleused. The authorsarguedthata comprehensiveand and search of decision informationis requiredto supportmore complex, systematic compensatorydecision-making.An individualusing a simplifyingnoncompensatory rule, however, can be much more selective in accessing information,for example, only as relevant to a "critical"dimension. Consequently, consistent search (i.e., uniformtypes and amountsof informationaccessed) can be taken as an indicatorof a compensatorychoice strategy,and highly selective (i.e., uneven) searchcan be construedas reflectingthe use of a noncompensatory rule. indices were developed to measurethe variance Consistency-selectivity(CS) in the amounts of informationsearched across decision alternatives(CSalt)and decision dimensions (CSdim). this study, CS scores range from 0, indicating In in informationsearched,to 16, representingthe maximum complete consistency selectivityin the4 x 4 decision matrices.Searchconsistency-selectivityon decision alternatives(CSalt) was calculatedas CSalt= I _n n

Vy
n=l

ayn n=l

azn

(2)

wheren is the numberof alternatives the choice set, anda represents number in the of (information)cells of the decision matrixaccessed on each alternative z, and y, so on. CSdim scores were calculatedas
CSdim = --Xu waum / awm (3)

wherem is the numberof dimensionsin the choice set, anda is the numberof cells accessed on each dimension u, w, and so on. The following example illustrates calculationof the CS measures.
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Dimension A Dimension B Dimension C Dimension D Number Considered 8 9 2 1 7 5 3 2 4 2 3 6 2

CSalt= (2 3)+(2

2)+(2

2)+(3-

2) + (3 - 2) + (2 - 2)1

= -1+0+0+1-1+01 =3

Reading across the row for alternative1, we see thatthe decision-makeraccessed two informationcells on that alternative(i.e., on Dimensions C and D). Three informationcells were searchedon Alternative2, two cells on Alternative3, and

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two cells on Alternative4. Summing the absolute differences in the numbersof cells accessed on each alternative according to Equation 2 yields CSalt= 3, indicating a fairly consistent search and the use of a compensatory strategy. Figuring Equation3 in the same mannershows an equally consistent search on
dimensions (CSdim = 3).

Controls on time stress and complexity effects. Both subjectiveand objecof tive measuresof task complexity were made. The four manipulations decision setting were designed with equal time constraints,informationload, and numbers of dimensionsand alternativesso as to minimize the effects of time-relatedstress and decision complexity on decision processing. Participants'own evaluations of the complexity of their decision task were assessed by way of a post-experimentquestionnaireasking them to rate its diffito culty on a scale from 1 (very easy/straightforward) 10 (very complex). The PS index was not significantly correlatedwith perceived task complexity (r = -.07, p = .43). An objectivetaskcomplexitymeasurewas figuredfor each of the fourdecision scenariosaccordingto the severityof the value trade-offscontainedin its decision matrix.Trade-offcomplexity(TC) scores were computedas
n m-1 m

12
TC=

(r - rq)2
(4)

=lq=j+l i=1 nm2(n2 -1)

where n is the numberof decision alternatives(four in this case), m is the number of value dimensions (four again), and rji is the rank given to alternativei on dimension j.13 TC scores range from 0 to 1. Scores nearing 0 indicate choice problemsthatrequireminimalvaluetrade-offsin orderto reveala single optimizing alternative.'4 Scores nearing 1 reflect highly complex decisions that involve multiplealternativesrankedas nearopposites on all dimensions. The complexity scores calculated for the four decision scenarios were all near the middle of the range (low stakes-low threatTC = .34; low stakes-high threat TC = .44; high stakes-low threat TC = .50; high stakes-high threat TC = .54), and each was unrelated to the PS measure. That is, there was no immediate indication that participants systematically adapted their decision processes to accord with either the perceived or the structuralcomplexity of their decision problem.

13See Maoz (1990) for a discussionof this measure,andMaoz andAstorino(1992) andAstorino-Cour-

tois and Trusty(2000) for applications.

14Problems that involve only a single dimension or alternativeobviously score low on trade-off

complexity as well.

