EN BANC
She did not know that nobody was
[G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO
ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of
the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against
her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in order to
suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said
Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete
hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting
upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law."
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years
of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her
home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to
prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a
striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside
his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as
the old woman was her distant relative.
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night
came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to
transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece
of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne
was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-
shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary
napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
"1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear,
generally oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,
approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left
AAL.
2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline
lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and
exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity
showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital,
February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due
to Traumatic Injuries, Face."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look
for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the
policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of
shoes which were identified as Marianne's.
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the
occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife
and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles
consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes
were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
appellant.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police
team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took
him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented
and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where
Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took
appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were
likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the
back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under
the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects
holding the bags.
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters.
The following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the
suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha Patawaran. Appellant
was found to sustain:
"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and
back: with abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-
healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt."
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The
mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant
broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am
the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let
the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first
asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the
mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and
son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked
the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered
by the media nationwide.
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor
and reenacted the crime.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified
that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in
Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and
son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their
one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00
in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and
his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor
of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until
February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police.
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In
one of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked
him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed
Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and
injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the
crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his
neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old
toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also
ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias
"Bobby" is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime
charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance
with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this
offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne Guevarra the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual
burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After
automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and executory,
the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED."
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
"I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS
BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE
ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE
WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF
CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED."
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the
three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news
reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was
also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen,
the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
"SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) x x x
(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) x x x"
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on
the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality
for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also
obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal
police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government."
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general
inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime
suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear
from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of
the crime, viz:
"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused
who did this act?
WITNESS First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood
stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma
who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it
was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose
whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q So you had a possible suspect?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then, what else did you do?
A We tried to find out where we can find him and from
information we learned that his parents live in Barangay
Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
 investigated him and in fact during the investigation he
admitted that he was the culprit."
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the
police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the
investigating team testified:
"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags
marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he
point these bags?
A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath
the canal of the toilet.
Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2) bags
were located?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what
did you do?
A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would
know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to
the place where the bags were located?
A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he
really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir."
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed
that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor
Trinidad testified, viz:
"Mayor Trinidad: x x x. During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought
him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the
Chief of Police, mayor?
A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin
mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when
he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to
allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him again
whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered
by a television camera."
xxx
xxx xxx
Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the
Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! Ako ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he
told you?
A The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone
and the second one was before the media people, sir.
Q What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of
Police?
A These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from
making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he
was going to say, sir."
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor
has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may
arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting.
The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him.
When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye"
on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was
recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives.
Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed
appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the
place where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your
interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the
police station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have
mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped
and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim was his
cousin.
Q And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible
for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his
admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence
that was committed on his person because I knew that there were five other
suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but he
said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the
uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot
recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place
of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . .
All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there
was no air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that was
being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a
voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped and killed,
so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime
where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of
Marianne Guevarra.
Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from
the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the
Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who accompanied you?
A I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor
Trinidad and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was
recovered.
Q How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and
crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag
police, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion,
Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?
A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime
was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me
and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra,
sir.
Q Did he voluntarily comply?
A Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP
Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A Yes, sir.
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the
proceedings for three successive days. His testimony is as follows:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own
investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q Were there people?
A The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy
chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and
several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the
suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed
Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this
offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense? And
you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really
admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the
affirmative answer.
Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while
ago?
A Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some
pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard
the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and
the suspect answered the same.
Q Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered
you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga
and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo."
"Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na
ikaw ang gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya
ng "Oo."
xxx
Q Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil
gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the
pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him,
reads almost everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the
court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito
Andan?
A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he was
really down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no
tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
x x x"
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on
February 26, 1994. He also testified that:
"Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from
Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of
police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?
A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people.
There were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q How about the other representatives from the media?
A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were
people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q How about Channel 7?
A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife
also present?
A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was
really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from
the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the
wife, sir.
Q How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they
around?
A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there, sir.
Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May
we know what question did you ask and the answer.
A My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q What was the next question?
A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim
aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on
the stomach.
Q What was the next question that you asked him?
A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed
the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered,
sir.
Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item
on that?
A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q Were there other questions propounded by you?
A Yes, sir.
Q "Ano iyon?"
A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of
the fence?
A I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A I have a xerox copy here, sir.
x x x"
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an
interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days
not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed
his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the
crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news
reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no
coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the
State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of
any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government,
rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not
unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department
of government and its agencies.
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical
evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the
Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. Allegedly, the
minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation.
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by
Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed
that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
"Hymen -- contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock."
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been
caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still
alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. His testimony is as follows:
"Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and
6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. x x x.
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the
cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied
first before you did you re-autopsy?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could
have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the
victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated
wounds could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the
circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor
examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then
I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible that the
lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the
victim was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any
bleeding.
Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with
clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim
was alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated
wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and
indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?
A This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at
6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on
the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q What could have caused those lacerations?
A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into
that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the
hymen, sir.
Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A It is possible, sir.
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina
does not negate the commission rape nor does the lack of complete
penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is essential is that there be
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's
vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any
injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant
are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an
investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near appellant's house;
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were
not in their house;
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass
nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house;
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface. This supports the thesis that she was thrown
over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. Marianne's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had
type "A" and type "AB." The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found
to be type "O," appellant's blood type;
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain;
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident
and were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan;
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His
alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away
from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-
appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Information dated March 11, 1994, Records, p. 1.
TSN of May 11, 1994, pp. 34-38; Exhibit "P," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits,
pp. 13-14.
Exhibit "U," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 18-19.
TSN of April 19, 1994, pp. 47-51; TSN of April 20, 1994, pp. 45, 55-56;
Exhibits "A," "C" and "I."
Exhibits "J," "K," "L," and "N."
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 71-72.
Exhibits "O," "O-2," and "O-5;" Folder of Prosecution Exhibits; pp. 11-12;
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 72-73.
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 18-19.
Exhibit "Q," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 15.
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 21-22
TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 88; TSN of May 20, 1994, pp. 13, 50.
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 78-82.
Id., pp. 20-24, 53, 59-64.
Exhibits "AA" and "CC."
TSN of April 27, 1994, pp. 14-18; TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 74-87; TSN of
May 27, 1994, pp. 8-32; Exhibits "S," "KK-1" to "KK-4," Folder of
Prosecution Exhibits, p. 41.
TSN of July 22, 1994, pp. 12-20, 75-80.
TSN of July 22, 1994, pp. 12-20, 75-80.
Decision of the trial court, p. 23, Rollo, p. 52.
Appellant's Brief, p. 3, Rollo, p. 69.
This provision was taken from Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
which adopted the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 [1966] and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. ed. 2d 977 [1964].
People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [1993]; Sampaga v. People, 215 SCRA 839
[1992]; People v. Penero, 213 SCRA 536 [1992].
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, p. 410 [1996]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 445; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294, 298
[1975].
People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566,
575 [1994]; People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People v Olvis, 154
SCRA 513 [1987].
Bernas, supra, at 411.
TSN of April 19, 1994, pp. 62-63.
TSN of April 22, 1994, pp. 7-15; TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 89-90; TSN of
May 11, 1994, pp. 30-31.
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 71-72.
People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1,
17-19 [1986].
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 20-21.
Id., pp. 26-27.
R.A. 6975, Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
Chapter III (D), sec. 51 (b).
Leuschner v. State, 397 A. 2d 622 [1979]; Vines v. State, 394 A. 2d 809
[1978]; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294 [1975]; Howell v. State, 247 A. 2d
291 [1968]; Statements made by defendant while in custody of police officers
but not pursuant to any questioning by officers were properly admitted as
spontaneously volunteered statements — State v. Matlock, 289 N.W. 2d 625
[1980]; State v. Red Feather, 289 N.W. 2d 768 [1980].
Baysinger v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 445, 447 [1977], where a defendant, not in
custody, in talking with the sheriff wanted the sheriff for a confidant instead of
a law enforcement officer, his admissions on an incriminating taped
conversation did not violate the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution and are thus admissible.
