Torts

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I.

Liability Based Upon Fault

Hulle v. Orynge (The Case of Thorns)- Strict Liability

Relevant Facts1466 scrap of legal reasoning that outlines the contemporary view of tort law in England. Procedural History Issue In what situations does the plaintiff have a just argument for seeking damages. HoldingA man must make sure that his actions do not result in injury of damage upon others. Even when not breaking the law, damage to anothers self or property is justification for a case. Reasoning Intent is not the issue, but facts of damage. Judgment/Disposition

Weaver v. Ward ( Kings Bench, 1616)- Fault

Relevant Facts Ward and Weaver were soldiers practicing military maneuvers when Wards musket discharged and injured Weaver. Accepted that Ward did not intentionally fire the weapon. Procedural History Issue Is a soldier liable for the damage to another during military skirmishes through no intent of harm? Holding A man will never be excused for trespass unless it is judged entirely without his fault. Reasoning Criminal responsibility is determined by the intent of the perpetrator, but even a lunatic can be held liable for the punitive damages of his actions even if he has no intent to harm others or their property. Only in the case of a man running into the path of a firing musket etc is the defendant without negligence. Judgment/Disposition judgment for the plaintiff

Brown v. Kendall ( Supreme Judicial Court of Mass. 1850)- embracing of concept of fault
Relevant Facts Action of trespass for assault and battery. Brown(P) and Kendall(D) both owned dogs who were fighting. The defendant unintentionally struck the plaintiff in the eye with a stick he was using to try to separate the dogs. The judge instructed the jury that if the defendant was performing a necessary act or one which was his duty to perform, and was doing it in a proper way, then he would not be liable if he was using ordinary care (the degree of care cautious men would use that is necessary to guard against probable danger. If Kendall did not have a duty to separate the dogs, he was liable for Browns injuries unless he was exercising extraordinary care and the accident was inevitable. However, Brown could not recover in any case if he himself had not been exercising ordinary care to avoid the injury. If Kendall had a duty

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to interfere, then Brown had the burden of proof to show both negligence by Kendall, and that Brown had used ordinary care to avoid the injury. If the act was not necessary, Kendall had the burden to show that he had exercised extraordinary care or that Brown had not used ordinary care in avoiding the injury. The jury ruled in favor of Brown. Kendall appealed.

Procedural History Supreme court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant argued that the judges instructions did not conform to the law. Issue The plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was unlawful of that the defendant was in fault. If the injury was unavoidable and his conduct free from blame he will not be liable. 1. Can a person be liable in trespass without proof of negligence or fault 2. Whether or not it was error for trial court to dismiss jury 3. Who has the burden of proof to show that the defendant was not using ordinary care Holding The court determined the judges directions to the jury were not conformable to the law. If the defendant did not intentionally hit the plaintiff and did so doing a lawful act he is not liable. In order for him to be liable the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not use due care in the act. Reasoning The plaintiff must be prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was unlawful or that the defendant was in fault. If the injury was unavoidable and conduct of defendant free from blame he is not liable. Judgment/ Resulting Rule New trial ordered. If an accidental casualty arises from a lawful act, no action can be supported for Plaintiff unless lack of ordinary care can be proved by Plaintiff

Vocab: y Vi et armis: By or with force and arms y Ordinary care: cautious y Prudence:cautious y Liability for Negligence: The plaintiff cannot recover if both plaintiff and defendant were using ordinary care, or if the defendant was using ordinary care and the plaintiff was not, or if neither party was using ordinary care. y Standard of Ordinary Care: The standard of ordinary care is determined on a case by case basis. It is that kind and degree of care which prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probable danger. y Inevitable Accident: An inevitable accident in which the defendant could not have avoided by the use of the kind and degree of care necessary to the exigency under the circumstances.

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*In this case Kendall was doing a lawful act and unintentionally injured Brown. Brown cannot recover unless he can prove that Kendall was negligent.