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Analysis and Results Test 1: Stakes-Threat Processing Strategy Effecton Information Is the processingpatterndecision-makersuse contingenton the stakes-threat characterof the decision task? A one-way between-groupsanalysis of variance (ANOVA)15was conductedto identifythe effect of the stakes-threat manipulation (i.e., low stakes-low threat,low stakes-high threat,high stakes-low threat,high stakes-high threat)on the orderin which individualsreviewed decision information. The dependentfactorwas the PS index. The ANOVA shows a nearly significantmain effect of the stakes-threat task = 2.35, p = .07]. Was the effect on information manipulation processing[F(3, 115) consistentwith hypothesis I? Figure 1 shows mean PS scores (rangingfrom -1 = puredimension-basedto 1 = purealternative-based processing)for the four treatment groups.Interestingly, in participants the high stakes-high threattreatment groupengaged in the highest degree of alternative-based processing (PSgl= .43). In fact, a closer look reveals to that,contrary the hypothesizedeffect andregardlessof the stakesinvolved, both treatments high-threat promptedrelativelymore alternative-based processingthan did either low-threattreatment.An ANOVA of (combined)high- and low-threat treatmentgroups shows this relationshipto be quite strong [F(1, 115) = 5.07, p = .03; PShigh threatkl = .38, PSlow threat,l= . 13], which suggests that the threatposed by the decision problemwas a significantfactor in the use of more demanding, alternative-basedprocessing strategies. In other words, it provides evidence of processing diligence in high-threatforeign policy settings, and a tendency to use simplifying heuristicsin evaluatingless threateningproblems.The impact of the stakes on the use of alternative-based versus dimension-baseddecision strategies is less clear. Althoughan ANOVA failed to show a strongeffect [F(1, 115) = .348,p = .557; choice high stakes,t = .22, low stakes,t = .29] of decisional stakeson participants' of processingstrategy,theremay be some interaction betweenthe stakesandthreat factors. As shown in Figure 1, the low- and high-threatdecision tasks can be distinguishedby the presence of high stakes. On one end of the scale, high stakes appearto intensify the heuristic(dimensional)processing alreadyassociatedwith the low threat level, presumablyreducing the cognitive effort allotted to that The problem(i.e., creatinga literal"no-brainer"). same effect appearson the other end of the scale. The presence of highly salient nationalinterestsin a setting that is also highly threateningserves to increase the extent of cognitively taxing,
15

of Between-groupsANOVA refersto the partitioning total variabilityin the datainto the differences between treatment means on two or more groups plus the residual effect (i.e., differences of observationswithin treatmentsfrom the overall treatmentmean). In assessing stakes-threat effects, the "treatment" having received one version of the four differentdecision scenarios. is

Stakes and Threat in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

V C)

501

I0.43

0.34

a)
.CD

.0 CD

_ - 0.25

E
-0.5

high stakes-

low stakes-

low stakes-

high stakes-

low threat

low threat DecisionType

high threat

highthreat

versus dimensionalprocessingby treatment. Figure 1. Alternative-based

alternative-based processing. The results of this first test show a significant move to alternative-based decision strategies associated with elevated threat. Further testing is warranted, however, before conclusions can be made about stakes-threat interaction effects. Test 2: Stakes-Threat Effect on Decision Rule The second test explored whether the stakes-threat characteristics of the foreign policy decision problem altered the choice rule decision-makers used (hypothesis 2). The dependent factor was the relative consistency-selectivity of information search. Tests were conducted separately for search consistency on alternatives (CSait) and on dimensions (CSdim). The ANOVA shows the level of threat (high vs. low) to have a weak effect [F(1, 115) = 2.8, p = .09; low threat g = 3.89, high threat ,t = 2.76] on the choice rule participants used in making a decision.16 As shown in Figure 2, the higher threat condition encouraged more consistent access of information for all alternatives considered. Again, contrary to the simplifying effect suggested by previous adaptive decision studies, individuals engaged in more cognitively demanding

6 Because the F

statisticused here is a two-tailedtest, the limit of statisticalsignificance,as is general convention,is takento be p < .09.