Aballe v. People, 183 SCRA 196, 205 [1990]; People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111,
123-124 [1988]; People v. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373, 378-379 [1981]; see also
People v. Rogers, 422 N.Y.S. 18, 48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709, 714
[1979].
People v. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426, 441 [1994]; People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47,
53 [1989].
People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 752 [1982], the accused, under custody,
gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters
in the office of the chief of the CIS.
TSN of April 27, 1994, pp. 11, 13-14; Exhibit "S."
TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 11-14; 15-16; Exhibit "AA."
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 76-77.
TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 78-84.
TSN of May 27, 1994, p. 9.
Id., pp. 10-14.
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 183-184 [1994] — We ruled that
an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer nor did he, in this case, act
as one.
cf. People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 525-526 [1987] where several accused
were forced by the police to reenact the commission of the crime.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991].
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 590 [1995]; Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.
2d 413, 417 [1957], citing Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations 93, 358.
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti,
supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures
done by private individuals without the intervention of police authorities;
People vs. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extra-judicial admissions
of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection with the
accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness where deemed outside the scope
of the provision on custodial investigation.
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 22, 24-26.
Id., pp. 43-44.
Exhibit "Y," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 27.
TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 63, 75.
Id., pp. 59-63.
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 [1994]; People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454
[1993;] People v. Magallanes, 218 SCRA 109 [1993].
People v. Rejano, 237 SCRA 627 [1994]; People v. Palicte, 229 SCRA 543
[1994].
People v. Fabro, 239 SCRA 146 [1994]; People v. Fortez, 223 SCRA 619
[1993]; People v. Abiera, 222 SCRA 378 [1993].
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 78, 95.
TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 83; April 25, 1994, p. 38.
TSN of April 19, 1994, p. 51; TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 66; Exhibit "I."
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 53-54.
Exhibit "JJ," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 40.
Exhibits "MM" and "NN," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 43, 44.
Exhibits "LL" and "OO," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 42, 45.
Exhibit "Q," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 15.
TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 82-84.
TSN of July 1, 1994, pp. 13-14.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO
DOMANTAY, @ “JUNIOR OTOT,” accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City (Branch 57), finding accused-appellant guilty of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 o’clock,
when the body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst
a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child’s body bore
several stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia
Macaranas, the rural health physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died
of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds
at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of inflammation of
the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victim’s genitalia,
although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal
resistance. Noting possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr.
Macaranas recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI.
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant
Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim’s grandfather, as the lone
suspect in the gruesome crime. At around 6:30 in the evening of that day,
police officers Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the
Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station where accused-
appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to killing
Jennifer Domantay. He likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon,
he had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his
aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan. The
next day, October 18, 1996, SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took
accused-appellant to Bayambang and recovered the bayonet from a tricycle
belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to
evidence the confiscation of the weapon.
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan
Carpizo, the Philippine National Police chief investigator at Malasiqui, filed,
on October 21, 1996, a criminal complaint for murder against accused-
appellant before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October
25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an
autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination of
the victim’s genitalia indicated that the child’s hymen had been completely
lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the
criminal complaint against accused-appellant to rape with homicide.
Subsequently, the following information was filed:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay
Guilig, Municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design and armed with a bayonnete, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a
minor of 6 years old against her will and consent, and on the same occasion,
the said accused with intent to kill, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab with the use of a bayonnete, the said Jennifer Domantay,
inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds, which resulted to her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl,
Lorenzo, all surnamed Domantay, Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso
Manuel, and Dr. Ronald Bandonill, to establish its charge that accused-
appellant had raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-
appellant and his two brothers-in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio
Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of the latter’s house in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he was in front of
Macasaeb’s house, tending to some pigeons in his yard. After the group had
consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-appellant gave money to
Edward Domantay and asked him to buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of
Sprite. Edward said he joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb
and accused-appellant. Edward said that accused-appellant, who, apparently
had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said: “No diad Antipolo tan
L[i]pa et walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay
onakis-akis” (“In Antipolo and Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig,
there will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and they will
cry and cry”). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of accused-
appellant’s waistline was a bayonet without a cover handle. It was not the first
time that Edward had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter
usually carried it with him.
