A.

POLICE POWER

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon DOLE Department Order No. 1 providing for guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers is valid. Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote general welfare. It is inborn in the every fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is called the law of overwhelming necessity. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to dispute the presumption of validity of official acts. DO No. 1 does not make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Ichong v. Hernandez The enactment of Retail Trade Nationalization Law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. Police power derives its existence from the every existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or define din scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self protection and survival; and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. The constitution does not define the scope or extent of the police power of the state; what they do is set forth limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and equal protection clause. Equal protection is against undue favor and individual class privilege while due process has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of police power through which and by its own personality and ensures its security and future. It cannot be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Lutz v. Araneta The questioned tax is levied with regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation of the sugar industry. The act is primarily an exercise of police power. Sugar production is one of the great industries in the Philippines. Its protection and advancement redounds to the general welfare. Hence, it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn. Once it is conceded that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the legislature may determine with reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Taxation may be made the implement of the states police power. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subject of taxation. Inequalities which result from singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitations. The tax is valid. Association of Small Landownwers v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform PD 27, EO 228, EO 229, and RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) are valid exercise of police power. Like taxation, the power of eminent domain could be used as an implement of he police power, the express objective of the law was the promotion of the general welfare of farmers which cam clearly under the police power of the state. To achieve this purpose, the law provided for agricultural lands subject to minimum retention limits for the landowners to be distributed among landless peasants. But where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever land they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the circumstances, under power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. A statute may be sustained under police power only if there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform had been laid down by the constitution. The first requirement is met. It is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the constitution. The expropriation is for public use and payment of just compensation is contemplated. Lozano v. Martinez The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power. The gravemen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the payment of an obligation which the law punishes. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. The lawmaking body may criminally punish the act as malum prohibitum pursuant to the exercise of police power. Department of Education, Culture, and Sports v. San Diego NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for medical education. It is a regulation of access to medical school. The government is entitled to prescribe an admission

test like NMAT as a means of achieving its objective of upgrading selection of applicants into medical schools and of improving the quality of medical education in the country. There is a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of police power. It is the right and responsibility of the state to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law and is also not arbitrary and oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court While contending that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement that there be a lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. The penalty of outright confiscation and automatic forfeiture of the bond in failure to produce the carabao were arbitrary. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and confiscate. The ordinance does not only confiscate but also prohibit the operation of memorial park cemetery because under Section 13 of the said ordinance, violation is punishable with fine and/or imprisonment. If the owner is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems that Section 9 is not a mere regulation but an outright confiscation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers. Instead of maintaining or building a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

B. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila The City of Manila, pursuant to its charter, has the authority to expropriate lands for public use. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise that right some law must exist conferring bathe power upon it. There are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila. First, the land must be private. Second, the purpose must be public. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. It is alleged that the cemetery may be used by the general community of Chinese, which in fact, in the general acceptation of that definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. Hence, the City of Manila has no right to expropriate the cemetery being a public property. In addition, there is no necessity of the taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation. The adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge which answers every purpose of the city. Republic of the Philippines v. PLDT While the Republic may not compel PLDT to celebrate a contract with the Republic, the latter may in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of government service may require subject to the payment of just compensation. There is no cogent reason why the power of eminent domain may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property without loss of title or possession. There is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting services would be the users of both telephone systems so that the condemnation would be for public purpose. People v. Fajardo The ordinance provides that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in the case that the proposed building destroys the view of the public plaza. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive Fajardo of the right to use their own property. Hence, it oversteps the bound of police power and amounts to taking of the property without just compensation. While property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare, and in its pursuit the state may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the state may not under guise of police power permanently divest ownership and beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi The following circumstances must be present in taking property for purpose of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter private property; (2) the entry must be under