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2:a
4

3.89

3.9

111

1112.76

2.73

low threat

high threat Decision Type

low stakes

high stakes

Figure 2. Mean searchconsistencyby combinedtreatments.

decision processing, in this case compensatory choice, under the high-threat condition.An ANOVA of the stakestreatment (high vs. low) also showed a weak manipulationeffect [F(1, 115) = 3.26, p = .07; low stakes gt = 2.73, high stakes L = 3.9]. In contrastto the threateffect, however, higher stakesencouragedmore selective searchon alternatives, indicatingthe use of an effort-saving,noncompensatorystrategy. Although the threat and stakes factors affected participants'evaluations of responsealternatives,neithertreatmentsignificantlyaffected evaluationof which decision dimensions (e.g., public opinion, economic impact) should be satisfied [F(l, 115) = 1.72,p= .19 for threat;F(1, 115) = 1.32, p = .25 for stakes].Why did the participants but adapttheirchoice ruleswhen comparingalternatives, not when informationon dimensions?One explanationmay be thatthe willingness seeking (or ability) to trade values on multiple decision dimensions is more clearly a function of an individual'sbelief system than is the process of weighing possible responseoptions.Simplyput, the fact thatpeople have differentcore values is more in important dimensionalevaluationthanin deciding between alternatives.Moreto over, makingtrade-offsbetweendimensionsrequiresthe decision-maker prioritize disparateinterestsand varied standards utility. Evaluatingalternatives,on of the otherhand,may be a more straightforward of judgmenton the appropriateness a specific actionin a specific circumstance, is not as sensitiveto the differences and in individualpreferences.

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Discussion Individuals generally adapted their decision strategies to the stakes-threat propertyof the decision tasks in termsof both the processing patternsand choice rules used. Overall,and contraryto the propositionsof a good deal of stresseffects research, participantsfollowed more cognitively demanding (i.e., alternativebased) informationprocessing patternsunderhigh-threatconditions. Simplifying (dimension-based) processingwas morecommonlyused in the low-threatsettings. in both the high- and low-threatsettings, the addition of elevated Interestingly, stakes had no significant independenteffect, but ratherappearedto intensify the processingeffect of the threatlevel. The threatcharacteristic the decision problemalso influencedchoice rules. of to the large body of literatureassociating crises with heuristicAgain, contrary based decision-making,the high-threatmanipulationencouragedmore effortful (compensatory)choice. On the other hand, the level of stakes involved in the decision task had the reverseeffect on the choice rule. Thatis, the presenceof high stakespromotedthe use of a simplifying,noncompensatory choice rule.Although this study representsan initial explorationof the effects of the stakes and threat propertieson decision-making,the results nonetheless indicate that these should not be takenas simple reflectionsof stressandcomplexityeffects. On the contrary, these foreign policy domain-specific decision factors appearto be independent of-and, in general,produceeffects opposed to-those associatedwith stressand complexity. Haass (1997) has observed that "the world in the wake of the Cold War ... promisesto be terriblycomplex, moreso thanwhatcame before"(p. 1). Moreover, for powers like the UnitedStates,it promisesto be freerfromthreatsof cataclysmic proportions,at the same time that it is "moredangerous(with the emergence of more numerousif lesser threats)."The results of this analysis have implications both for post-Cold War foreign policy decision-makingand for our theoretical of understanding rationalandquasi-rational decision-making.In the foreignpolicy of of setting, improvedunderstanding how variouscharacteristics a given decision situation might affect decision-makingcan help sensitize leaders to the "biases, pitfalls and fallacies that characterizedecision-makingprocesses" (Maoz, 1990, p. 179). For example, when evaluating a "lesser"internationalthreat,decisionmakers should be aware of the tendency to simplify decision processes in these settings ratherthan searchfor optimalalternatives. On a theoreticallevel, this paperhas extended researchby decision theorists primarilyworkingoutsidepolitical science. Althoughthose studiesprovidea solid basis for inquiry, what we can learn about the impact of the unique elements of foreign policy decision problems (or, indeed, decision-makingin other political of arenas)will greatlyenhanceourunderstanding the connectionsamongdomestic and international decision settings, decision strategies,and political outcomes.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am gratefulto Uri Geva, Nehemia Geva, BrittaniTrusty,Guy Whitten,Alex Mintz, the Decision Lab of the Programin Foreign Policy Decision-making at Texas A&M, and anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions and this assistance.Correspondence concerning articleshouldbe sentto AllisonAstorinoof Political Science, Texas A&M University, College StaCourtois,Department tion, TX 77843-4348. E-mail:Courtois@polisci.tamu.edu REFERENCES
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APPENDIX Decision Scenario and Decision Matrix for Low Stakes-Low Threat Treatment PresidentialBriefingon MonsoonDevastation and Crisis in Rongkur Situation: A devastating monsoon has ravaged the lowlands of Rongkur. After 2 years of severe drought,the monsoon rains have caused mud slides and relief workersestimatethat250,000 Rongkurishave deadlyflooding. International died in the flooding so far, and unless aid missions begin immediately,as many as 1.5 million more will soon die of starvation water-borne and diseases. The National SecurityCouncil (NSC) considers this crisis to be both low stakes in termsof the to importance vital U.S. interestsandpolicy, andlow threatin termsof the potential risk/costs to U.S. resourcesand personnel. Background: Rongkur'seconomy is builton subsistencefarming.Duringthe droughtwealthy landownersbought up land from peasant farmersdesperatefor quick money in orderto survive. The landownersthen chargedenormousrent to the formerowners to live on and farmthe land. When the socialist governmentof Rongkurattemptedto reformthis practice,the landownershired and armedtheir

