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Wake Up America Take Action to Reduce Government Waste

Wake Up America Take Action to Reduce Government Waste

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Published by Dianne Bishop

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Published by: Dianne Bishop on Sep 16, 2011
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04/26/2014

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accomplishedbyamereresolution-not"formallegislation"-thusavoidingthePresident'svetopower.This"resolution"mayrequireaone-housevetooraconcurrentresolutionwhichrequiresoothhouses(HouseandSenate)approval.Asyoucanreadilysee,thislistincludestopicsthataffectourlivesinonewayoranotheralmostonadailybasis.Itisthereforeessentialthatwelookintothismatteroflegislativevetomoreclosely.BillsrequiringCongressionalreviewandpermittingrejectionofallproposedFederalagencyrulesandregulations(andinsomecasesexistingrules)havebeenintroducedinincreasingnumbersduringthepastfewyears,butnosuchcomprehensivemeasurehasbeenpassed.Regulationsissuedbyafewfederalagencies,however,arenowsubjectbylawtosometypeofCongressionalapprovalordisapprovalprocedure.Historically,congressionalvetoprovisionshavetendedtolackuniformity.StatuteseithermayrequirethatExecutiveproposalsbeapprovedbyCongressbeforetheycanbeimplementedortheymayprovidethatanysuchproposalswouldbecomeeffectiveunlessdisapprovedbyCongress,usuallywithinaspecificperiodoftime.SomeauthorizeeithertheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,actingalone,torejectproposals.OthersrequirethatoothHousesmustgrantapprovalorpassadisapprovalmeasure.Anumberofstatutes,however,allowaffirmationorrejectionmerelybycommitteeactionineitheroneorinbothHousesofCongress.Likewise,thekindofmeasurewhichmustbeusedforcongressionalvetopurposesmaydiffer.Quiteoftenasimpleresolutionof
sressionalvetoallowsCongressto'eactionbypassingacom::urrentor
¥llHOUT
havingtosubmittheon!forhisconsideration.
eitherHouseissufficient.However,manylawsprovideinsteadthataconcurrentres0lutionofapprovalordisapprovalmustbeemployed.AfewcongressionalvetoactsinrecentyearshaverequiredthatoothHousesmustpassajointresolutionor,inafewinstances,abillmustbesenttothePresidentforapproval.Therefore,someexpertsbelievethatthisapproachisnota"truecongressionalvetomeasure".Congressstill,however,canmakeafinaldeterminationinatleasttwodifferentsituationsinwhicheitherajointresolutionorbiDmustbeused:First,ifthestatuterequiresadvanceapprovalbyCongress,eitheroneoroothHousesmayrejectaproposalsimplybynotpas.'iingsuchameasure;Second,ifthestatuteauthorizespriorCongressionaldisapprovalandifthePresidentshouldvetoajointresolutionorbillpassedbyCongresstorejectaproposal,bothHousescouldsubsequentlyoverridethePresident'sobjectionsbyatwo-thirdsvote.Becausethese"technical"proceduralfeatureshavebeenadoptedinvariouscombinationsduringthelasthalfcentury,atleast16differenttypescanbedistinguished.Inaddition,othershavebeenproposedbutnotenacted.Themostnumerouscongressionalvetotypesandnumbersoflegislativevetoesintroducedtodateinthe98thCongressare:1.Disapprovalbyasimpleresolutionpass-cdbyeithertheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives(60lawswith103provisions);2.DisapprovalbyaconcurrentresolutionpassedbyoothHouses(44Jawswith62provisions);3.ApprovalgivenbycommitteesinoothHouses(58lawswith86provisions);4.ApprovalbyconcurrentresolutionpassedbyoothHouses(19Jawswith36provisions).Nevertheless,atleast50ormoreprovisionsdonotfallwithinthesemajortypesandarescatteredamongotherlesscommonprocedures.Basicproceduresareoftenmodifiedinoneormoreofseveraldifferentways.Alimitmayormaynotbeimposedonthetimeduringwhichaproposalmustbeapprovedormayberejected.Thelengthoftheperiod,ifany,mayvaryfromafewdaystoseveralmonths.AnothermethodusedprovidesthateitheroneorbothHouses,oracommitteeorcommitteesofoothHouses,maybeauthorizedtowaiveorshortenthelengthofthedeferralperiodduringwhichaproposalotherwisecouldnotbecomeeffective.Inafewinstances,statuteshaveprovidedforaspecifickindorsizeofvotefortheacceptanceorrejectionofaproposal.Finally,inrecentyearsithasbecomequitecommontosetforthspecialrulesofproceduretoexpediteconsiderationbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativeswhenactinguponapprovalanddisapprovalresolutions.Totheextentoneormoreofthesevariationsareincorporatedinanybasiccongressionalvetotype,ittendstoonlycomplicateanddisorganizeanalreadycomplexanddiversesystem.
 
dent.Iheretennon
01
acongressIOnalvetolanvevetoISa"land
01
cop-out"becauseItlureU1egovernment.
SOmR
katkrs
ofCongressfeelthElegislativevetoisaninvaluablemRansofensuringeffectivenessofCongressionalpolicieswhilest1.11allowingthePresidentfkxibilityanddiscretion.
 