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 o’clock in the
afternoon on October 17, 1996, she and four other children were playing in
front of their house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-
appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking towards the bamboo grove of
Amparo Domantay where Jennifer’s body was later found. Accused-appellant
was about two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about 8 to 10
meters from the house of Jiezl Domantay.
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl’s testimony
that accused-appellant had gone to Amparo Domantay’s bamboo grove in the
afternoon of October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said that that afternoon, on his way
to his farm, he saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at the
spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifer’s body was later found. Accused-
appellant appeared restless and worried as he kept looking around. However,
as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he did not try to find out why accused-appellant
appeared to be nervous.
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon
of October 17, 1996, he was about to take his lunch at home in Alacan, a
neighboring barangay about half a kilometer from Guilig, when accused-
appellant implored Mejia to take him to Malasiqui at once. Mejia told
accused-appellant that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter
pleaded with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore,
agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous and afraid.
Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of going to the town
proper, he alighted near the Mormon’s church, outside Malasiqui.
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso
Manuel who testified that, on separate occasions, accused-appellant had
confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter
had been brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17,
1996. Before he commenced his questioning, he apprised accused-appellant
of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangasinense.
According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to answer the
questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted
killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the
bayonet he used in killing the victim. On cross-examination, Espinoza
admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning was accused-
appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant’s confession
reduced in writing. Espinoza’s testimony was admitted by the trial court over
the objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station
DWPR, an AM station based in Dagupan City. He covers the third district of
Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime in October 1996, an uncle of the
victim came to Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer
Domantay’s case. On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to
interview accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail. He
described what transpired during the interview thus:
PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias “Junior Otot” my I.D. card and I
presented myself as a media practitioner with my tape recorder [in] my hand,
sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that interview with the
accused Bernardino Domantay alias “Junior Otot”?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interest’s sake as a reporter,
why did he commit that alleged crime. And I asked also if he committed the
crime and he answered “yes.” That’s it.
....
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the commi[ssion] of
the crime, how did you ask him that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular matter?
A I asked “Junior Otot,” Bernardino Domantay, “Kung pinagsisisihan mo
ba ang iyong ginawa?” “Opo” sabi niya, “Ibig mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang
pumatay kay Jennifer?”, “Ako nga po”. The [l]ast part of my interview,
“Kung nakikinig ang mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong
iparating?”, “kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay tatanggapin ko”.
That is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot, what was his purpose, and
he said, it was about the boundary dispute, and he used that little girl in his
revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in
the jail, about two to three meters away from the police station. An uncle of
the victim was with him and the nearest policemen present were about two to
three meters from him, including those who were in the radio room. There
was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant, Manuel said he
talked to the chief of police and asked permission to interview accused-
appellant. On questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time
he had been called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted. As in
the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense objected to the
admission of Manuel’s testimony, but the lower court allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim
on October 25, 1996, testified that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the
numerous stab wounds she sustained on her back, the average depth of which
was six inches. He opined that the wounds were probably caused by a
“pointed sharp-edged instrument.” He also noted contusions on the forehead,
neck, and breast bone of the victim. As for the results of the genital
examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on
the right side of the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her death. He added
that the genital area showed signs of inflammation.
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the
crime and of the victim after the latter’s body was brought to her parents’
house, identified and authenticated the five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and
E) offered by the prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-
appellant denied the allegations against him. He testified he is an uncle of
Jennifer Domantay (he and her grandfather are cousins) and that he worked as
a janitor at the Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 o’clock in
the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside the house
of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
He confirmed that Daudencio was then having drinks in front of his
(Macasaeb’s) house. Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join
in the drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had
presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined the party. He
also claimed that it was he whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more
liquor, for which reason he gave money to Edward Domantay so that the latter
could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a pack of cigarettes. He
denied Edward Domantay’s claim that he (accused-appellant) had raised his
shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would
massacre someone in Guilig.
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, he
went to Alacan passing on the trail beside the bamboo grove of Amparo
Domantay. But he said he did not know that Jennifer Domantay was
following him. He further confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to
Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near
the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his
brother. As his brother did not come, accused-appellant proceeded to town
and reported for work. That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public
market, he was picked up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui
police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza regarding the
killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having owned to the killing of
Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He denied he had a grudge against the
victim’s parents because of a boundary dispute. With respect to his
extrajudicial confession to Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been
interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever admitted anything to the
former.