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Two monthsago, gang-Armyclashes broke own "gangs"to resist implementation. out when Rongkur's Prime Minister was assassinatedby one of the landowner gangs. Army Chief GeneralHaraniis now serving as acting PrimeMinister. Currently: The landownersaretakingadvantageof the monsoonto mountan offensive against the Rongkurigovernment.The capital city has been the site of continuous gun battles. In addition, there are unconfirmedreportsthat General Harani-who has not appearedin a numberof days-has been kidnappedby the landownergangs. Withouthis leadershipthe RongkuriArmy is quicklybecoming disorganizedand ineffective. The fighting, togetherwith the flood damage,make the situationin Rongkur both difficult and dangerous for internationalrelief workers: along with the indiscriminateshootings, and demandsof extortionpaymentsto the gangs, many of Rongkur'sroadsand bridgeshave been destroyed.Distributionof criticalrelief suppliesto the countrysideis now nearlyimpossible.Helicopterairliftsarethe only way to reach those areas. In addition,fighting aroundRongkur'sonly airporthas prevented delivery of food and medical aid. Aid/rescue workers are running critically low on supplies needed for the million Rongkurisleft homeless by the flood. Public Opinion: CNN has been broadcastingspecial reportson the situation in Rongkur,including a now well-known reportfrom a temporaryshelter filled with thousandsof poor children orphanedby the floods and fighting. Having in many cases seen their parents swept away by the floods, the children now face starvationand death from preventablediseases simply because relief supplies are bogged down by the fighting in the capital. The latest polls indicate growing

Yarbu River

Rongkur
st\. Dester River

Rongkur Citl

Monsoon devastation area

Rongkuri Sea

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sentimentamong the Americanpublic that somethingmust be done to relieve the sufferingin Rongkur. At the U.N.: Our U.N. Ambassadorreportsthat the U.N. Security Council would welcome a U.S. initiativeto aid Rongkur.He feels that since Rongkuris a countrywithout any majorallies, U.S. action resource-poorand poverty-stricken would encourageothernationsto get involved as well. According to the JointChiefs of Staff, the landownergangs representonly a minor threatto any U.S. personnel sent to Rongkur.Again, your advisors in the NationalSecurityCouncilconsiderthis crisis to be both low stakesin termsof the to importance vital U.S. interestsandpolicy, andlow threatin termsof the potential risk/coststo U.S. resourcesand personnel. After analyzingthe situation,the NSC staff has submittedfouralternatives for possible U.S. response: RESPONSEALTERNATIVES Offer $5,500,000 in U.S. emergencyassistanceto Rongkur(MONEY) * * * U.S. (unilateral) militaryforce sufficientto rebuildroadsandassureaid worker safety (U.S. ACTION) Lead U.N. military(coalition) force authorizedonly to rebuildroadwaysand assurethe safety of aid workers(U.N./AID) Lead largerU.N. militaryforce authorizedto deliver aid and restorepolitical orderand stabilityin Rongkur(U.N./POLITICAL)

