Consciousness of all synthetically objective formations of these kinds occurs through suchmultimembered acts that unite to form higher unities of consciousness, and it occurs by means of immanently constituted phenomena that function at the same time as substrates for differingvaluations, such as certain truth probability, possibility, etc.The concept "phenomenon" carries over, furthermore, to the changing modes of being consciousof something -- for example, the clear and the obscure, evident and blind modes in which one andthe same relation or connection, one and the same state -- of -- affairs, one and the same logicalcoherency, etc., can be given to consciousness.
the first and most primitive concept of the phenomenon referred to the limited sphereof those realities given to our senses, through which nature is evinced in perceiving.The concept was extended, without comment, to include every kind of sensuously meant orobjectivated thing. It was then extended to include also the sphere of those synthetic objectivities thatare given to consciousness through referential and connective conscious syntheses and to includethese objects just the way they are given to consciousness within these syntheses. It thus includes allmodes in which things are given to consciousness. And it was seen finally to include the whole realmof consciousness with
of the ways of being conscious of something and all the constituents thatcan be shown immanently to belong to them. That the concept includes
ways of being consciousof something means that it includes, as well, every sort of feeling, desiring, and willing with itsimmanent "comportment"
To understand this broadening of the concept is very easy if one considers that emotional andvolitional processes also have intrinsically the character of being conscious of something and thatenormous categories of objects, including all cultural objects, all values, all goods, all works, canbe experienced, understood, and made objective
only through the participation of emotionaland volitional consciousness. No object of the category "work of art" could occur in theobjectivational world of any being who was devoid of all aesthetic sensibility, who was, so to speak,aesthetically blind.Through this exposition of the concept "phenomenon" we obtain a preliminary conception of ageneral phenomenology, viz., a science of objective phenomena of every kind, the science of everykind of object, an "object" being taken purely as something having just those determinations withwhich it presents itself in consciousness and in just those changing modes through which it sopresents itself. It would be the task of phenomenology, therefore, to investigate how somethingperceived, something remembered, something phantasied, something pictorially represented,something symbolized looks as such, i.e., to investigate how it looks by virtue of that bestowal of sense and of characteristics which is carried out intrinsically by the perceiving, the remembering, thephantasizing the pictorial representing, etc., itself. Obviously, phenomenology would investigate inthe same way how what is collected looks in the collecting of it; what is disjoined, in the disjoining;what is produced, in the producing; and, similarly, for
act of thinking, how it intrinsically "has"phenomenally in it what it thinks; how, in aesthetic valuing, the valued looks as such; in activelyshaping something, the shaped as such; etc. What phenomenology wants, in all these investigations,