Cohen v. Petty ( Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, 1933)

Relevant Facts The plaintiff and her sister were passengers in the defendants car and were thrown from the car after going off the road into an embankment. The plaintiff and defendants stories of events matched; they agreed that the defendant suddenly exclaimed I feel sick immediately before fainting and crashing into the embankment. The plaintiff maintained that the defendant was negligent in speed and did not see him faint. The defendant has no history of seizures of fainting and did not previously feel ill. Procedural History The judge directed a verdict [took it away from a jury] after deciding that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed this decision in the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia Issue Can someone who is suddenly stricken by an illness(or event), that could not be reasonably anticipated be charged with negligence(damages from event)? Holding The original judge was correct in directing the verdict. Reasoning The plaintiff could not prove that the defendant was neglible. Even by stating that he was driving very fast, he had no way to anticipate his illness to make the moderate speed a point of negligence. Judgment/ Resulting Rule Affirmed. A person suddenly stricken by an illness, which he had no reason to anticipate is not liable.

Spano v. Perini Corp.( Court of Appeals of New York, 1969)

Relevant Facts Spano owned a garage which was wrecked by a blast on Nov. 27, 1962. On that date the second plaintiffs car was in the garage and received damage. The plaintiffs sought damages from the two defendants who were blasting for a tunnel in the vicinity on that day. The plaintiffs did not show negligence on the part of the defendants but relied on absolute liability (Absolute Liability doctrine: Blaster is absolutely liable for any damages he causes, even without negligence) Procedural History The Civil court of New York rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs without a jury. The Appellate Term reversed the judgment and that decision is being appealed by the plaintiffs. IssueShould a person who sustains property damage caused by blasting on nearby property be awarded damages without showing negligence by the blaster? WHO SHOULD BEAR THE COST OF RESULTING DAMAGE OF BLASTING?

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Holding The intentional setting off of explosives in an area where it is likely to cause harm to neighboring property results in absolute liability without the show of negligence. They must bear the cost of the damage to the plaintiffs property. Reasoning Court cites other states policies of absolute liability in regard to blasting as well as previous cases in state. Because of the highly and abnormally dangerous nature of dynamite, the rule which exonerates a party engaged in a lawful business, when free from negligence, has no application. Not trying to keep the defendant from blasting, only to recover damages incurred from blasting. Absolute liability on blaster for the damage incurred. Defendant must bear costs. Judgment/ Resulting Rule Reversed. Blasting is ultra-hazardous activity, results in strict liability. Blasting is acceptable but blasters must bear the cost. Higher level of care.

II.

INTENT

Garratt v. Dailey (Supreme Court of Washington, 1955)

Relevant Facts--- Brian Dailey, who is 5 years old, pulled a chair out from under Ruth Garratt. Ruth suffered a fracture of the hip. Brian said that he had moved the chair to sit in it himself, then tried to move it back when he realized she was going to sit, but was late. Medical damages amounted to $11,000. BATTERY Procedural History--- The trial court dismissed the case, claiming Brian did not have purpose, intent, or design to injure the plaintiff. Issue--- Should the case have been dismissed? Did Brian commit a tort? Was there damage to the plaintiff, and who is liable for such damage? Holding--- Case remanded (sent back) to the original courts for clarification. They must decide whether Brian knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down and to change the judgment if it is warranted. Reasoning--- It is not enough that Brian may not have intended to cause a battery. The court says that if Brian knew with a substantial certainty that the plaintiff would try to sit down in the chair that he had moved he had committed a tort and would be liable. The court does not believe the lower court examined this when making their decision. He does not have to act with volition, but has to know with a substantial certainty what will result in order for negligence to occur. Judgment/ Resulting Rule ---- Affirmed. In favor of plaintiff in the amount $11,000. For a tort to occur, there does not have to be volition( the act of making a choice or determining something) or intent. But instead, there is the substantial certainty of the consequences that could occur from the action. This knowledge alone is enough to decide that a tort has been committed. Trial court must do complete analysis of the tort.