In making your final choice among these alternatives,you may want to consider any, or all, of these areasof concern: CONCERNS * ? * * Cost in $ and economic impact (ECON) Impacton U.S. nationalsecurity(NAT'L SECURITY) Impacton relationswith othernations(INT'L RELATIONS) Domestic opinion (PUBLICOPINION)

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Decision Matrix Cell Contents

MONEY ECON This option will not affect the U.S. economy; the $5.5 million is availablethrough the international emergencyrelief fund. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 9. U.S. ACTION While U.S. humanitarian action will not affect U.S. business or trade, it will cost $6 to 8 million in unbudgeted expenses. Moreover, intervention now could set a precedent for costly U.S. interventionin futureworld humanitarian/ political crises. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 3. Sending a humanitarian force to Rongkur will in no way diminishour ability to defend U.S. security interestsaround the globe. U.S. lives will be at moderaterisk only if landowner gangs believe the U.S. action poses a threatto their political power. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is an 8. U.N./AID This option will involve moderate operational costs as nonparticipating SecurityCouncil membersshould providesome financial compensation for participants. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 6. U.N./POLITICAL Stabilizing Rongkur'spolitical situationwill likely entail moderatehigh costs for the U.S. thatcould last for a year or more. These costs will increaseif U.N. forces come under attackfrom landownergangs and additional are troops/weapons needed. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 3.

NAT'L SECURITY

This option will not affect either U.S. or world security.On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 10.

Althoughin commandof the U.N. force, U.S. generalsin Rongkurmay be unableto control the bearing(e.g., prejudices, aggressivetactics) of foreign military units. Some U.S./U.N. casualtiesshould be expected if landownerssee the U.N. force as politically On threatening. a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 7.

If all Rongkuri landowners perceive U.N. political objectives as enhancingtheir power/influence, U.N. forces should be at low risk. However, if U.N. stabilizationefforts are seen by even one landowneras threatening, U.S./U.N. forces will come under attackwith potentiallyheavy casualties.On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 5.

510 MONEY INT'L RELATIONS As financial assistancewill not resolve the aid distribution crisis in Rongkur, the U.S. should expect criticismespecially by poorernationsfor indifference to the lives of non-Western people. This could affect our influence in affairsbeyond Europeand Japan. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 6. U.S. ACTION This option will enhanceour influence abroad by demonstrating U.S. concern with humanrights and welfare, regardlessof political ideology, economic ties, etc. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 10. U.N./AID This option shouldenhance U.S. international prestigeby demonstrating our willingness to work with othernations in defense of humanwelfareregardless of political differences. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 10.

Astorino-Courtois U.N./POLITICAL This option may enhanceour influence among nationswith similarviews on humanand political rightsto ours. However, our relationswill be harmedwith some ThirdWorld nationswho perceive it as patronizingand arrogant imposition of Western political practices on the rest of the world. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is a 6. Americanswill support interventionas long as U.S. casualtiesare low. If casualties increase,public supportwill turn and possibly mark this as a major foreign policy blunder.On a scale of 1 = worstto 10 = best, this option is a 5.

PUBLIC OPINION

While this option This option will be popularas long involves no loss of U.S. lives, as U.S. casualties public and media are low, the perceptionthat operationis the administration successful and is indifferentto its U.S. troops are concernsover returned home Rongkurisuffering within 5 months. could significantly If not, your redecreaseyour election chances popularityratings. could be harmed. On a scale of On a scale of l = worst to 1 = worst to 10 = best, this 10 = best, this option is a 2. option is a 6.

As long as there are no U.S. casualties, Americanswill supportthis option as reflectingU.S. moralleadership and compassionwithoutthe expense of unilateralaction. On a scale of 1 = worst to 10 = best, this option is an 8.