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the
accused, Bernardino Domantay @ “Junior Otot” guilty beyond reasonable
doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation and as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 and accordingly, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00), and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1
Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because
they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution and
that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his
alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Art. III, §12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
....
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, “when
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.” R.A. No. 7438 has
extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.
Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police
station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact
the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore,
already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III,
§12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what
transpired during accused-appellant’s interrogation:
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to
him, I informed him of his constitutional right as follows; that he has the right
to remain silent; that he has the right to a competent lawyer of his own choice
and if he can not afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and
further informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing and
will be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but he told me that he
will cooperate even in the absence of his counsel; that he admitted to me that
he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and]
where he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in
writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is
invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza’s testimony on the
alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the
trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” As explained in People v. Alicando:
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
“fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized
evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of
the poisonous tree” is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant’s
confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v.
Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during
interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the
fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this
Court said:
[A]ppellant’s [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he
was interviewed was “tense and intimidating” and was similar to that which
prevails in a custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant
was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside
the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim.
Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he
agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso
Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around
because about two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the
radio room. We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any
undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving
his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that “it is . . . not altogether improbable for the
police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some
incriminating information from the accused.” This is pure conjecture.
Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no
evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he
was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his
purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-appellant. To
the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the
government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or
that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that
accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of fear. As already stated, the
interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant
had already confessed to the killing to the police.
Accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition,
the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other prosecution witnesses
dovetails in material points with his confession. He was seen walking toward
the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near
the bamboo grove where the child’s body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. ¾ An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
§4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. ¾ No person charged with treason
shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have
been committed without the children who were playing about eight to ten
meters from Amparo Domantay’s grove, where the crime took place, having
heard any commotion. The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant could
have covered the young child’s mouth to prevent her from making any sound.
In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5” x 2”) contusion on the left
side of the victim’s forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard
blunt instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground. The blow could have
rendered her unconscious, thus precluding her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay
contradicts that of Lorenzo Domantay because while Jiezl said she had seen
accused-appellant walking towards the bamboo grove, followed by the victim,
at around 2 o’clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he saw
accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove at about the same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw at exactly
the same time. What they told the court was what they had seen “at around” 2
o’clock in the afternoon. There could have been a difference in time, however
little it was, between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the victim
walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the place where the
victim’s body was later found. Far from contradicting each other, these
witnesses confirmed what each had said each one saw. What is striking about
their testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going
toward the bamboo grove followed by the victim “at around” 2 o’clock in the
afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had seen accused-appellant
near the bamboo grove “at around” that time. He described accused-appellant
as nervous and worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim of these
witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant. There is no reason he
would testify falsely against the latter. Jiezl, on the other hand, is also
surnamed Domantay and could also be related to accused-appellant and has
not been shown to have any reason to testify falsely against accused-
appellant. At the time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellant’s guilt
with respect to the killing of the child. It is clear that the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide.
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide]
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article [murder], shall be deemed guilty of
homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. The record shows that the victim, Jennifer
Domantay, was six years old at the time of the killing. She was a child of
small build, 46” in height. It is clear then that she could not have put up much
of a defense against accused-appellant’s assault, the latter being a fully grown
man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence supports a finding of abuse of
superior strength: accused-appellant had a weapon, while the victim was not
shown to have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife wounds
are located at the back of Jennifer’s body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed
with cruelty. The trial court appears to have been led to this conclusion by the
number of wounds inflicted on the victim. But the number of wounds is not a
test for determining whether there was cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.
“The test . . . is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented
the victim’s suffering thus . . . there must be proof that the victim was made to
agonize before the [the accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out [her]
life.” In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr. Bandonill testified that
any of the major wounds on the victim’s back could have caused her death as
they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and intestines.