* Character of Actors intention: If he did intend to pull the chair away then battery occurred, trial court said this was not proven. * Restatement of Torts: an actor who commits a direct or indirect act which is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another is liable if: 1) the act is done with the intention of bringing about

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a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and 2) the contact is not consented to by the other or the others consent thereto is procured by fraud or duress, and 3) the contact is not otherwise privileged. * Intent requires that the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced. *A battery would be established if a party acts with substantial certainty that a result will occur. The mere absence of any intent to injure, play a prank on, or embarrass the plaintiff, or to commit an assault and battery on her, would not absolve the defendant of liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Went back because did not go the full distance

Spivey v Battaglia( Supreme Court of Florida, 1972)

Relevant Facts---- Spivey and Battaglia were employees of Battaglia Fruit Co. At lunch several employees were sitting around. Battaglia (defendant), as a joke because the plaintiff was shy, gave her a friendly, unsolicited hug. He pulled her head toward him and in the process injured her neck. She felt pain in the neck and ear and skull. As a result she was paralyzed on the left side of her face and mouth. Procedural History---- Spivey brought suit for negligence and assault and battery. The trial court dismissed the case on the defense that the 2 year statute of limitations had expired for an assault and battery. District Court (Appeals) affirmed that ruling, citing McDonald v. Ford ( * set of facts (page 21 love making attempts) proved it was an assault and battery. RULE OF LAW: Assault and battery is not negligence because it is intentional! Negligence denotes something unintentional. Assault does NOT need intent, only the knowledge with a substantial certainty that the results could occur.) Issue--- Is this an assault and battery or negligence? Assault and battery would have expired under 2 year statute of limitations, but negligence can stand up. Holding--- No assault and battery. Case should be sent to the jury to decide on the negligence count. Summary judgment reversed Reasoning--- Unlike McDonald, there was no way that Battaglia could have known with substantial certainty that the results (injuries to Spivey) could occur. Therefore no assault occurred and the summary judgments and dismissals should not have occurred. Instead the case should be decided on negligence, which is decided by the differing circumstances in each case.

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Judgment/ Resulting Rule-- -Reversed summary final judgment. Difference between intentional and substantial certainty rule although both qualify for assault and battery must exist. It can affect things like penalties, statute of limitations, liability.

Ranson v Kitner ( Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889)

Relevant Facts---- Ranson believing it was a wolf shot and killed Kitners dog. Procedural History--- Trial court jury awarded Kitner the value of the dog= $50. Issue--- Can a defendant be liable for a wrong done even though they were acting in good faith? Holding---- Affirmed the trial courts decision. Reasoning---- They failed to show that an error had been made in the trial, and no prejudice on material errors. Possibility that it could have been a dog, and has to accept that mistake. Judgment/ Resulting Rule--- Good faith does not matter when they made the mistake that resulted in the tort *Difference Between Mistake and Accident: -Mistake: an error, misconception or misunderstanding -Accident: an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence

McGuire v Almy( Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 1937)

Relevant Facts--- A nurse working with a mentally patient, was struck by the patient with the end of a leg of furniture. The patient was in the middle of a violent attack, and had destroyed furniture in the room. The defendant told the plaintiff is she were to enter the room she would kill her, despite this the nurse fearing the patient would harm herself intervened. Procedural History---Issue---- Can a mentally ill person be liable for property damage Holding----- If an insane person commits an act that does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage just like normal person would be liable. Reasoning---- In order for a person to be liable he must have been capable of entertaining the same intent, as a normal person, and in fact entertained it. In this case it is apparent that the jury could find that the defendant was capable of entertaining and that she did entertain an intent to strike and to inure the plaintiff. She acted on that intent. Judgment/Resulting Rule--- In order for a person to be liable he must have been capable of entertaining the same intent, as a normal person, and in fact entertained it.

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Talmage v Smith( Supreme Court of Michigam, 1894)

Relevant Facts---- Smith owns land with sheds in the back. He walked up to his sheds and saw 6 or 8 boys playing on them and ordered them down. He went to another shed and saw two more boys who he also told to get down. He claims to have not seen the plaintiff two of the boys started to get down at once, he threw a stick in the direction of the boys before they could get down. The stick missed the intended target and hit Talmage in the eye. The damage made him lose sight in that eye permanently. Procedural History---- Jury ruled unreasonable and a verdict for the plaintiff. Issue---- Can intent be transferred from one party to another? Holding----- Upheld jury verdict, for the plaintiff. Reasoning---- Defendant intended to hit someone with the stick which is unreasonable force under the circumstances. He knew with substantial certainty there could be injury. The fact that the injury occurred to another party than was intended does not clear him of the responsibility. Judgment/ Resulting Rule--- Doctrine of transferred intent. (intent can be transferred)