warrant or color of legal authority; (3) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The first circumstance is present by virtue of the lease agreement. The second circumstance is present as it entered as a lessee. The third circumstance is NOT present since the entry by virtue of the lease is temporary being renewable from year to year. The fourth circumstance is also present as it is devoted to public use by the Philippine Air Force. The fifth is NOT present as the entry of the Republic did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee as the third and fifth circumstances are not present. Hence, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Amigable v. Cuenca Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of state immunity. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. Since the land has already been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Election To compel print media companies to donate the comelec space of the dimensions specified in Resolution No. 2772 amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes. The requisites for a lawful taking of private property must be examined here: (1) necessity of taking; (2) legal authority to effect the taking; and (3) payment of just compensation. All the three requisites are absent. Comelec has not been granted the power of eminent domain either by the constitution or by the legislative authority. Sumulong v. Guerrero The public use requirement of a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The constitution in at least two cases determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost. The other is in transfer, through the exercise of this power of utilities and other private enterprises to the government. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. It includes indirect public benefit or advantage. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. The lands are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Bayan Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. The same constitutes public use for purposes of expropriation. The following requirements must be met for the issuance of writ of possession to the expropriator: (1) there must be a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) a provisional determination of just compensation by the RTC; and (3) the deposit requirement under Section 2 Rule 67. Manosca v. Court of Appeals The power of eminent domain should not now be understood being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. The term public use must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need as a public exigency. For condemnation purposes, public use is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public; it is measured in terms of right of public to us proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of the public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute public use. That only few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay PD 1533, providing that just compensation be equivalent to the lower between the declared market value by the owner and the declared market value by the assessor, is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the decree constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Final determination of just compensation is incumbent upon the court. The PD deprived the courts of discretion to determine what is just and fair. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of its taking; it requires a full equivalent of the loss sustained. In order to arrive at such value, all the pertinent facts and circumstances as well as improvements must be considered. The rule laid down by the PD can serve as guidelines at most but cannot bind the courts. Due process also requires that the owners be given the chance to dispute the valuations made in the tax assessments which no longer reflect the value of the lands.

Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation Under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) an ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to pursue expropriation over a particular private property; (2) it is for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and landless; (3) payment of just compensation; (4) a valid and definite offer has previously been made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated but said offer was not accepted. A mere resolution authoring the mayor to commence expropriation is not sufficient. An ordinance is a law while a resolution is a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a permanent and general character but a resolution is temporary in nature. If Congress intended to allow LGU to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous LGC.

C. POWER OF TAXATION

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works The rule is taxing power must be exercised for public purpose only; money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purpose and not for the advantage of private individuals. In as much as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that the said appropriation sought a private purpose and hence was null and void. The donation to the government over five months after the approval and effectivity of RA 920 did not cure its basic defect. Punzalan v. Municipal Board of Manila The legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupation shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the National Government. Manila offers a more lucrative field for practice of the profession so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the province. There is no double taxation when one is imposed by the city and the other is imposed by the state. Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches, parsonages, and convents appurtenant thereto and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of real property taxes. In the present case, what the collector assessed against Fr. Lladoc was a donees gift tax. The assessment was not on the properties themselves. Manifestly, gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property used exclusively for religious purpose. Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino The exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not limited to property actually indispensable therefore but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purpose. The lease of the first floor to Northern Marketing Corporation by any stretch of imagination cannot be considered incidental to the purposes of education. School building as well as lot where it is built should not be taxed. But since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to Abra Valley College, Inc.

D. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Ichong v. Hernandez The retail trade nationalization law does not violate the due process of law clause because the law is prospective in application and recognizes the privileges of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects the privilege. Due process has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. There is no absolute power for there will be tyranny. There is no absolute liberty for there will be anarchy. The state can deprive persons of liberty, life, and property provided there is due process of law. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. There was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process as position papers were filed with the med-arbiter making the case submitted for decision. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, instead on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not. Instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the med-arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court There is a violation of substantive due process. The measure is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. The penalty of outright

confiscation and automatic forfeiture of the bond in failure to produce the carabao were arbitrary. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner, and immediately imposed punishment which was carried on forthright without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him due process. Allonte v. Savellano, Jr. Due process in criminal proceedings require: (1) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (3) the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; (4) the judgment is rendered upon lawful hearing. There were deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial. First, petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefore been scheduled for the purpose. Second, parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set for that purpose. Third, petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court, due process, rightfully occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is enshrined and valuable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. Aniag v. Commission on Election While the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone, save perhaps to hardened criminal, is a valuable right. To deny petitioners claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Apparently, Aniag was merely invited during preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latters explanation. Aniag then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the violation of gun ban case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not Aniag himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that Aniag was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the city prosecutor. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz NTCs order reducing the rate for telecommunications by 15% is unconstitutional for being violative of due process. Respondents contention that that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. The Public Service Act dictates that NTC has the power to fix rates upon proper notice and hearing. It is thus clear that with regard to rate fixing, NTC has no authority to make such order without fist giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commissions own motion as in the present case. Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations The fact that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process. There are primary rights which must be respected even in the proceedings administrative in character: (1) right to hearing includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence I support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the tribunal must have something to support its decision; (4) the evidence must be substantial such relevant evidence a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record; (6) the tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy; (7) the decision should provide for the issues involved and the reasons therefore. Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong The frat men were not denied of due process, more particularly procedural due process. The Dean of Ateneo Law School notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement about the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions: (1) students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusations against him; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence on their own behalf; (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

E. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

People v. Vera The Probation Law is violative of the equal protection clause. The law is prejudicial to those who may want to avail of the grants of the probation law since their provinces has all the say whether or not to provide salaries of probation officers to implement the act and should these provinces decline to act on it, then prisoners interested may fail to avail it. Hence, others would be deprived of the same right. Ichong v. Hernandez The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privilege conferred and liabilities enforced. The retail trade nationalization act does not violate the equal protection clause because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao The ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed in any position or businesses enumerated therein without first securing permit from the mayor and pay 50 as fee is null and void for being violative of the equal protection clause. The 50 fee is unreasonable since it fails to consider valid substantial differences in the situations of aliens (whether causal, temporary, or permanent). It exacts upon them 50 regardless of their status. The classification must be (1) based on substantial differences; and (2) reasonable relation for the subject of the particular legislation. In requiring the alien to secure a permit before he may be employed is tantamount to denying him of the right to engage in a means of livelihood. Due process and equal protection clauses protect the right to livelihood of citizens and aliens alike. Dumlao v. Commission on Election Section 4 of BP 52 provides for disqualification of candidates that has already retired from government and those who have committed act of disloyalty. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently from younger employees. In the case of a 65 year old elective local official who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is a reason to disqualify him from running for the same office which he had been retired; the need for new blood assumes relevance. Just as the provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial. Equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. The constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based on substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The second part of Section 4 violates the constitutional presumption of innocence. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with a penalty of arrest. Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon The Department Order No. 1 governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers does not thereby make undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law under the Constitution does not impugn identity of rights among all men and women. Himagan v. People Himagan was preventively suspended until the case against him is terminated under the DILG Act of 1990 instead of a maximum period of 90 days under the Civil Service Law. The reason why PNP members are treated differently from other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively is that the policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. Hence, there was no violation of equal protection of laws. Recognizing the existence of real difference among men, equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification must be: (1) based on real and substantial differences; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) applies to current and future conditions; and (4) applies to all members of the same class. Almonte v. Vazquez There was no violation of the equal protection clause when the Ombudsman gave due course to the anonymous complaint against EIIB. The constitution allows the procedure of admitting anonymous letters or statements especially when the subject of such is a public office. Also, the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government since the subject of its jurisdiction are public officials who can influence, quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them through pressure and exertion of undue influence. Lastly, the anonymous letter may be admitted since more often than not, complainants are poor and simple folks who cannot afford to hire the services of lawyers.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City Equal protection clause applies to persons or things identically situated and does not bar reasonable classification of the subject of legislation and a classification is reasonable where: (1) it is based on real and substantial differences; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) applies to current and future conditions; and (4) applies to all members of the same class. The ordinance imposing 1% municipal tax to Ormoc Sugar Company does not meet the above criteria. It taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company and no other. At the time of the ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company was the only sugar central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classifications to be reasonable should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax.

F. SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

People v. Marti The contraband (dried marijuana leaves) having come into possession of the Government without transgressing Martis right against unreasonable search and seizure, the court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made inspection of the packages. Such inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs. Mere presence of the NBI agents did make the act as warantless search and seizure. Mere observation in plain sight is not search. The right against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law and not against private individuals such as the proprietor. Stonehill v. Diokno The legality of seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. The seizure made in the offices of the corporation can be objected to by the corporation alone and not by the corporate officers in their individual capacity. With respect to those seized in the residences of the petitioners, the constitutional requirements have not been complied with, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. There was no specific offense that had been alleged in the application but only made mentioned of violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Code, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judge to determine probable cause. Soliven v. Makasiar The judge is required to personally determine the probable cause but is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses. The judge may (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting document submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; OR (2) if on the basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary explanation and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. Silva v. Presiding Judge of the RTC of Negros Oriental Branch XXXIII Before issuing the search warrant, the judge must determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answer. The judge failed in this regard. The deposition of witness contained most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely placing yes or no in the blanks provided. The capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In addition, the officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized money because the warrant only authorized the seizure of marijuana leaves and cigarette joints. Morano v. Vivo The constitutional guarantee requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by the judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. The commissioner of immigration and deportation may issue warrant of arrest in order to exercise its power to deport overstaying aliens. Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago Administrative proceedings are different from criminal proceedings. Probable cause in the present case need not be determined by a judge of court but by the President of the Philippines or his agent after thorough investigation of the activities of the alien. The same was also issued based on valid grounds such as pedophilia, which is inimical and offensive to public