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant
guilty of raping Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in part provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. ¾ Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved
to establish rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having
sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. For this
purpose, it is enough if there was even the slightest contact of the male sex
organ with the labia of the victim’s genitalia. However, there must be proof,
by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill’s report on the genital examination he had performed on
the deceased reads:
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of
the hymen. The surrounding genital area shows signs of inflamation.
....
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of
penetration of that area by a hard, rigid instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; neither does its presence
prove its commission. As held in People v. Ulili, a medical certificate or the
testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped
but to show that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone,
a physician’s finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does
not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving
carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established.
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear
may be caused by objects other than the male sex organ or may arise from
other causes. Dr. Bandonill himself admitted this. He testified that the right
side of the victim’s hymen had been completely lacerated while the
surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. He opined that the
laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of the victim’s death and that the
inflammation was due to a trauma in that area. When asked by the private
prosecutor whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by
the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But he also said when
questioned by the defense that the lacerations could have been caused by
something blunt other than the male organ. Thus, he testified:
PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right side of
the hymen, doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says there;
findings at the genital area indicated the probability of penetration of that area
by a hard rigid instrument.
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is possible,
sir.
....
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the probability of
penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument, this may have also been
caused by a dagger used in the killing of Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be sharp pointed
and sharp rigid, it should be a hard bl[u]nt instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u]nt instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument, sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of the right side
of the hymen, this may have been possibly caused by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I won’t say that this would have been caused by a dagger,
because a dagger would have made at its incision . . . not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other factors other the
human male organ, is that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
....
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this possible that
the laceration can only be on the right side of the hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the same as the
human organ?
A Well, it depends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] the organ, if the
finger is small it could the superficial laceration, and if the finger is large then
it is possible your honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with
homicide based on purely circumstantial evidence. In those instances,
however, the prosecution was able to present other tell-tale signs of rape such
as the location and description of the victim’s clothings, especially her
undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like. In People v.
Macalino, for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a two
year-old child on the basis of circumstantial evidence:
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the
fresh laceration had been produced by sexual intercourse is corroborated by
the testimony given by complainant Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs
upon hearing her daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant Macalino
beside the child buttoning his own pants and that she found some sticky fluid
on the child’s buttocks and some blood on her private part. (Emphasis in the
original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which
to infer that accused-appellant sexually abused the victim. The only
circumstance from which such inference might be made is that accused-
appellant was seen with the victim walking toward the place where the girl’s
body was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he
simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in
the hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance from which it might
reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his
pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girl’s vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding
of rape. In describing the stab wounds on the body of the victim, he testified:
[A]fter examining the body I took note that there were several stab wounds . .
. these were all found at the back area sir . . . extending from the back
shoulder down to the lower back area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in
crimes of rape, the usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim
is on the face, neck, and anterior portion of her body. Although it is not
unnatural to find contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused by
the downward pressure on the victim’s body during the sexual assault. It is
unquestionably different when, as in this case, all the stab wounds (except for
a minor cut in the lower left leg) had their entry points at the back running
from the upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white
shirt when her body was brought to her parent’s house immediately after it
was found. Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her
shorts. This must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing when the
stab wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood
to seep into her shorts to such an extent. As accused-appellant would naturally
have to pull down the girl’s lower garments in order to consummate the rape,
then, he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled
up the victim’s shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise, the
victim’s shorts would not have been stained so extensively. Again, this is
contrary to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it
was accused-appellant who had raped her. He did not confess to having raped
the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed
rape. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and
the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Domantay the amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages. However, the list of
expenses produced by the victim’s father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled
P28,430.00. Of this amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a receipt. Art.
2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual or
compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly proved. Therefore,
the award of actual damages should be reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary
damages in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Art. 2230 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of
exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is deemed appropriate.
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles and People v. Mengote, the
indemnity should be fixed at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another
one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty of homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and sentencing him to
a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of
Jennifer Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity, P50,000.00, as
moral damages, P25,000.00, as exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual
damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
Purisima, and Buena, JJ., took no part in the deliberations.
Per Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
Records, p.15. Dr. Macaranas was not presented as a witness and her post-
mortem report was not offered in evidence by either party.
Folder of Exhibits, p. 5; Exh. G.
Records, p. 1.
