OPTIONS POLITIQUES
SEPTEMBRE 2005
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banking system, and far-reachingreforms to our regulatory regime andour financial institutions policy.Estey essentially found that thebanks in question had compensatedfor having to pay more to attractdeposits by taking on riskier loans inthe expectation of higher returns, andthat the risk-assessment systems at thebanks were ineffective at controllingthe portfolio imbalance that resulted.Sectoral and geographical concentra-tion of loans contributed to the deba-cle, because of inordinate reliance onclients in the energy business andinordinate exposure to industry cycles.The deposits in both banks had, of course, been insured by the CanadaDeposit Insurance Corporation, butthat insurance had a limit of $60,000per account. Because Bank of CanadaGovernor Gerald Bouey had declared,at the time of the rescue package, thataccess to his lending window of lastresort was limited by statute to solventinstitutions, depositors concluded thatCCB must be safe. As a result, thebanks’ failures forced the governmentto introduce special legislation reim-bursing depositors for unrecoverablelosses beyond the $60,000 limit.The damage could not be limitedto two banks. Because of their relianceon wholesale deposits, in short orderthe Bank of British Columbia was con-veyed to the Hong Kong Bank of Canada (as it was then known, nowHSBC Bank Canada); ContinentalBank was sold to Lloyd’s Bank, whichin turn later left Canada, selling toHKBC; Mercantile Bank (the formersubsidiary of First National City Bankof New York, which still held 25 per-cent at the time) was shored up by aloan package from the Big Six plusCitibank and then sold to NationalBank of Canada; two small Western-based banks (Bank of Alberta andWestern Pacific Bank) were merged asCanadian Western Bank, andMorguard Bank was sold.
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he policy and regulatory frame-work that had been in place forthese bank failures, the first since the1920s, was subjected to a critical re-thinking. The Office of the InspectorGeneral of Banks was combined withthat of the Superintendent of Insurance to form the Office of theSuperintendent of FinancialInstitutions. CDIC introduced pruden-tial standards of its own so as not to beobliged to rely solely on the superviso-ry expertise of the banking regulator.A White Paper explored ways inwhich the financial sector might bemodernized, both to replace the lostcompetition brought about by the dis-appearance of so many smaller institu-tions in such a short space of time, andto examine ways to prevent a repeti-tion of the events.The conventional wisdom aboutwhat happened next is that Canadatried to emulate the 1986 developmentin Margaret Thatcher’s UnitedKingdom that has come to be knownas the “Big Bang.” While there is anelement of truth to this, Canada wasactually driven more by its owndomestic policy needs. The CEOs of the Big Six banks asked the minister of finance, Michael Wilson, for an emer-gency meeting, which was held at theChâteau Montebello, Quebec, site of the G7 summit in 1981.There was no one present otherthan the six CEOs, the minister, me ashis deputy, and Don McCutchan, atrusted advisor in the minister’s office.The bankers made a plea to be allowedto enter the securities business, whichhad been denied them for decades so asto minimize the risk to bank capitalresulting from securities market volatil-ity. Their thesis was that lending hadbecome securitized: the banks’ best cus-tomers could finance themselvesdirectly in the London InterbankMarket, in essence in competition withthe banks themselves, by issuingEurodollar securities, leaving to thebanks the worst credits, on whichspreads could be as little as 3/8 percent.Dick Thomson of the Toronto-Dominion Bank, speaking for thegroup, pointed out that while we werestill dealing with the fright-ening implications of therecent run on virtually all of the country’s smaller banks,the government needed toconsider the possibility of failures among the Big Six.The representationswere persuasive: not only were marketstandards changing so that CEOs of borrowers were increasingly indiffer-ent to whether a bank funded itself asa principal, added a spread and made aloan to the client, or designed a pieceof paper that the client signed and thebanker then sold to the street; butthere was a policy inclination amongthe minister and his officials to ques-tion the validity of the “four pillars”tradition of financial institutions regu-lation, which saw banks, insurancecompanies, trust and loan companiesand securities dealers all relegated totheir respective regimes of operationand supervision.
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he Glass-Steagall mentality thatproduced the separation of thepillars was now increasingly subject toserious questioning. One-stop finan-cial supermarket shopping was cominginto vogue as a model for growing andconsolidating financial institutions.The public policy imperative was togenerate new kinds of competition,and the creative juices that would beunleashed by combining commercialand investment banking was seen as ahighly desirable outcome.It should be remembered that noone expected the single model of
Stanley H. Hartt
Dick Thomson, of the Toronto-Dominion Bank, speaking for the group, pointed out that while we were still dealing withthe frightening implications of the recent run on virtually allof the country’s smaller banks, the government needed toconsider the possibility of failures among the Big Six.
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