morals and also violative of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the youth. The rule that searches and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute rule. Alvarez v. Court of First Instance The search warrant is invalid. The warrant was issued not based on the officers personal knowledge of the facts who submitted the affidavit. Moreover, statements were not subscribed, the identity of the informant is not even disclosed thereby casting doubt on the veracity of the alleged facts. There was no clear content as to the specific person and items that are to be searched or seized since it provides that all items connected with the lending business may be seized. Mata v. Bayona The search is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine probable cause. In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. However, the illegality of the search does not call for the return of the things seized if the possession of which is prohibited. People v. Del Rosario There is serious doubt that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized and confiscated at the residence of del Rosario. The manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called only after the policemen had already entered the residence and therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant shabu. In addition, the search warrant was no authority for the police to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant. They were only authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof. A search warrant is not a sweeping expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of articles relating to a crime. Umil v. Ramos Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assault against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. People v. Sucro An officer or private person may, without warrant arrest a person: (1) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (2) when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicting that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (3) the person to be arrested is an escapee. The first instance was present when the officer saw Sucro talk to same persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange something. The officer would then relay this to the station commander. The second instance was also present when one was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. People v. Rodriguez A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by place officers to trap and catch malefactors in flagrante delicto. The term in flagrante delicto requires that the accused or the suspected drug dealer be caught in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the Narcom agents failed to meet this qualification. The suspect was immediately released instead of arresting and taking him into custody. The following are instances the court allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant: (1) when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; (2) when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs law; (4) when it is made for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; (5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; (6) in case of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations. The raid conducted by Narcom agents in the house of the father was not authorized by a search warrant and does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Go v. Court of Appeals The case does not fall under the instances of lawful warrantless arrest. The arrest of Go took place 6 days after the shooting of the victim. The arresting officers were not present to be considered within the meaning of in flagrante delicto. Neither could the arrest effected 6 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when the shooting had just in fact been committed. Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that Go was the gunman.

Posadas v. Court of Appeals There is no question that the search was reasonable even without a warrant considering that it was effected on the basis of probable cause. The probable cause is that when Posadas acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag; that there was probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. Securing a search warrant for such purpose may prove to be useless, futile, and much too late. People v. Mengote The present case does not fall under any of the circumstances when an arrest or search warrant could be dispensed with. There was nothing to support the arresting officers suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. They did not know what offense, if at all had been committed, neither were they aware of Mengotes participation therein until after one appeared at the police headquarters that they learned in the robbery. Malacat v. Court of Appeals Even granting that Malacat was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of Malacat were invalid. Warrantless searches are limited to (1) custom searches; (2) search of moving vehicle; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (6) stop and frisk. The trial court confused the concept of a stop and frisk and of search incidental to a lawful arrest. In search incidental to a lawful arrest, the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is required before the search is made. In the case at bar, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search due to lack of personal knowledge or an overt act indicating that a crime has just been committed, being committed, or was going to be committed. Having shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest, the search conducted could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. Likewise, the search did not constitute a valid stop and frisk, thus the grenade found in his person cannot be admitted as evidence against him. People v. Aminnudin In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by the judge. Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a crime to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest. It is clear that they have at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo. There was no effort to comply with the law. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers and not the judge that authorized them to immediately arrest him. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. People v. Malmstedt Where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain search warrant. Malmstedt was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made was incidental to a lawful arrest. While it is true that there was no search warrant, there was sufficient probable cause for the officers to believe that Malmstedt was then and there committing a crime. Warrantless search of personal effects of an accused has been declared as valid because of the existence of probable cause where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused or where the accused was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee. When they received the information a few hours before the apprehension, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. The receipt of information by Narcom officers that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession plus the suspicious failure of Malmstedt to produce his passport taken as a whole led the officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search. Espano v. Court of Appeals Espano was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy buts operation conducted by the police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. Police officers saw Espano handing over something to the alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was therefore lawful. As a rule, warrantless searches are not valid. An exception is when warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapon or anything which may be used as a proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of one arrested to include premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the marijuana seized at Espanos house does not fall under the said exceptions. It was beyond the reach and control of Espano, hence inadmissible in evidence.

Papa v. Mago The police had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. Thus, except in the case of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizure recognizes the necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, wagon, motorboat, or automobile for contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Neither the state nor the Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without warrant, only unreasonable searches and seizure is forbidden. People v. Musa The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend to general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in plain view, this doctrine does not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. It must be immediately apparent to the police. In the instant case, Narcom agents searched the person of Musa after arresting him in his house but found nothing. Musa was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, searched the whole house and found plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore not within their plain view. The agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent. It cannot be said that the bag betrayed its contents whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency or otherwise that its contents are obvious to an observer. The plain view doctrine does not apply in this case. Valmonte v. De Villa Under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of the government is on the balance, or where the lives or safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed. In the case at bar, the on-going events justified the need for checkpoints. There were various attempted coup detat staged, NPA, murders, sex crimes, hold-ups, and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunitions have been objects of trade, etc. by virtue of its police power, the state has the duty to promote public welfare and checkpoints are evidently one of such means. The routine checkpoints does not intrude to a certain extent on motorists right to free passage without interruption but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupant subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search.