TSN, pp. 3-4, March 4, 1997.
Id., pp. 8,13.
Id., p. 19.
Id., pp. 13-15 (Translation by the trial court).
Id., pp. 20-21.
TSN, pp. 4-7, 13, March 3, 1997.
TSN, pp. 4-5, 13, April 3, 1997.
TSN, pp. 4-7, March 13, 1997.
TSN, p. 6, Feb. 28, 1997. People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 (1995); People v. Española, 271 SCRA 689
TSN, p. 4, Feb. 25, 1997. (1997); People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998); People v. Tan, 286 SCRA
207, 214 (1998) citing cases.
TSN, p. 8, Feb. 28, 1997.
Accused-appellant was picked up by the police without any warrant of arrest,
TSN, p. 14, April 10, 1997. although his case did not fall under any of the three instances where
Id., pp. 6-9. warrantless arrests are authorized under Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
TSN, p. 10, April 10, 1997.
TSN, p. 4, Feb. 25, 1995.
Id., p. 13.
251 SCRA 293, 314 (1995).
Id., p. 15.
269 SCRA 95 (1997).
Records, p. 20.
Id., at 314. Reiterated in People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998).
TSN, pp. 12-13, April 8, 1997.
Rollo, p. 59; Appellant’s Brief, p. 10.
Id., p. 16.
TSN, p. 10, April 10, 1997.
Id., pp. 10-11.
Rollo, p. 59; Appellant’s Brief, p. 10.
Records, p. 20.
Rollo, pp. 62-63, Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-14.
TSN, pp. 8-11, April 15, 1997.
TSN, pp. 10-11, April 18, 1997.
Id., p. 26-27.
Records, p. 13.
Id., pp. 17-18, 27-29.
Rollo, p. 32; Decision, p. 14.
Id., p. 31.
People v. Tonog, 205 SCRA 772 (1992); People v. Manzano, 58 SCRA 250
Rollo, p. 32; Decision, p. 14.
(1974).
Broken down as follows: P200,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as
People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19, 36 (1996), citing People v. Lacao, 60 SCRA
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P30,000.00 for
89 (1974).
funeral and related expenses.
TSN, p. 16, April 8, 1997.
Rollo, p. 50; Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.
People v. Alib, 222 SCRA 517 (1993); People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990).
Id., pp. 54-60; Id., pp. 5-11.
People v. Evangelista, 282 SCRA 37 (1997); People v. Orita, supra.
People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997).
Records, p. 20.
Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993).
People v. Butron, 272 SCRA 352 (1997); People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663 People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 (1997).
(1996); People v. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658 (1996); People v. Lazaro, 249 G.R No. 124300, March 25, 1999.
SCRA 234 (1995); People v. Salinas, 232 SCRA 274 (1994).
G.R No. 130491, March 25, 1999.
225 SCRA 594 (1993).
Supra note 74.
People v. Castillo, 197 SCRA 657 (1991).
See People v. Macalino, 209 SCRA 788, 795 (1992).
HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 617 (1931).
Records, p. 20.
TSN, p. 20, April 8, 1997.
TSN, pp. 15-19, April 8, 1997 (emphasis added).
See People v. Develles, 208 SCRA 101 (1992); People v. Magana, 259 SCRA
380 (1996).
209 SCRA 788 (1992).
Id., at 797.
TSN, pp. 12-13, April 8, 1997.
People v. Advincula, 96 SCRA 875, 878 (1980); People v. Lood, 117 SCRA
467, 471 (1982); People v. Aguirre, 143 SCRA 572, 578 (1986); People v.
Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82, 92 (1996).
People v. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, 448 (1979); People v. Saligan, 101 SCRA
264, 269 (1980); People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 746 (1982); People v.
Umali, 116 SCRA 23, 32 (1982); People v. Aguirre, supra.; People v.
Dawandawan, 184 SCRA 264, 269 (1990); People v. Magana, supra.
People v. Saligan, supra.; People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454, 459 (1993).
See People v. Madridano, 227 SCRA 363, 363 (1993); People v. Empleo,
supra.; People v. Garcia, supra.
Exh. C.
Exh. B.
See People v. Dino, 160 SCRA 197, 209 (1988).