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Observations - (in)Efficient (in)Efficiency

Observations - (in)Efficient (in)Efficiency

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Published by: abhimails on Oct 08, 2008
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05/09/2014

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Hemant Sreeraman - 1 Hope…can’t substitute Reason
OBSERVATIONS – (IN)EFFICIENT (IN)EFFICIENCY
Monday, October 23, 2006Investor thinking in equity markets never ceases to amaze me. Believers in Efficient Market Theory - which says that theprice of the stock at any time ‘reflects’ all the information pertaining to the stock - wax eloquent that the markets areefficient &, in the long run, it is next to impossible for a money manager to keep beating the general market. However, myobservations of the markets for the short period that I have been observing them, makes me question the validity of thatbelief. (Reading Aid: In the title, you can have the ‘IN’ in parenthesis in only one of the words at a time.)
 Prices fluctuate. That is a truism in the market. One of the reasons readily given for fluctuating pricesis that opinions about a company’s future tend to keep varying & the price, at any time, supposedlyreflects the collective opinions & expectations that the market has out of the company. I agree.However, I have not able to fathom as to why a company’s market value - as reflected by the stockprice - has to vary wildly, sometimes in a very short period of time. Do expectations out of thecompany change so drastically that the markets vacillate between extreme optimism to extremepessimism & to extreme optimism again within a short length of time? An example will aid thisdiscussion.Given below is the price movement of a company, Amara Raja Batteries over the past 4 years. Thecompany follows an April-March financial year. For further perspective, I have also included the year-end EPS (Earned Per Share) for each of the past 4 years. Comments follow the table.
TABLE 1
 
Year Ended
 
Mar-06 (D)
 
Mar-05 (C)
 
Mar-04 (B)
 
Mar-03 (A)
 EPS (Rs) 21 8 1 7Feb-06 Nov-04 Dec-03 Jun-02Price (Rs) High 278 124 105 102Price (Rs) Low 92 46 48 47Apr-05 May-04 Apr-03 Mar-03Market Value (Rs Cr) High 317 142 120 116Market Value (Rs Cr) Low 105 52 55 54
High/Low Difference % 202
 
169
 
119
 
(54)
 
Note: () in Column A signifies a drop.Reading Aid: The Price Low of Rs.47 was hit in Mar-03. Same holds for the other prices as well.
 The above table is a good example of how Prices follow Earnings over the long run. However, it alsoilluminates the extremes of investor thinking in shorter time frames. Remember, stock prices reflectfuture expectations out of a company.
Comments on Column A
 
(2002-2003)
 At the end of financial year March 2003, Amara Raja Batteries did an EPS of Rs.7. The company wasexpected to experience a bad year in 2004 & promptly the price, which hit a high of Rs.102 in June2002, dropped by more than 50% to hit a low of Rs.47 in Mar 03. This seems within the realm of rationality. What happened after this in 2004 is the first instruction.
 
 
Hemant Sreeraman - 2 Hope…can’t substitute Reason
 
OBSERVATIONS – (IN)EFFICIENT (IN)EFFICIENCY
Monday, October 23, 2006Comments on Column B (2003-2004)
The company, which was widely expected to do badly, vindicated the doom sayers & turned in an EPSof Rs.1, a drop of nearly 86%. However, the 2004 price low of Rs.48 was higher than the previous yearlow of Rs.47! When the EPS dropped 86% year-on-year, one would have expected the low to be
lowerthan the previous years low
. One could safely say that Amara Raja's stock in April 2003 at Rs.48 wasoverpriced in relation to the Earnings that were expected out of the company.What is even more startling is the fact that the stock quickly turned around to hit a yearly high of Rs.105 in Dec 03. At this price, it was valued at a cool 105 times the Earnings that it would post foryear ended Mar 04! If Rs.47 was overpriced then what was Rs.105? Had expectations changed sodrastically within 6 months that warranted a price change of 119%?
Comments on Column C
 