AccordingtoEizenstat"...itwasveryusefulbecauseitwouldhavegiventhePresidenttheauthorityheotherwisewouldnothave."EizenstatpointsoutthatinthosecasesinwhichaPresidentsendslegislationtoCongresswithaPresidentiaJveto,itrepresentsacourtesybetweenthetwobranchesofgovernment.ButinthosecasesinwhichavetoisimposedonthePresident,itisviewedasanunwarrantedlegislativeinterferencewiththeExecutivebranchofgovernment.ManyexpertsfeelthatthelegislativevetohasalsohelpedCongressto"paperover"divisionsinitsownranks.Insteadofdraftingspecific,unambiguouslegislationthatcouldnothavebeenapprovedbyCongress,thelawmakersoftendelegatedbroadauthoritytoregulatoryagencieswiththeprovisionthatit(Congress)couldvetotheresultingregulations.Forexample,CongressgavetheFederalTradeCommission(FTC)broadauthoritytoregulateintheareaofconsumerprotection.However,thelawmakersthenturnedaroundandvetoedregu1ationsdeaJingwiththesaleofusedcars.RegulationsconcerningfuneralsandtelevisioncommercialsforchildrenbarelysurvivedCongressionalscrutinyandpossiblevetoaction.
TheSupremeCourtRules
OnJune23,1983,theSupremeCourtissuedanopinionintheImmigrationandNatl.lTalizationService(INS)versusChadacase.TheCourtdeclaredone-andtwo-Houselegislativevetoesunconstitutionalbecausetheyviolatedthe"presentment"clauseoftheConstitution(ArticleI,Section7)andtheseparationofpowersdoctrine.LeftuncertainwastheConstitutionalityofalegislativevetoincorporatedinajointresolutionofapprovaJordisapproval.AjointresolutionwouldbesenttothePresidentforhissignature.TheimmigrationlegislationthatfiguredintheSupremeCourtdecisionprovidesagoodexampleofwhyCongresschosetodelegateauthoritytotheExecutiveBranch,subjecttoacongressionaJveto.Priortothelegislation,CongresswasfloodedwithprivateimmigrationbillsadmittingspecificpeopletotheUnitedStates,withfrequentsuggestionsthatsomemembersofCongresswerereceivingpaymentsforsponsoringtheprivateimmigrationbills.Underthenewlaws,CongressdelegatedauthoritytotheAnorneyGeneral(ExecutiveBranch)topermitaJienstoremainintheUnitedStates,subjecttoavetobyeithertheHouseortheSenate.
TheCourt'sImpact
CongressionalsupportersandopponentsofthelegislativevetoagreethattheSupremeCourt'sdecisionwillcreateconflictonCapitolHillandsignifiamtlyaJterthewayCongressconductsitsbusiness.Expertspredictthat,inplaceofthelegislativeveto,CongresswillpasstighterrestrictionsonPresidentialauthorityandrelymoreheavilyonthepoweroftheappropriationsandoverseeingauthorityCongresscanmuster.AccordingtoSenatorCaJLevin,Demo-
-
eratofMichigan,"...theCourt'sdecisionisgoingtocreatealotofconflictandchaos....We(Congress)areeithergoingtotiethePresident'shandstoomuch,andrequirethePresidenttocometoCongressforeverything,orwe'regoingtogivethePresident
100
muchpower.We'velosttheuseofaveryflexiblemechanism."SenatorCharlesE.Grassley,RepublicanofIowa,ChairmanoftheSenateJudiciaryCommittee'sAdministrativePracticeandProcedureSubcommitteefeelsthat"...thePresidentistheloserintheCourt'sruling.Itprobablymeansthatthere'sgoingtobeaverynarrowwritingoflegislationinthefuture."Similarly,RepresentativeAndyIreland,DemocratofFlorida,hascalledfor"...renewedinitiativeonthepartofCongresstocontrolregulatoryabuses."Irelandfeelsthat"theFederalbureaucracyisstilloutofcontrol.Congresscreatedit,andit'suptous(Congress)tocontrolit,oreliminatepartsofit,ifnecessary."RepresentativeElliotH.Levitas,DemocratofGeorgia,thechiefCongressionalchampionofthelegisIativevetopointsoutthat"theCourt'sdecisionisgoingtocripplethethingsthatthisPresidentoranyPresidentwillbeabletodo.CongresswillhavenochoicebuttoseverelycircumscribeanydelegationofauthoritytothePresident."Althoughintheminority,therearethoseexpertswhofeeltheCourt'sdecision"...willalmostcertainlygiveMr.ReaganandallsucceedingPresidentsmorepowerincertainkeyareas."Theynotedthat,"aJthoughtheCongresswillstil1beabletostymieaPresidentwithlegislation,aPresidentmayhimselfvetosuchlegisIation."APresidentiaJvetomaybeoverriddenonlybyatwo-thirdsvoteofboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.UoydCutler,aWhiteHousecounselto
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