(2004-2005)
 The markets seem to adhere to Newton's 1st Law of Motion- Inertia. When the results were expected tobe bad, the price moved up 119% & when the results were expected to be far better the next year,price dropped about 56%. This also illustrates the Rear-view mirror thinking that permeates themarkets. A succession of good or bad results coerces investors to form over optimistic or overpessimistic expectations out of a company. It's the latter that provides the most wonderfulopportunities for the long-term investor.However, after hitting the high of Rs.105 the markets realizing its stupidity promptly pummeled thestock to its 2004-2005 low of Rs.46. It’s worth observing that this low (year end EPS: Rs.8) was
lower 
 than the previous year low of Rs.48 (year end EPS: Rs.1). With the expectation of better numbers, onewould have expected this
year’s low to be higher than previous year’s low
but…This is where a long-term investor, who could form an objective & realistic opinion about Amara Raja's long-term prospectscould have made a killing. This is definitely easier said than done, however, forming an opinion about acompany's long-term prospects is like having a bird's eye view of a target. The target is forever movingbut a shooter knows exactly in which direction to fire. Admitted, he will not be able to hit bulls-eyewith every hit, but he only needs a couple of perfect hits to get his prey. Investing works similarly.The low of Rs.46 in May 04 coincided with temporary stupidity that gripped the overall market. Themarket conked & so did the stock of Amara Raja Batteries. At Rs.46, given its favorable long-termprospects, the stock was underpriced. Eventually the company did an EPS of Rs.8 in 2004-2005. For amoment lets assume that an investor was able to 'see', say an EPS of only Rs.4 for 2004-2005 . When thecompany hit a high of Rs.102 in 2002-2003 its EPS was Rs.7 for that year, giving it a P/E multiple of around 15 (102/7). If the investor had assigned the same multiple to his EPS estimate of Rs.4, he wasstaring at a price of Rs.60 (15 x 4) for the stock. From the low of Rs.46, this was a potential gain of 30%. Not a bad return, is it?The markets had gone from extreme optimism (Rs.105) to extreme pessimism (Rs.46) in 5 months,taking the stock from overpriced to underpriced territory respectively.At the end of 2004-2005, the company did an EPS of Rs.8 & the price promptly followed to hit a high of Rs.124. This was a fat gain of 169%. At this price the stock was priced at a P/E multiple of about 15,which could be considered reasonable, given its good prospects. (Sanity does prevail! & an observantinvestor had made good money.)
 
 
Hemant Sreeraman - 3 Hope…can’t substitute Reason
OBSERVATIONS – (IN)EFFICIENT (IN)EFFICIENCY
Monday, October 23, 2006Comments on Column D
 
(2005-2006)
 By this time, the company was in for exciting times ahead. It was chosen as the exclusive supplier toMaruti's new offering, the Swift & also to Hyundai Motors. Car sales were growing at a healthy pace &one could see Maruti Swift's everywhere. Why then should the price drop by 26% from the high of Rs.124 to the yearly low of Rs.92? The company had managed to grow its Trailing Twelve Months (TTM)EPS in every quarter over the past 4 quarters.This represented another fantastic opportunity for an investor. At Rs.92, it was valued at a little lessthan 12 times its 2004-2005 EPS of Rs.8. The prospects were far better than what the company hadseen in the past 4 years & inexplicably the markets were gifting the stock away at a throw away price.At this price the stock was underpriced & presented itself as an attractive investment opportunity.The company ended the year 2005-2006 with an EPS of Rs.21, which was a 163% jump over the lastyear’s EPS figure. I'm tempted to end this section with the last sentence but…Assume, once again, that an investor could 'see' an EPS of only Rs.10 for the full year (This was a good50%
less
than the actual figure). This translates to a price of Rs.150 at a P/E multiple of 15. From Rs.92there was a potential upside of 63%.Following the improved performance, the price promptly followed to hit a high of Rs.278, a gain of 202% from the yearly low! At this price, the stock was once again reasonably priced in relation to itsEarnings.
Some final comments (on post-March 2006 performance)
 
The company continued to do well & increased its TTM EPS for another quarter running. June sawanother bout of temporary stupidity gripping the market & this pummeled the stock to a low of Rs.148.This was a ridiculously low price given its vastly improved financial health & prospects. The extremefear presented a fantastic opportunity to again buy the company’s stock.Lets play out the scenario one last time. Assume, conservatively, that the company would be able toincrease its EPS by 20% in 2006-2007. This would result in an EPS of about Rs.25. Assigning, veryconservatively again, a P/E multiple of only 10, gives a price for the stock of Rs.250. From the low of Rs.148, this represented a potential gain of 69%. An optimistic scenario (P/E multiple of 15 on the sameEPS estimate of Rs.25) gives a price of Rs.375, a gain of 153%!As of this writing, the price is Rs.420. I leave you to calculate the gain...The above discussion presents some key aspects of market behavior. In the long run, a company’s stockprice is a slave of the Earnings. If the Earnings trend is up, that is the direction the stock price willhead. The mostly inexplicable short-term extremes highlight irrational human thinking. What defines a‘high’ & a ‘low’ price is an abstract question, the answer to which lies hidden within a load of information. However, even during these moments there are some rational guys who make a fortune byrelying on their conviction & observation.As we saw, the shorter the time frame, the more volatile is human thinking. This makes me also positthe validity of a belief of Quantum Mechanics - that says that the more restricted you make a set of electrons, the wilder they get in their vibration - in the stock markets. The violent price movements inshorter time frames, also brings to the fore the myopic nature of the markets. It’s akin to a bikerdriving with his sights fixed on the ground just 3 meters from the front wheel. At times he lauds

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